(SANITIZED) RESTRICTED ACCESS PROCESSOR

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85B01152R000200160007-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 18, 2007
Sequence Number: 
7
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 8, 1983
Content Type: 
FORM
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AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP85B01152R000200160007-4.pdf316.88 KB
Body: 
ROUTING AND RECORD SHUT SUBJECT: (opierml) DD/A Regist Restricted Access Processo - FROM: Dni3ISION NO. Ref: DDA 83-1433 erector ot Security DAU 8 JUN 1983 4E-60 Headquarters TO: (ORinr designation, room numb.,, and DATE when (Number each comment to show from COMWWS building) O"ICER'S ho . I vED IbRWAED? INI11ALS Iowa n Draw a lino aaesc column afra each comnwnf.) Rte EO/DDA UN e al 7D-24 Headquarters Attached is a brief answer 2. DDA's recent question ADDA y;U about 7D-24 Headquarters Restricted Access Processor. 3. 0 DDA JU 1 1983 4 7D-24 Headquarters 1 Jd 93 Att 5. 6. /O-/o 7. B. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. OS 3 1470/A FOR 1-79M 610 eom a s I- 25X1 STAT STAT STAT STAT FRtrry E. Fitzwater Deputy Director for Admtmstration ,~:. , hom ~.bom r' .o ~n1.1 COMMENTS (N~mbor oath commod to rnn oNo mn d a rrlwm. Dra.+ a Imo moors c % to aware of the work;Mitte is. dc the 11Restr1cted Access ~p(;eSSOT ~. "yew, Y +n FORM 610"" Dmw+sor _.. '. Local-Area Networks' Automated office equipment for :.)rd processing, data processing, :nape distribution, graphics proc- 'sing. and voice exchange is coming commonplace. Local-area >tworks can tie these functions ;,),ether, providing data, voice, and video communications within and aetween buildings up to several miles apart. We are working on sev- e ral local-area networks that can serve specific communications needs and support new automated oft"ice systems. Broadband local-area networks are preferred because of their versa :ility and capacity for expanded ser- are developing and testing vice- pilot and interim networks at Hanscom and Andrews Air Force Bases. Our work has also involved design and implementation of data :ommunications gateways between -.here pilot networks and other networks, such as military and commercial telephone systems. Although most of our work in :he networking area is for the Air Force. at MITRE we have one of the .argest operating local-area net- orks in existence-MITRENET. And we are designing two more: one for the Air Staff in the Pentagon, :he other for the Canadian House of Commons in Ottawa. National Aeronautics and Space Administration In this time of reduced funding for space programs, NASA needs better, . ri comer, data-handling systems for ie 1990s. The systems must be flex- -,le enough, and expandable -nough. to cope with NASNs work- ad. while minimizing life-cycle' :OSts. This view of the Tigris-Euphrates valley and the Persian Gulf region was seen from the Space Shuttle orbiter Columbia during its third mission in March 1982. MITRE has supported the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in this program since its beginning, mainly in hardware acquisition, software development, and training for the network control centers. NASA's data network will be significantly changed by 1985. The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) will have replaced most ground tracking stations. We are helping NASA develop long- term control facilities for the new TDRSS network by planning a net- work control center for operation in the mid- to late 1980s. Satellite communications and tracking resources must also be made more secure in order to accommodate DOD missions in space. DOD and NASA are coordi- nating a security upgrade program including ground and spaceborne elements and involving mission planning, scheduling, and control systems. At Goddard Space Flight Center in particular, we are re- sponsible for specifying security improvements. A key contribution is development of the Restricted Access Processor, a computer used to isolate uncleared civilian users from classified information; the con- cept is largely based on corn uter secure y ec no ogy eveloped by With completion of the Shuttle Orbiter test program, NASA, and later DOD, will begin flying opera- tional shuttle missions. Both NASA and DOD missions will be controlled initially by NASA facilities at the Johnson Space Center-with DOD missions under security controls. For the future, however, DOD plans a facility in Colorado Springs. There, the Air Force will plan and control space missions, develop Shuttle software, and train astro- nauts and flight controllers. Air Force and NASA systems will have sufficient commonality to permit