A REVIEW OF FEDERAL PROTECTIVE OFFICER PERFORMANCE AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE GSA GUARD FORCE AT CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B01152R000100080005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 2, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional) A Review of Federal Protective Officer Performance and
Possible Alternatives to the GSA Guard Force at CIA
FROM:
Chief, HSB
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
C/PSD
DD/PTAS
D/OS
0 2 NOV 1983
OFFICER'S I COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Attached is a rewrite of the
HSB study on eliminating the
FPO's. Paragraph l.g. and
related attachments have been
changed to reflect an exact
SLUC charge for certain FPO
positions. Although this
exact charge is slightly less
the study is essentially un-
changed. The exact SLUC
charges, however, may be im-
p ussions
with GSA and OMB.
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FORM 61 0 USE PREVIOUS
I-79 EDITIONS
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
VIA: Deputy Director of Security, PTAS
Chief, Physical Security Division
Chief, Headquarters Security Branch
SUBJECT: A Review of Federal Protective Officer
Performance and Possible Alternatives
to the GSA Guard Force at CIA
1. During the last several months, the Headquarters
Security Branch (HSB) has been reviewing activities of the
Federal Protective Officers (FPOs) assigned to CIA facili-
ties in the metropolitan area, and consulting with security
representatives from other government agencies and private
industry about possible alternatives to using a General
Services Administration (GSA) guard force. Results indicate
the following:
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LJ/\ I
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function of the guard force at CIA is access control.
The guard force must also understand exceptions to the
rule, special requirements, and the traditional Office
of Security (OS) helping hand philosophy. Presently,
the FPS guard force concentrates with a vengeance on
enforcing traffic rules. They look down on guard
duties, and have little identification with the CIA
mission or OS philosophy.
b. FPS leaders are disillusioned about their
ability to improve service. Because of unrealistic
personnel requirements levied by GSA and the Office
of Personnel Management (OPM), FPS is forced to process
candidates whom they know to be unacceptable. FPS
employs about 600 personnel elsewhere in the metro-
politan area but few can be assigned to CIA because of
previous security disapprovals from various other
government agencies. Any candidate who is security
disapproved by CIA must be placed elsewhere in FPS.
The local FPS regional director has infor-
mally and confidentially counseled OS to seriously
look for an alternative to the GSA guard force. This
same official believes that a real threat exists that
the Reagan administration will discontinue FPS in
favor of private industry doing the same work. Con-
currently, FPS is making a strong internal move toward
strict law enforcement service while eliminating sup-
port for guard duties.
c. Inefficient GSA staffing methods are not
likely to improve. Historically, GSA has normally
experienced about a 30% vacancy rate at most facili-
ties served by FPS. This is presently true at CIA,
NSA, State and DoD. In the last 12 months at CIA
GSA has made absolutely no pro,~zress in reducing
vacancies despite the
that OS has mace a consi era e ettort to expedite
security processing. Although 29 candidates were
approved, 29 other FPOs on duty at CIA facilities
departed, resulting in no net increase. Of the 190
candidates processed, 85% were either cancelled dur-
ing processing or security disapproved. The constant
strain of vacancies has caused excessive overtime,
undermined morale, and affected physical fitness.
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d. CIA staff employees are the only alternative
to FPS. Even if a non-CIA guard orce could identify
more closely with the needs of CIA, the vital factor
of direct control would not be present. Conversations
with other security representatives found no favorable
impressions of commercial guard forces by NSA, State,
or DoD. State, in fact, is returning to an exclusive
FPS guard force as a better alternative than private
industry. FPS, who administers numerous GSA commer-
cial guard contracts, is frustrated by a lack of control
and strongly recommends a CIA guard force vis-a-vis
private industry. The greatest fear from a private
industry contract is the consequence of recontracting
should a contractor's services become unacceptable.
This likely possibility alone makes such an alter-
native unacceptable.
If CIA seeks an alternative to GSA, the
quality of a guard force composed of CIA staff em-
ployees can be as superior as the quality of their
managers, because t supervision. Staff guard
forces at have been highly successful.
At these locations vacancies are always at a minimum,
performance is high, and control is direct.
e. CIA staffing must be realistic. CIA separa-
tion from t e GSA guard force would be -Tike trying to
dig a hole without falling in. The critical issue to
a successful CIA guard force is realistic staffing con-
cepts. The contrasting experience in the CIA recruiting
guards at the GS-5/GS-6 level and GSA recruiting
guards for Headquarters at the GS-4/GS-5 level clearly
demonstrates that a GS-5 "entry" level and GS-6 "ex-
perienced" level must be established to successfully
draw manpower the metropolitan labor market. The
only time has ever experienced vacancies was
after Position Management and Compensation Division
(PMCD) dropped the"entry" level back to GS-4
and "experienced" level back to GS-5, which is exactly
the GSA standard for Headquarters guard positions. A
successful appeal and re-establishment of the original
levels eliminated the vacancy problem at Other
appealing features to CIA guard force applicants would
be a CIA career, upward mobility, and transfer possi-
bilities after basic commitments. Attachment I outlines
the necessary grade levels for a successful CIA guard
force.
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Full-time staff positions are necessary to
reduce turnover and retain long term employees in what
has historically been an unattractive career field. One
year contract employees convertible to staff are recom-
mended to purge marginal performers. If these realistic
concepts cannot be accepted, CIA should not assume guard
force responsibilities. The probability of failure, for
the same reasons GSA has experienced, is simply too great.
f. Replacement of the GSA guard force should
occur in three phases. (See Attachment II.)
(1) Phase I - First Year: Takeover of all
easily assumed posts o least di iculty. In most
cases this would involve situations where posts
would be shared with another, more experienced FPO
or one of the Security Assistants now employed by
OS, or in a position where a situation requiring
arrest power is least likely. No Standard Level
User Charge (SLUC) positions would be eliminated.
Requirements for ve reduc-
tion of FPS by positions.
Weapons and arrest power would not be assumed during
this phase. Backup emergency response would con-
tinue through FPS and Fairfax County Police.
(2) Phase II - Second Year: Takeover of
most internal posts, including outlying bull ings.
This would leave at least one armed FPO at each
outlying building, all vehicle patrols and all
exterior gates. Weapons responsibility and arrest
authority would still not be assumed. Some SLUC
positions could be assumed during this phase.
FPS requirements would be reduced by another
positions. Backup emer-
would continue through FPS and
Fairfax County Police.
(3) Phase III - Third Year: Assumption of
law enforcement res onsibilities, weapons respon-
sibilities arrest aut orit , and tra is tic-et
u sume the remaining FPS
positions during this
pnase. Backup emergency response would continue
through Fairfax County Police.
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g. Uniform Concepts - The blazer concept at CIA
has been very successful in positions where weapons are
not required. It should be continued. Since most guard
forces draw from a high turnover labor force, complicated
uniform concepts become wasteful and time consuming.
However, Phase III integration, where weapons responsi-
bility is assumed, would require military/police type
uniforms by about 1/3 of the guards to allow exposure
of weapons when worn. The cost of two blazers is esti-
mated at $300 per position while the full uniform,
similar to that at would cost about $600 per
position.
h. Additional Equipment - Should CIA assume guard
duties, additional equipment costs of $200,000 or less
should be expected. (See Attachment III.)
i. Space Requirements - OS would require no addi-
tional space or managing a CIA guard force. Headquarters
space now occupied by FPS would be assumed as integration
during Phases I, II and III occurs. Cost for this space
is paid by the Office of Logistics under SLUC and would
not be passed on to OS.
j. Comparative Costs of a CIA Guard Force versus
a GSA Guar Force.
(1) Federal Protection Charges. Presently,
the FPS is funded by GSA though SLUC by adding
additional charge for federal protectinn to of
an
her
charges for space. This Agency paid
in 25X1
feprotection charges in FY83 and will pay
in FY84 for the same services due to a 25X1
scheduled rate increase (See Attachments IV D and
E). In theory, for this charge GSA makes a variety
of protection services available to government
agencies, including guard protection, a tactical
response force and security surveys. The standard
federal protection charge applies whether or not
customers need or use the services offered.
In FY85, GSA will drop the SLUC concept
in favor of the Fair Annual Increment Rate (FAIR).
Under this concept, FPS will be separately funded
by GSA. GSA will supposedly continue providing
the same level of protection services, but GSA
will absorb the cost and agencies will not be
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billed for federal protection services. GSA
officials tentatively believe this standard
policy will apply to the Agency even though
manhours are involved.
(2) Comparative Overall One Year Personnel
Costs at FY83 Rates. Attachment V reflects a
comparison between actual FY83 total FPO Per-
sonnel Costs (See Attachment IV A-C) and the
total cost of performing the same function with
CIA staff employees as recommended in this study.
The comparison reflects a 17.45% saving by use of
CIA staff employees. The same comparison was
essentially unchanged when FY84 rates with a 10%
inflation factor were used. In fact over a 10%
saving is realized even if the SLUC federal pro-
tection charges are not included, as it might not
be after FY84.
(3) Comparative First Year Personnel Cost
at FY83 Rates. Attachment VI reflects a compari-
son between first year Phase I integration costs
[see para l.f.(l) above and Attachment II] and
standard FPO costs. The comparison shows a first
year savings of 11.98% when CIA staff employees
are used to replace GSA guards. It is important
to note that no SLUC positions would be affected
during Phase I integration.
2. Recommendation. It is obvious that CIA needs to
regain controls of gum force responsibilities. This study
clearly demonstrates that such can easily be done by use of
CIA staff employees and a saving realized in the process.
It is the recommendation of the Headquarters Security Branch
that OS proceed immediately with a recommendation to the
Director of Central Intelligence to assume guard responsi-
bilities for CIA within the metropolitan Washington, D.C.
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