CUBAN CRISIS COMMENTS ON LEHMAN PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00803R000200090010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 7, 1962
• Content Type: BRIEF

1 :1
DDR Chron-2 NRO review(s) completed.
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TS-185134 7 Nov 1962
DDR to DCI Subj: Comments on Lehman Paper
Generally believes subj paper excellent presentation of facts insofar as
he knows them. ...a few corrections:
a. P. 12 para 23,This sentence im lie that there was some external directive
that the fits shld be carried out Neither I nor Col Ledford know 25X1
of any such directive. In fact, all missions which the Agency ran over Cuba
either before or after Sept 5 were designed to have maximum altitude over target
with the only compensating factor being the rgmt for sufficient fuel after coast-out
to reach the refueling point or alternate landing field.
b. Page 26, para 49. Criteria for launch as Cat II (2/8 cloud cover) or better ove:
critical target areas. In some cases fits were authorized with Category III over
appreciable parts of the flt.
c. Page 28, para 53. Documentation on the presentations made to the SG can
probably be pulldd together--actual recommendations were NRO recommendations
as opposdd to unilateral CIA recommendations. However, these were concurred in
by CIA. Primary objective was to cover suspect MRBM site on western end of Cuba and
at same time pass over one of the SAM sites which was considered most nearly
'op eratiol AoproQed' Re4tfa 005O051t :tCI DP 4B 3 0 ' -3determine
opnl status in order to assess risk to further U-91 msns required to get complete
coverage of Cuba asap. MRBM site at San Cristobal was not a secondary objective.
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It was considered at least if not more important than the SAM coverage.
I do not believe it was true that the mission would not have flown over
San Cristobal if the most likely candidate for an opnl SAM site had not been
in Western Cuba. In fact, the coverage of the SAM site was only desired to see
if one could fly with impunity over western Cuba.
d. Page 28, para 54+. I would suggest deletion of the words "by the Pres."
in the 3rd line since I believe this was a unilateral DOD decision rather
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 Approved For Rel
25X1 DD/R - CUBAN Crisis
(Soviet military in Cuba)
~- a ew-e-Yee-e~~~e~-~egeaeas-w
Chron-2 25X1
00803R000200090010-3
Staff Meeting Minutes 13 Nov 62
eported that Cuban air defense traffic indicates that their air
defense system is still being run by the Russians. It was observed that we must
anticipate and be prepared for the fact that some day they are going to shoot.
It was urged that maximum alertness on the part of everyone be maintained in order
to get any possible clue of impending plans to take action against our aircraft."
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 (DDR SMM) 25X1
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DD/R - Cuban Missile Crisis
SMM 13 Nov 1962
25X1
DD/R announced to staff that an inquiry would be made into the intelligence
coverage and reporting of the missile build-up in Cuba and said that a post mortem
from the standpoint of how more timely and precise intelligence might have been
achieved would be a good idea. His fear was that there might be some buckpassing
and he wanted OSA to review carefully all factors leading up to the 14 October
date, (when missiles were actually discovered) taking into account all requirements,
COMOR actions, Special Group actions, weather factors, etc.
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 By 14AWJ99 FeV fWaMe2~kq'Tr 6anCbi- I .O( W9OOac4R090010d3COMOR
members with regard to long range planning for aerial reconnaissance
of Cuba saying that evidence of deactivation of the IRBM and MRBM sites
coupled with observation of missiles and missile associated equipment
either on the docks or aboard ships made daily coverage of the deactivated
sites no longer necessary. Coverage of ports should be continued and
coverage of ports when ships capable of carrying
missiles are in port. Suspect caves to be covered once each
and low level night photography, and the entire island covered once a
week by BRASS KNOB photography.
25X1
Ch/JCS (Gen Taylor) notified DCI on 4 Nov 62 that nothing should be done
to the U-Z's in the way of installing ECM equipment until Gen Powers, CINSAC
completes a study on implications of installing this equpmt in these a/c.
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