NOTE TO (Sanitized) FROM DR. STEININGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00803R000100140005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 20, 1970
• Content Type: NOTES

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YAI,r,v
C'1 ~ 17' tr
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DDS&T until Dr. Hornig left office at the ti*--ttat the
administration changed and President Nixon came into
,;L iyw $ - 6 a
office. During Dr. DuBridge's tenure ? am # a ti.m - un1 i3
An initial meeting did take place between Dr. Wheelon
and Dr. Hornig in October 19464 as a kickoff for what was
intended to be regular meetings between the two to discuss
progress and problems of the technical side of the
intelligence community. Regular meetings d- i-& continue ,;,4,
about once every month or two between Dr. Hornig and the
year and a halfl/1- rer no regular meetings were held i -
between',and the DDS&T1 although there were occasional
briefings and discussions as situations arose that
required them. Since Dr. David became Science Advisor the
DDS&T has met with him on an average of once a month for
the purpose of bringing him up to date on new developments
on substantive intelligence. Either the DDS&T or the ADDS&T
participate in those meetings. Over the years the general
relationship between DDS&T and the Science Advisor have been
very good and there has been an excellent rapport in
discussions ranging from technical aspects of collection
system development to interpretatiorr3 of substantive intelligence.
From Dr. Steininger
NRO review(s) completed.
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c. Air Support: Increased employment, travel, transporta-
tion, aircraft maintenance, and procurement of aircraft, and
moderni,zation of facilities.
The only forecast reduction was in construction for special projects
which was expected to taper off.
Midway into. FY 1963 an activity program was approved for
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setting up an Electronic Data Processing Branch in OSA Operations Divi-
sion with the mission of providing planning data for OXCART and
IDEALIST missions, ephemeris plotting for satellite projects and such
other future programs as might be developed.
Also midway through FY 1963, the National Reconnaissance Office*
having come into being, the budgetary procedures for the CIA portion
of the National Reconnaissance Program were finally ironed out and an
agreement signed in April 1963. The Director of Program B (covering
those CIA projects falling under the control of the Director, National
Reconnaissance Office (D/NRO))was to prepare a definitized program
* See section on NRO at the end of this chapter.
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document including estimate of funds required.
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NRO
Monthly reports were to be furnished D/NRO on the fiscal status of
each project. This system was to be effective with the FY 1964 appro-
priations. FY 1963 funds appropriated to CIA for programs falling
under NRO control were to be obligated in accord with specific instruc-
tions issued by DNRO. There was no flexibility available to the Director,
Program B, in the use of funds between specific projects or tasks.
Any adjustments required specific approval of the DNRO.
Following the setting up of budgetary procedures for CIA's NRP
participation, long-range funding requirements for 1964 through 1968
were requested for presentation by the Director of Program B (the
DD/R). The IDEALIST program was expected to operate throughout
the five year period engaging in approximately 60 missions per year
with nine aircraft assigned: two at Detachment H, four at Detachment G
r
at Edwards supplying a dual staging capability, and three remaining
U-2's stationed at Lockheed for systems testing, replacement for
rotational maintenance and a backup for operations.
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OXCART was expected to reach operational peak in FY 1965
and continue with an average of 60 dperational missions per year
(an overoptimistic estimate). Modification and development would
continue on airframe and engine as well as tubsystems. Two perma-
nent staging bases and five pre-strike and post-strike bases were
planned. The TAGBOARD drone and related systems were expected
to be developed by FY 1965 and put into operation the latter part of
the period with a squadron of launchers to be organized by FY 1966.
(As it developed, the D/NRO transferred the TAGBOARD program to
the Air Force in 1963- see Annex 28 for chronology of that program.)
An advanced manned reconnaissance vehicle would be studied
in FY 1965 and a prototype produced in FY 1966, with ten vehicles to
be produced in FY 1967. (Research on this project-ISINGLASS-was
phased over to the Air Force by mutual agreement between the
DD/S&T/CIA and the D/NRO in April 1967. Since there was no estab-
lished Air Force requirement for a vehicle of this kind, according to
the D/NRO, the further development in this field has been a unilateral
effort by the original contractors with no governmental financing. )
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T O P S E C R E T
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Dissatisfaction with having to operate under the fiscal restrictions
imposed by the DNRO led OSA officials to consider the pro's and con's
of CIA's voluntarily withdrawing from the entire National Reconnaissance
Program and transferring its programs to the Air Force. On 7 October
1963, Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, appointed as the first Deputy Director
for Science and Technology in August 1963, outlined the considerations
of such action to the DCI among which were the saving of
personnel slots and of
FY 1965. He concluded, however, that:
in the CIA budget for
"... OSA represents a unique national asset: an
experienced, integrated organization with a demonstrated
capability for developing and operating reconnaissance
systems which produce intelligence data upon which this
country has come to rely. Until that record is matched, I
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submit that we can find better opportunities to save
ositions somewhere else in the
Federal Government. " 1 /
Fiscal Year 1965
The original submission to NRO for the FY 1965 budget for
the IDEALIST program was for
for procurement of new U-2 aircraft. The cost of this new air-
craft procurement, plus
oaf the total electronics program
were disallowed by NRO.
The concept of operations for IDEALIST remained approximately
the same as for the previous two years with five out of the nine avail-
able U-21s configured for inflight refueling and two for aircraft carrier
operations. The mission remained the same with requirements fur-
nished by the intelligence community through USIB and COMOR, and
with approvals for overflight operations being sought through the DNR.O
from the Special Group. Sortie estimate for FY 1965 was for a total
of 152 sorties of approximately 1342 total hours duration; plus 321
test and training missions of 963 total hours duration.
Total funds obligated by the Director of Program B at the close
of FY 1965 were:
1/
7 October 1963 (see Annex 29).
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The Auditor's Report on OSA operations for the FY 1965 period
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1 10f which represented OSA procurement for other programs
under NRO jurisdiction. The OSA staffing complement during this
period consisted of
staff employees and
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personnel divided among the Headquarters office,
with physical support also
being provided to
contractor techreps at various locations.
During this period the Office of Special Projects (OSP), which had
responsibility for the Agency's satellite activities, was separated from
the Office of Special Activities, DD/S&T, effective 15 September 1965.
OSP continued to rely on OSA for financial and security administration
of its contracts and its telegraphic communications support.
a
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Fiscal Year 1966
The outlook for the IDEALIST program for FY 1966 assumed the
life expectancy of the U-2 would carry through at least two more years.
Beyond 1966 the picture became less clear as to the identification of
specific targets for the U-2 system. The useful life was expected to
become more limited as the introduction of enemy defensive measures
increased, and the areas for safe operations` diminished. (See Annex 30
for estimate by the Director of Program B.
A significant increase in the OXCART budget for FY 1966 repre-
sented the funding of an expected staging/operating base at Kadena for
the purpose of China Mainland reconnaissance, while a.
increase for IDEALIST represented principally improved Elint, counter-
measures and camera systems. The NRO budget for Program B for
FY 1966 covering all OSA and OSP projects and OSA procurement for
the Air Force,
OSA's obligations at the
end of FY 1966 were:
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Fiscal Year 1967
Program B's NRO budget for FY 1967, including OSA and OSP
projects, and Air Force projects funded through OSA, amounted to
5Xlq a total of
Obligations for OSA projects alone were as
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NRO Establishment: Principal Events to December 1966
Background
When consideration was being given late in 1955 to the continuation
of the U-2 project as currently set up,
Mr. Bissell
in a memorandum to the DCI made the following suggestion with regard
to the long-term management of all U. S. reconnaissance programs:
"The present dispersion of responsibility, whereby
activities of the sort here under discussion are being carried
on by USAFE, FEAF, SAC, and ourselves, is uneconomic and
involves considerable risk of duplication of effort and of inade-
quacy of central control. It would probably be desirable in the
long run to create a single operating organization, controlled
directly from Washington, which would carry out all overflight
activities involving penetrations of more than a few miles in
depth in peacetime. This organization could draw heavily on
existing commands (and on the CIA) for support.
"The argument against the conduct of overflights by
strictly military organizations with air crews that are members
of the Armed Services of the United States is even more power-
ful today than it was a year ago. Though the second Geneva
Conference has demonstrated that the Russians are nearly as
unyielding as ever, enough of the spirit of the first Geneva Con-
ference is still adrift so that anything that could be identified
as an overt act of military aggression would call down serious
political penalties upon this country. Accordingly, if there is
to be a single organization responsible for overflights, its air-
crews should be civilians; it should be organized to as great an
extent as feasible with civilian personnel; and its activities
should be regarded as clandestine intelligence gathering opera-
tions.
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"The foregoing considerations lead me to the conclusion
that the single organization here proposed should be a mixed
task force, organized outside of the framework of any of the
regular military services though drawing extensive support
from them. On the other hand, I am inclined to believe that
the Air Force should own a majority of the common stock-in
this organization, by contrast with the present situation in
which the CIA owns the majority of the common stock in
AQUATONE. In any event, however, I believe that both CIA
and the Air Force should contribute personnel and support and
consideration might even be given to bringing the other serv-
ices in as minority stockholders.
"One further argument in favor of some such arrangement
as that here proposed is that an organization with a permanent
interest in this activity would be in a position to stimulate con-
tinuing research and development. It is worth noting that with
two early and unimportant exceptions the aircraft under pro-
duction for AQUATONE are the first ever designed exclusively
for a reconnaissance mission and, of course, are the only ones
that have ever been designed to meet the requirements of alti-
tude, range and security imposed by the contemplated mission.
"The views advanced in the preceding paragraphs have to
do with the ultimate organization (and by inference financing)
of overflight activities. . . " l/
In light of the above arguments, Mr. Bissell proposed that the DCI
examine, together with Messrs. Quarles and Gardner of the Depart-
ment of the Air Force, the organization for overflight reconnaissance
and endeavor to arrive at a rational and orderly pattern for the
longer run no later than Fiscal Year 1957.
if TS-142628, 11 November 1955, Memo for DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.
(See Annex 31).
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NRO Agreement
Six years passed before the organization proposed by Mr. Bissell
received active consideration by the Defense Department and CIA.
On 6 September 1961 a letter of agreement was signed by Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric and the Acting Director of
Central Intelligence (Gen. Cabell) with respect to the setting up of a
"National Reconnaissance Program". The agreement was that a
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was to be established on a
covert basis to manage this program and that it was to be under the
direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force (then Dr. Joseph V.
Charyk), and the Deputy Director for Plans of the CIA (Mr. Bissell),
acting jointly and supported by a small special staff drawn from Defense
and CIA personnel. The NRO would have direct control over all ele-
ments of the total program. (See Annex 32 for letter of agreement. )
Within the framework of this agreement, drafting sessions began,
looking toward an agreed division of responsibilities between Agency
and Air Force. On 22 November 1961, an eleven-page working draft
of "NRO Functions and Responsibilities" was presented by the Air
Force side and a meeting was requested between Mr. Bissell and
Dr. Charyk to consider the draft. This paper went into great detail
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on all aspects of the total reconnaissance program, even to establishing
responsibilities for the formatting of the collected product.
The DD/P countered with a two-page "Division of Responsibilities
Within NRO" drafted by Mr. Eugene Kiefer in collaboration with a
DPD working group of Messrs. Cunningham and Parangosky, and
Colonel Beerli. This paper (see Annex 33 for text) recommended the
continuation under NRO direction of the current workable and well
understood allocation of responsibilities between the Air Force and
CIA based on existing agreements, with consideration being given to
redefinition of responsibilities for developing programs in order to
make the best use of both agencies' capabilities. The DD/P sent
copies of this statement, with Dr. Charyk's agreement, to the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, as requested by
General Maxwell Taylor, then Special Assistant to President Kennedy.
Meanwhile at the end of November 1961, Mr. Allen Dulles had
retired as Director of Central Intelligence and Mr. John A. Mc Cone
had succeeded him. Also the imminent departure of Mr. Bissell from
the CIA was forecast, becoming effective 17 February 1962, and a
period of change and reorganization intervened before the conclusion
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of an NRO agreement. Following the departure of Mr. Bissell, the
Agency's reconnaissance projects were separated from the DD/P's
management control and placed under the aegis of the newly assigned
Deputy Director for Research (DD/R), Dr. Herbert Scoville.
Dr. Scoville, at a meeting with Mr. Mc Cone on 19 March 1962
to discuss NRO planning, was told that the DCI did not favor a dual
chairmanship for NRO but believed a single chairman with the other
agency's senior representative as deputy should be the management
set-up. The language of the agreement should not mention individuals
by name, but Mr. McCone was willing to concede Dr. Charyk the
Directorship with Dr. Scoville as Deputy Director. Within this gen-
eral set-up, the DCI insisted that projects be assigned specifically
to each agency, e. g. OXCART to CIA and SAMOS to USAF, V fie also',
wished to have language written into the agreement whereby advance
planning would be done jointly by the DNRO and the. DD/:JI110, -L ;ao l.y
it was the DCI's wish that CIA control,
all security clearances for all programs within the purview of the NRO.
The DD/R on 20 March 1962 sent to the DCI a new draft agreement
based on the letter agreement of 6 September 1961, and including the
desired changes of the DCI. D:r. Scoville noted to the DCI:
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"I have discussed this with Dr. Charyk who generally
concurs and believes that it is a good working document on
which to develop the specific plans for the National Reconnais-
sance Office. I made it clear to him that, although the docu-
ment does not specify that he will be the Director, this is our
intention. He concurred in the philosophy that both the Director
and the Deputy Director should be involved in the advance plan-
ning and that one Agency or the other should be given primary
responsibility for all approved projects... " 1/
The agreement of 2 May 1962 (see Annex 34) signed by the DCI
and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Roswell Gilpatric), which was
Dr. Scoville's draft as rewritten in the Pentagon, said that the DNRO
would be designated by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence and would be responsible directly to them for the
management and conduct of the NRP. However, no mention was made
in the agreement of a Deputy Director. CIA would be the Executive
Agent for DNRO for those covert projects already under its manage-
ment and such additional covert projects as might be assigned to it.
On 3 May 1962, the DCI confirmed to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
his agreement that Dr. Charyk be named DNRO. On 14 June 1962,
the Secretary of Defense issued the Department of Defense internal
directive regarding NRO and announced the designation of Dr. Charyk
as DNRO in addition to his other duties as Under Secretary.
I/ TS-155848, 20 March 1962, Memo for DCI from DD/R.
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q
Prior to scheduled meetings between Drs. Charyk and Scoville
on 22 and 23 May 1962 to iron out some of the working arrangements
on NRO, Mr. James Cunningham noted to the DD/R that, assuming
the greatest concession to date was yielding the position of DNRO to
Dr. Charyk and thus to the Air Force, the Agency should seriously
consider seeking the Chief of Staff position in NRO lest the CIA contri-
bution be so fully subordinated to Air Force interests that the only
influence it could exert would be through the DD/R's personal rela-
tionship with the DNRO in the Person of Dr. Charyk. Mr. Cunningham
was not insistent that the slot be filled by an Agency staff civilian,
although this was certainly reasonable, but he felt strongly that if
the individual assigned belonged to the military he should certainly
be on the Agency payroll, seconded to NRO, and responsive to CIA
policy views.
During the 22-23 May meetings Dr. Scoville agreed with
Dr. Charyk that the NRO Staff should be located in a single office,
which should be adjacent to the DNRO (in the Pentagon).
On 6 July 1962, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the
President, directed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and
the Director of Central Intelligence wherein he took note of the
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agreements made to date between them regarding NRO (which had been
reported to the President by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board)
and commented:
"We believe that the actual structure of the documents is
inadequate to support an efficient organization when the present
experienced and distinguished group moves on to other tasks.
We therefore recommend a continuing study of a more satis-
factory, permanent, documentary basis for the NRO with
particular references to existing NSC directives with which the
present NRO plan may be in conflict. " I/
The President had approved the Board's report and Mr. Bundy requested
that the Secretary of Defense and the DCI take appropriate action con-
cerning NRO documentation and make a joint report to the PFIAB by
15 September 1962.
The view which had been expressed by Mr. Cunningham regarding
Agency acquisition of the NRO Chief of Staff slot was not strongly sup-
ported by either the DD/R or the DCI. When Dr. Charyk issued his
first draft memorandum on organization and functions of the NRO on
23 July 1962 for DOD/CIA concurrence, the Chief of Staff position had
been assigned.a?s follows:
The NRO staff will be covered by the overt title of
Office of-Space Systems, Office of the Secretary of the Air
Force. The Director, Office of Space Systems will be the
6 July 1962. Memo from McGeorge Bundy to DCI
and Secretary of Defense.
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overt title of the Director, NRO Staff. The NRO Staff will
receive all administrative and logistic support from the Office
of the Secretary of the Air Force.
The Office of Space Systems had been set up under the Office of the
Under Secretary of the Air Force to manage the satellite program.
Its Director was Brig. Gen. Richard D. Curtin, USAF, who thus became
the first Director of the NRO Staff.
The DNRO's draft also established Program A (satellite effort)
under USAF management, and Program B (CIA assets) whose Director
was the Deputy Director for Research, CIA, and proposed setting up
Program C (Navy assets). In his memorandum to the DNRO of
29 August 1962, the DD/R commented on the proposed organization
and functions of NRO as follows:
"In general I concur with the referenced paper... and think
it is a good and useful basis for initial NRO operations. It is
probable that over a period of time some changes will occur,
particularly in the staffing pattern which must be responsive
to the particular current requirements...
"In connection with the CIA participation in the NRO, I
should like to suggest that the DD/R's position be designated
as Senior CIA Representative reporting directly to DNRO
rather than as Director of Program B since this would give him
the responsibility as the DCI's representative with responsibili-
ties across the entire NRO. The Assistant Director of Special
1/
23 July 1962. Memo from DNRO to Program Directors
and NRO to Director, para 2 d (2), frill text at Annex 35.
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Activities, CIA, who within the Agency has direction of Agency
reconnaissance activities under the DD/R, should be designated
as Director of Program R
"In view of the fact that the Agency is a legally separate
entity budget-wise from the Defense Department, I believe that
the NRO budgetary procedures insofar as they apply to CIA
should be spelled out in more detail than currently is the case
in paragraph 2 i, on page 4..,. " 1/
The DD/R appended to his memorandum a proposed procedure for
budgeting for the CIA portion of the National Reconnaissance Program:
"The over-all NRP will be prepared based on proposals
from the various Program Directors... These will be reviewed
by Drs. Charyk and Scoville and incorporated into the NRO pro-
posed program. This program will? be presented by Dr. Charyk
to the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, at which point it will
then become the official program.
"DNRO will present and defend this program to the Bureau
of the Budget indicating which portions will be the responsibility
of CIA. CIA will place in its annual budget funds necessary to
carry out its portions of the program. In the presentation to
Congress CIA will defend its program before its committees
with an indication that they are approved parts of the over-all
NRP.
"After Congress has approved the CIA programs including
those for NRO and provided the funds, the Agency will look to
the Bureau of the Budget to apportion those funds in the normal
manner. The funds contained in the CIA Budget for NRO activity
will be expended under the direction of the DD/R in accordance
with approved programs and NRO will be kept advised by
Dr. Scoville as appropriate.
29 August 1962. Memo for DNRO from DD/R.
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"In cases where budgeted amounts are not sufficient to
meet the program aims of NRO, e. g. where policy or pro-
gram shifts have taken place which required alterations in
scope, etc. , the Agency would look to NRO to provide the flexi-
bility or, as appropriate, take steps with the Bureau of the
Budget and/or Congress to acquire supplemental funds. Where
NRO either supplements Agency' funds or uses the Agency as an
executive agent for contracting purposes under the NRO agree-
ment, DNRO. will advance funds in the same manner employed
in the past. " l/
Commenting on the DD/R reply to the Charyk paper on organiza-
tion and functions, Mr. Cunningham agreed that the DD/R position in
the NRO should be elevated to Senior CIA Representative if it were
not desired by CIA to make a frontal attack on the problem and
secure the post of Deputy Director of NRO for the DD/R (which he
still felt to be the proper set-up). Mr. Cunningham also questioned
the provision in the paper that prior specific approval of the DNRO
will be required for any matter of the NRO or NRP to be processed
to higher authority. He felt that tied the DCI's hands to a degree in-
consistent with his role not only in the intelligence community but
more particularly as senior action official on programs of primary
concern to CIA.
Att. A, 29 August 1962. DD/R Memo to DNRO.
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On 11 September 1962, Drs. Scoville and Charyk agreed to the
following: (1) Dr. Charyk would propose to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense (Gilpatric) that Dr. Scoville be made Deputy Director of NRO;
(2) that the budgeting for CIA portion of NRP because of its complexity
should be studied further; (3)
(4) that the minor Agency
changes to the Charyk paper were accepted; (5) that a high level
liaison individual from CIA to NRO was acceptable to DNRO; (6) that
the Operations Center for satellite control would be transferred to the
Pentagon when NRO was sufficiently set up, approximately four months
hence.
On 5 October 1962 at a meeting with Secretary McNamara, Deputy
Secretary Gilpatric, Dr. Charyk, DCI McCone and DD/R Scoville
present, a 'CLA paper was presented by Mr. McCone on reorganization
of NRO to eliminate dual reporting by the DNRO and establishing the
Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent to the National Reconnaissance
Planning Group. Secretary McNamara said that from the outset of NRO
he had had reservations on the requirement for a special organization
for reconnaissance and did not understand why in the long run this
could not be handled by normal intelligence organizational procedures.
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T O P S E C R E T
He said while he was satisfied with the existing NRO organization for
the present, he would review Mr. McCone's paper and discuss it
with him at a later date. He suggested the possibility that perhaps
NRO and NSA should both be subordinate to DIA. Mr. McCone rebutted
this suggestion on grounds that the activities of these two organizations
transcended the strictly military intelligence sphere and also because
of the difficulties DIA was having in becoming functional.
On 17 October 1962 DNRO assigned DOD to manage and operate all
FIREFLY drones against Cuba under NRO supervision with CIA Elint
assistance. On the same day DNRRO refused the assignment of
I f CIA to the NRO Staff as a liaison officer (after
previously agreeing to such an appointment) because he felt he already
had all the full-time staff personnel necessary to accomplish the func-
tions assigned by the 23 July 1962 memorandum. Also on the same
day he assigned the AQ-12 (TAGBOARD) drone project management
to the Director of Program B (CIA).
During the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, the NRO was
put to its first test regarding timely flow of information on the recon-
naissance program between the Air Force and CIA and came up sadly
lacking in the view of OSA. When Dr. Scoville protested to Dr. Cha:ryk
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T O P S E C R E T
the latter stated clearly that he was not attempting to keep CIA
informed on all that NRO was doing but only on those programs which
were specifically CIA's responsibility. He added that he only reported
to Secretary McNamara and that the NRO was not a joint operation at
all. If Mr. McCone had any other understanding, Dr. Charyk said,
he should speak to Secretary McNamara.
On 17 October 1962, Dr. Charyk agreed, with several minor changes,
to the redraft of the NRO Agreement furnished the Secretary of Defense
by Mr. McCone on 5 October, and in a memorandum accompanying the
draft addressed to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric said that he felt the
establishment of the National Reconnaissance Planning Group was a
good step, and one which should satisfy the concern expressed by the
PFIAB. However, he considered the proposed paragraph on financial
management to be completely unacceptable.
--Jo
6d
On 23 November 1962, Dr. Charyk, as a result of a letter 1' rom
Mr. McCone on procedures governing CIA's responsibilities for funding
projects under the NRO agreement, explained the problem to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense in the following terms:
".. Mr. McCone again proposes to budget for those
programs which are the responsibility of the NRO; to justify
the amounts in their budget submission to Congress; and to
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T O P S E C R E T
have full fund control over arnounts contained in their budget.
This, in effect, gives the DNRO a financial function in advance
budget planning but not a responsibility for financial control
and administration of the National Reconnaissance Program.
The points raised here appear to me to be fundamental. Either
the DNRO has financial control and, hence, possesses the essen-
tial management tools required, or the NRO becomes a 'paper
concept'.
"With respect to the current fund problem, it is true
that no funds have actually been issued although the NRO
Comptroller has advised the CIA that funds are available for
approved programs and has also advised them of the amounts
which would be released at this time. No action to request
transfer of these amounts has been taken by CIA. This, I be-
lieve, is because the Agency desires the release of all funds
without restriction. I am prepared to release funds only as
requested and justified and I believe the Bureau of the Budget
is sympathetic to this position. In this respect I am advised by
my Comptroller that CIA is utilizing other funds to finance
contractual documents under the responsibility of the NRO and
that at the present time they are in a deficiency position. My
Comptroller has notified the CIA Comptroller that if funds are
not requested on Form 1080's by November 26th, the interim
Joint Resolution Authorization will be withdrawn. The CIA may
find itself in a highly vulnerable position as to violations of
financial procedures for Government operations... " 1/
As a result of Dr. Charyk's memoranda to Under Secretary
Gilpatric, the latter requested a conference with Mr. McCone for the
purpose of ironing out the differences regarding CIA participation in
the NRP. Meanwhile, the role cast by Dr. Charyk for CIA in the
program was not sitting well with OSA and there was a good bit of
25X1 1 / 23 Nov 1962. Memo to Mr. Gilpatric from Dr. Charyk.
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frustration at the working level. In the first week of January 1963
a memorandum was drafted in OSA for the DD/R's signature which
set out for the DCI the modifications to the NRO organization believed
necessary if CIA was to play an active role, not only as a participating
member in the NRP through IDEALIST, OXCART and CORONA pro-
jects, but also in the management, direction and coordination of the
total national reconnaissance effort. Due to the imminent resigna-
tion of Dr. Charyk, the time was felt to be propitious to effect the
changes (foremost among these being the designation of the DD/R as
Deputy Director of NRO, so as to give the Agency a day-to-day voice
and vote in the decision--making process within the NRO). This memo-
randum to the DCI was signed by Dr. Scoville, but subsequently he
had second thoughts and did not send the memorandum to Mr. McCone.
On 24 January 1963, Mr. Cunningham addressed a memorandum
to the Executive Director, Mr. Kirkpatrick, Q
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set forth the history of the Agency's joint participation in reconnais-
sance projects beginning in 1954, and making several proposals which
would offer CIA a greater role in the NRP than it currently enjoyed.
He pointed out the deterioration in CIA/USAF relations under the NRO
as follows:
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"With the advent of the National Reconnaissance Office
c ertain problems and incidents have occurred which would sug-
gest that the NRO in its present form is not functioning as de-
sired, and too often has been the arena for misunderstanding
between the Air Force and the CIA. Resolution of differences
has not been without a price paid in widening the gulf which is
rapidly increasing between a once harmonious USAF and CIA
relationship.
"Possibly this condition is more properly a sign of the
times and not the NRO. Possibly the responsibilities of the
reconnaissance programs have evolved to the stage where
their size and operation make clear-cut management no longer
realistic or obtainable within the Governmental environment
that presently exists.
"It is difficult to isolate a turning point in the USAF/CIA
relationship and to point to any one act or series of acts which
have prompted the erosion that has taken place. Whatever the
reason, it is fair statement of fact to conclude frankly that
during the short reign of the NRO the USAF/CIA relationship
has deteriorated to the point where mutual trust is now hesitant
and there is speculation on either side of 'power grabs' by the
other." I/
The proposed courses of action to improve the situation were:
1. Appointment of D/NRO and DD/NRO as full-time
positions, with CIA and DO:D respectively represented in the
two slots.
2. Make the NRO Staff an executive and administrative
body but not involved in day-to-day operational and contractual.
decisions.
3. Equalize the representation on the NRO Staff between
the participating agencies.
24 January 1963. Memo to Executive Director.
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4. Assign all Program Directors to the Washington area.
to simplify coordination processes.
5. Use Joint Reconnaissance Center for coordinating
activities rather than maintain a duplicate NRO facility.
6. Assign all national reconnaissance to NRO Program
Directors, including SAC.
7. Locate the whole NRO Staff in one office area on
neutral ground.
8. Designate Director of Program B (CIA) responsible
for processing and disseminating intelligence product from all
national reconnaissance programs.
As a result of direct conferences between Mr. McCone and
Mr. Gilpatric, a new agreement was staffed out and signed by them
on 13 March 1963. It provided for the DD/NRO slot to be filled by a
CIA appointee (the DD/R), but placed the executive direction of the
whole National Reconnaissance Program in the hands of the Secretary
of Defense, or his appropriate deputy, with policies and guidance to
be jointly agreed with the DCI. A separate"agreement was reached.
on 5 April 1963 as to program funding with particular relation to
Program B (CIA) and was made an appendix to the full agreement.
(See Annex 36 for text of these agreements. )
On 10 May 1963, a paper outlining the duties, of the DD/NRO, as
approved by the DNRO, was passed to Col. Ledford, AD/SA, by the
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new Director of the NRO Staff, Col. John L. Martin, Jr. (See
Annex 37 for terms of reference). This paper, which had originated
with Dr. Scoville, had been redrafted by the NRO Staff and it omitted
any requirement for coordinating, DNRO papers with the DD/NRO.
When Dr. Scoville protested, Col. Martin argued that there was
never time for coordination (des;pite the fact that NRO staff work was
always a lengthy and time-consuming process). In many cases, as a
result, the DNRO signed papers concerning Agency activities which
were factually incorrect, having never been cleared with the Agency's
senior NRO representative.
On 24 May 1963, the new DNRO, Dr. Brockway McMillan, noted
to Dr. Scoville three reasons why he intended to follow the policy of
using CIA contracting authority for other than Program B tasks:
(1) To provide essential. security to NRO matters not possible other-
wise; (2) to provide speed of response not obtainable through DOD
contractual channels for urgent cases; and (3) to obtain significant
savings to the government or improvement in management by use of
such contracting authority in joint procurement actions.
In June and July 1963 discussions and drafting sessions took place
between the NRO Staff and the JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center to
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01M54A draft
agreement was presented for Mr. McCone's comments on 8 July
which was characterized by Col. Giller (Acting DD/R on Dr. Scoville's
departure from the Agency) as being sufficiently vague and general to
permit any interpretation desired. He recommended that the paper be
rewritten, following a clearly-stated purpose for such an agreement,
and that the CIA Air Operations Center (within OSA), which had for
ten years planned and executed all covert overhead reconnaissance,
be designated the NRO Operations Center and source of support vis-a-
vis the JCS/JRC. Also that only in times of actual hostilities should
there be automatic transfer to the JRC of NRO operational assets.
On 17 August Col. Ledford wrote at length to the DDCI concerning
the disputes, confusion and slow-downs in the National Reconnaissance
Program. He said that steps should be taken to make the organization
work, or else it should be abandoned and a return to independent action
by DOD and CIA should be made. It was felt among the OSA Staff that
the basic difficulty in the entire situation was the dual role of the DNRO.
It was difficult for him to function impartially when on one hand he was
responsible for USAF interests as Under Secretary, and on the other
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he was responsible for over-all government interests in the role of
 :3
ieFol#@OW/Q2 QIRbF800WM6@lb0 aM4fact
were quite often diametrically opposed.
At a meeting on 15 October 1963 where the above DD/S&T views
were aired, Mr. McCone expressed the view that the Agency staff
should spend more time pre-empting its position in NRO with ideas
and spend less time complaining about projects and programs which
might be taken away from them. This resulted from the withdrawal
::3
by the DNRO of the TAGBOARD program from CIA direction and its
assignment to the newly designated Program D (USAF) under the
direction of Colonel Geary.
Although the position of Deputy Director, NRO, was awarded to
CIA, to be filled by the DD/R, Dr. Scoville found it impracticable
to do justice to both jobs at once, and furthermore he very soon after
his appointment as DD/NRO resigned from his position in the Agency.
On the appointment of Dr. Albert D. Wheelon to head the renamed
Directorate of Science and Technology, Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer of
that Directorate was assigned to the position of DD/NRO and served
in that capacity between ~August~ 1963 and the spring of 1965. Upon-hi-s-
departure, Mr. James Q. Reber was nominated to the DD/NRO slot
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from his current position as Chairman of the Committee on Overhead
 ReMON ~gLff@ITMi 94L? i:ll#-gpppgggp41 aRpq!:Llggll9Q4NRO
since September 1965 to the present.
Monthly Forecast
The system of the monthly forecasting of aircraft and satellite
activities under the National Reconnaissance Program was promulgated
on 3 January 1964 by the DNRO, whereby each Program Director would
submit his schedule to the DNRO for amalgamation with all others and
processing through the Special Group for approval. The Standard
Operating Procedure for the Forecast of NRO Air and Satellite
Activities was issued on 16 April. 1964 by the Director of the NRO Staff,
Brigadier General John L. Martin, Jr.
PSAC
In July 1965 at the instigation of the Special Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology (Dr. Donald Hornig),, the
President's Scientific Advisory Committee under the chairmanship
of Dr. Edwin H. Land was formed and its first meeting held on 21 July
1965. The broad charter of this panel is to maintain an overview of
the National Reconnaissance Program with particular interest in
technical characteristics of intelligence requirements, the status of
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existing projects, and the adequacy of research and development
 pr9pF d Fe e9a ~t5/ #21h I - ~~8 31~~~1 I ~rO h White
House level by Dr. Donald H. Steininger of Dr. Hornig's staff.
The continued dissatisfaction. on the part of CIA with the working
of the NRO led to the promulgation of a further revision of the agree-
ment in August 1965. On 6 August a new draft was discussed between
Mr. John Bross on behalf of CIA and Mr. Cyrus Vance, successor to
Mr. Gilpatric as Deputy Secretary of Defenife. The draft was agreed
to and signed by the DCI (then Admiral William Raborn) and Mr. Vance
on,Xl August 1965.. A g_o er _chang-edT t, e-n -agreement pT-evided
A Executive ~,ommlttee U. LNiW ' L.V r,uLUC Q.LL- Ya` ,,?? k-- ...
formulation of the National Reconnaissance Program. throb e-7
The DNRO was to sit with the Executive Committee but not to be a voting
member. (See Annex 38 for the text of the agreement. )
On 1 October 1965 Dr. Alexander Flax succeeded Dr. Brockway
McMillan as DNRO, and on the same day a letter was sent to him by
the DCI outlining the changes in the Agency's organizational structure
in support of the NRP; i. e. , the consolidation of satellite activities
under OSP, the manned reconnaissance under OSA and SOD, and all
these activities coming to a head under the management of the Director
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rescinded and the position of Director of Reconnaissance for CIA was
abolished. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology (then
Mr. Carl Duckett) was authorized to deal directly with the DNRO on
behalf of the DCI in the management of all CIA programs under the
National Reconnaissance Program.
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