AN UNCONVENTIONAL ARMS POLICY: SELLING OURSELVES SHORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00263R000100230008-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 31, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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DPC
DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman
Robert G. Uberatore, SUN Director
(202) 224-N51
January 31, 1983
AN UNCONVENTIONAL ARMS POLICY:
Selling Ourselves Short
Promotion of Foreign Military Sales
to the Developing World
under the Reagan Administration
Prepared principally by Kevin G. Nealer
with contributions by
Richard McCall, Foreign Policy Specialist, and
Richard D'Amato, Defense Policy Specialist
Views contained do not necessarily reflect those of the Democratic Policy Committee
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Page
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................... i
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 1
1. A Commitment to Restraint ................................................................................................................. 3
II. The Current Crisis ............................................................................................................................... 6
III. The Reagan Administration Policy in Application ............................................................................. 11
IV. A More Dangerous World ................................................................................................................... 16
V. Retrospect and Recommendations .................................................................................................... 24
Footnotes ................................................................................................................................................... 29
Appendix A: Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major
Supplier, 1974-1981 ............................................................................................................................. 36
Appendix B: U. S. Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Implications of
Sophistication ..................................................................................................................................... 52
Appendix C: F-16 Sales: A Case Study ................................................................................................... 59
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Arms transfers play a critical role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Historically, the
utilization of this policy tool often has been marked by controversy between the executive and
legislative branches of government. As a consequence, the role of Congress in the decision-making
process governing arms transfers abroad has been institutionalized through bipartisan legislation
reaching back over forty years. The most recent congressional initiative in this area is the Arms Export
Control Act of 1976 which established policy guidelines aimed at creating a regime of restraint and
selectivity.
However, the transfer of conventional arms through the foreign military sales (FMS) program of
the U.S. government and through commercial channels (requiring the issuance of export licenses by the
executive branch) has reached major proportions under the current Administration. The
Administration's $21.5 billion program of arms sales has departed from the criteria established in the
Arms Export Control Act, setting a new and possibly dangerous direction for U.S. policy which could be
detrimental to our own security interests.
The Administration's approach ignores the lessons of recent events in the South Atlantic, the
Persian Gulf, and the Middle East by encouraging an increasing number of developing countries to
acquire sophisticated weapons systems. There also is a body of evidence that American munitions
manufacturers are, in many instances, whetting the appetites of Third World nations for our most
advanced weapons, and that acquiring these weapons has become a status symbol in nearly all regions
of the world.
The Administration's arms transfer policy is built on two related misconceptions:
-The global increase in the arms trade is seen through the lens of bipolar world politics as
another opportunity for U.S.-Soviet competition. This view ignores the reality of a growing market in
which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. lead a long list of competing suppliers, particularly our Western
European allies.
-Arms sales are pictured as guaranteeing influence and extending U.S. security abroad. U.S.
experience, with Iran and others argues against this theory, as does the Soviet record of failure with
,I,
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such major customers as China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, and Sudan. While sales to NATO and other
close allies who share a common security concern can enhance U.S. interests, arms transfers to the
Third World do not create automatically such shared interests. This is particularly true when the
perceptions of the threat on the part of the seller and recipient are not congruent. The transfer of forty
F-16s to Pakistan is a case in point.
The tenets of the Administration policy directly conflict with the guidelines established in the
Arms Export Control Act. Specifically, an aggressive program of arms sale promotion undermines the
guiding principle that the U.S. should "exert leadership in the world community to bring about
arrangements for reducing the international trade in implements of war." In application, the
Administration's policy has undermined the Act in the following ways:
-By discarding previous guidelines in favor of a wholly "flexible, case-by-case" determination
for each proposed sale. This has led to inconsistencies and a program where the only predictable
elements are increases in both the quality and quantity of weapons sold.
-By depleting U.S. service inventories through accelerated sales of high technology items to
Third World customers.
-By reducing the pool of trained technicians available to U.S. armed forces, due to private
contractors who may be hiring service personnel away to support foreign sales.
-By ignoring the relationship between conventional arms transfers and nuclear proliferation.
-By failing to fulfill the mandate issued by Congress for the U.S. to exercise leadership in
seeking multilateral controls on global arms trade.
-By exposing the American taxpayer to billions of dollars in potential future "bailouts" for Third
World countries with whom we have signed arms transfer agreements and whose ability to meet
payments on already onerous debt burdens is in doubt.
Effects of the Administration Policy on Developing Countries
The new policy of arms promotion abroad affects developing country recipients in three ways:
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-The level of sophistication of arms being transferred is increasing dramatically, raising the
danger of regional arms races and increasing the risk that U.S. technology will be compromised or used
against us or our allies.
-The inability of developing countries to absorb high-cost, sophisticated military hardware,
undermining economic growth and siphoning precious material and human resources away from the
already burgeoning social needs of their populations.
-The quantity and quality of weapons being transferred to developing countries has the
potential for creating greater instability and increasing the likelihood that the recipients will respond to
political problems with military solutions.
There are several responses possible within the context of the Arms Export Control Act. The
procedures for congressional involvement in arms transfer policy require changes along the following
lines:
1. Major sales to countries other than NATO allies, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand should
require affirmative congressional approval. The current veto process does not function effectively.
2. Congress must participate in the long-term planning and policymaking objectives of the
Arms Export Control Act, assuring that legitimate security and developmental needs of Third World
buyers are met within the bounds of U.S. policy and economic realities. This would include automatic
submission to the Congress of Defense Requirement Surveys since it appears many arms requests flow
from these studies.
3. The Administration should heed the admonition in the Arms Export Control Act by seeking
negotiations to impose multilateral restraint over the transfer of arms around the world. The first step
should be consultations with NATO and other allies to review markets, the levels of sophistication of
arms being transferred, and the impact these sales may have on regional stability.
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First in Western Europe and now in the U.S., concern over nuclear arms proliferation has
caught the public imagination. Hundreds of thousands took that concern into the streets of Amsterdam,
Bonn, and New York. Public pressure brought the issue to the floor of the United Nations, the U.S.
Congress, State legislatures, and even town councils. It forced the Reagan Administration to begin
promised arms reduction talks with the Soviets. The broad spectrum of public interest and the sense of
urgency shown by so many led to fundamental change in Administration policy.' If good faith is
maintained on both sides, this change could translate into meaningful controls and an eventual
reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles.
But the threats to peace and international security are not posed by nuclear weapons alone.
Few believe that a regional conflict would start with an exchange of nuclear salvos, and many experts
reject the massive surprise attack as a likely scenario for a superpower showdown. Instead, the
greatest threat is portrayed as a local brushfire war that expands to nuclear conflagration. Wherever it
originates, the kindling for such a nuclear fire is likely to be conventional weapons. As the level of
sophistication and destructive potential of these weapons has increased, so has availability. The recent
tragedies of war in the South Atlantic and Middle East demonstrate that the introduction of high
technology nonnuclear weapons into Third World arsenals has challenged our assumptions about
conventional warfare.2 A new generation of laser, camera, and radar guided "smart" missiles, high
performance aircraft, and battlefield rocketry increases instability and the likelihood of conflict in those
parts of the world already dangerously close to the flashpoint.3
Against this background the Reagan Administration has announced its intention to embark on
the most ambitious promotion of arms sales in U.S history. It has rejected previous guidelines and, in
derogation of statutes and established practice, set out to make the trade in conventional weapons the
centerpiece of its foreign policy management.4 While conventional arms transfers can make an
important contribution as a tool of foreign policy, their role has long been subordinate to notions of
promoting security and the national interest in a well-crafted policy framework. In abolishing criteria
and moving to a "flexible" approach to transfers, the Administration has ushered in a new era in the
history of the arms race. This program has prompted Senator Proxmire to observe that the Reagan
1
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foreign policy "more than [that of] any Administration in American history, is based on a single strategic
factor: arms sales.... We will now sell arms to anyone, anywhere, for any reason." 5
The effort here will be to provide an overview of this policy and what it means for global
security. We will need to look at the legacy of U.S. arms export policy, recent trends, underlying
assumptions of this Administration, and the direction in which its policies are moving us, and others.
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A. The Legislative Response
Fifty years ago, the growth in the arms trade and the rise of militarism in Europe generated
popular criticism of weapons proliferation similar to the reaction to nuclear issues today. The 1934
publication of Engelbrecht and Hanighen's Merchants of Deaths helped focus attention on the need for
statutory -guidelines for U.S. arms transfers. Following the work of the Nye Commission, Congress
responded in 1935 with a bipartisan effort, addressing this issue by enacting the first in a series of
major laws regulating military transfers. World War II and the period of reconstruction saw the
emergence of a policy designed to strengthen U.S. security by providing our close allies with weapons
sufficient to combat aggression and protect our shared interests. As time went on and the economic
conditions of our allies improved, the Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants were replaced by sales,
and the European arms industry began to recover and expand. In 1968, Congress passed the Foreign
Military Sales Act$ to provide a framework for weapons transfers as a policy instrument. The legislation
discouraged sales to countries demonstrating a poor record of promoting democratic traditions,9
restricted weapons transfers to self-defense use only,10 and denied arms sales to countries where
scarce resources were better directed toward economic development.11
Despite these constraints, the U.S. became caught up in the global arms spiral that saw a
quadrupling of the world's dollar volume of arms trade between 1965 and 1975.12 The culmination of a
bipartisan congressional effort to cope with that trend and make arms transfers an integrated part of
overall foreign policy came in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).13 As the title indicates, the
Act represented a change in emphasis from sales to control. In the opening paragraphs, Congress
directed that:
It shall be the policy of the United States to exert leadership in the world community to
bring about arrangements for reducing the international trade in implements of war and
to lessen the danger of outbreak of regional conflict and the burdens of armaments.
United States programs for or procedures governing the export, sale, and grant of
defense articles and defense services to foreign countries and international organizations
shall be administered in a manner which will carry out this policy.14
To achieve that goal, the Act provides for major changes in the way arms sales are to be determined.
In particular, the AECA established extensive reporting requirements which the legislative history
tells us were included because of the "strong desire to provide for increased congressional
participation in the formulation of military assistance sales policies and programs." 15
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In addition, the Act mandates that the Administration weigh certain issues in making any
transfer. These include consideration of:
-Possible third party transfers and the associated security risks;
-Recipient country's policy relating to terrorists;
-Recipient's exclusionary policies which would discriminate against U.S. nationals on
the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex; and,
-Recipient's record on human rights.
This policy guidance, in conjunction with the information requirements and the emphasis on
government-to-government sales, was designed to guarantee a stronger congressional role in the arms
transfer process. To assure that objective, the Act includes provision for congressional vetos of major
sales.16 While it has not yet been invoked and remains politically contentious, the legislative veto has
proven a useful tool in shaping arms transfer policy.17
In an effort to supplement the policy guidance of the AECA, President Carter set forth a list of
objectives for arms export policy. In his statement of May 19, 1977, Carter announced that arms
transfers would continue to be an important element of U.S. policy, but would be regarded as
"exceptional." Transfers which promoted U.S. security and that of our close allies would continue
unchanged; NATO countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand were exempted from the new criterial,
But sales to other parts of the world would come under special scrutiny and, for any new sales, "the
burden of persuasion will be on those who favor a particular arms sale, rather than those who oppose
it.,, 18 This standard was to respect traditional security arrangements while reflecting a new caution in
transfers involving less-developed countries (LDCs).
Specifics of the Carter policy were aptly summarized in the 1981 Congressional Research
Service (CRS) report to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs entitled "Changing Perspectives on
U.S. Arms Transfer Policy." 19 The main points included reduction in the dollar volume of Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) and MAP programs, with qualitative restrictions on weapons transfers. This meant
a prohibition on introduction of new technologies into a region, development of export-only systems, or
sales of systems not yet operationally deployed with U.S. forces. It also entailed tight restrictions on
coproduction agreements and third party transfers of U.S. weapons. U.S. embassies would require prior
approval from the State Department before assisting U.S. arms firms in marketing overseas.
Obviously ambitious, the Carter plan was unable to live up to many of the expectations it
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engendered. The CRS 1981 report concludes that the Carter Administration failed to make arms
transfers an "exceptional" tool of foreign policy. Almost $40 billion in new arms agreements with LDCs
were made during the Carter years. The Carter approach to unilateral restraint came at a time when
Soviet and Western European suppliers were increasing their market shares. Moreover, the uneven
application of restrictions gave rise to uncertainties about U.S. arms export policy. Exceptions to the
qualitative guidelines included agreements for coproduction, and introduction of the FX as an export
model fighter to fill the performance gap between the F-5E and the first-line F-15 and F-16 aircraft.
But the Carter guidelines represented a serious Executive initiative in attempting to restrain
sales and bring them into the mainstream of foreign policy. The CRS report notes that:
The Carter arms transfer policy established a more precise and systematic decision-
making process and more specific guidelines for those in the arms sales chain.... This
framework increased the prospect that significant proposed sales would have to go
through a rigorous review.20
The report continued by noting that the requirement for State Department approval prior to sales
promotions,
...increased the prospect that foreign policy makers could and would be able to evaluate
the potential ramifications for American policy interests before being confronted with a
formal request for a sale resulting in premature promotional actions by U.S. arms
sellers.21
Defense analyst Andrew Pierre characterized the effect of the Carter policy in writing that it "provided a
framework for an important aspect of American foreign relations." 22
This review process led to over $1 billion in refused requests during the Carter presidency,
affecting more than sixty countries. Many of these rejections prevented acquisition of inapposite high
technology weapons by LDCs. The CRS report cites refusals of requests by Guatemala for F-5Es,
Pakistan for A-7s, Taiwan for F-4s, and Iran for F-4Gs, as instances in which purchases of equivalent
systems from alternate suppliers were not made. But the absence of multilateral controls did result in
alternate purchases following U.S. refusals of aircraft sales to Argentina, Ecuador, and India. In each of
those cases, a European-built product was substituted, giving weight to arguments for allied
cooperation in restrictions of the market.
While Carter did begin to follow through on the AECA mandate for multilateral control talks, he
failed to seek participation of suppliers other than the Soviets. These conventional arms talks (CAT)
collapsed after a year as a result of what participants described as "deteriorating U.S./Soviet relations,
a volatile Middle East, and an increasingly difficult political situation for the Carter Administration at
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home, along with bureaucratic confusion, personal rivalries, and tactical errors." 23 It was questionable
whether such talks could have produced any meaningful agreement when France and the other major
producers were not parties to the process.
The legacy of the Carter arms transfer policy is then a melange of successes and failures. By
offering "an institutionalized framework in which hard policy decisions can be made," 24 the Carter
program moved toward integrating arms sales into the fabric of foreign policy management. Perhaps a
greater commitment to multilateral controls and the requisite political will would have done more to lend
predictability and credence to weapons export policy and the conduct of foreign affairs as a whole.
Despite valid criticism that Carter "stepped in front of a moving train" on arms control, his
Administration did offer "a set of criteria designed to insure that a grant or sale of defense articles will
be in the national interests of the United States," 25 as envisioned by the AECA. The importance of
such guidelines becomes clear when looking at recent trends and the current policy.
An understanding of the current Administration's policies and where they may be leading
requires a look at recent developments and the assumptions derived from them. The facts are
sometimes hard to come by, but an accurate reading of the situation is essential to any judgment about
the direction of U.S. arms export policy.
In considering statistics on U.S. arms transfers, several caveats should be kept in mind. First,
arms transfers and support services have several different forms. Most important are the FMS program
sales, including loans and direct credits. These are complemented by private commercial sales, training
programs (chiefly, IMET), MAP grants, leasing and use of military equipment and facilities, the excess
defense articles program (EDA), and other formal and informal arrangements.26 This last catch-all
category includes programs that do not appear in conventional accountings of sales and support costs.
Like some private sales and classified programs, these costs are elusive. Moreover, the costs of the
FMS program itself may be understated with respect to administrative expenses and potential
liabilities.27
Second, comparisons between U.S. exports and those of other countries also suffer from
creative accounting practices which skew totals. One proposal would distill the costs of "nonlethal"
supports (e.g., training and military construction) out of U.S. arms transfer totals.28 The Administration
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has endorsed this device, along with the practice of comparing U.S. and Soviet transactions in isolation.
Many analysts criticize this approach as disingenuous, insisting that the more accurate accounting
would juxtapose Western allied transfers with those of the Eastern bloc. Comparisons also suffer
from "loss in translation" problems in evaluating data from other countries. Predictable barriers of
secrecy and the difficulties of valuing goods and services from planned economies confound East/West
comparisons. The Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency has testified that, in Eastern
bloc countries, "the whole financial structure can be artificial... the whole matter of pricing the
equipment." 30 These murky waters have spawned very different estimates of the market.
The Administration's comparisons announced by Under Secretary Buckley at an August 2, 1982,
press conference are but the latest expression of the controversy.31 They rekindle the debate over
reliance on numbers of weapons transfers as against dollar volume in measuring market shares. The
Department of State report upon which Mr. Buckley's remarks were based notes that, "Each [method]
has shortcomings and neither is a true measure of military capability." 32 However, the Congressional
Research Service's updated analysis recognizes that "the basic utility of the dollar value of arms
transfer agreements is in indicating long-range trends in sales activity by arms suppliers." 33 This CRS
report draws upon the same sources as were available to the State Department, and combines dollar
totals with a tally of systems transfers to provide a balanced view. Several important trends emerge from
this latest CRS study, and other public sources.
-In the first full year of its promotional arms sale policy (FY 1982), the Reagan
Administration sold an all-time high of $21.5 billion worth of arms worldwide. This is
more than double the previous year's total, and well above the amount the State
Department had indicated to Congress at the beginning of FY 1982.
-The U.S. and Western European allies continue to dominate the world arms trade in
many categories of weapons systems and in total dollar volume of sales values and
deliveries.34
-Arms deliveries to Third World countries from all sources are increasing geometrically,
from more than $7 billion in 1974 to more than $23 billion in 1981.35
-Soviet arms sales are now at record levels, and Soviet transfers to the Third World
accounted for about one-quarter of all arms agreements with that market in 1981.36
-Non-traditional LDC purchasers have entered the high technology market and world
arsenals are growing both in quantity and quality. Supersonic aircraft and new
families of missiles are becoming standard equipment in LDC weapons inventories.37
B. The Reagan Assumptions
The Reagan Administration has drawn some alarming conclusions from these trends. It has
inflicted its bipolar view of global politics on the facts of increased arms sales and declared another
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arena for U.S./Soviet competition. By viewing regional problems through an East/West optic, there is a
likelihood that the Administration has misread and misrepresented the potential dangers of unbridled
trade in sophisticated weapons 38
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Under Secretary of State James
Buckley relied on controversial Administration totals in concluding that Soviet arms deliveries to the
Third World for the period 1977 to 1980 exceeded U.S. shipments by 20%.3,9 Figures from the 1981
CRS report and other sources substantiate an increase in Soviet deliveries of only 14%; $23.6 billion for
the U.S., as against $26.9 billion for the Soviets.40 More importantly, the CRS analysis points out that
U.S. arms agreements with the Third World for that period exceed Soviet deals by over $3 billion 41
(Agreements can be a better gauge of trends, since they represent commitments for future deliveries.)
The State Department Special Report released by Mr. Buckley acknowledges that U.S. sales to LDCs
exceeded Soviet transfers by "roughly two to one" in total dollar volume for the entire sample period.42
The new CRS study confirms that between 1974 and 1981, "the U.S. made Third World sales in nominal
terms that exceeded those of the U.S.S.R. by about $9.1 billion." 43
The CRS report of August 1982 places these figures in perspective, recognizing the limitations
of dollar estimates and systems counting. It criticizes the Administration practice of excluding $15.5
billion in FMS construction cost between FY 1974 and FY 1981, and sounds a note of caution about
Administration methodology that led Mr. Buckley to say the Soviets were "clearly" in first place."
While the U.S. "has not matched the Soviets in terms of sheer numbers delivered in the recent four-year
period," the study warns that those numbers do not "provide any indication of the capabilities of the
recipient nations" because they cannot show levels of sophistication of weapons or quality of training
received45 As one observer notes, the advent of the Reagan policy is "less evident in the costs of the
arms the new Administration transferred than in their sophistication and the list of buyers." 48
Of equal significance are the CRS conclusions concerning the role of other suppliers in the
market. An economic analysis of the arms market shows it to be a fairly strict oligopoly, with high
barriers to entry for the production of advanced systems, and a global clientele. The system is very
much demand-driven.47 Leading producers are the U.S., U.S.S.R., France, and other Western European
countries. A recent report in the Congressional Quarterly noted that, "The nation that fills a void when
the U.S. refuses a sale is just as likely to be U.S. allies, France or Britain" 48 as the Soviet Union. The
1982 CRS study shows that Western European exporting countries led in deliveries to the Latin
American market in more categories of systems than did the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. It concluded that
"(T)he major Western European suppliers have become, in the recent period, serious competitors for
arms markets in every region of the Third World...." 49
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Proportionally more Western European production is geared to export than is the case for either
the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. France, the third largest arms producer, exports more than one-third of its
production, while the U.S. and U.S.S.R. each export less than one quarter of their production.50 While
the Soviets enjoy a strong and growing market share, it no longer makes sense to cast the arms sale
competition as a U.S./Soviet horse race. The Administration's insistence on that characterization
ignores the other competitors and presumes that, in a larger sense, there can be a winner.
This win/lose approach is predicated on a second misconception about arms transfers: that
they guarantee influence and control over the recipients. The hard lessons of recent history provide
evidence for the opposite conclusion, and show the Administration's concern over "who's on first" in
volume of sales to be a mistake in emphasis. The Falklands crisis found the British confronted by
Argentine forces equipped with British weapons systems. That bitter irony prompted one cartoonist to
depict British soldiers peering into the sky and asking, "Is it one of ours...or one of ours?" The U.K.
sold Argentina warships and electronics valued at $200 million over the past three years, according to a
recent Washington Post article by Anthony Sampson, author of The Arms Bazaar.51 Sampson notes
that one-fourth of the Excocet missile components are manufactured in Britain.
Whitehall's sense of embarrassment was well understood in Washington and Moscow. The U.S.
has seen two of the largest infusions of its arms in the past decade-purchases by Iran and
Vietnam-fail to reinforce U.S. interests or prevent regional instability. Even in the case of Israel, the
U.S. learned that it exports control and the ability to influence end uti,e along with U.S. weapons.52
Constraints on spare parts and extra ordnance shipments are post facto remedies at best, and seldom
used. Neither device offers any guarantees of behavior acceptable to the U.S.
As costly and painful as these lessons have been for the U.S., the Soviet record is even worse.
With the exception of the captive clients of the Warsaw Pact, virtually every major Soviet arms customer
since World War II has bitten the hand that feeds it. China, Egypt, Somalia, and the Sudan have turned
their backs on the Soviets, and the policy interests which their arms transfers were supposed to secure.
So too, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, Iraq, and India have moved away from Moscow's influence, taking
their Soviet-made weapons with them.53
President Ford's national security advisor, Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, argues that "the issue is
more complicated than influence. If you mean we are buying influence by selling arms...the answer is
clearly no." 54 The AWACS sale offers a recent example of this dilemma, where U.S. interest and
influence are not necessarily enhanced by the transfer, but would be vitiated by a refusal. Former
Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Barry Blechman, noted that
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"(t)his Administration exaggerates tremendously the influence arms sales bring. It's really negative.
Turning down a sale hurts your influence." 55 The "negative influence" also applies to the leverage a
sale is supposed to bestow on the seller once it is made. The practical effect is that the buyer, not the
seller, garners greater leverage from a completed sale, because buyers can raise questions about the
supplier's reliability as an ally and source. This provides even a small purchaser with some power over
the oligopoly, since political pressure can be brought to bear to play suppliers off against one another.
As the Center for Defense Information observed, "The good will generated by an arms sale, if any, may
only last until the next request for weapons comes along." ss
The most important point to be made is that arms transfers are not, of themselves, the cement
of influence by sellers over buyers. Common interests and shared perceptions of security may be
enhanced by sales, as is surely the case among NATO allies. Where those shared goals and policies
are not already in place, weapons transfers can create shifting dependencies and "negative" leverage.
And there is nothing to suggest that they change the local perception of local conflicts; that a border
dispute or factional rivalry assumes an East/West dimension for the recipients. U.S. interests are not
necessarily aggrandized, nor security concerns shared, when U.S. weapons systems move abroad.
Moreover, it is unhelpful to translate comparative market standing into relative defense strength,
as if contrasting the U.S. domestic arsenal with that of the U.S.S.R. The CRS report points up this
direction in Administration policy; a harkening back to the Nixon (Guam) Doctrine that nations with U.S.
weapons are surrogates, projecting U.S. influence.57 Under Secretary Buckley mirrored that thinking in
testifying that:
The marginal U.S. dollar loaned under FMS to the Turkish Army or to the Thai or
Pakistan Air Force is a dollar that we otherwise would have to spend outright on our
own forces to do a job that the Turks and Thais and Pakistanis can do better and at less
cost.58
While the dollars are fungible, policy interests and ideologies may not be. U.S. supremacy in
arms sales to LDCs is no more a guarantor that U.S. security is being served than was the case when
the Romans hired and equipped mercenaries to guard the outposts of their empire. A strong U.S.
market posture only means a larger relative share for U.S. arms manufacturers in a market where each
new sale by the competing supplier nations diminishes their ability to control events in the buyers' part
of the world. These transfers of sophisticated arms are giving Third World regimes options which had
been the exclusive currency of the more technologically advanced countries. As with any currency, its
proliferation debases its value-and the influence it supposedly represents.
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We've seen that current arms transfer policy is built on two related assumptions: (a) the
conventional weapons market is another species of U.S./Soviet arms race in which the U.S. is behind;
and (b) arms sales mean influence. Carrying these assumptions into the execution of its policies, the
Reagan Administration has discarded established tenets of restraint in U.S. arm transfers, and the
dictates of statute. These have been supplanted by a policy without guidelines, where the only
predictable outcome is an increase in quality and quantity of sales.
The Reagan Administration policy has been explained through two vehicles. The first
expression came in the Presidential Policy Directive of July 8, 1981. Beyond that document, there has
been a series of statements and testimony by Under Secretary Buckley and other Administration
spokesmen which sheds light on the Directive. These sources clarify the Administration's position on
the objectives announced by Congress in the Arms Export Control Act.
The CRS 1981 report concludes that, "(t)he Presidential Directive of July 8, 1981, does not
present a balanced and comprehensive reflection of the policy directions of the AECA." 59 In fact, the
Directive and follow-up statements raise serious doubts about the Administration's compliance with the
letter and spirit of the Act. Reviewing the most important areas, the following inconsistencies emerge:
1. Promotion, Not Control
The thrust of the AECA is to provide a framework for arms transfer policy and controls. Section
1 of the Act requires that U.S. policy aim at "reducing the international trade in implements of war." 60
The Reagan Directive announces the Administration's intention to "enhance United States defense
production capabilities and efficiencies." Similarly, National Security Advisor William Clark, in a May,
1982 speech to the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies remarked that, "Not only
does security assistance offer a cost-effective way of enhancing our security worldwide, but it also
strengthens our economy in general and our defense production base in particular." 61 The CRS 1981
Report notes that:
(T)he Act does not suggest that arms sales should serve as a positive force in
maintaining a strong American defense industry. This notion is somewhat contrary to
the balanced objectives expressed in the AECA which recognize legitimate national
security needs for arms transfers while also promoting controls and restraints so that the
sales do not accelerate out of control, fueled by domestic financial factors.62
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In the name of promoting the interests of U.S. manufacturers and serving their arguments for
economies of scale, the Administration has set its course in opposition to Congress and its efforts at
control. Arguments that filling the LDC demand reduces unit costs and benefits the domestic economy
are both questionable economics and dangerous in the implications they-hold for the growth in LDC
sales.63 Such arguments fail to acknowledge that export orders are uncertain and vary greatly from
year to year, making it difficult to depend on economies of scale from foreign purchases when the cost
effectiveness of new weapons production is being judged. Also, the available evidence suggests that
the reduction in unit cost that results from foreign orders does not provide extraordinary savings to the
government in the case of most systems being produced for the domestic market.64 Certainly marginal
economies should not justify a policy of weapons proliferation inimical to U.S. interests, and an
unwillingness by the Administration to comport with the basic direction of the Act should not be
excused by any-economic rationale.
2. Failure of Leadership: The Obligation to Negotiate
The Act specifies that "it shall be the U.S. policy to exert leadership in the world community" in
limiting arms transfers. Further, it was the sense of Congress that the President should "seek to initiate
multilateral discussions" and "work actively with all nations to check and control the international sale
and distribution of conventional weapons of death and destruction." 65 The Reagan Administration has
abdicated this leadership role. Mr. Buckley testified that he would "remain prepared to examine ways"
to achieve arms control, but would not "go it alone." This mirrors the Policy Directive language that
the U.S. will "retain a genuine interest" in the proposals of others.
Neither the language of the Act nor its legislative history contains a call for unilateral restraints.
To the contrary, the President is obliged to seek cooperative arrangements that would lead to controls.
This is not a passive posture. It requires that the President exercise traditional U.S. leadership rather
than a wait-and-see approach. The law calls upon the President for something more than being
receptive to another country's initiatives.
3. No Place for Human Rights
Section 301 of the AECA amends Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act and declares the
policy of the U.S. to be to "promote and encourage increased respect for fundamental human rights
and freedoms." 66 It specifically prohibits security assistance to any country "engaged in consistent
patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." The State Department is
unable to quantify arms sale refusals made on human rights grounds in either the Carter or Reagan
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Administration, but the difference in directions is clear.67 This Administration has supported lifting arms
sales prohibitions against the regimes in Argentina and Pakistan, and has increased military assistance
to El Salvador and Guatemala .68
Beyond these actions, the Administration has sent an unmistakable message around the world
that human rights issues are of less concern in current decisions on proposed arms sales. There is no
mention whatsoever of human rights-either directly or by implication-in the Presidential Directive on
arms sales. In his remarks before the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Buckley enumerated the
Administration's priorities on arms sales, noting the statutory obligation to consider human rights as But
Administration statements elsewhere raise doubts about his commitment to those principles.70
4. Feeding Nuclear Proliferation
Section 305 of the Act amends Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act,71 linking conventional
weapons transfers to the recipient country's policies on developing nuclear weapons. The
Glenn/Symington amendments banned security assistance to countries engaged in the production of
nuclear material outside of international controls. That restriction has not inhibited the Reagan
Administration's sale of forty F-16 aircraft and support systems to Pakistan, though it was unable to
obtain firm assurance that Pakistan has stopped nuclear weapons development. Likewise, the
Administration has permitted Brazil to purchase fuel from other suppliers without requiring penalties in
its contract with the U.S., and has allowed a token military training program in that country.72
Computerized process controls were sold to Argentina for use in unsafeguarded reprocessing
operations, while U.S. brokers have been permitted to assist South Africa in circumventing the. U.S.
embargo of fuel to that country.73 The signal to these recipients and others is a lack of U.S. interest in
nuclear proliferation among LDCs.
5. Jeopardizing U.S. Service Inventories
The AECA also restricts sales which "could have significant adverse effect on the combat
readiness of the Armed Forces of the United States" to an "absolute minimum." Section 21(i)(1)
requires that the President report and justify any such proposed transfers to appropriate committees of
the Senate and to the House. This portion of the Act reflects the long-standing U.S. policy against
draw-downs on scarce items in the domestic inventories for the sake of exports. Despite lip service to
this objective, the Reagan Administration practice appears to be at variance with it.
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The Administration has disregarded the advice of its own experts in promoting high technology
sales. Lt. General Kelly Burke, (USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and
Acquisition) testified in March, 1981 before the Senate Armed Services Committee that proposed sales
of F-16s would not undercut U.S. needs "providing the sales are negotiated with the normal lead time
requirements.... Specifically, a forty-two month lead time is required." 74 Later, Under Secretary
Buckley told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that those same sales of the most advanced fighter
plane in the world would be carried out on an accelerated basis.
Air Force internal documents substantiate the effect of these accelerated sales. They note that
the sales "will have a particularly dramatic impact on our F-16 support posture," compromising already
low parts inventories and the Administration's goal of preparedness 75 Those sources also criticize the
effect of the sales on production planning. -Thus far, accelerated transfers have resulted in preempting
delivery of six aircraft to Belgium and the Netherlands in an effort to cover U.S. inventory shortages.
Departure from its own timetable raises questions about the Administration's ability to assess
and meet the needs of U.S. and NATO forces. Despite the recognized uncertainties surrounding the F-
16 sales, the Administration has not reported their impact and has continued to make pro forma
guarantees which contradict documented Air Force findings.76 A special case study on the F-16
appears as Appendix C of this report.
B. Inconsistency Institutionalized i
Beyond the legal requirements and policy directions established by the AECA, the Administration
has signalled confusion and unpredictability in implementing a policy without guidelines. The
Presidential Directive recites a litany of goals to be pursued, but reveals more about its basic policies by
what it omits. The Center for Defense Information observes that the Administration has departed from
prior practice by:
-abolishing the "ceiling" on the total dollar value of U.S. arms transfers authorized
each year;
-dropping the prohibition on developing a weapon system solely for export;
-dropping the prohibition against introducing a newly developed, advanced weapon
system creating a significantly higher combat capability in a region;
-dropping the prohibition against making foreign sales prior to operational deployment
with U.S. forces; and
-rescinding Carter's so-called "leprosy letter" which instructed U.S. overseas officials
not to assist private American businessmen seeking to promote arms sales.77
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Statements made to support this approach rely heavily on one word: "flexibility". The Reagan
Directive and testimony by Administration officials repeatedly call for flexibility and a "case-by-case"
review of arms transfers. 8 A recent Congressional Quarterly report characterized this elusive standard
by noting that:
The Reagan policy contains no guidelines. Instead, all foreign requests to buy U.S. arms
are to be examined 'case-by-case'.... In essence, if another nation is deemed to need
the weapon in question, and the sale is thought to serve U.S. interests, the sale is to be
made.79
Consistency was the much-advertised yardstick by which the incoming Reagan Administration
measured the deficiencies of Carter foreign policy. That same measure applied to the totally subjective
"flexible" Administration approach to arms transfers leaves this Administration far more open to
criticism- than its predecessor. Even Aviation Week has seen fit to register concern about this trend,
noting that "the Reagan guidelines are more a repeal of Carter human rights doctrinarism [sic] than the
adoption of a new policy." 80 Without meaningful guidelines, the only predictable aspect of the Reagan
program is growth-in sheer numbers of sales and, more importantly, in sophistication of the weapons
systems sold.
C. Discarding Fiscal Restraint
Recent General Accounting Office (GAO) studies raise questions about irregularities in the FMS
program, and suggest a need for caution in assessing the extent of U.S. economic commitments. In
particular, a recent GAO report cites DOD for "inaccurate and incomplete estimates" of administrative
costs-81 This has occurred when the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) "directed the military
services to exclude certain valid costs from their budget submissions." With "no assurance that the 3%
surcharge" is covering administrative costs and DOD failure to "make an adequate and meaningful
analysis" of those costs, GAO found that:
Although GAO could not determine the total amount by which the military sales
appropriations are subsidizing the foreign military sales program, the amount is known to
be in the millions of dollars.
This has led GAO attorneys to issue an opinion which characterized DSAA practices as "legally
improper" under the Arms Export Control Act.82
Of much greater importance is the liability exposure created by the FMS loan program. GAO
has identified thirteen countries as being in default on interest payments 8s This increase, up from two
defaults in 1978, occurs as the reserve fund to cover such shortages has declined from $1.71 billion in
1980 to the present level of $860 million. Several countries unable to service their past debt are
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nonetheless objects of Administration requests for additional loans (e.g., Sudan and El Salvador). The
absence of meaningful eligibility standards also generates concern as this indebtedness mounts. The
manager of the Treasury's Federal Financing Bank (FFB) which oversees the guaranteed loans told the
Washington Post that:
I don't believe there are any requirements that the President or anyone find a country
creditworthy. If the Department of Defense comes to us and says it will guarantee a
loan, there's no reason for us to say no. 84
This practice is in conflict with the basic requirement of the Act that sales be "to friendly countries
having sufficient wealth to maintain and equip their own military forces at adequate strength, or to
assume progressively larger shares of the cost."
While some debts are being rescheduled, the Administration is seeking to have repayment of
$950 million for FY 1983 forgiven through the direct credit program. That proposal includes loan
forgiveness of $50 million for Sudan, adding it to the list of countries qualifying for what is essentially
grant assistance. The Administration also proposed including 19 additional countries to the
concessional repayment plan for FY 1983.
Congress has mandated that guaranteed loans at near market rates of interest continue as the
primary vehicle for financing military assistance. But current practices lead critics to conclude that FMS
loans are being used to fill the void left by MAP grants, which are being phased out. Administration
proposals for new concessional FMS loans give added weight to these charges. So too, reliance on
"cash flow" financing, which permits countries to incur obligations on U.S. arms purchases without
sufficent reserves, undermines the FMS program. The effect is to paint an unrealistic picture of FMS
obligations and create the potential that liabilities ultimately may fall on the U.S. Treasury, undercutting
the economic advantages these sales are supposed to confer on the U.S. economy.
The effect of the Administration's arms policy can best be understood by looking at its regional
application, projecting current trends through key recipients and neighboring countries. The Middle
East is by far the largest recipient of all arms transfers,ss but other areas with a history of instability are
seeing tensions increase as regional arsenals grow. Africa, the Caribbean, and South Asia offer
revealing case studies.
Such examples need to be prefaced by a few general observations on LDC weapons transfers.
First, the current volume of transfers to the Third World is, of itself, a highly destabilizing force. The
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recent Iran/Iraq war is a graphic example of the scope and character of a regional dispute exacerbated
by the presence of large amounts of sophisticated hardware on both sides. The introduction of high
technology weapons into a region can contribute substantially to localized arms races, raising the
likelihood that political problems will be answered by military solutions. William E. Jackson (former
executive director of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament) cautions that,
by introducing high-tech arms, "Far from preventing war, you may be increasing its severity or making it
more likely by making a country confident enough to push its interests. Once the political fabric is torn
sufficiently, war breaks out." 86 Of course the rivalries and tensions exist with or without advanced
weapons systems, but the availability of those weapons raises the level of conflict and the extent of
destruction.
Second, there is the related issue of qualitative increases in LDC weapons purchases. A review
of delivery dates for LDC arms transfers reveals that the gap between state-of-the-art systems and LDC
acquisitions has closed dramatically in recent years.87 In an article in Foreign Affairs Quarterly, Andrew
Pierre observed:
Prior to the 1970s most arms sales (especially to the developing countries) were the
surplus and obsolete weapons of the major powers, which they wanted to eliminate from
their inventories (often as military assistance grants) so as to make room for new, more
advanced weapons. Even in the early 1960s the aircraft transferred to the developing
world more often than not were ten year old F-86 and Soviet MiG-17 fighters .... 88
Developing countries are no longer interested in hand-me-downs. Sophisticated weapons have
become as much a status symbol as a national airline, with the added advantage of satisfying real and
perceived security needs.
Increased sophistication of LDC arsenals is consonant with the announced goals of the Reagan
program. Under Secretary Buckley has said:
What we do expect to see, as our policy is applied, is a qualitative shift in the kinds of
countries with which we will be concluding sales. They will include a large number of
developing countries.... with which we will want to develop a cooperative relationship....89
This statement and others confer legitimacy on what has elsewhere been viewed as a potentially
dangerous increase in coproduction agreements with non-NATO countries, whereby LDCs acquire
technical information to manufacture advanced weapons through licensing and joint venture
agreements. Coproduction is the most problematic aspect of increased LDC weapons sophistication,
with the net result of losses to the U.S. on three fronts: (a) more sophisticated weapons in the hands of
LDCs with a concomitant reduction in U.S. influence and security; (b) the attenuating of U.S.
technological advances through their acquisition by LDCs; and (c) the loss of U.S. jobs and creation of
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an LDC competitive base. Why these disadvantages are being institutionalized in U.S. policy is difficult
to understand, beyond recognizing the boost they provide to the short-term earnings of arms
manufacturers.91
Finally, LDC arms acquisitions must be viewed against the backdrop of the recipients'
economies. With LDCs buying arms at an estimated average increase in value of 25% per year, the
opportunity costs to many struggling economies are formidable.92 Each new weapons system bought
can translate into social services and developmental goals forgone.93 A recent Wall Street Journal
article points out that African arms imports are eleven times the level of a decade ago, and Latin
American purchases have increased by 608%.94 Such policies receive a tacit blessing from an
Administration which offered an FY 1983 foreign assistance budget request for a 44% increase in
defense spending, as against an 8% increase in developmental aid.95
The prevailing attitude in the Administration is that the very poverty of most LDCs would act as
an effective control on their arms spending. Under Secretary Buckley has said that:
The enormous cost of modern, weapons and the state of the world economy provide
their own restraints on the capacity and appetite of would-be purchasers.96
Reliance on this economic braking system does not seem realistic, given that the Administration
has encouraged greater LDC borrowing through debt forgiveness, rescheduling subsidies, "cash flow
financing", and proposals for a new concessional loan window. Moreover, the military regimes that rule
or exert strong influence over most LDCs have a vested interest in allocating substantial portions of
their national budgets for defense purchases. Without due regard for the absorptive capacities of the
recipients, the Administration's vigorous arms sale policy is helping to drive LDCs even deeper into
debt.97 Turning to regional profiles, we can see the effects of U.S. policies and those of other
suppliers.
While the Middle East is by far the largest regional recipient of arms transfers, Sub-Saharan
Africa is the fastest growing market.98 The region is the product of colonial rule, from which some of
its countries have only recently emerged. Despite some oil and mineral resources, Africa remains one
of the least developed areas in the world. Economic instability and poverty are leitmotifs of African
politics. So too is tribalism, a divisive feature that continues to complicate emergence of national
identities. More recent sources of conflict which thread through regional issues have been the different
external threats from Soviet adventurism and an isolated, powerful South Africa.
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The Soviets have dominated the African arms market, with France and the U.S. following at a
distance. This clear lead has done little to assure Soviet hegemony in the region, as noted in Section
II. While they maintain strong client relations with several states, the Soviets have failed to develop a
more conventional economic and diplomatic presence.100 The Soviet-backed Cuban forces in Angola
are regarded with suspicion and concern in neighboring countries. Cuban troops in the Congo cause
anxiety in Gabon, which depends upon Brazzaville's cooperation to transport strategic minerals to their
markets. Most important, Soviet arms shipments to Libya have destabilized the Sahel and all of Africa,
resulting in: open warfare in Chad and disturbances in Sudan. The list of Soviet customers includes
Angola, Equitorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, and Uganda.101
In the period 1974-1981, the Soviets have sent some 4,885 pieces of artillery, 1,555 tanks, and 340
supersonic aircraft to the region, along with other hardware and advisory support.102
The Allied share of this market has been far more modest, but still significant.103 Western
European transfers tend to follow colonial lines, with Francophone African nations relying on the
French, and former English colonies continuing military ties with Britain. The U.S. has sought to create
special relationships to facilitate plans for Rapid Deployment Force capacity through the region. To that
end, the Administration has proposed $165 million in FMS credits for Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia. This
is part of an increased arms transfer program which anticipates a quadrupling of FMS credits from the
1981 totals of $126 million to proposed 1983 levels of $474 million.104 As mentioned earlier, forgiveness
of indebtedness incurred by Sudan and new low interest loans for six other African countries are part of
this packag A parallel increase in U.S. commercial sales is predicted, from 1981 exports of less than
$6 million to the region, to a 1983 estimate of $17 million.105 The increase in volume of U.S., Western
European, and Soviet arms transfers has been accompanied by qualitative increases. Few African
arsenals will boast of the most sophisticated weapons systems, but recent trends show the region to be
one step away from latest-generation acquisitions. 106
This occurs against a backdrop of growing instability, largely caused by the endemic problems
discussed above, but interpreted by the major powers as having East/West dimensions. Continued
fighting in the Horn is a prime example. The Soviets are supporting Ethiopean leader Mengitsu in his
efforts to destabilize the regime of Somali President Siad Barre, who receives U.S. backing. Factional
groups in both countries create internal friction and complicate the picture. The U.S. faces the dilemma
of supporting the Somali government without encouraging further incursions into Ethiopia based on
Somalia's irredentist claims in the region. Another layer of complexity results from Somalia's long-time
rivalry with neighboring Kenya, which is also a U.S. customer and ally. The recent coup attempt in
Kenya emphasizes the uncertainty of the political situation in that country, and the persistance of tribal
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rivalries.107 Factionalism and tribalism also threaten the new regime in Zimbabwe108 and play a role in
the frustrated efforts to reach a settlement in Namibia.109
Perhaps most important, growing domestic strife and the enmity of Black African states makes
the position of Africa's largest military power, South Africa, more untenable. Friction with the border
countries of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland portends future violence. A Reagan Administration
initiative seeking to remove prohibitions against sales of nonlethal equipment to South African police
raises questions about U.S. policies there.
The continuing upheaval throughout the region and the relatively low level of arms
sophistication suggest the need for restraint by suppliers. But the quantity and quality of weapons
transfers to Africa are increasing and the opportunity for imposing those controls is slipping away.
B. The Caribbean110
The Caribbean region, like Africa, has not been a traditional customer for sophisticated
weapons. But, as in Africa, that situation is changing rapidly as the major powers introduce more arms
with greater destructive potential.
The Caribbean islands and littoral states of Central and South America are politically diverse.
Some of the islands remain protectorates (Guadeloupe, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico). Others are
sovereign, and retain small police cum military establishments which play a part in internal politics, but
do not exercise a major defense role in the region (Jamaica, Barbados, Dominican Republic). The
obvious exceptions are Cuba and a new regional bete noir, Grenada. Soviet military shipments to Cuba
have increased to their highest levels since 1962,111 and the construction of a military installation and a
large airport on Grenada contribute to regional uncertainties.
Traditional border disputes among Central American neighbors continue, especially between
Guatemala and Belize, Honduras and Nicaragua. But more important to the area are pervasive
economic and social problems, including land reform movements and the demands for more pluralistic
societies.112 A provocative government in Nicaragua and continued Cuban intervention feed those
fears. Border disputes also disrupt relations on the South American coast, where oil-rich Venezuela
claims 65% of Guyana.113 Tensions between Venezuela and Colombia over illegal immigration and
maritime boundaries also continue to grow.114
The major arms supplying nations have begun to capitalize on the demand generated by this
instability. The French have concluded sales agreements with Nicaragua of $13 million worth of
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helicopters, missile-firing patrol boats, air-to-ground missiles, and rocket launchers.115 This move
occurs as the U.S. Administration is seeking additional arms assistance for El Salvador, including more
helicopters and support services. Recent Soviet shipments to Cuba include MiG-23 aircraft, which the
Administration perceives as helping to raise the regional ante.
The U.S. has interpreted regional developments, especially the growing Cuban presence on
Grenada, as sufficient provocation to contract with Venezuela for the sale of twenty-four F-16 fighters,
at a. total cost of $615.3 million. This agreement undermines Paragraph 9 of the Declaration of
Ayacucho of 1974, in which Venezuela joined with seven other Andean nations to seek to limit the
introduction of offensive weapons into the region.116 The proposed sale brought a formal protest from
Guyana, and Columbia's president-elect has also expressed concern. 117 It remains to be seen whether
the sale itself and Venezuelan statements proclaiming a role as regional protector will seriously damage
strong U.S. ties with Columbia, including cooperation in controlling illicit drug traffic.
In the wake of the Venezuelan agreement, Peru made overtures concerning the F-16/J79;
another species of export fighter which resembles the F-16, but has a more modest power plant. State
Department officials privately expressed doubt about Peru's ability to finance such a purchase, and
about the effect the sale would have on that country's development. As could be predicted, the F-16
sale to Venezuela has served to "break the tacit threshold on sophisticated weapons in Latin America",
and make it "more difficult for Washington to turn down other nations which request the F-16." 118
Administration spokesmen have championed the Venezuelan sale as protecting an important oil-
supplying friend without overburdening its economy. A joint statement by Assistant Secretaries of State
Enders and Burt recites Administration concern about the Cuban threat and again offers the argument
that the sale would have gone to another supplier. if the U.S. had not reacted first.119 But former Under
Secretary of State Matthew Nimmetz told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "If Cuba gets
into fighting people by air, the U.S. is going to be involved; we are not going to count on Venezuela to
have an air war with Cuba." 120 Given the proximity to the U.S. and the level of conflict that an air war
would represent, Nimmetz's thesis seems well founded.
More important, the Administration's "us or them" posture begs the question of whether or not
such weapons should be sold by anyone. Professor Pierre has underscored both the need and the
opportunity for arms limitations in the whole of Latin America:
The potential for conflict within Latin America appears to have increased in recent years,
underscoring the significance of the need for restraint. The rising cost of arms and of
efforts to modernize the armed forces provides another incentive. Moreover, the
establishment of some qualitative ceilings on the type of arms that might be introduced
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into the region may be feasible, given the still relatively low level of military technology in
the inventories. Latin America would also be an especially appropriate region for
consultation among the suppliers. No nation has a dominant share of the arms market
that it would be asked to give up. The essentially commercial competition that exists at
present among the suppliers could therefore be regulated so as to ensure that political
objectives, such as regional stability, are best met. 1 1
Since the publication of Pierre's book earlier this year, the arithmetic of sales to the region has
altered, making localized and global arms restraint policies more critical, if serious confrontations are to
be avoided.
In contrast to Africa and the Caribbean, the Asian subcontinent has been a major arms recipient
since World War II. The U.S. provided a large volume of surplus weapons to Pakistan and lesser
amounts to India as part of its post-war communist containment policy. Between 1954 and 1965, the
U.S. gave $674 million in military grant assistance to Pakistan, and $95 million to India.122 These U.S.
transfers accounted for some 80% of Pakistan's armaments during that period and made the country
into a "serious military power." 123 The buildup led to an arms race with India, and eventually
contributed to three regional wars. The 1965 fighting over Kashmir resulted in U.S. curtailment of arms
transfers to both countries. While sales later resumed, a restrictive policy remained in effect until 1975.
When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979, the Carter Administration sought
to accelerate security assistance to Pakistan and rebuild relations which had further deteriorated in
November of that year when radicals burned the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, killing several American
employees. But uncertainty about the depth of U.S. commitment led General Zia ul-Haq to reject a
$400 million assistance offer as "peanuts." 124 His reticence was traceable to the fact that Carter
earlier had invoked the Symington amendment denying military assistance when it became clear that
Pakistan was developing a nuclear weapons capability. Nonetheless, the Carter Administration
managed to rekindle bilateral security discussions with the Pakistani regime.
The Reagan Administration advanced those discussions and took them in a new direction. The
result was an agreement to sell Pakistan an integrated air defense system which includes forty F-16
fighters at a cost of more than $1 billion. It generally is agreed that the purchase is supported by
financing from Saudi Arabia, since Pakistan would not be able to undertake such a commitment alone.
The State Department estimates Pakistan's GNP for 1981 to have been about $24.5 billion. Its balance
of trade deficit runs nearly two to one: $4.7 billion of imports versus $2.4 billion in exports.125 A recent
Wall Street Journal article notes that the sale represents a serious burden on a Pakistani economy
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where 29% of the country's budget is spent in servicing existing debt. The article also points up the
opportunity cost to a developing country such as Pakistan, where the annual per capita income is below
$250.126 More than three-quarters of the population is illiterate, and two-thirds live in mud houses. In a
country where only one village in five has electricity, the Secretary for Economic Affairs complains of
the drain that manning and servicing F-16s will have on the small pool of educated young men.127
Pakistan currently spends more than ten times as much on defense as on all social services combined,
and Pakistani officials admit that such a misallocation is unresponsive to the felt needs of their people
and creates the potential for internal problems.128
But the Pakistanis are unable to register any discontent at the ballot box. The Zia government
promised elections within ninety days after seizing power five years ago.129 Instead, Zia's predecessor,
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was executed and Zia's opponents charge that 2300 political prisoners were
jailed.130 General Zia gives no indications that elections will occur any time soon, and U.S. officials
privately admit no orderly transfer of power is likely in the foreseeable future. These facts cast doubt
on Reagan Administration claims that the F-16 sales will provide leverage on human rights issues, and
suggest parallels with the failed U.S. policies in Iran.
More importantly, the events within Pakistan. challenge the notion that U.S. arms shipments will
create a relationship which will encourage Zia's government to forego its research on nuclear weapons.
To date, this Administration has not made serious efforts to discourage continued Pakistani research
along these lines, short of signalling U.S. disapproval of a nuclear detonation by Pakistan. The sale of
aircraft which, with very minor alterations, are themselves capable of delivering a nuclear warhead is
hardly tailored to achieve restraint.
Reagan Administration policies with respect to South Asia follow in the tradition of
misunderstanding that has characterized the U.S. approach to security needs of the region since World
War 11.131 While U.S. policy makers have focused on the Soviet threat, both India and Pakistan are
obsessed with regional issues and a pervasive mutual distrust. Time and resources have permitted
India to emerge as the dominant area power, with nearly four-to-one air superiority and a domestic
defense industry which employs 250,000.132 But India has had difficulty coming to terms with its new
leadership role. Old hostilities and suspicions still shape its policies. The announcement of the
Pakistan sale prompted India to buy Mirage 2000s from France and begin negotiations with the Soviets
for new MiGs to add to its existing inventories of French, Soviet, British, and Indian-built fighters.133
Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to Washington was the occasion for President Reagan to offer an olive
branch for U.S./India relations in the incongruous form of a proposed $1 billion artillery sale.14 This
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development places the U.S. back in the uncomfortable position it was in before 1965-supplying arms
to both parties.
Administration spokesmen point to the 85,000 Soviet troops caught in the Vietnam-style guerrilla
war in Afghanistan as the real threat to regional security. But some U.S. officials and area observers
admit that a major Soviet threat to the region is unlikely. The Pakistani government seems to share that
perception; or at least to be less concerned about the possibility of a confrontation with the Soviets
than with traditional rivalries. This is evident from the fact that approximately 80% of Pakistan's army is
concentrated along the border with India. Pakistani air bases are also established in the east, rather
than along its borders with the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Thus, it seems more likely that current
policies will feed old tensions and generate new instability in a region where a delicate equilibrium
might otherwise prevail.
We have seen that the transfers of sophisticated weapons to Third World countries have
increased markedly over the past decade. The result of these qualitative and quantitative changes is
that LDCs now have unparalleled political and military options. Recently, such options have been
exercised in the South Atlantic and Middle East. The potential for more and even greater instability
exists in other parts of the world, and we have reviewed some regions which are shaping up as grim
"coming attractions." In the face of these challenges, U.S. policy has departed from the congressional
mandate of restraint. In its stead, the Reagan program of arms promotion abandons guidelines to
pursue a U.S./Soviet arms sale race, where LDC buyers become surrogates for the sellers, policing
seller interests with high technology weapons. Developmental goals and concern for regional stability
are minimized by this policy which purports to "deal with the world as it is, rather than as we would like
it to be." 135
But "the world as it is" turns out to be a complicated, multi-polar place; a product of diverse
economic and political conditions. As General Wallace Nutting (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern
Command) noted in his testimony on El Salvador, "conditions, not communists," cause instability.
Pursuit of successful foreign policy demands attention "on all fronts simultaneously: economic,
political, social, and military." 136 While competition from a belligerent and powerful Soviet Union must
be a central theme in U.S. relations with the developing world, there is every reason to believe that U.S.
interests are poorly served when that competition is expressed in large transfers of sophisticated
weapons. That course can result in a lessening of U.S. influence and freedom of action, regional
instability, and misallocation of recipient country resources. It may also compromise U.S. security
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needs through drawdowns on scarce items in our service inventory and an increased risk of reverse
engineering and countermeasure development.137
The alternative is to require that arms transfers be assigned a realistic role in the conduct of our
foreign policy. This means recognizing the very important contribution they make as one element of a
balanced approach to the security and developmental needs of key recipients, and of whole regions. It
also demands that some basic multilateral restraints be applied to the trade in sophisticated weapons to
developing countries, so that the collective security of suppliers and recipients will not be undermined
further by competition for the market. The Arms Export Control Act provides the U.S. with a framework
for initiatives on both fronts.
A. The Congressional Role
The Congress determined it would play a larger role in the formulation of arms transfer policy
when it passed the AECA. The legislative history noted that "Too often in the past decisions have been
made with respect to security assistance without the knowledge or concurrence of Congress." 138 To
"insure congressional oversight of arms transfers," the AECA incorporated requirements for annual
estimates (Sec. 25), expanded quarterly reports (Sec. 36(a)), and reporting on important offers to sell
(Sec. 36(b)). The 36(b) reports of major sales incorporate a notice period of thirty days. An additional
twenty day informal notice prior to such submissions was agreed upon as a "tickler" system for
important sales. Subsequent amendments consolidated and expanded the Sec. 25 reports, along lines
envisioned by Senator Javits in amendments he had proposed.l39 Other changes have made defense
requirements surveys (Sec. 26) and price and availability requests (Sec. 28) accessible to Congress.
Despite better information, it is apparent that Congress has not become a full partner to the
process. Informal reviews of 36(b) submissions show that many of these sales were not included in the
quarterly estimates required by Sec. 28 as price and availability requests. Most omissions seem to be
uncontroversial and not prejudicial to the congressional role. But breaches of the formal and informal
notice process weaken congressional oversight and the opportunity to participate in comprehensive
planning. Moreover, they create the risk of an AWACS scenario in which, as Senator Robert C. Byrd
noted, "a simple survey of Saudi defense requirements escalated into a major foreign policy issue for
the United States without a great deal of high level attention along the way." 140
Congress may also find that DOD and the Administration have created a "Catch 22" situation
for the legislative branch through the use of the "cash flow" method of financing. This permits credits
to be extended to countries which have only enough monies to meet current fiscal year cash
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requirements of a sale, rather than the usual demand that they set aside the total cost of the purchase
at the time the order is placed. By permitting this practice, GAO warns that Congress has allowed the
Defense Department to make "a deeper commitment without congressional approval for future
support." 141 Congress may one day soon find itself obligated to make sales to countries when such
transfers may run counter to U.S. interests.
More fundamentally, the information that Congress receives does not lend itself to use in long-
term planning.142 Staff members of the responsible committees argue that sales are presented in
isolation, and Congress is asked to approve without knowing the context of the transfer. This differs
dramatically from the extensive justifications which accompany bilateral and multilateral development
programs. Those programs use a country plan approach to report and evaluate all aspects of recipient
economies. U.S. aid levels are reviewed in terms of genuine needs and participation by other countries
and international organizations.
While additional data on arms sales are available to Congress under the extended reporting
provisions of Sec. 36(b), that clause has seldom been invoked, and does not include full economic
analysis. Likewise, the Sec. 25 report has not been adequate for economic planning. The economic
considerations embodied in Sec. 35, which would declare ineligible a country diverting development
resources to "unnecessary military expenditures", have never been called into play.
The solution may be as simple as requiring that the Departments of State and Defense share
with the appropriate committees the products of the military/economic reviews undertaken at the
mission level. The 1978 amendments to the AECA requiring that the Administration share defense
requirement surveys with the concerned committees have met with DOD resistance on the single
instance when invoked: a request relating to El Salvador. Accordingly, the surveys have no systematic
role in the congressional review process.143 It may be desirable that country reports be provided
through the vehicle of the regional subcommittees, in some established way. Certainly an "economic
impact statement" of some kind would be a small burden; no more onerous than the one AID and IDCA
now carry on developmental programs. And it would allow for a programmatic, informed approach to
FMS and commercial license proposals.
Consideration should also be given to charging one staff member on each committee with
responsibility for LDC arms export policies and for following the programs more carefully than is now
done. The size of the programs and the security issues at stake clearly justify some full-time attention,
and long-term congressional participation.
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Finally, Congress would guarantee a more positive role for itself by requiring that major sales be
approved, rather than relying on a resolution of disapproval, as is now the case. Senator Robert C.
Byrd recommended this approach in 1977 for sales in excess of $200 million for any one country.1"
The effect would be to involve Congress in important country policy decisions without intruding into the
more routine transactions that are properly left within the jurisdiction of the Executive agencies. Again,
this would help to assure continuity and a longer view of U.S. policies.
B. U.S. Leadership
The AECA obligation to seek multilateral controls should become an urgent priority. If the
Administration genuinely is "prepared to examine ways" to control the spread of high technology
conventional weapons, the time is now. The failure of the 1977 CAT meetings wih the Soviets offers
some important lessons, and suggests alternatives which are more likely to meet with success.
The first step necessarily would be multilateral discussions with NATO members. Those who
participated in the original CAT meetings urge that Western producers come to terms with a program
for restraint and market sharing before trying to reach consensus with the Soviets.145 Professor Pierre
concurs, noting that:
It is remarkable, in fact, that systematic foreign policy consultations among the major
Western powers on developments in the Third World do not already take place, given the
importance to the First World countries of what happens in some of the more volatile
parts of the world.146
The issue has become too important to allow the objection that such discussions are beyond
the ambit of European security and thus exceed the NATO mandate. The current competition among
allied producers undercuts shared policy goals and prevents a unified approach. Allied nations share
many objectives in other regions. That common'ground ought to be explored as part of the existing
collective security arrangement.
The economic interests of Western countries will, of course, be the barrier to a consensus on
restraint; especially among European nations whose economies rely more on exports. But market
division along geographic or product lines could offer solutions that would be economically attractive to
the producers. Experiments with regional cooperative schemes may lead to an acceptable formula for
the global market.
Only when the Allies can agree among themselves on a program of restraint will a serious
approach to the Soviets be possible. Professor Pierre characterizes this step as an attempt to establish
"rules of the game." 147 There is no doubt that the Soviets see negotiations as an opportunity to limit
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Western transfers and garner a better market position. But the Soviets share Western interests in
limiting the number of sophisticated weapons and the diffusion of influence that occurs. Those
interests might find expression in a willingness to abide by regional restrictions on categories of high
technology weapons. We have seen that Africa and the Caribbean may be good starting points for this
restrictive treatment.
Other channels for pursuing restraint have been suggested. The Palme Commission
recommends regional agreements and supplier/recipient guidelines for conventional transfers.148 Here
again, a unified allied approach may offer the best chance of success in achieving enforceable
agreements. But the suggestion that recipients be included in the process is important, and becomes
more so as- LDCs develop their own arms production capabilities. An orderly system for meeting their
security needs in appropriate ways requires developing country participation and commitment. The U.S.
has the choice of encouraging this process, or hoping to ride out the storm of growing instability that is
gathering.
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1. John Steinbruner, "Fears of War, Programs for Peace," The Brookings Review, Fall, 1982, p. 6.
2. Stanley Hoffman, "Three Falkland Lessons," New York Times, May 7, 1982; Charles Mohr, "New
Wars Show the Power of Military Basics," New York Times, June 18, 1982; Drew Middleton, "In
Falkland Fighting, Harrier Jump-Jet and Exocet Missiles Won New Regard," New York Times,
June 19, 1982; Letter to the Editor by Admiral Stansfield Turner, New York Times, June 20, 1982;
"Lebanon, Falklands: Tests in High-Tech War," U.S. News & World Report, August 16, 1982.
3. Lt. Co. G. H. Turley, "Time of Change in Modern Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, December,
1974; Leslie Wayne, "High Tech Companies Cash in on Today's Computer Battlefields," New
York Times, June 20, 1982; "Killer Electronic Weaponry," Business Week, September 20, 1982, p.
74.
4. Michael R. Gordon, "Competition with the Soviet Union Drives Reagan's Arms Sales Policy,"
National Journal, May 16, 1981, p. 868.
5. Press Release issued by Senator William Proxmire, November 6, 1981.
6. H.C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen, Merchants of Death (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1934);
See also Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (New York: Viking Press, 1977), p. 66 at seq.
7. Report on the Munitions Industry, S. Rep. No. 3., 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
8. Foreign Military Sales Act, 82 Stat. 1320 (1968) (current version renamed at 22 U.S.C. 2751
(1976)).
9. Id., ch. 1, Sec. 1.
10. Id., ch. 1, Sec. 4.
11. Id., ch. 3, Sec. 35.
12. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook 1981, (London: Taylor &
Francis Ltd., 1981), Table pp. 186-187.
13. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. 2751 and other
sections of the former FMSA.
14. Id., at Sec. 2751 (FMSA Sec. 1).
15. Committee Comment, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1976); U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, p. 1387.
16. 22 U.S.C. 2751(b)(1), (Sec. 36(b)).
17. An analysis and history of the AECA legislative veto is contained in "The Legislative Veto and
U.S. Arms Sales," an unpublished CRS White Paper by Dr. Richard Grimmett (September 24,
1979). The broader issue of the constitutionality of the legislative veto is treated in John B.
Henry's "The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits," 16 Harv. J. Legis. 735 (1979).
The Supreme Court is scheduled to deal with this issue in two cases to be considered in the
coming term: Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980);
Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 673 F.2d 425
(D.C. Cir. 1982). Both cases deal with the issue of one house legislative vetos.
18. Statement by President Carter on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, May 19, 1977, 1 Pub.
Papers 931-932 (1977).
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19. Congressional Research Service Report (hereinafter "CRS 1981 Report") prepared for the
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., "Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy," (Comm.
Print, Sept. 25, 1981), p. 11.
20. Id., p. 29.
21. Id., p. 29.
22. Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, (Princeton: Princeton University Press for the
Council on Foreign Relations, 1982), p. 59.
23. . B.M. Blechman, J.E. Nolan, A. Pratt, "Pushing Arms," Foreign Policy, No. 46 (Spring 1982), pp.
138-154.
24. CRS 1981 Report, p. 31.
25. Committee Comment, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1976); U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, p. 1388.
26. For a more complete description of programs, and costs, see the Congressional Presentation of
Security Assistance Programs for FY 1983, Summary.
27. See p.30, infra, "Discarding Fiscal Restraint."
28. Press Release issued by Senator Charles Percy, summarizing Administration report for 1978-1980
arms transfers, February 1, 1982.
29. Richard Wittle, "Special Report on Arms Sales: Part I," Congressional Quarterly, April 3, 1982, p.
723 (inset).
30. Hearings on Conventional Arms Sales before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
(hereinafter "Senate Hearings"), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 28, 1981), p. 22 (statement by Lt.
Gen. Ernest Graves, Director, DSAA). While Graves' remarks concern Soviet arms values, similar
difficulties obtain in making estimates for other suppliers, including France. See Andrew Pierre's
comments in Global Politics, footnote 45, p. 321.
31. "Soviet Union Is the World's Largest Arms Peddler, U.S. Asserts," Washington Post (AP), August
3, 1982. Buckley's remarks are contained in a State Department Press Release dated August 2,
1982.
32. Department of State Special Report No. 102, "Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World,
1972-81," August, 1982, p. 7.
33. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, updating information in the CRS 1981 Report and
presented as "Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1974-
1981" (herein after "CRS Update (1982)" or "CRS 1982 Report"), unpublished CRS White Paper
by Dr. Richard F. Grimmett (August 12, 1982). See Tables 1-7, pp. 13-23. Portions of this report
appear as Appendix A.
34. CRS Update (1982), Tables 2 (p. 16), and 3 (p. 19).
35. Id., p. 16.
36. ld., p. 13.
37. This typology is drawn from "U.S. Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Implications of
Sophistication," an unpublished Congressional Research Service White Paper prepared by Caleb
Rossiter of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of CRS. An Excerpt from Prof.
Rossiter's analysis is attached as Appendix B.
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38. Michael Harrison's article in Foreign Policy, No. 43 (Summer 1981), p. 3, entitled "Reagan's
World," offers a thoughtful overview of the Administration's preoccupation with the U.S./Soviet
dimension of foreign policy.
39. Senate Hearings, p. 10.
40. CRS 1981 Report, Table 2, p. 15.
41. CRS 1981 Report, Table 1, p. 13.
42. Department of State Press Release (not numbered), August 2, 1982, p. 3.
43. CRS Update (1982), p. 8.
44. "Soviet Union is the World's Largest Arms Peddler, US Asserts," Washington Post, August 3,
1982.
45. CRS Update (1982), p. 12.
46. "Arms Sales: Part I ," Congressional Quarterly, April 3, 1982, p. 720.
47. Pierre, Global Politics, p. 131.
48. "Arms Sales: Part I," Congressional Quarterly, April 3, 1982, p. 723.
49. CRS Update (1982), p. 11.
50. Congressional Research Service analysis places U.S. exports at less than 24% of total arms
production while the U.K. exports about 26%, France over 30%, and Italy 31%. In Global Politics
of Arms Sales, Andrew Pierre puts the French total at 41% in 1980 (p. 85). Pierre notes the
difficulty of assessing Soviet percentages, but acknowledges that export pressure is lower (p. 80).
CRS sources estimate Soviet exports to be about 18% of total production. CRS calculations are
based on five year averages derived from Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) figures
and other unclassified sources.
51. Anthony Sampson, "The Lethal Ironies of Arms Sales," Washington Post, June 21, 1982.
52. Dan Morgan, "Israel, the Customer, and America, the Armorer, Sway Each Other," Washington
Post, July 21, 1982, in which Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger is quoted as saying the
U.S. has "no control" over Israel.
53. Pierre, Global Politics, p. 81.
54. Remarks before the American Enterprise Institute Forum (No. 56), September 9, 1981, rpt., p. 23.
55. Barry M. Blechman, quoted in "Arms Sales: Part I," Congressional Quarterly, April 3, 1982, p.
722.
56. "U.S. Weapons Exports Headed for Record Level," The Defense Monitor, Vol. XI, No. 3 (1982), p.
8. Prepared by the Center for Defense Information.
57. CRS 1981 Report, p. 44.
58. Senate Hearings, p. 8.
59. CRS 1981 Report, p. 39.
60. 22 U.S.C. 2751.
61. Speech by William P. Clark, "National Security Strategy," delivered to the Georgetown Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, May 21, 1982, rpt., p. 10.
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62. CRS 1981 Report, p. 42.
63. Statement by Walter R. Edgington, International Committee, National Security Industrial
Association, included in Senate Hearing, p. 88. See also Mr. Edington's response to questioning
by Senator Percy, p. 99, acknowledging the primacy of national security concerns in making
foreign sales.
64. Congressional Budget Office Staff Working Paper of May 24, 1976 which concludes that "For the
current mix of sales the study estimates that only fifty percent of foreign military sales result in
cost savings to the U.S.," Summary, p. "x". Follow-up discussions with CBO officials confirm
that the savings from foreign sales are "not of a dramatic nature."
67. Cf. "Arms Sales," Congressional Quarterly, October 29, 1977, p. 2319; Congressional Research
Service Report No. 81-257, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Relations," December 10, 1981;
"Overhaul U.S. Policy on Human Rights?," U.S. News & World Report, March 2, 1981, p. 49.
68. "Arms Sales: Part II," Congressional Quarterly, April 10, 1982, p. 802.
69. Senate Hearings, p. 6.
70. In a May 21, 1981, address (reprinted as Department of State Current Policy 279), Under
Secretary Buckley referred to "undercutting, the capabilities of strategically located nations". as a
species of the "self-inflicted injuries" of the Carter policy. See also William Clark's speech to
Georgetown University, May 21, 1982, making no mention of human rights considerations.
72. "Envoy Asks and Senate Acts to Ease Ban on Aid to Brazil," Congressional Quarterly, June 5,
1982, p. 1341.
73. "The Administration's Record in Nonproliferation Matters," unpublished', report by Lynn Weiss,
Minority Staff Director, Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Prolif ration and Government
Process of the Committee on Government Affairs.
74. Written response by Lt. Gen. Kelly Burke (USAF) to questions from the Senate Armed Services
Committee in March, 1981.
75. Walter Mossberg, "Administration Split Over Who Gets F16 First," Wall Street Journal, June 23,
1981.
76. Section 206 of the AECA amends Section 21 of the Foreign Military Sales Act (22 U.S.C. 2761
(h)(i)) to require a written statement accompanying any proposal to sell defense articles or
services which "could have a significant adverse effect" on U.S. service inventories. Authorities
report that no such statement has ever been submitted by this Administration. The 36 (b)
submissions contain boiler-plate assurances that sales will not harm materially U.S. readiness.
Likewise, no detailed reports under Sec. 812 of the DOD Appropriations Act of 1976 (Pub. L. 94-
106) have been submitted by this Administration.
77. Defense Monitor, p. 3.
78. Presidential Policy Directive of July 8, 1981, 17 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 727-729 (July 13,
1981); Senate Hearings, p. 8 (remarks of Mr. Buckley) and p. 38 (remarks of Mr. West, responding
to Senator Glenn).
79. "Arms Sales: Part II," Congressional Quarterly, April 10, 1982, p. 797.
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80. William H. Gregory, "Controlling Military Sales", Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 29,
1981, p. 11.
81. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, "Improvement Still Neded in Recouping
Administrative Costs of Foreign Military Sales," AFMD-82-10, (February 2, 1982).
82. Id., Appendix II, p. 16.
83. Report by the General Accounting Office, "U.S. Security and Military Assistance: Programs and
Related Activities," GAO/ID-82- 40, June 1, 1982.
84. Dan Morgan, "13 Arms Buyers in Default on Interest to U.S.," Washington Post, July 12, 1982.
85. Pierre, Global Politics, p. 133. Table 3 shows that seven of the world's ten largest arms importers
are Middle Eastern countries. Pierre avers that this region accounted for 50% of developing
world weapons transfers in 1980, p. 134.
86. William E. Jackson, Jr., as quoted in "Arms Sales: Part I," Congressional Quarterly, April 3,
1982, p.724.
87. See Stockholm International Peace Research International Institute (SIPRI) Arms Trade Registers
(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1974), giving listings of national defense stockpiles with acquisition
dates of inventoried items. A review of these dates gives some indication of the compression
which has occurred, with developing countries acquiring more state-of-the-art equipment.
88. Andrew J. Pierre, "Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2
(Winter 1981 /1982), p. 267.
89. Senate Hearings, p. 12.
90. CRS 1981 Report, p. 52.
91. George Wilson, "Egypt as Warplane Maker," Washington Post, October 5, 1982. The article
reports that co-production agreements with Egypt for FX fighters are "an administration
objective."
92. Pierre, Global Politics, p. 131, citing SIPRI Yearbook, 1979.
93. "How Much Does a Soldier Cost?" South, July, 1982, p. 8.
94. June Kronholz, "Taking Up Arms," Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1982.
95. Defense Monitor, p. 6.
96. Senate Hearings, p. 12.
97. Brandt Commission, North-South: A Program for Survival, (London: Pan Books, 1980), pp. 120-
122.
98. Pierre, Global Politics, p. 255. This is true despite the constraints of Sec. 33 of the AECA,
restraining sales to the region.
99. CRS Update (1982), Table 7, p. 23.
100. Henry Bienen, "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in Africa," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 95.
No. 1 (Spring, 1980), p. 40.
101. Pierre, Global Politics, p. 257.
102. CRS Update (1982), Table 7. p. 23.
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104. Unpublished CRS White Paper, "Increasing U.S. Military Involvement in Africa," by Prof. Caleb
Rossiter, June 16, 1982, p. 3.
105. Id., p. 5.
106. Unpublished CRS White Paper, "Arms Transfers: Implications of Sophistication" by C. Rossiter,
July 26, 1982, p. 7.
107. "Kenya Foils Air Force Coup Attempt," Washington Post (AFP), August 1, 1982.
108.. "Mugabe Blames Opposition Party for Kidnapping," Washington Post, July 30, 1982.
109. Joseph Lelyveld, "Inside Namibia," New York Times Magazine, August 1, 1982, p. 12.
110. As used here, "Caribbean" includes the islands and the coastal countries of Central and Latin
America bordering the Caribbean Sea.
111. Jozef Goldblat and Victor Milian, "Militarization and Arms Control in Latin American," rpt. from
SIPRI Yearbook 1982, p. 398.
112. An overview of economic challenges to the region and the Reagan Administration response is
available in "The Caribbean Basin Initiative," by Messrs. Feinberg and Newfarmer in the Senate
Democratic Policy Committee's collection From Gunboats to Diplomacy (June 19, 1982), p. 206.
113. CRS 1981 Report, p. 62.
114. Id.
115. "French Arms Go to Nicaragua," New York Times (AP), July 13, 1982; Christopher Dickey,
"Nicaragua Says It Seeks Soviet, French Planes," Washington Post, July 29, 1982.
116. 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho, December 9, 1974, Peru, Bolivia, Panama, Venezuela, Colombia,
Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile; reported in El Peruano, No. 10105, December 10, 1974.
117. CRS 1981 Report, p. 62.
118. Pierre, Global Politics, p. 246.
119. Department of State Current Policy No. 349, "Arms Transfers to Latin America," October 22,
1981.
120. Unpublished Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 28, 1981, quoted
in CRS 1981 Report, p. 65.
121. Pierre, Global Politics, p. 254.
122. CRS 1981 Report, Table, p. 71.
123. Stephen Cohen, "US Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, No.1
(Spring 1976), p. 49.
124. Pierre, Global Politics, p. 223.
125. June Kronholz, "Taking Up Arms," Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1982.
126. See also CRS 1981 Report, p. 78.
127. "Taking Up Arms," sidebar.
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128. Id., comments of Secretary of Economic Affairs Ejaz Niak.
129. Stuart Auerbach, "Zia Has No Election Plans," Washington Post, July 11, 1982.
130. Id.
131. Cohen, "US Weapons and South Asia," p. 55.
132. Pierre, Global Politics, p. 222.
133. Id.
134. Richard Halloran, "$1 Billion Sale of Artillery to India Appears Likely," New York Times, July 29,
1982.
135. Presidential Policy Directive of July 8, 1981, 17 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 727-729 (July 13,
1981).
136. Unpublished Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 2, 1982.
137. Rossiter, "Implications of Sophistication," p. 9.
138. Committee Comment, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, p. 1387.
139. "Arms Sales: Part II," Congressional Quarterly, April 10, 1982, p. 798.
140. 127 Cong. Rec. S11,756 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1981) (remarks by Senator Robert C. Byrd).
141. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, "U.S. Security Assistance: Programs and
Related Activities," GAO/ID-82. 40, June 1, 1982, p. 71.
142. S. Scott Morrison's "The Arms Export Control Act: An Evaluation of the Role of Congress in
Policing Arms Sales," Stanford Journal of International Studies, Vol. 14 (Spring 1979), p. 105
offers a litany of reasons for the limits on congressional participation. See p. 166 ff. See also
Foreign Affairs Committee Print, Congress and Foreign Policy Series, No. 7, "Executive-
Legislative Consultation on U.S. Arms Sales," (December 1982)
143. In his 1977 address on "The Senate and Arms Sales," Senator Robert C. Byrd described the
need for closer cooperation between the Senate and DOD on arms sales information. While
several of his recommendations have become law, the institutional role of defense requirements
surveys established in Sec. 26 (by Pub. L. 95-384) has been frustrated, and cannot provide the
picture of current and potential recipient needs which Senator Byrd recognized as crucial to
fulfilling Congress's responsibility. See 126 Cong. Rec. 32843 (1977).
145. B.M. Blechman, J.E. Nolan, A. Pratt, "Pushing Arms," Foreign Policy, No. 46 (Spring 1982), p.
151.
146. Pierre, Global Politics, p. 297.
147. Id., p. 301.
148. "Vance vs. the Arms Race,"Christian Science Monitor, August 3, 1982
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Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
NWN
Washington, D.C. 20540
TRENDS IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE THIRD WORLD
BY MAJOR SUPPLIER, 1974-1981
Richard F. Grimmett
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
August 12, 1982
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Table 1
ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS WITH THE THIRD WORLD, BY SUPPLIER 1/
[In millions of current U.S. dollars]
1974
1975
2/
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
TOTAL----------- 20,263
20,550
24,393
25,134
21,416
28,631
43,803
26,728
323
-- 13
16
120
578
16
14
454
17
526
321
18
27
533
12
828
,
Non-Communist--
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
Of which:
United States --- 8,723
France-- -- -- 2,060
United Kingdom-- 750
West Germany----- 620
Italy--------- 410
Other free world- 760
9,990
2,630
940
630
1,040
890
12,468
1,040
600
730
360
1,380
6,439
3,140
1,415
1,200
980
1,280
7,486
1,950
3,860
2,520
1,390
320
8,901
4,350
1,270
900
340
2,560
9,463
8,680
2,170
770
2,870
3,580
4,868
1,215
1,460
1,150
370
3,765
Communist------------ 6,940
Of which: U.S.S.R.- 5,970
- 970
-
4,430
3,670
760
7,815
6,600
1
215
10,680
9,750
930
3,890
2,920
970
10,310
8,880
1
430
16,270
14,770
1
500
13,900
6,630
7
270
Other Communist
~
,
,
,
,
*Dollar inflation
index(1974-100)------ 100 109 117 125 134 144 160 181
* Based on Department of Defense Price Deflator (minus pension funds).
1/ U.S. data are for fiscal year given (and cover the period from July 1, 1973
through September 30, 1981). Foreign data are for the calendar year given. Statistics
shown for foreign countries are based upon estimated selling prices. All prices
given include the values of weapons, spare parts, construction, all associated
services, military assistance and training programs. U.S. commercial sales contract
values are excluded, as are values of the Military Assistance Service Funded account
(MASF) which provided grant funding for South Vietnam, Laos, Philippines, Thailand,
and South Korea. MASF for FY1974 was $840,000,000; for FY1975 $544,000,000. Related
grant transfers to South Korea and Thailand, also excluded, were $11,000,000 in FY1979;
$132,000,000 in FY1980; and $100,000,000 for FY1981. All data are current as of
January 1, 1982, and reflect termination of all sales contracts. The value of
Iranian contracts cancelled but not included in the U.S. data above are as follows:
FY1974 ($390,000,000); FY1975 ($1,157,000,000); FY1976 and transitional quarter($236,
000,000; FY1977($2,953,000,000); FY1978 ($1,673,000,000); FY1979 ($6,000,000);
FY1980 ($0). FY1981 ($0). Third World category excludes Warsaw Pact nations, NATO
nations, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand.
2/ U.S. data for FY1976 includes the transitional quarter (FY 197T).
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ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS VALUES AVERAGES, TO THIRD WORLD BY SUPPLIER, 1974-1977 1/
[In millions of current U.S. dollars]
1974
1975
2/
1976
1977
Average (1974-1977)
20 20,263
20,550
24,393
25,134
22,585.00
Non-Communist
13,323
16,120
16,578
14,454
15,118.75
Of which:
United States---
France-_-_-
United Kingdom---
West Germany---
Italy---___
Other free world-
8,723
2,060
750
620
410
760
9,990
2,630
940
630
1,040
890
12,468
1,040
600
730
360
1,380
6,439
3,140
1,415
1,200
980
1,280
9,405.00
2,217.50
926.25
795.00
697.50
1,077.50
-
----
940
6
4
430
7
815
10
680
7
466
25
Communist
-
of which: U.S.S.R.---
Other Communist-------
,
5,970
970
,
3,670
760
,
6,600
1,215
,
9,750
930
,
.
6,497.50
968.75
*Dollar inflation
index(1974'.100)-----
100
109
117
125
* Based on Department of Defense Price Deflator (minus pension funds).
1/ U.S data are for fiscal year given (and cover the period from July 1,
1973 through September 30, 1977). Foreign data are for the calendar year given.
Statistics shown for foreign countries are based upon estimated selling prices.
All prices given include the values of weapons, spare parts, construction, all
associated services, military assistance and training programs. U.S. commercial
sales contract values are excluded, as are values of the Military Assistance
Service Funded account (MASF) which provided grant funding for South Vietnam,
Laos, Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea. MASF for FY1974 was $840,000,000;
for FY1975 $544,000,000. All data are current as of January 1, 1982, and
reflect termination of all sales contracts. The value of Iranian contracts
cancelled but not included in the U.S. data above are as follows: FY1974
($390,000,000); FY1975 ($1,157,000,000); FY1976 and transitional quarter
($236,000,000);.FY1977 ($2,953,000,000). Third World category excludes
Warsaw Pact Nations, NATO nations, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand.
2/ U.S. data for FY1976 includes the transitional quarter (FY 197T).
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ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS VALUES AVERAGES, TO THIRD WORLD BY SUPPLIER, 1978-1981 1/
[In millions of current'U.S. dollars]
Non-Communist
Of which:
United States---
France-----
United Kingdom--
West Germany----
Italy-----_
Other free world-
Communist-
of which: U.S.S.R.--
Other Communist-
*Dollar inflation
index(1974-100) ------
1978
1979
1980
1981
Average (1978-1981)
21,416
28,631
43,803
26,723
30,144.50
17,526
18,321
27,533
12,828
19,052.00
7,486
1,950
3,860
2,520
1,390
320
8,901
4,350
1,270
900
340
2,560
9,463
8,680
2,170
770
2,870
3.580
4,868
1,215
1,460
1,150
370
3,765
7,679.50
4,048.75
2,190.00
1,335.00
1,242.50
2,556.25
3,890
2,920
970
10,310
8,880
1,430
16,270
14,770
1,500
13,900
6,630
7,270
11,092.50
8,300.00
2,792.50
134
144
160
181
* Based on Department of Defense Price Deflator (minus pension funds).
1/ U.S data are for fiscal year given (and cover the period from October 1,
1977 through September 30, 1981). Foreign data are for the calendar year given.
Statistics shown for foreign countries are based upon estimated selling prices.
All prices given include the values of weapons, spare parts, construction, all
associated services, military assistance and training programs. U.S. commercial
sales contract values are excluded, as are values of the Military Assistance
Service Funded account (MASF) which provided grant funding for Thailand,
and South Korea. Related grant transfers to South Korea and Thailand, also
excluded, were $11,000,000 in FY1979; $132,000,000 in FY1980; and $100,000,000
for FY1981. All data are current as of January 1, 1982, and reflect termination
of all sales contracts. The value of Iranian contracts cancelled but not
included in the U.S. data above are as follows: FY1978 ($1,673,000,000);
FY1979 ($6,000,000); FY1980 ($0). FY1981 ($0). Third World category excludes
Warsaw Pact Nations, NATO nations, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand.
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ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD, BY SUPPLIER 1/
[In millions of current U.S. dollars]
2/
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
- 7
263
044
8
11
916
15
392
912
18
21
923
179
21
414
23
,
TOTAL--
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
Non-Communist-------
4,343
5,014
7,666
9,652
11,702
11,733
12,379
14,234
Of which:
United States---
2,793
3,084
4,646
5,932
6,382
6,463
5,079
6,144
France---------
480
480
960
1,010
1,700
1,360
2,780
3,670
United Kingdom--
450
400
530
725
1,030
770
1,600
1,200
West Germany----
180
270
520
620
660
740
960
910
Italy----------
130
190
190
350
700
615
600
800
Other free world-
310
590
820
1,015
1,230
1,785
1,360
1,510
--
920
2
030
3
4
250
740
5
7
210
10
190
800
8
180
9
Communist---
,
,
,
,
,
,
,,
,
Of which: U.S.S.R.---
2,530
2,400
3,400
5,000
6,230
9,180
7,480
7,160
Other communist------
390
630
850
740
980
1,010
1,320
2,020
*Dollar inflation
index(1974'.100)-------- 100 109 117 125 134 144 160 181
* Based on Department of Defense Price Deflator (minus pension funds).
1/ U.S. data are for fiscal year given (and cover the period from July 1, 1973
through September 30, 1981). Foreign data are for the calendar year given. Statistics
shown for foreign countries are based upon estimated selling prices. All prices
given include the values of weapons, spare parts, construction, all associated
services, military assistance and training programs. U.S. commercial sales contract
values are excluded, as are values of the Military Assistance Service Funded account
(MASF) which provided grant funding for South Vietnam, Laos, Philippines, Thailand,
and South Korea. MASF deliveries values for FY1974 were $1,159,000,000; for FY1975
$1,125,000,000. Related grant transfers to South Korea and Thailand, also excluded,
were $11,000,000 in FY1979; $10,000,000 in FY1980 and $100,000,000 in FY1981. All
data are current as of January 1, 1982. Third World category excludes Warsaw Pact
nations, NATO nations, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand.
2/ United States data for FY1976 include the transitional quarter (FY 197T).
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42.
Table 2A
ARMS DELIVERIES VALUES AVERAGES TO THIRD WORLD BY SUPPLIER, 1974-1977 1/
[In millions of current U.S. dollars]
1974
1975
2/
1976
1977
Average (1974-1977)
7,263
8,044
11,916
15,392
10,653.75
Non-Communist
4,343
5,014
7,666
9,652
6,668.75
Of which:
2
793
084
3
4
646
932
5
4
113
75
United States
France -------
United Kingdom
West Germany----
-
,
480
450
180
130
,
480
400
270
190
,
960
530
520
190
,
1,010
725
620
350
,
.
732.50
526.25
397.50
00
215
Italy
Other free world-
310
590
820
1,015
.
683.75
Communist-------------
of which: U.S.S.R.---
-
2,920
2,530
390
3,030
2,400
630
4,250
3.,400
850
5,740
5,000
740
3,985.00
3,332.50
652
50
Other Communist
.
*Dollar inflation
1974
100
1
-
)
index(
* Based on Department of Defense Price Deflator (minus pension funds).
1/ U.S data are for fiscal year given (and cover the period from July 1,
1973 through September 30, 1977). Foreign data are for the calendar year given.
Statistics shown for foreign countries are based upon estimated selling prices.
All prices given include the values of weapons, spare parts, construction, all
associated services, military assistance and training programs. U.S. commercial
sales contract values are excluded, as are values of the Military Assistance
Service Funded account (MASF) which provided grant funding for South Vietnam,
Laos, Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea. MASF for FY1974 was $840,000,000;
for FY1975 $544,000,000. All data are current as of January 1, 1982, and
reflect termination of all sales contracts. Third World category excludes
Warsaw Pact Nations, NATO nations, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand.
2/ U.S. data for FY1976 includes the transitional quarter (FY 197T).
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ARMS DELIVERIES VALUES AVERAGES TO THIRD WORLD BY SUPPLIER, 1978-1981 1/
[In millions of current U.S. dollars]
1978
1979
1980
1981
Average (1978-1981)
18,912
21,923
21,179
23,414
21,357.00
11,702
11,733
12,379
14,234
12,512.00
Of which:
United States---
France-----------
United Kingdom--
West Germany-----
Italy------------
Other free world-
6,382
1,700
1,030
660
700
1,230
6,463
1,360
770
740
615
1,785
5,079
2,780
1,600
960
600
1,360
6,144
3,670
1,200
910
800
1,510
6,017.00
2,377.50
1,150.00
817.50
678.75
1,471.25
Communist-
of which: U.S.S.R.---
7,210
6,230
10,190
9,180
8,800
7,480
9,180
7,160
8,845.00
7,512.50
-
--
980
010
1
1
320
2
020
50
1
332
Other Communist
,
,
,
,
.
*Dollar inflation
index(1974-100)-------
134
144
160
181
* Based on Department of Defense Price Deflator (minus pension funds).
1/ U.S data are for fiscal year given (and cover the period from October 1,
1977 through September 30, 1981). Foreign data are for the calendar year given.
Statistics shown for foreign countries are based upon estimated selling prices.
All prices given include the values of weapons, spare parts, construction, all
associated services, military assistance and training programs. U.S. commercial
sales contract values are excluded, as are values of the Military Assistance
Service Funded account (MASF) which provided grant funding for Thailand,
and South Korea. Related grant transfers to South Korea and Thailand, also
excluded, were $11,000,000 in FY1979; $132,000,000 in FY1980; and $100,000,000
for FY1981. All data are current as of January 1, 1982, and reflect termination
of all sales contracts. Third World category excludes Warsaw Pact Nations,
NATO nations, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand.
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Table 3
NUMBERS OF WEAPONS DELIVERED BY MAJOR SUPPLIERS TO THE THIRD WORLD 1/
Weapons Category
United States
U.S.S.R
Major Western
European 2/
1974-1977
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns---
3,881
4,595
1,215
Artillery-----------------------
3,123
7,375
1,260
APCs and Armored Cars------------
6,853
5,245
1,470
Major Surface Combatants--------
61
12
19
Minor Surface Combatants--------
144
58
189
-
--~----
13
9
14
Submarines--~-
-
822
1
280
215
Supersonic Combat Aircraft
,
Subsonic Combat Aircraft -------
510
230
35
Other Aircraft ---
938
170
490
Helicopters- -----
463
305
890
Guided Missile Boats--------
0
32
8
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs) ----
2,450
14,345
1,755
1978-1981
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns----
2,375
5,635
510
Artillery----_--___-___-
2,783
7,000
1,145
APCs and Armored Cars-----------
5,658
6,810
3,230
Major Surface Combatants--------
23
28
43
Minor Surface Combatants---- --
33
110
93
_
1
6
8
Submarines---
Supersonic Combat Aircraft-----
500 .
1,795
240
Subsonic Combat Aircraft---------
149
-190
75
Other Aircraft------------------
330
300
410
Helicopters
172
845
715
-
---
0
42
21
Guided Missile Boats--
-
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)----
4,995
5,665
585
1974-1981
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns----
6,256
10,230
1,725
Artillery--
5,906
14,375
2,405
APCs and Armored Cars----------
12,511
12,055
4,700
-
84
40
62
Major Surface Combatants--
Minor Surface Combatants---------
177
168
282
Submarines--
14
15
22
---
1
322
3
075
455
Supersonic Combat Aircraft
,
,
Subsonic Combat Aircraft------
659
420
110
Other. Aircraft---_____-_-
1,268
470
900
Helicopters- ----
635
1,150
1,605
Guided Missile Boats---------
0
74
29
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)----
7,445.
20,010
2,340
1/ Third World category excludes Warsaw Pact nations, NATO nations, Europe,
Japan, Australia and New Zealand. U.S. data are for fiscal years given (and cover
the period from July 1, 1973 through September 30, 1981). Foreign data are for
calendar years given.
2/ Major Western European includes France, United Kingdom, West Germany,
and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.
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Table 4
NUMBERS OF WEAPONS DELIVERED BY MAJOR SUPPLIERS TO EAST ASIA & THE PACIFIC 1/
Weapons Category
United States
U.S.S.R
Major Western
European 2/
1974-1977
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns---
543
275
30
------ -?-------
904
1
120
75
Artillery ------
,
APCs and Armored Cars------------
1,101
95
20
Major Surface Combatants--------
31
0
1
Minor Surface Combatants- ---
88
0
0
Submarines----____-2 4
0
236
15
0
Supersonic Combat Aircraft
Subsonic Combat Aircraft----
106
0
0
Other Aircraft----------------
449
105
110
-----------
106
40
75
Helicopters- ---
Guided Missile Boats-----------
0
0
0
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)----
185
0
15
1978-1981
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns----
714
640
50
---------
870
475
115
Artillery---- ---
APCs and Armored Cars------
870
355
230
Major Surface Combatants-__-..-_
14
7
0
- --
25
44
16
Minor Surface Combatants
Submarines-------------------
0
0
2
Supersonic Combat Aircraft------
218
240
0
Subsonic Combat Aircraft---------
118
55
10
Other Aircraft-----------------
67
100
80
Helicopters --------
150
130
115
Guided Missile Boats- --_---__
0
8
3
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)----
1,078
175
0
1974-1981
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns---
1,257
915
80
_______-
774
2
595
190
Artillery- -___-
,
APCs and Armored Cars----_---_-
1,971
450
250
Major Surface Combatants--------
45
7
1
Minor Surface Combatants-_-__-_
113
44
16
Submarines----------------------
2
4
2
Supersonic-Combat Aircraft----
454
255
0
Subsonic Combat Aircraft--------
224
55
10
Other Aircraft---------- ---
516
205
190
Helicopters --------_--_-_-_
256
170
190
Guided Missile Boats ---
0
8
3
1
263
175
15
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)
,
1/ Excludes Japan, Australia and New Zealand. U.S. data are for fiscal years
given (and cover the period from July 1, 1973 through September 30, 1981). Foreign
data are for calendar years given.
2/ Major Western European includes France, United Kingdom, West Germany,
and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.
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AA
Table 5
NUMBERS OF WEAPONS DELIVERED BY MAJOR SUPPLIERS TO NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA 1/
Weapons Category
United States
U.S.S.R
Major Western
European 2/ '
1974-1977
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns----
3,168
3,230
1,020
Artillery---
725
4,195
665
APCs and Armored Cars------------
5,426
3,955
1,065
Major Surface Combatants----------
4
10
14
Minor Surface Combatants----------
26
15
88
Submarines--
0
5
3
Supersonic Combat Aircraft-------
559
1,000
115
Subsonic Combat Aircraft----------
262
150
15
Other Aircraft---------------
345
25
135
Helicopters-----------------------
282
180
685
Guided Missile Boats-------_____~
0
27
3
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)----
2,265
12,680
1,540
1978-1981
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns-----
1,656
4,155
390
--------
940
4
065
730
Artillery----
,
APCs and Armored Cars
4,731
5,125
1,950
Major Surface Combatants----------
4
16
7
Minor Surface Combatants----------
6
10
28
Submarines----------------~~---
1
3
2
Supersonic Combat Aircraft--------
270.
1,310
205
Subsonic Combat Aircraft----------
19
85
30
Other Aircraft--------------------
128
90
175
Helicopters--_-
7
575
390
Guided Missile Boats--------------
0
23
17
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)----
3,917
4,170
510
1974-1981
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns-----
4,824
7,385
1,410
Artillery-------------------------
1,665
8,260
1,395
APCs and Armored Cars---------
10,157
9,080
3,015
Major Surface Combatants----------
8
26
21
Minor Surface Combatants----------
32
25
116
Submarines------------------------
1
8
5
Supersonic Combat Aircraft--
829
2,310
320
Subsonic Combat Aircraft----------
281
235
45
Other Aircraft-----
473
115
310
Helicopters --_~_~_______~_
289
755
1,075
Guided Missile Boats-------------
0
50
20
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)----
6,182.
16,850
2,050
1/ U.S. data are for fiscal years given (and cover the period from July 1, 1973
through September 30, 1981). Foreign data are for calendar years given.
2/ Major Western European includes France, United Kingdom, West Germany,
and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.
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Table 6
NUMBERS OF WEAPONS DELIVERED BY MAJOR SUPPLIERS TO LATIN AMERICA 1/
Weapons Category
United States
U.S.S.R
or Western
European 2/
1974-1977
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns---
136
305
110
Artille --------
275
215
165
APCs and Armored Cars-------
293
55
120
Major Surface Combatant
26
0
2
Minor Surface Combatants----- -
30
17
55
11
0
11
Submarines--
Supersonic Combat Aircraft----
18
85
35
---
142
5
10
Subsonic Combat Aircraft-
-------------
142
15
95
Other Aircraft
69
45
40
Helicopters--
Guided Missile Boats-- - --
0
3
5
0
565
95
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)
1978-1981
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns---
5
70
30
917
420
130
Artillery-
APCs and Armored Car
14
175
210
Major Surface Combatants--_-_-_
5
1
21
2
21
29
Minor Surface Combatants
0
3
4
Submarines------
Supersonic Combat Aircraft------
0
85
30
--
12
0
5
Subsonic Combat Aircraft
97
55
65
Other Aircraft---
----__~____-_
15
30
-115
Helicopters --
-- ----
0
7
0
Guided Missile Boats---
0
245
70
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)
1974-1981
-
141
375
140
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns
Art illery--_-_
1,192
635
295
APCs and Armored Cars------------
307
230
330
Major Surface Combatants----------
31
1
23
Minor Surface Combatants--------
32
38
84
Submarines-
11.
3
15
Supersonic Combat Aircraft--------
18
170
65
Subsonic Combat Aircraft---
154
5
15
Other Aircraft----------- ---
239
70
160
84
75
155
Helicopters
Guided Missile Boats-
10
5
810
165
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)
1/ Excludes Canada. U.S. data are for fiscal years given (and cover the
period from July 1, 1973 through September 30, 1981). Foreign data are for
calendar years given.
2/ Major Western European includes France, United Kingdom, West Germany,
and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.
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Table 7
NUMBERS OF WEAPONS DELIVERED BY MAJOR SUPPLIERS TO AFRICA (SUB-SAHARAN) 1/
Weapons Category
United States
U.S.S.R
Major Western
European 2/
1974-1977
34
785
55
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns
----- ~-
219
845
2
355
Artillery---------
,
APCs and Armored Cars---------~
33
1,145
265
Major Surface Combatants------~
0
2
2
-~-
0
26
46
Minor Surface Combatants
Submarines---------~------------
0
0
0
--
9
180
65
Supersonic Combat Aircraft
0
75
10
Subsonic Combat Aircraft----
2
25
150
Other Aircraft---
Helicopters ---
6
40
90
Guided Missile Boats
0
2
0
0
100
1
105
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)
,
1978-1981
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns-----
0
770
40
Artillery
56
2,040
170
APCs and Armored Cars--------
43
1,155
840
Major Surface Combatants----
0
4
15
Minor Surface Combatants ----
0
35
20
Submarines -----__-__~~_
0
0
0
12
160
5
Supersonic Combat Aircraft--
Subsonic Combat Aircraft---- -
0
50
30
Other Aircraf t --
38
55
90
-------
0
110
95
Helicopters-------~--
-
0
4
1
Guided Missile Boats---
0
075
1
5
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)
,
1974-1981
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns
34
1,555
95
Artillery------------------~
275
4,885
525
APCs and Armored Cars------
76
2,300
1,105
Major Surface Combatants-----
0
6
17
--
0
61
66
Minor Surface Combatants -
Submarines--
0
0
0
Supersonic Combat Aircraft------
21
340
70
Subsonic Combat Aircraft-------~-
0
125
40
Other Aircraft---
40
80
240
Helicopters----
6
150
185
Guided Missile Boats------ -~
0
6
1
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMs)----
0
2,175
110
1/ U.S. data are for fiscal years given (and cover the period from July 1, 1973
through September 30, 1981). Foreign data are for calendar years given.
2/ Major Western European includes France, United Kingdom, West Germany,
and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.
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DESCRIPTION OF ITEMS COUNTED IN WEAPONS CATEGORIES, 1974-1981
Tanks and Self-propelled Guns
Light, medium and heavy tanks
Self-propelled artillery
Self-propelled assault guns
Artillery
Field and air defense artillery, mortars, rocket launchers, and recoilless
rifles -- 100 mm. and over
FROG launchers -- 100 mm. and over
Armored Personnel Carrier (APCs) and Armored Cars
Personnel carriers, armored and amphibious
Armored infantry fighting vehicles
Armored reconnaissance and command vehicles
Major Surface Combatants
Aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates
Minor Surface Combatants
Minesweepers, subchasers, motor torpedo boats
Patrol craft, motor gunboats
Submarines
All submarines, including midget submarines
Guided Missile Patrol Boats
All boats in this class
Supersonic Combat Aircraft
All fighters and bombers designed to function operationally at speeds
above Mach 1..
Subsonic Combat Aircraft
All fighters and bombers, including propeller driven, designed to function
operationally at speeds below Mach 1.
Other Aircraft
All other fixed-wing aircraft, including trainers, transports, reconnais-
sance aircraft, and communications/utility aircraft
Helicopters
All helicopters, including combat and transport.
Surface-to-air Missiles (SAMs)
All air defense missiles, excluding those which are shoulder-fired.
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EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Australia
Brunei
Burma
China
Fiji
French Polynesia
Gilbert Islands
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan,
Kampuchea (Cambodia)
North Korea
North Vietnam
Laos
Macao
Malaysia
Nauru
New Caledonia
New Hebrides
New Zealand
Norfolk Islands
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Pitcairn
Singapore
Solomon Islands
South Korea
South Vietnam
Taiwan
Thailand
Western Somoa
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Nepal
North Yemen (Sana)
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
South Yemen (Aden)
Sri Lanka
Syria
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Albania
Austria
Bulgaria
Belgium
Canada
Czechoslovakia
Cyprus
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany, Democratic
Republic
Germany, Federal
Republic
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
Yugoslavia
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51
NATIONS IN REGIONS IDENTIFIED IN ARMS DELIVERY TABLES AND CHARTS (cont.)
AFRICA (SUB-SAHARAN)
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Empire/Republic
Chad
Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
.Niger
Nigeria
Reunion
Rwanda
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
St. Helena
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Upper Volta
Zaire
Zanbia
Zimbabwe
LATIN AMERICA
Antigua
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bermuda
Bolivia
Brazil
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Falkland Islands
French Guiana
Grenada
Guadeloupe
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Martinique
Mexico
Monteserrat
Netherlands. Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
St. Christ-Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Pierre and Miquelon
St. Vincent
Suriname
Trinidad-Tobago
Turks and Caicos
Uruguay
Venezuela
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Congressional Research Service
O
z The Library of Congress
(EXCERPT)
Foreign Affairs Analyst
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
July 26, 1982
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Implications for U.S. Security Interests
The implications of sophisticated arms transfers are discussed under
four headings: regional stability; Soviet reverse engineering and counter-
measure capabilities; recipient threat to NATO countries; and levels of U.S.
training and maintenance personnel.
Regional Stability
Third World conflicts are not only destructive and costly to the partici-
pants, but they also can damage U.S. economic and security interests. Some have the
potential to place the United States and the Soviet Union in direct confrontation as
supporters of the participants. For these and other reasons, the U.S. has adopted
a policy of considering the impact of its arms transfers on regional stability.
Assessments of the potential role of sophisticated arms in preserving regional
stability can only be made on a case-by-case basis. No general rule appears to
arise from recent history. In some cases, possession of sophisticated arms may
encourage a country to carry out military operations which it may have otherwise
foregone. The scope of Israel's operations and goals in its invasion of Lebanon
and Argentina's seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas may have been influenced by the
possession of sophisticated weapons. In other cases, possession of sophisticated
arms may serve, as U.S. policy intends, to deter a potential adversary. American
transfers to South Korea would seem to be a successful case of such deterrence.
Finally, the primary motives for some transfers of sophisticated arms may be to
bolster U.S. security and political relationships and the recipient's prestige
rather than to enhance actual combat capability. However, the purchase of sophis-
ticated arms may in itself create a threat to the internal stability of poorer
countries by retarding their economic growth.
If a conflict does occur, however, the presence of sophisticated weapons may
tend to make it more destructive and costly than would have otherwise been the case.
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The high costs of reconstruction in Lebanon and of replacing British and Argen-
tinian equipment lost or damaged in the South Atlantic are recent examples of
this tendency. The longer range of the new weapons also tends to extend the bat-
tlefield from the front lines into populated rear areas.
Soviet Reverse Engineering and Counter-Measure Capability
By observing a weapon in action or by obtaining damaged or undamaged ver-
sions of it, technologically advanced countries may be able to perform "reverse
engineering" -- that is, deduce its construction and build a similar weapon.
Alternately, they may be able to devise effective counter-measures to the weapon.
Israel's recent successes against MiG fighters and SAM sites in its Lebanese
operations were attributable in part to counter-measures developed from observations
of these weapons in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The Soviet Union has also demonstrated
strong reverse engineering and counter-measure capabilities. Some technical analysts
feel that Soviet engineers used the U.S. Hawk, Franco-German Roland, and British
Rapier surface-to-air missiles, respectively, as their "goal models" in developing
the SAM-6, SAM-8, and SAM-13. Exporting sophisticated U.S. weapons increases the
likelihood of the Soviet Union obtaining them, or information about them, and per-
forming reverse engineering or developing counter-measures.
Threat to NATO Countries
As noted above, there are a large and increasing number of countries in pos-
session of weapons which could seriously threaten NATO operations. Most Middle
Eastern, South American and Asian countries are included in this group. However,
the suppliers of these weapons are often NATO countries themselves, and most Third
World recipients rely on their suppliers for long-term training and maintenance
assistance and resupply during a conflict.
Some analysts argue that this dependence tends to lessen the chances of a
recipient using its armed forces offensively against the wishes of NATO countries
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or against NATO countries themselves. However, Iran's apparent ability to
obtain spare parts from other countries for its U.S. equipment and reports
of major discrepancies in Saudi Arabian weapons inventories illustrate a par-
ticular problem. Once NATO countries export spare parts and weapons, covert re-
export -- banned by most arms transfer agreements -- may be difficult to control.
As more Third World countries become co-producers of weapons with NATO countries
or establish independent arms manufacturing capability, the ability of the NATO
countries to discourage their Third World customers from offensive operations
may be significantly weakened.
Levels of U.S. Training and Maintenance Personnel
Sophisticated weapons require longer and more intensive training and main-
tenance activities on the part of the supplier than other weapons. In most cases
in the Third World, a sale of sophisticated weapons implies a strong and on-going
relationship between the supplying and receiving governments. The number of U.S.
personnel operating overseas in support of weapons transfers has been rising re-
cently, and much of this rise can be traced to sophisticated weapons.
According to recent Defense Department reports, 7,640 U.S. Government and
contract personnel are implementing U.S. military sales in-country, 25 percent
more than there were two years ago. Saudi Arabia accounts for 60 percent of these
personnel. Over 1,000 more Defense Department personnel are in-country as man-
agers of arms transfer programs. In addition, a substantial portion of U.S. mili-
tary training of foreign soldiers -- both in the United States and in-country with
Mobile Training Teams -- under the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) and FNS programs is related to transfers of U.S. weapons.
It can be argued that high levels of U.S. personnel are in American interests
because recipients may find it difficult to use them to carry out offensive oper-
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ations without the cooperation of the U.S. Government. However, it should be noted
that there are substantial risks involved in high levels of personnel. The pre-
sence of a U.S. contingent may serve as an unintended "trip-wire" for the in-
volvement of the United States in a regional conflict. In the event of an attack
on the recipient of U.S. arms, the United States may be forced into a choice of
cooperation or non-cooperation with the recipient in directly supporting military
operations. For diplomatic reasons, such a choice may be difficult and costly.
Finally, the United States may find itself the primary supplier of contending forces
in a conflict, a situation in which the choice of cooperation and non-cooperation
would be even more difficult.
The Congressional Role in Sophisticated Arms Transfers
This paper has raised a number of issues which should be considered when
decisions are being made on the transfer of sophisticated U.S. arms. Congress is
an integral part of such decisions at present. It authorizes FMS credit financing
and debt forgiveness annually, and has the authority to veto major administration
transfer recommendations, although the President may void a veto on national security
grounds. Some in Congress, however, feel that involvement in arms transfer decisions
comes at too late a date in the process of negotiation between the Administration and
the potential recipient.
The Administration is required by a number of sections of the Arms Export
Control Act to provide Congress with advance notification of inquiries of and nego-
tiations with foreign countries which could lead to a formal letter of offer. For
example, Section 25 requires projections of potential offers for the upcoming fiscal
year; section 28 requires a listing of countries which have inquired about the price
and availability of specific items during a fiscal quarter; and section 36(a) requires
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a quarterly projection of all likely upcoming offers, which is published in the
Congressional Record with reference to the region, rather than the country, in
which a major sale may occur.
In some cases, though, advance notification does not occur, and Congress
is unable to express an opinion to the Administration on a potential trans-
fer until the proposal is made public with the transmittal of a 36(b) report
to Congress. At this point, Congressional resistance to a proposal may be more
damaging to foreign policy interests than it might have been while the proposal
was still informal, classified and unpublicized. Nonetheless, Congress has thirty
calendar days in which to pass a concurrent resolution of disapproval of a proposed
arms sale.
An informal notification mechanism has evolved over the past few years,
through which the Administration informs the Senate Foreign Relations and House
Foreign Affairs committees of the contents of 36(b) reports at least 20 days
prior to their formal transmittal. While this mechanism has somewhat alleviated
the problem of late notification on particular sales, it still appears that it is
difficult for Congress to oversee U.S. arms transfer programs and their implications
a world-wide and regional basis.
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60
By Kevin Nealer
and
Dick McCall
The Reagan Administration's $21.5 billion foreign military sales program for FY 1982 is the
largest arms transfer package in U.S. history. It sets new records for total dollar volumes, kinds of
customers receiving weapons, and levels of sophistication of defense materials being sold. In light of
the Falkland Islands War, even Great Britain is rethinking its arms sale practices, having sold Argentina
$200 million in military hardware prior to the outbreak of the conflict.
Administration spokesmen continue to stress the commitment to a growing and aggressive U.S.
arms sales policy. Despite the lessons of the Falklands and recent Mideast fighting, they still hold fast
to the so-called Nixon (Guam) Doctrine: that U.S. surrogates with high-technology weapons will police
our interests in the developing world.
The centerpiece for the Administration's policy in the Third World appears to be the F-16, the
ultimate stamp of approval for developing country customers. The U.S. Air Force's highly advanced
fighter is one of the most maneuverable, versatile tactical aircraft in the world today. Its sophisticated
fly-by-wire flight controls, high "g" cockpit, and powerful afterburning turbofan engine incorporate the
latest electronic and engineering advances. It can carry nuclear or conventional air-to-surface
ordnance, and can utilize the all-aspect AIM-9L "Sidewinder" missile for air-to-air combat superiority.
The F-16 may soon be equipped with even more sophisticated conventional weapons and defense
systems.
The Carter Administration first introduced the sale of F-16s abroad on a restricted basis, limited
to select NATO countries, Israel, and Egypt. Now the Reagan Administration has added Pakistan,
Venezuela, and South Korea to the list of buyers. Of these, only the Korean sale will follow a normal
delivery schedule. The other sales are to be made on an accelerated basis, contrary to the timetable
that USAF officials have described in testimony and planning documents as being necessary to avoid
critical U.S. inventory shortages. Democratic Policy Committee staff review of unclassified Air Force
internal documents reveals the following:
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Over-Extended Marketing
-in June of 1981, the former Director of Political-Military Affairs of the State Department,
Richard Burt, wrote to Richard Adams, Vice President of General Dynamics (GD), to solicit information
on the availability of F-16s for increasing export marketing. Adams responded that aircraft could be
provided on an accelerated basis of 24 months. This contradicted the USAF Master Plan projection of
42 months lead time. However, Adams emphasized the 24-month lead time delivery schedule could be
met only if the government agreed "to accept pre-contract costs and obligations incurred by General
Dynamics and its subcontractors." DOD memos verify that this General Dynamics proposal "allows
[the] contractor to obligate U.S. funds in anticipation of an FMS agreement (which violates Public
Law)." Under the Arms Export Control Act, major arms transfers and extension of FMS credits cannot
occur until the Congress determines that a given sale should not be disapproved.
Moreover, Air Force readiness projections warn that "the historical record says there will be
impacts" on U.S. forces, despite GD assurances to the contrary. Because "GD is competing with
Northrop's F-5G [F-20] for a portion of the potential export market," DOD analysts caution that General
Dynamics is getting ahead of itself in committing to an accelerated production schedule which it cannot
sustain without cutbacks to the U.S. and NATO inventories. (Note: DOD and State Department officials
have engaged in aggressive marketing of a plane never designed for general export. State's program
has been undertaken without reference to established USAF inventoryrequirements, or the FX export
program option.)
U.S.Inventory Depletion
-General Dynamics and DOD delivery schedules document the draw-down on service
inventories. From the second quarter of 1982 to the last quarter of 1984, 40 aircraft will be diverted
from the USAF for Egypt alone. Six planes have already been diverted from NATO purchasers for
Pakistan, and others must follow to fill that contract for a total of forty F-16s. Current projections do
not take into account future sales proposals which may include Indonesia, the Philippines, Jordan, and
others. Nor do they anticipate the effect of sales of the "J79" export model of the F-16. Those planes
incorporate a less powerful engine, but will necessitate pulling standard F-16 fuselages off the
production line and out of projected inventories. DOD planners report that FMS programs to date
"have required the diversion of USAF production aircraft and logistic assets at the expense of USAF
readiness." Continued acceleration of the F-16 sales program can only result in a further deterioration
of USAF readiness.
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62
The FMS-induced shortage goes beyond the problem of diversion of completed F-16s from our
own inventories and those of our allies. The crucial areas of maintenance and support also have been
affected by the FMS program. Accelerated sales have reduced already low parts inventories, especially
for systems with long lead times. The avionics packages, ejection seats, F100 engine spares, and
engine accessories cannot be acquired on an accelerated basis from subcontractors due to their
complexity and the limited production capabilities. Air Force and DOD reports document the fact that
"diversion of USAF spares will have a particularly dramatic impact on our F-16 support posture" leaving
the Air Force "critically short of spare parts to support our own peacetime and wartime commitments."
USAF program reports describe the Venezuela sale as a "a contractual and administrative
nightmare." They note that the only source of spares will be USAF inventories, and that such
"borrowing" will be "costly and difficult to manage". They also point out that the "drastic
acceleration" of the Pakistan sale "has had, and will continue to have, significant impact on USAF
management activity and support."
Only 67 percent of the nearly 470 USAF F-16s were operational during the first part of 1982. Air
Force spokesmen acknowledge that 1983 readiness will be even lower as parts and maintenance
support are spread thinner. The full impact has not been reported to Congress, as required by the
Arms Export Control Act.
Manpower Drain
As costly and debilitating as aircraft and spare part diversions have been, a greater threat to
U.S. force structure may result from the manpower drain caused by the need for technically trained
personnel to support the FMS program abroad. Air Force staffing justifications describe the "extensive
training" of some two years which is necessary to bring the skills of maintenance personnel to a
competent level in the complex and essential jobs of providing logistical support for the F-16s.
Advanced avionics such as communications, navigation, radar, and weapons systems require skilled
electronic technicians with "comprehensive training plus operating experience" to assure combat
readiness and absolute reliability. But Air Force officials acknowledge serious retention problems in
these categories of specialists, placing the service in the position of being unable to comply with DOD
Directive 1130.2 which requires "self sufficiency in maintaining and operating new systems" within
twelve months of introduction. Former Air Force Secretary Hans Mark was blunt about this problem
when he told The Wall Street Journal that "Airplanes don't fly because we don't have maintenance
people."
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Congressional action to provide special reenlistment bonuses for key technical positions within
the armed services has improved the trend line, but 1981 figures reveal that only about one-third of the
new technicians sign up for a second tour. Moreover, Air Force officials are concerned that General
Dynamics incentive bonuses may be an attractive lure for Air Force-trained technicians, thereby
undercutting the congressionally-initiated bonus system.
DOD officials point to the accelerating FMS program as the principle cause of this manpower
drain. They warn that sales to developing countries that have little technical infrastructure create a
demand for skilled personnel which private contractors satisfy by hiring away new USAF specialists. In
fact, Air Force internal assessments of the foreign sales programs describe "heavy dependence" on
private contractors. For the Egyptian sale alone, 130 technicians will be needed. General Dynamics
has told DOD officials that part of that force will be made up of personnel acquired from Air Force
ranks. One DOD report concludes that "GD will undoubtedly backfill the vacant flightline personnel
positions with recruits from the USAF with F-16 experience. The faster the pace of the F-16 FMS case,
the faster the F-16 base maintenance capability will be degraded."
As a result of the F-16 FMS sales program, the Air Force finds its manpower needs
compromised in several ways. Most importantly, the USAF ability to maintain our own force capability is
reduced because some Air Force technicians must be sent overseas to train and assist private
contractors and locals in servicing foreign-owned aircraft: this at the expense of U.S. readiness. In
addition, government investment in new trainees is not being recouped and attempts to build a corps of
experienced personnel are frustrated when private contractors hire away recruits for services which the
government must then rent back at the contractors' price, causing "turmoil in the USAF personnel
system."
Finally, the service loses control over uniformed personnel. An independent study conducted
for DOD warns that "continuing reliance on civilian technicians means that maintenance skills are not
being successfully transferred from the producers to the ultimate users of the systems" i.e., the USAF.
Moreover, the study points out that "the Military Departments do not have statutory authority to compel
[contractors] to perform any function in support of forces engaged in conflict." This poses a danger to
U.S. military capability during wartime.
Security Concerns
Along with endangering U.S. readiness, F-16 sales to developing countries raise special
problems. A recent Congressional Research Service White Paper characterized the sale of high-
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technology weapons systems as "increas[ing] the likelihood of the Soviet Union obtaining them, or
information about them, and performing reverse engineering or developing counter-measures." This is
especially true of the F-16s and the advanced missile systems which they will carry. Our experience in
Iran where news reports allege that the Soviets gained access to F-14s and the U.S. air-to-air Phoenix
missile is the most recent example of the compromise of U.S technology vital to our ability to maintain a
qualitative edge over the Soviets.
The security risk is particularly evident when the purchasers do not share U.S. goals or
perceptions of the security threat. For example, the Administration has justified the sale of F-16s and a
sophisticated air defense system to Pakistan on the grounds of the Soviet threat, particularly the threat
emanating from Afghanistan. Yet 80 percent of Pakistan's army is located at, or near the Indian border,
where it also maintains its air bases. Continuing Pakistani research on nuclear weapons development
contravenes official U.S. policy, and raises questions about the sale of an aircraft that can be used as a
nuclear delivery platform, such as the F-16.
The Pentagon shares the security concern associated with the F-16 sales to Pakistan. On
November 29, 1982, a dispute erupted between the U.S. and Pakistani governments over the avionics
configuration of the F-16s Pakistan had purchased. The Pakistanis believed they were purchasing the
standard U.S. Air Force F-16, and refused delivery of the first six when they found out they would not
receive state-of-the- art electronic equipment for detecting enemy ground and airborne radar. The New
York Times reported on November 30, 1982, that U.S Air Force officials "did not want to provide the
advanced equipment because of the need to protect its security. The Pakistanis were being offered a
less advanced system."
However, the Administration overruled these USAF objections and agreed to provide the most
sophisticated version of the F-16 to Pakistan. This turn of events precipitated concern on the part of
the Congress that the original FMS notification submitted by the Administration did not indicate that
Pakistan would receive state-of-the-art U.S. avionics equipment.
Venezuela is another example of potential differences between the U.S. and a recipient as to
perception of security threats. Venezuela is embroiled in border disputes with Colombia and Guyana.
Its declaration of a role as "regional protector" following announcement of the purchase of F-16s
represents a quantum leap in the regional arms race beyond the capabilities of the MiG-23s in Cuba
which U.S. officials used to justify the sale. The net effect of sales such as these is it diminution of U.S.
combat readiness in favor of building foreign arsenals over which we do not have control, and which
may harm our own security and that of the region.
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In many ways, the sale of 40 F-16s to Pakistan is the classic example of an arms sale "gone
wrong." The elements are as follows:
First, the Congress approved the sale on the basis that the bulk of the $1.1 billion in financing
would be provided by Saudi Arabia. However, on November 30, 1982, the Administration submitted a
reprogramming notice to the Congress for FMS credits in the amount of $150 million for Pakistan. Of
that amount, $120 million was to be used for -payments on the six F-16s due in Pakistan in mid-
December. In that reprogramming request, the Administration did not state from what country, or
countries, FMS credits would be reallocated.
Because the Saudis were not forthcoming in financing the first six F-16s, their participation in
future funding of the program has been called into question. Since it is apparent that Pakistan will not
be able to repay the FMS loans made available for the F-16 program due to its already burgeoning
external debt, the burden may fall on the U.S. taxpayer. Potential U.S. taxpayer exposure for the
Pakistan program could be $1.1 billion.
Second, the delivery, of the first six F-16s on an accelerated basis resulted in a diversion from
Dutch and Belgian inventories in order to repay the United States for the six delivered from our
inventory. Since the Administration has agreed to an accelerated delivery schedule for the entire
Pakistan program, further diversions are likely.
Third, in light of the growing manpower problems in the USAF to service our own F-16
requirements, the Congress should be concerned over the issue of U.S. technical support for the
Pakistan program.
Fourth, despite the Administration's justification of the sale on the basis of the Soviet threat to
Pakistan, it should be obvious that President Zia remains concerned primarily about the traditional
rivalry with India. Recent news accounts alleging that the Indian military may be considering the option
of a preemptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities reinforces the view that the long- standing
enmity dominates the perceptions of both countries.
Fifth, the fact that the USAF was concerned over providing state-of-the-art avionics equipment to
Pakistan for fear it would be compromised, only to have these concerns brushed aside by the
Administration, should not be taken lightly. Legitimate Pentagon concerns were overridden by an
Administration which determined the necessity to make a "symbolic gesture " to Pakistan-a gesture
which may prove to be contrary to U.S. interests.
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And finally, from the very beginning, Pakistan dictated the nature of the F-16 program for that
country. It dictated the time of delivery, terms of the sale, the financing arrangements, and the kind of
equipment which was to be provided. Every essential element of a legal contract was dictated by the
Pakistan government.
The proliferating sales of top-of-the-line U.S. military technology to developing countries raise
many issues even beyond those discussed in this study of the F-16 program. Arms sales are an
important tool of foreign policy. However, they are tools which require discrimination on the part of the
United States as a supplier. Bending to foreign demands before meeting our own legitimate security
requirements only jeopardizes the national consensus which now exists regarding defense spending.
As the fighting last summer in Lebanon between Israeli and Syrian forces demonstrated, the U.S.
maintains a significant qualitative edge over some quantitative advantages enjoyed by the Soviet Union
in their weapons systems. Yet the Administration has allowed itself to be maneuvered into a position of
jeopardizing this qualitative edge by succumbing to the demands of Third World countries such as
Pakistan.
The political advantage the Administration perceives in allowing a country such as Pakistan to
dictate the nature of the technology we make available has to be weighed against what should be
paramount in U.S. arms policy the protection of this technology against compromise. The F-16s being
provided Pakistan contain state-of-the-art U.S. Air Force technology. Soviet AWACS and fighter
interceptor capabilities are hampered by the current lack of this technology. If a decision is made to
provide the Pakistanis with either the AIM-9L or AIM-9M air-to-air missile for their F-16s, the Soviets
would have an even greater incentive to obtain technology we are making available to Preident Zia's
government. The AIM 9L and the more sophisticated AIM-9M, now being developed, have an all-aspect
capability. In other words, interceptor aircraft do not need to maneuver behind a hostile aircraft to
score a kill. The Soviets have not yet been able to develop this capability which is vital to offsetting
larger numbers of enemy aircraft.
The Soviets have been careful as to which weapons systems, particularly aircraft, they make
available for export. An advanced Soviet export fighter is the MiG-23 Flogger, which is of 1967 vintage.
However, the export version contains less sophisticated avionics equipment than those MiG-23s in the
Soviet inventory. The more sophisticated Soviet fighters are not available for export at this time.
It is ironic that an Administration which has pressed our NATO allies to control the types and
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flow of high technology items to the Soviet Union would engage in an aggressive arms export policy
which puts top-of-the-line U.S. military equipment advances at risk. Earlier this year, the Senate
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a report warning that the Soviet
Union dedicated "substantial resources to highly focused atttempts to secure American technology and
was increasingly adept at acquiring this technology."
The pressure the Administration has exerted on our allies regarding the technology transfer
issue has placed additional strains on the alliance. However, the Administration's credibility in this
matter is strained considerably when it pursues a policy resulting in the global proliferation of high
technology military equipment, such as the F-16s, over which we lose direct control once it is sold to
another country.
Along with the Administration's aggressive policy of transfering high technology weapons into
the Third World, there also has emerged a new arms sale lexicon. In the case of the AWACS sale to
Saudi Arabia it became a "litmus test" of our relationship with that country. And as the Pakistanis
maintain, the F-16 sale to their country is a "symbolic gesture." Neither the "litmus test" nor the
"symbolic gesture" are criteria to be found in the Arms Export Control Act. Yet this terminology used
to justify high-technology sales to countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is irrefutable evidence
of a policy which is clearly "the tail wagging the dog." Recipient countries are now dictating the terms
of major U.S. arms sales. Meeting U.S. defense requirements and protecting the qualitative edge we
enjoy over our major adversary in the world-the Soviet Union-should be the paramount national
security concern of our government. However, in the name of "litmus tests" and "symbolic gestures"
the Administration has placed this technological edge in jeopardy. What concerns our military
personnel above all else is having to face a potential enemy that has comparable avionics and missile
capabilities to our own. They know the potential enemy has an edge in numbers which can be offset
only by superior U.S. technology and the qualitative advantage it confers.
It is incumbent upon the Congress to reevaluate completely our arms sale practices and the
legal underpinnings which support them in light of the developments outlined in this study. The
reevaluation would, of necessity, involve review of the present adequacy of procedures contained in the
Arms Export Control Act, which has historically defined congressional involvement in this critical area of
foreign policy.
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