LETTER TO MR. ARTHUR F. VAN COOK FROM THOMAS H. WHITE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00236R000200170007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 24, 1981
• Content Type: LETTER

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C%w4TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENhrr'
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
NSA review
completed
STAT
STAT
Mr. Arthur F. Van Cook
Director of Information Security
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy Review
Department of Defense
Room 3C260, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
Reference: 1-04123/81
24AUG1981
OIS Registry
We have reviewed the systematic classification review guidelines
(DOD Directive 5200.30) transmitted by Mr. Stiver's memorandum of 12 February,
and have made note of the suggestion to exchange guidance and the authorization
to use this guidance to avoid the cost and time involved in referring documents
for review. I am sorry to be so late with my response but it fell through a
crack.
While recognizing the administrative advantages of such interchange, we
feel we must decline the offer. Our experience has been that the sensitive
aspects of many of our documents are sufficiently subtle or complex as to raise
differences of viewpoint even among our experienced reviewers here as to their
continuing classification status. Consequently, we would prefer to reserve these
decisions to our own reviewers and components having jurisdiction over the
material.
We have received, in the past year, a number of documents from various
DOD components requesting a systematic review. We have attempted to handle all
of these as expeditiously as possible. Should you have or become aware of com-
plaints regarding our handling of these documents, please do not hesitate to
let us know.
As you know, I will be departing for a sabbatical within the next few
weeks. will be acting in my behalf and can be reached at the
same number if you have need to discuss any topics of mutual concern.
Best regards,
Thomas II. White
Director of Information Services
Directorate of Administration
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
11 - OIS Subject
1 - OIS Chrono
1 - CRD Liaison w/DOD On file OSD release instructions
1 - CRD Chrono nnni?
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OIS 81-160/1
Navr
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Classification Review Division
Executive Officer, Office of Information Services
SUBJECT: DoD Systematic Declassification Review Guidelines
1. The attached DoD memorandum provides the Agency with a copy of its
systematic declassification review guidelines and grants the Agency author-
ization to apply the guidelines to DoD classified information in our files.
It also requests that the DoD be authorized to apply our systematic
declassification review guidelines to information held in DoD files that is
under the classification review jurisdiction of the Agency.
2. You will note that the memorandum is directed to the Director of
Administration and that it has been forwarded to OIS for action. Would you
please prepare a response to DoD for DIS signature.
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2 3 FEB 1981
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THE DEPwwY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFEN9WIF
~_ 6X37 j
MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Administration
Central Intelligence Agency
2 FFR 1981
In reply refer to:
1-04123/81
SUBJECT: Systematic Declassification Review Guidelines
Executive Order 12065, "National Security Information" requires that
agency systematic declassification review guidelines be authorized for
use by the Archivist of the United States and provides that such guidelines
may be used by any other agency with approval of the issuing authority.
In the interest of improving the economic operation of the systematic
declassification review process, I hereby authorize your Agency to apply
our systematic declassification review guidelines to DoD classified
information held in your files. A copy of our guidelines, which are a
part of DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic Review of 20-
Year-Old Classified Information in Permanently Valuable DoD Records," is
enclosed for your use.
I am convinced that it would be mutually advantageous for agencies and
departments of the Executive Branch to exchange systematic declassification
review guidelines and to authorize their use by others. Such action can
reduce the amount of documents referred for review and result in a cost
avoidance for all concerned.
Accordingly, it is requested that the Department of Defense be authorized
to apply your systematic declassification review guidelines to information
held in DoD files that is under the classification jurisdiction of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Please contact Mr. Arthur F. Van Cook, my Director of Information Security,
in the event that you have any questions ppncerning this matter.
Ronald H. Stivers
Acting
Enclosure -
DoD Directive 5200.30
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
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91W ZS C 61 93J
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III
June 18, 1979
NUMBER 5200.30
Department of Defense Directive
USD (P)
Guidelines for Systematic Review of 20-Year-Old
Classified Information in Permanently Valuable
DoD Records
References: (a) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Declassifi-
cation of World War II Records," May 3, 1972
(hereby canceled)
(b) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum,
"Downgrading and Declassification of Histori-
cal Records," April 12, 1974 (hereby canceled)
(c) Executive Order 12065, "National Security
Information," June 28, 1978
(d) through (h), see enclosure 1
A. PURPOSE
This Directive reestablishes the policies contained in
references (a) and (b); establishes guidelines for the system-
atic declassification review of 20-year-old information classi-
fied under references (c) through (f) and prior orders,
directives and regulations governing security classification;
implements section 3-402 of reference (c); and delegates
authority to implement the DoD systematic declassification
review guidelines.
B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
1. The provisions of this Directive apply to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and to activities assigned for admin-
istrative support, the Military Departments, the Organization
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified
Commands, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to as
"DoD Components").
2. This Directive applies to the systematic review of
20-year-old permanently valuable classified information,
material, or records developed by or for the Department of
Defense and its Components, or its predecessor components and
activities, that are under the exclusive or final original
classification jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.
Accordingly, information that is foreign government informa-
tion; Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or in nonpermanent records is
outside the scope of this Directive.
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C. DEFINITIONS
1. Cryptologic Information. Information pertaining to the
activities and operations involved in the production of signals
intelligence or to the maintenance of communicatiorLs security.
2. Intelligence Method. Any human or technological method that
is or may be used to collect or analyze foreign intelligence or
foreign counterintelligence.
3. Intelligence Source. Any human or technological source from
which foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence is, has
been, or may be derived.
4. Foreign Government Information. Information that is pro-
vided to the United States by a foreign government or international
organization of governments in the expectation, expressed or implied,
that the information is to be kept in confidence; or produced by
the United States pursuant to a written joint arrangement with a
foreign government or international organization of governments
requiring that either the information or the arrangement, or both,
be kept in confidence. Such a written joint arrangement may be
evidenced by an exchange of letters, a memorandum of understanding,
or other written record.
D. POLICY AND PROCEDURES
1. DoD classified information that is permanently valuable, as
defined by 44 U.S.C. 2103 (reference (g)), shall be systematically
reviewed for declassification when it is 20 years old whether the
information:
a. Has been transferred to the General Services Admin-
istration for accession into the Archives of the United States or
in the possession and control of the Administrator of General
Services under 44 U.S.C. 2107 or 2107 note (reference (h)), or
b. Is in the possession or control of DoDComponents.
2. The transition to systematic review at 20 vice 30 years
shall be implemented as rapidly as possible, and completed by
December 1, 1988.
3. When DoD classified information becomes 20 'years old, it
shall be:
a. Declassified automatically if it is not within one of
the categories specified in enclosure 2.
b. Reviewed for declassification by responsible DoD re-
viewers in accordance with enclosure 3 if it is within any of the
categories specified in enclosure 2.
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Jun 18, 79
5200.30
4. Systematic review for declassification shall be in accordance
with procedures contained in DoD 5200.1-R (reference (f)). Infor-
mation that falls within any of the categories in enclosure 2 shall
be declassified if the designated DoD reviewer determines, in light of
the declassification considerations of enclosure 3, that classifica-
tion is no longer required. In the absence of such a determination,
the designated DoD reviewer shall recommend continued classification
in accordance with the procedures of reference (f).
E. RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY
1. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Review shall:
a. Exercise oversight and policy supervision over the imple-
mentation of this Directive;
b. Request DoD Components to review enclosures 2 and 3 of
this Directive every 2 years;
c. Revise enclosures 2 and 3 to ensure they meet DoD needs;
d. When appropriate, authorize other departments and
agencies of the Executive Branch to apply the guidelines of this
Directive to DoD information in their possession.
2. The Head of each DoD Component shall:
a. Recommend changes to enclosures 2 and 3 of this Direc-
b. Propose, with respect to specific programs, projects,
and systems under their classification jurisdiction, supplements to
enclosures 2 and 3 of this Directive;
c. Ensure that the records of the Component that have not
been accessioned by the Archivist of the United States and, upon
request of the Archivist, those that have been accessioned are re-
viewed by DoD personnel designated for the purpose in accordance
with this Directive; and
d. Provide advice and assistance to the Archivist of the
United States in the systematic review of records under this Direc-
tive.
3. The Director, National Security Agency shall develop, for
approval by the Secretary of Defense, special procedures for systema-
tic review and declassification of classified cryptologic infor-
mation.
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4. The Archivist of the United States is authorized to apply this
Directive when reviewing 20-year-old DoD classified information that has
been accessioned into the Archives of the United States.
F. EFFECTIVE DATE
The provisions of this Directive are effective immediately.
Enclosures - 3
1. References
2. Categories of Information to be
Reviewed for Declassification
3. Declassification Considerations
C. W. Duncan, Jr.
Deputy Secretary of Defense
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-Jun 18, 79
5200.30 (Encl 1)
REFERENCES, continued
(d) Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1 Concerning
National Security Information, October 2, 1978 (43 FR 194)
(e) DoD Directive 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program,"
November 29, 1978
(f) DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program Regulation,"
December 1978, authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, November
29, 1978
(g) Title 44, United States Code, Section 2103
(h) Title 44, United States Code, Section 2107
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(2) Procedures and techniques for noise reduction pertain-
ing to an individual ship's component.
(3) Vibration data relating to hull and machinery.
c. Operational characteristics related to performance as
(1) Endurance and total fuel capacity.
(2) Tactical information, such as times for ship turning,
zero to maximum speed, and maximum to zero speed.
2. All information that is uniquely applicable to nuclear-
powered surface ships or submarines.
3. Information concerning diesel submarines as follows:
a. Ship silencing data or acoustic warfare systems relative
(1) Overside, platform, and sonar noise signature.
(2) Radiated noise and echo response.
(3) All vibration data.
(4) Seismic, magnetic (including AM), pressure, and UEP
signature data.
b. Details of operational assignments, i.e., war plans, anti-
submarine warfare (ASW), and surveillance tasks.
4. Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) data.
5. Information concerning mine warfare, mine sweeping, and mine
countermeasures.
6. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) or electronic counter-
countermeasures (ECCM) features and capabilities of any electronic
equipment.
7. Torpedo information as follows:
a. Torpedo countermeasures devices: T-MK6 (FANFARE) and
NAE beacons.
b. Tactical performance, tactical doctrine, and vulnerabili-
ty to countermeasures.
8. Design performance and functional characteristics of guided
missiles, guided projectiles, sonars, radars, acoustic equipments,
and fire control sys ems.
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H. Information concerning or revealing escape, evasion, cover, or
deception plans, procedures, and techniques.
I. Information that reveals sources and methods of intelligence,
counterintelligence activities, identities of clandestine human
agents, methods of special operations, and analytical techniques for
the interpretation of intelligence data.
J. Information concerning electronic intelligence, telemetry intelli-
gence, and electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures,
electronic countermeasures, electronic counter-countermeasures) or
related activities to include:
1. Information concerning or revealing nomenclatures, functions,
technical characteristics, or descriptions of foreign communications
and electronic equipment, its employment/deployment, and its associa-
tion with weapon systems or military operations.
2. Information concerning or revealing the processes, tech-
niques, operations or scope of activities involved in acquiring,
analyzing, and evaluating the above information, and the degree of
success obtained.
K. Cryptologic information (including cryptologic sources and
methods) currently in use. This includes information concerning
or revealing the processes, techniques, operations, and scope of
signals intelligence comprising communications intelligence,
electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence; and the
cryptosecurity and emission security components of communications
security, including the communications portion of cover and deception
plans.
1. Recognition of cryptologic information may not always be an
easy task. There are several broad classes of cryptologic infor-
mation, as follows:
a. Those that relate to communications security (COMSEC).
In documentary form, they provide COMSEC guidance or information.
Normally, COMSEC documents and materials are accountable under
the "Communications Security Material Control System." Examples
are: items bearing "TSEC" nomenclature ("TSEC' plus three letters),
"Crypto Keying Material" for use in enciphering communications,
Controlled COMSEC Items (CCI), and cryptographic keying devices.
b. Those that relate to signals intelligence (SIGINT).
These appear as reports in various formats that bear security
classification, sometimes followed by a five-letter codeword
(World War II's ULTRA, for example) and often carry warning
caveats such as "This document contains codeword material,"
"Utmost secrecy is necessary...". Formats will appear, for example,
as messages having addressees, "from" and "to" sections, and as
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summaries with SIGINT content with or without other kinds of intelli-
gence and comment.
c. Research, development, test, and evaluation reports and
information that relate to either COMSEC or SIGINT.
2. Commonly used words that may help in identification of
cryptologic documents and materials are "cipher," "code," "codeword,"
"communications intelligence" or "COMINT," "communications security"
or "COMSEC," "cryptanalysis," "crypto," "cryptography," "cryptosystem,"
"decipher," "decode," "decrypt," "direction finding," "electronic
intelligence" or "ELINT," "electronic security," "en=cipher,"
"encode," "encrypt," "intercept," "key book," "signal intelligence"
or "SIGINT," "signal security," and "TEMPEST."
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5200.30 (Encl 3)
DECLASSIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS
A. Technological developments; widespread public knowledge of the
subject matter; changes in military plans, operations, systems, or
equipment; changes in the foreign relations or defense commitments
of the United States and similar events may bear upon the determina-
tion of whether information should be declassified. If the responsi-
ble DoD reviewer decides that, in view of such circumstances, the
public disclosure of the information being reviewed would no longer
result in at least identifiable damage to the national security,
the information must be declassified.
B. The following are examples of considerations which may be appro-
priate in deciding whether information in the categories listed in
enclosure 2 may be declassified when it is reviewed:
1. The information no longer provides the United States a
scientific, engineering, technical, operational, intelligence,
strategic, or tactical advantage over other nations.
2. The operational military capability of the United States
revealed by the information no longer constitutes a limitation on
the effectiveness of the armed forces.
3. Information pertinent to a system is no longer used or
relied on for the defense of the United States or its allies.
4. The program, project, or system information no longer
reveals a current weakness or vulnerability.
5. The information pertains to an intelligence objective or
diplomatic initiative that has been abandoned or achieved, and will
no longer damage the foreign relations of the United States.
6. The information reveals the fact or identity of a United
States intelligence source, method, or capability that is no longer
employed and that relates to no current source, method, or capa-
bility that upon disclosure could cause at least identifiable
damage to national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy.
7. The information concerns foreign relations matters the
disclosure of which can no longer be expected to cause or increase
international tension to the detriment of the national security of
the United States.
C. Declassification of information that reveals the identities of
clandestine human agents shall only be accomplished in accordance
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with procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence
for that purpose.
D. Special procedures of the National Security Agency apply to the
review and declassification of classified cryptologic information.
The following shall be observed in the review of such information:
1. COMSEC Documents and Materials. If records or materials in
this category are found in agency or department files that are not
under COMSEC control, refer them to the senior COMSEC authority of
the agency or department concerned or by appropriate channels to
the following address:
Director
National Security Agency/Central Security Service
ATTN: D4/I
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755
2. SIGINT Information.
a. If the SIGINT information is contained in a document or
record originated by a DoD cryptologic organization, such as the
National Security Agency, and is in the files of anoncryptologic
agency or department, such material will not be declassified if
retained in accordance with an approved records disposition schedule.
b. If the SIGINT information has been incorporated by the
receiving agency or department into documents it produces, referral
to the National Security Agency is necessary prior to any declassi-
fication action.
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
DoD Systematic Declassification Review Guidelines
FROM: EXTENSION NO.
Executive Officer, ffice of OIS 81-160/1
Information Services DATE
1206 Ames Building 23 February 1981
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
building) INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Chief, CRD
FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
I-79 EDITIONS
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