CIA S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SYSTEMATIC REVIEW REQUIREMENTS OF E.O. 12065 AND ITS PREDECESSOR E.O. 11652

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00236R000100170009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 31, 1980
• Content Type: MF

STATI NTL
REFERENCE
Release 2002/02/14: ciA-RDP880160StR000100170009-7
3 1 JAN 1980
Mr. Douglas Cannon
Deputy Team Leader, Logistics & Communications
Division/GAO
Chief,M
Information Services Staff
CIA's Implementation of the Systematic Review
Requirements of E.O. 12065 and its Predecessor
E.O. 11652
Telephone Conversations f 4 and 7 January 1980
Concerning
Specific GAO Questions
1. Your questions and answers thereto are set forth below in logi-
cal sequence:
Q.
Status of Records Schedules - total holdings with percent permanent
and temporary.
A. The Agency has Records Control Schedules approved by the National
Archives and Records Service identifying permanent and temporary
records. However, a precise percentage breakdown of permanent and
temporary records depends upon: (1) completion of our records re-
view which under ISOO Directive No. 1 isn't due until December 1,
1980; and (b) updating of our records control schedules. At this
point the estimated Agency total records holdings, both permanent
and temporary, is 274,997 tubic feet of record. 224,199 cubic feet
are considered temporary - an estimated 50,798 cubic feet are perma-
nent as follows:
ARCHIVES
RECORDS CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
Constituting:
DCI 5,237
DDA 48,935
DDO 32,416
DDS&T 40,441
NFAC 54,954
TOTAL (cu. ft.) PERMANENT (cu. ft.)
24,497 24,497
68,517 10,812
181,983
estimative factor of
5% = 2,708
estimative factor of
x 10% = 12,781
15,489
ESTIMATED TOTAL PERMANENT RECORDS 50,798
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Estimate of percent of CIA records which must be reviewed document
by document as opposed to bulk declassification.
A. Generally all CIA permanent records must be reviewed document by
document to avoid the inadvertent declassification of national
security information meeting the classification criteria of E.O.
12065. Certain unique files, such as chrono files of an office,
which are largely classified and in which file integrity is essen-
tial, may be reviewed on a folder basis. Under this procedure, the
file is reviewed as a single document. Classification of the file
is maintained with each document stamped for individual review if
it is requested under the FOIA or Mandatory review provisions of
E.O. 12065.
Q.
Number of pages reviewed to date and percent declassified - OSS vs.
CIG/CIA.
A. CIA has reviewed 862 cubic feet or 1,724,000 pages of OSS permanent
records for accessioning to NARS, of which a first increment of 200
cubic feet has been accessioned. Over 90% of OSS material reviewed
thus far has been declassified. CIA has systematically reviewed
1,166,384 pages of CIG/CIA information 20 years of age or older of
which 58,161 pages or 4.98% has been declassified. Declassification
of later information varies according to category. For example, of
855 documents constituting 9,786 pages of older (1947-1950) finished
intelligence reports reviewed, 7,133 pages or 72.9% were declassi-
fied. On the other hand no permanent information on certain sensi-
tive operations can be declassified.
Q.
The estimated number of pages of permanent records to be reviewed
by 1988. Rate of review with current and projected resources.
Shortfall if any.
A. Of the estimated 50,798 cubic feet of permanent records, some 25%
are "guesstimated" as 20 years of age or older. An additional 25%
are estimated as becoming 20 years of age or older by 1988. The
estimated workload to be accomplished by 1 December 1988 is there-
fore half of the permanent records or 25,399 cubic feet. At 2,000
pages per cubic foot, the estimated number of pages to be reviewed
by 1988 is 50,798,000. In FY 79, excluding OSS documents, 20 CIA
review officers systematically reviewed over a period of 250 work
days, nearly 700,000 pages of material. An additional 11 personnel
were involved as intelligence assistants, data inputers, secretaries,
and managers. The rate of review was 140 pages per day per reviewer.
Estimated number of pages reviewed per year at the FY 79 rate are:
FY 80 - 1,050,000; FY 81-84 - 1,225,000; and FY 85-88 - 1,330,000;
or a total of 11,270,000 pages. This number amounts to 22% of the
estimated workload to be completed during the period FY 80 through
1988 leaving a shortfall of 78%.
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41g Ng
HThe,number of CIA personnel working on systematic review for declas-
traification.and the yearly cost beginning with FY 73 to FY 80 with
'projections for FY 81 - FY 88.
, CIA personnel allocated to systematic review and costs incurred are
set forth below beginning with FY 73 and continuing through FY 88.
ItEshould be noted that CIA's review program began modestly in FY 73
With 3 part-time independent contractors to review OSS documents.
This part of the systematic review program subsequently increased
to 15 part-time independent contractors at an annual cost of $160,000.
This allocation rate of personnel and funds for OSS documents is
projected through FY 83 when hopefully all OSS documents will have
been systematically reviewed.
In FY 77 and FY 78 components began to detail personnel for the
systematic review program pending the authorization of required new
positions. In FY 79, 39 new positions were authorized for the
systematic review program with an additional 5 positions projected
for FY 81. Approval was also secured to hire retired annuitants as
part-time contract employees equivalent to 8 AE. A 5% inflation
factor is included in cost projections beginning in FY 82.
FISCAL YEAR
NO. OF PERSONNEL
COSTS
1973
3
$ 31,500
1974
7
65,000
1975
10
94,484
1976
15
143,650
1977
25
421,820
1978
30
547,022
1979
46
1,038,277
1980
57
1,647,000
1981
62
1,728,000
1982
62
1,806,400
1983
62
1,896,720
1984
47
1,823,556
1985
50
2,019,600
1986
50
2,120,580
1987
50
2,226,609
1988
50
2,337,939
TOTAL
$19,948,157
Q. If CIA were relieved of the systematic review requirement and con-
tinned mandatory review only, what would be the saving.
-3-
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A. Excluding OSS permanent records for which we believe systematic
review should be completed at modest cost by the end of FY 83, it
will cost beginning in FY 80 an estimated $17,606,404 to accomplish
22% of CIA's estimated workload to be completed by 1988. The
savings would be tremendous if CIA were relieved of the systematic
review requirement and serviced only mandatory review requests. In
1978 CIA spent $260,000 servicing mandatory review requests and a
comparable amount in 1979. If $260,000 for mandatory review
requests is projected for the years FY 80 - FY 88 the cost is
$2,340,000. This amount compares to an estimated $17,606,404 for
systematic review for the same period to accomplish only 22% of the
task. Estimated savings would be $15,266,404. It should also be
recognized that overall most intelligence permanent records cannot
be declassified for reasons of national security. Relief from the
systematic review requirement of E.O. 12065 would not only enable
funds and personnel to be directed against high priority intelli-
gence objectives, but would also lesson the possibility of error in
releasing sensitive information which could result in serious damage
to national security. The latter possibility increases in a worsening
international environment when release of older information about a
country whose government has changed could adversely affect U.S.
relations with the new government. Finally, it could be noted that
if personnel were allocated to complete by 1988 the estimated work-
load of permanent records, the cost would be in the neighborhood of
$80,000,000.
2. Guidelines as listed below governing the systematic review program
are attached:
a. Guidelines for Classification Review of CIA Predecessor
Records and Information Between 1941-1946;
b. Review of Foreign Government Information (OSS Documents);
c. Guidelines for the Review of Records for the Period From
the End of OSS to the Beginning of CIA 1 October 1945 -
20 September 1947;
d. CIA Systematic Review Guidelines;
e. Guidelines for Systematic Review of Foreign Government
Information Thirty Years Old or Older;
f. Special Procedures for Use in Systematic Review of
Cryptologic Information Pursuant to Section 3-403 of
Executive Order 12065; and
g.
Categories of Information for Which the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office (ISO()) Has Granted
Waivers of the 10-year Review Requirement of Section
3-401 of Executive Order 12065.
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is requested that information provided by CIA and included
'in proposed GAO: reports be checked with CIA from the standpoints of
classification and use prior to publication.
STATI NTL
. Attachments: a/s
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STATINTL
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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? CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
5 February 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Douglas Cannon
Deputy Team Leader
Logistics & Communications Division, GAO
STATINTL FROM:
STATI NTL
Chiet, Information Services Staff
Directorate of Administration
SUBJECT: CIA's Implementation of the Systematic Review Require-
ments of E.O. 12065 and its Predecessor E.O. 11652
REFERENCE: Telephone Conversations of 4 and 7 January 1980,Between
IninConcerning Specific GAO
a
I. Your questions and answers thereto are set forth below in
logical sequence: /
Q. Status of Records Schedules - total holdings with percent permanent
and temporary.
A. The Agency has Records Control Schedules approved by the National
Archives and Records Service identifying permanent and temporary
records. _However, a precise percentage breakdown of permanent and
temporary records depends upon: (1) completion of our records review
which under ISO() Directive No. 1 isn't due until December 1, 1980;
and (2) updating of our records control schedules. At this point
the estimated Agency total records holdings, both permanent and
temporary, is 274,997 cubic feet of records. 224,199 cubic feet .
are considered temporary -- an estimated 50,798 cubic feet are
permanent as follows:
TOTAL (cu. ft.)._ PERMANENT (cu. ft.)
ARCHIVES 24,497 24,497
RECORDS CENTER 68,517 10,812
HEADQUARTERS 181,983
Constituting:
DCI 5,237 estimative factor of
DDA ? 48,935 x 5% =. 2,708
DDO 32,416 15,489
DDS&T 40,441 estimative factor of
NFAC 54,954 x 10% ..12,781
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ESTIMATED TOTAL PERMANENT RECORDS , 50,798
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Q. Estimate of percent of CIA records which must be reviewed document
by document as opposed to bulk declassification.
A. Generally all CIA permanent records must be reviewed document by
document to avoid the inadvertent declassification of national
security information meeting the classification criteria of E.O.
12065. Certain unique files, such as chrono files of an office,
which are largely classified and in which file integrity is essen-
tial, may be reviewed on a folder basis. Under this procedure, the
file is reviewed as a single document. Classification of the file
is maintained with each document stamped for individual review if
it is requested under the FOIA or Mandatory review provisions of
E.O. 12065.
Q.
Number of pages reviewed to date and percent declassified - OSS vs.
CIG/CIA.
A. CIA has reviewed 862 cubic feet or 1,724,000 pages of OSS permanent
records for accessioning to NARS, of which a first increment of 200
Cubic feet has been accessioned. Over 90% of OSS material reviewed
thus far has been declassified. CIA has systematically reviewed
1,166,38t pages of CIG/CIA information 20 years of age or older of
which 58,161 pages or 4.98% has been declassified. Declassification
of later information varies according to cateaory. For example, of
855 documents constituting 9,786 pages of older (1947-1950) finished
intelligence reports reviewed, 7,133 pages or 72.9% were declassi-
fied. On the other hand no permanent information on certain sensi-
tive operations can be declassified.
Q. The estimated number of pages of permanent records to be reviewed
by 1988.. Rate of review with current and projected resources.
Shortfall if any.
A. Of the estimated 50,798 cubic feet of permanent records, some 25%
are "guesstimated" as 20 years of age or older. An additional 25%
are estimated as becoming 20 years of age or older by 1988. The
estimated workload to be accomplished by 1 December 1988 is there:
fore half of the permanent records or 25,399 cubic feet. At 2,000
pages per cubic foot, the estimated number of pages to be reviewed
by 1988 is 50,798,000. In FY 79, excluding OSS documents, 20 CIA
review officers systematically reviewed over a period of 250 work
days, nearly 700,000 pages of material. An additional 11 personnel
were involved as intelligence assistants, data inputers, secretaries,
and managers. The rate of review was 140 pages per day per reviewer.
Estimated number of pages reviewed per year at the FY 79 rate are:
FY 80 - 1,050,000; FY 81=-84 - 1,225,000; and FY 85-88 - 1,330,000;
or a total of 11,270,000 pages. This number amounts to 22% of the
estimated workload to be completed 'during the period FY 80 through
1988 leaving a shortfall of 78%.
-2-
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Q.
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The number of CIA personnel working on systematic review for declas-
sification and the yearly cost beginning with FY 73 to FY 80 with
projections for FY 81 - FY 88.
A. CIA personnel allocated to systematic review and costs incurred are
set forth below beginning with FY 73 and continuing through FY 88.
It should be noted that CIA's review program began modestly in FY 73
with 3 part-time independent contractors to review OSS documents.
This part of the systematic review program subsequently increased
to 15 part-time independent contractors at an annual cost of $160,000.
This allocation rate of personnel and funds for OSS documents is
projected through FY 83 when hopefully all OSS documents will have
been systematically reviewed.
In FY 77 and FY 78 components began to detail personnel for the
systematic review program pending the authorization of required new
positions. In FY 79, 39 new positions were authorized for the
systematic review program with an additional 5 positions projected
for FY 81. Approval was also secured to hire retired annuitants as
part-time contract employees equivalent to 8 AE. A 5% inflation
factor is included in cost projections beginning in FY 82.
FISCAL YEAR
NO. OF PERSONNEL
COSTS
1973
3
$ 31,500
1974
7
65,000
1975
JO
94,484
1976
15
143,650
1977
25
421,820
1978
30
547,022
1979
46
1,038,277
1980
57
1,647,000
1981
62
1,728,000
1982
62
1,806,400
1983
62
1,896,720
1984
47
1,823,556
1985
50
2,019,600
1986
50
2,120,580
1987
50
2,226,609
1988
50
2,337,939
TOTAL
$19,948,157
Q. If CIA were relieved of the systematic review requirement and con-
tinued mandatory review only, what would be the saving.
-3-
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A. Excluding OSS permanent records for which we believe systematic
review should be completed at modest cost by the end of FY 83, it
will cost beginning in FY 80 an estimated $17,606,404 to accomplish
22% of CIA's estimated workload to be completed by 1988. The
savings would be tremendous if CIA were relieved of the systematic
review requirement and serviced only mandatory review requests. In
1978 CIA spent $260,000 servicing mandatory review requests and a
comparable amount in 1979. If $260,000 for mandatory review
requests is projected for the years FY 80 - FY 88 the cost is
$2,340,000. This amount compares to an estimated $17,606,404 for
systematic review for the same period to accomplish only 22% of the
task. Estimated savings would be $15,266,404. It should also be
recognized that overall most intelligence permanent records cannot
be declassified for reasons of national security. Relief from the
systematic review requirement of E.O. 12065 would not only enable
funds and personnel to be directed against high priority intelli-
gence objectives, but would also lessen the possibility of error in
releasing sensitive information which could result in serious damage
to national security. The latter possibility increases in a worsening
International environment when release of older information about a
country whose government has changed could adversely affect U.S.
relation d with the new government. Finally, it could be noted that
if personnel were allocated to complete by 1988 the estimated work-
load of permanent records, the cost would be in the neighborhood of
$80,000,000.
2. Guidelines as listed below governing the systematic review program
are attached:
a. Guidelines for Classification Review of CIA Predecessor
Records and Information Between 1941-1946;
b. Review of Foreign Government Information (OSS Documents);
c. Guidelines for the Review of Records for the Period From
the End of OSS to the Beginning of CIA I October 1945 -
20 September 1947;
d. CIA Systematic Review Guidelines;
e. Guidelines for Systematic Review of Foreign Government
Information Thirty Years Old or Older;
f. Special Procedures for Use in Systematic Review of
Cryptologic Information Pursuant to Section 3-403 of
Executive Order 12065; and
Categories of Information for Which the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office (IS00) Has Granted
Waivers of the 10-yetr Review Requirement of Section
3-401 of Executive Order 12065.
g.
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3. It is requested that information provided by CIA and included
in proposed GAO reports be checked with CIA from the standpaints of STATINTL
classification and use prior to publication.
Attachments: a/s
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11 December 1978
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GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION RUJEW or
CIA PREDECESS-OT RECORDS AND INFORMATI-ON
BETWEEN 1941-1946
These guidelines are for use in reviewing the classification of
permanent records of the Coordinator of Information (COI), (in existence
from July 1941 to June 1942); the Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
(June 1942 to September 1945); and the Strategic Services Unit (SSU),
(October 1945 to October 1946) for which the Director of the CIA has
responsibility. Executive Order 12065 requires that classified infor-
mation constituting permanently valuable records of the government, as
defined by 44 U.S.C. 2103, shall be reviewed for declassification as it
becomes twenty years old or thirty years in the case of foreign govern-
ment information. The Order further requires that guidelines for system-
atic review for declassification shall be issued and state specific
limited categories of information which, because of their national
security sensitivity, should not be declassified automatically but should
be reviewed item-by-item to determine whether continued protection is
needed.
A document can only be exempted from declassification if information
contained therein is exempt by statute from declassification or meets a
two-step test:
1. It concerns one or more of the classification requirements
set forth in Section 1-301 of Order:
(a) military plans, weapons, or operations;
(b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities, sources or methods;
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the
United States;
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters
relating to the national security;
(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding
nuclear materials or facilities; or
(g) other categories of information which are related
to national security and which require protection
against unauthorized disclosure as determined by
the President, by a person designated by the
President pursuant to Section 1-201, or by an
agency head; and
2. Its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected
to cause at least identifiable damage to the national security because of
the nature or substance of the information itself or the fact of its
possession by the United States Government.
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4
Decisions to exempt a document from declassification must balance
the need to safeguard U.S. national security interests against the
public's right to know. If classified informa:ion or documents from
other U.S. Government agencies are found among these records, they will
be reviewed under the originating agency's classification review guide-
lines or be referred to the originating agency for its review as
appropriate.
The major concern in the review of the records of the COI, OSS and
SSU is to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods. The
Director of the CIA has statutory responsibility to protect intelligence
sources and methods.
An intelligence source is a person, organization, group, technical
system, mechanism, device or any other means or instrument that has
provided or is being developed to provide foreign intelligence or foreign
counterintelligence and which, if its identity or capability is disclosed,
could be vulnerable to counteraction which may nullify or significantly
reduce its effectiveness in providing foreign intelligence or foreign
counterintelligence to the United States. The premature disclosure of
the identities of sources who cooperated in confidence will undoubtedly
have an adverse impact on an intelligence agency's ability to obtain
new sources out of the fear of ultimate compromise. Ideally, source
identities should never be disclosed but at a minimum they should not
be revealed for at least 75 years to afford a basic level of protection
to the sources and their immediate families.
A present, past or prospective intelligence method is a procedure,
mode, technique, or requirement used or being developed to acquire,
transmit, analyze, evaluate, or process foreign intelligence or foreign
counterintelligence or which supports an intelligence source or operation
and if disclosed, is vulnerable to counteraction that could nullify or
significantly reduce its effectiveness in supporting the foreign intel-
ligence or foreign counterintelligence activities of the United States,
or could reasonably lead to the disclosure of an intelligence source or
operation.
Operational intelligence activities of the COI, OSS, or SSU are not
of themselves exempt from declassification, except to the extent that
disclosure would expose sensitive intelligence sources or methods currently
in use or proposed for use, or do damage to the current or future foreign
intelligence or diplomatic interests of the United States.
All classified documents and other materials originated by COI, OSS,
or the SSU, or for which they had responsibility, may be declassified
except those which, after review under these general guidelines, contain
information judged to be still sensitive and which, if declassified,
reasonably could be expected to:
1. Identify personnel who were assigned under non-official
cover or would reveal a non-official cover arrangement.
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uftgliterriSTance MMTYVVrt'unrinnrs"17rftlYMy" sensitive because
of governmental relationships which still could be adversely affected
by disclosure. As a general rule, OSS personnel serving under official
cover need not be protected. This applies especially to personnel
serving at OSS Headquarters and under military unit cover in the field.
Personnel serving in the field under non-military cover, where that
cover was a peculiarity of the war-time situation, e.g. Lend Lease,
War Shipping Administration (WSA), United States Commercial Corporation
(USCC), Office of War Information (OWI), Federal Economic Administration
(FEA), and there may have been others, need not be protected.
3. Identify agents informants or collaborators, witting or unwitting,
unless already identified in open literature.
4. Reveal the relationship with any element of a cooperating foreign
government or international organization, provide details about it, or
reveal information obtained in confidence from such an entity. Classi-
fied information received from such an entity in confidence may not be
declassified without consulting the originating foreign government entity
or international organization.
5. Reveal the strategies, procedures, techniques and devices used
to acquire, train and employ agents, collaborators and informants, or
to create and employ technical sources for intelligence purposes, and
which have more than a strictly wartime applieetion.
6. Disclose communication intelligence, eryptography and related
activities which must be protected until they can be reviewed by the
National Security Agency. An exception to this is German and Japanese
encrypted,communications intercepted and decoded during World War II
which are declassified.
7. Disclose censorship materials which are to be protected until
they can be reviewed by the General Services Administration. (See NARS
guidelines of 26 April 1978 for exceptions.) Care must be taken to
protect any cooperative foreign government or cntity of the foreign
government which may have been involved in censorship activities.
8. Disclose classified information originated by another U.S.
Government agency which should be coordinated with that agency or its
successor agency prior to release or be reviewed under the declassi-
fication guidelines issued by the originating agency for that purpose.
9. Disclose information which might adversely affect the conduct
of current or future U.S. foreign relations.
10. Disclose information which could placc a person in jeopardy.
STATI NTL
Classification Review Group
Information Systems Analysis Staff
Directorate of Administration
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Classification Review Procedure/OSS CRP 79-006/OSS
REVIEW OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
1. E.O. 12065 authorizes protection of foreign government information
for up to thirty years before requiring it be reviewed for declassification
under guidelines developed, where appropriate, in consultation with the
foreign government concerned. The Agency position is that classified docu-
ments created by a foreign government or foreign government information,
however obtained, which is used in OSS reports, may not be declassified
without specific instructions from the foreign government concerned. The
basis for this position is that such information and documents were given
to the U.S. Government with the understanding that they would be held in
confidence and, that the unauthorized or inappropriate exposure today could
impact adversely on current or future U.S. liaison and diplomatic relations
as well as directly on U.S. intelligence equities. These general consider-
ations should be kept in mind when reviewing OSS records, and any given
foreign government document or information should be viewed under this
light. The basic requirement is to protect current and future CIA and
U.S. intelligence interests. Complete guidelines which would neatly cover
each and every case presented to the reviewer is not feasible. The follow-
ing however, are provided to give the reviewer a more specific idea of
what requires protection in the areas of sources and methods, liaison
relationships, and U.S. foreign relations:
a. Sources and methods - protect the identity of agents and
collaborators; informants where a serious and sustained relationship
existed; include persons used jointly. Protect intelligence methods,
("theirs," "ours," or "joint") which have had continued applicability in
their or our operations or would, if revealed, create a negative reaction
from one of our friendly liaison services with whom we continue to coop-
erate, or could impact adversely on our foreign relations today or in the
future. Sensitive intelligence methods are those which are not essentially
identical to methods universally employed by intelligence services and
therefore widely known, or that have not been rendered obsolete by techno-
logical advances.
b. Liaison relationships - consider what the liaison services'
attitude and requirements are for release of their own information and
records as the basis against which to consider our handling of their docu-
ments and information. All services protect their sources and we must do
likewise. More difficult to judge is information concerning intelligence
methods and organizational data, release of which might cause an adverse
reaction that could impact negatively on our current or future relation-
ship with that service. Identification of their personnel is certainly
one such category of information that should not be generally released,
organizational details another, and information that could reveal some-
thing of their methods of operation should receive careful attention.
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RDP85B 001 0170009-7
or narelations - n e./en moretAllbcuitarea in which to
render judgments is that information which could impact adversely on current
or future U.S. foreign relations. The same categories of information noted
above are applicable but here we must consider the additional factor that
exposure could impact adversely on current or future U.S. foreign relations.
Such problems would likely revolve around prominent personalities, contro-
versial government policies or actions, or government to government relation-
ships considered particularly sensitive and often maintained under some
measure of secrecy for that reason. These problems are more likely to
arise concerning those countries which were neutral or not totally committed
to either side during WW II and who continue to follow somewhat independent
roads today. Such countries would be the neutrals such as Sweden, Switzerland,
Ireland, Spain and Turkey. While no guide can hope to i:nticipate all the
possibilities let alone cover them, it can at least-or maybe at best-sens-
itize reviewers to the areas where improper release of information or records
could create or contribute to an adverse foreign reaction that would be
detrimental to U.S. foreign policies and relations and thus to ow national
security. The above comments are intended as a general guide, not as a
definitive or all inclusive directive. Individual judgment must be relied
upon in most cases. When in doubt iefer the question to C/CRG/OPS.
2. When you find foreign government information or documents which
fall within the above categories they should be treated as any other docu-
ment and processed as follows:
a. Remove from box and replace with a Withdrawal Notice.
b. Stamp the document with the reviewer's stamp.
c. Fill in the Withdrawal Notice number and the document
number from Job No. 79-00332A.
d. Mark to indicate any change in classification.
e. Fill in the year of the "Next Review Date" to indicate
a time period of 40 years from the date of the document's creation
date (30 years allowed by E.O. 12065 plus 10 years for the first
review extension).
f. Fill in the date of the review action and your employee
number.
g. Complete Form 4023A as usual.
Classification Review Group
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STATI NTL
Approved For elease 2002/02/14 : CIA-RDP85B0OCI3*00100170009-7
2 duly 1979
Classification Review Procedure Cu 79-32 and
CRP 79-008/OSS
GUIDELINES FOR THE REVIEW (.)1 RECORDS FOR 11.W, PERIOD
FROM TlE END OF oss TO hIP BEGINNING OF CIA
1 October 1.9Z - 2H SepteriN:r 1947
BACKGROUND
On 20 September 1945 President Harry Tillman signed an Executive Order
breaking up the OSS as of 1 October 1945 and directing the Secretary of
State to take the lead in developing the program for a comprehensive and
coordinated foreign intelligence system. flc Research and Analysis (W)
and Presentation Branches of the OSS went intact to the State Department.
The remaining activities of the OSS (mostly clandestine services) were
assigned to the War Department which was to keep them separate in the
Strategic Services Unit (SSU) established by the Executive Order for that
purpose and to keep those activities to serve as a nucleus for a possible
central intelligence service.
On 22 January I94o President Trtunan issued a Presidential Directive
which established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) functioning directly
under the National intelligence Authority (NIA). flie NIA consisted of
representatives of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a personal
representative of the President. llie Director of CIO was appointed by the
President. His duties included planning to coordinate departmental intel-
ligence activities; recommending prlicies and objectives of the "national
intelligence mission;" correlating and evaluating intelligence for strategic
and national policy and disseminating ir within the Government; performing
functions related to intelligence a the President and NIA might direct;
and performing services of common concern where those services could be
performed more efficiently by a central organization. Significantly, the
Director of CIG was not given the duty of directly collecting intelligence.
The CIG was described as "a cool lerati\e interdepa rtmental activity." Since
the SJ had been expected only to setae: all interim function, the Executive
Order of 20 September 1945 directed the Secretary of War to discontinue the
SSU as soon as its functions and facilities could he: 1) placed in a new
central intelligence organization; !) placed in the War Department; or 3)
dropped entirely. General Magruder, Chief of the SSD, was to superintend
the liquidation of those SSU activitie to be dropped entirely during
peacetime. On 29 January I940 thy sc,..:retary of War directed that the SSU
should be liquidated by 30 June 19Th, 'Ilie Director of CIG was to take what
records he wanted from SSD through the Secretary of War and retain operational
control over them. Title a the reeords Was to he settled later. Magruder
felt that SSU plans, properties and periuiel must he maintained because
they were indispensable For the IMWIMTKIa of intelligence in peacetime.
(hi 14 February 194h he 'weed that the SSO he placed under the Director of CIG.
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As t erg ici'--001:r1f06:1IfOCRIRtld get the
ent 261AV.WaciT;m5i.ionized under Colonel
)(ity14,.#,!4*
Fortier to study this question. 'Ilie committee foiuul support for the opinion
that the SSU, as was, ought ie not go to the CIG. 11K, conpuittee had heard that
the bulk of intelligence inf7iTiation came from friendly governments; that
much material came from other sources than secret collection; that SSU
personnel had not been adequately screened; and that ninny clandestine personnel'
had become exposed during WW The committee thought that the SSU should
be reorganized and the desired portion placed under the GIG as a "going
concern." The committee thought that CH.; .nloold closely coordinate clandestine
operations, concentrate on the USSR and the Satellites, penetrate key institu-
tions to aid possible U.S. military operatiocis;, develop liaison with foreign
intelligence agencies and develop sleeper not in Germany and Japan while
overt collection of intelligence inforwt[on remain with the other Ii. S.
Government agencies. The committee also recogni:cd the interrelationship
between the SSU and the RO Branch (still located in the State Department)
and urged that their activities be in because the MA Branch was
"closely geared to the secret intelligence branches as their chief guide."
The committee also felt that the Director of (AC should take authority and
responsibility for liquidation of the
On 3 April 1946 the final liquidation of SSU was postponed from
30 june 1946 to 30 June 1947. Meanwhile, the Chief of SSU was directed to
obey the instructions from the Director of CIC. This made it possible for
Fortier, Assistant Director and Acting Chief of Operational Services of
CIG, to take over such SSU assets as the Piieetor of CIG wanted while unwnnted
assets would be absorbed into the War Department nr abandoned. The arrange-
ments for the transfer of SSU to the GIG through the War Department were
complicated but it enabled the C1G to take legally what it wanted while
Magruder, Chief of the SJ, got rid of unwanted facilities through the V;ar
Department. Although no specific legal oetion was taken, the passage of time
and the inferential approval of the National Security Act of 1947 appears to
have vested title of SSU property to the CIG.
In June 1946 General Vandenberg became the Director of GIG (replacing
Admiral Souers). Vandenberg felt that the Director of C1G must be the NIA's
executive officer and he immth ateny struck out 10 obtain grouter authority
and independence for the GIG. While his idea:; wet resistance from the member
agencies of NIA, Vandenberg did win some poinN. ror example, Vandenberg
wanted the CIG to conduct all espionage inl counter-espionage for the collec-
tion of foreign intelligence abroad. 11M , proposal was modified to allow the
Director of GIG to conduct only those "oreanized federal" operations which
were outside the U.S. and its possessions, but still left CIG with the
authority to collect intelligeneL Miformation. The purpose of the revision
was to permit the military services to collect intelligence for departmental
purposes and it 1%;IS meant to protect the FBI in performing its dot ii. with ii
the U.S. Vandenberg then established the Office of Special Operntions to
collect foreign intelligence. Durinn the saumer and. fall of 1946, the Gin
arranged to take over the personnet. undercover agents, and foreign stations
of the SSU. By mid-October 1946 the liquidation of SSU was complete. (SSU as
a bonafide organization never actuollv went ont of business. The C/1MS/01))
is the current chief of SRI and is anthori.xd to conduct ;_ertain business for
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NEW
? Approved.For elease 2002/0204 : CIA7RDP85130r Q01010170009-7
and on behall 01 SSU.
.v,JSt . _ S
NJ at:1 ii)t-(1 V(' LIfti? out cial
requests from EX-SSU or OSS personnel.) 1 ield stotions wore notified that
effective 19 October 1946
....scontinues all overseas activities and the
NSS1MWS vesponsinilit> for conducting
Office of Special Operations of CIG
espionage and counterespionage in the field for collection or Foreign intcl
ligence information required for notional seenrit,.."
As noted above, the CIG tokeover or the SSU stretched over a period or
several months in. 1946. During t
?1
a,s period the LIG took over many or the
personnel, installations, facilities and CONVI orrangements and units as well
as administrative practices of the SSII. Mir: you will find CIG, after
19 October 1946, using SSU cover unit designations and letterhead stationery
from such units making it difficult to identily Cl(l documents from appeorance
alone. It could be argued that if the letterhead is SSU then it is an SSU
document. Be that as it may, for general rurpir:es in classification review
consider all records created before 1 'A-toner 1916 as SSU and all records
created after that date as CIG.
GUIDELINES
For our general use in the classification review process, the date of
19 October 1946 will be considered the pivotal date marking the "end" of the
Mr"?M-7.arITginning" of the C1G. Generally speaking, records dated prior
to 19 October 1946 will be considered SSG documents and those created :i iter
that date will be considered CIG documents.
The methods of organization and operotion used by the SSU were very
similar to those developed and used by the O. The SSU was essentially a
military unit, staffed mostly by military personnel and housed in the War
Departnent under military command. It is therefore pertinent for us to review
SSU documents under those guidelines developed ror and used in the Llassifi-
cation review of OSS records. LIG on the other hand, very son after its
creation began to take on an independent lire and although many C1G personnel
continued to be military it quickly ottricted more civilians and it was not
under direct military command. We will, therefre, look at CIG document as
relating closely to the beginnings or the CIA and will review CIG documents
under those guidelines developed fei? and used in the classification review of
CIA records. AS a general rule, the OSL; revio, team will t reTonsible For
reviewing documents originated heCore October 1916 and the other CRD
reviewers will be responsible tor those documents originated after 19 Octohei
1946. This date is not intended to he an absolute rule; as in all reviek,
wolT, individual judgement must be used. For eNomple, a document or
after 19 October 1940 might refer to the past and to activities or problom,...i
of the SSU making it in essence a more or less typical SSU docimmit containing
material relating to the SSU. Such a dociment should he reviewed NS being
essentially a SSU document and using the OSS guidelines to judge the Llasifi-
cation action. On the other hand, a document originated before 19 October 1946
might refer to the future and to akAivities or problems relating to the C1G
making it in essence a more or 1 typicol CIG document. This type document
should be reviewed as a CIG dmlament using the CIA guidelines.
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1VA
All reviewers should be espeL ial IV,tiyyt or these types of docuinent
and pay particular attention to their clasification review. If there is
any question, coordination should he effected between the CRD Operations
Branch/OSS and the CRD Operations rianeh/cIA throni.th the (lief of the (Ttli
Operations Branch.
The major categories of in which most likely will require
continued protection are: 1) infonmition which identifies sources; 2)
foreign government information and details of intelligence agreements we
had with foreign governments; 3) information revealing unique intelligence
methods not generally known or used and Hot outdated; and 4) informati,,a
which could still cause negative rcaLtiom; that could impact adversely on
current or future U.S. foreign relations. Some more specific guidelines
are as follows:
1. Protect all sources to avoid cteation of a reputation that U.S.
intelligence services cannot protect their sources. A rare exception to
this rule might be possible where the contact was fleeting, incidental,
insignificant and overt.
2. Identification as an SSU St ill \\ill be juded and handled tL,
same way as it is for an OSS staffer. Starter-, yenerallY will not bo
protected merely because they later w'rked or the ClG or the CIA. If
however, the person engaged in work for LIG or the CIA, thefi
SSU (and OS'S) employment may be cxuri,ted fr(4:1 declassification to pr(JN:.ct
the later sensitive work or posit lou i the CU; or the ClA.
3. Persons who served tu.ider non- Hi: i.] coker are protected at ill
times as is their cover.
STATI NTL
Chief,
Classification koviow Division
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McDirulor
.
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WishingIon. fl C 20505
5 JUN tin
Mr. Michael T. Blouin
Director, Information Security Oversight Office
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20405
Dear Mr. Blouin:
Enclosed for your review are guidelines issued pursuant
to Executive Order 12065 for the systematic review of United
States originated classified information over twenty years old
and under Central Intelligence Agency classification jurisdic-
tion. Also enclosed is a copy of my letter to the Archivist
of the United States forwarding these guidelines for his use.
Yours sincerely,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Enclosures
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The Director
Central Intelligence Agency
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Washington, D. C. 20505
5 JIM 1979
Dr. James B. Rhoads
Archivist of the United States
National Archives and Records Service
Eighth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20408
Dear Dr. Rhoads:
Pursuant to Section 3-402 of Executive Order 12065, I hereby issue
and enclose for your use the required systematic review guidelines cover-
ing classified information of United States origin and more than twenty
years old over which the Central Intelligence Agency has classification
jurisdiction. These guidelines were prepared in consultation with your
designated representative Mr. Edwin A. Thompson, Director of the Records
Declassification Division, National Archives and Records Service.
Copies of this letter and of the enclosed guidelines have been for-
warded to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (IS00)
for his review, as provided by the Order. Systematic review guidelines
for "foreign government information" as defined in Section 6-103 of the
Order and in Section I/F of ISO? Directive No. 1 will be provided at a
later date, in compliance with the provisions of the Order and Directive
concerning such information.
Yours sincerely,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Enclosure
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Approved For:NWlease 2002/02/14: CIA-RDP85130023i10000100170009-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW GUIDELINES
A. Authorization. The following guidelines apply to information of United
States origin ullich is more than 20 years old and over which the Central
Intelligence Agency has classification jurisdiction. Under the provisions
of Section 3-402 of Executive Order 12065, the CIA authorizes the Archivist
of the United States to use these guidelines in the review of such informa-
tion upon its transfer to the General Services Administration and accession
into the National Archives.
B. Categories of Information Excepted from Automatic Declassification.
Except for?reign government-ETOrmation, viliiEh is exempt from automatic
declassification under Section 3-404 of the Order, all classified informa-
tion over 20 years old which is under the classification jurisdiction of
this agency is automatically declassified unless it falls within one or
more of the categories described below. Information in these categories
shall not be declassified until reviewed for declassification by designated
CIA personnel, and must be referred to CIA for such review by all other
agencies having custody thereof. Waiver of the Order's 10-year review
interval requirement having been granted pursuant to Section 3-401 by the
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, information in
Categories 1 through 5 below is to be systematically reviewed again 30
years following its initial review. Information in all other categories
listed below shall be re-reviewed at 10-year intervals, as necessary, until
it can be declassified or assigned a date or event for automatic declassifi-
cation. Category 29 is a new category under Section 1-301(g) of the Order.
CATEGORY 1
Information constituting or concerning cryptologic, cryptographic or
signals intelligence including information on the development and/or use
of any method, means, system, device, installation or activity for the
production, acquisition or transmission of such intelligence or for the
protection of cryptographically processed data including cryptographic,
communications and emanations security procedures, techniques, materials
and equipment.
(Next Review Date: 30 years following initial review.)
CATEGORY 2
Information constituting or concerning counterintelligence, defined by
Executive Order 12036 of 24 January 1978 (Section 4-202) as "...information
gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage and other
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clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, international terrorist
activities or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers,
organizations or persons, but not including personnel, physical, document
or comunications security programs."
(Next Review Date: 30 years following initial review.)
CATEGORY 3
Information concerning or covered by special access, distribution
and protection programs continued or established pursuant to Section 4-2
of Executive Order 12065.
(Next Review Date: 30 years following initial review.)
CATEGORY 4
Information which identifies any undercover personnel or unit(s),
or clandestine human agent(s), of the Central Intelligence Agency or of
a predecessor agency; or which otherwise reveals information classifiable
under the provisions of Executive Order 12065 concerning intelligence
sources, methods or activities including intelligence plans, policies,
or operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, a predecessor agency,
or any element of either.
(Next Review Date: 30 years following initial review.)
CATEGORY 5
Information covertly acquired which is contained in intelligence
reports and other documents that bear the legend "THIS IS UNEVALUATED
INFORMATION" or, lacking this or an equivalent marking, are similar in
format or content to items so marked; and in which the formats used,
subject matter, source descriptions or other content would, in collec-
tions or aggregates of such reports and/or other documents, reveal the
nature, scope or extent of United States intelligence activities in,
or in relation to, particular foreign countries or areas or would
identify intelligence sources or methods.
(Next Review Date: 30 years following initial review.)
CNIEGORY 6
Information which reveals or identifies a present, past, or prospec-
tive intelligence source, whether a person, organization, group, technical
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Approved Forltillease 2002/02/14: CIA-RDP85B0023??600100170009-7
system, mechanism, device, or any other means or instrument that provides,
has provided, or is being developed to provide intelligence.
CALEGORY 7
Information which reveals or identifies a present, past, or prospective
intelligence method, procedure, mode, technique, or requirement used or
being developed to acquire, transmit, analyze, correlate, evaluate, or
process intelligence or to support an intelligence source, operation, or
activity.
CATEGORY 8
Information that discloses the organizational structure of the Central
Intelligence Agency; the numbers and assignments of CIA personnel; the size
and composition of the CIA budget, including internal and external funding;
logistical and associated support activities and services; security procedures,
techniques, and activities including those applicable to the fields of
communications and data processing; or other quantitative or qualitative
data revealing or indicating the nature, objectives, requirements, priorities,
scope or thrust of CIA activities, including the missions, functions, and
locations of certain CIA components or installations.
CATEGORY 9
Information pertaining to intelligence-related methodologies, techniques,
formulae, equipment, programs or models, including computer simulations,
ranging from initial requirements through planning, source acquisition,
contract initiation, research, design, and testing to production, personnel
training, and operational use.
CATEGORY 10
Information which identifies research, procedures, or data used by CIA
in the acquisition and processing of intelligence or the production of
finished intelligence, when such identification could reveal the particular
intelligence interest of the CIA, the value of the intelligence, or the
extent of the CIA's knowledge of a particular subject of intelligence interest.
CATEGORY 11
Information pertaining to training in intelligence sources, methods,
and activities provided under the auspices of CIA to individuals, organi-
zations, or groups that could reveal or identify equipment, materials,
training sites, methods and techniques of instruction, or the identities
of students and instructors.
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CATEGORY 12
Information that could disclose CIA policies and procedures used for
personnel recruitment, assessment, selection, training, assignment, and
evaluation.
CATEGORY 13
Information that could lead to foreign political, economic, or military
action against the United States or other friendly nations.
CATEGORY 14
Information that could create, stimulate, or increase international
tensions in such manner as to impair the conduct of United States foreign
policies.
CATEGORY 15
Information that could deprive the United States of a diplomatic or
economic advantage related to the national security, or that could weaken
the position of the United States or its allies in international negotia-
tions, or adversely affect other activities pertinent to the resolution
or avoidance of international conflicts or differences having national
security significance.
CATEGORY 16
Information concerning plans prepared, under preparation, or contem-
plated by officials of the United States to meet diplomatic or other
contingencies affecting the national security.
CATEGORY 17
Information that identifies or otherwise reveals activities conducted
abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives, and planned and
executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent
or acknowledged publicly; or information that discloses support provided
to such activities.
CATEGORY 18
Information revealing that the United States has obtained, or seeks to
obtain, certain data or materials from or concerning a foreign nation,
organization, or group; the disclosure of which information could adversely
affect United States relations with or activities in a foreign country.
-4-
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CATEGORY 19
Information that could lead to political or economic instability, or
to civil disorder or unrest, in al foreign country or jeopardize the lives,
liberty, or property of United States persons in such a country or could
endanger United States Government personnel or installations there.
CATEGORY 20
Information concerning foreign intentions, capabilities, or activities
which could pose a potential threat to United States national security
interests or to those of allied or other friendly governments.
CAIEGORY 21
Information indicating the extent of, or degree of success achieved
by, United States collection of intelligence on and assessment of foreign
military plans, weapons, capabilities, or operations.
CATEGORY 22
Information revealing defense plans or posture of the United States,
its allies, or other friendly countries or enabling a foreign nation or
entity to develop countermeasures to such plans or posture.
CA1EGORY 23
Information disclosing the capabilities, vulnerabilities, or deployment
of United States weapons or weapons systems.
CATEGORY 24
Information that continues to provide the United States with a scientific,
technical, engineering, economic, or intelligence advantage of value to the
national security.
CATEGORY 25
Information concerning research of a scientific or technical nature
leading to the development of special techniques, procedures, equipment
and equipment configurations, systems, or devices for collection or
production of foreign intelligence; or the operational planning for,
deployment or use thereof in such collection or production, or for other
national security purposes.
CATEGORY 26
Information concerning United States Government programs to safeguard
nuclear materials, techniques, capabilities, or facilities that could com-
promise, jeopardize or reduce the effectiveness of such programs.
-5-
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CNfLGORY 27
Information on foreign nuclear programs, activities, capabilities,
technologies, facilities, plans and intentions, weapons and their deployment
that could disclose the nature, scope, or effectiveness of United States
intelligence efforts to monitor nuclear developments abroad or could cause
such efforts to fail or be restricted in a manner detrimental to national
security.
CNIIGORY 28
Information pertaining to contractual relationships or joint arrange-
ments with individuals, commercial concerns or other entities when such a
relationship or arrangement involves a specific intelligence interest, or
reveals the extent or depth of knowledge or technical expertise possessed
by CIA, or when disclosure of the relationship or arrangements could
jeopardize the other party's willingness or ability to provide services
to CIA.
CATEGORY 29
Information that could result in or lead to action(s) placing an
individual in jeopardy.
C. Agency Assistance to the National Archives. This agency has designated
experienced personnel to guide and assist National Archives personnel in
identifying and separating documents and specific elements of information
within documents under these categories that are deemed to require continued
protection. These CIA-designated personnel are authorized to declassify
categories of information exempted from automatic declassification (listed
in the preceding section) if it is determined that they no longer require
protection. These CIA personnel will make recommendations for continued
classification of the documents or categories of information requiring
continued protection.
D. Continuing Application of Earlier Guidelines. The systematic review
guidelines and instructions identified below shall remain in effect until
canceled or superseded:
1. Downgrading instructions provided in the letter of 16 April 1973
from Lawrence R. Houston, Central Intelligence Agency General Counsel, to
Dr. James B. Rhoads, Archivist of the United States.
2. Instructions concerning information on Secret Writing (S/W), cited
in the letter of 8 June 1973 from Central IntelligenceSTATINTL
Agency Archivist, to Mr. Edwin A. Inompsori, DIrector of the Records Declas-
sification Division, National Archives and Records Service.
-6-
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Approved ForWlease 2002/02/14: CIA-RDP851300236,B800100170009-7
3. Guidelines concerning
material, cited in the letter
Director of the Record
STATINTL Records Service, from
Review Officer.
r. in ompson,
Service, National Archives and
Central Intelligence Agency Senior
STATI NTL
4. Central Intelligence Agency issuance dated 11 December 1978 and
entitled "GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF CIA PREDEC1ISSOR RECORDS
AND INFORMATION BETWEEN 1941-1946", signed b Chief of theSTATINTL
Classification Review Group, Information Sys a ysis staff, Direc-
torate of Administration.
STANSFIELD TURNER
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MrDimatx
Central Intelligence NTAliv
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WashintlioDiArAr,
1 0 JP .N 1980
Mr. Robert W. Wells
Acting Director, Information Security Oversight Office
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20405
Dear Mr. Wells:
CIA concurs in the Guidelines for Systematic Review of
Foreign Government Information Thirty Years Old or Older
forwarded under Director, Information Security Oversight Office
letter of 11 December 1979.
STANSFIELD TURNER
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_ApProvell For Release 2002/02/14: CIA-RDP85B00236*100100170009-7
U'eneral Information Security
Services Oversight
Administration Office Washington, DC 20405
Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20605
Dear Admiral Turner:
Enclosed is the final draft of the Foreign Government Information Guidelines
agreed upon after months of consultation by a working group of senior officials
from all affected agencies. They are being forwarded to you for your final
and official review.
Please notify this office within 30 days of your official concurrence with the
enclosed. Many thanks for your assistance in the development of this product.
Kindest regards,
Sincerely,
MICHAEL T. BLOWN
Di rector
Enclosure
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? Approved'rbr Release 2002/02/14: CIA-RDP851300$36R000100170009-7
GUIDELINES FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
THIRTY YEARS OLD OR OLDER
A. PURPOSE.
These Guidelines for the systematic review and declassification of foreign
government information have been developed in accordance with the provisions of
Section 3-404 of Executive Order 12065, "National Security Information," and
Section III.0 of Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1: All
foreign government information constituting permanently valuable records of the
United States Government, for which a prior declassification date has not been
established, shall be systematically reviewed for declassification as it becomes
thirty years old. Foreign government information found to be within one of the
specific categories of information listed in Part F below shall be reviewed
item-by-item by authorized personnel of the agency or agencies concerned to
determine whether continued protection beyond thirty years is needed. All foreign
government information not identified in these Guidelines as requiring item-by-item
review and for which a prior declassification ,-:ate has not been established shall be
declassified at the end of thirty years from the date of original classification
subject, when appropriate, to consultation with the foreign governments or inter-
national organizations of governments concerned.
B. DEFINITION.
"Foreign government information" as used in these Guidelines consists of:
1. Documents or material provided by a foreign government or governments,
international organization of governments, o. any element thereof in the expectation,
expressed or implied, that the document, material, or the information contained
therein is to be held in confidence;
2. Documents originated by the United States that contain classified informa-
tion provided, in any manner, to the United States by foreign governments, international
organizations of governments, or elements thereof, with the expectation, express or
implied, that the information will be held ir confidence;
3. Classified information or material produced by the United States pursuant to
or as a result of a joint arrangement, evidenced by an exchange of letters, memorandum
of understanding, or other written record, with a foreign government or organization
of governments requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both be kept ir
confidence.
C. SCOPE.
1. These Guidelines apply to 30-year old foreign government information which
has been received or classified by the United States Government or its agents.
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2. Atomic energy information (including that originated prior to 1947 and
not marked as such, that received from the United Kingdom or Canada marked "Atomic,"
and that received from NATO marked "Atomall which is defined and identified as
Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data in Sections lly and 142d of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is outside the scope of these Guidelines and is not
subject to systematic review and may not be automatically downgraded or declassified.
Any document containing information within the definition of Restricted Data or
Formerly Restricted Data that is not so marked will be referred to the Department
of Energy Office of Classification for review and appropriate marking, except for
licensing and related regulatory matters which shall be referred to the Division of
Security, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
D. AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES.
1. Foreign government information transferred to the General Services Admini-
stration for accession into the National Archives of the United States shall be
reviewed for declassification by the Archivist of the United States in accordance
with Executive Order 12065, the directives of the Information Security Oversight
Office, these Guidelines, any applicable terms of accession, and any supplemental
guidelines provided by the agency with classification jurisdiction over the
information.
2. Foreign government information constituting permanently valuable records
of the Government (as defined in 44 U.S.C. 2103) that is 30 years old and undergoing
systematic review for declassification while in the custody of an agency shall,
except as provided in Part C, above, be reviewed for declassification and downgrading
by that agency in accordance with Executive Order 12065, the directives of the
Information Security Oversight Office, these Guidelines, and any supplemental internal
agency guidelines.
3. Foreign government information falling within any of the categories listed
in Part F of these Guidelines shall be declassified or downgraded only upon specific
authorization of the agencies to ,:hich the information was furnished by the foreign
government or international organ.zation of governments concerned and/or which have
classification jurisdiction over it. When such information is in the custody of an
agency but was furnished to or classified by, or is otherwise under the classification
jurisdiction of another agency or agencies the information shall be referred thereto
for review. Information so referred shall remain classified until all reviewing
agencies have authorized its declassification. If the custodial agency cannot readily
identify the agency or agencies having classification jurisdiction, the information
shall be referred in accordance with Part G of these Guidelines for review or further
referral.
4. Foreign government information falling within any of the categories listed
in Part F of these Guidelines appearing in White House documents, which is either
identifiable as having been furnished or appears to have been furnished by a foreign
government shall be reviewed by designated White House personnel and further referred
for review to any other agencies whose classification interest is indicated by the nature
or content of the documents.
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E. EFFECT OF PUBLICATION.
1. Foreign government information is declassified if already published in or
cleared by executive branch officials authocized to declassify the information, and/or
by the foreign government(s) involved, as appropriate, for publication in any
unclassified executive branch publication; or if officially published as unclassified
by the, foreign government or international organization of governments that furnished
the information, unless the fact of the U.S. Go'rernment's possession of the informa-
tion requires continued protection.
2. The unofficial publication, in any manner, of foreign government information
contained in United States or foreign documents, or of substantially similar informa-
tion, does n9t in or of itself constitute or permit the declassification of such
documents. The original sources of the information, or the means whereby it was
acquired by the United States Government, may require continued protection and could
preclude declassification. Nevertheless, unofficial publication is a factor to be
considered in the systematic review of information and may affect determinations as
to requirements for its continued classification protection. However, the classifi-
cation status of information which concerns or derives from intelligence activities,
sources or methods shall not be affected by any unofficial publication of similar or
identical information. Final determination:- as to the declassification of information
identical with or similar to unofficially pui,lished information shall be made by the
agency or agencies holding classification jurisdiction over the information.
F. CATEGORIES REQUIRING ITEM-BY-ITEM REVIEW.
Foreign government information falling into the specific categories listed below
shall be reviewed for declassification in accordance with Part A above:
1. Information exempted from declass:Lication under any joint arrangement
evidenced by an exchange of letters, memor?Idum of understanding, or other written
record, with the foreign government or international organization of governments, or
element(s) thereof, that furnished the information. Questions concerning the
existence or applicability of such arrangements shall be referred to the agency or
agencies holding classification jurisdiction over the records under review.
2. Information related to the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities,
foreign and domestic, including but not nece.3sarily limited to vulnerabilities and
vulnerability assessments of nuclear facilities and Special Nuclear Material.
3. Nuclear arms control information (see also #11 below).
4. Information regarding foreign nuclear programs (other than Restricted Data
and Formerly Restricted Data), such as:
a. Nuclear weapons testing.
b. Nuclear weapons storage and stockpile.
c. Nuclear weapons effects, hardness, and vulnerability.
d. Nuclear weapons safety.
e. Cooperation in nuclear programs including, but not limited to,
peaceful and military applications of nuclear energy.
f. Exploration, production and import of uranium and thorium from
foreign countries.
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5. Information concerning intelligence or counterintelligence sources,
methods or activities including but not limited to intelligence, counterintelligence
and covert action programs, plans, policies, operations, or assessments; or which
would reveal or identify:
a. Any present, past or prospective undercover personnel, installation,
unit, or clandestine human agent, of the United States or of a
foreign government;
Any present, past or prospective method, procedure, mode, technique
or requirement used or being developed by the United States or by
foreign governments, individually or in combination, to produce,
acquire, transmit, analyze, correlate, assess, evaluate or process
intelligence or counterintelligence, or to support an intelligence
or counterintelligence source, operation, or activity;
c. The present, past or proposed existence of any joint United States
and foreign government intelligence, counterintelligence, or covert
action activity or facility, or the nature thereof.
6. Information that could result in or lead to actions which would place an
individual in jeopardy directly attributable to disclosure of the information,
including but not limited to:
a. Information identifying any individual or organization as a
confidential source of intelligence or counterintelligence.
b. Information revealing the identity of an intelligence, counter-
intelligence or covert action agent or agents.
7. Information about foreign individuals, organizations or events which, if
disclosed, could be expected to:
a. Adversely affect a foreign country's or international organization's
relations with the United States.
b. Adversely affect present and/or future confidential exchanges
between the Unit:d States and any foreign government or inter-
national organization of governments.
8. Information related to plans (whether executed or not, whether presented in
whole or in part), programs, operations, negotiations, and assessments shared by one
or several foreign governments with the United States, including but not limited to
those involving the territory, political regime or government of another country, and
which if disclosed could be expected to adversely affect the conduct of U.S. foreign
policy or the conduct of another country's foreign policy with respect to a third
country or countries. This item would include contingency plans, plans for covert
political, military or paramilitary activities or operations by a foreign government
acting alone or jointly with the United States Government, and positions or actions
taken by a foreign government alone or jointly with the United States concerning
border disputes or other territorial issues.
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9. Information concerning arrangements with respect to foreign basing of
cryptologic operations and/or foreign policy considerations relating thereto.
10. Scientific information such as that concerning space, climatology, communi-
cations, maritime, undersea, and polar projects, that could be expected to adversely
affect current and/or future exchanges of such information between the United States
and any foreign governments or international organizations of governments.
11. Information on foreign policy aspects of nuclear matters, the disclosure
of which could be expected to adversely affect cooperation between one or more foreign
governments and the United States Government.
12. Nuclear propulsion information.
13. Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of nuclear
detection systems.
14. Information concerning or revealing military or paramilitary escape, evasion,
cover or deception plans, procedures, and techniques whether executed or not.
15. Information which could adversev affect the current or future usefulness
of military or defense policies, programs, ,veapon systems, operations, or plans.
16. Information concerning research, development, testing and evaluation of
chemical and biological weapons and defense systems; specific identification of
chemical and biological agents and munitions; and chemical and biological warfare
plans.
17. Technical information concerning wapons systems and military equipment that
reveals the capabilities, limitations, or w.lnerabilities of such systems or equipment
and that could be exploited to destroy, Leanter, render ineffective or neutralize such
weapons or equipment.
18. Cryptologic information, including cryptologic sources and methods, currently
in use. This includes information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques,
operations, and scope of signal intelligence comprising communications intelligence,
electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence, the cryptosecurity and edission
security components of communications seeu2ity, and the communications portion of cover
and deception plans.
19. Information concerning electronic intelligence, telemetry intelligence and
electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures, electronic counter-countermeasure!
or related activities, including but not necessarily limited to:
a. Nomenclature, functions, technical characteristics or descriptions of
communications and electronic equipment, its employment/development,
and its association with weapon systems or military operations.
b. The processes, techniques, operations or scope of activities involved
in the acquisition, analysis and evaluation of such information, and
the degree of success achieved by the above processes, techniques,
operations or activities,
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20. Present, past or proposed protective intelligence information relating to
the sources, plans, techniques, equipment and methods in carrying out assigned duties
of protecting United States Government officials or other protectees abroad and
foreign officials while in the United States or United States possessions. This
includes information concerning the identification of witnesses, informants and
persons suspected of being dangerous to persons under protection.
21. Information on deposits of foreign official institutions in United States
banks and on foreign official institutions' holdings, purchases and sales of long-
term marketable securities in the United States.
22. Information concerning economic and policy studies and sensitive assessments
or analyses of economic conditions, policies or activities of foreign countries or
international organizations of governments received through the Multilateral Develop-
ment Banks or through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
23. Information described in subparts 2-22 of this Part contained in corres-
pondence, transcripts, memoranda of coversation, or minutes of meetings between the
President of the United States and a current or former foreign government official.
24. Information described in subparts 2-22 of this Part contained in documents
originated by or sent to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
his Deputy, members of the National Security Council staff, or any other person
performing national security functions on behalf of the White House.
25. Federal agency originated documents bearing NSC or White House comments
relating to categories of information described in subparts 2-22 of this Part.
26. Information as described in subparts 2-22 of this Part contained in
correspondence to or from the President, including background briefing memoranda and
talking points for meetings between the President and foreign government officials,
and discussions of the timing and purposes of such meetings.
27. Information as descriLed in subparts 2-22 of this Part contained in agency
message traffic originated by White House Staff members but sent through agency
communication networks.
G. REFERRAL AND DECISION.
1. When the identity of agencies holding classification jurisdiction over
foreign government information is not apparent upon initial inspection, or when
reviewing officials do not possess the requisite expertise, the information shall
be referred as follows to an agency competent to make the decisions required or
further to refer the information for review by the appropriate agency or agencies:
Categories 2 4, Department of Energy or Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (as appropriate)
- 6, Central Intelligence Agency
7 - 11, Department of State
12 - 19, Department of Defense
20 - 22, Department of the Treasury
23 - 27, National Security Council
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2. When agencies have determined on their own authority, and/or after consul-
tation when necessary with other U.S. agencies and with foreign governments or
international organization of governments which furnished the information as
appropriate, that information under their jurisdiction no longer requires classifi-
cation protection, such information shall then be declassified. Such action may
involve the declassification of an entire document, or only portions of a document.
If it is determined that classification must be extended beyond 30 years, the
provisions of Section III,C,2(b) of Information Security Oversight Office Directive
No. I apply.
H. DOWNGRADING.
Foreign government information classified Top Secret may be downgraded to Secret
after 30 ,years unless an agency with classification jurisdiction over it determines
on its own authority, or after consultation, as appropriate, with the foreign govern-
ment or international organization of governments which furnished the information,
that it requires continued protection at the Top Secret level.
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(neral Information Security
IftiiWAYA40v. r
RuP85B00236F0S001700Q9e
ington, U 20405
3.4 JAN i81.)
Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Dear Admiral Turner:
Section 3-403 of Executive Order 12065, "National Security Information,"
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to establish special procedures for the
systematic review and declassification of classified cryptologic information.
Further, Section III.C.2.d. of Information Security Oversight Office Directive
No. 1 provides that such procedures promulgated in accordance with the provi-
sions of Section 3-403 of the Order shall be binding on all departments and
agencies.
By enclosure to our letter of October 4, 1979, we distributed to you a copy
of such procedures. The document entitled, "Special Procedures for Use in
Systematic Review of Cryptologic Information Pursuant to Section 3-403 of
Executive Order 12065," bears a National Security Agency letterhead and is
dated September 1979.
Attached herewith is a copy of revised procedures dated January 1980 which
supersede the ones mentioned above. Please insure that all appropriate per-
sonnel/activities are furnished copies of the revision and that, where possi-
ble, all superseded copies be destroyed.
Sincerely,
ROBERT W. WELLS
Acting Director
Enclosure
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iNst/
oved For Ratite 2002/02/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R04410100170009-7
POLICY
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
January 1980
SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR USE IN SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF CRYPTOLOGIC
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 3-403 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12065
1. General guideline: cryptologic information uncovered in
systematic review for declassification of 20/30 year old government
records is not to be declassified by other than U.S. government
cryptologic agencies. The information may concern or reveal the
processes, techniques, operations, and scope of signals intelligence
comprising communications intelligence, electronics intelligence,
and telemetry intelligence, or it may concern the cryptosecurity and
emission security components of communications security, including
the communications portion of cover and deception plans.
2. Recognition of cryptologic information may not always be an
easy task. There are several broad classes of cryptologic information,
as follows:
a. Those that relate to communications security (COMSEC).
In documentary form, they provide COMSEC guidance or information.
Normally, COMSEC documents and materials are accountable under the
"Communications Security Material Control System." Examples are:
items bearing "TSEC" nomenclature ("TSEC" plus three letters), "Crypto
Keying Material" for use in enciphering communications, Controlled
COMSEC Items (CCI), and cryptographic keying devices.
b. Those that relate to signals intelligence (SIGINT).
These appear as reports in various formats that bear security classi-
fication, sometimes followed by a five-letter codeword (World War II's
ULTRA, for example) and often carry warning caveats such as "This
document contains codeword material," "Utmost secrecy is necessary . . .
Formats will appear, for example, as messages having addresses, "from"
and "to" sections, and as summaries with SIGINT content with or without
other kinds of intelligence and comment.
c. Research, development, test, and evaluation reports and
information that relates to either COMSEC or SIGINT.
3. ,Commonly used words that may help in identification of these
documents and materials are "cipher," "code," "codeword," "communi-
cations intelligence" or "COMINT," "communications security" or "COMSEC,"
"cryptanalysis," "crypto," "cryptography," "cryptosystem," "decipher,"
"decode," "decrypt," "direction finding," "electronic intelligence" or
"ELINT," "electronic security," "encipher," "encode," "encrypt,"
"intercept," "key book," "signals intelligence" or "SIGINT," "signal
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4. Special procedures apply to the review and declassification
of classified cryptologic information. The following shall be observed
in the review of such information:
a. COMSEC Documents and Materials. If records or materials
in this category are found in agency or department files that are not
under COMSEC control, refer them to the senior COMSEC authority of the
agency or department concerned or by appropriate channels to the
following address:
Director, National Security Agency/
Chief, Central Security Service
ATTN: Policy Staff
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755
b. SIGINT Information.
(1) If the SIGINT information is contained in a document
or record originated by a U. S. government cryptologic organization
and is in the files of a non-cryptologic agency or department, such
material will not be declassified. The material may be destroyed un-
less the holding agency's approved records disposition schedule requires
its retention. If the material must be retained, it must be referred to
the originating organization for systematic review for declassification.
(2) If the SIGINT information has been incorporated by the
receiving agency or department into documents it produces, referral of
the SIGINT information to the originator is necessary prior to any de-
classification action.
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9
r` "'floral Information Security
1981?/02/14ReP851300236R1 'W10,0170009-7
p
inis awn ice VVashington, CC 20405
40 :
P/IV Director, Information Security Oversight Office
biect Waiver for 10-year review requirement
: Senior Officials
All Executive Branch Agencies
,110/A Registry
By the the provisions of Section 3-401, Executive Order 12065, the Director of
the Information Security Oversight Office is given the authority to extend
the period between subsequent reviews for declassification for specific
categories of documents or information.
In response to requests for waivers of the 10-year review requirement from
agencies of the executive, branch, this Office made the decision that, rather
than granting a series of waivers from various agencies of the executive
branch covering their own particular fields of interest, a single waiver should
be granted that would be applicable and responsive to the needs of all execu-
tive branch agencies. This approach was taken to promote uniformity throughout
the executive branch information security program.
In developing this waiver, extensive coordination was conducted with the major
classifying agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, Justice and Treasury. The enclosed waiver reflects
the views of those agencies. The efforts to develop the final version of the
waiver were greatly facilitated by the personal interest and involvement o.6
Admiral Turner, Director of Central Intelligence.
It is requested that the provisions of the enclosed waiver be brought to the
immediate attention of all officials within your agencies. Any extension of
the period for subsequent declassification reviews for material covered by
the waiver shall be accomplished strictly in accordarice with the enclosed
procedures.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
)
/ 2 '
MICHAEL T. BLOUIN
Director
Enclosure
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CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION FOR WHICH THE
DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT
OFFICE (MO) HAS GRANTED WAIVERS OF THE
10-YEAR REVIEW REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 3-401 OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12065
The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office has granted a waiver from
the 10-year review requirements prescribed in Section 3-401 of Executive Order 12065
for the following categories of information:
- -
Intelligence documents and/or material(s) constituting or containing identifi-
able foreign government information as defined in Section 6-103 of Executive
Order 12065 and Section I F.1 of Information Security Oversight Office
Directive No. 1.
Information constituting' or concerning cryptology, including infermation on
the development and/or use of any method, means, system, technique, procedure,
activity, installation, device, material or equipment used for the acquisition,
production, or transmission of signals intelligence or for the protection of
classified communications or data."
Information constituting or'concerning counterintelligence, defined by
Executive Order 12036 of January 24, 12978 (section 4-202) as "... information
gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage and other
clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, international terrorist
activities or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers,
organizations or persons, but not including personnel, physical, document,
or communications security programs."
Information involving or concerning intelligence sources and methods and
covered under special access, distribution and protection programs continued
or established pursuant to Section 4-2 of Executive-Order 12065.
Information which identifies any undercover personnel or unit(s) or clandestine
human agent(s) of a National Foreign Intelligence Board or other United States
Intelligence Community member agency; or which otherwise reveals information
classifiable under the provisions of Executive Order 12065 concerning intelligenc
sources, methods or activities including intelligence plans, policies, or opera-
tions of such an agency or any element thereof.
Intelligence reports and other documents which contain information covertly
acquired and which bear the legend, "THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION" or an
equivalent marking, or are similar in format or contents to items so marked;
and in which the formats used, subject matter, source descriptions or other
content would, in collections or aggregates of such reports and/or other docu-
ments, reveal the nature, scope or extent of United States intelligence activitie
in, or in relation to, particular foreign countries or areas or would identify
intelligence sources or methods.
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The application of the l0-year4review waiver shall be strictly limited to infor-
mation described above that:
has been systematically reviewed following its 20th anniversary, or its 30th
anniversary in the case of foreign government information;
is identified through such review as requiring continued classification for a
period in excess of twenty additional years;
cannot, when so reviewed, be assigned a definitive date or event for declassifi-
cation, thus requiring at least one additional review; and,
has its classification extended beyond 20 years, or 30 years in the case of
foreign government information, by an agency head or official designated by
the President as authorized to do so under Executive Order 12065.
Information to which this waiver is applied shall be re-reviewed 30 years after its
initial systematic review, ai thereafter at 10-year intervals if necessary.
This waiver applies only to the systematic review process prescribed in Section 3-401
of Executive Order 12065. Information requested under the Freedom of Information Act
or the mandatory review provisions of Executive Order 12063 will continue to be
processed in accordance with the Act and the Order, whether or not the information
falls within the categories of itiformation for which this waiver is granted; nor
shall this waiver be construed as an exemption from any requirements imposed on an
agency by Section 3-303 of E.O. 12065.
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