LETTER TO W. A. BARBEE FROM(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00236R000100070006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 4, 1980
• Content Type: LETTER

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WNTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEfT-Y
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
4 February 1980
.W. A. Barbee
CW4, USA
Chief, Declassification Branch
Documents Division, Joint Secretariat
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D. C. 20301
Dear Sir:
sbJ 1 l e
(3)
Your letter of 13 November 1979 requr:stcd that we review for
declassification eight page;-: from one of the histories entitled
The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy, 1953-1954. These pages contain classified
information extracted from, or attributed to, the CIA.
We have reviewed the eight pages and found that the CIA-attributed
portions of those pages may be declassified. On the basis of this
letter, you are authorized to declassify those references.
This memorandum is unclassified when removed from the enclosures.
Sincerely,
Chief, Classification Review Division
Information Services Staff
Directorate of Administration
Enclosures:
pp. 93, 94, 215, 216,
263, 264, 265 & 266
CRD/ISS/DDA:GWA:daq (4 Feb 1980)
Distribution:
Orig. Addressee Watts
CRD Subject file w/atts
1 -CRD chrono w/o atts
1 - TS file Watts
JCS review(s) completed.
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Sincerely,
L,Av O 6 ..,
W. A. BARBEE
Chief, Declassification and
Archival Branch
Documents Division
Joint Secretariat
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/ /p '.S -6- c
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
The Joint Chiefs of Staff is continuing its program to
review for declassification the histories of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in order to give them wider distribution.
Enclosed are reproductions of pages from one of the histories
entitled The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint
Chiefs of Staff and National_ Policy, 1953-1954. These pages
contain classified information extracted from, or attributed
to, the Central Intelligence Agency.
Request your office review these pages to determine the
current classification of the CIA information therein and
advise this office of your action.
Please return the reproductions with your reply.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
Upon removal of the enclosures, this memorandum become
UNCLASSIFIED.
Enclosures
pp. 93, 94, 215, 216,
263, 264, 265, & 266.
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Council on 22 November 1954 with his o
a
o
al a
wn
ppr
v
ndthat of
. the Service Secretaries 129 In the Council, their rietpoint was
opposed by Cannot a?:r -:- - A- - -. r .2 q. ~ :, ,
n
d
U
ite
States should adjust to the trend -Of world opinion
instead of seeking to reverse it, and should base tt6'policy
on recognition of the fact "that total war would bar in-
pute
calculable disaster" M
r Dulles did not dis
..e neeor
thd f
adequate military strength or for a policy of determined re-
sistance to aggression. Nevertheless; to retain "the support
of allies, the United States should forego actions that
appeared "provocative," and, if hostilities occurred, should
meet them in a manner that "will not inevitably broaden them
into total nuclear war." Moreover, he was ready, under
"proper conditions," to'inegotiate with the Communist nations
concerning disarmament and other issues. Even if such
negotiations yielded no agreement, they would t least expose
the falsity of the Soviets' "peace" offensive..?
To the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) Secretary
Dulles' views amounted to a rejection of paragraph 45 of NSC
162/2. The Committee believed that Secretary Dulles had over-
emphasized political at the expense of military considerations;
had unrealistically assumed that use of nuclear weapons could
be avoided in a general war; and had evidenced a premature
readiness to negotiate.31
In criticizing the JSSC comments, General Ridgway made it
clear that, to a large extent, he shared the outlook of the
Secretary of State. He did 'not regard Mr. Dulles' views as
inconsistent with NSC 161/2;. Rather than foreswearing all
attempts to negotiate, as the JSSC report appeared to suggest,
General Ridgway would d1reft attention to insuring that the
nation was'militarily powerful enough to be able to negotiate
29.T(TT Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Review of Basic
National Security Policy," 22 Nov 54, same file, sec 48.
30. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Review of Basic
National Security Policy," 17 Nov 54, Encl to JCS 2101/172,
18 Nov 54, OCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 48.
31. (TS) JCS 2101/173, 21 Nov 54, same file.
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from.strength,32 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, took no
action on the Committee's report and made no official comment
on th
i
e v
ews of the Secretary of State.
The Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles,
fully agreed with the Secretary's assessment. "There is
throughout Europe," he warned the Council, "an impatience to
explore the possibilities of 'coexistence' that will b
e
increasingly difficult to resist." Although the United States
might ignore this attit
d
f
u
e
or a time, a continuation of the
Soviets' "peace offensive" could eventually force the nation to
participate in the
h
searc
for a general settlement if it did not
wish to be diplomatically isolated
He offered
.
no suggestions
for coping with this difficulty, but did propose a coordinated
economic, military, and covert counteroffensive against'th
e
Soviets' subversive warfare,3-3
The National Security Council took up the question of a
revised national security policy on 24 November 1954. The
members directed the Planning Board to prepare the draft of a
new directive. They also considered, and referred to the
President, a suggestion for a special study, to be made by
governmental or private agencies of ways in whi h b f
c
I
a
, e ore the
beginning of "mutual nuclear plenty," the unity of the free
world mig~t be increased and the Soviet bloc divided and
weakened, 4
While awaiting the draft; the Council discussed the
subject inconclusively on 3 December and again on 9 December.
At the first of these meetings, General Ridgway explained his
dissenting views on national policy and strategy.35 On the
second occasion, the discussion turned to purely military matters
32. TS Memo by CSA, "Review of Basic National Security
Policy," 22 Nov 54, same file,.
33. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Review of Basic
National Security Policy," 18 Nov 54 same file.
34. TS NSC Action No. 1272, 24 Nov 54,
35. (TS) NSCIAction No. 1279, 3 Dec 54.
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24 September 1952 the 3oard's chairman, Mr. Jack Gorrie,
summarized the report for the National Security Council.
The President thereupon directed the Department of Defense
.to survey the cost and feasibility of an early warning
system.l Three weeks later, after hearing a report by
the Department, President Truman instructed Mr. Gorrie
and Secretary of Defense Lovett to prepare specific
proposals. for consideration along with the 1954 budget.16
At the same time, the President and his advisors
pursued several other lines of study of the air defense
.problem, beginning with the reexamination of national
security programs undertaken in September 1952 by the
Secretaries of State and Defense end the Director for Mutual
Security. In connection with this review, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff prepared a detailed description of existing,
continental defense forces and of the increases planned by
the Services. They indicated various ways in which the
forces could be further strengthened, at a cost of some
$10 billion above the $7 billion cost of existing programs.
They recommended that existing programs be completed as
rapidly as possible but that no new ones be approved with-
out further study.l(
The final report on security programs, which was sent
to President Truman on 19 January 1953, went beyond the
cautious conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It
asserted flatly that present programs would not provide a
"minimum acceptable continental defense," and that the
nation should "consider favorably" the expenditure of "very
substantial addi1,onal .resources over the next few years"
for the purpose. The :issue was one for the incoming
Administration to resolve.
The, Joint Chiefs oa' Staff, in commenting on this report
before it was sent to the President, had pointed out that it
15.' TS NSC Action No. 679, 24 Sep 52.
16., TS NSC Action No. 678, 14 Oct 52.
17. TS Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Re-examination of
programs for National Security," 20 Nov 52 (derived from
OS
10
8
8
J
2
1/
0), CCS 3
1 US (1-31-50) sec 22.
18i. (TS) NSC 141, 19 Jan 53, same file, BP pt 6.
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rated Soviet capabilities higher than they had when they
made their recommendations. Cf the higher appraisal were
to be accepted, they agreed; then additional continental
defense measures would be needed, but these should not be
allowed to jeopardize existing military programs.l9
Accurate assessment of Soviet strength was vital to a
decision on this grave issue. As early as August 1951, the
National Security Council had instructed the Director of
Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff
th
I
t
,
e
n
erdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and
the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal. Security, to
prepare a "summary evaluation of the net capability of the
USSR to injure the Continen t-il United States." This study,
completed in October 1952, concluded that the Soviet Union
could.inflict "serious but not permanently crippling damage."
But the Director of C ni:. r n_I_ Tr telli genen, General Walter
Bedell Smith, characterized his report as a limitea initial
effort-one that "falls far ehort of supplying the estimates
essential to security planning." He recommended that the
Council authorize him to undertake a more detailed study and
to submit proposals for establishment of an agency to produce
such appraisals regularly in the future.20
The Joint Chiefs of Stiff did not question the value
of such studies, but they believed that the Council's own
staff should be responsible for preparing them. If that
body could not do so, they told the Secretary of Defense,
then they themselves should be assigned the task.21
1 .~TS Mnmo, JC o SecDFf, "R exariin,ation of U.S.
Programs for National Security," 12 Jars 5? (derived from
JCS 2101/8)1), same file, sec ? ;.
20. (TS) NSC Action Nos. 51`), l Aug r,l, and 543, 30 Aug
51. (TS) Memo, Dir CIA to ExecSecy, NSC, ? "A Project to
Provide a More Adequate Basis !or Planning for the Security
of the United States," 111 Oct 5 , App to JCS 1902/34, 28
Oct 52, CCS 371.2 US (3-30-43) sec 9.
21. (TS) Memo, JCS to SeeDef', "A Project to Provide a
More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the
United States," 21 Nov 5F (derived from JCS 1902/36), same
file, sec 10.
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Chiefs of Staff and the ;Director c,f' (!,=ntrnl Inte11.gence.
This suggestion had come from the new Director, Mr. Allen
Du 11 e s._,...~-
When the Committee:submitted NSC 159 to the Council,
President Eisenhower referred thi_;s part of It to the Director
of the Office of Defense Mobilization, Dr. Arthur S. Flemming,
for further study.l~',5 The outcome of this process was a set
of proposals drafted by the Planning; Board, based on recom-
mendations from Dr. Flemming's office, that was sent to the
Council on 9 April 1954; The Board concluded that continuing
action in continental defense could be insured by requiring
responsible agencies to submit semi-annual progress reports
to the Council. For periodic reappraisal of Soviet capability,
most Board members favored the establishment of a standing
two-man subcommittee, to which other members would be added
as necessary on an ad hoc basis, such as the heads of the
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, the Interdepart-
mental Committee on Internal Security, the Office of Defense
Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and
the Atomic Energy Commission. But the JCS Advisor, supported
by the Defense, Treasury, and FOA Members of the Board,
believed the Department o;;: Defense should be responsible for
preparing such studies.13f)
The
question at is3u here had come up in October
1952
without
being resoolved. Soviet "net" capability was,
of
course,
the difference between two other quantities, the
Soviets'
"gross" offensive capacity and the defensive strength
of the United States. Who should perform the subtraction to
derive this difference: One alternative, would require highly
classified information about US forces and weapons to be dis-
closed to persons outside the Department of Defense; the
other would mean that equally sensitive intelligence infor-
mation regarding the Soviet Union must be released outside
134. I'S) NSC 1.59, 22 Jul 53, JCS PB Adv File "NSC 159,
159/2.- Continental Defense." (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to
PB, "Organization for Continental Defense," 19 Mar 54, same
file, sec 38.
135. TS) NSC Action No. 873, 6 Aug 53.
136. s) Memo, ExeoSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Organizational
Arrangements for Continental Defense," 9 Apr 54, Encl to
JCS 1899/110, 14 Apr 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 39.
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the carefully guarded portals of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The Joint Chiefs oe Staff firmly supported the
position taken by their advisor in the Board. The estab-
lishment of a special committee, they believed, would require
detailed operating plans to be divulged to persons having no
"need to know," and would infringe upon their own res onsi-
bilities and and those of the National Security Council.137
Before the Council discussed the matter, Admiral Radford
and Mr. Allen Dulles attempted to compose their differences
F
in a conference that merely made it clear how far apart they
were. The Director of Central Intelligence contended that
responsibility for estimates of Soviet capabilities had been
conferred upon him by law. No information would be needlessly
endangered under his proposal, Mr. Dulles maintained; the
subcommittee would require only estimates of the effectiveness
of US forces, not details of war plans. Moreover, he feared
that appraisals emanating from the Department of Defense might
be "colored" for budgetary or other reasons. Admiral Radford
viewed the process of evaluation as a conventional problem in
military operational planning. In this view, the Central
Intelligence Agency was analogous to the "intelligence section"
of a commander's staff, and should feed data to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (the equivalent of an "operations section")
to be evaluated in relation to US capabilities. Admiral
Radford also reminded Mr. Dulles that the Secretary o Defense
had his own statutory responni.bilities to consider. l3
137. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Organizational Arrange-
ments for Continental Defense," 23 Apr 54 (derived from JCS
1899/111), same file.
138. (TS) Memo for Record, 5 May 54 (unsigned; apparent-
ay prepared in office of GEN. Gerhart), recording conference
between Radford and Dulles, same date; JCS PB Adv File, folder:
NSC 5408 - Correspondence Regarding Through December 1955. The
discussion ended inconclusively, with an agreement that ADM
Radford would refer the matter back to JCS and SecDef and that
a delay would be sought in discussion of the problem by NSC.
Whether further discussion took place is unknown. At the
request of the SecDe [', however, the NSC on 6 May postponed
consideration of the subject until its next meeting; (TS) NSC
Action No. 1108, 6 May 54.
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After considering the subject; on 13 May 1954, the
National Security Council postponed a decision on the
question of machinery for evaluation, while approving the
Planning Board's other proposals.139 On 9 June 1954 Admiral
Radford and Mr. Dulles appeared before the Council'and set
forth their opposing; views. President Eisenhower then settled
the issue through a compromise, Ile ordered the establishment,
on a trial basis, of the subcommittee sought by Mr. Dulles,
but named Admiral Radford as its chairman. The two members
were to prepare their own terms oi' reference and were to be
aided by a staff with adirector of their own choosing. The
President specified that there was to be no "unnecessary dis-
closure" of war plans or of intelligence methods or sources.140
In accord with this decision, Admiral Radford and Mr.
Dulles submitted terms of reference, modeled on those given-,
the Edwards Subcommittee in 1953, which called for a report
covering the period through 1 July 1957 to be submitted by
1 Novem~nber 1954. The council app~'oved these terms on 24,
June.141
On 4 November :l u51r :Admiral Radford and Mr. Dulles sub-
mitted their findings to the Council. The members of that
body found no reason to .order any change in continental de-
fense programs, but apf,roved the subcommittee's recommendation
that a permanent procedure be established to insure a new
evaluation at least annually. The pature of this procedure
was left for future determination.l 2
The Northern Canada (Distant Early Warning) Line
The Arctic test program was conducted by the Western
Electric Company under a contract with the Air Research and
Development Command of the US Air Force. By the middle of
1954 the results showed that it was feasible to operate radar
]3TS N -SC Action No. 1113, 13 May 54.
140. TS NSC Action No, 1150, 9 Jun 54.
].41. (TS) NSC 5423; 23 Jun 511, CCS 381 US (5-23-46)
sec 42. (TS) NSC Action No. 1164, 24 Jun 54.
142. (TS) NSC Action No. 1260, 4 Nov 54. No copy of the
Subcommittee's report has been found.
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warning stations at high lat'i_tudes. Engineers of thu!company
in consultation with US and Canadian Air Force and Navy officers,
had selected tentative sited for a line all the way across
On the basis of these findings, the US-Canadian Military
study Group on 3 June 1954 recommended the construction of an
early line across the "more northern portions of North.
America," in order to keep defenses abreast of expected Soviet
technological progress. The members pointed out that the
value of this line would be "directly related to the effective-
ness with which it is extended to cover flanking approach
routes," thus in effect recommending that, like he Mid-Canada
Line, it should be thrust out into the oceans.lt On 9 July
the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the US members of the
Permanent Joint Board on Defense to seek the agreement of
their Canadian colleagues to the construction of the line.1 45
Meanwhile, on 30 June L-)54, the Chairman of the Canadian
Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Charles Foulkes, had
notified Admiral Radford that the Canadian Government would
construct the Mid-Canada Line at its own expense. Admiral
.Radford, in reply, promised that the United States woull erect
the seaward extensions "progressively," and told General
F'oulk_m that the question of the far norther line would soon
be raised within the Permanent Joint Board.116
In acknowledging this reply, General Foulkes wrote that
his Government was already 3onvinced of the need for the
northern line, and hence that no Board action was needed. At
the same time, he pointed out that, under current plans, all
radar lines In eastern Canaria--the PINK, TREE chain, the
Mid-Canada Line, and the AtLantic extension of the latter--
would converge on the c--oasts of Labrador and Newfoundland,
143. TS-RD) DOD Progress Rpt, 1 Jun 54, p. 17.
144. S) JCS 1899/125, 29 Jun 54, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48)
sec 8.
1.45. (S) Dec on JCS 1899/125, 9 Jul 54; (s) SM-630-54
to Chm, US Sec, PJBD, 9 Jul 5)4; same file.
146. (TS) Ltr, Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, to CJCS,
30 Jun 54, and reply, 8 Jul 54, Encls B and C to JCS 1899/134,
21 Jul 54, same file.
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