COMPARISON OF TEAM A AND TEAM B CONCLUSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00134R000200080004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 16, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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?+ ~' k i FAC # 2818-80
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SP - 56/80
16 April 1980
Copy __ ., 1,
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director National Foreign Assessment Center
FROM: Acting National Intelligence Officer for Strati
Programs
SUBJECT: Comparison of Team A and Team B Conclusions
1. This responds to your question as to whether, as stated by Kenneth
Adelman in the attached article, the conclusions of Team B on the Soviet
threat have fared far better than those of Team A since the 1976 experiment
in competitive analysis.
2. There were three subjects involved in the experiment: Soviet
strategic objectives, ICBM accuracies and air defenses.
Current Soviet
ICBMs are not as accurate as estimated by leam u more accurate than
estimated in the 1976 NIE.
an issue on which there is considerable disagreement.
b. The Team B report on air defenses was useful for its identifi-
cation of critical uncertainties in our assessments of Soviet low altitude
defense capabilities. Its main thesis--that Soviet air defenses could be
much more effective than judged in the NIE--has not been confirmed by sub-
sequent evidence or analysis, although uncertainties remain in our largely
subjective assessments.of Soviet air defense effectiveness.
c. The more detailed response to your question addresses the Team A
and Team B assessments of Soviet strategic objectives, because this remains
3. The bulk of the Team B report on Soviet strategic objectives was a
critique of NIEs issued prior to 1975. The Team B report contained two other
sets of conclusions: assessments of selected Soviet strategic developments
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SP - 56/80
SUBJECT: Comparison of Team A and Team B Conclusions
(the seriousness of which were allegedly minimized in the NIEs) and esti-
mates of Soviet strategic objectives. A few Team B estimates of selected
Soviet developments have proved to be incorrect, but in the main the esti-
mates were consistent with those in the 1976 and subsequent NIEs or remain
to be affirmed or denied by evidence. The bottom line judgments of the
Team B about Soviet strategic objectives are very close to those in the
1976 NIE, as indicated in the attached comparisons of key judgments. Some
of the Team B conclusions went beyond the scope of NIE 11-3/8-76, therefore,
in the attachment these findings are compared with the judgments in
11-4-78, "Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena." 25X1
4. Despite the similarities in key judgments the Team B report conveys
a much more strident tone than either NIE 11-3/8-76 and NIE 11-4-78. The
Team B dutifully carried out its charge to assume an adversarial position--
to marshall the evidence in support of more threatening interpretations of
Soviet objectives. On the other hand, the Team A product was not an essay
with a single theme; it was a national estimate which attempted to review
the evidence objectively, citing uncertainties which qualified its conclu-
sions. In light of the aggressiveness of Soviet conduct since 1976, the
Team B report, because of its tone and the billboard effect of its interpre-
tations of overall Soviet policies and objectives, can be regarded as having
"fared better" than findings in the NIEs, even though the conclusions of the
Team A and Team B were quite similar. I
5. As for other comments about the article--Kenneth Adelman's articles
have cited errors in national intelligence to give support for his ideas
about how to reorganize CIA. In a previous article in the fall 1979 issue
of Foreign Policy, coauthored with Robert F. Ellsworth, his thesis was
that since the Agency's inception the DDO has exercised undue influence
over CIA substantive assessments and has been largely responsible for
estimative errors. As a remedy, he proposed that the DCI be relieved of
his directorship of CIA to concentrate on his responsibility for the Intel-
ligence Community budget and for producing national intelligence. A second
theme in his articles is that the DCI should not try to produce coordinated
national intelligence, but present the President with conflicting evidence
and opposing views and let the President grapple with alternative interpreta-
tions. Adelman calls for national intelligence so tough, shrewd and ruthless
that no trend or fashion will ever again screen data or warp perception--so
icily penetrating that no degree of conformity will force blunders in the
future. Under Adelman's scheme, however, whether the US makes blunders would
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SECRET
SP - 56/80
SUBJECT: Comparison of Team A and Team B Conclusions
apparently depend on which tough, shrewd, ruthless alternative interpreta-
0
6. Adelman and Ellsworth are among the former officials in policy-
making positions who have become severe critics of intelligence, some of
whom are promoting remedies for erroneous estimates of the past. I be-
lieve people like Robert Ellsworth, John Foster, Henry Kissinger and others
have on occasions, used intelligence as a scapegoat for rationalizing their
orientation of US policy and military programs in dir hich in retro-
spect do not appear to have been in the US interests. 25X1
Attachment
SEC RRIE
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16 April 1980
The Team A - Team B Experiment
Soviet Strategic Objectives
QUESTION:
1. Have the conclusions of Team B fared far better than those of
Team A since the 1976 experiment in competetive analysis?
ANSWER:
2. An evaluation of the conclusions of Team A and Team B requires
consideration of the roles of the two teams in the experiment. While
the experiment involved competing analyses, it was not an adversarial
process. The B Team carried out exactly the task of an adversary ac-
cording to its charge, that is, it marshalled the evidence in support of
a more threatening interpretations than in the NIEs. The product of
Team A, however, was not that of an adversary. The product was not an
essay in which the evidence was interpreted and presented to give sup-
port in each paragraph for a common theme. The Team A report was a na-
tional estimate, which attempted to present an objective assessment of
the subject weighing the evidence and citing uncertainties related to
its conclusions. This difference in approach resulted in a different
tone in the findings of the two teams.
3. This tonal difference is not clearly evident in the brief
summary below comparing the conclusions of NIE 11-3/8-76, the Team A
report, and of the Team B report. To answer the question completely,
the comparisons below also include judgments from NIE 11-4-78, "Soviet
Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena," because the Team B
report contained conclusions which went beyond the scope of the Team A
report in NIE 11-3/8-76. The findings cited below (abbreviated but re-
taining the operative words) were drawn from only the key judgments of
the three reports:
Comparison of Team A and Team B Conclusions
About Soviet Strategic Objectives
Team B Conclusions
rr
v' i. ~. r i \ i
Team A Conclusions
(findings from NIE 11-4-78 are shown
in parenthesis)
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T, D
C
Team B Conclusions
Seek a strategic nuclear environment
in which other instruments of power
can be brought to bear
Seek to assure that if deterrence failed,
Soviets could resort to nuclear weapons
to fight and win a nuclear war; think in
terms of effective war fighting capa-
bilities.
No evidence Soviets willing to reduce
military budget to raise standard of
living.
Should the global correlation of forces
shift in Soviets' favor they would act
with less concern about US sensitivities.
Evidence of Soviet willingness to take
increased risks (e.g. in Middle East)
may be a harbinger of what lies ahead.
Scope and intensity of Soviet military
programs could lead to short term threat
cresting in 1980 to 1983.
Undeviating commitment to triumph of
socialism, global hegemony.
Team A Conclusions
Hope their strategic nuclear capa-
bilities will give them more lati-
tude for vigorous pursuit of foreign
policy
Striving to achieve war-fighting,
war-survival capabilities that would
leave them in better position than
US if war occurred.
In future Soviets might shift alloca-
tion of resources between military
and civilian sectors but no sign
Soviet leaders preparing for such
a shift.
Hope strategic forces will give them
more latitude for virorous pursuit of
foreign policy, discouraging US use
or threatened use of force to influ-
ence Soviet actions. (Prognosis for
1980s: purposeful, cautions explora-
tion of USSRs increased military
strength; more stalwart in defense
of USSRs interests; assert right to
search for new beachheads of USSR
influence; more assertiveness; greatly
enhanced military capabilities.)
Strength of Soviet offensive force
will be greatest relative to the US
in early 1980s. (By early 1980s
Soviets could have marginal advantage
over US in strategic nuclear capa-
bilities.)
Strategic forces contribute to Soviet
goal of achieving dominant posture
over West--in political, economic,
social and military strength.
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Team B Conclusions
For Soviets, peaceful coexistance or
detente involves penetration and
weakening of capitalist zone,
strengthening hold on socialist camp,
and intense build-up of all types of
military forces.
Soviet concern with China will not
deter USSR from increasingly aggressive
policies toward West.
Team A Conclusions
(Soviets see program of detente
due to growth in USSR military
power; detente is the management of
change to constrain as little as
possible Soviet gains; does not
constrain pursuit of competitive
advantages.)
(Soviets see sweep of postwar inter-
national affairs confirming their
convictions about march of history;
even defection of China has not
undermined these convictions.)
Soviet leaders determined to achieve
maximum possible measure of strategic
superiority over the US. Place high
priority on attaining war-fighting
and war-winning capability and may feel
attaining it is within their grasp.
Gap between long term aspirations and
short term objectives is closing.
If Soviets can't achieve capabilities
that would give them substantial pre-
dominance over the US following general
nuclear war, they intend to acquire
war-fighting advantage such that they
would be less deterred than US from
initiating use of nuclear weapons; be
able to exploit local military advan-
tages with out fear of US initiated
escalation.
Soviets unrestrained in strategic
programs by "how much is enough."
Soviet military effort raises ques-
tion of whether seeking clear
strategic superiority over US. May
be optimistic about strategic competi-
tion with West, but cannot be certain
about US behavior. Cannot set prac-
tical objectives for some specific
relationship in strategic forces
to be achieved in some specific
period.
Expectations reach well beyond
capability merely to deter an all-
out US attack. Soviets seeking war-
fighting and war-survival capabilities
to leave USSR in stronger position
than US; to provide visible and
politically useful advantages, giving
them more latitude for vigorous
pursuit of foreign policy, discour-
aging US use or threatened use of
force to influence Soviet actions.
(War-fighting requirement calls for
unremitting effort which is required
for confident superiority over NATO)
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Team B Conclusions
Team A Conclusions
Within next 10 years expect degree (Post Brezhnev leadership may see
of Soviet military superiority permitting superpower status and costly mili-
dramatically more agressive pursuit of tary efforts as basis for more perva-
hegemonial objectives. sive leverage on world affairs.) (S)
4. In its critique of past NIEs, some issued in the 1960s, the Team B
concluded that estimates through 1975 tended to minimize the seriousness
of the threat in the areas listed below. The Team B saw a relationship
between a mind set of the estimators which understated Soviet intentions
and objectives and the NIE findings about developments in the following
Soviet strategic programs:
a. ICBMs and SLBMs
b. Civil defense
c. Military hardening
d. Mobile missiles
e. Backfire
f. Anti satellite testing
g. Strategic ASW
h. ABM and directed energy
i. Non-central nuclear systems.
In addition to assessing Soviet objectives, the Team B made its own estimates
of future Soviet developments in the above areas. A few Team B forecasts
have proved incorrect, but in the main the Team B estimates either were con-
sistent with those of the 1976 and subsequent NIEs or, as in the case of
Backfire performance, remain to be affirmed or denied by evidence. (S)
 THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
8 April 1980
In the attached article, Ken Adelman
says "In 1976, the now-famous Team B had
access to raw data as it reached conclusions
on the Soviet threat which have fared far
better than those of Team A." In your
judgment, have the Team B conclusions "fared
better" than the Team A conclusions? If
you have any other comments on the attached
article, I'd be pleased to have them.
Bruce L. Clarke; Jr.
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0* 4
ter Tito" was found to be more sunerficiat
than :hose in some European newspapers.
The authors had averaged less than two
years experience with that country and
had not tapped outside expertise
An augmented analysis side could of`er
the P evident superb net assessments. i.e.
comparisons in each theater !Europe.
Asia. strayed c. etc.i of the resources avail-
able to an adversary and those available to
the U.S. and pa. ;icipating. a ties. T::e CIA
has, with justficaticn, considered assess-
ment of U.S.. capabilities outside its ore-
vious jurisdiction. Yet the Secretary of De-
fense has used this technique to good effect
and the President should now do iikewse.
here are a host of excellent proposals
offered by ex-Deputy Defense Secretary
-Robert Ellsworth and others to: centralize
elez nic intelligence collection and analy-
sis; fund additional- back-up satellite sys-
tems: boost a warning and crisis r:ianage-
ment system;~and augment tactical inteili-
gexe:.
More evident than these necessary mea
surer would be changing the very- name of
the CIA, as has been recommended by ex-
Deputy Director of the CIA Ray Cline.
Such a step would, as he says, deprive
"the K.G.B. and every tir,horr dictator or
ayatollah" of ant 'International whipping
boy." or at least one with a familiar ring
to its name. -
);,:,Mr 1.4detmaif is Senior Po.'itical Scie t-
tist at the Strategic Studies Center of SRI
fri3zrrwstimtaa! _.._ . .
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 NUMBER 36 FALL 1979 $3.00
'12 11 America Must Do More
James R. Kurth
THE FUTURE OF
ARMS CONTROL
A Glass Half Full ...
Leslie H. Gelb
... Or Half Empty?
Richard Burt
Revolution In Trade Politics
Thomas R. Graham
Keeping Them Happy
Down On The Farm
Kathleen Patterson
PROLIFERATION WATCH
Half Past India's Bang
Lewis A. Dunn
Carter's Bungled Promise
Michael Brenner
We Tried Harder (And Did More)
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
TAIWAN:
THE PROSPEROUS PARIAH
Derecognition Worked
Leonard Unger
A Most Envied Province
Frank Ching
Foolish Intelligence
Robert F. Ellsworth F&
Kenneth L. Adelman
Lessons Of The
Yom Kippur Alert
Scott D. Sagan
Dateline Nicaragua:
The End Of The Affair
Richard R. Fagen f
 Approved For Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP
9(
I~OOLISI I
1N'I'F I. , MENCAE
by Robert F. Ellsworth
and Kenneth L. Adelman
The intelligence community should brace
itself for a new wave of castigation that
widens its past sea of woes. The looming
storm will arise from accusations that it
inadequately warned the United States of
Soviet military capabilities and technological
breakthroughs during the 1970s and early
1980s. These inevitable accusations, origi-
nating from the center-right, will diffuse
throughout the body politic and will focus
on the competence of American intelligence
analysis. For the Central Intelligence Agency
elite-those in the Operations Directorate-
has catered for years to America's foreign
policy establishment view that the biggest
game in town is at least collaboration and at
most condominium with Russia. This has
led to a'process of discounting data that por-
tray the Soviet Union as a genuine threat
rather than as a potential partner.
Past hubris has brought on present neme-
sis. The CIA's (and military intelligence's)
attempts at political assassinations, covert
shenanigans, illegal spying on American citi-
zens, and free-wheeling operations have
reaped their reprisals. The now receding accu-
sations,' originating from the center-left,
focused on these intelligence excesses. As a
result, the reins of the covert operators were
pulled in, as the five-year-old investigations
and presidential Executive Orders scaled
down the CIA's activities.
The limitations were perhaps overdue,
though the fanfare was overblown. The CIA
was never as ttefatious as strident critics con-
ItuHV R l P. I I,swlltt III. f urmrt' deputy set retut'y of
detern.,e, is visitinu s,holar at the Srhool of Advanrrd
international Studies of` J hr Johns lluphins t.'nn?er-
sirrt KPNNI-rII L. ADI'LS!AN, former assistant to the
secretory of cleleme, is senior political srienlist at the
Strateyie Studies Center of SRI International.
it .=3 ,
, ., ~F,.r =;s o ro ed. or: Release=2007 06 h;i l -) P 3 fl: 3 kF~?.tl fl# ~E 3~
 Approved For Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP85B00134R000200080004-7
tcp,d. Anil few of its members indulged in
offensive deportment. Even if every official
investigated for illegal practices were found
guilty. the culprits would still add up to a
tiny percentage of all intelligence personnel.
Executive and congressional investigators
have highlighted the sensational at the ex-
pense of the more significant.
Pres:.dent Carter aimed at the right tar-
get---inadequate performance rather than
overzealousness -on Armistice Day 1978,
when he fired off a handwritten memo to
his top security advisers. It opened pungently,
"1 am not satisfied with the quality of polit-
ical intelligence." The president was justifi-
ably dstraught by the crumbling of the
shah's reign in Iran. He resented that Ameri-
can intelligence officers, long stationed in
Tehran. had failed to tell him what General
Ludendorff told the kaiser after a brief visit
with the Austrian army on the eve of
World \Var 1: "We are allied to a corpse."
The much touted intelligence failure in
Iran oo as due to a massive failure of imagina-
tion. Similar human frailty led the British
ambassador in Berlin, two days before the
onset of World \Var 1, to report that war
was out of the question. The syndrome also
afilic:ed American leaders on the eve of Pearl
Harbor, Stalin at the outset of Operation
Barbarossa (Hitler's 1941 invasion of Rus-
sia). and the Israelis immediately before the
197 gyM Kippur war-the three most cele-
brated intelligence failures of recent times.
But no such failure 'of imagination can
account for staggering CIA errors, corn-
poundcc' over 15 years, in estimating Soviet
(ones and intentions in strategic weaponry
and overall military effort. Beginning in the
1960s the CIA embarked upon a consistent
underestimation of the Soviet ICBM build-
up. missing the mark by wide margins: its
estimates l,ecamc progressively worse, on the
low side hi the mid-1970s the intelligence
contnnrnii v' underestimated the scale and
etfectis'encss of the Soviets' multiple inde-
pendents' t.irgetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)
nrogr rni'.. I:y'en more important, Soviet war-
iiThu'orth #I' AJ;lman
head accuracies that have already been
achieved-and that have equaled U.S. accura-
cies--had been estimated by American intelli-
gence to be unattainable by Moscow before
the mid-1980s.
U.S. intelligence also committed a gross
error by underestimating the overall Soviet
military effort. In 1 976 the CIA suddenly and
retroactively doubled the percentage of gross
national product it figured the Soviets had
been and were devoting to defense-from
between 5 and 7 per cent (only slightly
higher than the U.S. level) to between I I
and 13 per cent (up to nearly three times the
U.S. level). Such flawed CIA estimates helped
form national security policy for the past 15
years. In the mid-1960s the United States
began its decade-long strategic stall, basically
abjuring new strategic initiatives. It was then
that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
informed the public that "the Soviets have
decided that they have lost the quantitative"
strategic arms race and "are not seeking to
engage us in that contest." Lest the point be
missed, he added, "There is no indication
that the Soviets are seeking to develop a
strategic nuclear force as large as ours."
Legacy of Failures
The same American errors in anticipating
the Soviet strategic build-up linger on. The
latest flaws can be gleaned simply by com-
paring a series of charts measuring the super-
powers' relative strategic capabilities. The
charts published in the fiscal year 1980
annual report by the secretary of defense,
when compared to those of last year, show
a worsening forecast of the strategic situation
in the early I960s. Instead of enjoying an
edge over the Soviets, as predicted only last
year, it now seems the United States will be
substantially inferior until about 1986, one
year after the scheduled expiration of SALT
if. This means the United States will be
negotiating SALT III from a weak position.
The change in estimates between 1978 and
1979 is not due to American revisions of
force posture. Rather, the changes in the
 charts reflect 1979's correction of 1978's
underestimation of the drive and momentum
of Scvict strategic improvements. Specifically,
U.S. intelligence last year did not imagine the
scope of recent Soviet improvements in frac-
tionization or number of warheads per niis-
sile, accuracy (which gave them a 180 per
cent Improvement over the current generation
of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles),
and overall force reliability (the percentage
of times their missiles launch when triggered).
Also, c;timates of Soviet Backfire bomber
production rates had been too low.
FY 1979
AFTER U.S. RETALIATION
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U S POST ATTACK
SOVIET POST ATTACK
78 80 82 85 87
END FISCAL YEAR
FY 1980
AFTER U.S. COUNTERFORCE
RETALIATION
Day-to-Day Alert
LEGEND
? US FORCES
? SU FORCES
t I I I I I I I I I I I I
75 76 17 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
END FISCAL YEAR
Ellsworth U Adciman
The same problem has dogged U.S. intel-
ligence at the regional level. Defense Secretary
Harold Brown informed the Congress last
February that the Soviets' "ability to move
their forces speedily into position for an
attack" in Europe was "estimated to be
greater" than was thought a year ago. At
about the same time, the intelligence com-
munity found its previous estimates of North
Korea's military might palpably low. There-
fore, the CIA and others suddenly had to
boost their estimates of Pyongyang's ground
forces by some 25 per cent, even though U.S.
estimates of the North's tanks had previously
been increased by nearly one-third. Again,
nothing much had actually occurred on that
volatile peninsula: North Korea's military
build-up has been boringly steady since
1970-1971. But U.S. intelligence failed to
note that North Korea had amassed the fifth
largest ground army in the world. Today
major conflict involving the United States
may be more likely there than anywhere else.
"l'his string of recent intelligence estimates
on the low side disproves a recurrent notion
within liberal circles that the Pentagon and
the CIA are in cahoots to overestimate the
Russians for their own budgetary and ideo-
logical motivations. The fact that the legacy
of such failures reaches back over 15 years
and four presidents likewise disproves a re-
current notion within conservative circles that
the recent underestimates of Soviet power can
be ascribed solely to the Carter administra-
tion's infatuation with arms control.
The real source of the problem lies deeper,
within the bowels of the intelligence bureau-
cracy itself. American intelligence has long
been stultified by the domination of a clique.
The CIA has suffered from an encrustation of
leadership as its directors over virtually all
of its history have been linked--by shared
experience, psychological inclination, and
profession-to the CIA's Operations Direc-
torate (which is responsible for covert activ-
ities). This link began under William
Donovan in the World War 11 Office of
Strategic Services and was carried forward
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by CIA Director Allen Dulles, who came out
of World War I I thrilled by his covert upera-
tirrnal successes in Switzerland. His brother,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, ac-
Witting to former CIA official hermit Rouse-
vclt, was "licking his chops'' to rerun the
dazzling covert -operation in Iran (which
had in 1953 reinstalled the shah) in sundry
spans scattered throughout the '1 bird World.
Firestorm of Criti;cisrrr
The Operations Directorate reigned su-
prcntc even after the Dulles era: Two thirds
of the highest CIA executive positions were
filled by officers whose careers had blossomed
in covert activities, and for years after the
I)ulleses departed, the covert side still con-
surued more than half the agency budget.
'1 he clandestine clan planned and executed
the reckless Bay of Pigs invasion while keep-
inv intelligence analysts in the dark. President
Kennedy was thus denied the opportunity
1,17 a detached evaluation of the scheme.
Covert operations are spectacular when they
succeed but hideous when they do not; the
I>ay of Pigs did not, as intelligence analysts
kould have forecast had they been given a
chance. In another show of strength, the
Directorate handled much of the CIA's liaison
with State. Defense. and other key agencies
until the mid- I Q70s, thus spreading its own
perspective beyond CIA headquarters.
Admiral Stansfield Turner, the current
director of central intelligence, has weathered
a firestorm of criticism for "gutting Ameri-
can intelligence." In fact, he has simply ac-
cclerated the task begun under predecessors
James Schlesinger, William Colby, and
(icorge Bush to pare down the overstaffed
but powerful Operations Directorate. The
('IA is not synonymous with the Operations
Directorate, though the Directorate's parti-
sans contend otherwise. Turner has taken
c.tr; not to stack the top with old clandestine
hands. Just the opposite, in fact, since he is
surrounded by individuals who generally
1aA experience as national intelligence pro-
du,ers or users.
1i11.n rrh Fi AdcIman
Though l-urner has trimmed Operations'
sails, he has yet to launch a successful pro-
gram to boost the capabilities of the National
foreign /\ssessmr'nt Center, the agcnry's
analysis side. In the past, it has focused far too
much on current intelligence and has been
content with a lack of professionalism on the
part of country and regional specialists. This
became clear in the early 1970s after the Na-
tional Security Council ordered the CIA to ad-
dress an age-old topic: Yugoslavia after Tito.
The report was more superficial than those
written in German and Swiss daily news-
papers. It turned out that the agency analysts
who wrote it averaged less than two years'
experience with the country and had not
tapped outside expertise.
Cot-ert o1 rations are sl-eetaenlar
~~Len they stteeieetl hilt ltilleolls
ashen they' do not.
Nor does 'T'urner have control over all the
actions of the Operations crew. Two years
ago. for instance, the leadership of the ana-
lytic branch of the CIA realized that it could
not achieve from within the needed upgrad-
ing in breadth of expertise and perspective on
world affairs. They sought to find a way to
gain access to the best minds in the nation for
help in analyzing intelligence information. A
strategy was developed to find and focus the
talents of people from academia. business,
private research groups, and others to assist
the agency and to be available as a resource
for selected agency analysts on momentous
matters.
But the effort was soon sabotaged by those
inside the agency who stood to lose most-
the Operations crew and their alumni within
the administration, the inspectorate general,
and current intelligence reporting offices.
They recognized that outside help. however
well intentioned in trying to build up rather
than tear down the intelligence capability.
would weaken their hold by forcing other
opinions to be considered or even incorpo-
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rated. Better, they figured, to nip the budding
threat. So they objected to the outsiders' ac-
cess to classified material and charged finan-
cial falsification of government accounts and
sloppy management of specific projects.
Those standing accused heard the abounding
innuendos but were not permitted to sec the
specific allegations. Yet a protracted struggle
In:,ucd until those organizing the new initia-
tive were worn down, and it was abandoned,
Poor Preconceptiolls
Intelligence forecasts for Iran were also
victims of this infighting. At the close of
1978. a congressional intelligence committee
reque>,ted a full briefing on the situation in
Iran. 'I he CtA responded by sending its Op-
crations--not its Analysis-people who, of
course. testified from their own limited per-
>.pecti':e. They lacked the imagination to see
that a massive. popular counterrevolution
had been launched against the shah's mod-
crn .'.neon revolution. These covert officers
had treasures within Iran, not only the shah
on the Peacock Throne, but also the now-
tamous listening posts on the Soviet border.
men swayed the entire intelligence
:on;munity to report that the shah's oppo-
nents were numerically insignificant and
politically impotent.
`l he? prominence of cloak-and-dagger tra-
ditionalists casts a shadow beyond slanted
country or regional reports. Their supremacy
afleets strategic issues and can be related to
the dangerous underestimation of the Soviet
in il~tar build-up. As a group, these members
(d the i,.% have long subscribed to an esscn-
tial,.y optimistic world view. First, they as-
surned that smooth superpower relations are
kriti:al to America's survival and welfare, and
that th., United States and the Soviet Union
arc winding their way toward a modicum of
cOOperation, if not collaboration. They felt
their vocation was to work out the rules of
the global game for the new era. Dedication
to this vocation led to projection of similar
Purposes upon the essential partner-the So-
viet Union-even if that projection also led
to screening out data that clearly suggested
another vision of the future.
Second, they assumed that the Third
World lacks the wit and wherewithal to in-
fluence decisively the great game of world
politics. They cherished the developing world
as a playground for covert operations, not as
a participant in world affairs worthy of seri-
ous and sustained analysis. Thus, the CIA
displayed a shocking failure of imagination
in 1973 when it explicitly discounted the
Yom Kippur war (although the head of the
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research wrote in April 1973 that war
was highly likely there before the year's end),
the Arab oil embargo, and the oil price hike.
The Operationists' preconceptions are
widely shared among academics, journalists,
and even government officials. Yet in Langley
these preconceptions have screened out data
that, if properly quested and digested, should
have prevented strategic intelligence failures.
Such perspectives have pervaded U.S. strate-
gic behavior over the past 15 years and helped
case the Soviet Union into a relatively more
assertive role on the world stage. This is a
risky trend, one that has increased the possi-
bility of superpower confrontation. It could
be fostered by Soviet cockiness over what
Moscow perceives to be strategic and historic
imperatives flowing as much from U.S. per-
missiveness as from Soviet military prowess.
The United States desperately needs to
know not just what the Soviets have done
or are doing, but what they will be doing
years from now. Most weapons systems take
somewhere between two and 12 years to re-
search and develop and have a lifespan of five
to 20 years. Thus, today's defense planning
must be based on estimates of a far tomor-
row's adversary capabilities. Even if future
arms control agreements hold down or reduce
weapons more effectively than SALT I and Ii.
the United States will nonetheless have to an-
ticipate the trends in weapons development
allowed under their terms.
To do so, the traditional intelligence--gath-
ering methods must yield to the advanced
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technique of signals intelligence (SIGINT).
Historically, human espionage has reaped
I'ountiful harvests for world powers, radiat-
ing an image of might and beauty--the Brit-
ish Empire between 18 15 and the close of the
nineteenth century, and the United States be-
tween World War 11 and the Kennedy assas-
sination. But such luster has now dimmed.
Resides, human espionage is of limited value
in trying to penetrate a closed, compartmen-
talized society like the Soviet Union. It can
occasionally confirm data, but can rarely fur-
nislr r eli able original information.
:10.Nu?eriny the Uncunsu'erable
The deficiencies of human espionage must
he compensated for by SIGINT. which can best
help the United States learn and predict what
the Soviets are up to in terms of weapons re-
:,carkIr and development. This was potently
demonstrated by the furor over the loss of
wo listening posts in northern Iran by which
the United States learned the results of Soviet
:missile tests. Turner publicly bristled over
their loss, particularly since the green-eye-
shade types in the Office of Management and
Budget (omli) had made savage cuts last De-
cember in funds for SIGINT in favor of other
intelligence accounts. Espionage received its
!,lit sl re, but O\113 lavished funds upon
today's most enchanting intelligence tech-
nique-photographic equipment.
OMB's error was grave and was made all
t he riskier by the fact that the U.S. technologi-
cal superiority in weaponry is swiftly fading.
The U.S. Navy was agape last May, for in-
stance. when the Soviets launched a nuclear-
howcred submarine that steams faster (40
knots) and dives deeper (more than 2,000
feet) than anything the United States has.
Such tremors constitute an early warning
signal of sliding American technological su-
premacy. For the Soviet Union is charging
ahead both in terms of military production
(it now spends three times as much as the
United States on strategic forces and one-
third more on general purpose forces) and in
tcrrtls of military infrastructure, upon which
future arms programs are to be mounted
(where it spends 80 per cent more than the
United States). According to the Defense Dc-
partment, the Soviet military is increasing its
share of highly skilled labor, even though
more than half its research and development
scientists and engineers are already thought to
be working on military projects. Their im-
pressive efforts, marshaling increasingly scarce
roubles, signal a wish to persist in acquiring
larger and more capable military forces. Such
activities also propel the Soviet society and
economy into additional military endeavors,
thereby seeding arms-related institutions and
spawning military-oriented activities that,
over time, gather a momentum of their own.
Advanced signals and photographic sen-
sors are now able to monitor every major
construction activity in the Soviet Union and
virtually every major Soviet weapons test.
The verification debate that is building up
over the SALT 11 agreement will make many
Americans realize that U.S. security depends
as much upon strategic intelligence as it does
upon the size and nature of U.S. offensive
strategic weapons. The Carter administra-
tion will be explaining each of the provisions
of SALT 11 in terms of specific American stra-
tegic reconnaissance capabilities.
But even strategic reconnaissance, as prom-
ising as it now seems, cannot provide the
answer to U.S. intelligence needs. Tradition-
ally. presidents have turned to their advisers
to answer the unanswerable-the singular
solution to a perplexing problem or the defin-
itive analysis of any happening. Woodrow
Wilson was extreme in degree, though charac-
teristic in kind, when commanding his advis-
ers aboard the George Washington on the
way to Versailles: "Tell me what's right to
do and I'll do it."
In the vain hope of telling a president
"what's right to do," intelligence was cen-
tralized by- the National Security Act of
1947. The new intelligence system thereby
became different from that of Britain, which
has at least five separate organizations respon-
sible for intelligence; France, which has four;
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and \\'est Germany with three. In contrast,
the i\merican structure, headed by a director
of central intelligence (DCI), has lumped a
veritable array of responsibilities-for para-
military operations, technological collection,
military order-of-battle estimates, and politi-
cal and economic analysis-into one institu-
tional framework. This consolidation ex-
poses the entire intelligence community to the
same political and cultural pressures, and re-
inforces the tendency of all elements to sway
together with the mood of the moment. It has
fostered a type of "groupthink" where the
pressures for unanimity override individual
mental faculties-somewhat analogous to
what occurs in a jury room.
I.S. technological superiority in
weaponry is swiftly fading.
This problem could be relieved by loosen-
ing t he 1947 act in order to promote fiercely
indc: endent, keenly competitive centers of
intelligence collection and analysis. Carter's
F xec utivc Order of January 24, 1978, moved
in quite the opposite direction. Responsi-
bilities laid on the DCI were specified to
include: acting as chief of the CIA itself;
exercising full and exclusive authority for
approving the CIA's budget, as well as those
of all intelligence units in the departments of
Defense, State, Treasury, and Energy, and
the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion: and shouldering responsibility for the
accuracy and value of all intelligence apprais-
als. The Carter Executive Order has also as-
signed dual roles to the CIA's own National
Foreign Assessment Center and Directorate
for Administration.
The two functions-head of national in-
telligence in terms of both budget and esti-
mate;, and operating chief of the CIA--
should be separated. Such a move, which can
only be made by Congress, would eliminate
ovnsiderable confusion. Fat more important,
it would improve the caliber of reporting by
divorcing America's main intelligence chief
from concerns for the immediate agency and
its activities. The new, liberated DCI could
coordinate all intelligence programs without
special responsibility for any one segment. In
case of a conflict between the DCI's sense of ria-
tional intelligence needs and the desires of one
agency, the presumption Would be that the
national perspective would prevail.
Nonetheless, the new DCI should stay clear
of the traditional sand trap and not try to
coordinate intelligence estimates or analyses.
The president should be presented with the
conflicting evidence and opposing views that
well up from the newly dispersed intelligence
network, and the DCI should avoid placing a
distinctive stamp on the product. The presi-
dent must grapple with alternative interpre-
tations of events and the risks and costs of
adopting one policy view over another.
The Congress, meanwhile, wrestles with
the question of an overall charter for Amer-
ican intelligence. If enacted, such a charter
would give Congress a set of responsibilities
roughly commensurate with its traditional
privileges of ex post facto criticism of intelli-
gence. More important, it would cloak the
sundry components of the intelligence com-
munity in a robe of congressional and even
constitutional legitimacy they presently lack
and, in this way, help redeem and justify the
intelligence agencies to the public. If sagacious
enough to legislate a clear separation be-
tween the head of the CIA and the DCI, the
charter would go a long way toward improv-
ing the quality of L.S. information on for-
eign activities and intentions.
It is time to reissue Shakespeare's ''warn-
ings and portents of evils imminent," as well
as prescriptions to avoid them. What the na-
tion requires is national intelligence that is so
tough, shrewd, and ruthless that no trend or
fashion will ever again screen data or warp
perception. What is required is such realistic
and icily penetrating national intelligence
that no degree of conformity-with the press
or with academia or with political fashion-
will force such blunders in the future. It is a
tall order.