CIA ESTIMATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00134R000200040009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 3, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP85BOO134R000200040009-6
MEMORANDUM FOR: Pfr. J. Williamson
Admin. Office
Attached are retention copies of some
correspondence by Dr. pines relating to
press interest in the coI.petitive analysis
experirent. I thought they might be use-
ful for the record.
STAT
2 8 Jan. 7'
FORM
5.75 1()l EU DITIONS OUS
 TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
proved For Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP85B00134R00020004 -
? ?
Memo of Record
Richard Pipes
CIA Estimate
DATE: 3 January 1977
LOCATION: ETDC
CC:
Today, Monday, January 3, 1977, in the morning, I received a call from
a Mr. Phillip Clark, representing the American Security Council of Washington,
D.C. He told me his organization planned to hold a meeting in Washington on
January 21st to which representatives of the media would be invited and at which
the CIA experiment which I headed would be discussed. He said that among the
invited participants were General Keegan, General Graham, Mr. Paul Nitze, and
Professor Van Cleave. Mr. Clark asked me if I would chair this session: I
replied I would let him know in a couple of days.
Since I regard such a conference to be both a breach of security and politi
counter-productive, I immediately contacted General Graham and I believe I was
successful in dissuading him from participating. I also tried to contact Mr.
Nitze, but he was out of town: I will try to get in touch with him tomorrow,
also in the hope of dissuading him from participating.
I also contacted Mr. Richard Lehman of the CIA and told him of the plans
to hold this conference.
RP/slc
cc: I I STAT
 ?
TO: Richard B. Foster
FRO'w: Richard Pipes
SUBJECT: New York Times Articles on Intelligence Est fT,a-Le
it T;W7
44T
DATE: 30 December 197
LOCATION: WDC
CC:
Since the appearance on December 26, 1976, of David Binder's article on
Team B in the New York Times, I have been deluged by telephone calls from
the media. In addition to CBS which wanted me to appear on the Walter
Cronkite show, I heard from ABC network and from Channel 2 in Boston.
I have told both stations that I would not appear on any news programs
dealing with this information, but would consider participating on a
serious panel discussion of strategy problems. Channel 5 in Boston,
a CBS affiliate has asked if I would appear on a half hour program called
"Newsmakers" next week in which I would be interviewed by two correspondents
on problems of international security, but I have not yet given them an
answer either way. This morning I was telephoned by Channel 2 in-Boston
which said that .they would like to set up a four-person panel that would include
in addition to me, Paul Nitze and Professor Doty to discuss similar subjects.
I have talked to two correspondents, 'Mr. Benjamin of Newsweek and Mr. Marder
of the Washington Post, both of whom are doing articles on this story. In
each case, I emphasized that I would divulge no information on the content
of either Team A or Team B reports or on our recommendations. Our conversation
concerned mainly the broad implications of the experiment and general issues,
based on my previous writings with which the interviewers seemed familiar.
I tried in these conversations to stress first that the experiment was
internally generated by the intelligence community and should not be used
to criticize it, and be that it was wrong to assume (as they suggested) that
behind it lay political motives, namely the desire to pressure the Carter
Administration. Mr. Marder seemed very well informed about the. circumstances
surrounding the experiment and seems to have talked to Mr. Leo Cherne, the
Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).
Today at noon ','I had lunch with the columnist Joseph Kraft who seemed to
wish to convey to me that the "leaks" were counter-productive in the sense
that the Carter transition team resented being 'put on the spot'. I told
him that these considerations were irrelevant since I had nothing to do
with the leaks and that I believe the same applied to the other members of
Team B.
As reported in my memo of 22 December 1976, 1 have been authorized by Mr.
Richard Lehman to talk in general terms about our project to the press. I
will continue to repor.t.in writing discussions with any representatives of
the media. Should the above mentioned panel with either Channel 5 or Channel 2
in Boston materialize, I will report on them as ~?,ell.
proved For Release 2007/03/09: C
 Approved For Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP85B00134R00020004Q. Q -6 27 er 197
Distribution
ic.r,. ruster V --I 1 ,Lii~"
SUBJECT: New York Times Articles on Intelligence Estimate cc:
26 December 1976
The attached zeroxed article appeared on page 1 of the New York Times,.
December 26, 1976 and was also reprinted in its entirety, December 26, 1976,
by the Washington Post. Also attached you will find a memo of record by
Richard Pipes indicating that he had cleared the discussion with Mr. Binder
of the Nev York Times with :?Ir.Richard Lehman, Deputy Director of the CIA.
As you know, Dr. Pipes was the head of the committee that studied the issues
involved in an alternative interpretation of data.
Earlier William Beecher of the Boston Globe reported on the "Alternative.
Estimate" study in a manner which indicated more of an overt criticism of the
CIA. Dr. Pipes has been extremely careful about any discussions outside the
intelligence community and with me on this matter and he has cleared all
discussions with both members of the intelligence community and with me.
On Sunday, December 26, 1976, Dr. Pipes phoned me and indicated that
CBS TV news had contacted him and asked for an interview on the Sunday night
news program. I urged him to decline without approval of either the intelligen
community or Leo Cherne, Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board (PFIAB).
I talked to Dr. Pipes today, 27 December 1976, and he indicated that
he had several additional phone calls from TV news programs concerning, the
Binder article in the New York Times. He said that he had talked again to
Richard Lehman, CIA, and had referred the telephone calls to him since it is
not the policy of the intelligence community to endorse any statements to
the news media except those that are officially released. This ruling has
been used by Dr. Pipes to turn do~,-n all invitations to appear on all TV
newscasts- He is writing a memo of record on these matters today.
In none of the news statements has SRI been mentioned..
RBF/slc
cc:
STAT
 =-' Hpprovea ror rceiease zuuiiusiu' -. ui/-x-rcuroonuu isz+rcuuuzuuu'+uuu i-n
The Record ? DATE: 22 December
Richard Pipes
Conversation with Mr. David Binder of the
New York Times
On the evening of December 20 I received a telephone call from Mr.
David Binder of the New York Times who, wanted to know if I could "talk"
about Project B. I told him I could not, whereupon he informed me that he
had received a briefing by the Agency on this work. I told him. that in
view of this fact I would find out the following day whether I could or
could not talk with him.
The following day, December 21, during a meeting between Team B and NFIB
I discussed this conversation with Mr. Richard Lehman, Deputy Director, CIA,
who told me that he had indeed talked to Mr. Binder and given some general
information on the Project "to set the record straight." He said he had no
objection to my talking with Mr. Binder in similar terms. Later that after noon
I tact Mr. Binder at the airport prior to my departure for Boston and chatted
with him about Team B. I avoided any mention of its findings or conclusions
and restricted my comments to general background information. I was particular
keen on conveying to him that the Project was not intended to assail the CIA
but should be viewed as a form of self-criticism initiated by the DCI and
intended to improve the process of national estimates.
RP/slc
STAT