MINERAL SUPPLY AVAILABILITY: BOTSWANA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-01156R000300360002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 16, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2011/02/18 : CIA-RDP85-01156R000300360002-4 d States Department of State I~oT5Wku71
MEMORANDUM
TO: INR/EC/CDC - Mr. Frederick Shoup
FROM: AF/S - Peggy Blackford
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability: Botswana
REF: Lindstrom Memo dated November 9# 1983
A. Botswana is a pro-Western democracy which would probably
favor the U.S. in an East-West conflict and would in any case
come under strong pressure from South Africa to provide strategic
materials to the United States.
B. Botswana's production of cobalt could be easily disrupted in
time of war. The Botswana Defense Force numbers only about-3000
men who attempt to patrol an area the size of Texas. Guerilla
forces could easily infiltrate the border.
C. Botswana's nickel matte which contains cobalt is exported via
South Africa which could be expected to vigorously defend its
rail lines and port facilities. Nevertheless sabotage is a real
possibility.
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MEMORANDUM
TO: INR/EC - Mr. Lindstrom
FROM : AF/C - Debo:/ah I.1 pp1~11
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply, Availability: Gabon
A. The Government of Gabon. which is pro-West and
capitalist, is unlikely to withhold manganese from the
United States in the event of war. Gabon. as an oil pro-
ducer, is, at present. financially secure.
B. Gabon is a stable, one-party state. held together
by the personality of one man. President Bongo. who main-
tains power by a careful balancing of the country's varied
ethnic interests. Although we do not anticipate civil
unrest in the event of a war, the assassination of President
Bongo or deliberate attempts at destabilization by outside
forces could change the picture. In addition. Gabon's
economy and government bureaucreacytts run by French techni-
cians; the removal of these technicians, for whatever reason,
would cause the disruption of government in Gabon, and would
certainly seriously inhibit production and exports.
C. Manganese is exported from Gabon by sea; land
routes will not be available for several years to come. The
disruption of North Atlantic shipping would certainly have
an adverse effect on Gabon's export of manganese to the
United States- Of Gabon's neighbors, Cameroon and Equatorial
Guinea are pro-West. Congo is non-aligned -but has close
ties to the Soviet Union and other east bloc countries.
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MEMORANDUM
To: INR/EC - Ralph E. Lindstkom
From: AF/S - Daniel H. Simpson
Subject: Your Memorandum of November 9 on Reliability
of Supply of key Minerals from Namibia
For the purposes of the study described in your
memorandum, a distinction would have to be made between
the status quo in Namibia (South African control) and the
character of any elected government if the current inter-
national negotiations result in Namibian independence.
In the first instance, one would have to assume that
there would be no likely disruption of the supply of
diamonds or other minerals produced in Namibia (uranium,
copper, lead, tin, or zinc).
Were a crisis to unfold after Namibian independence,
it is conceivable that an elected Namibian government,
particularly one involving SWAPO, might seek to withhold
critical or strategic materials or prove susceptible to
Soviet pressure to do so. More likely, given the virtual
certainty, under any conditions, of Namibia's continued
heavy economic dependence on South Africa and the great
extent of Western involvement in the Namibian minerals sector,
there would be little chance of an effective embargo directed
at the Western market. Moreover, the complete dependence
on South Africa as a transit channel for Namibian exports
eliminates the possibility that land routes through other
neighboring countries would have any bearing on questions
of supply.
Similarly, we discount the possibility that civil unrest,
sabotage, insurgency, or other military action, whether or
not Soviet-inspired, would have any effect on mineral
production or exports. Under current circumstances, of
course, Namibia faces just those conditions, with no effect
on production. Given Namibia's topography, the vast
distances involved, and the relatively sparse population,
any threat to production appears minimal, even in the
context of actions directed against a Namibian government
i
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TO: INR/EC- Mr. Lindstrom
FROM: AF/S- David Passage
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability- South Africa
This memorandum contains the responses pertaining to
South Africa in answer to your questionnaire dated
November 9 concerning supply reliability of critical
and strategic minerals:
A. It is unlikely that the South African Government would
withhold its important supplies of platinum, chrome and
vanadium from the U.S. in time of war. South Africa
considers itself a bulwark against communism and Soviet
expansion, and would probably want to assist the United
States in the event of a war along the lines assumed in
the questionnaire. In addition, U.S. policy--by trying
to promote peaceful change away from apartheid and toward
a system of government in South Africa which involves the
country's black majority--is aimed at ensuring that we
stay on friendly terms with any government that should
succeed the present South African. Government.
B. Civil unrest, sabotage or insurgency could indeed disrupt
South Africa's production or exports of the above-named
minerals in wartime, but such activity would have to be
of greater magnitude than at the present time. Groups
which are seeking--principally with Soviet assistance--
to overthrow the government of South Africa have not at
this point demonstrated an ability to project force which
could result in such disruptions. There is nothing to
preclude a change in tactics, however, which might result
in greater damage being inflicted on South Africa's
infrastructure, particularly in a war-time situation.
C. The above contingencies could well cause land routes
through neighboring countries, such as Botswana, Zimbabwe,
Mozambique and Namibia, to be interrupted in time of war.
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MEMORANDUM
TO: INR/EC - Ralph Lindstrom
FROM: AF/E - Richard W. BogosianAr
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability: Cobalt
from Uganda
REP: Your Memo of November 9, 1983
The following addresses the questions posed in your
memo regarding the supply reliability of cobalt from. Uganda.
A. Barring a radical change in its foreign policy,
Uganda is unlikely to withhold sales of cobalt to the United
States under the wartime scenario described in your memo. -
Instead, Uganda would probably attempt to maximize the econ-
omic benefits of commercial trade in its strategic materials.
In any case, Uganda's borders are so permeable that any
official interdiction of mineral exports would be very dif-
ficult to enforce.
B. Unless Uganda itself were directly involved in the
hostilities, the chances of war-inspired disturbances dis-
rupting production or exports are minimal. Since Uganda ex-
periences more or less chronic domestic instability, there is
a chance that during a prolonged war, local production could
be disturbed by random civil unrest.
C. Uganda would depend on both land and sea routes for
the export of cobalt to the U.S. Under the contingencies
described in the memo, the principal port handling Ugandan
exports (Mombasa, Kenya) could be damaged or otherwise
unavailable for trade with the West. Also, closing of the
Red Sea and Suez Canal would disrupt, but not necessarily
impede, seaborne trade between Uganda and the.U.S. More
likely, the interruption of normal sea trade routes would
cause a break in regular. supply until alternative routes were
 established. That assumes that Ugandan cobalt remains
economically-Competitive and essential enough to justify
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MEMORANDUM
TO- __INR/EC - Mr. Lindstrom
FROM: AF/C - Glenn A. Munro
SUBJECT: Request for Information--Mineral Supply Availability:
Zaire
A. It is highly unlikely that Zaire under President
Mobutu Sese Seko would withhold supplies of copper and
cobalt from the U.S. in time of war. President Mobutu has
made close tj.es with the West a cornerstone of his 18 year
leadership of Zaire. His government and country depend upon
mineral sales to the West to stay afloat economically.
Western countries, the U.S. included, have twice acted to
save his regime when it was invaded by East Bloc backed
guerillas in the late 1970's. Mobutu clearly sees his
political and economic fortunes as inextricably linked to
the West and especially the United States. We see no
evidence to support the idea that the Mobutu regime would
willingly deny us access to its mineral supplies in time of
war.
B. However, mineral production in Zaire is vulnerable
to actions designed to disrupt it. The main cobalt and
copper producing areas are found in Shaba province, near the
Zambian and Angolan borders. These are notoriously unstable
areas, as witnessed by the Shaba I and II invasions. Dissi-
dent Zairian movements are active just across the borders,
and a full scale civil war is taking place in Angola. Security
within Shaba province is poor. with ill-equipped and often
unpaid Zairian troops more concerned about shaking down civil-
ians than preparing for the region's defense. If the war were
to reach Central Africa or if the USSR or its clients were to
incite the Zairian opposition groups to disrupt minerals pro-
duction, this could probably be done fairly easily.
C. Active guerrilla movements, politically volatile
relations between countries in the region, poorly developed
and maintained transportation facilities and a chronic lack of
spare parts all combine to render it conceivable that supplies
of minerals'from Shaba province would be interdicted in time
of war. The Benguela railway now functions at only a fraction
of its capacity because of sabotage caused by UNITA guerrillas
in Angola. The Lubumbashi to Durban railway, which currently
carries two-thirds of Shaba's mineral production, passes through
Zambia and Zimbabwe. and it is likely that in the case of a con-
ventional war the Zimbabwean-South African border would be
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closed. The internal transportation system from Lubumbashi
to Matadi via Ilebo is least likely to be interdicted, but
this too--is vulnerable to sabotage and in its present poor
condition can only carry part of the region's mineral
production. A fourth possible route exists via Zambia
and the Tazara Railway, to Dar Es Salaam, but it is not
presently used and suffers from many of the problems cited
above.
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MEMORANDUM
B. Simpso
FROM: AF/S - Daniel
SUBJECT: Request for Information on Mineral Supply
Availability - Zambia
REF: Lindstrom Memorandum of November 9, 1983
Following are replies to questions posed in the referenced
memorandum.
A. Because of the likely enormous political and economic costs
of such a decision, the Government of Zambia is unlikely to
withhold cobalt and copper from the United States in time of
war.
The importance of mining to Zambia's overall GDP has declined
in recent years, but the sector remains the primary determinant
of Zambia's economic and financial performance. The U.S. is a
major market for Zambian copper which alone has traditionally
accounted for 95% of the country's export revenues. Although
the U.S. has not been the primary market for Zambia's generally
low-quality cobalt, the Zambian mining sector recently has
devoted considerable effort to producing a higher grade of
cobalt which would increase its attractiveness in the U.S.
market.
The country's recession plagued economy weakened further in
the past two years owing to recurring droughts which necessi-
tated costly food imports and further expenditures of foreign
exchange. The government is undertaking a program of IMF-World
Bank mandated reforms, moving to reschedule debts, and accord-
ing greater emphasis to agriculture and industrialization, but
Zambia's economic health and prospects will remain tied to its
ability to earn foreign exchange from copper and cobalt exports
for the foreseeable future.
B. Civil unrest, sabotage, insurgency or military action from
forces in neighboring countries, whether or not Soviet-
inspired, could disrupt Zambia's production and/or export of
_ cobalt and copper in war time. Land-locked Zambia's mining
industry would be vulnerable to actions from hostile neighbors
l or insurgencies.. Its production in part is dependent upon
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foreign sources of spare parts and machinery. Zambia's
exports and imports must transit through neighboring
countries. Disruption of maritime services and sea routes
between-.Zambia and the U.S. also could disrupt the country's
production and export of these minerals.
Additionally, expatriate expertise continues to play an
important role in Zambia's copper and cobalt mining Sectors,
although a program of Zambianization is underway. Zambia's
ability to retain the services of its expatriate personnel
could affect the production and export capability. The
attitude and actions of Zambia's politically important,
independent trade unions which are strong in the mining
sector would also be an important factor.
C. Civil unrest, sabotage,insurgency, or other military action,
whether or not Soviet-inspired, could cause land routes
through non-producer countries -- routes important in the
import of Zambia's cobalt and copper to the United States
- to be interrupted in war time. Zambia's exports travel
by surface through neighboring countries. Consequently,
political and economic conditions in Tanzania, for example,
would affect Zambia's ability to continue exports to the U.S.
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MEMORANDUM
FROM: AF/S - Simeon L. Moat
(
SUBJECT: Zimbabwe: Mineral Supply Availability
REF: Your Request for Information dated 11/9/83
Following is our best and briefest response the
questions you posed:
A. Would Zimbabwe withhold chromite and asbestos from the
U.S. in wartime?
-- Zimbabwe's most likely reaction to a conventional war
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be to attempt tb
remain neutral. That would include honoring previous
commitments for supplying strategic minerals and basing
future supply decisions on economic (including deliverability),
not political factors.
B. Would Zimbabwe's production or exports be cut off?
-- Zimbabwe's production of chromite and asbestos would
probably not be cut off voluntarily, but could be disrupted
by Soviet-inspired unrest. Zimbabwe is landlocked and
exports would depend on the ability of Mozambique and South
Africa to insure transit of such shipments.
C. Would trans-shipment be blocked?
-- Barring major Soviet intervention, complete cutoff is
unlikely, since several alternate transport routes exist.
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A. Given Australia's history of close alliance and cooperation
with the US in-peace and war, we assume that in a future
conflict it would be.no less supportive of the US than
any other of our very closest allies. Such support would
likely include as much of the minerals listed in the
question as Australian industry could spare. Australia
is a partner with the US and New Zealand in the ANZUS
security treaty.
B. If public support of Australia's support role in the
hypothetical conflict is high, such disruption is extremely
unlikely.
C. It is possible that increased Soviet activity in the
Pacific could disrupt US-Australia sea lanes of communication
(Australia does not share a land border with any other
country).
EA/ANZ:BNGt :rlw Concurrence: `-
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CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
TO: INR/EC - Ralph E. Lindstrom'
FROM: EA/C - Richard H. Howarth
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability
The following information is provided in response to your
memo of November 9.
A. The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
consistently emphasizes its independence from both the Soviet
Union and the United States, and can therefore be expected to
act strictly in its own national interest in time of war. In
its self-perceived role as a Third World leader, the PRC could
be expected to hew to a non-aligned and an aggressively
independent course of action.
Although the PRC perceives the Soviet Union as a greater
security threat than the United States, that motivation alone
should not be construed as sufficient to ensure the continued
shipment of strategic materials during war time. In addition,
PRC actions in a conventional war including action in Korea
would be directly affected by long-standing ties between China
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). If, for
example, the US was perceived as an aggressor in the DPRK, the
PRC would be likely to take a hostile attitude towards the US.
Alternatively, China would not shrink from making a profit and
establishing a greater market presence by continuing sales to
the US, if the alignment of third countries and the battle
situation permitted.
B. Because of the significant Soviet military force
deployed.on China's long land border with the Soviet Union, one
could expect significant disruption of Chinese economic
production during a time of global hostilities, and US access
to strategic materials from China could not be assured. -This
is necessarily dependent upon the precise location and extent
of hostilities, but the PRC cannot be considered a reliable
source of supply under the scenario provided.
C. The scenario provides tha the Pacific would be free
from all but slight interdiction-.-therefore China's primary
trade routes would remain intact.
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 Mineral Supply Availability
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w0999E, November 17, 1983
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Mineral Supply Availability -- Indonesia
NOTE: Indonesia is a major supplier of petroleum to the U.S.
(currently supplies about 8% of our imports). If Middle East
supplies were disrupted, we would undoubtedly seek to increase
our purchases from Indonesia.
A. As a formally non-aligned nation with very modest defense
capabilities, Indonesia would seek to avoid any action which
might draw it directly into a big power war. At the same time,
its political sympathies would be strongly with the U.S.
For that reason and because of the substantial economic benefits
it could reap, Indonesia would seek to continue and even
increase its export of strategic materials to the U.S. as long
as it judged that such action would not put it in jeopardy of
direct Soviet retaliation (it probably would be willing to run
the risk of Soviet interdiction of shipping, especially since
it has only a small ocean-going merchant fleet and the great
bulk of its exports are transported on U.S. or third country
vessels).
B. The Government of Indonesia at all times places a high
priority on maintaining domestic stability, keeping a tight lid
on the expression of dissident views. In times of international
unrest, it would keep the lid on even tighter. There is little
likelihood of domestic unrest of sufficient magnitude to signi-
ficantly disrupt production or export of strategic materials,
in the absence of a severe breakdown of the Indonesian economy.
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Mineral Supply Availability -- Malaysia
A. Provided Southeast Asian and Pacific sealanes remain open
in wartime and Malaysia itself is not occupied or invaded
militarily, the flow of strategic materials, including rubber,
tin and exotic metals, to the United States would likely be
maintained. On the political side, the Malaysian Government is
staunchly anti-communist and could be counted upon to assist in
maintaining the flow of critical materials to the United States
and other Western nations. Although technically non-aligned
(as.are Malaysia's ASEAN partners Indonesia and Singapore), the
Malaysian Government supports a U.S. strategic presence in Asia
as a bulwark against communism, whether the threat might emanate
from the USSR, China or Vietnam. In time of threat or inter-
national tension, Malaysia would largely be guided by the common
outlook and/or policies of ASEAN, but these are expected to be
fundamentally pro-Western and supportive of Western anti-
communist efforts.
B. There is no significant subversive or terrorist threat to
the Malaysian Government, whether Soviet-inspired or not.
The GOM has effective military, police and security forces to
maintain domestic order, although acts of sabotage provoked by
Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) factions or the few pro-
communist guerillas remaining in the Sarawak-West Kalimantan
border area would not be out of the question. Also, while
Malaysia's communal problem revolving around deep-seated
mistrust between the Malays and Chinese remains a constant in
the political life of the country, inter-ethnic tension is not
likely to affect the viability of the government, Malaysia's
national integrity or defense and security capabilities in
wartime or other periods of international tension. Indeed, a
"national emergency".in the face of an external threat or a
major internal subversive threat would result in measures to
forestall communal unrest. In this situation, it is not likely
that the flow of strategic materials from Malaysia would be
adversely affected.
C. Since natural commodities flow out of Malaysia by sea, the
question of land routes to or through neighboring countries does
not arise.
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TO: INR/EC - Mr. Ralph Lindstrom
1
FROM: EA/PIA - Steven R. Pruett`,?.
SUBJECT: Request for Information-Mineral Supply
Availability
A. The actions of the territorial administration in New
Caledonia in wartime would depend primarily on decisions of the
French Government. If France were occupied, Australia, the
major regional power, might feel compelled to intervene as it
did in World War II.
B. Given New Caledonia's geographic location, it is not
likely that Soviet action, short of a military move on
Australia, would disrupt New Caledonia's nickel production.
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UNCLASSIFIED _
MEMORANDUM
TO: INR/EC - Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: EA/PHL - Ulrich A. Straus*
SUBJECT: Request for Information--Mineral Supply Availability
with regard to the questions raised in your memorandum of
November 9, the following can be said regarding the
availability of critical and strategic materials from the
Philippines in wartime:
A. Under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1952,
each party is committed to self-help and mutual aid to
"maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity
to resist armed attack" and to "act to meet the common dangers
in accordance with its constitutional processes." In view of
these obligations and the close and friendly relationship
prevailing between the two countries, we fully anticipate that
the Philippines would continue to make chromite, cobalt, and
nickel available to the U.S., unless its own involvement in the
hostilities should make continued shipment of these commodities
physically impossible.
B. Since U.S. military facilities on Philippines soil
would inevitably be engaged in the war posited by the
interagency review. group and hostile Soviet military action
against those facilities would be equally likely, the
possibility of disruption of Philippine production of critical
minerals during wartime must be considered by U.S. planners for
stockpiling purposes. It is of course conceivable that, even
if our military facilities there were damaged or destroyed, the
Philippines could nevertheless stay out of the war, but
alliance obligations and other considerations make this
unlikely. On the other hand, civil unrest, sabotage, and
insurgency are not likely to affect Philippine mineral
production unless the country is actually invaded.
C.. Only sea routes are involved. Maintaining those routes
would have to be entirely a U.S. responsibility.
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MEMORANDUM
TO, INR/EC/CDC - Frederick Shoup
FROM: ARA/AND - Lee M. Peter
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability Review
A. Bolivia maintains diplomatic relations with the USSR and,
under the Siles Administration, has sought closer economic and
commercial relations with Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies.
Nevertheless, under present and foreseeable circumstances
neither the Siles Government nor any likely successor regime
would withhold supplies of tin and tungsten from the US. Under
a civilian government, leftist elements could try to obstruct
such transactions, but centrist influences and economic
considerations would almost certainly outweigh their efforts.
A military government would undoubtedly continue to supply the
US in the event of a major East-West conflict.
One factor that could color Bolivian attitudes -- at least
under a left-to-center civilian government -- would be the
position of other Latin American governments toward a US-Soviet
conflict in a Third World context in which the US was seen as
the aggressor. Bolivia could join a boycott by other Latin
producers if the boycott involved a substantial share of OAS
member states. Overcoming Bolivian solidarity with other Latin
nations in such circumstances could be difficult and costly.
B. Labor action and sabotage could disrupt Bolivian mineral
production and exports, at least temporarily, during a
US-Soviet conflict.
The National Labor Federation (COB) is well organized and
frequently critical of the US and the Government. Within the
COB the miners are the most cohesively organized group. Labor
leadership is likely to be critical of the US in any conflict
with the Warsaw Pact, especially if Third World proxies or
Third World locales are involved. Whether labor militancy
would seriously interrupt production would depend on economic
factors and on the willingness of the Government to intervene.
High prices and high wages would make labor more tractable.
Present or foreseeable governments, even if critical of the US,
_would probably respond to US economic incentives and political
pressure to end'major labor actions.
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Sabotage, both' spontaneous and Soviet-inspired, is
possible. As with -labor unrest, the Government would be
responsive to US pressure and incentives to halt sabotage,
although its-traditional weakness could limit its ability to
halt determined saboteurs.
C. Bolivia ships its mineral exports through Chilean ports.
By a? treaty of 1904, Chile granted Bolivia free use of its
ports, and later clarifications have made those rights
essentially inviolable. Under present or foreseeable
circumstances Chile is unlikely to deny passage to Bolivian
minerals. Labor stoppages and/or sabotage could obstruct
transit and loading, but under the current or foreseeable
Chilean governments such interruptions would probably not be
prolonged or serious.
Bolivian mineral shipments do not normally move through
Peruvian ports, but if Chilean ports were unavailable they
could be used. Under present and foreseeable circumstances
Peru would permit such movement. Labor unrest and/or sabotage
are unlikely to have a serious or long-term effect.
Shipment through Argentina by rail is also possible, but
simply uneconomical.
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MEMORANDUM
TO: INR/BC - Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: ARA/BR - Irving Williamso , r.
SUBJECT: Request for Information - Mineral Supply Availability
Below are the aswers for Brazil to the questions posed in
your memo of November 9, 1983, a copy of which is attached.
A. Given Brazil's pro-western orientation, and its need
to maintain a trade surplus to finance its foreign debt,
Brazil would not be expected to withhold in time of war
any of the strategic materials listed.
B. Under the scenario specified in the request, civil
unrest, etc. are unlikely to disrupt Brazil's production
of exports of the strategic materials listed given the
ability of the Brazilian Government, and ultimately the
Brazilian military, to maintain order.
C. Given Brazil's location, and its extensive port
facilities, the strategic materials in question would not
come to the United States by land and therefore question C
is not applicable.
Attachment:
Your memo of November 9, 1983
SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2011/02/18: CIA-RDP85-01156R000300360002-4 States Department of State ~; C1I NEVI
Washington, D.C. 20520
November 15, 1983
TO: INR/EC - Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: AF/W - Nancy E. Morgapt N
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability - Guinea
REF: Your memo dated November 9, 1983
In response to your memo about availability of Guinean
bauxite, AF/W offers the following responses:
A. Would the Government of Guinea, considering both
its financial needs and its political orientation in
war time, withhold bauxite from the United States?
Response: No.
B. Would civil unrest, sabotage, insurgency, or other
military action, whether or not Soviet-inspired, disrupt
Guinea's production or exports of bauxite in war time?
Reesnse: Given Guinea's remote location in West Africa,
it is highly unlikely that any local disturbances would
disrupt production or export or bauxite from the country.
C. Would the above contingencies cause land routes through
non-producer countries--routes important in the import of
Guinea's bauxite to the United States--be interrupted in
war time?
R~esp nse: No. Guinea is located on the coast of West
A rica; shipment of bauxite is by sea, not through any
other country.
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TO: INR/EC - Mr. Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: ARA/CAR - Richard H. Morefield'D
SUBJECT: Bauxite Supply Availability from Guyana
REP: Your Memorandum of November 9, 1983
Please find.below our response to your questions raised in
the referenced memorandum regarding Guyana.
1. Would the Government of Guyana withhold bauxite and
alumina shipments in wartime?
The current Government of Guyana, professedly socialist,
nationalized the former American and Canadian holdings of
Guyanese bauxite shortly after independence. Guyana is the
United States' principal source of calcined bauxite, used for
the manufacture of heat resistant materials of furnace linings
for the production of steel. While the current Guyanese
Government maintains friendly relations with Cuba and the
Soviet Union and its East European allies, and while relations
with the United States have fludkiated and are now at a low
point, we would expect the current government to adopt a
pragmatic approach, especially as the United States could
interdict Guyana's major non-bauxite exports (sugar, rice, and
wood products). -In addition, wartime conditions would be
likely to preclude continued importation of necessary products
from non-Western Hemisphere suppliers, a consideration which
would not be lost on any Guyanese government. We would
therefore anticipate the current Guyanese Government's
continued cooperation in the export of bauxite to the United
States in wartime, although we would expect that government to
use whatever leverage it possessed to assure high prices and
the supply of vital import needs. The principal opposition
parties in Guyana are ideologically to the left of the current
government and one, the Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP), has
openly admitted its close ties with the Soviet Union. Were the
PPP to be in power during a war situation such as that
hypothesized, it is possible that it would attempt to embargo
the export of strategic materials to the United States. It
would quickly confront serious economic difficulties, however,
and it would be unlikely to be able to retain power for any
significant period while obstructing traditional export and
import patterns.
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2. would civil unrest, sabotage, etc. disrupt production
of exports during wartime?
Guyana's bauxite production and export facilities are
relatively isolated and access to them subject to tairly-easily
imposed controls. Sabotage by groups with ideological and
party ties to the Soviet union and Cuba would be a possibility,
but probably could not be mounted on a scale sufficient to
seriously impair production or export, particularly as wartime
production would be likely to create prosperity for the
producing communities and sabotage would thus face popular
opposition. Production, of course, would continue to be
dependent upon supplies of fuel, spare parts, and equipment
from abroad.
3. Intenuption or routes through third countries?
Because of the shifting sand/mud bars of the Guyana
current off the northeast coast of South America, the tonnage
of ships serving Guyana is severely limited, and, as a
consequence, some Guyanese production is transhipped through a
Trinidad port. We would expect the Government of Trinidad and
Tobago to cooperate fully in wartime conditions with the
continued shipment of Guyanese bauxite to the United States.
Draft:ARA/CAR:RLfr:eb
ll/lb/83 632-3210
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TO: INR/EC Mr. Ralph E. Lindstrom
FROM: ARA/CAR - Richard B. Morefield
SUBJECT: Bauxite Supply Availability from Jamaica
REF: Your Memorandum of November 9, 1983
Please find below our responses to your questions raised
in the referenced memorandum regarding Jamaica.
1. Would the Government of Jamaica withhold bauxite and
alumina shipments in wartime?
We would expect the current Jamaican Government to
cooperate closely with the United States in a wartime
situation. The current opposition, were it to be in power
during a war, would also be likely to continue the export of
bauxite to the United States, although it might be somewhat
less cooperative than the current government. As the important
Jamaican tourist industry could be expected to all but
disappear during wartime, the importance of bauxite exports
would be significantly enhanced.
2. Would civil unrest, sabotage, etc. disrupt production
of exports during wartime?
Isolated attempts at sabotage could occur, but would be
unlikely to seriously curtail production and export.
Production and export would depend on the supply of fuel, spare
parts, and equipment from abroad.
3. InteriUption of routes through third countries?
Jamaican production is shipped directly by sea to the
United States.
Draft:ARA/CAR:Rb"wy?rieb
11/16/83 632-3210
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 Mq,co
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TO: INR/EC - Mr. Lindstrom -~/
C)~~
FROM: ARA/MEX - George High
SUBJECT: Request for Information--Mineral Supply Availability
Your memorandum of November 9 requested information on the
amount of certain critical and strategic materials which could
be expected to come from Mexico during wartime.
In our view, it is unlikely that Mexico would withhold fluor-
spar and zinc from the U.S. in a wartime situation. It is
highly probable that Mexico would be allied to the U.S. - or at
least sympathetic with U.S. objectives - in such a war and
would, therefore, not wish to undercut U.S. capabilities. We
do not believe Mexico's production or export of zinc or fluor-
spar would be disrupted in wartime, though it is conceivable
that internal groups sympathetic to the Soviets could cause
some dislocation. As Mexico borders the U.S., transport lines
are direct and would not be influenced by the position of
non-producer countries.
ARA:MEX:JGBuff:mph
11/17/83 Ext. 21881
'NANG 67515
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 Approved For Release 2011/02/18 : CIA-RDP85-01156R000300360002-4 .s Department of State PEkv
November 16, 1963
TO: --INR/EC/CDC - Frederick Shoup _
FROM: ARA/AND/P - William Lofstrom
SUBJECT: Mineral Supply Availability Review
A. Although Peru has normal diplomatic ties with the Soviet
Union, enjoys a favorable balance of trade, and has a close
military supply relationship with the USSR, under present and
foreseeable circumstances Peru is not likely to withhold
supplies of lead, molybdenum and zinc from the United States in
time of war. The present Belaunde government is openly pro-US
and any likely constitutional successor would probably also
identify with the US and with other hemisphere nations in any
east-west conflict. Although the Peruvian army and airforce
have a significant Soviet component in their inventories,
problems related to supply, parts and training have caused the
Peruvians to question the utility of the relationship. For -
political reasons also, the Belaunde government has begun to
seek alternative sources for parts and service for existing
equipment, and for new acquisitions. In a situation of real or
potential east-west conflict, this tendency would probably be
reinforced, and alternate sources would probably be more
.readily available.
B. Peru's leftist political parties and its militant, leftist
oriented labor union confederations would be critical of the US
in any east-west conflict, especially if Third World proxies or
a third world locale were involved. Labor stoppages affecting
mines, processing plants and transport systems could result in
temporary interruption of the flow of minerals to the US
market, but it is unlikely that this would have a serious or
long term effect.
Cleared:ARA/AND:LAScot
:YLofstr c
ARA/AND/P
O
r
11/15/83:x632-3360
WANG 2070D
C. Not applicabl
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TO: - INR/EC/CDC - Fred Shoup ~
FROM: ARA/CAR - Richard MorefieldT
SUBJECT: Request for' Information - Mineral Supply Availability
The following responds to your memo of November 9 which
requested information concerning the reliability of Suriname as
a supplier of bauxite.
Although remotely possible, we do not believe it likely
that the Government of Suriname would withhold bauxite from the
United States in time of war. Bauxite provides the major
source of government revenue to the Government of Suriname and
the United States is Suriname's largest consumer of Suriname's
bauxite exports. Suriname could consider withholding bauxite
from the United States only in the event it is able to find an
alternative buyer, which is not likely given the currently soft
international market for bauxite. Even during 1982/83 when
U.S. - Surinamese bilateral relations were strained as a result
of political problems, the Government of Suriname made no
effort to interfere with bauxite exports or with U.S. - owned
firms involved in the extraction of bauxite. Civil unrest,
insurgency or sabotage which could cause mechanical problems,
such as loss of power, and/or an exodus of managerial staff
involved in bauxite extraction, could disrupt Suriname's
production or export of bauxite during war time. Bauxite
exports are sent by ship from Suriname and need not transmit
non-producer countries.
Draft:ARA/CAR:SLysysW.eb
11/14/83 632-3449
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TOe-
FROM:
SUBJECT:
INR/EC/CDC - Mr. Shoup
EUR/CAN - James C. Nelson
4
Request for Information -
Supply Availability
The following answers with respect to Canada
are keyed to the questions in your memo of
November 9, 1983:
A. No.
B. No.
C. No.
Cleared: EUR'- JMMeda
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