SIG-IEP REVIEW OF PUBLIC INFORMATION STRATEGY FOR EAST-WEST ECONOMIC WORK PROGRAM

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85-01156R000200220006-6
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
21
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 7, 2010
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 19, 1983
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP85-01156R000200220006-6.pdf729.1 KB
Body: 
83-12110 Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 } S/S~H332153 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVID E. PICKFORD DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Attached is a Public Information Strategy high- lighting the results of the East-West Economic Work Program... Under Secretary Wallis, in his capacity as Coordinator of the East-West Economic Work Program, has asked that this document be reviewed by the SIG-IEP and then-transmitted to the Special Planning Group (SPG) for consideration as part of ?heir public diplomacy effort. - Charles Hill Executive Secretary Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 .. ~ 1,t~11' i t~[. Public Information Strategy for Highlighting Results of East-West Economic Work Program Introduction With the completion of the first phase of the East-West economics work program initiated last Fall, it is useful to pull together and document the results accomplished by this process. ..This paper is designed to serve as a resource document, with agreed-upon substantive themes, for public presentation of the results and contributions of the study and work programs, including speeches, articles; interviews, etc. The attached tabs present the unclassified source documents from which the themes below were taken. __ Objectives _-. _ _. - Provide background on the overall reorientation (late 1970s - present) of Hestern policies toward East-West economic relations - Describe the circumstances surrounding the imposition of expanded sanctions relating to the Soviet natural gas pipeline as well as the lifting of those sanctions. -.Highlight outcome and contribution of study and work program thus far and show wisdom of action to lift pipeline sanctions - Emphasize the collective nature of the effort toy' analyze the security implicat~.ona of Ea>c-West economic 'relations - 1. Overall reorientation of Westezc. attitudes toward East- West economic relations In the early 197Os, economics was a key part of the overall thaw in East-West relations. Lenient Western credit terms and a large increase in the level of trade resulted in_benefits for AAllPlf'trltTl i1 Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 r,~I. w ~~~... o .~ . ~ Mi Ir>lr~n n'~ ~ ~ Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 both aides--but with particular value for the East. Toward the end of the 1970a, and particularly after 1979, the massive Soviet military buildup as well ae their adventurism and military aggression demonstrated that detente -- with its incontestible economic benefits for the Soviets -- was no barrier at all when they saw opportunities to advance their strategic position. As the Soviata demonstrated that their fundamental values -- - =and"policies had-not changed.-Western governments.--.with the - -- -U.S. acting most quickly -- began to discuss and reevaluate their economic, political and security zelationahips with the 'East. -(A chronology of recent events in the area of_East-Pleat economics is contained at Tab 1)- Following the-Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the-Carter Administration held discussions in eazly_1980 at the Ministerial-level with our NATO allies on the =most appropriate economic responses to this blatant-act of military aggression. Af the Ottawa Economic Summit meeting the following-year,-President Reagan proposed a fundamental-ze- evaluation of East-West economic relations to the assembled .heads of state and government. The discussions at Ottawa _ culminated in a communique statement on East-Heat economic relations linking this area to Westera political and security objectives -- the first such reference to result from an economic summit since the first meeting in 1975 (Ottawa statement contained at Tab 2). 'Following the Ottawa meeting, Under Secretary Rashish _ _- undertook a mission to Europe. in the Fall of 1981 to reem- phasize President Reagan's concerns over-the wisdom of as- stating the Soviets with construction of-the Siberiar~ natural- gas"gigelf ne and to cast further sight on al-ternative sources of energy: = It was President Reagan's strong preference to avoid unilateral U.S. actions in this area if at all possible. Then Soviet-inspired imposition of mzztial law in Poland in ..December, 1981, gave further impetus to the ongoing seorien--: tation' o? Weatezn policies. -The U.S. and its allies imposed 'economic sanctions on Poland, while the U.S., acting an its ~ oriri, imposed restrictions on shipments of oil and gas ex- traction and transmission equipment by American firms. Under Secretary Buckley's mission to Europe in April, 1982, underscored U.S. concern over Western supplies of oil and gas equipment to the Soviets. In addition, the Buckley mission -began a series of discussions on the interest-rates-and credit - terms applicable to trade with the Soviets.._ Subsequently, _a_ decision was taken in the contezt of the Export Credit Arrange- ment to reclassify the Soviets and other countries with com- parable levels of GDP into the "relatively rich" category that 1 .1 pYr'11` ~Y 1 IH~ i~~w-iiirrui~ni Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 requires stiffer terms. (Details are pzavided below in Section 7.) At Versailles in June, 1982, allied leaders again discus- sed East-West economic relations and included a statement on this subject in their communique (included as Tab 2). This issue proved to be a contentious one, however, and following the meeting it became clear that there were significant differences in interpretation among allied leaders. 2. Im osition of Extended Sanctions on Oil and Gas E ui ment June Following Versailles Presidentr Reagan, observing that there had bean no movement on fundamental issues by the Poles or the Soviets; extended-the sanctions on-oil and. gas_equip_ment to subsidiaries of V:S:-firms and'to-licensees of U.$. techiiol- ogy. .Although the President.would have preferre3 not to impose unilateral sanctions, hie overriding priority was_ to demon- strate U:S: resolve in the face of the continued brutality and suppression of human rights in-Poland. The extension of the oil and gas sanctions provoked severe protests-from our allies. At an informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers at La Sapiniere in Quebec, Canada, in the Fall of 1982 an intensified series of discussions on East-West economic relations was initiated. By November, a broad con- sensus within this group had emerged on the nature of the economic relationship with the East, io assist Western governments in defining the specific implications of that consensus, and as a further basis for cooperation in this area, the U.S. and its par#ners agreed to undertake a work program consisting of a series of studies of-this subject, coupled with renewed"impetus to various negotiations already underway., The tangible results of that program.are now becoming available. .__ To-under~coze his belief in the effectiveness of a collective approach and show his confidence that a further convergence of views would occur as a result of the studies and discussions that were starting, the President in November lifted the: oil and gas sarictioris. -- - - ~ - 3: `Outcomes' airrd~ Accomplishments of" the 1982=83 ~~eQr-k. p=ogram. The details of-the intensified program of analyses. and discussions of East-West economics was agreed by all concerned governments in December, 1982, and was conducted in the. following institutions: - NATOz Overall security implications of East-West economic relations- CONFIDENTIAL - CoCom: Improved surveillance and control over Western exports with strategic or military impli- cations - OECD: East-17est Financial relations and credit terms; problems stemming from Eastern nations' cen- tralized control of trade OECD/IEA: Vulnerabilities from undue energy dependence; encouragement of alternative energy sources - _ 3._ Wozk Program Results: Overall-Security Implications of East-West Economic_Relations ~ - In NATO, the Economic Committee undertook an extensive "" study of the security implications-of Basi-West economic: relations. The Committee's. work was used by the NATO-country Foreign Ministers as the basis for their discussion of the topic during their meeting, June 9-10. - - - - - ` " - - -. .The. U:S._and_iis-partners recognize that their trade and financial relationships with the Soviet Union must be con- sistent with our shared security interests. These interests include the transfer of strategic technology, dependency relationships, and other dealings that contribute. to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. While mutually beneficial trade based on commercially Bound terms contributes to constructive relations, we must remain vigilant to .avoid ...further use by the USSR of some trade relations to enhance its military strength. We realize that, in our economic relations _with the Soviets, we must avoid undue dependence or piefe;en- tial treatment. (June 1983 NATO Communique; Comparison with 5. Work Program Results a- Coordinating controls over the CoCom, the Coordinating Committee. fo~_Multilateral-Export ~_ . Contiols, coordinates the Western-effoi~o-pievent-the-trans- _' fer of strategic technology to,the East. .While CoCom-has been zeaeonably effective overall, we recoynize that the Warsaw Pact = has obtained valuable equipment_and_te_chnology by circumventing " controls in various ways. To strengthen the multilateral CoCom system and make .it as effective as possible, the U.S. and its partners have recently _:-.:; taken a number of significant actionss ". CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011,56'8m0'0~0.20022p0~0f0+6A-6 Wl A ~~~1>f 1 INL - In January, 1982, at President Reagan's initiative, we held a CoCom High Level Meeting -- the first such meeting in many years. Since then, the organization has been carrying out the recommendations of that meeting to strengthen the effectiveness of the organization and the national control systems. - In April, 1983,_a_.second High-Lead Meet#ng was held, at which progress toward the conclusions reached at the earlier meeting was assessed. Special emphasis was .also placed on improvem_enta-in the_~oordination_ -----:between-stember governments in atrenythening national licensinc,~-and enforcement methods. This was particu- -. ;laxly important since CoCom itself has no-independent _ --_ _control-system and must. :depend on the national en- _ _ _forcement_efforts of-the fifteen member--states.- - At both meetings, member governments acknowledged the need to adapt CoCom controls to keep pace with technological developments. Accordingly, CoCom has. been meetirsg on a con- - tinuoua basis to upgrade and strengthen the embargo lists. Member governments have also agreed to study whether their security interests require controls on certain categories of high technology that are not now controlled. Details of both High Level Meetings and of ongoing CoCom activities are confidential. HoHever,-the U.S. is extremely . pleased with the outcome of the most recent meeting and the- progress to date. .The decisions taken at the meeting~ag well as subsequent actions confirm that thr allies are prepared to work with.us toward assuring that high:techrz~logy trade with the East does not undermine Western security. 6. Work Program Results: Enerav Aependence - The-U.S. and-its partners have agreed that they should avoid undue dependence on_any one sonree_for--energy,supplies:'~= Such__dependence-on-one sonrce=conkd potentially enable it to exercise monopoly power and exert political pressures. Conse- quently, the U.S. and_its-partners have agreed to move ahead expeditiously with the development of alternative Norwegian and North American energy resources and strengthen the ability of the West to manage any disruption of energy supply. Sn undertaking the recent study of energy requirements and security, the U.S._and its partners examined the present and projecEed energy supply+ and demand situations, assessed the CONFIDENTiAI Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 ? . t,lltYf' IUGY ! !HL energy vulnerability of individual nations by each type of fuel, and identified those policies that could enhance energy security. One of the key findings of this analysis was that, although an interruption in the supply of oil remains the major risk, rapidly growing imports of natural gas from non-OECD sources pose a significant challenge -- one that is most acutely felt in Europe. The study-of_energy requirements shows that there will - probably be-a_.gap:_between contracted supply and anticipated demand for gas-in-the-1990x. If this gap is f-iiled-by-the---_-__ Soviet Union,.-already ~a large and low-cost supplier,-dependence - on this source would reach potentially very serious-=Ievels.-_.In .this event. Europe would not be able to cope with an extended interruption of-natural gas without widespread and drsruptive-- cuts in supplies to consumers.-- _ ~ ~ - -- -- dependence on a single supplier, the U.S. and itc partners com- mitted themselves to avoid undue dependence and to emphasize the development of secure alternatives indigenous to the OECD area ~:_In_pazticu_lar-, the U.S: and its partners committed=----- themselves to: - - " - Encourage their companies to begin negotiations as soon as possible on deliveries from the Norwegian Troll field or from North American gas resources. The _goal is to make. supplies available at prices-comps- titive with other fuels in"the mid-1990x. ---- _ - Take those actions necessary to strengthen their -_ ability to deal with a supply:intezzuption. -Such actions vary depending on a nati?n'e situation, but include increased gas storage facilities, contingency programs to restrain demand, improved fuel-switching capabilities,- a flexible grid structure, more flexible -supply contracts,. and greater Burge capability.. .implementing these measures. The U.SJ arid'itr '- -- partners will also .assess periodically whether gas supplies.-from-any one source are large enough to .cause The agreements that have been reached enhance the energy security_of the_U.S. and its partners. We now have for the first time a cohsrent framework for examining energy security isaues'_on a continuing basis: We are pleased with the-progress that we have made and we believe that we have come a=long way ['~IDENTIAI_ ww. frfw~ ~.~ a Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 ? {,J1J111 ItJLi 1 t Il1L since the 1981 Ottawa Summit when Bzesident Reagan first sug- gested the need to examine energy security issues. (Extracts from IEA conclusions at TaD 5) 7. Work Program Results: East-West Trade and Financial Relations In the OECD, the U.S. and its partners recently completed the first phase of a thorough economic analysis of trade and financial relations with the Soviet Unioa and its East European .allies: The-analysis_concluded_that East-West trade-had not developecT asr_rapidly as once expected.-_and that in.relative- terms it=is- of marginal?importance to ths-West., Western gains- f-rom-this- trade have- been. disappointing-.- Eastern nations,- - _- after financing more than half-of-ii,rir increased=level,. of imports-in--the- late 1970s by borrowing. have- in some -cases been unable to meet their debt obligations despite a sharp cut in _their imports. The-main reason=for the above trends seems to lie in the nature of the economic system in the-East, which makes it difficult for-these-countries to make effective use of im--- ported _capital- equipment and technology, and. La produce -goods which-are competitive on Western markets. The U.B. and its partners concluded that in East-West economic relations. governments should exercise financial prudence without granting preferential treatment. In general, these relations should be guided by the indications of the market. _ -,_ _. - - - -- - - ? _ in the area of credits for export financing, the U.S and its partners agreed that it was not sensible to give-the Soviets the same concessionary interest zate8 that aretgiven to developing countries.- Since Ju h+,.--1982, the minimum interest rate applicable-to direct government provided credit-to the: Soviets and other rich countries-is i2.4t, nearly two per-- centage points above the current U.S. prime rate. The U.S: and its partners are continuing work to extend and strengthen this Finally;--the-U:3.--and-its"_partners are working ?to improve our statistics~on=trade-.flews-and_foreigtr indebtedness,-so that the data with which we work with-will be-more--current and-,will be based on-common definitions and understandings. (Relevant.. sections of OECD Ministerial Declarations included at Tab 4) 8. Implementation of the Findings The commitments made in-CoCom and in the OECD's export czedif consensus arrangement azecrecognized by all;as-governing specific actions of participating countries. However,?none of the organizations within which these analyses were performed is a supra-national body whose recommendations are legally CO~IFIDElJTlAL Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 ? ~ ~ ~uNriutN I IAL binding on member states. Indeed, such a rigid arrangement would be antithetical to the spirit of our alliances and friendships with other democratic countries. Rather, in performing these studies and carrying out the results of nego- tiations, members have concurred in the validity, relevance, and importance of the findings that were reached and will take the conclusions of the analyses strongly into account when formulating their national policies in these areas. In addition, IEA members have specifically directed that regular -Feviews-of-.country-,energy policies~give-special attention to .gas dependence and-nlternative issues in light of the principles adopted-in-the policy conclusions. - -- - g_ Ongoing. Efforts' Work with our._allies and partners in analyzing our economic relations with the East is an ongoing process in which we are seeking to heighten awareness of the security and economic policy dimensions of East-West economic relations. Beyond the development of a specific set of conclusions, we wanted to start a process..that~-would provide informed analyses for the -use of policy-makers----Happily.-thi"s expectation has-been bonne out, and work will be continuing in-the ozganizatioris involved in the initial series of analyses: - CoCom will be analyzing whether members' security __ _ interests require controls on additional high tech- - nology items and reviewing means by which it can _ -- strengthen national licensing and enforcement - ?- - NATO will be performing additional anayses of.-the __ security .implications of East-West economic ielationa -from which=-its members can draw-in formulating na- tional policies. As stated in its recent commu- _- enhance its military strength. occur in dealing with the state trading-"countries of the East,. and will also put into place an ongoing review process for the careful examination of other pzobems in East-West economic relations. OECD will also continue its work on monitoring trade and in- debtedness data. ' --OECD and IEA will also give specifiT attention to~ ? energy dependence in their country-by-country re= views, and they will also continue to promote in- terest in Norwegian and North American energy sources. rn~,~in~iri ni . w~~ ,r~w~ ..~. . Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 WIU IN6.1{IIIiL We believe that this effort has been helpful in enhancing Western security, and that the results of the work program justify the President's confidence in lifting the sanctions and pursuing a collective approach. In this regard, at Williams- burg, the Summit leaders noted with approval the progress made in these discussions and urged that work go forward in the appropriate locations. -Dr afted:E:EHurwitz_ :Approved:E:RMorris CO~FiDEftT1~L Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 Tab 1 - Chronology of Recent Events in the Area of East-West Economics _. Tab 2 - Economic Summit Statements on East-West - - Economics Tab 3 - NATO Communique Statements on Esst-West - Economics Tab 4 - Relevant Sections of OECD Ministerial Declarations Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 - - ----~. --- ?~cLCAL cventE a the Area of East-West Economic Relations January -- Ministerial level discussions with NATO allies on appropriate economic responses to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan July -- Ottawa Summit Meeting; First mention of East-West economic relations in a Summit Communique October -- Rashish mission uudertakea to reemphasize ----_- - J'residant=.Reagan a concern over European assist*,nce fn eonstruction of Siberian natural gas pipeline -?- - December-=---Dec2azatiori of Martial Law in Poland January -- U.S. and allies imn?ce ,:_:~_~ shipments of oil and gas extractionlandetransmission equipment April -- Buckley mission conducted to begin discusions of interest rates and credit terms, as well as to underscore U.S, concerns on pipeline June -- Versailles Summit meeting; communique statement on East-West economic relations acompanied by discord over interpretation June -- U.S. extends sanctions on energy equipment to U.S. subsidaries and licensees September -- Meeting at La Sapiniere, Quebec, to develop consensus approach to East-West economic relations November -- Key Western nations reach broad consensus - on East-West economic relations; agreement to start or accelerate analyses and discussions on aspects of Phis subject; President lifts pipeline sanctions December -- Agreement among all NATO and OECD countries on elements of work program Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 April-June -- Major elements of East-West economic work program completed: CoCom High-level meeting, IEA, OECD, and NA40 ministerial endorsement of communique statements; decisions made to continue work Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 Economic Summit Statements on East-West Economic ReIabions Rambouillet, 1975 10. {7e look to an orderly and fruitfu; increase in our economic relations with socialist countries as azz important element in progre~a ir. detente, and in World economic growth. Puerto Rico, 1976 - - He discussed East/Nest economic zelatiorrs. We welcomed in this context. the steady growth of East/West trade and expressed the hope that ecorronic relations between East and West-would procalpcommerciallbasisntiWe agreedothatfthzscprocess warzante our careful examination as well as efforts nn our part to ensure that these economic ties enhance overall-East/West relationships. 3ti. We also reviewed the significance of East-West economic relations for our political and security interests. We recognized that there is a complex Bala:ice of political and economic interests and risks in these relations. We concluded that consultations arid, where appropriate, coordination are necessary to ensure that, in the field of East-West relations, our economic policies continue to be compatible with our political and security objectives. Versailles, 1y8~ - We agree to pursue a prudent and diversified economic approach to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, consistent with our political and security interests. This includes actions in three key areas. First, following international discussions in January, our representatives will work together to improve the international system for controlling exports of strategic goods to these countries and national arrangements for the enforce- ment of Becuzity controls. Second, we will exchange informa- tion in the OECD on all aspects of our economic, commercial and financial relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Third, taking into account existing economic and financial con- siderations, we have agreed to handle cautiously financial relations with the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European coun- tries, in such a way as to ensure that they are conducted on a sound economic basis, including also tt~e need for commercial pzudence.in limiting export credits. The development of economic and financial relations will be subject to periodic ex-post review. Williamsburg, 1983 - _ (9) East-West economic relations should be compatible with our security interests. We take note with approval of the work of the-multilateral organizations which have in recent months -- analyzed and drawn conclusions regarding the key aspects of East-West economic relations. Ws encourage continuing work by these organizations,-as appropriate. Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 ~ Tab 3 NATO Communique Statements on East West Economic Relations January, .1982 14. In the current situation in Poland, economic. relations with Poland and the Soviet Union are bound to be affected. Soviet actions towards Poland make it necessary for the Allies to examine-the-course of future economic and commercial rela- tions with the Soviet Union. Recognizing that each of the Allies will--act in accordance with its own situation and laws, they will examine measures which could .involve arrangements regarding imports from~the Soviet Union, maritime agreements, air services agreements, the size of Soviet commercial repre- sentation and the conditions surrounding export credits(;). 16. In addition to agreeing to consult on steps to be taken in the near future, the Allies will also reflect on longer-term East-West economic relations, particularly energy, agricultural commodities and other goods, and the export of technology, in light of the changed situation and of the need to protect their competitive position in the field of military and technological capabilities (*). May, 1982 12. Economic exchanges have an important role in the development of a stable Easi-West relationship. The Allies reaffirm their intention which they expressed in their declaration of 11th January 1982 to review East-West economic relations, bearing in mind the need for such relations to be _ mut::ally advantageous and to take full account of security considerations, particularly in the technological, economic and financial areas, including export credits. In particular, they acknowledged the dangers involved in transfer of militarily relevant technology to the Warsaw r-act countrie~.- June, 1982 ("Bonn Declaration") F. Our purpose is to ensure economic and social stability for our countries, which will strengthen our joint capacity to safeguard our security. Sensitive to the effects of each country's policies on others, we attach the greatest importance to the curbing of inflation and a return to sustained growth ` Thq Greek delegation has reserved its position on these paragraphs __ Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 and to high levels of employment. While noting the important part which our economic relations with the Warsaw Pact coun- tries play in the development of a stable East-West relation- ship, we will approach those relations in a prudent and diversified manner consistent with our political and security interests. Economic relations should be conducted on the basis of a balanced advantage for both sides. We undertake to manage financial relations with the Warsaw Pact countries on a sound economic basis, including commercial prudence also in the granting of export credits..- We agree to exchange_infosmation in the approp=late fora.nn:-a11_aspects:o# our economic, com- mercial and financial relations--with-Warcaw-Pact countries. December _1982 _ _ 15. :-The Allies recognize that mutually advantageous trade with the East on commercially sound terms contributes to con- structive"East-West relations:--At the same time'they_agtee that bilatera~_economic-and trade relations with t}ie Soviet Union and Eastern Europe must also be-consistent with their---_ broad security concerns which include the avoidance of con- tributing to Soviet military _.strength. Studies are underway or will soon be undertaken on several aspects of East-West eco- nomic relations and Ministers will consider these issues again, on the basis of these studies, at their next meeting (1). 15. The linisters note that since:theiz last meeting . several aspects of East-West economic-relations have been -- studied including the security implications of these~re- lations. Trade conducted on the-basis of commercially .sound terms and mutual advantage, that avoida.prefezential treat- ment of the Soviet Union, contributes to constructive East-West relations. At the same time, bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union and the courtrias ~,f E~c>~e~.. Euro e mu t - p s re _ maim consistent with broad Allied security concerns. These - "_ include idi _avo ng _dependence on the Soviet Union, or contribu- ting to Soviet military capablitie6. Thus, development of Western energy resources should be encouraged In order t ' . o avoid further-use by the Soviet Union of soae'forms of trade to _ enhance its military strength, the Allies will-remain vigilant in their continuing review of the security aspects of East-West econmic relations. This work will assist Allied governments in the conduct of their policies in this field. (1) (1) Greece recalled.its position on various aspects _o? this? "--- paragraph. _ Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 Tab 4 May, 1982 . 44. Ministers recognized the value of different aspects of the work of the Organization on East-West economic relations, and agreed that their interrelations should be considered further within the Organization. 22.__ Pollowing a decision taken by Ministers last year, the Organization has carried out a thorough economic analysis of the evolution of trade and financial relations with the USSR and other Eastern European countries. Ministers noted that - these relations have, with some exceptions, evolved in a._leaa-- d~rnamic waX-Shan those with -more market-oriented economies and not met earlier. expectations. =- `= ' - -~- - - -- -- 23. This purely economic analysis demon6tiates that East-West-bade and credit 'f lows should be guided by the indications of the market:-- In~the light-of these-indications, Governments should. exercise financial prudence without grant- ing preferential treatment. Ministers recognized, moreover, that practices connected with the state-trading System of centrally planned economies can create problems which need to be kept under close examination within the Organization. Mose generally,they agreed that, in. the light of changing circum- stances, the Organization should continue to review East-West IEA Stateaent on Gas Security 9. Ministers agreed that gas has an important role to play in reducing dependence on imported oil. They also agreed, how- ever, on the importance of avoiding the development of situ- ations in which imports of gas could weaken zatt-er than strengthen the energy supply security and thus the overall economic stability of Member countries. They noted the poten- tial risks associated with high levels of dependence on single supplier countries. Ministers stressed the importance of ex- peditious development of indigenous OECD energy resources. _ ted - - They no that exi sting contracts are currently insufficient to cover expected gas demand-by-the nid=1490s.-and.-agreed that- in f~Yling-this--gap -steps- should be taken to ensure_~hat_ no=one producer is-in~a position to exercise,monopoly power over OECD and IElk countries= To obtain the advantages of .increased .use of gas an an acceptably secdie_basis, they agreed ghat:. ---- =- their countries would seek to avoid undue dependence on any one-source of gas imports and to obtain future gas supplies from secure sources, with emphasis on indigenous OECD sources. Additional supplies-from-other sources would _ --be obtained from as diverse sources as possible?_taking.___ into account supply structures, the share of gas-in energy balances, and the geographical situation of individual countries. In assessing the full costs of gas supply sources, gas companies and, as appropriate, governments _will-consider security factors; _- - _ - their Governments would either encourage gas companies- --~ and other undertakings concerned to taxe or take themselves -- -the-necessary and appropriate cost-effective measures suited to each country's situation to strengthen their ability to deal with supply disruptions; these measures could include increased gas storage facilities, contingency demand restraint programs, improved fuel-switching capabil- ities accompanied by adeguatc dta.^k? o`, c?il or other alter- i nat ve fuels, a more flexible grid structure, greater flexibility of contracts, more surge-capacity, measures to accelerate infra-OECD trade on short notice through standby` contracts for supplies. in a djsruption, and interruptible contracts with consumers; - action should be taken to develop at economic cost indi- genous gas resources, particularly in North America and the North Sea, which show promise of alleviating overall or particular pressures on energy imports; Approved For Release 2011/01/31 :CIA-RDP85-011568000200220006-6 - concerned member governments noting the potential for further development of North American gas resources and noting that part of the Norwegian Troll field nay be de- clared commercial by 1984, would encourage their companies to begin negotiations on deliveries from these sources as soon as possible, with a view to making supplies available at prices competitive with other fuels in the mid-1990s; -'- trade-barriers--and-other-barrierQ=which could-delay_ ~- .- --development-b#--indigenous gas resources should be avoided or reduced- ` - their`governments--+ould encouz?!ge tt*e companies concerned `- to undertake feasibility studies, if appropriate in-cooper-_ .ation with member governments, to determine the economic, engineering, technical and financial factors. relevant to. possible imports-from a variety of non-OECD sources; ` - governments within one region where there is scope for effective coopezatiort should invite gas companies operating irr their jurisdictions to-address and negotiate on a com- mercial basis cooperative arrangements to meet a disruption of supplies to any one country or to the region as a whole; - special attention should be given in the annual country review process in various international organizations to the future pattern of--gas supplies, to the progress on the development and implementation of security measures, and to whether gas imports into the OECD from any single source constitute such-a proportion of total supplies as-to give rise to concern about the timely development of indigenous resources and ?~he vulnerability of supplies, either for an individual Member country or-collectively; - in considering the degree of vulnerability, relevant. factors include the -share of impc;st3 in te>La1 gas - -_ consumption ahd_ in-total primary- energy require~ents,- the supplies, secforal distribution, stocks-and fuel=switching - poasibilities; -- - - - an in-depth exchange of views about this question would take place within the normal review process whenever con- sidered necessary. To allow a full assessment of its - energy situation, the country concerned shall inform the other member states if it plane major changes in its energy policy or gas supply pattern which are significant in the context of development of indigenous OECD resources and vulnerability of gas supplies; -?~ Ministers expressed the view that special attention should be given in relevant international organizations to the gas im- port situation of individual countries and regions. IEA Ministers instructed the Governing Board to keep this issue under continuing reivew.