NEW TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-01156R000100130005-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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NEW TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Although Summit countries may not be ready to launch a new
round of trade negotiations now, we want to promot; an interest
Von trade with LDCs in negotiations in a few years.'
II. ESSENTIAL FACTS
The expansion of world trade and the health of the
international financial system require growth in LDC exports
and increased demand by LDCs for the goods and services of
developed countries and other LDCs. Although some LDCs may
need to limit import growth temporarily as part of their
balance of payments adjustment efforts, the success of those
adjustment efforts and the sustained recovery of the world
economy depend upon the further liberalization of this trade.
In the GATT Ministerial, the US and Switzerland proposed
a special North/South round aimed at MFN liberalization by LDCs
in return for preferential access to developed country markets
in addition to existing GSP. Most of the other developed
nations, with the exception of the Germans, Dutch, and Swedes,
were reluctant to endorse this until the strength of Western
economic recovery was more apparent. The US task is to keep
Summit countries' attention focused on the need to keep their
markets open to LDC exports and to launch a process at the
appropriate time for developed countries and LDCs to exchange
liberalization commitments.
Criticism: How can we expect high-debt LDCS to make
mutual trade concessions in the foreseeable future?
Response: Even if negotiations were launched today, it
would be several years before LDC concessions would be
implemented. Concessions from high-debt LDCs would have to be
consistent with their balance of payment situations.
Criticism: How does the US GSP renewal proposal fit with
this line of thinking?
Response: Our proposal for GSP renewal is an important
step in liberalizing N/S trade. It offers advanced LDCs an
opportunity to negotiate for a greater degree of preferential
access than they enjoy under the existing system. The mid-
level and least developed beneficiaries will keep existing or
expanded unilateral GSP benefits. Since GSP is limited in
product coverage, duration and extent of preferences, long-term
mutual liberalization'will require broader multilateral efforts.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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Today almost all nations view high technology industries
s critical to .thei.r.national security. A broad rige of inter-
entionist policy instruments has been adopted by zany foreign
?governments to protect and foster indigenous high-technology
:sectors. We are concerned that these policies, unrestrained,
may splinter global markets and reduce the pace of innovation.
II. ESSENTIAL FACTS
Growth in high technology world trade has been rapid,
increasing from $25 billion to $500 billion in two decades.
However, the US relative share of this trade has been declining.
At Versailles, the French-led initiative on high technol-
ogy, which endorsed government intervention, was diverted to
the preparation of a report on Technology Growth and Employment
which recommends, among other things, that "an open and compet-
itive trading system...must be strengthened." You have com-
mended President Mitterrand on the completion of this report.
In May 1982, the US succeeded in launching a study of
high technology problems and related governmental policies in
the OECD. The US proposed a study of the special trade problems
of the high technology sector at the November Ministerial level
meeting of the parties to the GATT, which was approved in April.
Multilateralism, the foundation upon which US trade policy
is constructed, and the GATT are the best hopes for fostering
and maintaining an open and equitable trading system. The sup-
port of ongoing work programs in the GATT and the OECD directed
toward understanding and addressing the problems of the future
in trade in high technology goods and of potentially conflicting
government industrial policies can be beneficial to all.
III. KEY POINTS
Criticism: The US is ahead in high technology due to the
DOD and large internal market, while we must support this
critical area by direct government action to catch up.
Response: The US admits that a robust high-tech sector
is a matter of priority to all; however, policies of unlimited
governmental intervention will not result in healthy interna-
tional competition among private firms, but inter-government
rivalry that will fractionate markets, slow the development of
.new technologies and their international application, increase
internal costs and be destructive of the open trading system.
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TECHNOLOGY, EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
I. ISSUE
How the Summit should endorse the report on echnology,
Employment and Growth commissioned at Versailles.
II. ESSENTIAL FACTS
In response to Mitterrand's initiative at Versailles, a
Working Group was set up to study how international cooperation
in science and technology could stimulate economic growth and
employment. The group produced a report describing the histori-
cal contributions of technology to growth, the future potential
for stimulating sustained economic recovery, and suggested poli-
cies to further international cooperation in 19 areas. The US
is lead country in 6 projects, among which are solar system ex-
ploration, nuclear fusion and high energy technology, and
endorses our efforts in lowering trade barriers and guarding
against transfer of sensitive technologies to Eastern Bloc
nations.
The Group's report was endorsed by all Heads and published
in March. There have been meetings to get the projects under-
way and and the Working Group met again in early May to review
progress on them. Their final report is attached. There is
agreement that the Summit should take note of the report and
endorse implementation of the technology projects. There is
further agreement that there is no need to report to future
summits. The French may push for a higher profile treatment of
the report, but we recommend it simply be acknowledged as
supportive of the economic and trade objectives of the Summit.
-- We welcome the study and the initiation of cooperation
on the projects which have been developed from it.
-- It remains important to stress the critical importance
of removing barriers to ensure open markets for trade in high
technology products, while guarding against transfer of
sensitive technology to our adversaries.
-- We recommend that in our communique we acknowledge the
report and endorse its collaborative projects.
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RESULTS OF THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT WORKING GROUP
ON TECHNOLOGY, GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT
MEETING OF MAY 2-3, 1983
;Government and Ministries welcomed this report on technology,
:growth and employment as a useful, additional dimension to, the
continuing Summit process. Reactions by Parliaments, the
public, the scientific community and the press have been gen-
erally positive.
. The Working group reviewed the reactions-to ids report
hich was published on March 25, 1983. Heads of Sate and
The Group also reviewed the progress of the 18 projects
in the Report. Some of these have already forged ahead strong-
ly; others are still in the detailed planning stages. In all
cases further meetings of interested participants have been, or
are being, planned.
The Working Group also considered how its report could be
discussed at the Williamsburg Summit and how to ensure continued
implementation of the projects. Following are its recommenda-
tions and suggestions to the Sherpas of the Summit countries':
At the Summit: In the context of their overall economic
objectives, the heads of State and Government could take note
of the Working Group's activity and report, and endorse imple-
mentation of the projects and the need for enhanced interna-
tional cooperation. They could also note the importance of
technology to developing countries as well as industrialized
nations, and provide for their access to the projects follow-
ing their initial implementation among the Summit countries.
Follow-up after the Williamsburg Summit: Heads of State
and Government could recommend that the host country for future
summits organize informal meetings of this group to review pro-
gress on the projects for cooperation, encourage their imple-
mentation, and ensure continued policy-level oversight and
coordination as work proceeds.
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SERVICES
We will want to discuss the development of international
rules for trade in services.
:_II. ESSENTIAL FACTS
The service sectors (banking, insurance, telecommunica-
tions, transportation) offer some of the most dynamic export
opportunities-among the OECD countries, but a variety of
foreign barriers limits exports of services.
Practically all of the 20 million new jobs created in the
US in the past 10 years have been in the service sectors. Net
job creation during the same period in Europe has been zero.
The Europeans have not emphasized services and have failed to
develop any meaningful export base in these areas.
Services are not covered by the GATT. The US is urging
its trading partners to discuss ways to establish a set of
international disciplines that will liberalize trade. France,
Italy and the EC oppose these efforts because they believe that
resolving traditional trade problems of manufactures and
agriculture should have priority.
III. KEY POINTS
Criticism: Efforts at liberalization of services would
assist the US but have less relevance for most other countries.
Response: Services are basically strong in all the
developed countries because of their knowledge base. Every
developed country stands to gain from liberalization because of
the significant new employment it would generate and the close
relationship to overall competitiveness.
Criticism: Services may be a good idea for the future,
but we must first resolve existing problems in manufactures and
agriculture before we tackle such a complicated problem.
Response: The services issue will require years of
discussion and negotiation which is why work must begin now.
We do not have to sacrifice our efforts in the goods area to
examine services problems; they can operate in parallel.
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AGRICULTURE
I. ISSUE
The US should reinforce efforts to obtain the European
.Community's (EC) commitment to limit use of agricultural export
tiate a: strengthening of .the. GATT rules on+agriculiral trade.
"II. ESSENTIAL FACTS
The CAP guarantees high prices to farmers, encouraging ex-
cess production. Export prices can be lowered to world levels
only by subsidies. Subsidies of this size cause major distor-
tions in world trade and disadvantage competitive exporters
(e.g. the US). The EC is now second to the US in farm exports.
Because the CAP depends on export subsidies to dispose of
its surplus, the EC has resisted efforts to tighten agricultural
trade rules. To counter these subsidies in third markets, the
US seeks to limit the use of export subsidies by changing world
trade rules, retaliates with actions such as subsidized flour
sales to Egypt, and attempts bilateral dialogue with the EC.
The US has taken unprecedented steps to curb production
and has endeavored to act responsibly in the international
area. Congressional concern about EC subsidies may result in a
legislatively-mandated US countersubsidy program, which could
damage our bilateral relationship and the world trading system.
We do not challenge the CAP, a cornerstone of European
unity, and we recognize the political difficulties for the EC
in this area. But the destructive potential of an escalating
trans-Atlantic dispute over agricultural trade is great and the
time we have to deal constructively with the problem is short.
Criticism: Current GATT rules permit export subsidies
for primary agricultural products under certain conditions.
Response: The commitment to an open and liberal trading
system should include strengthening the GATT rules on agricul-
tural export subsidies and other unfair practices. Although
current rules allow export subsidies on primary agricultural
products, we need to work together over time to minimize the
trade and resource distorting effects of these practices.
Criticism: The US also has a large, costly farm program.
Response: This argument is irrelevant. Most nations
support domestic agriculture. The issue with the EC is export
subsidies, not the size of, respective domestic support programs.
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INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ISSUES
Sharp declines in commodity export earnings have cut
deeply into the incomes of many LDCs. They seek corrective
initiatives such as additional price stabilization agreements
wand augmented . compensatory. financing. Some Summitartners
(e.g., France and FRG) may urge US cooperation in- hes.e schemes.
;II. ESSENTIAL FACTS
Non-fuel commodity prices fell 25% between 1980 (a high
price year) and 1982. Some recovery is occurring but these
prices are likely to remain soft. LDCs want new price-raising
commodity agreements, new concessional credit lines inside and
outside the IMF to offset the decline in export receipts, and
improved access to world markets. All will be important issues
at UNCTAD VI. Our Summit partners agree that quick-fix commod-
ity agreements are inappropriate. Canada sometimes supports US
general opposition to suggested measures, but often takes coop-
erative attitudes toward LDCs. The Japanese give some support
to LDC positions, particularly when ASEAN's interests are at
stake. The UK often sides with the US in preferring to avoid
market disruptive policies and large resource transfer programs.
Criticism (France and Italy): US opposition to new price-
stabilizing agreements contributes to polarization of N/S rela-
tions. More flexibility would help defuse LDC confrontational
positions, and contribute to market stability for commodities.
Response: The recession in industrial countries is the
major cause of low commodity prices. The emerging recovery has
arrested the decline. Restrictive agreements which promote
inefficiency in market allocation will only postpone the neces-
sary adjustments to changing world market conditions. US poli-
cy has been positive: we have resisted protectionism, adopted
GSP, proposed a N/S trade round, agreed to an increase in IMF
resources, participated actively in commodity discussions, and
taken steps to help manage the current debt problems of LDCs.
Criticism (UK, France, FRG): The US has opposed propo-
sals for easier LDC access to the IMF's Compensatory Financing
Facility (CFF) and has refused to discuss in UNCTAD the need to
.complement IMF resources through a new facility outside the IMF.
Response: Export earnings stabilization is essentially a
balance of payments (BP) issue which can be dealt with best in
the IMF in the context of overall BP financing. The IMF will
review the CFF in June and will decide at that time whether
changes in the CFF are necessary. A new multinational institu-
tion to complement IMF's efforts would be counterproductive.
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ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)
AND OTHER OFFICIAL CREDITORS
We should try to obtain endorsement.of the I*'.s.role in
dealing with current balance of payments and debt V_roblems, urge
imely ratification of the agreement to bolster IMF resources
;through the increase in quotas and enlargement of the General
Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and encourage closer cooperation
among major countries in responding to financial emergencies.
II. ESSENTIAL FACTS
The IMF is the key institution in international efforts to
ensure continued availability of official financing on a scale
sufficient to enable debtor countries to adopt orderly adjust-
ment measures. Agreement has been reached on an increase in IMF
resources, including a 47% increase in quota subscriptions (to
$99 billion) and a revision/expansion of the GAB to deal with
systemic threats. The US and other countries are currently
seeking the necessary legislative authority to implement the
resource increase by November 30, 1983. Additionally, monetary
authorities of the major countries, in cooperation with the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS), have provided short-term
bridge financing to some countries in. situations involving
system-wide dangers to tide them over during negotiations with
the IMF and other creditors. Discussions are taking place to
develop an early-warning system of emerging debt problems and
to provide a more organized mechanism of responding to
emergency financing needs which threaten the system.
III. KEY POINTS
Criticism: Summit countries strongly support the IMF's
efforts but France and possibly Canada, Italy, and the EC may
argue for increasing IMF financing and easing the economic
policy conditions on use of IMF resources.
Response: IMF financing may ease adjustment burdens but
does not remove borrowers' needs to put their houses in order.
The key to IMF success is the ability to promote sound policies.
Criticism: France may ask IMF allocation of Special
Drawing Rights (SDR) (an international reserve asset) to
provide extra financing for LDCs.
Response: We are prepared to consider SDR allocation on
the merits but remain concerned about the potential impact on
inflation expectations and on Congressional support for IMF
legislation. We want to avoid arousing LDC expectations.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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? ROLE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
Commercial bank lending to less developed countries (LDCs)
.is larger than that of all other lenders combined.:. Continued
commercial bank lending to LDCs with IMF adjustment programs is
vital if adjustment programs.are to succeed. In recent months,
some commercial_.banks,.both.US..and foreign, have sought to limit.
?~or reduce their lending to troubled borrowers. Regulatory
..proposals in the US probably will have the effect of further
restraining many banks' willingness to increase foreign lending.
II. ESSENTIAL FACTS
As a matter of policy, the USG does not attempt to
influence the specific lending of individual banks. We feel
banks must be responsible for their own judgments; if the
lending decisions are poor, the banks will suffer reduced
profits and potential or actual losses. In shaping its
adjustment programs, the IMF has required commercial banks to
increase exposure in Mexico (by $5 billion), Brazil (by $4.5
billion), Argentina (about $1.5 billion), and Yugoslavia (about
$600 million). This already accounts for about half the total
estimated new commercial bank lending to non-OPEC LDCs in 1983.
Criticism: Will this mean that bank lending will
continue to be excessive?
Response: Some slowdown in'the rate of growth of inter-
national lending is expected in the context of reduced interest
rates, lower inflation, slack economic conditions, heightened
prudential considerations, and ongoing adjustment efforts in
borrowing countries. Exposure in LDCs relative to bank capital
might decrease.
Criticism: Should official creditors let banks decrease
exposure?
Response: No, the burden of new and rescheduled lending
should be fair to all participants.
Criticism: The US should urge its banks to increase net
lending, both to assure against a financial collapse and to
preserve the role of private finance in LDCs.
Response: We are willing to make general statements to
encourage new lending, but prefer not to twist arms on specific
cases. Our banks have, in fact, cooperated in many tough cases
and we believe they are fully aware of their responsibilities
and where their long-term interests lie.
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THE MUUILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK!(MDBs) AND
THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT SSO )
Other Summit countries are concerned that we;will not be
able to complete our IDA VI contribution in FY84. This would
eopardize the projected July start of IDA VII. Iraddition,
he World Bank (IBRD).and LDCs.appear to have unrea;,listic expec-
'.?ations regarding the size of IDA VII. Some Summit countries
may also support an increase in the IBRD's lending program.
II. ESSENTIAL FACTS
IDA VI originally covered the 3-year FY81-83 period. US
funding was later spread over 4 years. Administration assurance
to complete IDA VI funding by FY84 caused others to provide $2B
more for FY84. $1,340M is needed to complete our contribution.
Versailles called for early IDA VII negotiations. Begun
in November 1982, they are clouded by uncertain US IDA VI
funding. The IBRD has asked for unrealistic IDA VII funding.
There is growing support among IBRD members for an
increase in the $60 billion FY82-86 IBRD lending program.
III. KEY POINTS
Criticism: The US is not providing adequate financial
support for the MDBs, particularly IDA.
Response: We are strongly committed to all the MDBs.
FY83 subscriptions and contributions totaled $3.65 billion,
including callable capital.
IDA funding is a special problem. There has been strong
Congressional opposition to the IDA VI agreement. We have
requested a $245M FY83 supplemental. This, plus the $l,095M
FY84 request, will complete the US contribution. Congressional
approval of full IDA VI funding by FY84 will be difficult.
The impact of any US IDA VI shortfall on the timing of US
participation in IDA VII depends on the size of the shortfall.
At this time, we still expect to participate in FY85.
IDA VII funding will probably be scarce. It is important
not to have unrealistic expectations. We must be careful not to
overstate the importance of IDA to LDC economic recovery. Sus-
tained OECD growth, maintenance of an open world trading system,
and pursuit of appropriate LDC domestic policies are paramount.
The $60 billion FY82-86 IBRD lending program will be
adequate provided IBRD resource allocation is more effective.
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INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
To convince the Summit countries of the urgent need to
reaffirm support for nondiscriminatory treatment of investment
.and to achieve greater global consensus to address investment
roblems -- especially government interventionist: actices
hich distort or restrict investment and trade flo*.
II. ESSENTIAL FACTS
As the world economic system improves over the next
several years, growth prospects will pick up in both developed
and developing countries, but capital availability will be a
significant constraint on recovery. A key US goal is to
encourage the Summit countries to reaffirm and extend their
commitment to the principles of nondiscrimination embodied in
the 1976 OECD investment instruments, especially the national
treatment principle (the principle that foreign investors
should be treated no less favorably than domestic investment in
like situations). Some developed countries, such as Canada and
France, though nominally committed to national treatment, have
adopted policies which discriminate against foreign investors.
For the developing countries, planned levels of official
development assistance and private credit flows are expected to
fall short of expanding needs. Private investment can pick up
some of the slack. LDCs seem to recognize this but many are
unwilling to commit themselves to policies which would provide
a stable framework for investment.. The Summit countries' should
encourage developing countries to adopt liberal domestic
economic policies which will encourage investment flows, and
explore multilateral means of.achieving the same objective.
Criticism: Developed countries are open to investment.
Response: Generally yes, but serious problems remain re
treatment of investment, entry barriers, and disincentives. All
need to be addressed in the OECD and bilaterally. We should re-
sist pressure from the OECD to deviate from national treatment.
Criticism: The developing countries oppose efforts to
reach global understandings on investment.
Response: This is a shortsighted view. Investment flows
to developing, especially the poorest, countries are clearly
insufficient for their needs. The advanced developing coun-
tries have an increasing stake in maintaining a healthy global
investment system, and must share the responsibility for this.
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BILATERAL AID
Many less developed countries (LDCs) face large balance
of payments deficits resulting from worldwide recession, weak
demand and low commodity prices, inappropriate ecoWmic poli-
ces, and large debt servicing requirements. A-ma'r concern
is how the international community can help these countries
-~address.their economic problems and reestablish a viable
"economic position and economic growth. Summit participants may
wish to explore the possible role of bilateral assistance
programs in assisting this adjustment process; currently most
bilateral programs emphasize long term project assistance.
II. ESSENTIAL-FACTS
The US believes that the reestablishment of non-
inflationary economic growth in the developed world is central
to the long term performance of the LDCs. We also believe that
the IMF is the primary institution to assist the LDCs in their
effort to address their immediate balance of payments problem.
We continue to believe that our bilateral economic assistance
program should be primarily focused on addressing the long-term
development problems of these countries.
Criticism: In light of the serious balance of payments
problems of the LDCs, should donors provide more assistance in
program form rather than project form?
Response: While in specific circumstances we have pro-
vided liberal balance of payments assistance, generally in con-
junction with the IMF, we believe our bilateral program should
continue to focus on longer term problems of development.
Our bilateral assistance program emphasizes four basic
elements: promotion of an increased reliance on market forces
and the utilization of private initiative; development of the
infrastructure necessary for long-term development; encourage-
ment of sound economic policies; and assistance to increase the
LDCs capacity to obtain, develop and adapt technology.
Criticism: How can donors increase the effectiveness of
their assistance efforts, particularly in Africa?
Response: Increased coordination among donors reduces
chances of donors working at cross purposes. The recent efforts
for Kenya and Sudan, which have included the adoption of a
leadership role by a major donor, represent a useful approach.
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DEBT PROBLEMS OF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES
The decline in oil prices is creating serious financial
difficulties for some LDC oil exporters, particulalzly Mexico,
Venezuela and Nigeria. This has caused loss of badness for
11,fisome Summit country exporters and arrears on debt-Vervice
':payments to Summit country banks.
II. ESSENTIAL FACTS
Mexico, alone among the oil exporters, has debt of such
magnitude that serious aggravation of its present problems
could pose a threat to the stability of the world financial and
trade systems. Mexico has undertaken an IMF stabilization
program supported by a package of financial assistance. World
recovery should help Mexican economic and debt servicing
prospects, and creditor cooperation should prevent a new crisis.
Elsewhere in Latin America, Peru also has IMF-supported
economic programs in place. Ecuador is negotiating.a program
and Venezuela may seek one. These countries sharply reduced
imports last year, adversely affecting some US exporters.
There may be further cuts this year.
In Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia had strong balance of
payments positions at the beginning of 1982 and have recently
undertaken strong adjustment measures.
In Africa, Nigeria has yet to take significant actions
and may encounter serious financing problems before year end.
Private bank exposure is $64 billion in Mexico, $27 bil-
lion in Venezuela, $8 billion in Indonesia and $7 billion in
Nigeria.
III. KEY POINTS
Criticism: Reduced imports and debt service payments
threaten Summit country exporters and the banking system.
Response: Economic gains to oil importers from cheaper
oil should outweigh oil-exporter losses. Nevertheless, the
problems of oil exporters will need careful attention. Summit
countries need to encourage continued adjustment by these.
formerly prosperous LDCs. The Summit countries need to provide
adequate private and official financing, maintain open trade
with the LDCs, and achieve long-run non-inflationary growth to
help reduce interest rates even further.
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DEBT RESTRUCTURING
Some question whether special forms of debt relief are
necessary to keep major borrowers from repudiating.. interna-
tional debt or to prevent failure of the world financial system.
I. ESSENTIAL FACTS
The US has a broad-based strategy to deal with interna-
tional debt problems. It includes all key participants -- LDC
borrowers and governments, governments in the developed world,
commercial banks and the IMF. The strategy has five key parts:
-- Most important is effective adjustment in borrowing
countries. While they must take steps immediately to put their
economies back on a stable course, this adjustment will take a
number of years to complete to be orderly and effective.
-- The continued availability of official balance of
payments financing on a scale sufficient to help see troubled
borrowers through this adjustment period. Since the key
institution for this purpose is the IMF, it is urgent that
Congress enact the proposed increase in IMF resources.
-- The willingness of governments and central banks in
lending countries to act quickly to respond to debt emergencies,
but only in extraordinary circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
-- Continued commercial bank lending to countries that
are pursuing sound adjustment programs.
-- Resumption of economic, growth and maintenance of an
open trading system so that borrowers will be able to increase
exports and improve their balance of payments positions.
Criticism: This strategy seems overly optimistic.
Response: Existing strategy has a reasonable chance for
success. The near term may be turbulent and there may be unex-
pected problems. Assuming resumption in world growth, medium
term chances for improving debtor financial positions are good.
Criticism: Can we take more direct action?
Response: There are no quick fixes. All such proposals
have major flaws which would deter needed adjustment in borrow-
ing countries, serve to reduce commercial bank financing, and
ultimately put more of the risk on the US taxpayer.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85-01156R000100130005-8
 CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85-01156R000100130005-8
DEBT SERVICE RATIOS OF KEY LDCS
This chart shows interest payments plus amortization of long and
medium-term debt as a percent of exports of goods and services.
Country
. P .cent
Argentina
Y01
Bangladesh
less than 1
Brazil
79
Chile
64
Colombia
33
Guatemala
22
India
9
Israel
35
Ivory Coast
41
Jordan
8
Korea
18
Mexico
66
Morocco
42
Pakistan
15
Peru
63
Philippines
32
Singapore
less than 1
Syria
18
Taiwan
7
Thailand
21
Tunisia
14
Zaire
63
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP85-01156R000100130005-8