TERRORISM REVIEW (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-01095R000100170002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 15, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER RL F COPY
Terrorism Review
GI TR 84-024
15 November 1984
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Secret
1 Focus-Iranian Terrorist Threat Remains High
3 Highlights
Terrorism Review I I 25X1
Death in Guatemala City
21 Terrorism in Colombia and Prospects for Peace
27 Chilean Terrorists Up the Ante
29 Chronology of Terrorism-1984
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor
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This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence.
Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other
agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication.
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Terrorism Review) 25X1
Focus Iranian Terrorist Threat Remains High
Although Iranian-backed terrorists did not attempt any attacks in the days
preceding the 6 November US elections, the threat they pose to US interests in the
Middle East, particularly in Lebanon, remains high. The terrorists may have been
forced to postpone their attacks because of increased security at US facilities. Iran
and its surrogates, however, remain committed to eliminating US influence in the
Middle East. We therefore believe that Shia extremists will continue to target US
facilities in Lebanon and possibly other parts of the Middle East. F-1
Several threats issued by persons claiming to represent the Islamic Jihad early this
month indicated that Iranian-backed terrorists were planning attacks on US and
Allied interests in the near future:
? On 4 November, a Lebanese radiobroadcast claimed the Islamic Jihad had
threatened to conduct a surprise attack against the United States and its allies
before 6 November.
? Also on 4 November, an anonymous caller to a foreign news agency claimed the
Islamic Jihad would strike a "hard blow" against US interests in the Middle
East very soon. The caller added that the Islamic Jihad would attack the US
Navy and specifically warned that, "if we cannot prevent the reelection of Mr.
Reagan, we shall inevitably prevent him from completing his second term of
office."
? On 5 November, a caller claiming to represent the Islamic Jihad indicated the
group would attack any Lebanese officials who participate in the troop
withdrawal talks with Israel.
? Also on 5 November, spokesmen for the Hizballah-elements of which we
believe use Islamic Jihad as a covername-published an article that labeled the
negotiations with Israel "sacrilege" and called for a "holy struggle" to eliminate
Israel.F_1
As the September bombing of the US Embassy Annex indicated, attacks by the
radical Shias can occur with little or no warning. The Hizballah in Lebanon and
Iranian-backed groups in the Persian Gulf and possibly elsewhere may believe that
new US targets of opportunity will emerge as heightened security measures taken
prior to the US elections are gradually relaxed. Local security services responsible
for protecting US facilities beyond the limited area controlled by American
personnel may be unable or unwilling to devote special attention to US needs
indefinitely. The terrorists' primary target in Lebanon probably is still the US
1 Secret
GI TR 84-024
15 November 1984
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Ambassador's residence in Yarze. The original Hizballah plan for a suicide vehicle
bombing against the residence could be replaced by other types of operations, such
as suicide attacks with explosives-laden aircraft, or a commando-style raid. We
have not, however, seen much credible evidence of Hizballah capabilities to
conduct such attacks at present.
If continued high security in Lebanon denies the terrorists any attractive targets
there, Iranian-backed terrorists may target other US facilities and personnel in the
Middle East. The "surprise" referred to in the 4 November Islamic Jihad threat
suggests that attacks outside Lebanon may be planned. In addition, an Iranian
radio commentary marking the fifth anniversary of the takeover of the US
Embassy in Tehran encouraged similar attacks on US Embassies elsewhere=
We believe the most likely alternative targets for attacks would be US in Kuwait,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or Cyprus. Iran could use either local Shia collaborators or its
other operatives in these countries to conduct such attacks. While the terrorists
undoubtedly would like to conduct spectacular bombings against official US
facilities as they have in the past, smaller scale armed attacks or kidnapings of
vulnerable US officials also are a serious possibility. Nonofficial US interests, such
as corporate facilities or unprotected private citizens, may offer softer targets that
would nevertheless allow the terrorists to maintain their pressure on the United
States. F - - - I
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Highlights
Correction: Libya Not Targeting US Ambassador
We have learned that the information concerning an alleged Libyan plot to kill the
US Ambassador to Sudan, described in this space in our last issue, was entirely
fabricated. The story is groundlessF_~
West Germany Red Army Faction Buildup Continues?
A number of recent events indicate that the RAF may be planning a terrorist
attack in the near future. Several persons on the federal police watchlist of
suspected and potential terrorists have disappeared in recent months, suggesting
they may have joined the hardcore underground. Imprisoned RAF members are
preparing to stage a hunger strike. Two cars were recently stolen from a rental
agency in Mannheim by a woman associated with the RAF. At least one of the
cars was used by the two men who robbed 22 handguns from a gunshop in
Maxdorf, near Mannheim, on 5 November. They also took a large quantity of
ammunition.)
Documents discovered at the time of the arrests of six RAF terrorists in Frankfurt
last summer indicated that the group had advanced plans for terrorist attacks.
Among the documents was a strategy paper calling for a hunger strike of RAF
prisoners to take place as a political action in parallel with attacks against US
military and NATO installations. The RAF has a history of stubbornly adhering
to its plans even when it knows the authorities have discovered them.
Arrests Interrupt Urban Terrorist Comeback
A monthlong counterterrorist operation by Turkish security forces in Istanbul
netted several dozen members of two urban terrorist groups, the Marxist-Leninist
Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU) and the Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol). After
three years of low activity, the two groups were believed responsible for a number
of bomb attacks in Istanbul during August and September against private
businesses, government buildings, and several branch offices of Turkey's ruling
party. In addition, Turkish security forces were concerned that the virulently anti-
American MLAPU might have been preparing an attack against US personnel
and property in reprisal for the mid-October sentencing of 22 of the group's
members to death. F_~
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The arrests demonstrate that Turkish security forces, although unable to
exterminate these urban terrorist groups, are nevertheless capable of neutralizing
terrorist efforts to regain lost momentum. The operation against MLAPU
uncovered material for making explosives, but Tayfun Bilgin-the group's
explosives expert and one of its top leaders, who had been thought to be outside the
country-evaded capture. F-~
Significant Developments
Civil Airliner Hijacked to Iran
On 6 November a Saudia Airlines jet en route from London to Riyadh with 131
passengers and crewpersons was hijacked after a stopover in Jiddah. The two male
hijackers, believed to be North Yemenis, diverted the plane to Tehran. While on
the ground there, they were overpowered by the crew and passengers and arrested
by Iranian authorities.
The hijackers had demanded a ransom of $500,000, the payment of an equal sum
to North Yemen, assurance that Saudi Arabia would leave North Yemen alone,
and political asylum for themselves in Iran. Their fate is not known, but the crew
and passengers, including 12 Americans and 40 Britons, were returned safely to
Saudi Arabia. F--]
Court Approves Extradition of ETA Member to Spain
In Alajuela, the Superior Penal Court of Appeals authorized the extradition of
accused ETA operative Gregorio Jimenez to Spain, overturning a lower court
ruling that asserted the charges Jimenez faced in Spain were political. 0
The Appeals Court decision may be evidence of a stronger Costa Rican
Government posture against terrorism. On the other hand, since Jiminez is
suspected of involvement in a plot to assassinate Democratic Revolutionary
Alliance (ARDE) leader Eden Pastora in 1983, the decision may also reflect a
desire to avoid trying Jiminez in Costa Rica. Either way, retaliatory attacks by
ETA members or supporters are likely. F---]
political activists.
Terrorist Threat Used To Justify State of Siege
President Pinochet declared a 90-day state of siege on 6 November, claiming it
was needed to combat the recent wave of terrorism. The terrorist attacks included
a large number of bombings and resulted in some deaths. According to press
reports, the declaration was followed two days later by the arrest at the University
of Chile of at least 35 students protesting the declaration, and secret police raids in
Santiago and the southern city of Temuco that netted at least 25 labor and
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India
Pinochet's actions, although keyed to the need to respond to the recent surge of
terrorist attacks, also, allow him to restrict the activities of the democratic
opposition. The state of siege and several other measures, including the closure of
opposition publications and the banning of unauthorized meetings in the capital,
constitute the most sweeping political crackdown since Pinochet seized power in
his September 1973 coup. Although the measures initially may allow the
government to stop the escalating terrorist activity, their draconian nature will
further antagonize political moderates and might increase the support enjoyed by
the radicals.)-1
Shining Path Conducting Antielection Campaign
The Sendero Luminoso apparently has begun a campaign to disrupt voter
registration for the 1985 presidential election. On 26 and 27 October, two offices
of the National Elections Board (JNE) in Lima were attacked and the voting rolls
were burned. Eight persons were injured by bombs the terrorists threw as they
were leaving. In early November Sendero Luminoso terrorists killed 12
government officials at election registration centers in the central Peruvian towns
of Jivia and Jesus. Security forces arrested 11 suspects. The government has now
augmented police protection for JNE offices. F-]
We believe the recent attacks could be the opening salvo of a sustained effort to
derail the electoral process. Past police successes in penetrating the organization's
infrastructure in Lima, however, may indicate that the Sendero Luminoso will find
it difficult to sustain such a campaign in the capital,
.The Gandhi Assassination
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was shot to death on 31 October by two Sikh
members of her security force. One of the two attackers was killed and the other
seriously wounded by other guards. Although it is widely believed that Mrs.
Gandhi's assassination was the result of a Sikh conspiracy, and rumors of the
involvement of a Sikh army general are rife, there is as yet no evidence to suggest
that the shooting was anything more than an act of vengeance by the actors
concerned. The surviving assailant is still being questioned and may implicate
others. F-1
The immediate consequence of Mrs. Gandhi's death was a week of Hindu violence
against Sikhs, an event that may lead to a Sikh backlash and a cycle of terror such
as occurred in Punjab in 1982 and 1983. Communal frictions also surfaced
between Muslims and Hindus in Bombay earlier this year, and the Tamils of the
south have recently been restive. Mrs. Gandhi was willing to use the Army to
suppress outbreaks of communal violence, but it remains to be seen whether the
new Prime Minister, her son Rajiv, will be as firm.
Finally, there is some concern that further assassination attempts may be made,
perhaps against Rajiv or President Zail Singh, if some of the more radical Sikhs
feel emboldened by the attack on Mrs. Gandhi. But it may be that Sikh outrage
has played itself out in the murder of the leader who authorized the storming of
the Sikhs' Golden Temple last Junel
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Group Implicated in Bombings Poses Threat to Americans
In the wake of an apparently spontaneous outbreak of communal violence in
Jakarta last September and October, disturbing information has come to light
suggesting that a hitherto unknown terrorist group may have been behind the riots
and bombings. Of more direct import to the United States is a series of incidents
that indicates that this group may be targeting American personnel and facilities.
After rioting in the Tanjung Priok section of Jakarta on 12 September-which,
claimed as many as 150 lives-and a trio of anti-Chinese
bombings on 4 October that killed two and wounded 16, Indonesian police rounded
up hundreds of suspects. some of the detainees
claim to belong to "Solidaritas Islam," a recently established group that seeks to
overthrow the Indonesian Government by exploiting Muslim frustrations over
societal inequities. They admitted Solidaritas had planned to instigate mob
violence on 20 September, but instead took advantage of Muslim indignation to
help fuel the events of 12 September and then set off bombs in Chinese-owned
banks and businesses on 4 October. The group reportedly intends to set off more
bombs.
Subsequent to these events, several threats to US personnel and facilities from
Muslim fundamentalist extremists have surfaced. In mid-October, Indonesian
employees of the American Employees' Recreation Association Club were
observed with posters praising Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, which they claimed to
have obtained from the Iranian Embassy. On 5 November the US Embassy
received a letter signed by Solidaritas Islam threatening the Embassy with the
same sort of bombings experienced by the Chinese establishments. The same day,
an identical threat was telephoned to an apartment building housing several US
officials by a person who also pledged to bring an "Islamic Jihad" down on the
occupants. These were the first threats from extremist Islamic groups in Jakarta
since last March.l
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French Policy Toward
Extradition of Terrorists
The following has been adaptedfrom an evaluation
recently furnished by the US Embassy in Paris.
Some observers in both the Socialist and opposition
camps believed that the French Government's 23
September decision to extradite three Basques to
Spain would be a wedge leading to a major
breakthrough for future terrorism-related extradition
cases. A month after the decision, however, the
government's reluctance to generalize about
extradition or any other aspect of the terrorism
problem remains strong, and it is questionable
whether the government will be as forthcoming in
extraditing other accused terrorists in the coming
months.
It appears that the government made its late
September Basque extradition decision primarily
because it was backed into a corner by circumstances.
Judging from past practice, the French would have
preferred to support Spanish democracy and Spain's
battle against Basque terrorism in less forceful and
controversial ways. These extraditions caused severe
repercussions against French commercial interests in
Spain and significantly heightened the security
problem in French Basque country just prior to a
presidential trip.
A 1982 government policy statement on extradition
sets forth the basis for rejection of extradition on
political grounds while reaffirming French
cooperation on extradition for criminal cases. With
the Basque decision, the government has indeed
shown its willingness to extradite terrorists who carry
out political crimes of extreme violence. However, the
government has long avoided defining clear and
consistent principles for dealing with accused foreign
terrorists. For several reasons, the government
especially resists pronouncing anathemas on foreign
nationalist groups or lumping them together in policy
statements. Coldblooded calculators in the
government see no reason to court trouble by
confronting groups that have not focused on French
targets. Some also believe that the shifting tides of
international politics may eventually create conditions
where these groups will be useful to France. In
addition, some officials, while opposing terrorists'
methods, sympathize with particular grievances-or
at least recognize them as political problems that
should be resolved through negotiation.
In addition to these general considerations, the
extradition issue exerts specific pressures on the
government. Many a committed Socialist militant can
recite by rote a number of instances where violent
nationalist groups fighting against governments
claiming to be democratic won their struggles,
assumed power, and came to be regarded as
legitimate members of the world community. The
recent extradition of the three Basques went down
hard in many Socialist circles where the right of
asylum is a sacred principle. The government, in view
of the declining morale within the Socialist Party on
other issues, is reluctant to force-feed the faithful a
steady diet of such extraditions.
In the wake of the Basque extraditions, the French
press reported that Spain was submitting additional
extradition requests to France. These requests thus
far have generated only a faint grinding of teeth in
Paris. We cannot predict with certainty that the
government will maneuver to avoid further
extraditions, but official behavior recently appears
aimed at discouraging any ideas about automaticity.
We suspect that expulsions may remain a prime tool
for dealing with alleged Basque terrorists. The
prospects of extraditions to Italy appear particularly
discouraging. French officials have characterized
Italian extradition requests as poorly prepared and
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unrealistic. By this they apparently mean that the
Italians sometimes present membership in a terrorist
group as a sufficient reason for extradition, whereas
the French want to play down these "political"
aspects of the cases and concentrate on criminal
actions. We suspect, however, that even an Italian
dossier which demonstrated convincingly the
commission of a violent crime might run into trouble
with the French. Although government officials are
reluctant to say so specifically, some are uneasy as a
result of criticism in the French press of the Italian
judicial system.
In sum, we see the government as keeping open its
options on extradition. Justice and Interior Ministry
sources have said that future cases involving "political
criminals" might not evoke the same response as did
the Basque cases last September. We believe, the
French Government will strive to avoid placing itself
in a position of automatic approval on extradition
cases.
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Death in Guatemala City
A recent spate of assassinations in Guatemala City, at
least some of them politically related, reveals the
fragility of the process through which the country is
gradually returning to constitutional government. F-
Some of these killings may have been terrorist acts,
depending on the identities and motivations of the
murderers, which in most cases have yet to be
determined. This possibility is of some importance to
those of use who chronicle terrorist events; indeed, it
is the reason the murders are described in this
publication. In the context in which the killings
occurred, however, the question of whether or not they
were terrorist acts can be seen to be of little relevance.
Businessman Murdered
On 25 October prominent Guatemalan businessman
Freddy Sedri Calderon was found murdered, together
with his bodyguard. They had been kidnaped around
8 October by six armed men originally identified in
the press as police investigators. It now appears likely
that the two were killed after ransom negotiations
broke down between the Sedri family and the
kidnapers. Two persons have been arrested in
connection with the case.)
Party Leader Attacked
The Secretary General of the National Unity Front
(FUN), Gabriel Giron Ortiz, reported that, during the
early morning hours of 26 October, unknown persons
fired several shots at his house. Although no one was
hurt, Giron requested protection from government
security forces. F--]
National Assemblyman Assassinated
On 26 October Santos Hernandez, an Indian deputy
in the National Constituent Assembly representing
Quiche Department, was shot to death as he was
walking along a Guatemala City street. The
assailants, several men who arrived in two vehicles,
also killed his two bodyguards. Hernandez had been
elected to the assembly in July as a member of the
FUN but angered his party by subsequently
announcing that he was planning to switch to the
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(MLN).' Speculation over the identity of his killers
has been wide ranging:
? The FUN may have killed him because of his
intended defection.
? The MLN, which was planning a formal ceremony
to accept Hernandez into the party, may have killed
him to prevent him from reconsidering his defection,
as he was rumored to be doing.
? Business rivals may have killed him to break his 25X1
reported monopoly on transport in his home region.
? Extreme leftwing elements may have killed him to
embarrass the government.
Two Communist Professors Murdered
On 26 October National University of San Carlos
economics professor Carlos de Leon Guidel was shot
to death by unknown assailants as he drove home
from the university. The following day, the dean of
the economics faculty, Vitalino Giron Corado, was
shot to death as he stopped at a gas station while
driving to the funeral of de Leon. The assassins
arrived in two cars; those from one car pulled Mrs. 25X1
Giron away from her husband, while those from the
second car shot him.
A government statement about the murders implied
the two professors had been murdered by common
criminals, but it seems more likely they were either
killed by government security forces-de Leon had
previously been kidnaped and then released by
security personnel-or that they died as a
' FUN leader Giron then revealed that Hernandez was illiterate
and tried to take his place in the assembly, but the assembly voted
instead to let Hernandez keep his seat, saying he could serve as the
representative of the country's 4 million illiterates.)
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consequence of an internecine struggle in the
Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT). Both
were rumored to be members of the PGT Orthodox
Faction, and the university is currently in the throes
of a PGT-fomented labor dispute.n
The US Embassy fears that the deaths of the two
Communist professors indicate that the rector of the
university, Dr. Eduardo Meyer, is in extreme
jeopardy. Meyer, who refuses to use bodyguards, is
sometimes mentioned as a likely presidential
candidate. An attack against him would, in the
Embassy's view, be a major setback to the process of
returning Guatemala to constitutional government.
Moreover, according to the Embassy, in the past when
its members have been murdered, the PGT has
retaliated in kind. Thus the ground has been prepared
for a cycle of retaliatory assassinations. F7
US Peace Corps Volunteer Slain
On 28 October in Guatemala City, a US Peace Corps
volunteer was found shot to death. With help from the
US Embassy, which had received a tip, a few days
later police identified and arrested the apparent killer,
a young Guatemalan. According to him, the killing
was basically an accident. Although there are some
holes in his story, there were apparently no political
overtones to the incident.n
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Terrorism in Colombia and
Prospects for Peace F_1
Political violence has ebbed and flowed in Colombia
for more than three decades but has never really
disappeared. At present, there are four major terrorist
organizations operating in the cities and countryside
conducting kidnapings, extortion, bombings, bank
robberies, murder, takeovers of towns, and other
forms of violence. Although these groups have never
seriously threatened Colombia's political stability,
their activities have hurt Colombia's economy and
have undermined public faith in the government's
ability to protect its citizens. They all have an anti-US
attitude and have in the past victimized US citizens.
Given the intensity and longevity of Colombian
terrorism, there is little hope that a lasting cessation
of violence will result from President Betancur's peace
plan, which includes cease-fire agreements with the
major terrorist groups. Adding to the difficulties in
achieving peace is the growing violence of the
narcotics traffickers, who have developed close ties
with the terrorists. F-1
The Terrorist Groups
The major Colombian guerrilla groups trace their
origins to the bitter civil war known as "la violencia"
that lasted from 1948 to 1957. During this period,
members of the Conservative and Liberal parties
fought each other in a bloody confrontation that cost
the lives of at least 200,000 people. Members of both
parties formed guerrilla bands either for group
protection or in order to harass the enemy. When "la
violencia" was finally brought to an end, many
guerrilla groups refused to lay down their arms; rural
banditry had become a way of life. =
The largest insurgent-terrorist group, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
has about 25 guerrilla "fronts" with some 2,500
armed combatants and a support organization of
approximately 10,000 sympathizers. The FARC was
established in 1966 as the armed wing of the Moscow-
line Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), but
generally has operated independently of the PCC. The
FARC is primarily a rural organization and seldom
operates in the cities. It obtains its funds mostly
through kidnaping, extortion of wealthy ranchers,
and, since 1980, from the narcotics trade=
The best known terrorist group in Colombia is the
19th of April Movement (M-19), which emerged in
January 1974 when it stole the sword of Simon
Bolivar from a Bogota museum. Since then, M-19-
which took its name from the date of the election
defeat in 1970 of former dictator/president Gen.
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla-has demonstrated an ability
to conduct daring and spectacular incidents. On New
Year's Eve in 1978, M-19 members raided an Army
arms depot by tunneling into it and making off with
more than 500 weapons. In February 1980, 16 heavily
armed members seized the Dominican Republic
Embassy in Bogota during a diplomatic reception and
took 80 hostages, including the US Ambassador,
triggering a siege that lasted for more than two
months.ln
M-19 has suffered several setbacks since the
Dominican Republic Embassy incident. Its reputation
was tarnished in early 1981 when an M-19 splinter
group kidnaped and later killed a US citizen affiliated
with the Summer Institute of Linguistics, a US
religious organization. In March 1981, M-19
attempted to launch a coordinated rural attack on
various coastal towns. Several hundred recruits, newly
trained in Cuba, landed in several boats and were
quickly confronted by Colombian security forces who
killed more than 25 attackers and captured 800.
Because M-19 had often claimed it was a purely
Colombian group, its image was further tarnished by
its now-obvious association with Cuban
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The worst blow to M- 19 was the death of its
charismatic leader, Jaime Bateman, in a plane crash
in Panama in the spring of 1983. Since then, the
movement, which is currently believed to number
about 900 activists, has not mounted a large-scale
operation and is rumored to be divided. It obtains
most of its funds from bank robberies, kidnapings,
and drug traflicking.n
The National Army of Liberation (ELN), is a pro-
Cuban urban/rural organization with approximately
500 combatants. Founded in 1963, the ELN carried
out terrorist attacks until 1973 when Colombian
military raids crippled the movement. Cuba
subsequently withdrew its support. The group
remained relatively weak until 1982 when it began to
increase its urban and rural activities, especially
kidnapings. In November 1983, ELN terrorists
kidnaped President Betancur's brother, but released
him in the face of nationwide revulsion. In January
1984, the ELN suffered a serious setback when police
raided an ELN safehouse in Bogota.
The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) was founded in
1967 by the pro-Beijing Colombian Communist
Party/Marxist-Leninist (PCC/ML). It has about 600
members, of which about 350 belong to its urban
branch, the Pedro Leon Arboleda group (PLA), which
often operates independently of the EPL. Both the
EPL and PLA have attacked US interests. The EPL
attacked the US Embassy and the US Marine
Security Guard residence in Bogota in the late 1970s.
The Trotskyite Workers Auto Defense Movement
(ADO) is an obscure but violent group that was almost
completely destroyed in 1982 with the arrests of
several of its leaders. The ADO has recently
resurfaced and reportedly was cooperating with the
ELN in a plot to attack US Embassy officials last
spring. Another shadowy group is the People's
Revolutionary Organization (ORP), which carried out
two major kidnapings in 1983 but then disappeared. It
is possible that the name ORP was used by M-19 or
another terrorist group.n
Unlike some other Latin American countries,
Colombia has not had a serious problem with
rightwing terrorism, but in the last two years the
"Death to Kidnapers" (MAS) and other rightist
movements have appeared. MAS, which assassinates
suspected terrorists and other leftist extremists, is
believed to be made up of elements of the security and
military forces; possibly it is financed by drug
traffickers. Shortly after he assumed office in August
1982, Betancur launched an investigation of MAS,
which publicly implicated several military officers.
The armed forces were outraged by the government's
findings, but attacks by MAS and other extralegal
counterterrorism declined after this adverse publicity.
Counterinsurgency Efforts
The Colombian military has waged a campaign
against rural and urban terrorists for the last 30
years, committing 10,000 to 15,000 field troops to
counterinsurgency operations. Over the years, the
armed forces have also assumed a major part in
shaping national policy toward the insurgents. For
instance, state-of-siege decrees codified in the security
statute of 1978 gave the military the responsibility for
trying insurgents in military courts (a reaction to a
slow, corrupt, and lenient civilian court system).
Betancur has attempted to reduce the role of the
military in internal affairs-against the wishes of the
armed forces command-while at the same time he
has recognized the necessity of maintaining a strong
military counterterrorist capability. n
At the behest of Betancur, who came into office
committed to achieving peace with the guerrillas, on
20 November 1982 a general amnesty was approved
by the Congress. The amnesty was designed to entice
guerrillas to lay down their arms and enter the
mainstream of Colombian politics. Under the
generous terms of the decree, all those accused of
politically motivated crimes except murder were
pardoned, and the amnestied guerrillas were promised
economic benefits as an incentive for adopting
legitimate livelihoods. A civic action program was
designed to redress the social and economic
inadequacies in the countryside, a long-professed goal
of the insurgents. As an adjunct to the amnesty
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project, Betancur formed a peace commission to study
ways and means to solve the social, economic, and
political inequities that had fed the insurgency. F-1
M-19 and the FARC initially indicated their support
for the amnesty. After the bill became law, however,
M-19 rejected the pardon and demanded a six-month
truce. M-19 blamed the Army for the failure,
claiming that in one area the Army was blocking
M-19 members from turning themselves in by
conducting offensive operations, ambushes, and
blockades of guerrillas in regions they controlled.
FARC soon followed M-19 in rejecting the program,
while the ELN and EPL never accepted the concept
of amnesty. After a few months, terrorism returned to
its previously high levels. Only a small number of
guerrillas turned themselves in to the authorities. L_
The main cause of the program's failure was the
guerrillas' insistence on several conditions before
accepting amnesty that the government could or
would not meet. Their main demands were initiation
of a "national dialogue," imposition of a truce, and
withdrawal of the military from guerrilla strongholds.
Some were extreme, such as the one requiring that all
multinational corporations leave Colombia. The
demand for a national dialogue was partially met by
Betancur's encouragement of the peace commission to
meet with the guerrillas and hear their views. It was
this commission's work which eventually led to cease-
fire agreements with the FARC and M-19. F-]
Impact on US Interests in Colombia
Although the large majority of the victims of violence
in Colombia are Colombians, foreigners-especially
US citizens-also have been targeted by Colombian
terrorist groups. In 1977 a Peace Corps volunteer was
kidnaped by the FARC and released only three years
later after the payment of a large ransom. US
Ambassador Diego Asencio was held hostage for two
months in 1980 during M-19's seizure of the
Dominican Republic Embassy. In 1981 a US citizen
working for the Summer Institute of Linguistics was
kidnaped by an M- 19 faction and later murdered.
after the payment of a large ransom. In May the
FARC kidnaped Catherine Woods Kirby, a rancher,
and in June the FARC abducted Russel Martin
Stendal, also a rancher. Both were released following'
the payment of ransoms.n
US Government installations also have been targeted.
In July 1978 a bomb placed on the grounds of the US
Embassy knocked down one of the security walls. In
1980 a bomb intended for the US Consulate in Cali
exploded prematurely, killing two M-19 terrorists. In
1983, USIS-sponsored binational centers in
Barranquilla and Bucaramanga were damaged by
bombs, and a guard at the Medellin binational center
was killed in a terrorist bombing. On 22 May 198425X1
two bombs exploded near the US Embassy. Q
In the last seven years the threat to US officials and
US businessmen has steadily increased. Following the
Bishop kidnaping and M-19 threats to target
multinational organizations in 1983, several major
US firms with operations in Colombia decided to pull
out their US personnel. Other US firms have been
discouraged from investing or expanding their
operations in Colombia.n
Broader US interests also are affected by the
corrosive effects of Colombian terrorist activity. The
United States has an interest in assuring that
Colombia has a stable democracy and a workable
economy. Kidnapings and extortion have led
numerous Colombian businessmen to flee the country
and transfer assets abroad, resulting in increased
unemployment and slowed economic growth.
Although democratic traditions are strong, because of
the state of siege that has existed for almost three
decades, the military has acquired an informally
institutionalized role in political affairs. Although the
Three Americans were kidnaped in 1983. The most
spectacular attack was ORP's kidnaping of a Texaco
executive, Kenneth Bishop, in a bloody shootout in
downtown Bogota. He was released five weeks later
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military strongly supports Colombia's democratic
principles and there is little threat of a military
takeover, the possibility of a coup is sometimes
rumored during periods of heightened terrorist
activity. n
Foreign Connections
Colombian terrorist groups maintain contacts with
foreign governments and terrorist groups. FARC,
M-19, and ELN terrorists, for example, have been
trained by Cuba. At the time of its formation, the
ELN had particularly close ties with Cuba, receiving
training, advice, and possibly funds. In the 1970s,
Cuba-ELN relations were weak, but a renewal of ties
was reported in 1980.n
Although M-19 originally asserted it was not
supported by foreign governments, the 1981 Cuban-
sponsored invasion on Colombia's Pacific Coast
disproved its claim. To protest Cuba's role in this
invasion, Colombia broke diplomatic relations.
Further evidence of M-19 ties with Cuba surfaced in
1980-81 when Castro began using Colombia's
narcotics ring to funnel arms and funds to M-19,
using as intermediary Jaime Guillot Lara, a
Colombian drug trafficker now in custody in Mexico.
The M-19 also has close ties to the Nicaraguan
Government and contacts with terrorist movements
throughout Latin America, including Chile's
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and two
insurgent Venezuelan groups.
There is little information on the FARC's foreign
connections. A US citizen held captive by the FARC
for four months reported in January 1984 that some
of its leaders told him they had trained in Vietnam,
Libya, and Cuba. The Cuban influence on the FARC
is strong, according to this source. He also noted that
20 to 30 percent of the FARC guerrillas he saw in
captivity were not Colombian. His captors told him
that Colombian guerrillas had served in Nicaragua
and that some were currently fighting in El Salvador.
A portion of all guerrilla revenues from bank robbery,
kidnaping, drug trafficking, and so on is sent to
Salvadoran insurgents, according to this same source.
Cuban support to Colombian terrorist groups has
diminished since Betancur became President. Castro
would like to reestablish diplomatic relations with
Colombia, and he realizes that any large-scale
assistance to Colombian terrorist groups would be
counterproductive. Nevertheless, Castro probably will
maintain contact with Colombia's insurgent
movements and continue to provide training and other
types of support.
extortion, kidnaping, and robbery for funds.
Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking
Colombian guerrilla groups initially shunned all
contact with narcotics growers and traffickers in
order to avoid any corrupting influence on the moral
principles of their revolution. After 1977, however,
the FARC became attracted to the drug business as a
way of supplementing its original reliance on
The narcotics/ terrorist relationship provides benefits
to both groups. The FARC lets the coca growers go
about their business and often warns them of patrols
by the antinarcotics police or military units. In the
FARC-dominated region, with the FARC in control
of strategic points along various rivers, the police can
no longer move about with impunity. The basic
benefit to the guerrillas is financial, and the basic
benefit to the growers is protection.
The ELN and the EPL are involved with the
traffickers to a much lesser degree. M-19 used the
drug-smuggling apparatus of Jaime Guillot Lara to
bring a large shipment of weapons into Colombia in
1980-81. After Guillot's arrest in Mexico City in
November 1981, evidence surfaced of Cuban
involvement in a narcotics-terrorism-gunrunning
operation. Cuban officials and Colombian drug
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traffickers were clearly associated in facilitating
narcotics shipments to the United States. The extent
to which Cuba has continued to facilitate drug
trafficking, either for money or arms, is not known.
Prospects for Peace
On 28 May 1984, a cease-fire agreement between the
Colombian Government and the FARC went into
effect. Under the terms of the agreement, FARC will
condemn and forbid kidnapings, extortion, and
terrorism in return for pledges of political, social, and
economic reform. The FARC will be allowed to
reorganize itself politically, while the Betancur
administration will urge the Congress to institute
political and agrarian reforms, facilitate the
establishment and functioning of communal and
peasant organizations, workers cooperatives, and the
like. Two provisions not included in the agreement are
the laying down of arms by the guerrillas and the
withdrawal of armed forces from guerrilla-dominated
areas. Thus, the potential for renewed activity by
either side is high.=
After the cease-fire agreement with the FARC, the
Colombian Government concentrated on reaching
accords with the other insurgent groups. By late
summer it had reached agreements with the EPL, a
column of the ADO, and M-19. The ELN refused to
enter into peace talks with the government. M-19
leaders were reported to be dissatisfied with the terms
of the FARC cease-fire agreement because it was not
coordinated with other insurgent terrorist groups and
did not include enough "social reforms."
At one point, M-19 demanded that the Colombian
Government lift the state of siege (reinstated after the
30 April assassination of Justice Minister Lara
Bonilla) and replace the military defense minister
with a civilian as conditions for signing an accord.
M-19 also insisted that the peace process be
broadened into a national dialogue. Betancur
responded to the last demand by the creation in late
July of another national commission of "negotiations
and dialogue" to conduct official negotiations with
M-19 and the EPL. M-19 was also said to have
demanded extensive agrarian reforms, elimination or
prosecution of the MAS organization, and wage hikes.
Nevertheless, the insurgent groups stand to benefit in
several ways from the cease-fire agreements. The
most obvious advantage to them is that they will gain
time to rest and reorganize, without government
harassment. The guerrillas may also need to regain a
more positive public image. By rejecting the 1982
amnesty, the insurgents cast themselves in the roles of
bad guys, with the government appearing to be the
good guy. 0
Few Colombians believe that the insurgent
organizations actually intend to lay down their arms
and convert themselves into political parties. Many
FARC guerrillas are not ideologically committed;
rather, they pursue the guerrilla way of life as a
profession and a livelihood-they are classic Latin
American bandidos. Furthermore, the FARC-
narcotics connection has become so close that the
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could lead to confrontations with FARC guerrillas
and spark military confrontations in violation of the
cease-fire. F-1
The cease-fire agreement is also threatened by
dissidents within the FARC and M-19 who have
rejected the peace proposals. The "Ricardo Franco
Front" of the FARC announced its rejection of the
cease-fire with a series of bombings in Bogota on 22
May, including two near the US Embassy, one at the
US-sponsored binational center, and several at US-
affiliated businesses. A split in the M-19 hierarchy
over the issue of a peace accord has been reported. On
8 June a Colombian newspaper announced that the
Ricardo Franco Front and a breakaway M-19 faction
called M-19 South had merged and signed a pact
vowing to step up fighting in the cities and
countryside.
Although cease-fire violations began to be reported
almost as soon as the agreement with the FARC was
signed, the peace commission refused to attribute
these acts to the FARC. In fact, the Betancur
administration made every effort to avoid
antagonizing the FARC. In early August, in one of
the few instances where Betancur has interfered
directly in military affairs, he issued direct orders to
Army units to pull back after they had surrounded a
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large FARC contingent. In the future, elements of
Colombian security forces not in agreement with the
cease-fire agreements might provoke confrontations
with the guerrillas, which could endanger the peace
process.
M- 19 and EPL members as well as government forces
continued to conduct operations during the cease-fire
negotiations, which delayed and almost torpedoed the
signing of the accords. In July, a wave of kidnapings
occurred in various regions, and an EPL leader was
reported to have told the media that the group used
and would continue to use kidnapings as "political
activity" fundamental to the support of the guerrilla
group. Bombings continued as well, and M-19
claimed responsibility for an explosion at the
Honduran Consulate in Barranquilla on 20 July.
Another bombing at the Chilean Consulate in
Medellin on 23 July may have been the work of the
ELN. It is not clear if these bombings and other acts
were condoned by the leadership of the terrorist
groups or were the work of dissidents operating on
their own initiative.n
Just as the talks were reaching the final stages, M-19
leader Carlos Toledo Plata was killed by unknown
individuals. One day later, M-19 and members of the
Ricardo Franco Front invaded and temporarily
occupied the industrial city of Yumbo, killing nearly
40 persons. Just before the scheduled ceremony to
sign the cease-fire, an elite unit of Colombian police
attacked a convoy carrying M-19 leader Carlos
Picarro Leon, wounding him and several other M-19
members. Evidently, both sides meant to demonstrate
that it was not through any lack of will or means to
fight that they had agreed to the cease-fire. F-1
Perhaps one of the greatest dangers to the cease-fire is
the narcotics/ terrorist connection. Although terrorists
and narcotics traffickers have not conducted joint
operations in the past, this could change. The
terrorists could soon find themselves in need of
money-they have promised to stop such fund-raising
operations as kidnapings-and could be tempted to
conduct operations for or with the narcotics
traffickers. The traffickers, for their part, probably
will become even more dangerous and anti-US owing
to Betancur's decision to extradite narcotics
traffickers to the United States, a decision prompted
by the April 1984 assassination of Justice Minister
Lara. They have little to gain from the cease-fire and
much to gain from closer cooperation with the
terrorists. Ifl
The record for achieving peace through amnesties and
cease-fire agreements in Latin America has been
mixed. In Venezuela a "pacification program" in
1968 offering amnesty for guerrillas who chose to
surrender proved to be the final blow to an eight-year-
old insurgent movement, already weakened by
guerrilla factionalization and government military
successes. On the other hand, after Argentine
President Juan Peron released political prisoners in
1973, terrorist activity increased and soon almost
paralyzed the country.n
The tradition of democracy in Colombia simply may
not be as strong as the tradition of violence. The
political and economic reforms demanded by the
guerrillas in the cease-fire agreements could take
years to implement, and the guerrillas could tire of
waiting. Also, if the guerrillas do not gain a
significant political following in a short term, they will
probably be discouraged from following a peaceful
path. The implementation of the plan was largely due
to the President's personal popularity and credibility,
and its endurance will depend on the ability of his
successors to maintain his plan.n
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Chilean Terrorists
Up the Ante
On 6 November, citing increasing terrorism, the
military government of Augusto Pinochet suspended
civil rights and declared Chile to be in a state of siege.
Among the stimulants of this move was a recent
bombing campaign by the Manuel Rodriguez
Patriotic Front (FPMR), which was launched in
conjunction with the 11th major antigovernment
protest carried out by political opposition and labor
groups since mid-1983. n
The FPMR claims to be an independent revolutionary
organization. The Chilean Government and US
Embassy believe that the FPMR is the military arm
of the Communist-dominated Popular Democratic
Movement. F-1
Between 21 and 29 October,'the FPMR is suspected
of bombing at least 15 sites throughout Chile (see the
table). Most of the attacks occurred in Santiago,
Talcahuano, and Concepcion. Targets included the
Tobalaba Airport, railroad tracks, factories,
transportation facilities, and municipal buildings. In
Curico a bomb severely damaged a bridge and cut rail
traffic to southern Chile. Two Chileans were injured
by an explosion at the US-owned Anaconda firm in
Santiago
FPMR Attacks Against
US Targets
15 May 1984 In Santiago a 5-kilogram bomb
exploded in front of an Exxon
subsidiary, damaging 80 percent of
the windows.
29 May Armed FPMR members forced the
editors of the Associated Press
office to broadcast an anti-
government proclamation.
6 August In Valpariaso an explosion caused
minor damage to the Binational
Cultural Center.
The Coca-Cola plant in Santiago
was the site of three bomb
explosions that caused $2 million
worth of property damage.
The most serious attack for which the FPMR has 16 October
claimed credit occurred on 25 October, when the
FPMR detonated an estimated 35 kilograms of
explosives inside a taxi that had been parked near the
Diego Portales Building, which houses the 25 October
headquarters of the military junta. The blast injured
five persons in an adjacent apartment and destroyed
six cars. It was the first successful car bombing in
Chile and the first major FPMR attack against a
government building
A bomb caused minor damage to the
windows of the Morgan Bank in
Vina Del Mar.
In Rancugua an explosion caused
extensive damage to the North
American Cultural Institute.
An explosion caused minor damage
and injured two Chileans at the
offices of the Anaconda mining firm
in Santiago
Secret
GI TR 84-024
15 November 1984
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FPMR Attacks in Chile,
21-29 October 1984
Target
Type of
Attack
21 October Santiago
Tabalaba Airport
Explosive
Slight
23 October Santiago
Factory
Explosive
Slight
Santiago
Employment office
Explosive
Slight
Santiago
Nursing home
Explosive
Slight
Santiago
Grocery store
Arson
Extensive
Santiago
Street
Explosive
Slight
24 October Talcahuano
Railway tracks
Explosive
Extensive
Concepcion
Railway tracks
Explosive
Extensive
Santiago
Lamp post
Explosive
Slight
Santiago
Taxicab stop
Explosive
Unknown
25 October Santiago
Anaconda office
Explosive
Slight
26 October Santiago
Headquarters of military
junta
Explosive
Extensive
29 October Santiago
Railway tracks
Explosive
Unknown
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24-27 October Argentina: Human Rights Activists Bombed
On 24 October in Buenos Aires, a bomb caused minor damage to a church while
members of the Relatives and Friends of Persons Killed by Subversion (FAMUS)
were attending mass. There were no injuries. On 27 October the offices of a former
member of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons
(CONADEP) were firebombed. Files and equipment were destroyed, but again
there were no injuries. No group has claimed credit for the attacks
29 Secret
GI TR 84-024
15 November 1984
Chronology of Terrorism-1984
Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and
counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last
issue. Events and developments that have already been described in previous
issues are not included unless new information has surfaced. Asterisks denote
events covered elsewhere in this issue in greater detail. F-1
been killed by police in the September disturbance.
*Indonesia: Solidaritas Islam Responsible for Bombings
In Jakarta, Indonesian police arrested 40 persons in connection with an anti-
Chinese bombing campaign originally thought to be spontaneous communal
violence provoked by a serious riot in September. Some of the suspects claimed to
be members of "Solidaritas Islam," a hitherto unknown group. They said the
group carried out the bombings of three Chinese-owned banks and businesses, in
which two persons died and 16 others were wounded, after one of its members had
West Bank: Bomb Defused
Border police safely defused a bomb found near the Israeli settlement of Ma'ale
Efrayyim. No group claimed responsibility for placing the bomb.F__1
Lebanon: PFLP-GC-PC Operation Foiled by Israeli Navy
An Israeli naval patrol exchanged fire with persons on board a small dinghy off the
coast of West Beirut, killing two persons who turned out to be members of a pro-
Arafat splinter of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC) that calls itself the PFLP-GC-Provisional Command.=
Corsica: Court Decision Against FNLC Spurs Riots
In Bastia, Corsican nationalists rioted after the local French court of appeals
upheld prison sentences handed down last June to two members of the Corsican
National Liberation Front. Molotov cocktails were thrown during the riots, which
left 12 people injured and the homes of two magistrates damaged by explosions.
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Chronology of Terrorism-1984
Yugoslavia: Two Bombings in Croatian Capital
In Zagreb, bombs exploded in Republic Square and Tomislav Square but caused
no injuries or damage. A Yugoslav citizen has been arrested in connection with the
bombings, but it has not yet been established whether he was acting alone or on
behalf of a nationalist group.
El Salvador: FPL Murders Salvadoran Guard
In San Salvador, the supervisor of the Salvadoran guards at the US Embassy was
killed by three self-proclaimed members of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL).
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Peru: More Common Graves Found
Near Huanta four graves containing a total of 19 bodies were uncovered, bringing
to more than 70 the number of such bodies found during the week. No group has
claimed credit.
*Guatemala: National Legislator Murdered
In Guatemala City, National Constituent Assembly Deputy Santos Hernandez
and two of his bodyguards were shot and killed by unknown persons.n
*Guatemala: Two Communist Professors Murdered
On 26 October in Guatemala City, Carlos de Leon Gudiel, a professor of
economics at the University of San Carlos, was shot to death by unknown
assailants as he drove home. On 27 October, Vitalino Giron Corado, the dean of
the economics faculty at the university, was shot to death by unidentified attackers
when he stopped at a gas station on his way to the funeral of de Leon. Both of the
dead men were believed to be members of the Orthodox faction of the Guatemalan
Labor (Communist) Party.0
Israel: Soldier Arrested for Attack on Arab Bus
A rocket attack on a bus filled with Arabs killed one Arab and wounded 10 others.
A previously unknown group called the Avengers claimed responsibility for the
attack, saying it was in retaliation for the shooting deaths of two Israelis near
Bethlehem in September. Several days later, however, police arrested an Israeli
soldier who admitted he had been the attacker and also claimed responsibility for a
grenade attack on an Arab cafe in Jerusalem in September. Police are now trying
to determine if the bus attack was the work of a lone individual or a terrorist
group. F-1
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Chronology of Terrorism-1984
West Germany: Arms Cache Discovered
Near Dortmund, .police discovered an arsenal of weapons, 20 pounds of explosives,
and various Nazi memorabilia during a raid. Arrest warrants have been issued for
five West Germans who are suspected of being members of an extreme rightwing
paramilitary group. F1
Northern Ireland: PIRA Attacks Continue
In Derry, snipers shot at but missed members of a British Army patrol as they
moved through the Bogside District. In Newry, a bomb exploded outside a car
showroom, causing extensive damage but no injuries. The police blamed the
Provisional IRA for both attacks. F-1
France: Iparretarrak Bombs French Industrialist
In Saint-Pee-Sur-Nivelle, the French Basque group Iparretarrak bombed and
destroyed the villa of an industrialist whose company, which employed many
Basques, had recently suffered financial reverses. Another bomb damaged his
office in Mauleon Island. F7
Northern Ireland: Catholic Taxi Driver Murdered
Masked gunmen shot and killed a freelance taxicab driver, apparently just because
he was Catholic. Police speculate that the murderers were Protestant Loyalists and
fear that the attack may signal the beginning of a new wave of sectarian violence,
since the Provisional IRA usually retaliates in kind.)
*India: Gandhi Assassinated by Sikh Bodyguards
In New Delhi, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two Sikh
members of her security detail, who shot her as she walked across the grounds of
her residence. In an ensuing struggle, one of her assailants was killed and the other
was seriously wounded. A third member of the security force was also reported to
have been wounded. F
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 Chronology of Terrorism=1984
Ethiopia: Kidnaped Americans Released
In Addis Ababa, two American citizens, who were among several foreigners held
by the Tigrean People's Liberation Front since its forces overran the town of
Lalibela on 19 October, were released unharmed. The release was arranged by the
International Red Cross. F-1
Chile: Bomb Explodes Near Pinochet
In Santiago, a. bomb exploded 200 meters from President Pinochet as he attended
the inauguration of the International Industrial Fair. There were no injuries and
no group claimed credit. F7
West Bank Violence Among Palestinian Factions
In Bethlehem, four attacks on Palestinian property in three days appear to be the
result of increasing tensions among radical and moderate Palestinian factions. On
the night of 31 October, a car belonging to a relative of the man convicted of
trying to assassinate Bethlehem's Mayor Freij was destroyed by arson. The
following evening the offices of the Bethlehem Press Service were severely
damaged by firebombs. Rivalry between Communist and Muslim Brotherhood
Factions of the Village Leagues caused these incidents, according to press reports.
Mayor Freij's store was the target of arson attempts on both 1 and 2 November,
with the second attack causing about $50,000 damage. The mayor had met with
visiting US Secretary of Defense Weinberger in October.n
Late October-Early *Peru: Sendero Luminoso Torches Electoral Offices
November On 26 and 27 October in Lima, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) terrorists
attacked two offices of the National Elections Board (JNE) and burned the voting
rolls in an effort to disrupt the June 1985 presidential elections. Eight persons were
injured. In early November, Sendero Luminoso terrorists killed 12 government
officials at election registration centers in the central Peruvian towns of Jivia and
Jesus. Security forces arrested 11 suspects. As a result of the attacks, the
government has augmented police protection for JNE offices. F-1
Chile: Bomb Kills Four
In Valparaiso, a bus was destroyed, four policemen were killed, and 11 persons
were injured by a remotely detonated bomb. No group claimed credit.n
Spain: ETA Bombs Civil Guard Barracks
In Araya, members of the Basque terrorist groups ETA/M claimed credit for a
grenade and machinegun attack on a Civil Guard barracks. A guard's wife was
injured.fl
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Chronology of Terrorism-1984
West Bank: Katyusba Rockets Fired From Jordan
According to press reports, two Kaytusha rockets were fired from Jordanian
territory into the Bet She'an valley area, probably by Palestinian fedayeen. Israeli
authorities are becoming concerned that Jordan is not preventing the infiltration of
Palestinian terrorist teams into the Israeli border area.n
Chile: Police Post Attacked
In Santiago, unidentified individuals attacked a police post with grenades and
machineguns, killing two policemen and wounding four. F7
Belgium: FCC Tries To Bomb Police Van
In Brussels, police defused a bomb that had been placed under a van outside the
police station. Apparently, the device had malfunctioned. Security officials suspect
the Fighting Communist Cells were responsible because the device was similar to
one used in a previous FCC attack.=
Italy: Red Brigades Trial Begins
In Genoa, 21 accused members of the Red Brigades went on trial, accused of
having murdered six people in the Genoa area between 1978 and 1980. Among the
defendants are Mario Moretti, reputedly involved in the kidnaping and execution
of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, and Patrizio Peci, one of the most important
of the Red Brigades pentiti, as those who have turned states evidence are known.
Costa Rica: Assassination Attempt Against Anti-Sandinista Leader
In San Jose, "Contra" leader Alfonso Robelo Callejas escaped injury from a
grenade thrown into his vehicle, although a young Costa Rican woman riding with
him was seriously wounded. No group has claimed credit.
Venezuela: Grenade Damages Italian Embassy and Portuguese Consulate
In Caracas a German-made M-81 grenade caused minor damage to the building
that houses the Italian Embassy, Portuguese Consulate, and the Venezuelan
Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. There were no casualties.
*Saudi Arabia: Civil Airliner Hijacked to Iran
Two North Yemeni men hijacked a Saudi Airlines jet bound from London to
Riyadh with 131 persons aboard, after it made a stopover in Jiddah. The plane was
diverted to Iran, where the skyjackers were attacked and overcome by crew and
passengers. The passengers were returned unharmed to Saudi Arabia. F-]
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Pakistan: Al-Zulfikar Skyjacking Accomplices Sentenced
In Karachi, four accomplices in the March 1981 hijacking of a Pakistani airliner
by Al-Zulfikar terrorists were sentenced to death and a fifth received a life
sentence. They were convicted of obtaining the tickets, arms, and ammunition used
in the hijacking.0
United Kingdom: Iranian Airline Office Occupied
In London, seven anti-Khomeini Iranian students were arrested after briefly
occupying the offices of Iran Air. No one was hurt and damage was slight.
Spain: Shooting of Electrician
In San Sebastian, members of ETA shot and killed an electrician, allegedly
because his father was a police informer. F
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