CIVILIAN SPACE POLICY REVIEW GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00821R000100110003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 25, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
25X1A FROM: I
Acting Director o Security
SUBJECT: Civilian Space Policy Review Group
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1. Il Attached for your review is a copy of a draft
paper ent ed "A Review of Satellite Reconnaissance Security
Alternatives" which was prepared by a Working Group of the
Civilian Space Policy Review Group in response to a require-
ment to review the implications of declassifying the "fact of"
photographic satellite reconnaissance.
2. L_AParticipants in preparation of the paper were
Gus Weiss, airman, from Admiral Murphy's office in OSD,
David Williamson of NASA, Lt. Col. James Welch of Air Force,
Stephen Bond from the State Department and of 25X1A
the Community Security Group. Major credit for the writing
effort belongs to Mr. Williamson and Lt. Col. Welch.
3. I think you will agree that this paper represents
a signifi effort for a task that had a ten day deadline
for submission to the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Executive Office of the President. It does not pretend to
answer all questions that surround the issue, but hopes to
draw to the attention of the policy maker a skeletal outline
of problems and steps that must be faced should a decision be
made to proceed with the declassification action.
shouldn't". r- 100!P
4. It represents the DCI's position and desire to
see "how" can declassify "fact of" rather than "why we
Downgrade to Confidential when
separated from attachment.
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SUBJECT: Civilian Space Policy Review Group
Distribution;
Original - Addressee
1 -- AD/Sec
V/- Registry/Sec
1 - Chrono/Secom
1 - Subject/Secom
SECOM im:25 July 1978
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A REVIEW OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE
SECURITY POLICY ALTERNATIVES
I. Introduction and Objectives.
Presidential Directive NSC-37 established a security policy
for space intelligence activities that states, inter alia,
that "the fact that the US conducts satellite reconnaissance
for intelligence purposes is classified CONFIDENTIAL (XGDS)"
and that the special product controls (over imagery and other
space-derived data) will be used sparingly by the DCI. This
paper examines possible revisions to this policy, first in
light of a simple declarative declassification only of the
fact that the US conducts a classified satellite photography
program as an adjunct to gaining SALT acceptance, and then in
light of a possible extension of such declassification to
selected reconnaissance imagery for furthering economic,
social, and political objectives of the US.
II. Summary- of Conclusions.
In summary, this very compressed review suggests the
following:
1. Under appropriate circumstances and with stringent advance
preparation, the "fact of" can be declassified with real
but not unacceptable risks to intelligence security and to
US foreign and domestic policy.
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2. The benefits of declassifying the "fact of" alone are
rather limited: there is an obvious, commonsense value
to the forthright admission of what is widely known: there
are some relatively short-lived public information values;
and there may be some improvement in the credibility of
SALT verification.
3. If a decision is reached to go beyond declassification of
the "fact of" and to include a selective and time-phased
public release of substantive imagery, both risks and
benefits increase; it is believed that the risks, while
far from negligible, could be adequately controlled and
that the potential longer term benefits of such a policy
revision warrant a very careful assessment of this
possibility before its acceptance or rejection.'
4. It is imperative that full and detailed execution and
contingency plans be developed and assessed well in advance
of overt policy change or official public statement on this
matter.
III. Considerations of Implementation.
An implementation plan for such declassification of
"fact of" and/or imagery must, more or less in the order noted
below, address the following elements:
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1. The Congress. The Intelligence Committees and most of the
senior leadership of both Houses are fully or sufficiently
aware of the space intelligence program and its relation to
NTM and verification. In case either limited or extended
declassification is proposed, it would be necessary to
fully brief the involved committees and the leadership on
the purposes of the proposed policy.change, the detailed
action plan and contingency positions, and the longer range
implications thereof.' Without.a Congressional consensus
on the overall. approach and, particularly, on the strict
limitations of the scope of the declassification policy,
it would not be prudent to proceed. On balance, it is
deemed probable that such consensus could be reached and
maintained if the proposal were thoughtfully worked out.
and the full prestige of the Administration were to back
it.
2. The USSR. Given that "fact of" classification is largely
a political consideration first designed to maintain a
."gentlemen's agreement" with the USSR on the conduct of
space intelligence and more recently to avoid confrontative
questions in the area of NTM for SALT verification, it
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seems that the Soviet interest in a change in US policy
would be so high as to require formal, high level consul-
tation based on considerable frankness as to the scope
and implication of the US proposal. The USSR has made a
distinction between satellite reconnaissance for National
Technical Means (NTM) of verification and satellite
reconnaissance for "espionage." The Soviets have never
explicitly stated their definition of the difference,
however, and Soviet reaction to a proposed policy change is
uncertain. The USSR is sensitive to world opinion about
the relative technological capabilities of the US and the
Soviet Union. Comparisons between Soviet and US NTM
capabilities, even speculative, would cast the USSR in an
unfavorable light.(The position taken by the USSR in the
UN.on allowable resolution limits for open dissemination
of satellite imagery has already prompted unfavorable
comparisons). Furthermore, the Soviets have expressed
their sensitivity about US release of NTM issues discussed
in the SALT Standing Consultative Committee. Second, the
Soviets could view a public policy change as casting doubt
on their ability to prevent "espionage" from outer space
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and, for internal and international prestige reasons,
they might choose to take a tough line, including a more
aggressive posture on ASATs and on the rights of overflight.
Lastly, declassification could be viewed as a form of
international "one -upsmanship" by the US, especially in
light of current tensions. Such private consultation
with the Soviets would stress the relationship of the
proposed policy change to national acceptance of SALT II
and, if imagery release were contemplated, the scope,
content, purposes, and timing of such release.
consultation results in a Soviet assessment that the impact
would be relatively benign and that their net national
interests were still protected, their real interest in
SALT and their overall political posture vis-a-vis the
US might lead to a favorable response. A negative Soviet
reaction would not place at . risk. the technical security of
space intelligence but would provide some further insight
as to basic Soviet international political and military
perceptions. Without an understanding as to the probable
Soviet posture, it would seem.unwise to proceed unilaterally
with a policy change.
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3. US Intelligence Security.
a. The classification of the "fact of" satellite
reconnaissance has served as'the first line of
defense. for overhead intelligence. programs. After
declassification, US agencies and officials could
expect to be under considerable pressure to provide
more information in a climate in which intelligence
photography and perhaps other information is known
to be available. Moreover, interpretation of
photography alone is ambiguous; intelligence information
is derived from a careful professional analysis of
data from several sources, including SIGINT.
Compromise of these electronic systems could result
from explanations and interpretations accompanying
even selective relase of photography. This argues
that careful, well thought out strategies of information
release and management of requests and criticisms are
necessary adjuncts to declassification of the "fact
of." It seems highly unlikely that declassification
of the "fact of" alone could take place, with absolute
refusal to release any more information about derived
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data, sources, methods, and analysis. Some additional
information is certain to be released, whether inadver-
tently or purposefully thereby threatening at least
a partial compromise of intelligence discipline,
b. This then argues for development of a strict and
coherent revised security policy prior to implementation
of a policy change.
Elements should include: a firm
and uniform Executive Branch administrative penalty
policy (dimissal) for violations of space intelligence
guidelines; advance instructions to all in-place
security officers in Federal, industrial, and academic
institutions; briefings for senior former members of
the space intelligence community to establish the
limits of intended disclosure; establishing a central
single source for responses to public queries.
4. Allies. Given that US friends and allies are either
direct or indirect beneficiaries of the US intelligence
programs, their interest in preserving unimpeded access to
valid intelligence information would have to be assured
through consultations that outlined the limits and extents
of planned disclosure and the political assessment of
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external (i.e., Soviet and other) reactions. Particular
care would have to be given to the question of possible
imagery release by the US of data taken over Allied
countries; it is not clear at .this time that any such
release from intelligence systems should be contemplated
without the prior consent or even through the intermediary
of the friendly nation. Those who have had access to
classified satellite imagery in the past may react quite
differently than those who have not.
5. International Reactions.
a. The program to gain tacit acceptance by all countries
of the principle of overhead data collection has been
primarily possible through the efforts of civil remote
sensing programs. This gradual,.de facto approach has
been low-key and very successful, taking into account
those data which could potentially impinge on US
intelligence programs and on international sensitivities
about strategic-quality information. A percipitous
US shift from this gradualism may force governments
to take positions they have otherwise avoided taking.
The. ensuing reactions could tend to. blur distinctions,
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both in the minds of the US public and foreign countries,
between the use of space for beneficial and military
purposes. It has in the past been considered to be in
the best interests of the US to promote an image of
satellites being only for certain humanitarian purposes
and to avoid tainting this image by blending in other
actual or potential uses for satellites.
b. Developing countries (LDCs) recognize that they can
benefit from remote sensing of their territory.
However, the LDCs generally are arguing for a restrictive
legal regime governing these activities, asserting that
release of remote sensing data to third parties without
their prior consent is a violation of their national
sovereignty and poses a threat to their economic and
national security. The effect of a US disclosure of
satellite reconnaissance could be to stiffen their
resolve to restrict overhead reconnaissance. One
would expect that the obvious international benefits
of nuclear arms control would soften such arguments.
The record of the LDCs in the United Nations, while
largely one of narrow self-interest, may not be an
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accurate measure of real LDC responses, however, to
the extent that they have a sincere desire to. further
nuclear arms control.
c. Pressure for a more clearly defined international legal
regime for space would probably increase in the United
Nations as a result of declassification. of "fact of."
The United Nations has assiduously avoided formal
consideration of satellite operations related to
military or national intelligence purposes, and UN
discussions deal only with remote sensing of the earth
and its natural resources, but an announcement by
the US could force the. issue. Countries previously
quiescent about overhead reconnaissance would be
forced to take a position on the basic questions
concerning sovereignty, internal and external security,
and exploitation by more powerful states. Accusations
of superpower hegemony by the PRC is one example of a
possible reaction. Such reactions could have,a heavy
impact on the still-developing international law of
outer space. While the US, Soviet, and French position
is that photo reconnaissance of the earth from space is
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not precluded by applicable international law, many
states if forced to take a position on the issue are
likely to seek a restrictive regime or to deny
entirely the legitimacy of such activities, at least
without prior consent. This would place both US civilian
and military space programs on the defensive. Just as'
could happen with the USSR, prior consultation would be
helpful if the US could be sure of eliciting an
affirmative or neutral response; but a negative response
would exacerbate the risk of adverse political reactions.
6. US Public Reactions.
a. The case for the verifiability of a SALT II agreement
could be made more convincingly to the public if an
explanation could be offered as to how the verification
is accomplished. An announcement that the US verifies
such agreements by use of satellite reconnaissance may
allay fears about Soviet cheating and contribute to
public and Congressional support for a SALT II agreement-
Since much of the informed public, press, and Congress
already assumes satellite reconnaissance, the increase
in support might be marginal; this margin could mean
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the difference in eventual ratification in the US
Senate. The announcement could also serve to affirm
the commitment of the Administration to greater open-
ness in government and the promotion of space operations
for keeping the peace. Without public examples of
data quality, however, there is some question as to the
degree of public satisfaction on verifiability.
b. There is no question that data on space intelligence
would be sought under the FOIA and that, in the worst
case, legal proceedings could force disclosures
inimical to intelligence discipline and national
security unless impeccable guidelines were established
and maintained as to what is classified and why (see
3b, supra).
IV. A Concept for Further Study.
Preliminary-review suggests the possibility of a new
national policy in the use of remotely sensed imaged data for
a spectrum of US interests, both domestic and foreign. The
focus of such a policy would be on the use of remotely sensed
data and the information that can be derived therefrom, not on
the management or control of the systems which collect such data.
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The purpose that could be served is an expansion of the utility
of data and information to the nation without incurring severe
political and national security costs.
1. Features of Policy Concept.
a. The fact 'that US space systems collect photographic
data for national security purposes is declassified,
b. The security protection afforded to all the systems --
space and other.--- which.collect global military and
intelligence data is continued and enhanced to preserve
a "band of uncertainty" as to US capabilities,
limitations, vulnerabilities, and importance.
c. The US will begin a careful, time phased, centrally
controlled and evolutionary process of releasing
selected reconnaissance imagery into the public domain
in two ways:
1) For economic and development purposes, release
selected blocks of mapping quality imagery of the
US from the existing archives as an adjunct to the
existing data ha-se.
2) For policy purposes dealing with specific US
interests, use individual samples of imagery
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(archival or new) on a priveleged or public
basis when credible evidence is required on
particular conditions or events.
3) Depending on international reactions during and
after the initial period of. release of US imagery
only selected blocks of foreign coverage may be
released either bilaterally or openly.
d. Since the organized release of previously classified
imagery will supplement, not replace, the growing
capabilities of civil space systems responsible for
continuing and updating the global data base from
space, developing national and international expectancies
will have to be met by operational civil systems.such
as follow-on earth and ocean survey satellites and
Shuttle-based film return capabilities in the 1980's
and beyond; the priorities of on-going space intelligence
systems remain the national security interests of the
US.
2. Potential Benefits.
a. The broader use of previously classified and compart-
mented data could well be an efficient means of meeting.
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important domestic needs for an authoritative data
base. supplementing (or in some cases replacing)
imagery sources currently available to the private and 25X1
public sector.
existing imagery of the US, no added burden is placed
on current intelligence collection systems. The
additional. burden on the intelligence community of
-sorting-and reviewing appropriate US regional data sets
for phased release would depend upon the rate of
release desired; presuming that such release is aimed
at bridging.the period until similar materials can be
By limiting release to
collected by open civil programs (e-g., Shuttle Large
Format Camera), the effort could be spread over some
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three or four years without becoming unduly
burdensome.
b. Other economic applications of space data dealing with
dynamic phenomena -- land use changes, disaster
,assessment and relief, environmental monitoring, crop
productivity -- require the repetitive coverage being
offered by civil systems and not envisaged for
intelligence systems.
Such civil uses would also
benefit considerably from the availability of a high
quality imagery data base even if quite old.
c. A new dimension of flexibility could be provided in the
US in international affairs by less-constrained use of
remote sensing data: peacekeeping possibilities might
include private or public release of visual evidence
and analysis of impending crisis, hostile actions, or
.threatening situations (weapons shipments, border
violations, querrilla concentrations, nuclear capa-
bilities); selective economic development information
can be provided without subterfuge as to data sources;
and treaty verifiability,and verification can be more
credibly demonstrated as needed for domestic and
international audiences.
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3. Implementation Approaches.
a. All the issues noted in Section III, supra, would have
to be dealt with in detail before this concept could
be implemented; in addition, some purely domestic
issues stemming from release of imagery of the US
might arise in the areas of privacy or of use of such
data for law enforcement purposes.
b. If implementation barriers were overcome and fore-
seeable new problems contained in a.detailed plan, an
eventual policy structure might take the following
direction:
1) The US is dedicated to the concept of open available
and freely interchanged data about the world -- for
the social, environmental, and. economic betterment
of human society. Note that this is the objective
as put into law in the 1958 space act.
2) Civil space programs will, in the future as in the
past, continue to make available data on a global
basis except in times of national emergency; data
from our military space programs will be used to
supplement civil data through the periodic release
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of significant data sets useful for specialized
cartographic, geological, and related analyses.
3) To support these ends, certain previously restricted
space data acquired by the Defense Department in
pursuit of its national security mission will be
.made available through official channels.
4) This approach is designed to meet several major
objectives: the reduction of classified data and
activities, the preservation of national security as
required, the integrated use of US resources to
meet the needs of the country and the world, and
the dedication of technology to humane purposes.
5) The continued separation between civil and military
activities in space is fundamental to the US way
of life. Space must remain-open and free for the
use of all nations in seeking their own objectives,
and hostilities in space must be forbidden.
V. Recommendation.
Given that the initial assessments outlined above appear
reasonable, it is clear that further, work on analyzing the
concept of a space intelligence security policy change is in
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is in order. This effort. should fall into four phases:
1. An intensive analysis of the points and possibilities
noted in this paper by a few key individuals selected from
the Departments of Defense and State, the intelligence
community, and the Executive Office of the President
under the direction of a senior NSC member. This could be
accomplished within 4 to 6 weeks; with an additional'2-
week period for official agency comment.
2. Presidential review and decision on desirability of change
and appropriate scope thereof in 3 weeks.
3. Detailed development and setting in place of the implemen-
tation elements -- consultation strategies., security
planning, contingency plans -- by the responsible agencies
over a period of at least 12 to 16 weeks.
4. Execution after final Presidential review and approval.'
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REFERENCE VPY
RETURN TO GS REGISTRY
25X1A
Civilian Space Policy Review Group
Acting Director o security
0
25 July 1978 25X1A
Attached for your information
DD/A 7D-26 is a memorandum reporting the
completion of your tasking to
participate in a group review-
ing how to handle declassifi-
cation of the "fact of."
(DDA 78-2458 6 DDA 78-2458/1)
Orig -
Adse
1 -
D/Sec
Q -
EXI OS Reg
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2 5 JUL 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
25X1A FROM:
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25X1
25X1
25X1
Acting Director of Security
SUBJECT: Civilian Space Policy Review Group
1. Attached for your review is a copy of a draft
paper en d "A Review of Satellite Reconnaissance Security
Alternatives" which was prepared. by a Working Group of the
Civilian Space Policy Review Group in response to a require-
ment to review the implications of declassifying the "fact of"
photographic satellite reconnaissance.
2. Participants in preparation of the paper were
Gus Weis airman, from Admiral Murphy's office in OSD,
David Williamson of NASA, Lt. Col. James Welch of Air Force,
Stephen Bond from the State Department and of 25X1A
the Community Security Group. Major credit for the writing
effort belongs to Mr. Williamson and Lt. Col. Welch.
3. I think you will agree that this paper represents
a signifi effort for a task that had a ten day deadline
for submission to the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Executive Office of the President. It does not pretend to
answer all questions that surround the issue, but hopes to
draw to the attention of the policy maker a skeletal outline
of problems and steps that must be faced should a decision be
made to proceed with the declassification action.
4. It represents the DCI's position and desire to
see "how" can declassify "fact of" rather than "why we
shouldn't".
Downgrade to Confidential when
separated from attachment.
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STATINTL
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