REVIEW OF 'INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS' DRAFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00821R000100050005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 8, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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OGC Has Reviewed
8 NOV 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel
FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security
SUBJECT: Review of "Intelligence Activities and
Individual Rights" Draft
1. This Office has reviewed, in the limited time afforded
it, the Draft entitled "Intelligence Activities and Individual
Rights." There are certain concerns and questions which have
become evident from this review and these are detailed in the
commentaries which are provided in the subsequent paragraphs.
a. Page 14, (c)(5) No alien lawfully admitted
for permanent resident (as defined in section 101(a)
(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) who has
.applied for United States citizenship may be recruited
as a covert human source by an entity of the Intelligence
Community of the United States.
Comment: While this Office fully understands the
intent of (5), there are definite questions presented
regarding its applicability to necessary defector handling,
defector debriefings, etc. This Office believes that
these questions must be clarified.
b. Page 15, (c) (1) Personally identifiable infor-
mation about a United States person shall be sealed
within seven years, unless such information is evidence
of a specific act in violation of law or appears on its
face necessary to another authorized national foreign
intelligence or foreign counterintelligence activity.
Comment: This Office questions the prudence of "sealing"
such information as mentioned in this section and else-
where, and wonders why "seven years" is the chosen period
of time. Elsewhere it is stated that material can be
unsealed for compelling reasons. This Office desires a
precise defining of those "compelling reasons."
OS 7 4812
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c. Page 15, section 206 (d) (l) Inforulation
about a United States person may be used or
disseminated (followed by nine conditions).
Comment: A literal interpretation of provisions
A) through (J) would seriously` limit our use of
the National Agency check as an investigative
tool. It would appear that this Office could
conduct no checks without permission of the
person concerned. This would eliminate our
support to DDO in the processing of Operational
Approvals. The entire section appears to be-in
contradiction with other provisions of the draft,
and without clarification-is confusing to the
point th't this Office can only suggest a
complete revision to specify legal intent.
d. Page 19, section 207(g) No enti` of
the Intelligence Community may employe false
identification or'other "pretext" technique to
conceal from a United States person the govern-
ment affiliation of an employee or contractor
of the Intelligence Community, except under
regulations promulgated by the Director with
the approval of the Attorney General.
Robert W."
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o the-Intelligence Community. This Office
wishes to note that portion which states that
these arrangements can be approved under
regulations promulgated by the Director with
the approval of the Attorney General and to
strongly urge that immediate action be taken
to effect such approval.
2. This Office also reserves full acceptance of all other
portions and sections because of the limited time available for
review. It is the position. here that there could be some very
critical, hidden problems in this draft-
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 Approved For Release 2002/05/29 CIA-RDP85-00821 R000100050005-6
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel
FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security
SUBJECT: Review of "Intelligence Activities and
.Individual Rights" Draft
.1. This Office has reviewed, in the limited time afforded
it, the Draft entitled "Intelligence Activities and Individual,
Rights." There are certain concerns and questions which have
become evident from this review and these are detailed in the
commentaries which are provided in the subsequent paragraphs.
a. Page 14, (c)(5) No alien lawfully admitted
for permanent resident (as defined in section 101(a)
(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) who has
-applied for United States citizenship may be recruited
as a covert human source by an entity of the Intelligence
Community of the United States.
Comment: While this Office fully understands the
intent of (5), there are definite questions presented
regarding its applicability to necessary defector handling,
defector debriefings, etc. This Office believes that
these questions must be clarified.
b. Page 15, (b)(2) No personally identifiable
information about.the political. beliefs or associations,
or private lives, of United States persons shall be
maintained, except such information as is clearly
necessary for an authorized national foreign intel-
ligence or foreign counterintelligence activity.
Comment: This Office assumes that the political beliefs
or associations do not preclude the maintenance of
records regarding individuals who belong, or have
belonged, to the Communist Party, the Weathermen, Students
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for a Democratic Society and similar type organizations.
If such information is precluded, then the efficacy of
this Agency's clearance process is in grave jeopardy.
c. Page 15, (c)?(1) Personally identifiable infor-
mation about a United States person shall be sealed
within seven years, unless such information is evidence
of a specific act in violation of law or appears on its
face necessary to another authorized national foreign
intelligence or foreign counterintelligence activity..
Comment: This Office questions the prudence of "sealing"
such information as mentioned in this section and else-
where, and wonders why "seven years" is the chosen period
of time. Elsewhere it.is stated that material can be
unsealed for compelling reasons. This Office desires a
precise defining of those "compelling reasons."
d. Page 19, Section 207 (g) No entity of the
Intelligence Community may employ a false identification
or other "pretext" technique to conceal from a United
States person the government affiliation of an employee
or contractor of the Intelligence Community, except under
regulations promulgated by the Director with the approval
of the Attorney General.
Office wishes to note that portion which states that
these arrangements can be approved under regulations
promulgated by the Director with the approval of the
Attorney General and to strongly urge that immediate
action be taken to effect such approval.
2. This Office also reserves full acceptance of all. other
portions and sections because of the limited time available for
review. It is the position here that there could be some very
critical, hidden problems in this Draft.
Robert W. Gambino
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Adse
1 - D/Security
STATINTL 1 - OS Registry
1 - SAG
1 - PPG 1 - Chrono
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 Approved For,'ReeIe se 2062105129: CIA-RDP85-00821R000 00051)005r=Pi'_ -_ = - -_
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
A 1D Is;DIVIDUL\L PICTS
SHORT sTI
sec. 201. This title may be cited as the "Intelligence Ac -;
vities and Individual Rights- Act of 1977. "
STATEti.. IT OF PURPOSES _
Sec_ 202_ It is the purpose of this Act-
to insure that the intelligence activities of the
United- States do not Infringe upon or violate rights protected
by the Constitution or laws of the United Stites ;
(2) . to establish standards and procedures for intelli -
gence activities affecting the rights : of United States persons;
(3) to provide fair and effective safeguards a gaius.*
intelligence activities which may "violate rights protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Sec. 203. .(a)
Except as otherwise provided in this section,
the definitions in Title I, the National Foreign Intelligence
Act of 1977 , shall apply to this- title
(b) . As used in this title ---
- (1)
The terra "agent of a foreign power" means ---
(A) Any person who
(i) knowingly ' engages in clandestine intelli --
IZ2
gence activities for ox-on behalf of a.foreia power,
which activities involve or will involve a viol at .on
of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(ii) knowingly engages in activities that
involve or will involve sabotage or terrorism for or-
on.-behalf of a foreign power;
(iii) conspires with or knowingly aids oz- abets
any person, knowing that such person Is engaged iL
activities described in subsectians (2.) (i) - (? w) a ;o-re
in the activities specified tharzi r or
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(iv) pursuant to the direction. of.? art
intelligence service' or intelligence network of
a foreign power, knowingly callects or txens~ t
information. or material to are intelligence service
Or of . a fo eiga pvric.r i i a
manner intended to conceal the nature of such irtfor---
mation or material or the fact of such trans-ssioa
or collection, under circumstances which indicate
the transmission of such information or material
would be harmful?to the security of the United. States
or that lack. of knowledge by the. United States of
such collection or transmission would be harmful t
(D) electronic surveillance where at least one party to
the communication has given prior consent to the interception.
of the communication; and -
the security of the United States.
(B) Any organization substantially directed and
controlled, by persons engaged in the activities spe'ified
in subsections (B) (i)--(iv) .
(2) The term "covert human source'
otherwise directly controlled by an entity of the Intelligence
agent or human source of information who. is secretly paid or
Community of the United States:
.(3) The term "covert investigative. technique?' means' ----
(A) review of bank, credit, and telephone' recordz:
(B) review of medical .and social history records and of
con:Ei.dential records-of private institutions and of Federal,
State, local, and foreign government agencies (otter than
intelligence or law enforcement agencies) ;
(C) review of tax returns and tax-related information
pursuant to the provisions of section 6103 of the Itxteraa .
Revenue Code;
 E) the inspection of t:ne e;_terior of first class ,.l
as defined in :title 39, United States Code, section 425L(a ,
before : such mail is delivered to the person to whoa it is
ach1 essed.
(4) The term "delegate of the. Attorney General" means an-
Assistant Attorney General or an employee of the Department of
Justice works in the office - of the Attorney General and who i.s.
designated by the "Attcrney General to carry out a duty other':ri se
essia ed to the Attorney General.
(5) The term "foreign power" means '--
A
) a foreign . go-Tern lent or any component thereof ,
w ether or not recoogrtized by the United States;
(B) a faction of a foreign .nation or nations not subst -
tially composed of..United States persons;
(C) a commercial entity which is directed and control
led by a foreign gove~~ent or governmernts ;
(D) a foreign-based terrorist group ; or-.
(E) a foreign-based political organization, `riot sub-
stnnti ally composed of United States persons.
already in the possession of a Federal, State, local, or forei _
0), The term "name check" means the retrieval of informaticrt.
intelligence or law enforcement agency.
collection of information readily available from public sources
or available to a private person,-including interviews of the
(7) '. The terms ""overt investigative technique" means the
subject or his friends or associates..
(8) The term "physical and photographic surveillance means
observation to acquire information, whether or not requiring the
use of a surveillance device, under circumstances in which a
r-.-arrant would not be required for law enforcement purposes_
(9) The term. "reasonable suspicion" r..earns specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rat_ioaal inferences
from those facts, support a finding.
 (10) The term "records reviews", means rezT e:v` of any
records of private institutions and of Federalt -
Federal, S SL.. G.4P, joC'r.~-L~
'
and foreign government
agencies
law enforcement agencies) which are not confidential
(il) The tern "sabotage" means activities which would
.be prohibited by Title 18, United States Code, chapter 105,
if comm..itted aoair_st the United States.. -
(12) The term "to seal" means to retain info=atian which
identifies a particular person and entries in a general name
index, but to restrict access to' such information and entries
to ecapellzrg circumstances.
(13) T ha term "target" means
(A) a person who is, or is likely to- becomes the object
a recruitment effort by an agent of _ a foreign_ gawzz;
(S) information, property, or.. acti.-Trities i n . the U:z~
-ta .
estates which are or are likely to become the object of:
L ._~.razj_sr:L, saoocage, or cianaestzne ii
an age--at of a foreign power_
(14) The term "terrorisrz" means activities which
(A)- are ,violent acts or. acts dangerous to human lzl:e: -:
which would be criminal under the laws of the United States
or oaf any State if cor fitted within its jur?sdictzoni -mod
(i) to intimidate or coerce the
(ii) to influence the policy of-
intimidation or coercion, or
civilian popuLatian
(iii) to affect the conduct of a Bove ent by
assassination or kidnapping..
(15) The 'term "United States" when usee, in a g eograahic sensue
means all areas under the territorial sovereignty of the United
5 the Trust Territory of the Pacific xsl~n ds, z--d theme C=aT
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 (16) The . term "United States persoxl" reau
'C. st
(B) an alien lawfully admitted for parmnar eut
regidenice (as defined in seci-ion 101(x) (20) WE the
Ixrlnrigrztion and -Nationality Act) ;
(C) an organrizatign substantia t ly `composed of
citizens of the United States or aliens larufully adm?ttad
for permanent residence.. .
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 FO B G r CO ts, `{'~#I,LIGENCE ACTIlTITI~..S
authorized under Title I may be directed against united States
persons only in accorda-ice with the provisions of this section_
Fore C_o t?%Zt?~?-~_Z igence
(2) Foreign counterintelligence activities directed
against United States persons shall inci de --- -
(A)- the conduct of foreign counterintelligence
investigations writhin, the Una. ted States to detect
sabotage, terrorism, or clandestine intelligence actw--
vlties by an agent of a foreign. power;
(B) the conduct of inquiries within. the-. United
States regarding targets of an agent of a forei per;
(C) the conduct. of inquiries within the United. Stctez
regarding persons who are being considered as sources of
assistance in ..the conduct of foreign ca meter to ligenCz
investigations;
(D) the intentional collection -of -ir farmatian ~out-
s? de the United States relating to. the detection-of sabotage,
terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities by an.
agent of a foreign, power and relating to- -the protection
of national security-information -from disclosure to a
foreign power.
any circus tances -initiate foreign counterintelligence actzv-~ ti es
(3) No agency of the- Intelligence Cozzity shat l_ under
solely upon information that a United States -Herman -i c 9:1nCraa-T"er
in act!v-_'ties protected by the First Amendment -to the Con--
stitution of the United States;
(4) If any official or employee of an agency of the Intel--
ligence Co=unity has any reason to believe that -foreign
counterintelligence activities, ray be initiated in violation of
the require- tints of paragraph (3), he-shall bring the activi tics
to the attention of the Attorney General or his delegate fol-
. eviera and authorization on the basis of a j? ittert finding by
 the Attorney General or his. delegate that the rerurenY*zts
of paragraph (3) are satisfied-
(b) (1) A foreignn.- counteriatellligenc-_ --a Liar-,
directed against a United S4a'Zes parson t.i' t'r the ~.rrt:"-
States may be initiated only in accordance with the provisions
of this subsection.
t -
(2) A preliminary. foreign 'counterintelligence investi-
gation may only be initiated upon a specific and credible
allegation or specific and credible information that a United
terminated not later than 120 days after. the date of initiation,-'
States parson is, or may be, an agent of a foreign power.
A preliminary investigation of .a United -States person shall. be
(3) A full foreign "counterintelligence investigation may
Suc?? further investigations may not exceed ninety days.
of.facts or information obtained during the investigation..
find ng that further investigation is justified on the basis - C:11
person is an agent of a foreign power. A' full investigation
only be Initiated upon- reasonable suspicion that a United States
prig, ,written approval of the Attorney General.or his delegate.
of a United States person shall be initiated only - with- the
Such an investigation shall be terminated not later than one
year after the date of initiation, unless the Attorney General
or his -delegate makes a written finding that there. is probable -
power.or that the person's activities pose a substantial
cause to believe that the person is an-agent of aforeiQ
likelihood of harm to the security of the United States- -Full
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investigations which continue beyond-one year shall be reviewed
at least annually by the Attorney General ar his delegate to
determine whether the requirements for continued investigation -
are still met..
(c)(1). A preliminary foreign counterintelligence investi--
gate on may Involve, when necessary for. the -roves igaLiori t _a
unless the Attorney' General or his delegate Makes, a written :=:
 overt tec~:d ? goes a-td naw checks -
r
physical and photographic suivei ZZarrce;
record reviet.;s ; and
(D) inquiry of previously established covert hu .n. so ce
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and ( .) , a full
fo eign counter? ntelligerlce investigation under this sec do n rn -.
in.'s, olve , when necessary for the inves tigati.on, the use Of
'.. i teccL;LZques at
in paragraph (1) above;
(B) targeting of Covert human
(C) covert investigative techniques
(D) electronic su,-veilla'ae as defined ii Tit-r e
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
and in
aceordaaxcs
with the standards and procedures of that Act;
(3) ;,mere the subject of a foreign' counterixxteLlizene ._;
gatzon joins or participGtas in the activities of an ;or a z za =4^z
is not a for'eig po:?,er, the investigation. shalL'be limited.
then of-ores of the sub; ect to influence or control the orga~iz=. ca.
.cove- -= sources may not joiri or participate ii . the a ctivi e s
c?se'_-minTng and r portiric, activities of the subject. Tha inves a-~
4ishall exclude the :tonal activities of the organization, other-l
u~ ._~ r~ `~ zap oo w-Ltnout the prior approval of the Attorne
General or his delegate.
(d) (l) . A limited ninety-day inquiry maybe, cortducted.
regarding a United States person who is the. target of an' agen
in the target; and
and to determine the probable nature of the agent's interest -
(B)_- the techniques used in the inquiry are limited to -
naLLa checks, such physical surveillance as is necessary for
-identifying the target, and such -~rttervieY' s as are necessac~_
(A) the inquiry is necessary to identify the target
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in the target, provided that such intet-vi-W are
conducCe d in such a manner as to z ~i aimi e any. a l er-sa
of ects on the target_
(2) A limited nilety-day, inquiry, ray 'be conducted
regarding a United States person being considered as a poCen-
ti.- source of assistance in the conduct of an authorized
foreign counterintelligence 'investigation, provided that (A) there is a bona fide expectation that. the
person will be used as a source of assistance in the -
conduct of such an investigation; and
determine the fitness of- the person for use as a sorce`
to name checks and such interviews as- are r ecessay to
(B) the techniques used in the inquiry are limited
foreign counterintelligence purposes outside the United States
(f) (1) one intentional collection. of information for
Manner as to minimize any adverse effects on. the pzrscrr~
provided that such interviews are conducted ia. such -a-_
of assistance in the conduct of such an investigation
who reside abroad and are'-officers or employees of a.
(A) information concerning United States persons
conce ~rLg Lax tea States persons shall be limited to :
foreign power;
(B) information. which is evidence that a United States.-
person may be an agent, of a foreign-power;-
(C) information which is evidence that a United States
person may be a target of intelligence activities of.
foreign power;
(D) information concerning a United States person-who
stay be a source of assistance -in the conduct .of property
authorized foreign counterintelligence activities.
(E) information which evidences or concerns a possible
threat, to the. physical safety of any person;
(V
,Z) information ~fh~ Ch i_s evidence that a Gnit~d
States person is era -aged in the unauthorized, disclostire..
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 of properly classified national security wrzforatzan_
foreign counterintelligence purposes may 'involve, whan: n_eces_
(2) Such intentional collection .of info=ati or_ for
sary to acquire the information, the use of --
(B) records. reviews;
(C) physical and' p. ho photographic surveillance, r.: tier
procedures established by the agency head with the
approval of the Attorney General;
(D) covert humazi sources, under procedures astaolishe
by the agency head with the approval= of the Attorney Gertetai
(E) covert investigative techniques' under grbce as -_
established by, the. agency head with, the approval of 'the
= = - . =
e
Attorn
y General;
(F) electronic surveillance.., as defined in, Title
=;{
the Overseas Surveillance Act, and is ' accordanCa w.r_t . the
standards and procedures of that Act_
(3) The Attorney General or his delegate shall reviet.7 at
least annually all foreign. co= terintell igence- activities ixi--
volving the intentional collection of informati.orL outside the
United States concerning United States persons' to deter .ju
whether the standards and procedures of this subsection have
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 ITATICNA.L FOREIGN INTELL 1CCE ACTIVITIES
Sac- 205(a)(1).- . National foreio intelligence activities
aiit11orized under title I may be directed at a U_ S . person only,
(B) special care is taker, to - insure that domestic
political or personal information about United States
in accordance with, the provisions of this section-
(2) National foreign intelligence activities ir_ay in,-vi
the collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination of infor-
mation concerninS U.S_ persons acquired from publicly available
sources under regulations promulgated by the entity directors,
pro -z-fded that .
the conduct of a limited ninety--day inquiry -regardinga United
persons -is not- collected, maint~ -ned,. used, ox dissemi-
(3) National foreign intelligence activities may involve
ta_nce in the conduct of national foreign intelligence acticritias
States person: being considered as a potential source of -assis-
only if ---
- (A) - there is a bona fide expectation that the,
person will be used as a source of assistance'in the
conduct of such-activities;
(B) the techniques used in the inquiry are limited
to i.ame checks and. such interviews with the person, and.
with persons who know him as are necessary to determine
(4)
ofnonpublicly available info- atioa
intelligence -activities .:ma involve
the person's fitness for use as a source of assistance in
the conduct of specific national foreign intelligence
about a United States person or organization if the Attome
(A) the in.forration, is relevant to' the mission, of
entity which. collects, maintains.,.'. uses,, or disszm* --
National fore-
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;,-C.-the intentional collection
 General nakes a prior Mitten finding that:
(A) the person or organization is
a foreign power;
(B) tha person resides
abroad and
employee of a foreign _ power; _
(C) the organization is a foreign
an agent of
is. art officer
paver; or
-(D) : the information being sought is essential to
the national defense or the conduct of the foreign
affairs of the United :States .
(5) National foreign intelligence activities may volve
the incidental acquisition of nonpublicly available irwfort i ou
about a United States person from collection activities directed
against foreign powers, organizations-; or persons prov:Lded
that the information is maintained, `used, and disseminated in
accordance with the standards and procedures of S'ec _ . 2Qa
(6) - The Attorney General.--or. his. delegate shall reuieP
all national foreign intelligence activities involving the
collection or incidental acquisition of no' npublicly availably
in far atiou about United States persons' at least-" ever7- ninety-
to determine whether such activities satisfy- the'require=e-ats
of this section..
(b) (1) National foreign intelligence activities ay
involve the placement' or recruitment of -a -covert human soCe
within a United States organization, - without the knowladg of
ttie principal executive otticer or otttcers o
only --
(A) for the sole purpose of preparing-the cave=
hunan source for assignment to a national foreig-a intei_
ligence activity outside--the United States;
(B) for such.tima as is necessary to accomplish
this purpose;
(C) if the director of the entity which handles
a 'written finding that such action is essantia?
for national foreign intelligence purposes of vitai-
 .importance to the United States;
(I)) -,Mder- procedures appro'v-ed by
he " h me
General or his delegate ' reasonablj
y designed to pre vec.-
the misuse of participation of the covert h-,=an source
in the activities of the organization and the misuse
of any information. obtained-from such participation; and
(E') if no information about a United States persor.
acquired from the covert human source is disseminated
-outside the entity which, handles the source, unless such
inf
i
ta
ar,_at
on per
ins to felonious criminal conduct or
threat of death or serious bodily harm,., in which case
such informatiox_~mayp be disseminated only -with tie: approval ,
(2) National foreign intelligence activities may involve
the . use of a covert human source who is employed by a United
Stars organization, where the activities of the source: relate
to his employment, only if the principal executive 'officer or
officers of the employing -organization. are informed of the
nature of the activities of the covert human source.:
(c) (1) No United States person Who--is not-_ a ' regular
c.I_C an enri.cy . of m e lnteilzgence Commun
to assess t in the conduct of national foreign intelligence
activities unless -
(A) tie assistance is completely voluntary;
(B) no pressure that, would significantly impair
the person's ability to make a free and rational choice
has been brought-:to bear upon the person; -and.
(C) the person is informed of-,the nature of the
assistance and of-any reasonably anticipated adverse
consequences such assistance may have for him.
(2) No United States organization r?ihich is not a foreign
po_rer may be used to assist in the conduct of na L"' OrI _l foreign
intelligence activities unless ---
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 (A) the principal executive officer. or officers
of the organization volun arily agree to pro-u-ida the
assistance; -
(B) no pressure that would significar_tly impair-
the ability of the principal executive officer or
officers of the organization to make a free aad rationa?
choice has been brought to bear upon them;
(C) the principal executive officer or officers are
ir_fc rmed of the nature of the assistance and of any reason-
ably anticipated adverse consequences such assiacanc&_ maa
(D) the-principal executive officer -- or- officer" S- -
give assurance that.the assistance is not.-iri rLo1atio of
the charter,. constitution, bylaws, or rules and- re.giations
of the organization.
(3)
No United States educational or
nonprofit organization which assists
foreia intelligence activities may receive any cov rt fi7 ncja1.
assistance or support for such activities, direct - oz . fndireat r
from the Governwent of the United States.
(4). No United States educational,- - private Vol zta,-~-y
nonprofit organization may be used by an entity of the In-tel-?
l? gence Co=rnity to assist in the conduct of naticttal. foreigm
intelligence activities unless the entity director - makes ,a ,
prior -ritten finding that the activities -- to be assisted are
necessary to the national defense or the conduct of the foreign
affa-i rs of the United States-
(5) No alien lawfully adrnitted. for permanent -resident
(as defined in section 101(a)..(20) of the Immigraticra and
Nationality Act) who has applied for
nay be recruited as a covert human
United States citizenship
source by an entity- of the
-Intelligence Cozt-}r of the United States-
Approved?FOr Relea$e 2002105125 GIXk~1 6 $5rD0829.f Qfla1p0059005=6'
 Re1ease-2002/O5729 : CIA=RDP86-6Oa24ROOQ4OOG6O00
mAIN EN?NNCE, USE, AND DISSEHIFI,\TION OF
7R{F.'GA~, 1 rQ :
Sec_ 2-06(a)- Information: about United States parsons
acquired, ?.n.tenti opal l y ,or ziic'i_ Jer? Z l~r_ in the c,011.rse- of
national foreign intelligence and foreign cou