SECOM MANAGEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE (MARCH)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00821R000100030034-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: January 30, 1979
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2002/03125 c-CIA-RDP85-00821R000100030034-6-
30 January 1979
*Army review completed*
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB GAMBINO, CHAIRMAN, SECURITY COMMITTEE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIt~NFE
DEPARTMENT QF THE ARMY
SECOM Management Planning Conference (March)
You asked for some suggested topics:
a. Topic: How to Reestablish National Consensus on Information Secur-
ity. Scope: National (political, media, public, judicial, bureaucracy) atti-
tudes and beliefs about extent,and nature of national information security
requirements to protect intelligence activities (and other "classified infor-
mation") in disarray. Happened in last 7-8 years. Without rough-consensus,
Executive Branch cannot make system work. Bureaucrats complaining to each
other will not solve. Limited, bureaucrat oriented legislation not much help.
Problem substantially political at heart. Political interaction (Legislative-
Executive-Media) in a public debate, while slow and "inefficient" may be only
way to reestablish consensus. Substance of issues extensive: "OKI' for press
to probe, pick, and publish; "wrong" for bureaucrat to reveal: "OR" for Con-
gress/Staff to reveal 99 percent of a "secret," withholding 1 percent classified,
allowing hostile element to "estimate" accurate picture; "litigious" involve-
ment of lawyers in-process forces compromise; "investigative" process, etc.
Should "National Commission" be recommended?
b. Topic: NFIB SOP for Community Damage Assessments. Scope: Damage
assessment process for intelligence information, methods and sources now
informal, relatively unsophisticated. Constantinides initial work. Un-
authorized Disclosures Working Group output necessarily limited. Highly
sophisticated net assessment capability required for meaningful damage assess-
ments. SECOM can "manage" but NFAC and other agency analysts needed.
c. Topic: Future Operating Procedures for SECOM and DCI. Scope: Col-
legial, cooperative, with strong leadership; or "executive authority" opera-
tion, with DCI exercising centralized authority to act or issue binding orders
with or without general agreement. Which most effective; or have EO 12036
and Administration proposals on 5.2525 already pre-empted discussion; delinea-
tion of SECOM jurisdictions vis-a-vis those of other committees and "centers."
d. Topic: Views on New Compartmentation Proposals. Scope: Does new
proposal make progress? How? Without regard to agency positions, what do
SECOM members really think about proposal? How could it be improved? If
F"ECOT-' gets "policing" function, what will be needed, and how to handle?
in C~
Approved For Release 2002/03/25 : CIA-RDP85-00821R 10%3 4$3
 Approved For Release 2002/03/25 CIA-RDP85-00821 R0001 00030034-6
DANI-Z 30 January 1970
5:...:T3JEcr: SECOM Management Planning Conference (March)
e. Topic: Main Threats to Security of Intelligence Information, Methods,
and Sources in Next Years. Scope: Trends in threats to security of in-
telligence activities, at least those threats of foreign origin, have not
changed much in recent years, but the security environment may be changing
(SALT, PRC shifts, new ME alignments). Should SECOM request long-range CT
trends projection from CI production community, estimating nature, scope
and course of future threats to security o'f,US intelligence activities, as
a basis for SECOM advice to NFIB and DCI?
f. Topic: Training and Developing Intelligence Community Security Spe-
cialists. Scope: Comparing security training and development in Intelligence:
Community agencies; differences, distinctions between agencies with intelli-
gence missions only, and multi-mission agencies; impact of differences on
overall security of intelligence activities.
I am sure I will think of others, but these are for starters. The Peary
session could be the best idea to come to SECOM for a long time.
MERRILL T. KELLY
Special Assistant to the ACSI
(Human Systems)
Approved For Release 2002/03/25 : CIA-RDP85-00821 R000100030034-6