OFFICE OF LOGISTICS PERSONNEL ATTITUDES CONCERNING CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00759R000100160012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 24, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT t Office of Logistics Personnel Attitudes Concerning
Current Investigations
STAT I
1. At your request, an attitudinal survey among ffica of LogisticsL
(OL) personnel was conducted on 22 and 23 September. s survey sample con-
sisted of personnel of all grade levels of responsibility in the clerical.
professional, technical, and wage board categories of employees. Their atti-
tudes, reactions, and opinions were gathered by interview, questionnaire,
and written narrative. The basic questions asked for their reactions to
and opinions of:
a. The conduct of both the Senate Select Committee (SSC) and the
House Select Committee (MSC) and their respective staffs,
b. Coverage of the investigations by the news media,
c. Future of the Agency,
. Employee morale*
e. Mr. Colby's handling of the investigations.
2. Understandably, most of our personnel feel resentment that the in-
vestigations are being conducted at all, but what is particularly upsetting
to them is the way in which they are being conducted. Some feel that the
SSC is attempting to be objective and is searching for real problems in an
organized, businesslike way. This reaction might be because we have had less
contact with that committee. On the other hand, they feel that the HSC is
looking primarily for the sensational and going about it in an amateur and
disorganized manner at that. Overwhelmingly, our personnel feel that the
actions of both committees are a struggle for political recognition and
prestige and that those goals are being abetted by the media.
3. With very few exceptions do OL personnel feel that the media are
handling the coverage of the investigations without bias. While few have
been able to follow the proceedings on television, other than excerpts in the
scheduled news broadcasts, all react to the press. The same label of "sensa-
tionalism" prevails in their opinions. They believe that any headline with
"CIA" in it will sell newspapers and magazines and that. as far as the press
is concerned, is more important than the security and integrity of our nation.
Some point out that our questionable and damning activities make the front
page and, where we do have a supportive reporter, those articles are usually
buried deep inside the publication.
NT
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SUBJECT; Office of Logistics Personnel Attitudes Concerning
Current Investigations
4. With regard to the future of the Agency, all believe that the Agency
will survive but expect that it will be reorganized and tightly controlled.
One respondent fears that those controls might limit or adversely affect
our imagination and creativity. Others think that functions will be trans-
ferred to other agencies and that the "central" intelligence agency will,
in effect, disappear. Most have faith, however, that the Congress and the
American people recognize the value of our work and will not permit us to
become a public library of intelligence information.
5. Morale is high among the rank and file employee, but there is a sense
of frustration among the senior personnel who are required to spend so much
time on "unproductive work" at the expense of doing their regular Jobs. Ques-
tions were structured to elicit not only the feeling of the respondent himself
but that of his associates. Only three rank and file respondents indicated
any waning of morale or erosion of pride. On the contrary, our personnel
generally seem to feel like a family under attack. and have developed a resolve
because they recognize the importance of what they have done and what they want
to continue to do in spite of the unknown future of the Agency.
6. Mr. Colby's image receives nothing but high praise. Comments on his
candor, patience, brilliance, and good humor under obvious stressful conditions
were almost universal. Several feel that he might have revealed too much in-
formation to the committees and to the press but, at the same time, admit
that he probably had no other option in an already hostile environment. Others
feel that he might have been able to respond to questions more convincingly
had he been given more complete and accurate information before his appearances.
Still others feel that it is unfair that he has to defend, and be subject to
ridicule for. Agency activities which did not occur "on his watch." It is a
continuing inspiration, however, that in spite of the great amount of his
time and concern that must be devoted to the investigations, he still finds
time and concern to devote to "his own people" in the Agency and its work.
Our feeling might be summed up in the written comment of one of our employees.
"Throughout this whole fiasco, Mr. Colby has been a perfect gentleman and has
shown the patience of a saint and the endurance of an Apache Indian. In spite
of all of the unwarranted and unfortunate publicity, Mr. Colby has given me
reason to be more proud than ever before to be a member of this elite organi-
zation."
7. As the Director of Logistics, it gives me a great deal of pride also
. stand on their dedication and loyalty
44/ Michael J. Malaniclc
ircheel J. Malanick
rector of Logistics
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STATINTL
Distribution:
d# 1 -Arise
'- EOOL'
OL/P&P
OL (.cps
l- D/L Chrono
$, Staff
'' widel in IMSISUIe f
24 Sep*75)
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Mr. Colby: I asked you all to come out here today to try to clarify a little
bit what the discussion this morning was all about. The
first and I think most important aspect is that it is not
a dispute between the executive branch and the Congress
over the Congress' access to information. All the information
concerned has been made available to this committee by
this agency and by the other agencies. What it really is
all about is whether that material, which is highly
classified, will be released publicly, and to the other
nations that are most interested in it, by the action of
a subcommittee Of the Congress in a matter of an afternoon,
and by a vote of that subcommittee without consultation
and discussion with the originators of that kind of
material. The material in question does include some
material that in my view would reveal the intelligence
sources and methods; and there is a specific statute that
calls upon me to protect intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure. The particular kind of
material we are talking about also happens to be communications
intelligence, and there is a specific. statute referring
to that and giving that kind of intelligence specific,
extra protection beyond what other statutes do for other
kinds of classified information and even for other kinds
of intelligence sources and methods. Therefore, the
question is not whether we will, provide this information.
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We have provided it. The question is not whether it
cannot be made public in some form or another, because
over the years we have worked with the other committees
of the Congress on many occasions in seeking a particular
way of phrasing or paraphrasing or sanitizing in some
fashion the documents that they have so that they can be
publicly released. I think you'll find that in both my
own testimony at various times and in other documents
given to the Congress and published by the Congress.
You'll also find it, I might add, in a number of subjects
that are covered that stem from the'most sensitive and
highly classified sources.' I refer, for example, to the
fact that most sophisticated Americans who study Soviet
weapons systems know that there is a new generation that
is in the process of deployment after considerable experimentation:
Most Americans know, on an unclassified basis, the character-
istics of those weapons systems, the fact that they have
MIRVS, and various aspects of them; and this material
comes from the most highly classified and sensitive of
sources. But it has been separated from the source
indications so that it does not pinpoint the way in which
this information was gathered. Therefore, we have in
this question here whether we are going to apply the
statutory requirement that I do protect intelligence
sources and methods and whether we are going to give
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extra protection to this particular Kind of intelligence
sources and methods. We are certainly prepared to negotiate,
discuss, and work out solutions to the very real problems
we know that this presents to the Congress in wanting to
report to the people; and we are sympathetic with that
problem and are sure we could do so. But we can't do so
if there is an assertion of a unilateral ability of a
subcommittee chairman to do this without consultation and
without an effort to develop a way in which it can be
made public without injuring our sources. With that, I'd be
glad to listen to questions.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, the Committee's rules seem to indicate, and I think
the Chairman cited today, that the Committee has the
power. to release whatever information the Committee
determines. Do you challenge the legality of that Committee
rule or . . .
Mr. Colby: This problem came up in the earlier stages of this relationship,
particularly with these investigative committees, and we
determined that it is easy to avoid coming to the ultimate
question there. Good faith on both sides can be worked
through and a solution arrived at that is satisfactory to
the other committees and yet does protect the particular
sources. And I think that kind of negotiation--discussion;
consultation--would have resulted in a solution to this
problem.
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Speaker: Mr. Colby, you've said in the past that some of the
things that have been examples of wrongdoing by the CIA
were aberrations, that you should be judged on what the
Agency does. Are you at all embarrassed by the revelation
that the Agency was so wrong in the Mideast in 73?
Mr. Colby: No, it isn't a revelation. I've referred to it in public
many times myself that our estimates were wrong about
that war. Many of the journalists here probably have
heard me say that. In various speeches I've referred to
it. And so, the fact is that we are wrong sometimes.
This building is not a crystal ball. It's an attempt to
work out the facts and understanding of foreign situations
so that our Government can approach those situations on a
basis of knowledge and better understanding. Now, in the
course we obviously try to point ahead and see what is
likely to develop in the future; and we aren't always
right. This was the purpose of the post-morturn, which is
the subject of discussion today, which was to examine the
way we do these things, to find any weaknesses in them,
and improve our performance. And we have made a nu-nber
of changes in order to improve our performance.
Speaker: Chairman Pike suggested this morning that what had happened
is that he had simply hit a sensitive nerve, that he was
about to demonstrate that the Intelligence Corimtmity
isn't worth the expense. Were you concerned about that?
Do you think that's an accurate statement?
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rear
to
these investigations as a Way of clarifying to the American
people the real nature of modern intelligence and to get
us away from some of the old myths about it. And I'm
convinced that a full, fair, responsible investigation
will show that our intelligence is the hest in the world;
and, yes, that it is costly, but that it's important to
America and is very valuable to America.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, just so we can be sure . . (Interruption)
2nd Speaker: Chairman Pike was having a discussion with
yesterday about. why sources and methods would be revealed
in six paragraphs of conclusions from the analyst's statement,
and he said that, to him anyway, the average man couldn't
see where--pardon me, the average person couldn't see
where any sources or methods were revealed by the text of
those paragraphs. Could you explain to us as a professional
intelligence officer some of the reasons you feel sources
and methods were disclosed in those six paragraphs yesterday?
Mr. Colby: Surely. Only.in the ones that were deleted and certain
aspects that were included, a very few items that were
included, does this apply. The fact is that . . . (Interruption)
STAT Speaker: bjected at first to the release of any of
those paragraphs.
Mr. Colby: We didn't think that they were totally relevant in that
degree. We did release it after some discussion, and the
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overall conclusion was released at the outset. The
overall conclusion about the failure and the way in which
it happened was released.
Speaker: There was nothing about the sources and methods in the
release of conclusions--in the release of all the four
words.
Mr. Colby: Of all but the four words and the other items that are
still deleted.
Speaker: There's nothing about sources and methods in what we have
now.
Mr. Colby: That's right.
Speaker: Except for the four words.
Mr. Colby: Except for the four words, and I'm not going to pinpoint
those four words.
Speaker: Well, can you pinpoint why they were being . . .
Mr. Colby: The reason I do not want to pinpoint the four words and
the reason it is important is that they do -reveal intelligence
sources and methods, and average men and women don't
study these things. Very expert analysts go over it.
They go back to the date on which the event took place.
They look at the practices that they were going through
at that time to see what the basis for the statement in
that particular phrase might have been. They examine
their own machinery to see if there are chinks in the
armor and whethef there are gaps in their ability to keep
secrets that they want to keep secret.
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 Speaker
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going to spot those four words? And then, why not the
rest of us?
Mr. Colby: They may well, but I don't want to help them. And some
of their experts may not be as good as some of the others.
Speaker: You've already said that it deals with comrmmications intel-
ligence and it seems a fairly good guess to speculate
that the four words you are talking about are "and
greater comliutications security," which indicates that
whatever security the .Egyptians had we had the ability to
penetrate.
Mr. Colby: Well, I'm not going to discuss the specifics of the four
words. I am referring to the fact that we do have to
examine very carefully whether a particular revelation of
certain material would indicate the source. This is the
same problem that you ladies and gentlemen of the press
have in the way you write certain things in order to
protect your sources; that if you write a thing in a
certain fashion it will reveal the source, and if you
write it in another fashion it won't reveal the source.
STAT Speaker: Why did you have
object to the release of the
whole paragraph at first, when he first spoke yesterday?
Mr. Colby: When we first talked about this, the question was "Can we
release enough of this so that the conclusions come
clear--so that the basic thrust of the message comes
clear?" And the. answer was "Yes, we can." The question
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o whether to release the individual texts of the assessments
at that time immediately gets into the picking out of one
word, two words, three words; and initially we didn't
really think it was that important to the theme being
pursued, and that consequently it would be easier if he
left the whole thing out. But, when an issue was made
about it, we looked at it carefully and stressed that
only certain, very key words would be important to determining
the source.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, you've been concerned about the public credibility
of this agency and the substance of this, without going
into things that you don't want to discuss, the substance
of this involves a four-word phrase and which you assert
may jeopardize the sources. But, time and time again,
the assertion has been. made that sources are involved.
Frequently, what seems to be involved is something which
any 25-year-old on any side would know. If it is a
matter of whether they could come to the conclusion that
we have a. capability for monitoring cormm_rnications--is
this a great surprise to. you?
Mr. Colby: That's no problem. We've indicated that in the'text
we've released that communications intelligence operations
are carried on. The problem here is that we were referring
to one specific thing at a specific time and date; and,
obviously, in a foreign country certain specific things
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those--a meticulous recapitulation of those--by experts
in that country could indicate to them that certain of
their systems are strong and certain of their systems are
weak.
Speaker:, Are you convinced that these four words, whatever these four
words are, are really important enough, either in themselves
or as an example of something else that would be more
harmful, that would justify this confrontation that you have
now entered into?
Mr. Colby: I certainly think these four words are worth it. I
confess I'm delighted that this issue did not arise over-
the revelation of a name of an American who has helped us
at some risk to his own company's business and his own
livelihood, or to a foreign agent of ours who might be
exposed to punishment and some form of retribution by his
government. We did not have that issue, but it's inherent
in this issue that we are discussing: As to whether the
Chairman and the subcommittee unilaterally will decide
upon the release because they don't think it's important,
or whether they will consult with us and work out a
solution to the way the matter is phrased so that we both
can'go away happy.
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Speaker: ldhat steps are you`prepared to take to regain control
of the material that they now have, if they have decided
to . . .?
Mr. Colby: That's a subject for further negotiation and discussion.
It's premature to answer that question right now.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, did you ask the Committee to delete the four
words that we're talking about, or did they just not do
it, or were they not asked to delete those four words?
Mr. Colby: They were asked and they voted against it.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, there's always been a suspicion of using the
sources and methods argument to keep secret things that
would be embarrassing and now there seems to be growing
suspicion that you're using this furor to cut off cooperation
with that committee and stop its work. Are you going to
try to stop the work of that committee?
Mr. Colby: Of all the things I've done in the course of these investigations,
I think that keeping information from the committees
was not prominent among them. If anything, I've been
criticized rather forcefully for giving them more than
perhaps was necessary. So we are not holding information
back from the committee; were not holding information
back from the Congress; we're not holding information
back from our normal links on the Hill. We are asking
that we have some arrangement by which. we have some
assurance that there will not be a unilateral decision by
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App. roved conu i.ttee to go ahead and relea c something that we
think is important without any discussion or consultation
Speaker: Well, for right now are you going to cut off cooperation
and stop giving them more material?
Mr. Colby: With respect to the House Committee, certainly. The
President indicated that he has directed, and I'm in
full support of that, that we no longer provide any
witnesses or any classified information to them.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, the only way this committee has made much
headway has been to get information from you. In effect,
what you are telling us is that you're going to stop that
investigation unilaterally.
Mr. Colby: We're going to stop it until we can work out an arrangement
where'we have some assurance that there won't be any
revelation without our discussing it together.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, why do you recommend this action . . . (Interruption)
Speaker: Did you recommend this action to the President, Mr. Colby?
Mr. Colby: Our people were discussing this with the committee yester-
day, and I've taken this position. Obviously, the President
.is aware of this whole situation.
Speaker: Did you personally recommend to the President or Mr. Buchen
that this be the method of handling?
Mr. Colby: I made the recommendation to, the committee that this
material not be revealed, and, then follo:Ning its
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and various people there to discuss what should be. one
about it.
Speaker: But they've taken a very particular course of action.
They have halted any cooperation
Mr. Colby: I concur fully with that.
Speaker: But did you recommend it?
Mr. Colby: I concur fully with it. I really don't think we are going
to get into a discussion of who recommends what to the
President at any one time.
Speaker: Can you rule out . . . (Interruption)
Speaker: What else did you recommend?
Mr. Colby: I'm not going to talk about who recoimaends what to the
President.
Speaker: . . . You can recommend it and . .
Mr. Colby: I really don't think I want to get into the discussion
about recommendations to and from the President.
Speaker: Well, you are in the position . . . (Interruption)
Speaker: halt this investigation.
Speaker: Mr. Rowan and others have suggested and I wanted to know
if you, in fact, recommended
Mr. Colby: I fully subscribe, agree, and concur with this action.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, these words, we understand- now, were the
subject of some discussion before and there was obvious
disagreement. Is it not the sort o F disagreement that
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chose to believe that you are wrong?
Mr. Colby: I was not consulted myself. I was not present. I had
no opportunity to discuss what it meant, the background
of it. I've not had any chance. We could have worked
this out undoubtedly over the weekend, or sometime--but
to have a vote right then.
.Speaker: Did your people discuss it with the committee?
Mr..Colby: Well, I'm not going to go into what happened during the
executive session, but we made the point that that material
should not be released. -
Speaker: My point is--is it really an open page or is it a possibility
that it is a matter of judgment, and in its wisdom the committee
judged that the argument put forward by your people
simply had no merit?
Mr. Colby: It is indeed. It's a matter of judgment, and I think my
qualifications to judge this thing are at least as good
as the members of the subcommittee who really are just
new to this whole field.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, you speak a lot about unilateral decisions.
Are you claiming for yourself the unilateral right to
decide what of this can be made public?
Mr. Colby: No. As I've said to the other committees of the Congress,
we try to avoid getting, and find no necessity to get,
to that ultimate question.,`which is a very complicated question
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In our cons a. u Iona of n o governmen can wor.- at
out.
Speaker: And when you do get down to the ultimate question, it's
going to be your way rather than their way?
Mr. Colby: I'm going to avoid the ultimate question. This is the
position we've taken with the other committees: We just
are not going to get to that question. There are lots of
times you can work things out without getting to ultimate
questions.
Speaker: You got close today.
Mr. Colby: Pardon?
Speaker: Aren't you close to the ultimate question now?
Mr. Colby: Yes, we're close to it now. They've already assumed the
answer to the question without trying to work it out.
Speaker: On. your part, are you contemplating court action, a declaratory
judgment . . .
Mr. Colby: It's premature to say how we are going to work it out,
but we'll undoubtedly negotiate about it and try to
resume the cooperation and collaboration that we have had.
As I've said, we have provided a great amount of information
to all the committees and specifically to the two investigating
committees. I don't see any reason why we can't go back
to that, provided we get some resolution of this critical
question of unilateral authority to release material
without discussing it.
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(Interruption)
Speaker: . . could you not have deleted the four words before
you brought it to an issue?
Mr. Colby: The question about deleting it-we have, tried not to take
the position that we will delete all classified information.
That's a question that we don't want to go that far. As
Chairman Pike said, that would make it impossible to
investigate the Intelligence Community..
Speaker: Mr. Colby, some of the words are deleted from this document.
Were they deleted by the committee at the suggestion of
CIA?
Mr. Colby: Yes.
Speaker: So the committee got the document without the deletions?
Mr. Colby: Yes.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, regardless of who took the initiative in demanding
the return of these documents, did you in fact discuss
the action with President Ford before the finite House
made its demand?
,. Mr. Colby: I've had discussions with the White House today.
Speaker: With President Ford?
Mr. Colby: With the White House.
Speaker: Is it your knowledge that this will be the position taken
by the Administration with regard to all agencies, not
just your own?
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speaking for the executive branch.
Speaker: Are the CIA's ground rules on the release of information--
are they clear enough to all the offices of Congress or
will this question continue to come up again and again?
Mr. Colby: It's really been no great problem. We give testimony; we
give highly sensitive testimony in executive session. We
then discuss how much of it can be released. We have
discussions and even arguments about how much should be
released. We've been able to resolve those arguments in
all previous cases to the mutual satisfaction of both
sides.
Speaker: Will this relationship continue on this basis or do you
see necessity for CIA to get tough?
Mr. Colby: No, I'm looking forward to the continuation of
our very good relationships with the rest of the Congress.
We have some very good relationships. We regularly
provide them with very sensitive material. I'm. looking
forward to continuing that because we have an understanding
that it will not be released without our agreement.
Speaker: Did you have any advance warning what was going to
happen yesterday?
Mr. Colby: I found out yesterday.
Speaker: If Mr. Pike refuses to change his position, is there no
way that he will be given classified information?
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Speaker: Mr. Colby, after having heard all this, it seems rather
clear that you don't have confidence in the expertise of
Congressmen with regard to sensitive classified security
information. They on the other hand obviously distrust
your motives in invoking sources and methods and national
security; and I think that's perhaps the dilemma of our
times.
Mr. Colby: I think both sides have a reason for their position and
it's a position that reasonable men-can work out. There
are lots of incompatible things that we work out, we
Americans, through discussion and compromise. As I said,
paraphrasing, changing words slightly, things of this nature
can get the thrust across and still protect the particular
source.
Speaker: Do you plan to meet with Mr. Pike on this?
Mr. 'Colby: Not at the moment. I really don't know what we are going
to do about it right now.
Speaker: Have you received any communication from him or anybody
else on the committee?
Mr. Colby: No, I have not.
Speaker: Or have you in turn communicated with the committee since the
events of this morning?
Mr. Colby: No, I have not. It's premature to give you the answer to
what I plan to do.
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Speaker: Mr. Colby, you have said that you were looking forward to
the day when they would get into the question of how well
the intelligence agencies operate. Judging from what's
happened right now, it looks like they won't get into it
too deeply.
Mr. Colby: I still look forward to getting into it. We have one
post-mortum here that does indicate that we were wrong.
It's a post-mortum that we put together ourselves in
order to learn some lessons. We have other situations that
we are really quite proud of it terms of the work of the
Agency--the SALT agreements, various others, the Pentagon
Papers problems, various things of this nature that have
gone on over the years. I think that the purpose of
intelligence, again, is not to be a crystal ball that
tells you that every leaf on every tree is going to fall
on just what time and date. The purpose of intelligence
is to increase our general American awareness of the
realities of the world in which we live and the factors
at work so that we can approach these problems on a basis
of better unders taading. With this, we obviously try to
project. Sometimes we're rig ht--most tines we're right--
sometimes we're wrong.
Speaker: If I could follow up on that for just a second. If the
committee won't be able to get to an evaluation without
your cooperation, would you predict that. something will
be worked out or do you think that this is it?
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Mr. Colby: I have great #a:Lth in the ability of the American constitutional
structure to work out solutions to apparent impasses.
Ive've done it on many occasions.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, one of the recommendations in the post-mortun
would appear to imply, at least to me, greater effort
and resources expended on the analytical side and relatively
'less on the collection side. Have you done anything
specific in agreement with that recommendation?
Mr. Colby: As you perhaps know, we have been reducing the
amount of personnel and resources in intelligence over
the past several years. In that process, I've made a
particular effort to protect the analytical side from the
same kind and scope of reductions that have applied to
some of the others. This has proportionately given them
a greater role, although in absolute terms even they have
gone down.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, just to pinpoint this
Mr. Colby: Excuse me, we also have put together a number of innovative
ideas as to new ways of analysis, new techniques of
production of our material, new techniques of presentation
of our material to the customers that we serve--a variety
of things in order'to ensure that our message gets home.
Speaker: The implication that I read into that post-mortum was
that you had all the information, but just like at Pearl
Harbor you had no way to get it together in the end to
make it meaningful.
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Intr. Colby: I think the one game that is played' in intelligence
agencies after an event is to look around. for that one
report that predicted it, and I guarantee you, you can find
it. There is always one report somewhere that predicts an
event is going to happen. It may be lost in a hundred that
predict it won't, and it'may be a prediction of a hundred
events that didn't take place. But, after a particular
event, you can always find the one report. The post-morttnn
was to look at the intelligence process of how we put
these together and not come up with some nice fuzzy
answer that satisfies everybody, and on the other hand,
not overlook clear indicators that perhaps are a minority
but do deserve serious consideration- I think in that
post-morturni that's one of the critical features. We had
a bit of a mind set; we thought that certain factors were
moving in a particular direction and we did not give
adequate attention to some other reports and other factors
that indicated the contrary.
Speaker: How much weight do you give to the point that Ray Cline
made yesterday on one case of inaccurate performance on
the part of the Intelligence Corurtulity; that it's all
coming from the bottom; you're not getting information
from the top; that you're not finding out what is being
said in high level negotiations?
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 W. Colby: Appfpved For R le?ser2004/05/12o CIA-RDP85~ 0759MOO1001 l of it
we don't.. And with the ability of the press to penetrate
the information sources of our Government, I have a certain
sympathy with the desirability of holding close some of the
more sensitive diplomatic negotiating initiatives and
activities; and, therefore, I feel that the intelligence
business can give an independent view of a negotiation or
a situation in which our political leaders might be
operating on a misapprehension based on direct assurances.
And, if we in the Intelligence Corrn unity can present the
fact that that is contradicted by some other indicators,
then we make them ask the question of whether they are
right or maybe they are being told something that is not
right. This happens all the time all over the world.
Speaker: Were you aware enough in the period that Mr. Cline talked
about--the Nixon/Kissinger period--were you aware enough
of what was being said in high level negotiations to be
able to provide that information?
Mr. Colby: I can't give a flat, overall statement about that.
Sometimes we knew about them, sometimes we didn't. And,
I think that is not the major factor in this situation.
It certainly was not the major factor that lead to this
particular mistake, by a long shot.
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Speaker: Mr. Colby, to get back to the point of the dispute yesterday,
were you asserting your objections to whatever it was that
the Committee wanted to put in and did eventually make
public--as Director of Intelligence, on behalf of NSA,
or as CIA Director or what?
Mr. Colby: I was asserting them because the statute tells me that I
am responsible for the protection of intelligence sources
and methods.
Speaker: Was it NSA that said, "Don't do it"?
Mr. Colby: No, it was me.
Speaker: But as Director of CIA or as Director of Central Intelligence?
Mr. Colby: It says "The Director of Central Intelligence will protect . . .
and that's my job, so I tried to carry out what the statute
told me to do.
Speaker: You get the distinction . .
Mr. Colby: I get it, but I am responsible all around the block.
Speaker: By the same token, Mr. Colby, could you have -released the
material, unilaterally, on your own . . . ?
Mr. Colby: I would have gone through a procedure before I did so. I
would have gone through a rather complicated procedure
of assessing what the effect gh
mit have been. I did release
a certain amount of this material, obviously.
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Sp a .er : So you have more power than the Select CUluilittee of the House?
Mr. Colby: I have the power to release %4at I think will not reveal
intelligence sources and methods. I do have that power,
which is also in the statute. It says I will protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Obviously, if it's an authorized disclosure, I am not
supposed to protect it. I think various executive orders
have made the point; very clearly that we should not
overclassify, that we should release things when we can.
Speaker: But you do have the power to decide what is an authorized as
opposed to what is an unauthorized disclosure?
Mr. Colby: Anyone who classifies a piece of material can declassify
it under the executive orders.
Speaker: But a full select corronittee, a special select committee of
the House of Representatives, in your opinion does not have
that same power?
Mr. Colby: Without going through the procedure of consultation with
us and discussing it with us, and particularly in'the
course without prior warning on that day.
Speaker: Well, they consulted with you but they simply did not do
what you want.
Mr. Colby: No, I don't think they really did consult with us. They certainly
didn't consult with me. They consulted with a couple of
my officers, and we did not have a . . (Interruption) . .
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 APprR (Rd if el@a?eoZOOL4/iQ?/a 1g[ PI815sOOZ RROO-1401 W,1 Cat
aside from that, I had no opportunity to discuss in d:;tail
the rationale for this.
Speaker: Did you suggest to them via phone call that you could come
down and work this out yourself as one of the options?
Mr. Colby: I had suggested that earlier.
Speaker: They were not interested in your presence?
Mr. Colby: No, they were not interested in my presence.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, now that it's out, how do you size up the impact
on our Intelligence Community?
Mr. Colby: This particular item? I'll have to wait -umti:L I see what
actions are taken by a foreign country; because we have
lost intelligence. Here is a rather prominent item of great
intelligence value that we have lost by a leak. This
particular situation, I will.. have to look at very carefully
to see what reaction this causes, not only in the country
concerned, but also among other countries as to whether
they are going to take advantage of the attention to this
problem and look over their procedures to see if they
are working properly.
Speaker: Did you describe this next step, that is to the Committee,
and the ramifications of it?
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11r. Colby: I don't. IaAoty what was said by my officers. I certainly
didn't.
Speaker: Mr. Colby, are you concerned that the furor over the
President's order that attempts to get this back will
call attention to this document that it might not have
otherwise received?
Mr. Colby: I think that the document as a.whole was going to get
quite a lot of attention. I think, with your ability to
locate references, you're going to do a pretty good job
of trying to find out exactly which words, and that
certainly will call attention, but I'm not going to
pinpoint it.
Speaker: What is the point? If we can.
Mr. Colby: That's my point. You can and so can other people if they
go at it hard, but everybody in the world hasn't got the
same ability that you ladies and gentlemen. have of ferreting
things out.
Speaker: You may tell them.
Mr. Colby: That's your business.
Speaker: There's been a lot of discussion that perhaps the reason
the CIA did this measure was because there are things
that would be brought out by the Pike committee's in-
vestigation into the Portugal situation next week . . .
The CIA's role with the entire Portugal scenario over
the last year and a half . . .
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Mr. Colby: We are just reacting to this partic.t.zlar si tuati.on. ~~'e
were not thinking ahead to any particular problem in the
future. Although, as I did indicate, I am, concerned about
the human beings who work with us, both Americans and
others. I believe that we must make this point. I have
given very firm assurances to a lot of people, both
Americans and foreigners, that their names grill not come
out. Now I have got to carry out that assurance or we are
not going to get people to work with us. I'Ve're already
having people withdraw from working with us, and I certainly
don't want to chase any more away. I think that gives
the answer.
'hank you very much, ladies and. gentlemen.
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26
 ki, As the CIA has ecc, le a l Cttr r tin ~n
edfi~ift' Rel as::2404/0,5+AI~c~R=.091R(}Q04079fAQr~a2~~st year, t r rrn.,er
v I' p C+ r. { S ' \E ~ ~ Of Americans \:17 ivP_.it a ositive rit-
{ 4 in,,- has risen 5 rots ;;ltl:o r e a ,,n-
t 15-T!
-
; f ~' r 4' cy's negative marks also her risen 3
points. Its ratings tend to rarallel "thosF: - 1
of the Federal Bureau of Iris estigatior:
t e, and oth federal law-enforce - ,it arc
,r ~~-~ '~I ~t1 ,' TFfE ~r1IiIUUS bn3re_s that have been
I vc t1 -I-.-
gati,.b the :
1 CL' L. -have-.. not ?- bFen1~
building cnormot of is reservo.rs o. public
confidence. The cross-section was asked.-.
"There -have been several re^ ?nt, in
ve;tiga,aons of the. C.IA: Do you feel the
71
Y f tr Y7TrDSJ' ' /GAG [read list} investigations have been.f all
OUIS~4TC1Ses cr and- 'Just,'too harsh on the ClA, cr a
- whitewash of the CIA'?`
BY A 47 to 2"a per cent nlctraltt}.,'.~ A.symbol on ihte rise. ? t err ?a Too wvrr7o-
Americans laser" "mak n g. ,ee Ceri -Just hush rash sore
lntelligenr-e?Agency more-2c
~3
countable"to the CIA must br rrinnitorcd more clesel fi ~ec[ai.r