URBAN INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 182
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 19, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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19 July 1972
MEMORANDUM THRU: -CHIEF,-SECUR;TY_OPERATIONS_DIVISIM.
FOR: DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Urban Insurgency
1. Introduction.
- ateti!-172)0 JUL 1972
a. In your 10 Jul 72 memorandum to me, subject: "Project for Active
Duty Training," you directed me:
(1) To determine what changes, if any, are necessary in US Army
doctrine respecting urban insurgency, and
(2) To outline a study effort to effect appropriate changes.
b. I have conferred with the individuals listed in your memorandum,
have reviewed 'AU :selected references and study work similarly recommended,
and have held informal discussions with knowledgeable CIA associates.
c. The short answers to the two tasks listed above are:
? (1) Existing US Army doctrine respecting insurgency is sound; it needs
to be supplemented by detailed doctrinal sta5Fements particularized for the
urban situation, and by tactical principles to provide guidance for the
conduct of operations to identify,. prevent and counter urban insurgency.
(2) The above task can best be performed by the creation, in the FM
31-series, of an authoritative. text. This effort can be successfully
undertaken by in-house Army assets pursuing allocated sub-tasks as suggested
hereinafter.
2. Discussion.
a. Basic US Army doctrine pertinent to urban insurgency is contained
in () FM 100-20, "Field Service Regulations: Internal Defense and
Development (IAD),". May 1967. Although dated in some respects (revisions
needed aremainly those to update changes over the past five years in US
organization - Chapter 5 - and in national policy - the Nixon Doctrine),
FM 100-20 remains entirely valid in its general statements of overall
policy and broad doctrinel
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(1) "Strengthening of police agencies, the first line of defense, and
reorientation or increased emphasis on certain basic police control techniques
to diminish the insurgent threat, are prerequisite to the conduct of
successful government operations...." (3-7h)
? (2) "The police should be expanded and reorganized as required to support
the increased populace and resources control effort, the intelligence
effort, and restoration of law and order to planned priority areas.
Paramilitary forces may be organized or expanded to supplement the police
or regular military forces." (3-8h)
(3) "CIA is responsibleiXother activities as directed." (5-2b)
(4) "AID...plans and implements programs...to maximize the capability
of civil police." (5-4h)
(5) '!DOD develops friendly paramilitary or police forces...or
strengthens existing organizations." (5-6)
(6) "DOD...develops military doctrine for stability operations."
(5-6c)
(7) "Specific responsibility of the Army in stability operations:
develop...the doctrine, tactics, procedures, techniques, and equipment
to be used...." (6-2b)
(8) "The Army...supports AID through direct liaison at national and
field level. Army personnel support AID operations by administering the
aspects of the MAP program that beara/..military and paramilitary, police
activity." (6-3g)
(9) "US support of civil police forces normally will be accomplished
through AID. Paramilitary police forces may be supported through MAP."
(6-7c) .
(ID "AID has primary responsibility for coordinating US suppdrt to
civil and some paramilitary police. DOD also provides training, when
appropriate, for paramilitary and.military forces which support police
operations." (6-11c)
(11) "Local and regional police are used to assist in establishing
and maintaining order in urban areas." (7-6e)
? b. Necessarily broad, these and similar doctrines set forth in FM
100-20 do not particularize the urban situation, the only specific allusion
to which is contained in the passage quoted in (11) above. Nevertheless, FM
100-20 constitutes a sufficient broad framework for development of detailed
doctrine, and indeed invites such development in the passages quoted in
(6) and (7) above.
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c. There have been at least two abortive attempts in recent years to
produce authoritative doctrine on urban insurgency. One, described in
your memorandum, attempted the external research route, which was deemed
inappropriate. The other, launched in 1968, attempted to have USACDC
develop a single FM on the subject. This latter effort has had a pathetically
inconclusive' history. A year was first consumed in approving a ,USACDC
counter-proposal that specified existing FM's be revised, rather than treating
urban insurgency in a separate FM. Three more years have now elapsed and
hone of the proposed revisions have yet been published. A June 72 "Final
Draft Manuscript"of FM 31-23, incorporating some agreed changes does exist,
but "does not reflect final approval of DA." Nor does it cover much of
the material outlined in the original CDC proposal.
d. It is my firm opinion that the initial DCSOPS concept of a single
FM devoted to urban insurgency was sound. I feel ODCSOPS erred in its
4 Jun 69 acceptance of USACDC's alternative, and specifically that the
following ODCSOPS comment was in error:
"Due to the relevancy of urban warfare doctrine for counterguerrilla
and stability operations, and for combat in fortified and built-up areas,
it is felt that the multiple manual approach would provide a broader
exposure of the desired doctrine and facilitate its availability to users."
.This formula assumes two errors. It accepts the notion that the single FM
and the multiple approach are mutually exclusive, which they of course are
not. It also adopts the phrase urban warfare as substituted by USACDC
for the initial charge to get on with urban insurgency, and thus sets the
tone for all which followed, in which process the problem became diffused
into the whole field of combat in towns.
e. It is now time to return to the original 1968 proposition. If,
meanwhile, USACDC ever does get around to inserting urban insurgency matters
into other related FMs, all to the good. But a separate integral manual on
urban insurgency is every bit as heeded now as it ever has been, and should
be produced forthwith.
f. There is no lack of pertinent material. In fact the problem
is rather one of culling the available literature to extract the best. A
good start in this direction has been made:
(1) "Currant_Urban Guerrilla_Tpctics:. A_Bi3aliography," Franci/s
M. Watson, Jr. (CRESS/CINFAC), Sep 1970.
(2) "Army Doctrine,on_Urban Counterinsyrgeacy," a May 72 Active Duty
Training Troject by MOBDESNAJ Sellers, with Anx A, "Collected References,
and Comments as to Relevance to Urban Counterinsurgency Doctrine."
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(3) "A Selected Annotated Bibliography on Urban Low-Intensity Conflict,"
Battelle, 12 Jan 72 (C).
These three annotated bib iographies, and the better of the works they list,
shold provide all that is needed to describe urban insurgency and its
causative factors.
g. What is more difficult to come by is source material on the Army's
role in countering urban insurgency. Available reports on the Vietnam
urban aspects of TET 68 and "MINI-TET" (May 68) should be reviewed. Army
contributions to PHOENIX, with special reference to PHOENIX in the major
Vietnam cities, should also be culled. The POI's worked up at USARSA for
the Seminar on Urban Watfare (0-7) and the old Irregular Warfare Orientation
Course (06-A) offer leads to preventive measures.
h. What is most difficult of all is to achieve AID and CIA input
designed to flesh out the generalized statements in FM 100-20 such as those
quotes in 2a (3) and (4) above. Here it would seem desirable to seek drafting
assistance from those two agencies, perhaps best done after all other sections
of the new FM have been drafted and are available.
i. A word should be said at this point about the real, or at least alledged
sensitivity of this subject. Concern that the Army's interest therein would
be misconstrued as a domestic concern seems to have conditioned the 1970
turn-down of the proposal to contract out a study of the problem and is
probably still a factor. Whether or not such concern is justified, the
decision was all to the good, for yet another "study" would probably not
have filled the bill. The production of an FM wouldoeven if it were
classified "Confidential," and if meaningful input from CIA is to be obtained,
it will probably be necessary to resort to classification anyway. So for
both purposes, protection from domestic outcry and inclusion of somewhat
sensitive information, it is prudent to think in terms of a classified FM,
in order to get on with a meaningful production.
j. Another word is in order on nomenclature. It has been noted above.
that the phrase-turn from "urban insurgency" to "urban warfare" badly side tracked
the first FM proposal. Now that "IDAID4has become a term of art, it might
be well to think of the new FM's title as a take?off from FM 31-22, "Internal
Defense/Development Operations, US Army Doctrine." Perhaps what we are striving
for could be entitled: (C) FM 31-22A, "Ititernal Defense/Development Operations -
Urban Areas" (U). On the other hand if FM 31-23, "Stability Operations -
US Army Doctrine" even achieves DA approval, it would supersede FM 31072,
12 Nov 63 and (S) FM 31-22A, 22 Nov 63., Alternatively, a supplement to FM
31-16, "Counterguerrilla Operations," could be produced as (C) FM 31-16A,.
"Counterguerrilla Operations - Urban Areas."
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3. Study Effort and Allocation of Sub-Tasks.
a. On-going Efforts.
(1) ARPA is grinding out a study of "Military Operations in Built
up Areas," originated 1 Oct 71. This title e6hemistically covers some
material on urban insurgency,and hence the effort should be kept under review
for whatever use can be made of, the relevant materials it generates. But
it will be long in gestation, will be somewhat broad brush and theoretical
in content, and (most importantly) will lack the authenticity implicit in an
approved FM. It should not therefore, be viewed as an answer to the problem.
(2) AIR has produced some police studies (typical is a May 72 pamphlet
on the police of India, Guatemala, Bolivia and Thailand).which should be
reviewed for possible relevance to the required FM. AIR also made a presenta-
tion to the recent MORS Symposium's panel on urban insurgency. The results
of that panel's effort should shortly be available to JCS J3 DOCSA (COL
Norman or COL Birch), and should 'be reviewed.
(3) Carlisle's Strategic Studies Institute will be assigning a 2/4 man
team to a project "Service Roles in Providing Assistance to Allies Under
the Nixon Doctrine" in December. This effort may be a vehicle for
additional broad-brush treatment of urban insurgency.
(4) Individual authors continue to produce works bearing on the
problem. One such, better than most, is "Urban Guerrillas, the New
Face of Political Violence," by Robert Moss (London: Temple Smith, 1972).
Such productions should be reviewed while the FM is in process to assure
inclusion of up-to-date information and examples.
b. Proposed Study Effort.
Since none of the above ongoing efforts bids fair to solve the need
an in-house DA effort is proposed, with allocation of sub-tasks as follows:
' (1) ODCSOPS MOBDES. A forthcoming MOBDES to IA should be assigned a
project for Active Duty training which would require him to:
(a)" Pull together in one location the full texts of the better works
listed in the bibliographies above.
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(b) Research available DA histories and accounts bearing upon MACV
activities in Vietnam urban areas 1965 to date, with special emphasis on
TET and MINI-TET 68.
(2) FM Drafting Team. Realizing that Tb O manpower available to IA is
so sufficiently engaged in current business as to prevent undertaking the
task of drafting the required FM, it is suggested that a two-man team,
consisting of a junior active duty officer at Ft Bragg and a senior retired
officer be formed. The model would be the comparable group which created
the FARSEA "Guerrilla Handbook." The materials collected as a result of (1)
above should be gathered at Bragg, where the junior member of the team could
commence drafting. The contract retiree, available for up to 90 days,
could review drafts and improve them on the basis of his experience.
(3) When a semi-finished draft is at hand, IA SO UW could make it
available to AID/PSD and CIA for addition of material pertinent
to those two agencies.
25X1
(4) The final IA draft could then be vetted through ODCSOPS for forwarding
to CDC with an updated version of the initial 1968 request for the prompt
completion of a finished FM on urban insurgency.
4. Recommendation. That the above be approved as a method of proceeding?
to produce an Army Field Manual on Urban Insurgency.
R. D. DRAIN
COL, AR-USAR
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THE PROBLEM OF URBAN INSURGENCY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SEeTION I: INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose of Study. The study of urban insurgency was undertaken for the
following purposes:
a. To identify the characteristics of urban insurgency and the military
aspects of its containment.
b. To determine whether or not revolutionary conflict is shifting
from rural guerrilla warfare to urban insurgency.
c. To determine whether or not current US Army doctrine will be
adequate for coping with urban insurgency.
2. Assumptions and Restraints. The study does not examine the containment
of urban insurgency within the US. Nor does it consider the possible conduct
of urban insurgency operations by US forces within the context of an
unconventional warfare mission.
3. Methodology. The study is based on the examination of revolutionary.
texts, the analysis of current revolutionary doctrine and a case-study
survey of 43 recent examples of urban insurgency, such as Algiers (1956-
59), Montevideo (1963-70) and Belfast (1967-73). Approximately 100
books, articles and films are cited in the bibliography.
4. Organization of Study Results. The study is organized into three
sections of three chapters each. Section I deals with revolutionary
theory, modern urbanization and current revolutionary doctrine. Section
II outlines the organizational and operational characteristics of an
urban underground. Section III examines US defense policy, identifies
the tactical principles necessary for success in urban counterinsurgency
operations, and provides solutions to the problems associated with the
conduct of such operations. A detailed table of contents is provided
at Tab A.
SECTION II: MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
1. The Nature of the Problem. The study yields six major conclusions
with regard to the problem of urban insurgency:
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a. Because of the rapid urbanization of the modern world and
because of the political unrest associated with such urbanization,
insurgency within metropolitan areas is likely to increase. Subversive
literature currently being circulated throughout the world emphasizes
the vulnerability of the urban area.
b. Urban insurgency differs from rural insurgency in its emphasis
upon techniques of provocation. It concentrates on tactics which will
provoke overreaction by the government and arouse public opinion against
the government. Emphasizing terrorism, it does not rely upon the
development and maintenance of large guerrilla bands to achieve
revolution.
c. The impact of media television will have a crucial effect on US
public opinion regarding Army involvement in urban counterinsurgency
operations. Because of this impact, and because of the traditions which
govern its role in national defense, the Army will be vulnerable to a loss
of public support and the consequent erosion of its own stability when
it becomes involved in urban counterinsurgency operations.
d. The cities of the US can be seriously affected by urban insurgency
occurring within selected foreign cities. Because the major cities of
the world are netted technologically in terms of such functions as trade,
finance, communications and transportation, the stability of the US is
dependent on the stability of these functions within many cities external
to its own boundaries, and hence the US itself may be affected indirectly
by interference with these functions.
e. Because of this technological extension, and because US armed
forces are vulnerable to the erosion described above, if drawn into
counterinsurgency operations, urban insurgency lends itself to strategic
employment against the US, carried out by a third power sponsoring conflict
within selected foreign cities under the guise of revolutionary insurgency.
f. US Army tactical doctrine is generally inadequate for urban
counterinsurgency operations and could result in an escalation of conflict
if employed in such operations. Because it is oriented toward rural
guerrilla warfare, this doctrine fails to emphasize the techniques of
non-provocation essential for an urban environment.
2. Responses to the Problem. The study also yields five conclusions with
regard to how the Army may respond to the problem of urban insurgency.
a. A separate urban counterinsurgency manual should be prepared. This
manual would indicate how provocation may be avoided in urban counter-
insurgency warfare by the incorporation of certain basic principles (the
principles of patience, discrimination and restraint) in tactical doctrine.
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b. A training program should be developed for utilization by US Army
personnel prior to engagement in urban counterinsurgency operations as
either advisors or unit members. This training would clarify the way in
which urban insurgency differs from rural insurgency and would emphasize
practical exercises which stress the principles cited above.
c. An urban counterinsurgency CPX format should be developed. This
CPX would train personnel in the techniques of integrating military action
with civic action in an urban environment, and would stress reliance on
non-military agencies in the containment and elimination of urban in-
surgency.
d. The Army should avoid involvement in the containment of sporadic
?urban terrorism. Since the containment of such terrorism does not appear
to be a proper military mission, other Federal agencies should be employed
for this purpose and should be utilized in an advisory assistance role to
strengthen foreign police agencies as necessary.
e. Although not directly confronted with domestic problems concerning
urban insurgency, the active Army should develop more effective ways of
assisting the National Guard in executing two essentially conflicting
missions, i.e., domestic disturbance and mobilization readiness.
SECTION III: OUTLINE OF STUDY
1. Background Considerations. Section I of the study provides a definition
of urban insurgency, an examination of the way in which the urban environ-
ment is susceptible to insurgency, and a survey of how current revolution-
ary techniques seek to exploit this vulnerability.
a. Urban insurgency is defined as systematic low-intensity aggression
against the technological, economic and political structure of an urbanized
nation, occurring within its own boundaries or within those metropolitan
areas to which it is linked via this structure, undertaken for either
revolutionary purposes or for purposes of diverting its military strength.
b. The urban environment is shown to be extremely vulnerable to
subversion because of its technological complexity and because of the
political unrest associated with modern urbanization. It is also shown
to be compatible with the sustained conduct of insurgency operations.
c. Revolutionary doctrine currently available is shown to advocate
terrorism, hijacking, assassination and "propaganda by violence" in the
conduct of urban insurgency. Carlos Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban
Guerrilla is examined in detail, and is shown to advocate tactics which
are adaptable to both revolutionary urban insurgency and strategically-
motivated urban insurgency.
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2. The Characteristics of Urban Insurgency. Based on case-studies,
Section II shows that:
a. The urban underground is usually organized in small, highly
compartmentalized cells which operate on a sustained basis without their
members departing from normal civilian routine. These cells are readily
adapted to the exploitation of larger elements, such as Mass protest
movements.
b. The recruiting, training and logistical procedures employed by
an urban insurgency apparatus are extremely efficient within the metro-
politan environment. The techniques of ambush, raid and terrorism
employed by such an apparatus are all based on the exploitation of the
environment s physical and social characteristics.
d. The Battle for Algiers and other case-studies indicate that the
principal military problem in coping with urban insurgency is the danger
of over-reaction, the use of excessive military force and the consequent
escalation of violence. As a result, military action often succeeds in
the momentary containment of an insurgency while provoking a mass reaction
which will cause resumption of revolt.
3. National Defense Against Urban Insurgency. In Section III, the
examination of national defense policy and national tradition indicates
that:
a. The Army's role in national defense requires the maintenance of
public support and the accomodation of public opinion. In the execution
of the FID program, its involvement in urban counterinsurgency operations
calls therefore for the recognition of three traditions which underlie
public opinion: the respect for efficiency, the tendency to reduce complex
foreign problems to moral issues, and the non-glorification of war.
b. In order to accomodate these attitudes, in order to guard against
the revolutionary principle that conventional forces are best destroyed
piece-meal by erosion of public support, and in order to guard against
the escalation of an insurgent situation, the Army must incorporate in
its counterinsurgency tactical doctrine three princples via which all this
may be accomplished:
(1) Patience in the containment and elimination of an insurgent
movement, in order to prevent escalation and involvement of US forces
beyond the advisory role envisioned in the FID program.
(2) Discrimination in target selection within the urban environment,
so that public opinion is not aggravated by counterinsurgency operations.
(3) Extreme restraint in the use of firepower and explosives, so that
provocation and escalation of the insurgent situation are avoided to the
maximum extent possible.
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c. To maintain preparedness to cope with urban insurgency as it might
occur within a foreign environment, and to maintain a capability of executing
those roles it might play within the framework of the FID program, the Army
does not need to establish and maintain specially trained units. A more
reasonable response would be those measures indicated in Par 2, Sect II above.
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CONTENTS
SECTION I: BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS
Chapter 1: Urban Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare 1
1. The Analysis of Urban Insurgency
2. Definitional Problems in the Analysis of Urban Insurgency
3. Revolution and the Dual-Warfare Nature of Modern Conflict
4. The Nature of Subversion
5. From Subversion to Insurgency
6. Rural Guerrilla Warfare as an Aspect of Insurgency
7. A Definition of Urban Insurgency
Chapter 2: The Urban Complex as an Insurgent Environment 20
1. The City in History
2. The Process of Modell Urbanization
3. The Vulnerability of the Urban Complex
4, Strategic Subversion and the World-City Urban Complex
5. Strategic Principles Bearing Upon Urban Insurgency
6. The Impact of Urbanization Upon Insurgent Warfare
7. Insurgency in a Technological Environment
Chapter 3: Insurgent Doctrine and Revolutionary Thought. 0 ? 0 ? 38
1. Revolutionary Doctrine and Urban Insurgency
2. The History of Revolutionary Doctrine'
3. Lenin's Concept of Partisan Warfare
4. Revolutionary Insurgency and the Principle of Erosion
5. The Popularization of Revolutionary Doctrine
6. Urban Insurgency and Its Strategic Implementation
SECTION II: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN INSURGENCY
Chapter 4: Organization of the Urban Underground . . . .... ... 56
1. The Persistence of the Underground
2 The Objectives of.the Underground
3. The Cellular Princple of Underground Organization
4. Communications and Security Within the Urban Underground
5. The Organization of Demonstrations
Chapter 5: Administration and Operation of the Urban Underground . ? . ? . 72
1. Recruiting Procedures Within the Underground
2. Training Within the Urban Underground
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3. Logistical Considerations Within the Urban Underground
4. Intelligence Collection Within the Urban Underground
5. Raids, Ambushes and Terrorism in the Urban Environment
Chapter 6: Recent Trends in Urban Insurgency 89
1. The Battle for Algiers: Its Background and Development
2. FLN Operations in the Bittle for Algiers
3. French Army Operations Against the FLN
4. The IRA and the Battle for Ireland
5. The Tupamaros and the Battle for Montevideo
6. The Operations of the Black September Organization
SECTION III: NATIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST URBAN INSURGENCY
Chapter 7: US Defense Policy and the National Tradition.
1. National Policy and Dual-Warfare Preparedness
2, The Army's Role and the National Tradition
3. The National Guard and the Strategic Problem
4. The Military Assistance Program and the FID Program
5. Political Awareness and National Tradition
0 ?0000 ? 0 .104
Chapter 8: Political Awareness and Tactical Doctrine 122
1. The Need for a Separate Doctrine
2. Factors Influencing Political Awareness
3. Tactical Efficipncy and the Principle of Patience
4. Target Selection and the Principle of Discrimination
5. Tactical Violence and the Principle of Restraint
6. Urban Counterinsurgency Tactics and the Principles of War
Chapter 9: Problems and Solutions 140
1. The Development of a Separate Urban Counterinsurgency Manual
2. The Need for .a Special Program of Instruction
3. Training for Urban Counterinsurgency via the CPX Method
4. The Need to Develop Non-Military Counterterror Capabilities
5. Problems for the Future
Bibliography. . .
?0 ? ????00?0?004 0000 004 156
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THE PRCOLDI OF URBAN INSURGENCY
APRIL 1973
PREPARED BY
INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARNE
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PREFACE
The study which follows was initially undertaken as an effort to determine
the nature of urban insurgency, with its primary objective being the identifi-
cation of current trends in revolutionary warfare.
In the beginning, its specific orientatien was based on two questions: Is
revolutionary conflict shifting from rural guerrilla warfare to a new and dif-
ferent kind of insurgency within the confines of the metropolitan area? And if
BO, what are the characteristics of this new form of revolutionary action? As
the study indicates, the attempt to answer these questions led to the discovery
that a far more complicated threat lies hidden in the nature of urban insurgency.
This threat is essentially strategic, and not revolutionary.
What this ?mans is that for the United States, the perils of urban in-
surgency are to be identified in two forms: the diversion and erosion of its
armed forces, and the crippling of its technology. These themes are addressed
throughout the study.
The study recognizes that domestic disturbances are not the proper con-
cern of the US Army. Indeed, in Chapter Seven this restraint and the national
traditions which underlie it are examined in detail, for they have indirect im-
pact upon the way in which the Army may prepare for missions outside the nat-
ional boundaries.
The study iS divided into three sections. In Section I, it examines the
nature of revoluti onary warfare, the growth of urbanization and the character-
is tic? of modern revolutionary doctrine. In Section II, it summarizes the
organizational and operational techniques of an illegal urban underground, and
also identifies certain recent incidents -- particularly the struggles within
Algiers, Belfast and Montevideo, as well as the activities of the Black Sept-
'ember movement -- as being most indicative of what urban insurgency may amount
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411.1r
to. Section Section III is devoted to an examination of current US defense policy,
the ways in which the Army may cope with the problems which underlie urban
insurgency, and the specific actions it may take to prepare itself for an
urban counterinsurgency role outside the United States.
One of the primary conclusions set forth in the final section i3 that
successful urban counterinsurgency operations require unusual political aware-
ness on the part of the personnel involved. 'Exactly how such awareness may
be integrated with tactical doctrine is set forth in Chapter Eight. A second
major conclusion is that the Army may best prepare for such operations by de-
veloping a separate field manual, by creating special instructional packages,
and by somploying CPUs designed to Orient its personnel to the complexities
of urban counterinsurgency warfare. A third and perhaps more surprising con-
clusion is that in order to guard against its own over-commitment (as well as
the threat of erosion) the Army would be well advised to encourage the develop-
ment of non-military police forces capable of bearing the burden of the urban
insurgency threat. These matters are examined in Chapter Nine.
Source materials are set forth' in the bibliography at the end of the
study. The study was completed in April 1973, and was done by COL Seale. R.
Doss (USAR) sax! CPT Ronald Hiett (USAR), under the direction of the Security
Operations Division, International and Civil Affairs Directorate, Office of
the Deputy Chief of staff for Military Operations.
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Ale CONTENTS
;SECTION BACKGROUND CONSIDERATTUNS
Chaptm. 1: Urban Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare .
1. The Analysis of Urban Insurgency
2. Definitional Problems in the Analysis of Urban Insurgency
3. Revolution and the Dual-Warfare Nature of Modern Conflict
h. The Nature of Subversion
5, From Subversion to Insurgency
6. Rural Guerrilla Warfare as an Aspect of Insurgency
7. A Definition of Urban Insurgency
Chapter 2: The Urban Complex as an Insurgent Environment . ^ ? 20
I. The .City in History
2. The Process of Modern Urbanization
3. The Vulnerability of the Urban Complex
/4. Strategic Subversion and the World-City Urban Complex
5. Strategic Principles Bearing Upon Urban Insurgency
6. The Impact of Urbanization Upon Insurgent Warfare
7. Insurgency in a Technologieal Environment
Chapter 3: Insurgent Doctrine and Revolutio nary Thought . . . 38
4
I. Revolutionary Doctrine and Urban Insurgency
2. The History of Revolutionary Doctrine
3. Lenin's Concept of Partisan Warfare ?
it. Revolutionary Insurgency and the Principle of Erosion
5. The Popula ization of Revolutionary Doctrine
6. Urban Insu gency and Its Strategic Implementation
SECTION II: TI E CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN INSURGENCY
Chapter h: Organization of the Urban Underground . ? 56
1, The Persistence of the Underground
2. The Objectives of the underground
3. The Cellular Principle of Underground Organization
h. Communications and Security Within the Urban Underground
5. The Organization of Demonstrations
Chapter 5: Administration and Operation of the Urban Underground ? . .72
1. Recruiting Procedures Within the Underground
2. Training Within the Urban Underground
3. Logistical Considerations Within the Urban Underground
h. Intelligence Collection Within the Urban Underground
5. Raids, Ambushes and Terrorism In the Urban Ihvironment
Chapter 6: Recent Trends in Urban Insurgency . . 89
? 1. The Battle for Algiers: Its Background and Development
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2. TIN Operations In the Battle For Algiers
3. French Anny Operations Against the FLN
It. The IRA and the Battle for Belfast
5. The Tupamaros and the Battle for Montevideo
6. The Operations of the Black September Organization
4
SECTION III: NATIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST URBAN INSURGENCY.
Chapter 7: US Defense Policy and tl-n National Tradition ? ? ? 104
1. National Policy and Nal-Warfare Preparedness
2. Tho Army's Role and the National Tradition
3. The National Guard and the Strategic Problem
h. The Military Assistance Program and the FID Problem
5. Political Awareness and National Tradition
Chapter 8: Political Awareness and Tactical Doctrine
?
1. The Need for a Separate Doctrine
2. Factors Influencing Politicil Awareness
3. Tactical Efficiency and the Principle of Patience
Target Selection aixi the Principle of Discrimination
5, Tactical Violence ard the Principle of Restraint
6. Urban Counterinsurgency Tactics and the principles of War
? 122
-Chapter 9: Problems and Solutions ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 1140'
1, The Development of a Separate Urban Counterinsurgency Manual
2. The Need for a Special. Program of Instruction
3. Training for Urban Counterinsurgency via the CPX Method
h. The Need to Develop Non-Military Counterterror Capabilities
5. Problems for the Future
Bibliography ? 9 0 0 ? ? ? ? ? 156
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SECTION I
BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS
All warfare is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must
seem unable; when using our forces,
we must seem inactive; when we are
near, we must make the enenvf believe
that we are away; when far away, we
must make him believe we are near.
Hold out baits to entice the enemy.
Feign disorder, and crush him.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
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CHAPTER ONE
, VIW ,Wir
URBAN INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
1. The Analysis of-Urban Insurgency
Violence in the streets is not a strictly modern phenomenon. Almost
,all the major cities of the world have been aubjected at one time or another
to crippling outbursts of rebellion or agitation, usually in the wake of
economic or social disorder. In the 20th Century, 'however, such disorder
has been accompanied by the announced determination of various revolutionary
movements to bring about political upheaval through urban violence. It is
not surprising, therefor, that urban violence is now the subject of in-
creasing attention on the part of political and military analyets.. The
term "urban insurgency" has thus crept into the vocabulary of those con-
cerned with violence in the modern city. "
Certain fundamental questions dominate this concern:
(1) What are the distinguishing characteristics of urban insurgency, as
opposed to random)violence in the city?
.(2) What is the relationship between urban insurgency and other forms
of revolutionary activity, such as a rutal-based guerrilla movement?
(3) What are the countermeasures which have proven successful in pre-
venting, controlling or combatting urban insurgency In actual instances of
its occurrence?
In short, the effort to analyse urban insurgency revolves around an
?
attempt to define it first, and then determine its characteristics. This
attempt requires an examination of the various forms of revolutionary act-
ivity, the purpose of this examination being the development of distinctions
by means of which urban insurgency may be identified and studied. This pro-
cess of analysis permits the isolation of urban insurgency as a phenomenon
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Ailie Noe
separate from (although, on occasion, related to) other forms of violence
and subversion. Additionally, it permits the dissection of identified in-
stances of urban insurgency on a case-study basis. This case-study procedure
facilitates the determination of .the causes, as well as the stages, of urban
insurgency.
Finally, the case-study identification of the causes of urban insurgency
permits examination, of the role of political doctrine and political agitation
in the creation of urban unrest and the transformation of such unrest into
actual insurgency. The widespread use of political propaganda in the 20th
Century has frequently resulted in the misidentification of random violence
as true insurgency, with this conflIsion sometimes even encouraged for the
sake of political provocation. Therefore the exact determination of the re-
lationship between agitation and insurgency is of central importance in under-
standing the latter.
There is no shortage of insurgent doctrine as such. Set forth in the
works of revolutionary writers ranging from Lenin to Carlos Marighellaj
blueprints for insurgency are readily available. Nor is there a shortage
of historical instances of urban violence, although many such instances
prove upon closer scrutiny to be considerably less than actual insurgency.
The systematic analysis of urban insurgency thus permits concentration upon
a selection of representative revolutionary works and their relationship
to specific instances of such insurgency.
' Despite the availability of both doctrine and exartles, the analysis
of their relationship reveals a general unawareness that detailed blueprints
for urban insurgency have existed since the turn of the century. More modern
revolutionary writing has largely concentrated on thi central role played by
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rural guerrilla warfare, with only peripheral attention to the details of
urban warfare. However, the recent increase in urban terrorism suggests a
shift back to the metropolitan area as the center of insurgency, and thus
suggests the resurrection of the earlier, urban-oriented revolutionary
doctrine. This doctrine is elaborated upon lb:Chapter Three following the
analysis, in Chapter Two, of the social and cultural forces which underlie
this renewed emphasis upon urban revolution.
2. Definitional Problems in the Analysis of Urban Insurgency
The definition of key words and phr,..ses is of considerable importande
in the study of urban insurgency. 'Since the shift from guerrilla warfare
to urban insurgency reflects a shift in revolutionary thought -- as outlined
in Chapter Three -- it is notourprising that the key toms employed in dis-
cussing, describing and analysing this process are also subject to change.
A case in point is the meaning of the ward "guerrilla". In the language of
the rural-oriented discussion of revolutionary conflict, the word owes its
meaning to a concept of unconventional warfare within which armed revolution-
aries operate as militarily-organized units engaged in raids, ambushes and
similar assaults upon conventional military forces. In the more recent
shift within revolutionary doctribe, "guerrilla" takes on a different mean-
ing, as is reflected in Marighellafs Minimanual For the Urban Guerrilla.
Committed to terrorism and "propaganda by violence", Marighellals urban
rebel becomes a guerrilla only as the word itself undergoes a change in usage.
Definitions are nevertheless important, for they provide the theoretical
framework necessary for an examination of the problem of urban insurgency.
Within the presentstudy, seven key terms require definition before urban
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insurgency itself can be defined and examined. They are:
Subversion: 'Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psy-
chological, morale, or political strength of a regime.
Insurrection: An abrupt, armed uprising against the military and seCur-
--ity forces of a constituted government.
Revolution: The effort to seize power via the violent overthrow of the
prevailing political authoritq.
Civil War: kmilitary struggle which takes place when revolutionary
forces adopt the organization and tactics of conventional military forces.
Internal War: A f
of conflict within which the prevailing government
is challenged by a process of subversion and insurgency.
Urban Society: An environment whose technological, economic and political
characteristics are predominantly those of a modern metropolitan area.
InsTmem: Systematic, low-intensity aggression against the political
structure of a nation, falling short of civil war.
Of these sevjn, the first definition is provided by AR 310-25 and JCS
Pub 1. The next five are definitions derived from common usage. The def-
inition of insurgency is, however, a departure from the usage specified by
AR 310-25, which defines insurgency as follows: "A condition resulting from
a revolt or insurrection against -a constituted government which falls short
of civil war. In the present context, subversive insurgency is primarily
Communist inspired, supported or exploited." This departure is predicated
on three factors. First, since insurgency falls short of civil war, it
actually amounts to low-intensity aggression, in contrast to the relatively
high-intensity conflict' which Would characterize combat: between conventionally
organized forces. Se?nd, insurgency may be undertaken by forces whose
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ideological persuasion is not necessarily Communist. Third, while insurgency
may well result from revolt or insurrection, it may also result merely from
the deliberate intensification of internal aggression undertaken for purposes
other than the actual overthrow of a government. Even then it would be .
systematic, of course, since insurgency is not merely random violence but is
violence undertaken for some specific purpose.
Certain points follow immediately from these definitions. Internal
war maybe seen as something distinguishable from revolutionary war; as
shown in Chapter Three, this distinction is of primary importance because
it permits awareness of the possible strategic utilization of urban in-
surgency, as when such insurgency is fomented not so much for the sake of
revoluticn as for the sake of diversion. Additionally, the other definit-
ions permit the recognition that insurgency may grow out of subversion with
or without being initiated by or resulting in insurrection. This enhances
understanding of the current disagreement among .revolutionary theorists
themselves. Finally, the definitions permit suspension of those revolution-
ary theories which focus upon subversion, insurgency and insurrection as
distinct phases in revolutionary warfare, thus forcing their analysis to
obey models and theories which may prove misleading with regard to urban
insurgency.
The definition if urban insurgency, as developed in the pages which
follow, is set forth at the end of this chapter.
3. Revolution and the Dual-Warfare Nature of Modern Conflict
While definitions are important in the study of urban insurgency,
equal importance must be accorded to the way in which the US Army is drawn
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into a concern for insurgency in the first place. Indeed, *ne of the most
important characteristics of urban insurgency will turn out to be its potential
impact on the Army's concept of itself, and thus one of the most important
obstacles to understanding the deeper threat of urban insurgency is the
recognition of what this concept amounts to.
'Traditionally, the Army's role in national defense has been envisioned
in terms of conventional conflict -- that is, defense of the US against a
foreign power whose armed forces threaten the security.of the nation. The
various public attitudes which underlie this tradition are examined in Chapter
Seven, where their impact on the problem of urban insurgency is developed in
detail. Most important, however, lb the concept of conventional war which
results from this heritage. In response to the American political tradition
and its own role in national defense, the Army's concept of itself is one
which calls for conflict against a foreign force organized and operated along
lines similar to its own, with the conflict ideally initiated by an abrupt
outbreak of hostilities and a declaration of war. In this sense, World War
II provides a model which governs the Army's modern organization:- Because
World War II was accompanied by internal conflict behind the boundaries of
the Axis powers, the Army's Modern organization also includes a capacity to
exploit such conflict in the event of any future war -- in effect, a capacity
to bring about insurgency behind the lines of the enemy in conjunction with
and in support of Conventional operations. Thus, even with its capacity to
support insurgency in conjunctiOn with orthodox operations, the Army's con-
cept of itself -- and hence its concept of how war should be waged -- remains
essentially conventional.
The emergence of an alternative concept of war results, therefore, in a
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Now / ? 4milf
serious throat to the Army's concept of itself and its concept of how war
is to be waged. 'But it is just such an alternative which undorlies modern
revolutionary theofy. The scenario is Lenin's: a gradual increase in unrest,
protest and dissatisfaction within a given country, leading to subversion
,and violence, culminating in insurgency or insurrection, resulting only then
. in civil war and the emergence of relatively conventional conflict between
opposing military forces. Successful in Russia, China and Cuba, the scenario
lends itself to continuation elsewhere. In those areas where its own inter-
ests would be threatened by revolution, the US must therefore protect its
interests accordingly. /In effect, it must respond to this alternative form
of war while maintaining its preparedness for conventional war.
Thus the Army is confronted with what amounts to a dual-warfare mission:
given the task of maintaining readiness for land warfare on its own terms,
? it is simultaneously confronted with preventing war on opposing terms and,
consequently, with interdicting the process envisioned by Lenin. This
I
interdiction effoL t was undertaken with varied success in Lebanon, in the
Dominican Republic and in Vietnam. Refined now in the Foreign Internal
Defense program (whose implications are examined in Chapter Seven) the
interdiction effort leads to a concern for how insurgency may be contained
and eliminated -- and hence leads to special consideration for the inter-
dictien of urban insurgency within a friendly foreign nation. The strategic
merit of the interdictich effort is, of course, its capacity to abort the
process envisioned by Lenin. Its strategic danger, however, is the risk of
diversion, for the strategy of interdiction invites its own counterstrategy:
the fomenting of subversion and insurgency for the more sake of provoking
interdiction and thereby diverting the military strength of the US$ The
most crucial discovery to be made about urban insurgency is its adaptability
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to such strategic utilization.
Revolution is easily understood: its ultimate seal is the overthrow of a
? government. But since strategic diversion would be most effective if disruiaed
? as revolution, and since the dual-warfare mission irvites such diversion, the
recognition of how urban insurgency lends itself to thin threat will require
reconsideration .of how subversion, insurgency and revolution are interrelated.
h. The Nature of Subversion
In the sense in which it is defined here, revolition requires the erosion'
of incumbent political authority. Unless this condition is met, and unless
those powers in authority can be effectively challenred as a result of this
erosion, the attempt to seize power cannot be signiffxant enough to merit
the status of revolution.
The classic example of erosion of authority is provided by Czarist Russia
in the period preceding the revolution of 1917. WitA the gradual decline of
the Czarvs capacity to control events, the opportuniV to seize power became
a real possibility for the Czar's opponents and revoaittion resulted. In
turn, German history of the same period provides the classic example of a
relatively stable government being subjected to an uprising which failed
to materialize as revolution. Hitler's unsuccessful Eutsch of 1923 failed
primarily because the government in power had not, at this point, lost its
capacity to sustain itself. Quickly aborted, the Munich putsch was not even
an unsuccessful revolution'.
The erosion of governmental authority follows orTtain -general patterns.
Initially it involves the development of opposition elements inspired by some
basic inadequacy on the part of the goveroment. Such opposition groups may
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remain dormant for a prolonged period -- or they may, as in C7arist Russia,
enrage in acts of violence designed to aggravate the government's position.
Asakseination and sabotage are typical efforts to subvert the government.
The deliberate and systematic undermining of political authority is ,
thus a stage in the revolutionary process, and its objective is to establish
those conditions under which power may be seized from the government. This
undermining process may consume years of effort, culminating in an abrupt
collapse of the government, as in the case of the Czar's abdication in 1917.
Or it may involve an accelerated effort to subvert the government, followed
by insurgency, or insurrection, or even civil war. The transition from un-
rest and disaffection to subversion and rebellion is thus varied and is al-
ways quite complicated. But its end result, if it is to accomodate rev-
olution, is the crippling of governmental power.
Subversion in its earliest stages may involve relatively uncoordinated
acts of rebellion on the part of groups which differ radically in their own
,goals. Such was the case in Germany during the 19201s, when both Fascist
and Communist elements sought the collapse of the Weimar government i In
turn, subversion may involve only a single, highly coordinated organization
determined to bring about the collapse and overthrow of the ruling powers,
as in the Algerian insurgency of the 1950's. What is crucial about the
process of subversion is not so much a unity of ultimate goals as 2 unity
of immediate purpose -- which is the weakening of the government in power.
Organized in increasingly complicated structures, modern governments
are vulnerable to more and more diverse forms of such subversion. Given
its many responsibilities for maintaining law and order, insuring economic
stability, managing its own agencies and retaining the consent of the pop-
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itimW 11119
ulace, the typical government presents an array of targets against which
subversion may b'e directed. Its failure to execute any of these responsi-
bilities will weaken its own status and provide momentum to a revolutionary
movemNit.
In the economic sphere, subversion may involve the instigation of
strikes, acts of industrial sabotage, efforts at production slow-down, inter-
ference with methods of distribution, and similar activities directed at re-
ducing the efficiency of the economic system, and htnce at reducing the ac-
ceptability of the government in power. In the strictly political sphere,
the dissemination of pyopaganda and the development of anti-government
protests and demonstrations also sCrve to undermine authority. The infil-
tration of various governmental agencies, particularly its police and mil-
itary forces, can be a significant form of subversion if it succeeds in
undermining the allegiance of these agencies. Additionally, acts of overt
violence and terror -- particularly in the form of kidnapping and assassi-
nation of key
dials -- may succeed in reducing the government's strength.
When such acts of terror cause the government to over-react in a repressive
way, thus alienating previously sympathetic elements of the population, the
subversive's cause is strengthened even further.
What is most significant about these forms of subversion is that they
are often a prelude to, and then a complement of, armed insurgency against
the government. They may even culminate in insurrection. In the earliest
stages of subversion, however, insurrection would be premature since the
government's position has not been sufficiently weakened. Being premature
in this sense, it is doomed to failure, as was the case with the 1905 rev-
olution in Russia and the 1923 uprisings in Germany. When insurrection is
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delayed until the government's position has been suffciently'weakened by
subversion, it stands a greatly improved chance of success. Again, the
classic example is provided by the Russian revolution of 1917; when the
Provisional Government established after the Car's overthrow had reached
the point it could no longer resist Bolshevist subversion, the Bolshevist
insurrection proved both swift and insurmountable.
5. fr)m Subversion to Insurgency
. Because it is ideally launched only after subversion has weakened
the government, insurrection is described by Lenin and others,.as a phase
in the revolutionary process. But. if insurrection leads to civil war,
as was the case in Spain in 1935; it will normally be accompanied by a
continuation and even acceleration of those subversive acts of sabotage,
terror and propaganda which preceded it. To identify subversion and in-
surrection.as mutually exclusive phases in a revolution would therefore be
mistaken.
Insurrection has not only led to the overthrow of the government or
the commencement of protracted civil war. In other cases, when it has
failed to achieve either of these results, its failure has brought about
the complete collapse of the revolutionary movement (as with Budapest in
1956), or has resulted in the revolutionary movement reverting to subversion
(as with the St. Petersburg uprisings of 1905), or has led to protracted in-
surgency along the lines of guerrilla war (as with the, Chinese Communists
following the Canton and Shanghai uprisings of the 19201s). Moreover, not
all instances of insurgency have been initiated by insurrection. As in
Vietnam, in which the gradual escalation of subversion led finally to in-
surgency, guerrilla warfare can emerge through raids and ambushes which grow
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16.0 4111,
in frequency and intensity until a state of insurgency exists without an.
abrupt armed uprising ever having occurred. In turn, insurgency in the
rural environment can lead to urban insurrection, as was the design of the
1968 Tet offensive upon the part of the Vietcong. But this outcome is not
4
itself a necessary condition for revolutionary success, since Castrols Cuban
insurgency triumphed without significant urban insurrection. Obviously,
then, the variations on the revolutionary theme are great, and these var-
iations have led to doctrinal disagreements among revolutionaries them-
selves, as described in Chapter Three. They have also led to disagreement
about the meaning of the terms involved in describing revolution.
In general, however, insurgenCy has been described as a relatively
open attack upon governmental agencies and installations by organized groups
of revolutionary forces. These forces have been distinguished from the
earlier agents of subversion by three factors: (1) unlike the subversive .
underground, they are generally organized into military or para-military
structures which continue to exist through the duration of the insurgency,
(2) th-y are committed to direct and systematic assault upon the government
not so much for the sake of weakening the government as for the sake of
forcing its collapse, and (3) they require, for the continuation of their
own operations, logistical resources similar to those available to convent-
ional military forces.
Modern history has!?een the popularization of a distinct and flamboyant
label for such forces: they are not rebels but guerrillas. The use of such
terminology permits distinction between the military forces of the government
in power and the military or para-military forces of the revolutionary move-
ment -- or, in the international sense, between those conventional forces of
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a foreign power which may constitute an external threat and those forces of
a revolutionary movement which constitute an internal threat. This distinct-
ion between conventional forces and guerrilla forces has generated a vast
amount of guerrilla warfare literature in the post-World War II era, with
particular emphasis upon the operations of guerrilla forces as "a new form
of warfare".
The tendency to identify guerrilla insurgency as a significantly dif-
ferent form of war is due largely to the objectives of insurgency and the oper-
ation of the insurgent forces amid the continuation of subversion. Con-
ventional warfare ordinarily involves the battlefield confrontation of
opposing military forces -- accompanied, since the advent of military av-
iation, by the bombardmen7 of the various industrial and urban bases which
support those forces. Traditionally, such warfare has been dedicated to
the destruction of opposing military forces and the removal of their capacity
to threaten the n tion opposed by them; only rarely (as in World War II) has
it beenaccompanied by the objective of overthrowing the governmant or the
opposing nation. Insofar as guerrilla warfare is an aspect of revolution,
and is thus dedicated to the overthrow of the government, it differs from
conventional warfare in its final objectives. Insear as it is combined
with subversion against the political apparatus of the state, it also dif-
fers in its overall methods.
What is crucial about guerrilla war is this dependence upon the con-
tinued impact of subversion. Guerrilla operations 1111 or may not be accompa-
nied by conventional warfare: in Jugotlavia, the World War II partisan cam-
paign Was an adjunct of the total war against Nazi Germany -- but in Castro's
Cuban insurgency, the government was not confronted simultaneously with an
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.de
. external military threat. In either Case, sustained guerrilla activity
must be accompanied by a significant degree of subversion, for it is sub-
version which weakens and diverts the government, raking it vulnerable to
guerrilla war.
The various forms of subversion such AO propaganda, terrorism, in-
filtration, assassination and sabotage -- are thus activities which prepare
the way for insurgency ,ior insurrection) and then complement it in the more
advanced stages of revolution. In this sense, insurgency involves a broad
spectrum of opposition to the government. In a formula sense, insurgency
is a combination of subversion plus armed resistance, and the emergence of
open warfare as a product of this Combination marks the revolutionary shift
from mere subversion to actual insurgency.
6. Rural Guerrilla Warfare as an Aspect of Insurgaa
Once the momentum of the revolutionary effort has reached a level of
violence sufficient to inspire armed resistance agailnst the government, the
shift from subversion to insurgency may result in ether an abrupt collapse
of the government or a long and sustained struggle between the insurgent
forces and those of the government. Those short-rum cases which have pro-
duced relatively swift revolutionary success have most often involved urban
Insurrection :: the overthrow of the frovisionai Govermient of RusH.a was
largely a matter of warfare in the streets, as was the case with the rev-
olution which had earlier 'toppled the French monardy.? An a result, urban
insurrection has been characterized by brevity. It has not always been sue-
?eyeful) of course) and in those instances when it 1.2s failed it has usually
been described as an uprising as with the Shanghai uprising Of 1927 and
the Budapest uprising of 1956. Nor has insurrection always been revolutionary
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in intent; the Warsturiuprising of 19/4 was essentiaYmy dedicated to resistance
'against German occupation forces.
When such urban insurrection does fail, and when it is an aspect of rev-
olution, the revolution itself may collapse in defeat or, if sufficient forces
survive, result in protracted insurgency within the countryside external to
the urban environment. In the 20th Century, this shift to rural insurgency
in the wake of urban defeat has been largely due to the fact that it is. only
in a rural environment that insurgent forces have been able to manage the
security and mobility necessary for their own survival. Thus it is in the
rural context that the modern guerrilla has flourished) as with Mao's campaign
in China and the Vietcong insurgency in South Vietnam. When rural insurgency
has not been accompanied by urban-subversion it has.gerprally_failed, however,
as with Gueverrals abortive Bolivian expedition. In such cases, freedom from
distraction by subversion permits a government to concentrate its security
forces upon the elimination of the guerrilla.
The relationship between rural. guerrilla warfare and urban subversion
has therefore been 2 complementary one in the history of 20th Century rev-
olution. While the rural environment provides the security necessary for the
sustained existence of an insurgent force, the rural operations of such a
force have rarely been sufficient to topple a government, however. In the
case of Mao's 20-year campaign against the Nationalist Chinese, the combined
impact of Japanese invasion and Communist insurgency were necessary to bring
the revolution to 2.sucCensftl end; in Castrols Case., substantial urban sub-
version was a necessary complement to the operations conducted in the Sierra
Maestr2s.
The balance between rural guerrilla warfare and urban subversion has been
NOW'
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Now
lee
influenced by such variables as the physical strength of the guerrilla element,
?
the extent of external support provided by foreign interests and the capacity
of the government tO- endure a prolonged revolutionary challenge. Despite these
variables, the patterns of modern revolutionary warfare reveal the necessity
--ter such a balance. They also indicate that revolutionary success requires
an increase in the intensity of rural guerrilla operati6ns to balance any
decrease in the impact of urban subversion (as in South Vietnam prior to the
Tet uprisings), as well as requiring an increase in urban violence to balance
any decrease in the impact of rural operations (as in South Vietnam during
the Tet uprisings). giihIn this necessity, and given the increasing vulner-
ability of the modern city, any deCrease in the potential effectiveness of
rural guerrilla warfare is thus likely to produce a 'reneWed concern for urban
insurgency as 2 primary vehicle of revolution.. This is, in facto the thrust
of the revolutionary doctrine examined in Chapter Three.
il.
7. A Definition o Urban Insurgency
A tentative definition of urban insurgency would begin with emphasis
upon the revolutionary seizure of political power and the dissolution of the
prevailing system of government. In terms of the relationship bc'tween sub-
version and insurgency, and in view of the modern emphasis upon rural guerrilla
warfare, 2 more refined definition might characterize urban insurgency as highly
intensified subversion carried out in support of rural insurcency. However,
the analysis of those current military, social, political and technological
trends which will inevitably influence the nature of revolutionary warfare
suggdst that urban insurgency may well be emerging an far more than an aux-
iliary form of such war. Urban insurgency may well be destined to become
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- vol Iwo
the primary form of revolutionary struggle. .
Several facto's provide a hint of this possibility. In terms of military
technology, the adwCnt of the helicopter provides the governmental security
force with a mobility so great that the rural guerrilla's earlier advantage
of refuge and security is seriously diminished. In terms of social structure,
one may note the accelerating urbanization of those areas of the world which
arm most susceptible to revolutionary unrest to begin with; this urbanization
is generally accompanied by a decrease in the rural population base from which
the guerrilla movement might otherwise draw its strength. Moreover, the rap-
idly changing relationsyip between the city and the countryside, essentially
a product of modern industrial technology, makes the city less dependent upon
the political stability of the rural area, and hence reduces the rural guerrilla's
chance of toppling the government from a rural stronghold. At the same time,
however, the complexity of the modern city, with its intricate technological
structure, makes iextremely vulnerable to subversion by sabotage. And, per-
haps most importan , the process of urbanization hs meant, in many of the
major cities of the world, a concentration of masses of dissatisfied people
readily subject to revolutionary temptation. In effect, then, the modern city
grows more vulnerable to subversion as it grows more powerful' in political and
technological significance.
? Whether or not the modern city provides conditions which would permit sus-
tained insurgency remains to be examined. As indicated earlier, the occurrence
of insurrection within the confines of the city has generally resulted in either
swift revolutionary triumph (or defeat), or a transfer of the revolution's
Local point to 2 rural environment. But it is entirely possible that the
changing nature of the city may result in conditions which would permit pro-
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Niue
tracted urban guerrilla war instead. Such war would be properly described
as urban insurgeney. If it is to .encompass this possibility, and thereby
permit an understar*ng of the increasing potential for such warfare, the
definition of urban insurgency must allow for these conditions.
In this sense, then, the definition must incorporate the following
major points, as developed in the preceding pages:
(1) Urban insurgency is a form of violence against the prevailing
government, ordinarily undertaken for revolutionary Turposes by armed and
organized enemies of the government.
(2) As a revolutilary activity, urban insurgency has as its objectives
the seizure. of political power and the dissolution and replacement of the
prevailing political system.
(3) Urban insurgency is preceded by subversive PCts, such as sabotage,
terror and propaganda, which weaken the government in power and Which. are
continued during the insurgency itself.
(4) Urban ins rgency may be initiated by armed uprising of an insurrection7
ist nature, or may be the result of subversion which has been intensified until
it has flared into open insurgency.
.(5) Amounting to guerrilla warfare within the city, urbah insurgency may
or may not be accompanied by rural guerrilla warfare.
In capsule form, then,urban insurgency is 1ow-in tensity aggression
within the environment of the city. Its historical characteristics suggest
its categorization as a form of revolutionary war. But the examination of its
potential will result, in Chapters Two and Three, in the recognition that urban .
insurgency may be provoked for other purposes than actual revolution, insofar
as revolution involves the overthrow of a political system. In terms of .modern
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revolutionary doctrine, international strategy and the accelerating importance
;
of its cities for an industrialized nation, it is conceivable that urban in-
,
surgercy may be fomcnted for stratmgic purposes, rather than ,strictly rev-
olutionary purposes. To permit the analysis of these possibilities, the
following definition is employed' in the pages which follow:
Urban Insurgency is systematic low-intensity aggressi3 against the
4:11
technologicall-econOMiC.ind political structure of an urbanized nation,
occurring within its Own boundaries or within those metropolitan areas to
,
which it is linked via this structurp, undertaken for either revolutionary
purposes or for purposes of diverting its military strength.
4
?
Cs. 4""A"^F"-
C. I
19
C29 ?-?-? ,?
L
id,0`d
C--
brds,-S.
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CHAFT6R TWU
Awe
THE URBAN COMPLEX AS AN INSURGENT ENVIRONNaiT
1. The City in History
To understand the environment within which urban insurgency may occur,
it is necessary to understand the complex nature of the modern city and its
relationship to the rural countryside. Ordinarily the distinction between
the two is conceived in terms of population 'density, with the city being
thought of as an area in which that density is extremely great while the
rural countryside in an area in which it is relatively low. In fact, the
crucial difference is an -agricultural matter: traditionally, the city has
consisted of people who do not grovi their own food and who can therefore
be'assembled . for the sake of carrying out other funetions,' while the rural
countryside consists of poo.Ple who grow food for all.
As a result, the history of the city is parallel to the history of agri-
'6Uture and technology. Thus the advent of iron not only permitted the
development of the plow and the hoe which made agriculture more efficient;
it also, as a result, permitted the growth of great cities like Rome and
the development of the weapons via which these cities could dominate the
countryside. In the mod
n world, the advent of machine technology has
resulted in tractors amid reapers which have further increased agricultural
efficiency, thereby accelerating the growth of cities; at the same time, this
technology has resulted in a factory system via which the city could achieve
even greater domination over the countryside. What is most remarkable about
the modern world id that its technology has not only brought unprecedented
agricultural efficiency; it has also virtually erased the qualitative-differ-
ences which have long distinguished the city from the countryside.
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Historically, life within the city has differed from that of the country-
side not only in regard to the typos of labor performed, but also with regard
to its intellectual and political atmosphere. It is the city where ideas
have flourished and books have been written) where intellectual and political
unrest have been centered, where styles have been determined. Isolated from
all this, the rural countryside has been characterized by moral and relig-
ious traditions far less subject to change. It is true, of course, that
revoluticn has sometimes erupted in the countryside, often in response t6
a sense of exploitation -7. just as rebellion has often erupted within the
cities in response to poterty or tyranny. But throughout the world, the
p.aCe. of life within the rural area has been essentially different from
that of the city -- until the advent of modern teCtInology. With the ad-
vent of the truck and the automobile, the gap between the two has disappeared;
with the advent of radio and television, differences in thought and attitude
have diminished; with the introduction of machine technology, the farm itself
has become a factory. Indeed, the most striking characteristic of modern
civilization -- North America, Japan, Western Europe -- is that the country-
side itself has been urbanized in the qualitative sense. Except for pop-
ulation density, the difference between the city Eaci the rural area has
vanished in these urbanized regions.
Meanwhile, technology has accelerated the process of change. Most
important, psychological changes have been brought about by the mass communi-
cations techniques made possible by modern technolecy; bombarded daily by
books, newspapers, magazines, television programs, all competing for its
attention, the population of an urbanized area is ntlw subject to what amounts
to urban stress. .Within this climate of unrest; propaganda feeds on confusion
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and political agitation in commonplace.
Of all these -forces, the television camera is most powerful. Its pres-
ence has not only influenced the nature of urban civilizatin; it has liter-
ally altered the nature and meaning of revolutionary warfare. For, as the
,Trench Army found in Aleeria, the. most important consequence of military
Aaction against an insurgent force may not be its impact on that force but
its impact on a population far removed from the scene of the insurgency.
If that population is able to monitor such action through the medium of tel-
evision, and if the violence of the counterinsurgency effort provokes neg-
ative reaction on its p/art, the populace may well withdraw its support of
this effort. The remark that "we iion the battle in Algiera, but we lost the
war in Paris" is merely one index of this phenomenon; guarding against it
may well be the most critical aspect of oounierinsurgency operations within
? an urban environment.
Success in such operations therefore requires redognition that the :
i
urban environmentl yields a new kind of battlefield. The historical dis-
tinction between the city and the rural countryside having been erased
wherever modern technology has been introduced) solving the problem of
urban insurgency is thus dependent on understanding this newenvironment.
2. The Process of Modern Urbanization
With more workers needed in factories and fewer workers needed on
farms, the urbanization process has been accelerated with each new techno-
logical step along the path of modern industrialization. Only 2.4 per cent
of the world's population resided in cities of 20,000 or more at the beginning
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*wf *Ime
of the 19th Century. By 1950 that fiFure had increSsed almost ten-fold:- The
rapid urbanization of man continues, and has been described as Hperhspe the '
most spectacular social phenomenon of modern timesn. In turn, the develop-
mont of radically new means of communication and transportation has resulted
in something equally spectacular: the cities themselves have become netted
with each other.
As cOmplex as this growth process has been, it is nevertheless charac-
terized by certain basic features which prove relevant in the analysis of
urban insurgency:
* The industrialization of North America and Western Europe is now being
followed by the effort to bring abut industrialization in other major regions
of the world. Japan and Russia have become irdustrfAized 1n the past two
generations, and much of Asia and Latin America are now moving rapidly in
this direction.
? This process of industrialization is resulting in the rapid growth
of urban complexes in regions of the world which had remained predominantly
rural up to the very recent past. In certain Latin American countries -- par-
ticularly Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador and Venezuela -- the current urban pop-
ulation is now almost four times what it was in 1950.
* Inevitably causing change in social values, the industrialization/urban-
ization process has been accompanied by rising expectations of prosperity, re-
sulting in concentrated masses of people vulnerable to political agitation and
revolutionary provocation Wher these expectations become frustrated.
* Because of the intricate relationship between the urban complexes of
the world, instability in one major city will have impact in those other
cities with which it is economically related. The interruption of the shipping
facilities of a large port through which petroleum is processed can, for example,
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%.1-1 vit
,paralyze the industry of anothe r city dependent on petroleum energy.
* Despite the unprecedented status of the urban complex as the nerve-
center of industrialized civilization, those factors which make it powerful --
its size, its organization and its function -- are also factors which make it
increasingly vulnerable to political unrest and revolutionary agitation.
These factors apply in different degrees to the various major cities
of the world. They indicate why otbursts of urban unrest are of paramount
concern half-way around the globe. If the world is shifting rapidly to an
urbanized status, and if the control of the major cities of a region will
result in political and military domination of that region, then the rev-
olutioliary instinct will inevitablir direct itself to such control, seeking
to convert unrest into the subversion which would m2ke the seTzure of such
control possible.
3. The Vulnerability of the Urban Complex
The political and military importance of a particular city is more a
matter of the given city's function than it is a matter of mere size. Recent
population figures indicate Shanghai is the world's largest city, totalling
109000,000 people. In terms of it potential for revolutionary significance
Shanghai may be, however, far less important than other, smaller cities which
serve as centers of communication, transportation and political influence.
What is most important is the way in which each such center of power is vul-
nerable to subversion.
All cities are vulnerable in one way or another, in that the interruption
of electrical power, water supply or food transportation can disturb the pre-
carious balance of goods and services upon which urban life is based. The
typical city is, of course, dependent upon the countryside and the world be-
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yaw. 4411
yond for 2 steady flow of foodstuffs; it is estimated that New York City, re-
quiring a daily input of some 5000 tons of food, has in its warehouses and
on its store shelves only enough food at any given time for some lb days.
Depending on the complexity of the city, it is also dependent upon the
effectiveness of its internal services; interference with a city's water-
works, followed by the collapse of its fire-fighting agencies, can lead
swiftly to a city's devastation. As a rule, the more elaborate the city's
organizational structure, the more fragile is its stability.
With regard to subversion, the important vulnerabilities of a given
urban area are 4 function of two factors: the specific character of the
city ,and the particular objectives 'of the subversive movement. A given.
city may be 2 gigantic industrial complex whose parillYSis woUld undermine
the stability of the national government; for the purposes 6f revolutionary
subversion, the city's most important vulnerability :night therefore be the
hydroelectric plants Upon which its factories are deyendent. But for the
purposes of strategically-oriented, externally-inspized subversion, the same
city's most important vulnerability might be its shipping facilities instead--
especially if the collapse of these facilities would subvert a nation's
capacity to transport troops and supplies to some distant force.
Since the estimate of any given city's vulnerability to subversion
would require attention to the subversive motives in7olved
defense against 1
urban subversion -- and, ultimately, against urban ilsurgency -- might appear
to demand unorthodox principles of intelligence, Whether or not these prin-
ciples would be applicable to military intelligence is examined in Chapter
Eight, at which point the moro-goneral 4Ueition'of. aUS.miliiaiy.role in
. .
urban insurgency is dealt with. /t is obvious, howexer, that whatever security
5
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Age - vow
agency is involved in defense against subversion and insurgency, the execut-
or its role will demand attention ,to motives, since these motives will dictate
target selection within the urban environment.
Not ill the targets involved will hear directly on the stability of 2
city. The robbery of a bank for the sake or obtaining funds and the looting
of an arms depot for the sake of obtaining weapons are acts stressed by both
Lenin and'Marighella, but these acts Will not be directly subversive unless
accompanied by propaganda, The more direct acts of subversion are those
which create unrest, arouse popular opinion against the government, inter-
fere with the cityls various functions, or otherwise undermine the prevail-
ing political structure and its military/security forces. The more import-
ant 2 city is to the stability of a nation, the more"decisive'this subvers-
ion win be; if it is permitted to flare into open insurgency, the stability
of the entire nation may be threatened. The most striking hint of this possi-
bility was provided by the 1968 Paris disorders which momentarily arrested
the economy of France and threatened the overthrow of the French government.
As with Paris, the typical modern urban complex is made fragile by the vulner-
ability of the industrial system upon which it is based and from which it de-
rives its importance.
.4. Strate0x Subversion and the World-City Urban Complex
Since a projection of current world strategies is outside the scope of
this study, it is not possible to classify any given urban complex as being
more strategically significant than some other comp3ex. That characterization
would be a function of a particular strategy. It is nevertheless possible to
identify a number of modern urban configurations which have attained "world-
'city" status of such magnitude that their potential strategic significance
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pasts light upon the strategic possibilities for urban insurgency.
By definition, a world-city is an urban complex which has attained
political and econemic influence of such scope that its stability has direct
impact upon the stability of the rest of the world. In contrast, a region-
-ally important city may be extremely important to the political and economic
stability of a riven geographic area without having direct influence upon the
rest of the world. This contrast would result in the categorization of London
as a world-city, leaving Shanghai to be classified as a city of only regional
'significance even though its pOpulation is roughly equal to that of London.
?
The world-cities 'ire characteristically centers of trade and government.
They are great ports which distribUte imported goods to all parts of their
own nations and receive goods for export to other nation's; within the nations
within which they are located, roads and railways focus upon them, and they
are the sites of the great international airports, such as Heathrow, Kennedy,
Orly, Schiphol and Sheremetyevo. They are also the banking and financial
centers of the w4 1d, housing the trading banks ard insurance organizations
upon which world-wide trade and industry are dependent. They are not always
Identified by a single 'city-name; in several cases, they are actually inter-
connected complexes of previously distinct cities now merged'into one gigantic
configuration through the impact of transportation and communication. One
such product of this, growth process is the no-called Rhine-Ruhr world-city,
actually an agglomeration of ten cities of over 200,000 people apiece and an-
other ten cities of between 100,000 and 200,000 apiece, all located in a h0-mile
radius. Included in it are Donn, Cologne, Dusseldorf and an autobahn net
which link more than 10,000,000 residents of this world-city complex. A
similar ring.of cities -- actually referred to by thb Dutch themselves as
Randstand Holland -- is the complex containing Rotterdam, Amsterdam,
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Utrecht and The HOW. Although it contains only 04100,000 people, its in-
fluence upon world cause Um 'handstand to be identified as one of the seven
true world-cities. The others, besides Rundstand and Rhine-Ruhr, are New
York, London, Paris, Moscow and Tokyo-Yokohama. Not only are these seven
the dominant metropolitan centers within their own geographic areas; they
are linked together throughout the world as a result of modern communication,
transportation and the industrial-economic system which had made them depend-
ent upon one another.
It is this international influence which makes the world-city a potent-
ially important target of strateric subversion. Subversion intense enough
to paralyze the industrial activities of thn Tokyo-Yokohama complex would
have severe consequences throughout that part of the world which has grown
dependent upon Japanese technology. Interference with the factories of the
Rhine-Ruhr complex would effect industry thousands of miles away. This
sudden ripple-effect is both subtle and substantial; it is illustrated by
the way in which a late 1960's snowstorm which taused serious delays in air
traffic in and out of New York also caused, as a direct consequence, unprec-
edented surface traffic snarls in cities as far away as Los Angeles. In a
world dominated by a f w gigantic metropolitan complexes, a serious disturb-
ance in one can have grave (and possibly predictable) impact elsewhere. Hence
their strategic potential: a foreign power seeking to strike at the economic
heart of another power might well elect to do so indirectly, by subverting
within a given world-city :those particular functions upon which the attacked
power is dependent, with the targeted world-city not even being inside the
national boundaries of the nation being attacked.
Similarly, a nation may be attacked indirectlY Via the subversion of
certain functions within the network of its own cities: the hijacking of
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commercial aircraft?within the United States has halullt,conomic and political
effects which hint at the range of possibilities open for strategic exploit-
ation.
What is perhaps most important about these possibilities is their
subtlety. Given the way in which the cities of an industrialized nation
are netted internally, just as the world-cities are netted internationally,
subversion against a nation could involve selected acts so widespread through-
out this net that their local frequency is slight and their interconnection
is unnoticed. The technological_ process which has transformed their cities
into such a net of urban/complexes is only vaguely recognized by the indust- .
rialized nations of the world, to begin with. Conditioned to think of their
cities as distinct entities becauie of their geographic separatdon and pre-
pared to recognize insurgency only when a sustained outburst of violence is
. concentrated in particular places, industrialized nations may be most vulner-
able where they are. most easily blinded. Indeed, it is not inconceivable
that subversion of high-level intensity, so great that it is actually in-
surgency, could be undertaken throughout a network of cities, with its acts
of violence so generally widespread that their intensity is not locally not-
iceable and their cumulative force is not nationally recognized. By analogy,
one might imagine a battleship whose commander has been trained to think an
attack means enemy bombs and torpedoes, but whose ship is about to go under
without warning because its hull has been rusted away by some chemi cal inl-mo-
duced into the ocean within which it floats. If surprise is a principle of
war, unconventional war lends itself to new forms of surprise through the in-
creased potential for urban insurgency.
It is in this sense that the functional interconnection of the great
.world-cities casts light upon the strategic aspects of urban insurgency: to
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the extent that its :awn cities are similarly irtercNcted, and to the ex-
tent that its major cities are connected to the world cities, an industrial-
lend nation is to that extent vulnerable to attack by strategically-motivated
subversion -- with the attack being undertaken at a selected level of intens-
ity, against selected functions, at selected points within the national and
international network of cities.
5, Strategic Principles Bearing Upon Urban Insurgency
The external sponsorship of subversion, insurgency and even revolution
is a well-recognized phenomenon. It is exemplified in the Vietnam War.
Subversion need not be/externally sponsored, of course, for it may grow out
of local unrest amid the failure of the prevailing government to satisfy some
e
given element of the population. Such subversion may be motivated by Commun-
ist ideology, or motivated by different ideologies and merely influenced by
Communist techniques which are copied. It may or may not involve a clarity
of objectives; mu ?h violence against the modern state is prompted by a spirit
1
of vengeance and nbellion resulting in deliberate, sustained sabotage of the
prevailing political system for the mere sake of destruction. Regardless of
its origin, a_foreign power interested in diverting the strength of another
nation may well fan the flames of such subversion for the sake of achieving
its own strategic ends. Insurgent flames do not feed on mere propaganda, how-
ever; their intensity is finally dependent upon the availability of arms and .
munitions, and a foreign power hoping to profit from the subversion of another
nation can be expected to follow the principles of economy in fanning these
flames. Presumably, then, it will provide support only to the extent that
(and the places where) its own objectives can be satisfied. Even within the
context of Communist ideology,and the worldwide sponsorship of revolution to
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which that ideologylifd, the economic limitations upOlesuch sponsorship
have been pronounced.
Besides this principle of economic constraint, certain' other general
principles emerge from the distinction between revolutionary insurgency and
strategically sponsored insurgency, the distinction between urban insurgency
and rural insurgency, and the distimetion between low-intensity subversion
and outright insurgency. Considered within the context of modern industrial
urbanization, these principles indicate that'
* The strategic significance of a given urban complex is not dependent
upon its population total or even its geographic location but is largely a
matter of its economic and political functions and their relationship to, as
well as their influence upon, similar functions in ether areas.
* The strategic significance of urban subversion (or, possibly, urban
insurgency) in any given metropolitan area will depend on the extent to
which such subversion assists a given power in the pursuit of its own c4,
jectives4V.
* The extent to which support of subversion is provided by a foreign
power will be dependent upon the strategic objectives of that power, and
will fall short of extensive material assistance unless high-intensity sub-
version and insurgency are in the interests of the foreign power.
? . * In the absence of external support and the limitation of a revolut-
ionary movement to its own resources, the selection of targets for subversion
will be dictateiby local political objectives and may result in events which
have no international or strategic significance.
* The relationship between urban and rural activities on the part of a
given subversive movement will be determined by the overall environment with-
in which the movement occurs, by the particular objectives of the movement,
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and by the extent timoihich the movement is influencsieby a foreign power.
* Successful resistance to subversion of either a low-intensity or
high-intensity nature will depend largely upon the capacity of the pre-
vailing government to identify the movement, to ascertain its objectives,
and to anticipate its selection of targets.
Although abstract, these principles permit the further analysis of
the relationship between sponsored subversion and locally inspired rev.-
elution: .This is undertaken in Chapter Three. Additionally, thq(bring
into focus certain basic questions which arise in the attempt to under-
stand urban insurgency within the context of modern industrial technology
and its impact upon urbanization. Precipitated by the emergence of the
world-cities and other enormously influential metropolitan centers, as well
View'
as by the increasing frequency of politically-motivated violence within
these centers, these questions are arrived at in the attempt to accomodate
the future with the past.' For the recent past reveals a sequence of rev-
olutionary movements which were nurtured through insurgency that was essent-
ially rurali and not urban. Thus:
(1) Are urban subversion and insurgency likely to be engaged in only
as a complement of rural insurgency, so that significant urban insurgency
is not possible except in support of Grin conjunction with rural insurgency?
(2) When and if urban insurgency could be undertaken as the primary
vehicle of revolution
101.11111
or strategic insurgency disguised as revolution
410
are its characteristics likely to differ from those of an essentially rural
insurgency?
Both .questions require attention to revolutionary thought, which is
the subject of Chapter Three. However, the impact of modern urbanization
upon such thought indicates that the answers to both questions are a def-
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mite, though compleeno:
t..
. 6.4_2he Impact of Urbanization Upen Insnrgent Warfare
Contemporary theories about revolutionary warfare most often stress
the crucial role of rural insurgency, elevating it to a position of central
importance in the revolutionary process. In this assessment and in the
various forms of training doctrine which follow from it, the rural guerrilla
is characterized in terms of his ability to strike decisive blows against a
'conventional military force while relying on the countryside and its pop-
ulace for support and security. In the oft-quoted vision of Mao, the
peasant countryside is/an ocean within which the guerrilla fish swim. And
in the extension of this metaphor, it is tempting to, think of the city as
a mere spawning ground for such fish:
This emphasis upon the rural insurgent is due to a series of relatively
recent events in revolutionary warfare. Foremost among these events is the
success of the Ch1 nese Communist revolution, which survived through rural
insurgency after a series of abortive urban uprisings in such cities as
Shanghai and Canton.' The success of the Cuban revolution, in which Castro's
rural insurgency echoed and reinforced Mao's conclusions about guerrilla
warfare, has been almost equally influential. Indeed, the propagandization
of Che's role in that revolution has served -- despite his subsequent defeat
in Bolivia -- to popularize the image of the rural guerrilla as the ultimate
agent of revolution .? And the rural operations of the Vietcong, carried out
in the wake of Hogs victory over the French, have had a-Similar effect de-
spite the ambiguous nature of the Indochinese-Vietnamese wars. In short,
/
the net impact of these insurgencies has been to magnify the role of rural
insurgency in modern.ievolution. even to the extent of equating revolution
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with rural guerriltewarfare. low
The theoretical justification for this emphasis rests upon three prin-
ciples drawn from the success of such revolutions. First, it is generally
maintained that the city provides a sanctuary for governmental security
forces within this sanctuary they cannot be challenged successfully, and
so it is the countryside, and not the city, which is the appropriate choice
of battlefields for the guerrilla. Second, it is maintained that the urban
complex does not provide the environment necessary for organizing, training,
A
maneuvering and securing a guerrilla organization, vhile the countryside
does. Finally; it is maintained that the employment of a guerrilla force
over a sustained period is a virtual prerequisite for revolutionary triumph,
since it in only through a process of erosion that the government's secur-
ity forces may be brought to their knees. This final conclusion no doubt
reflects the failure of literally thousands of urban insurrections and up-
risings which ended in abrupt suffocation; Step-by-step, the three prin-
ciples lead to the ?rIit identification of revolution witb rural insurgencys
since guerrilla war ip necessary, and since the guerrilla can neither flour-
ish in the city nor triumph in the city, revolution must anchor itself in
the countryside. Hence the conventional revolutionary scenarios political
unrest; then urban and rural subversion, then rural guerrilla warfare, and
finally the collapse of the government's security forces and the overthrow
of the government itself.
However relevant in terms of recent revolutionary events, this scenario
may prove inappropriate for a world within which the modern city is changing
rapidly, and within which the relationship of the city to the countryside is
changing as a reeult; The revolutions which most influenced the modern vision
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of guerrilla war worr?raged in areas which were relaMely Undeveloped
from the standpoint of industrial growth and industrial urbanization. For
those parts of the world which have achieved a high level of industriali-
zationi the conclusions drawn from these recent revolutions -- and the
rural guerrilla scenario based on these conclusions -- would appear to be
inappropriate already, As the rest of the world moves toward induatrial-
ization, the scenario may4rove to be essentially anachronistic; Mao's
ocean may, indeed, be drying up:
Insurgenexin a Technological Environment
Since the three principles supporting the rural guerrilla concept are
based on insurgency which succeeded in industrially,Undevelopp4 areas (or
in an environment within which the complex nature of modern urbanlzation
had not yet emerged) the impact of industrialization upon revolutionary
methods of operation will depend upon the extent to which the three prin-
ciples remain valid or prove invalid fovan industrialized environment:
While the projection of this impact is necessarily speculative, the rad-
ical transformation of certain national or regional areas by modern in?
dustrialization already undermines these principles. Specifically, the
major portion of Japan, most of Western Europe, and the northeastern part
of the Western Hemisphere have been so altered by industrial growth that
the combined effects of population density and technological change have
produced an urban/rural form of civilization to which the principles now
appear inapplicable;
Thin form of civilization reflects the most advanced features of the
industrial growth process described earlier in Sections 2-3 of this chapter:
Among them are certain features which weigh heavily against the rural guar
-
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rillat IM,
* Highly efficient forms of air and surface transportation which make
possible the rapid .deployment of security forces: The helicopter is of
particular significance in this regard, since its availability increases
the challenge to the guerrilla's rural sanctuary: In turn, the advent of
mass automotive transportation has resulted in ever-expanding highway nets
which slice the countryside into smaller and smaller pieces:
* Highlyreffective forms of communication, surveillance and intelli-
gence.collection which marry the rural countrysidwto the urban complex in
a way previously unknown; Modern telephonic and television nets virtually
erase the urban/rural information gap and, among other things, make possible
the almost instant awareness of gUerrilla
* The introduction of agricultural technology which accelerates the
decreasing need for agricultural workers and thus reduces the rural pop-
ulation within which the rural guerrilla might otherwise flourish -- so
that i Mn the sense alluded, to earlier, Mao's ocean hardly exists in the
industrialized world:'
* The development of agricultural specialization, which changes the.
countryside in qualitative ways virtually eliminating the rural area as a
support base for guerrilla Warfare:- Wed more and more to modern processing
and manufacturing techniques, the rural farmer is not Only less capable of
providing siaple_support to a guerrilla movement but is himself more depend-
ent on and more a captive of the urban complex:
While such developments spell a vanishing frontier for the rural guer-
rilla; they are accompanied brother, equally significant, implications for
insurgent warfare:* For there are certain features in the process of modern
.urbanization which weigh hea4i7ron the side of urban insurgency as an al-
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tornativo to rural Ilelare:' They aret
* Tho increased availability of automatic weapons and sophisticated ex-
plosive devices which increase the rebel's capacity to confront and challenge
security forces in an urban ,complex -- as exemplified by recent incidents in
which a handful of insurgents have been able to hold at bay the security.
forces massed against them."
* Tho availability of telephonic system which give an urban under-
ground the communications necessary to permit rapid assembly as an insurgent
force, and which permit coordination of insurgent actions within the midst
of the urban complex. /
* The availability of automotive transportation, which permits both
rapid assembly of and increased mobility for an urbanrrevolutionary organ-
ization, thus permitting it to !strike and disperse with ease.
* The emergence,-irithinthe groWth pattern of metropolitan com-
plexes; of urban areas which are virtually inaccessable to governmental secur-
ityrforces and whi)ch provide resulting sanctuary for an insurgent force.
Taken as a whole; these factors indicate that the modern city's in-
dustrializztion has produced technological and demographic consequences
which weigh against the rural guerrilla but which, ironically, Increase the
potential for t.irban guerrilla war:' In effect, thong the three principles
upon which guerrilla warfare has been based may well be replaced by newly
emerging principles of insurgent warfare:
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urittrIDR 11-11LDD
Nur
w.
INSURGENT DOCTRINE AND REVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT
1. Revolutinnarx_Doctrine and Urban Insurpncy
The examination of the urban complex as an insurgent environment leads
to three conclusions:
(1) The emphasis upon rural guerrilla operations in recent revolution-
ary doctrine is largely a result of insurgent success in underdeveloped
areas.
(2) In the more industrialized urban regions of the world, technological
growth is creating an environment which lends itself to urban insurgency as
the preferred alternative to rural guerrilla warfare.
(3) Urban insurgency conducted within certain world-city complexes and
. ?
metropolitan areas could have strategic significance aufficient to justify
Its sponsorship and support by i foreign power.
The three conclusions lead quickly to a concern for the doctrine in terms
of which revolutionary action is carried out, with particular attention to
the way in which revolutionary doctrine mry be adapted to a changing urban
environment. If some sort of blueprint is necessary to provide direction and
guidance to a subversive movement, the emergence of serious urban insurgency
would evidently require both the development and dissemination of an urban-
oriented revolutionary doctrine. The question is: doe such a doctrine even
exist? "
The role which printed material plays in such matters can hardly be ex-
aggerated. Revolutionary teachings serve not only to influence the potential
rebel in propagandistic ways; they also provide instruction in how to achieve
revolution. Such teachings range from instruction in the manufacture of ex-
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plosi to the outline of techniques for organizing mass protests; on the
ves
more theoretical level, as in Lenin's work, they provide the revolutionary
with an understanding of how the various stages
put together. The extent to which the printing
the mass dissemination of such instruction is 2
revolutionary action. It is estimated that
of Maols teachings have appeared in English
This reliance upon printed doctrine is
the role which printed material plays
from cookbooks to medical journals, a
provides the flow of ideas which make
of a revolution are to be
press has made possible
central factor in
more than ten million
alone.
not
in modern
modern
copies
surprising, considering
civilization. Ranging
never-ending list of publications
expertise possible. Revolutionary
p-
literature follows much the same pattern QS that of amy other activity:
the test of an idea begins with its widespread dissemination among those
interested in its subject matter. The exchange of ideas among revolutionary
thinkers is therefore much like the exchange of .ideas among engineers or
botanists; it involves conferences, letters, critiques, seminars, conventions
and publications. In turn, while revolution itself may be a matter requiring
the utmost secrecy, the spread of revolutionary ideas and techniques cannot
be kept secret, for just as the poet seeks an audience, the revolutionary.
seeks a following. The history of the Communist movement and its various
insurgencies is paralleled by the publications of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky,
Mao, Ho and other, lesser-known, Communist thinkers.
Given this necessity for the open distribution of subversive doctrine,
it is not surprising that such publications are equally available to those
who are merely curious about -- or even opposed to -- the revolutionary's
announced goals. Thus the possession and study of subversive literature is
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Nee Nome
hardly evidence of w revolutionary tendency. On the other hand, since the
existence of even a moderately sophisticated subversive movement is depend-
ent upon the availability of skills and techniques of a fairly high order,
the absence of revolutionary literature will have the effect of limiting
the tactical and technical expertise of a subversive organization.
The ends to which a subversive movement may put such expertise are
not necessarily the ends envisioned by the authors of any given revolution-
ary text. Maoys teachings may influence the thought and action of a rev-
olutionary movement whose goals are so nationalistic as to entail ultimate
opposition to Chinese interests. It is even conceivable that anti-Communist
subversion against an established Communist government could be inspired by
and executed along tactical lines laid down originalWbY-ComMtnist rev-
olutionary theory and doctrinee What is important is whether the modern
potential for significant urban insurgency is accompanied by both the theor-
etical and technical literature necessary to generate such insurgency --
independent of any question as to whether such insurgency would satisfy the
motives originally underlying the literature.
The remarkable fact is that the literature not only exists, but has ex-
isted throughout most Of the 20th Century.
2. The History of RevolutionarK Doctrine
Certain major works of revolutionary writing reveal the history of
insurgent thought. They also reflect the changing iids of such thought,
indicating bow this thought has proceeded from an essentially urban orient-
ation at the begirning of the century to a rural orientation whiCh may now
be shifting back to the original emphasis upon revolution in the city. If
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-
Nif
such a shift does transpire in the wake of the urban tendencies described ?
in Chapter Two, the earlier literature can only regain the. significance
which it had lost in the intervening period, for it had stressed the key
role of urban insurgency in MI6 revolutionary process.
Foremost among the early works of revolutionary writing which stressed
urban insurgency were those of Lenini as exemplified in Partisan Warfare.
Written in. 1906, it was produced against the background of a decade of
strikes and uprisings which had failed to unseat the Czarist government.
In it, Lenin restates the goals of Marxism, reviews the historical process
of revolution and emphasizes the central role of armed terror as a prelude
to insurrection. Lenin did not restrict insurrection to urban warfare
. f
indeed, "Marxism does not tie the movement to any particular combat method",
he wrote -- but he did foresee the crucial function of -the city as thn ulti-
mate revolutionary battlefield, Like almost all early Marxists, Lenin in.;.
itially saw the highly industrialized Western European countries as more '
vulnerable to Marxist revolution than less developed nations such as Czarist
Russia. His outline for the pursuit of revolution nevertheless influenced
the outcome of the Russian revolution, and proves relevant again as set
forth in the pages which follow.
Equally revealing is Trotsky's subsequent thought, widely circulated in
the History of The Russian Revolution. In the examination of that revolution,
Trotsky observes that "only mass insurrection has ever brought the victory
of one social regime over another" and then argues that such insurrection
can. only succeed when it is organized carefully and coordinated with a con-
spiratorial movement which prepares for its emergence. In a brief chapter
entitled "The Art of Insurrection", Trotsky provides an outline for this
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process of subversion and insurrection which, 28 an outline, bears remark-
able relevance to the current potential for urban warfare. The tactics it
advocates arc readily adaptable to urban insurgency in the modern world.
Lenin and Trotsky are not the only Communist thinkers to influence the
patterns of insurgency, of course. During the period immediately following
the Russian revolution, a series of lesser-known theorists developed in de-
tail the. lessons of that revo3ution? 'adapting them to the urban environment
of the as yet unsubverted West European complex of nations. Much of their
work was directed by the Soviet Union's various agencies, and some of it --
as set forth in Section 5 -- is virtually anonymous. But it reveals how
the initial revolutionary vision of urban warfare could be worked out in
r c
the detail necessary to make such warfare 2 widespread phenomneon.
The gradual submergence of these early writings in the flow of rev-
olutionary literature is due, at least in part, to what may prove to be
historical .accident. Between the Russian Revolution and the present were
certain upheavals which served, at least momentarily, to redirect the ener-
gies of revolutionary thought from urban insurgency to rural insurgency. One
of these upheavals was the momentary triumph of Fascism in certain regions,
accompanied by the ruthless extermination of West European revolutionaries;
another was the occurrence of World War Two, which forced the Soviet Union
to direct its attention to self defense while relenting in the effort to
foment foreign revolution; still another was the success of the Chinese
Communist struggle which, in the aftermath of World'Vor Two, finally suc-
ceeded in the seizure of China and the popularization of a rural guerrilla
blueprint. And, finally, the varied success of Ho, Castro and other rev-
olutionaries working in an industrially undeveloped environment has not only
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Nur
served to reinforce the momentum of the rural guerrilla doctrine but has
served to obliterate the earlier emphasis upon the urban complex AS the
actual revolutionary battlefield.
Recently published works indicate, however, that revolutionary, theory --
kept, as always, in line with revolutionary ppportunity -- is once again
shifting to the context of the city. Most typical of this work is the so-
called Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, authored by Carlos Marighella,
an Uruguan terrorist killed in 1969. As outlined in Section 5, his emp-
hasis upon terrorism and the techniques of urban violence involves what
amounts to a recipe for insurrection within the city. Coupled with the
earlier, more theoretical views of'Lenin and Trotsky, the writings of Mari-
-
ghella thus provide a blueprint for insurgency quit.e? unlike th'at outlined
by such rural-oriented advocates as Mao and Che. Thellinimanual has found,
in turn, a widespread audience and has been published in several languages.
The extracts which follow are not meant to characterize these writings
as the key documents of revolutionary theory. Such documents do not exist,
in the sense that no single text can be identified as, say, the history, of
Rurope or the key to French cooking. In such things there are no Bibles.
But these documents do indicate that the doctrine and techniques necessary
for urban insurgency do exist .- and their widespread dissemination indi
cates that the opportunity for revolution in an urbanized environment need
not await the arrival of such teachings.
3. Lenin's Concept of Partisan Warfare
Much of Lenin's early commentary is devoted to justifying the use of
violence and insurrection as a necessary part of the revolutionary process.
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Noe
This justification is provided an argument aeninst the position maintained
by many turn-of-the-century critics, who held that the employment of viol-
erce was neither compatible with the aims of a social revolutionary nor
feasible in the face of a powerful governmental force. Confronted with
these claims, Lenin provided counter-claims which amounted to the insist-
ence that violence was inevitable. Thus Partisan Warfare attempted to ans-
wer what was then, for the revolutionmr, an urgent question: what is armed
struggle? In answering that question Lenin set forth a series of observat-
ions which bear relevance to the study of modern insurgency:
(I) The revolutionary must reject abstract principles and undertake
a careful study of the mass struggle actually taking place. In this sense,
it is necessary to accept and employ "ever new and different methods of
defense and attack". Moreover, it must be concluded that "due to changes
in social conditions, new forms of battle will arise inevitably", although
no one can see what the character of these future encounters will be.
(2) Given that a revolutionary technique must reflect historical con-
ditions, the failure of one tactic must be followed by the introduction of
alternate tactics. The general strike is only one means of forcing the
overthrow of the government, just as the erection of barricades and their
employment as focal points of resistance may be another. Just as the rev-
olutionary must be committed to actions, he must be flexible in the choice
of tactics.
(3) Armed struggle in the process of revolution in waged by small
groups which have two goals requiring sharp distinction. "The first ob-
jective is to kill individuals such as high officials and lower-ranking
members of the police and the army. The second objective is th confiscate
money from the government as well as from private persons." Lenin estab-
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ler
li shed the importance of this latter objective by arguing for the need to
obtain funds in order to purchase arms, bribe officials, and carry out the
revolution.
(14) The failure of such actions will generally reflect not so much
the failure of a revolutionary tactic as the failure of revolutionary org-
anization. "Our complaints about partisan warfare", Lenin wrote, "are
nothing bit complaints about the weakness of our party...which is incapable...
of organizing the uprising". To key to successful revolution is organization,
a point Lenin stresses repeatedly.
(5) Since partisan warfare -- that is, revolutionary insurrection is
merely a "form of civil war", it ih best fought by what Lenin called a "combat
party", prepared to agitate, demonstrate or terrorias' the Weed arises. An
Lenin puts it such revolutionary elements "must learri,how to wage war. That
is all there is to it."
(6) Such action must be executed in strict accordance with the revol-
ution's ultimate goals. They must not be allowed to develop spontaneously,
in such a way that they degenerate into inconclusive violence. And, most
important, they must be executed in such a way that they widen the gap be-
tween the government and the people, so QS to sustain the revolution.
(7) The battles of the revolution must be conceived of in terms of a
protracted war, "a series of a few big battles, separated by comparatively
long intervals, and a large number of small engagements which take place
during these interim periods". As Lenin puts it, "the uprising cannot
assume the traditional form of a single blow".
These major points/reiterated elsewhere in Lenin's other work, do not
preclude the development of a rural guerrilla war, of course -- for to do so
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would violate Lenin'elKphasis upon flexibility in th.Nmonoice of techniques
and tactics. But they do reflect his awareness that successful revolution
requires concentration upon urban violence. "Organize fighting brigades
among students, and particularly among workers", Lenin wrote. "Let the.
squad begin to train....some can undertake to assassinate a spy or blow
up a police station, others can attack a bank to expropriate funds for an
insurrection. Let every squad learn, if only by beating Up police".
In the revolution of 1917 which thrust Lenin into power, it was the
force of such urban violence that proved decisive.
4. Revolutionary Insurgency and the Principle of Erosion ,
What is most striking about revolutionary doctrine is not merely the
?
way in which it is adaptable to modern urban insurgency; what is equally sig-
nificant is the underlying concept of how an opposing military force is to 6
dealt with, for this concept -- which amounts to the concept of erosion
is what makes the revolutionary threat so serious in the context of modern
urbanization.
In his study of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky identified the essential
condition for revolutionary success as being the elimination of military
opposition by indirect means. "The first task of every insurrection is to
bring the troops over to its side", he wrote, "and the chief means of accomp-
lishing are the general strike, mass processions, street encounters, battles
at the barricades". Trotsky's interpretation of the Russian Revolution can
be reduced to the recognition that successful revolution must be predicated
not on the physical defeat of the governmentla security forces -- for that
In, after all, a most difficult uUdertsking .-- but on the erosion of those
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gime
?yof
forces through propaganda, confusion, creation of disorder and a gradual
elimination of their will to resist insurgency. The tactics of the barricade
are essential psychological: to create in the context of the urban environment
and on the part of the government's security forces a widespread distaste for
the kind of conflict which characterizes revolution. If that distaste can
be cultivated, t1-13 army's will to resist can be eroded and only if that
happens can a revolution succeed. It is this. insight which underlies the
real threat of urban insurgency, for as it is carried over into the modern
urban environment it feeds on conditions of stress which make erosion an
even greater danger than it was in 1917.
It is true, of course, that in' the aft4Ermath of the Russian experience
revolutionary thought has been entangled in disagreeinit 'Over'both goals and ?
tactics. Lenin's emphasis upon the city as the focal point of revolution
led to the development of tactical blueprints for the conduct of urban war-
fare, as exemplified in the remarkably detailed Road to Victory (1927) and
its successor, Armed Insurrection (1928). Based on the scrutiny of specific
urban uprisings -- particularly those in Hamburg (1923), Shanghai (1926) and
Canton (1927) -- these Communist works were circulated throughout Europe and
Asia, and even today bear relevance to the conduct of urban insurrection;
indeed, they have been revived and republished in several languages during
the past decade. But their significance has been ovorshadowod by the emergence
of a revolutionary doctrine which did not focus upon the city as the focal
point of revolution. As Mao's thought superseded Lesinis, as the goals of
the Russian Revolution shifted, as Communist success in the rural areas of
China led to a different attitude about revolution, revolutionary thought
has concentrated on the tactics of rural insurgency amid deep disagreements
'over the nature of revolution itself.
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Hence the difference between Mao's emphasis upoPthe peasant as the
vehicle of revolution, in contrast to Lenin's emphasis upon the factory ?
worker. Hence, also, the deeper disagreement among Communiets as to the
relative virtue of urban insurgency as opposed to rural insurgency, resulting
in. ideological disagreement over the identification of targets appropriate
for revolution. It can be no coincidence that the most significant revol-
utionary events in recent history -- the Cuban revolution and the Indochinese
wars ? were thus carried out along linos dictated by. Mao's thought, since
these were revolutions which occurred within underdeveloped.areas that lent
themselves to rural guerrilla warfare. Nor is it any coincidence that as
the world becomes more urbanized, and as revolution is directed more stead-
ily against these urbanized regions, Lenin's thought.- 7 along ,with the in-
sights of Trotsky and other early adherants of urban warfare -- receives re-
newed attention. But the differences in ideology, in goals, in tactics and
in techniques are nevertheless accompanied by arremont in terms of funda-
mental principles. And in both Lenin's and Mao's thought, the fundamental
principle remains the same. It is the principle identified by Trotsky: rev-
olution succeeds only with the erosion of the opposing armed forces.
The erosion of armed resistance is essentially a matter of morale: once
the will to resist has disappeared, revolution may succeed. Since Lenin and
Mao are in accordance on this principle, differences in tactical emphasis
with regard to urban insurgency versus rural insurgency is really only a
secondary matter. The crucial question for a revolutionary must be: where
may" this erosion process be exploited most effectively? In the modern world,
the answer is that it is most effective within an urban complex -- for it in
there that the various influences of technology, mass communications, political
' unrest and ideological stress result in a condition ideally suited for rev-
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olutionary action. Artutlined in Chapter Two, it inNiOis condition which
makes the urban environment most vulnerable, and it is this vulnerability
which guarantees increasing revolutionary attention to urban insurgency. In
Chapters Seven and Eight the details of the erosion process are further ex-
amined. What is immediately obvious is that since revolutionary thought is
opportunistic, since revolution feeds on the psychological erosion of oppos-
ition, and since urbanization means increasing vulnerability to psychological
erosion, 'urban insurgency is undoubtedly destined to play a central role in
future revolutionary thinking.
Perhaps most 'important is the inevitable recognition that this principle
of erosion may be exploited for strategic purposes, RA well: if an urban en-
vironment lends itself to revolutionary action because it is vulnerable to
erosion, it also lends itself to strategic action carried out merely to erode
a nation's military strength. Given the dual-warfare Assion described in
Chapter One, and given the impact which urban insurgency can have on the morale
of an army, the US Army provides an ideal target-for strategically-inspired
urban insurgency -- that is, insurgency whose objectives are not revolutionary,
but diversionary. Moreover, urban insurgency may have strategic impact beyond
even the erosion and diversion of an army: given the technical vulnerability
of an industrialized nation, such insurgency provides a readily available
weapon for eroding a nation's ability to function effectively in an industrially
competitive world. Few of these implications are likely to be overlooked.
5. The Popularization of Revolutionary Doctrine
The complex events of the post World War Two era may be understood in
terms of shifting strategies and alliances, the gradual revision of certain
Communist beliefs and the emergence of so-called "third world" nationalistic
149
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Noe
movemente which have adopted the techniques of the early Communist revolution-
aries without necessarily identifying themselves as Communints. In the un-
developed areas of the world, the application of these techniques has re-
sulted in rural guerrilla warfare, ;long the lines exploited by Mao, Ho and
Castro. In more developed areas, the result has been urban violence. And
amid that violence, a modernized revolutionary literature has been circulated,
with emphasis upon the techniques of urban terror. Almost all of it rein-
fortes the earlier doctrine, which called for terrorism as a prelude to urb-
an insurrection.
Marighellali Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla is typical of this recent
literature. In it, Marighella identifies the task of the urban subversive:
r e
"to distract, to wear out, to demoralize" through kidnappingl'assassination,
sabotage and the propagandization of violence. What it', most'striking about
the Minimanual is its detailed adaptation of the earlier revolutionary con-
cepts to the modern urban environment: in it occur specific instructions on
such things as the hijacking of commercial aircraft for propaganda eurposes,
the "kidnapping of a political personality....to exchange or liberate im-
prisoned revolutionary comrades", the use of the telephone and postal system
to spread false information on the planting of bombs, and the employment of
the automobile in ambushes against local police. Recent events reveal how
effective this adaptation has been, not only in Latin American but in those
urban areas linked together through the growth of modern technology. Mari-
ghella himself stresses the impact which subversion in one city can have
upon the political climate in another city a hemisphere away. Throughout
the Minimanual, he proclaims the effect which terrorism at a distance can
have upon the United States in particular.
$0
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Marighellacs political motivation remains unclear, and the Minimanual
_
confines itself to scorn for "Yankee imperialism and fascist capitalism",
revealing no political objectives beyond the destruction of the existing
system. Even so, the Minimanual echoes the insurgency doctrine of the early
Communist theorists. With its emphasis upon the robbery of banks for the
sake of obtaining revolutionary funds, its stress upon proper timing and
careful organization, and its concern for the infiltration and neutralizat-
ion of governmental security forces, the Minimanual ia clearly influenced
by the writings of Lenin ard Trotsky. Its primary effect, however, has been
not only the resurrection of Lenin's emphasis upon urban insurgency, but the
popularization of such insurgency is the focal point of revolution.
?
The Minimanual does rt address itself to the rcIationshil) between
the terrorist movement and the development of a cland4fitine governmental
apparatus which would assume power once it is ready to be seized; in this
sense, Marighella's published thought is typical of many contemporary
pamphlets which emphasize revolution for its own sake. Nor does the Mini-
manual theorize about the phases Of the revolutionary process; instead, it
provides a scenario for intensifying organized terrorism to such a point
that the government in power finally collapses. Marighella, unlike Lenin,
makes no distinction between subversion and insurrection. In the absence
of this' distinction, the subject of mass uprising goes untreated, and what
is left in a formula via which increased violence (NI become incipient.
urban insurgency.
What is important in such work is therefore not only its popularization
of urban insurgency, but its advocacy of a form of violence and terrorism
almost perfectly suited to the purposes of strategic insurgency. As with
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? 1400
similar revolutionary treatises which have appeared in the past decade, it
is this adaptability which makes the urban insurgency proclamations of the
Minimanual most important/
6. Urban Insurgency and' Its Strategic Implementation
Not all revolution is Communist inspired, nor is all revolutionary in-
surgency devoted to the establishment of a Communist government. Oppression
by the government in power may provoke opposition from dissident groups
who disagree with each other as to altrrnative forms of government, who
nevertheless 'join together in revolution, and who then struggle among
themselves for power as in the period following the Czar's abdication
in 1917. Amid such struggle, the superior organization of .a Communist
minority may well result in its triumph, of course ?.and, presumably, in
its swift profession of alliance with other Communist powers. But in the
sense in which it was conceived by Lenin and advocated by Trotsky, world-
wide Communist revolution as a single, coherent thrust for power may be de-
scribed as an abandoned goal. Internal conflict among the major Communist
powers, plus the continued survival of the Soviet Unicin without such world-
wide revolution, have been the principle factors in this revision of Commun-
ist theory. In its place may be emerging the reliance upon revolution not
for ideological purposes but for strategic purposes.
Several major factors underlie this possibility. The advent of nuclear
weapons having compromised their willingness to risk total war in the settling
of conflict, the major powers of the world have sought alternative strategies
and techniques; the US doctrine of limited war was initially for just this
purpose. Whether or not the success of this alternative otrategy in the
Korean War served to inspire a deliberate counter-strategy is a matter of
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Nor
Nor
speculation. Perhaps more important is the way in which urban insurgency
reflects the availability of such a counter-strategy.
This counter-strategy is made available by the emergence of three
factors. First, the advent of technology has resulted in an unprecedented
concentration of economic and political power in the metropolitan areas of
those nations which have become modernized. The stabdlity of such a nation
is thus dependent on the stability of its major cities. Second, the source
of its economic and political strength has ironically become the greatest
vulnerability of the modern industrialized state, since its cities offer
such concentrated targets. Third, the widespread dissemination of a
thoroughly tested and highly effective blueprint for urban insurgency, avail-
able to dissident elements of varied political persuasicn, 'has resulted in
2 volatile mixture of revolutionary technique and revdIntionary motivation.
This mixture has already resulted in thousands of urban,explosions, of
varying force and varying impact. The manipulation Of this mixture being
possible, the cities being vulnerable, and the strength of an industrialized
nation being dependent on its cities, such a nation may be readily attacked
by the fomenting of urban insurgency within its cities -- or, indeed, by
the fomenting of urban insurgency within cities upon which its own economy
is dependent although the cities themselves are thomsands of miles away.
The strategic variations available are enormous.
The actual seizure of power need not be the objective of such a
counter-strategy. Rather, its objective could be to divert the energies
and resources of the attacked nation, forcing it to concentrate upon its
own internal problems at the expense of external matters. Moreover, the
attacking nation need not expose itself in the process. Relying on clan-
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destine means to manipulate unrest it could, theoretlly, orchestrate
that unrest in such a way it is maintained at whatever level desired. As
with limited war, limited insurgent war is also possible. And for the
purposes of strategic diversion, limited insurgency may be more suitable
than insurgency brought to 2 fever pitch. For the latter runs the risk
of culminating in insurrection, with the consequent risk of an abrupt ex-
tinction of the insurgent movement -- while limited insurgency, marked by
extreme terrorism but not accompanied by serious plans for the revolutionary
seizure of power, offers itself to continuation over a sustained period
and hence offers.the greatest prospect of diverting the strength of a
nation. Since it is in this sense Ahat 'urban insurgency involves strategic
potential, it is also in this sen6e that the absence.-q4 any spvious comment
about revolutionary objectives is most striking in Mar,ighellats treatise
and similar works of Modern revolutionary advocates.
Nor must insurgency be confined to the cities within an attacked
nation. Giver the interreldtionship of the modern industrial cities as
described in Chapter Two a nation may find its economic system interrupted,
its internal stability undermined and its foreign alliances challenged by
the impact of urban insurgency executed in cities which are well outside
its own geographic boundaries. If the attacked nation can be drawn into
diverting its energies to the solution of urban insurgency in some such
third-country target, the compound effect of this strategy would be even
greater. .
Because of these possibilities, the response to urban insurgency re-
quires careful assessment of not only the motives but also the objectives
of an insurgent movements In the sense set forth in Chapter Two, it also
.roquirms recognition that insurgency may be widespread, concentrated on a
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particular urban function and yet not even apparant to the attacked nation
because of its relative dispersion throughout 2 network of internal and
external cities. The variations on such insurgency are therefore endless,
as the Case studies of Section II illustrate. Exactly what role the US
Army might play in the resistance of such insurgency is the subject of
Section III,
,
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? ? Nwpw
SECTION IT
TIE CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN INSURGENCY
The secret for the success of any
operation, simple or complicated,
easy or difficult, is to rely on
determined men. Strictly speaking,
there are no easy operations. All
must be carried out with the s ame
care exercised in the case of the
most difficult, beginning with the
choice of the human element, which
means relying on leadership and
capacity for .decision in every test.
, ? , /.4 ?
Carlos Martghella, Minimanual of
? - The Urban
Uirerrilla
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'mar CHAPTER FOUR ? mmir
ORGANIZATION %OF THE URBAN UNDERGROUND
1, The Persistence of the Underground
Zealot resistance to the Roman occupation of Palestine. Spartans
working within the Democratic institutions of Athens to develop dissension
and distrust of the government. Assassins employing selective murder in
order to influence politics in the near East during the crusades. Committees
of Correspondence transmitting information and propaganda among the British
colonies of North America. Resistance to the German and Japanese occupation
forces. Political murders of athletes in Munich and U.S. officials in
Montevido and Khartoum. Rioting demonstrators attacking British troops in
in the streets of Belfast. Abductions of American and British businessmen in
Argentina. Lingering low-intensity, political conflicts and disputes through-
out the world which are increasingly evident in metropolitan areas in the form
of aircraft hijackings letter bombs kidnappingS, political murders, bank
robberies, demonstrations and riots.....
Whether local or international in impact, all these activities were, or
are, based upon the exist4ce of an underground organization. This organiza-
tion may be sophisticated or simple, large or small, but regardless of these
aspects it will be generally organized along the traditional lines of the
illegal underground apparatus which ha n existed throughout the history of
rATIP:inds
The illegal underground apparatus erd most of its techniques have been
exposed because of its increatinf; employment during the last three decades,
as well As a vast body of literature which exist; describing it; As a result
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Nor,
this aspect of revolutionary warfare is now in use threTEtlout the world by
numerous minority groups seeking to implement their own particular social or
political changes:. Employment of illegal underground techniques by these
groups will continue as long as they hold promise of imposing the will of a
minority upon a majority in a short period of time:I Most of their success
has been due to the misunderstanding of, and improper reaction to these tech-
niques by governments and security forces throughout tho world
The illegal underground apparatusi often a creation of some secret so-.
ciety; has formed the basis for resistance or revolt throughout history, and
this type of organization is neither new nor rare:' This type of organiza-
tion has also often existed as the "other side of the coin" for many organ-
izations which appeati. or have appeared to participate,legally,Ind openly in
? ?
the affairs of society:.
The illegal Underground apparatus is not the product of any one group or
of any particular period in history. 4 However; it can be said that during the
latter half of the 19th century and most of the 20th century; the Communist
Party developed and used this form of organization and its operational tech-
niques more successfully than any other group in the history of the world,'
The increased appearance of revolutionary warfare in the mid and late
20th century, particularly the use of the illegal underground apparatus and
its operational techniques; is clearly a responsete; and consistant with the
three major strategic and tactical considerations which characterize the
conduct of modern warfare, The first in the rise of total war -- a process
which has evolved from mass conscription of mans armies; to the complete
involvement of all members of a population in a situation where two opposing
forces are attempting to organize and control the tame population The
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second is the desire of participants to escape the efi@fte of ever-increas-
ing fire-power:I The third is the wish of participants to keep the conflict
at a level of intensity low enough to preclude the introduction of nuclear
weapons:
Today it may be possible to add a fourth general considerations the desire
of participants; whether one or all are engaged in clandestine operations;
to keep the conflict at a level of intensity low enough to preclude any
particirent from having to introduce conventional main forte units and/Or
weapons systems:4
Detection, of the illegal underground apparatus is usually difficult;
especially in more open societies; anti especially during its formative
period.' This often holds true until the time that thnri.er7c7d initiates
enough overt actions to produce a pattern which may reveal its existence.'
This is due to the fact that most metropoliten security forces i.e.' police;
customs; federal investigative agencies; in the more operi societies spend.
the majority of their time; and focus most of their activities upon crime
and criminals.( Obviously; many. of the early activities of the illegal
underground apparatus such as exprofalations; theft of arms; and even murder,
will be confused. with nonpolitical criminal behavior and activities.. It
nay be only after the "crime wave" ceases to abate that, security forces come
to realize that they have a politically motivated illegal element to deal with..
Today; in certain eocietie6; involvement in the formation and development
of an illegal underground apparatus may easily fall within the bounds of what
has been described an "discretionary behavior".. Discretionary behavior is
that behavior which the majority of the population dees not really believe
threatens the status quo -- even though it may be quite violent or anti-social
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Nap- as in the context of u7;ircan insurgency: Obviously, if VIS could keep the
number of illegal underground organizations ire a particular country or region
limited in number; and their operations at such a low level of intensity
an to permit then to be viewed as "discretionary" by most of the populace;
one could then engage in a systematic attack upon a government; system; or,
group for a considerable period of time without eliciting a vigorous re-
sponse from security forces:'
../
The Oblectives of the Underrtound
Offensive operations of the illegal underground apparatus are usually
short in durations and executed by &Ian teams using offpnsive tactics and '
following carefully made plans which emphasize; detailed 'intelligence collec-
tion and reconnassiance; surprise; violence; end mobility: "Keep in mind that
in the -conduct of its operations the underground must obey the principles
of war PLUS the principle of Deliberate Delay:" Deliberate delay has been
described as the "prevention of.disclosure and defeat in premature hostile
contacts": In other words; "pick your fight"; and "if the fight looks
fair; bug out";,'
Many of these operations will be carried out during the hours of dark-
nose; howeverldue to the ease of evading direct fire of small arms in an
urban environment; as by merely turning a corner; daylight operations are
quite feasible: The objectives of these operations axe the lowering of
-
the morale of the underground; capturing arms; materna; funds; or hosta-..
gee; while proving the ineffectiveness of the government... All will provide
training for members of the underrround apparatus. These operations are
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,Akbe Ntio
unlikely to produce any stunning defeats of the security forces and even'
less likely to result in the total overthrow of a government/ however,- they
do support the complete spectrum of actions and techniques nsei by the
Illegal undergroeni nrytratun to Pinot:ton in an urban environment:1
? Unfortunntely; dee to their nature; fheral offensive operations are often
the rost obvious nortion of the actlors of an illegal underground apparatus
and as such attract the bulk of publicity and government attention.' Far more
Important and far more dangerous in the long run is the actual underground'
apparatus itself and the political causes that drive it,
The actual operation of an underground apparatus is much more dangerous
and complicated in an urban environment than in a rural environment:. The
urban environment offers far greater temptations and 6mforts to members of
the organization than does the rural environment:. Many,ppportunities will
be available for members of the underground apparatus to take dangerous short-
,
cuts and short-circuit the more tedious but essential security measures required
to reduce the risk to personnel; equipment, and operations in the city: The
density of the urban population may offer more potential recruits to the
urban insurgents; but it also harbors more potential informers:' As a conse-
quence, it is vital that the organization be made up of dedicated personnel
and that it conducts constant detailed training for all members, whether their
positions are administrative or operational:. In addition; a very high level
of discipline must be maintained in order to insure a satisfactory level of
participation and performance by its members:'
? All of these conditions and factors are recognized in the traditional'
techniques of the illegal underground apparatus and a great deal of attention
is paid to theme' Some modern underground organizations have tended to skim
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Normi NOW
over these realities as time consuming and uneceseary; focusing instead
upon offensive operation? in hopes of short-run results.' Usually they have
paid heavily for these attempted short cuts: The Tupamaros; operating in and
around Montevideo,Uruguay; came close to destruction pursuing a course consist-
ing of spontaneousi uncoordinated; detentralized armed notions; and have been
in the process of attempting to rebuild their organization along the lines
of the traditional illegal underground apparatus.'
The experiences of both our allies and ourselves during the last two
decades should have proved to us that the design and implementation of effec-
tive countermeasures to insurgency; whether rural or urbani,nust be predicated .
upon a much more thorough understaning of the illegal underground apparatus
and its operations coupled with increased political awireness on,the part
of our represenatives closest to the situation.'
It follows that there is a definate need for developing the ability of
selected officersi whether serving as advisors; staff officers or common-
.
ders; to recognize the involvement and manipulation of various social and
political activities in foreign areas by underground organizations and tech-
niques. To accomplish this; it must be insured that these personnel under
stand more than just the basic terms and components -describing revolutionary
war.' They must appreciate the political significance of these activities
and their very sensitive nature in an urban environment i where each act of
the participants is rapidly transmitted through the population and readily
amplified.' They must understand not only the traditioPal illegal undergronnd
apparatus but also some of the modern variations of tFse organizationsi op-
erations,' and techniques.' What follows is a combination outline and thumb-
nail of the traditional illegal underground apparatus which forms the
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Nmoi
ase for any activity in any phase of revolutionary war.711.
_lit The Cellular Principle of UnderEronnd OmEinizati n
The traditional Underground apparatus operating in. an urban environment is
organized hierarchially; and rises from a base of cells; through buildings, .
neighborhoods; and districts to the urban or metropolitan headquarters. However,
some of the current illegal underground organizations; particularly those
which are Operatinm internationally; have a much smaller structure than the
traditional organization; and their cells may be organized more along func-
tional lines for a specific period of time; or for a specific mission.'
The goals of the underground apparatus are illegaT. and the primary means
r -
used to reach these coals are illegal.' For these reasons -the underground will
It
always try to conceal the identity of its membership and the structure of its
organization.'
The illegal underground apparatus can be spread- throbghout.th6-metropolitan
environment.' Its members come from, all over the urban area and may well hold
a wide variety of social and ecomic positions within the area; consequently
a well organized underground has access almosteverywhere.' It performs the
normal tasks of any organization in addition to those specialized tasks re-
quired to keep it in business and to accomplish its own particular ends:.
It may be that the illegal underground apparatus; traditionally organized;
may perform more functions itself than any other single organization known
to man -- except a government; which; of course; it is designed to replace.'
Membership may be divided into leaders; nemberst' auxiliaries and sympa-
thizers .i The leadership is composed of the dedicated full-time personnel
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who are devoting all their time and effort to the undergligfund and to its
objectives:' The regular members normally maintain their normal role in the
urban area while performing organizational duties and attending underground.
mentinrs and receiving training Auxiliaries are part-time workers available
to the underground only for particular periods of time; utilized for the per-
formance of certain tasks or/npecial assignments: Sympathizers are non-members
who are not apt to assist the government and who are generally well-disposed
toward the underground anA its aims.' They may involve themselves in demon-
strations and occasionally? provide other aid to the apparatus:1
The primary cell is the basic building block of the illegal underground
apparatus and is usually composed of,a leader and two members. This
composition may vary greatly and will be dealt with ]pri:_ The leader will
supervise the activities of the members and he will be the only one to receive
and transmit ordersi informationi and material verticaaly or horizontally
as required by the role of his cell in the underground apparatus:, The ways
in which the primary cells may be arranged in order to build an underground
apparatus are limited only by imagination after careful evaluation of the
Overall situation and your own objectives.' Obviously the density of the
population will have an influence upon the number of cell that arc; or
can be formed
The cells in an underground organization may or may not be highly
compartmentalized usually this will depend upon government actions toward
the underground il Compartmentation limits or preventm contact and knowledge
of one member by another and of one cell by anothori so on through the appara-
tus:4 If the apparatus in compartmentized apprehension of one man or even
one cell; will not normally either harm the apparatus or permit security
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NIWP" forces to "roll-up" any more personnel or cells; simply because of lack
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of information about other members and other cells on the part of those
?
In government hands.'
A further featurr of(the cell mild. be whether it was orgenized
functionally or geograPbically:" It might be the explosives manufacturing
cell for the entire underground or simply a cell in a neighborhood that
may have to perform a vide variety of functions.' Often the two are combined
and the cell will perform as the intelligence cell for a neighborhood or;
let us say; the reconnaissance cell for targets in Western Europe'
The types of cells are broadly divided into administrative cells and
operational cells.' Specific examples of administrative cells would bet re-.
cruiting; training; finance; trandport; manufacturing;,lialson; etc.' Er-
mulles of operational cells would be intelligence; sabotage; psychological
.")
operations; assassination; armed teams; etc:' During times of mass recruit-
ing and mass organizing; auxiliary cells are sometimes formed as an aid
in handling large numbers of personnel and in order to provide a vehicle for
testing and evaluating prospective members for the underground apparatus.
Arrangement of the cells in the organization will be based upon con-
ditions in the operational area and upon the imagination; training; and
experience of the leaders. However the general overall arrangement will
usually be either in parallel or in series,
In a parallel arrangement of cells; communications and command and
control run vertically and there is little; if any contact among the -
member n or cells horizontally. This arrangement is particularly useful
in times of danger to the apparatus and in the conduct of intelligence ?
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collection operations where the need to double check twOrmation and to
maintain a back-up source of information are important tasks.
,14 Communications and 'Security Within the Urban Un4erfrround
Cells arranged in series run horizontally and are most useful in
activities, requiring a division of labor such. as manufacturing (material
moves from cell to cell; each cell performing its task upon it in order
to produce a finished item much like an assembly lino in a factory).
Production of' an underground newspaper would be another example of cells
in series (one cell collects information; one cell edits it, one cell
publishes it and another makes the distribution).' ?
"
Communication among the cells may be either technical or non-technical,
.formal or informal.- In a metropolitan area it is possible that the abundant
technical communications facilities available to the urban insurgent
-
may greatly influence his operations by improving his communications -- e.g.',
telephones, small commercial tuo-way radios; and radlo and T.V. sets to
receive his appeals and messages to the population. The urban environment
also offers easy procurement of chemicals for production of invisible
inks and for the components required to build a variety of communications
equipment. If; however/ the underground makes Use of technical communi-
cations available to it in the city it runs the risk of compromise by
government security forces using wire-tapping and other forms of electronic
surviellance.
For this reason most underground organizations will rely upon tra-
ditional non-technical communication methods.' These non-technical mean;
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of commlniCation may range from visual signals (lamps hung in a bell
tower) to use of both live and dead "drops".' A drop is simply a place
or perton where messages or materials are left for another to pick up --
thus preventing both members of the underground from being in one location
at the same time and even from knoving one another.' It could be a clerk
in a shop (a live drop) or beneath a. rock in a park (a dead drop). The
formality for communication within the organization depends largely upon
the size of the cells -- if they are largelinformal communication with
few written messages or records will be prevelant:' If cells are small
the reverse is true more writing and records will be necessary.' In
underground communications message are normally sent by two routes to
insure delivery and great emphariiii placed upon acknoNledgemen:t.of message
receipt -- otherwise compremise must be assumed.?
-
In general; most illegal undergrounds solve their problems of
means and methods used to coordinate over long periods of time (command
and control) by centraliving their administrative functions and deeentralizing
their operational fUnctions,: Too much centralization requires too much
coordination.' Too much coordination requires too much communication.' Too
much commrnication in terms of frequent meetings, production of documentsi
and written messages helps the security forces attacking the apparatus;'
In order to prevent this condition the traditional apparatus will issue
an many mission type orders as possible and leave the details to the
lower edhelonsi?
Security is clearly a vital factor in every aspect of every activity of
the illegal underground apparatus.' Basically the member of an illegal
underground apparatus is safest when he apeears to be most like every
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other member of the populaee anti does nothing to arouse suspicion,' Thin
?
will rec.uire training and self-discipline and care will have to be taken
to prevrnt accidental divulgence of information or I-costing, MariGhellais
Minimannal stresses that the Urban insurgent must take care to blend with
the poiJlace in the area of the city that he in operating in.
DocUments must often be stolen, forged, or purchased in order for '
members to exist or conduct operations,' This is a bigger problem for the
urban insurgent because he is apt to face more paperwork and control
measures based upon paperwork than for the rural insurgent,'/'InternatiOnal
operations of en illegal underground apparatus will requiTe even more in the
way of sophisticated documentation.4
Close attention is paid to the security of meeting and rendezvous sites'.
ft
These sites are changed frequently and, the times of arrival and delarture
. of underground members is varied, In publicosignals:and passwords are used
to insure that the area is clear and that both members recognize each other,'
Other security measures include investigation of backgrounds of
recruits; loyalty oaths to impress members with security, limiting
personal contact among members of the underground, strict regulation of
liaison, ninimization of records, and use of codes and cover identities
and stories,'
In ease of capture of a member of the illegal underground apparatus,
most organizations will exfiltrate all members the captured individual
*mild Identify,' If possiblei all features and activities of the organiza-
tion that the captured member could reveal are immediately altered e Because
of this, the French Army in Algiers often collected Arabs at random, knowing
a given group would probably contain some cell members, Whose cella would ?
thereby be exfiltrated from Algiers,'
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The Organization of Demonstrationn
The demonstration in one of the most useful, and most used tech-
niques of insurgency. In the urban setting the demonstration takes on
added significance because it serves the functions of attracting publicity,
involving numbers of the population in a common activity, providing a
training vehicle for members of the underground organization.' And it
may prodnee a, situation where over-relction on the part of the Jovernment
will alienate members of the population.'
The underground organization will carefully examine the groups
involved in a' particular demonstration in order to insure that there is
twiny a chance for them to control the demonstration and turn its use.
to their own ends:I Largelplanned-demonstrations almos.t alwamponsess
the potential for transformation into mass violence of,such size and dura-
i
.tion that the government may Fe forced into committing errors and into
acting in a fashion which may further aggravate the situation
In some cases the underground organization may plan and execute
small demonstrations which appear to be spontaneous.' Because they use
a limited number of participants and depend a great deal upon surprise,
these tyres of demonstrations require etailed planning and a high degree
of discipline. If violent, this type of demonstration reduces the number
of unnecessary easualities while providing training and experience for
members of the underground apparatus' It may, also provide an outlet for
more violent members of the organization short of out and out terToist
actions
The general techniques used to mcganize and control a demonstration
do not vary significantly with thei methods used to take over or "stiffen"
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an on going demonstration which the urban insurgents have determined
will serve their purposes.' In the majority of eases these techniques are
simple wad depend more upon discipline and training than upon sheer
numbers of underground participants. Even quite large masses of reople
can be controlled by a small number.of.personnel using the folloWing
techniques.'
The senior members of the underground responsible for the control
of the demonstration will generally keep themselves some distance from the
demonstration and any action occurring as a result of the demonstration.'
These leaders constitute what is known as the exterior command and they
transmit their orders to other members of the underground apparatus
inside the demonstration via hand and arm signalsi measengerel, and today,
with the advent of small i inexpenSive two-way radio sets, even use of radio.
The second level of leadership is usually located inside the demon-
stration and has the mission of transmitting and supervising the orders
of the exterior command. Due to the cellular form of the underground
apparatus these may be the only underground members who know the identity
of the exterior command. It is possible that the operation might be "cut-
out" thru use of messengers and/or pre-arranged signals so elaborately
that very few of the underground cells ox individual members participating
would actuallyknow how many members of the underground apparatus were
actually participating.' The second level of leadership will usgally
remain clone to any sicnificant actiona that the demons:%ration becimen in-
volved in and an a result will usually require some phynical protection
in the form of bodyguards to perrit them to devote their attention to
supervision of the demonstration The body guards will also usually have
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a secondary mission of insuring the escape of this interior leadership;
even at their own expense; from government security forces or from other
elements within the demonstration itselfT
Another element of the underground within the demonstration are
the rstandard bearers" who may be carrying signs; banners; etc. Initially
the standards may reflect popular irsues or demands; but as the demonstra.-
tion intensifies the leader; may direct that these standaids be changed
for standards which are more aggressivsin nature, thus contributing to a
change in the tone of the 'demonstration:" Many times important members of
the underground apparatus involved in the demonstration may locate themselves
In the vicinity of specific standards in order that they Can be easily
locatee by messengers and other underground participants during the course
?
of the demonstration;;
Some operational cells may have highly specialized missions. One
of these woad be that of "cheerleaders" who have carefaly rehearsed
a variety of slogans; again varying in content and aggressiveness in order
to alter mood and actions of the masses :I These slogans will be changed.
upon direction of the leaders thru the use of prearranged signals e.g.4
change in standards; etc.' As in the case of the standards the slogans
may become more aggressive as the derionstrations become more intenoe.
Other, cells may serve to "herd" the front; flank; rear; or spperate section
of the demonstration in order to give it shape and physical direction and,
as a resat; better control by the underground.'
Some cells may serve as attack groups who take offensive action
against Government representatives; other groups in or near the demonstration,
or facilities which may be targets. These operational cells are normally
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armed in some fashion (clubs; rocks; molotov onektaila -- and in some
cases knives; grenades; and even firearms) These cells also provide
an organized violent response if the demonstration is attaOked; thne
intenefying the demonstration:
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CHAPTER FIVE
AfMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF THE URBAN UNDERGIOUND
1; ReeruitinK Procedures Within the Underground
In order to develop an effective organization, the illegal under-
ground apparatus must perform certain basic administrative acts such as
recruiting, training, obtaining funds, and procuring supplies; The under-
ground in a metropolitan area does not have as great a need for material
and equipment as does the illegal apparatus supporting a rural insurgency
with ita large military units 1' However, the need for recruiting and training
is just as vital to its continued existence as are these functions for
the continued existence of the rural arparatus;' The urban apparatus will
I' ? On
usually use the simplest and easiest techniques,to accomplish these
essential housekeeping activities; WithouA,Tontinuous recruiting, the under-
ground, like all organizations; would cease to grow and' perhaps cease
to exist;' However; the illegal underground apparatus does not norrally need
really great numbers to accomplish its aims. A large organization makes
some operations easier; but in the metropolitan area personnel are not
necessarily as important as technical Skills, dedication, and tight or-
ganization'
The techniques used in recruiting will vary with the organization stage
of developmeht and with the needs of the organization;' Initially, emphasis
will be upon selective recruiting; an then later, when the leaders are
trainedg'emphasis is shifted to mass recruiting efforts if the general
situation in the metr4olitan area permits M.' During and after recruit-
ment the prospective member of the apparatus is usually subjected to a
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variety of tests to insure that he is not a penetraion agent or an
Inform:. In some cases a process of grsdual committment is used to
recruit a member or a group of member3:' The target is led into helping
the orjanitation and as a result either compromises himself in the. ,
process; or the recruiter leads him to believe that he is compromised as
far as the government is concerned:* He will be led to believe there is
no way out of becoming a member of the organization:. In some cases; coer-
cion will be used to deliberately compromise a specific individual who
would be very valuable to the underground.' He will be led into some aet
that will make it impossible for him to betray the apparatus without
incriminating himself'
Recruiters generally seek people with the type gf grievances and
vulnerabilities which are most likely to cause them to agree with the
ends and means of the organizationw At times recruiters have been,in-
structed to specifically seek those who have, tasted failure or poverty
at some times in their lives; or simply to look for unhappy and ugly per-
sons -- all those being characteristics which breed generalized discontent
or hostility toward society and which may be channeled by the underground
toward its own ends:' Thus the recruiter for the urban underground offers
to many persons living in our Modern urban complexes an opportuniAT for
comradeship in a common caUse; like that of a secret society or group in
danger:' Indeed; comradeship is one of the things which appeals most to
many socially alienated persons in urban areas:' Social pressure and
fashions within a sub:-culture may lead many into seeking; or accepting
membership in the urban underground,' Whatever the individual reasons
for joining; the recruiter must insure that his appeals coincide with the
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value system of his target.'
Selective recruitment focuses upon persons who would be useful
to the apparatus because of their social or occupational situation and
who could be transformed into dedicated members of the apparatus. These
are the type of persons who are sought to fill leadership; intelligence,
and other special positions Within the apparatus.' Selective recruitment
makes maximem use of the fail-safe principle of maXimum compartmentation
in its operations because it exposes members of the apparatus to the danger
of ident!Sication and betrayal.' A spotter identifies a prospective recruit
who would' be useful. to the underground and who appears to be approachable.?
The spotter then drops from the picture and his Information is passed to a
recruiter who makes his approach.' If he sees fit he will make a direct
PI" ?
1 0.
offer; if not; he will attempt to gradually lead the Individual into the
?
organi%ation.' The recruit in then tested by having him perform some task
which is unimportant to the underground to see if he will carry it out
faithfully without supervision.' The recruit may then take a loyalty oath
and receve training necessary for him, to perform his duties in the appara-
tus. Throughout this entire period he is kept under observation and
continuously tested.'
Whbn recruiting leaders; the illegal underground apparatus will seek
persons with an ability to deal with people. Since most operations are
decentrall%ed the underground must depend upon leaders at the 1owe31 level
to give directions; enforce discipline; and to sustain morale. Persons
from thn local community with leaderohip experience are prime taroets;
Intelligence gathering is one of the major activities of the apparatus
ro persons are sought for recruitment into intelligence duties who have
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access 'a) information which may be useful to the apparatus.' An example
of this was a member of the FLN in Algeria who served as vice-mayor of
Algiers.' Often someone without current access to information is rneruited
and assisted by the organization to ndvance to a position where he will
have access to important information:
Recruiting for personnel with special skills will be of concern to
the underground.' There will always be a need for doctors; nurses; car-
penters, locksmiths; chemists radio operators; gunsmiths; etc l' in the
operations of an illegal underground apparatus.'
In traditional underground methods; mass recruitment, usually takes
place only after a solid organization has been formed.' In some cases this
nay take years.' Recruiters in this type of activity,con-take,advantage of
past organizational assisstence to the needy and to groups opprest,ed or
ignored by the government.' Often these groups are most willing to assist the
underground after they have been made aware of their neglected status in
relation to the society as a whole.' Coercion in mass recruitment occurs
by narmed invitation": by luring a group into a buildinglor to a neigh-
borhool rally or meeting against their wishes,in order to compromise them
With the government.' The setting for this act must be viewed as illegal by
the government (violation of curfew; etc.) so that the participants can
be made to feel that they have compromised themselves with the government;
gradual involvement and the threat of exposure are also used on the
asses,' Sometimes quotas for membel:ship are given to local leaders and are
backed up by threats against individuals or the community,' The youth are
usually easily persuaded to jnin orranizations of this types, mairay because
Of their sense of adventure, and because they most often make decipions
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based on emotion rather than on reason
:-
141.313 recruitment relies upon the use of key men who know their own
area and people thoroughly:' These men use specific appealsi geared to local
grievances and issues with social vressure in order to recruit the masses.
They are usually natural leadOs;' They have the respect of the mmmunity
that they reside in and usually are cusceptible to recruitment into the
apparatus: Having been recruited and. trained himself i he will initially
recruit among his friends and then use the bandwagon effect to bring in
many more supporters and member for the apparatus:* This key man is im-
portant in mass recruiting because more often than not people will accept
guidance from a member of their own group than they .will from an outsider
Such men perform as a. channel of oommunication from Ap apparatus to a
large segment of the population; the:" normally do not exercise any
control functions themselves
g; Training Within the Urban Underground
Training is an extremely important activity for the underground
apparatus because a well trained membership means that the organization
will be able to survive and conduct operations in pursuit of their aims
even under adverse conditions. Although literature is widely available on
underground organizations and their techniques; only those deeply interested
in thee ratters; uill be likely to trouble themselves to locate and study
Eect of the populace in any given metro;olitan area will have little
knowledge of the techniques necessary to conduct these activities.' Training
in matters of organizational techniques may be especially necessary in
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those metropolitan areas of the world where mass organizations have yet
to come into existences' Many undergrounds have placed great emphasis
upon practical "OJT" type training of members in what amounts to "trial
by fire" during participation in action-operations after Onli a minimum
of training:. This technique is favored by many of today's illegal under-
ground organizatiOns:
Literature; as discusSed earlier; is readily available anal'. aspects
of underground operations to those who are interested.' Study and gradual
application of this literature makes it feasible for a small extremist'
minority group to educate itself well enough to establish and. operate an
illegal underground apparatus
Very formal activities for training in underground operations such as
schools ere usually located in quite secure areas either .outside the metro-
politan area; or more often outside the country.' Often leaders of under-
ground organizations 'aye been graduates of various Communist Party schools;
either Russian; Chinese; Cuban; or North Korean:' These leaders upon
returning to their homes do not necessarily form Communist undergrounds
nor do they necessarily pursue Communist goals.' It is conceivable that
sometjing like "night schools" might be set up in urban areas for certain
types of training for the general membership.
'Most of the training conducted by the underground is informal in
nature and elven to small groups.' Use of smaller groups offers fewer se-
curity Tmoblems and permits a vide variety of locations for the cohduct
of training.' For example; several members could receive training each
day by having lunch with an instructor in a park,' Technical training would
be easior to give in an urban environment due to the abundance of shops,
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Noir
plants; and hospitals; etc:'
Political indoctrination will be of utmost importance to the under-
ground; especially indoctrination of the leaders intelligence operatives;
and certain specialists:* The membership of the ort,anization mug: develop
suffici *Int dedication to insure thai., they will function in situations
where the underground does not have flire et control over them:.
Weapons and explosive training in urban areas poses greater problems
than in rural areas: HoweveTothis can be overcome by teaching fundamentals
and conducting dry-runs in an urban setting and them spending weekends in
live exercises in remote rural areas;' If this is impractical; air rifles
can be used for firearms training and to improve marksmenship in basements;
garages; attics; and even hallways and alleys:' In sprit) cases the members wiL1
first use weapons and explosives during actual operations this
possible if there has been a great deal of practice and "dry-flring":" As
in any type of training program; whether for conventional warfare or for
underground action operations there is no substitute for intelligence
and. imagination on the part of the training officer or instructor..
The underrround apparatus always needs funds for purchase of food
and supplies; medicine; component parts of equipment; weapons; and explo-
sives:* ? Pund.sllin also be necessary for the full-time leaders and workers:"
Financial aid may e.lso have to be provided to families of members who
have been captured; killed"; or extiltrated:' Funds 411 also be needed
for intelligence purposes and briber
Internal sources of funds can le developed from the population and
Pnart all forms of economic activity 3.r the metropolitan area.:' These sources
range from individuala; to businesses; te possibly; the treasury of the
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government itself: Methods of collecting these funds will have an impact
upon the attitude of the population toward the apparatus and may reflect
the attitude of the apparatus toward the population:.
Wen-coercive methods of aceuiring fUnds will bring in moniev in the
rm.," of gifts; loans; and receipt or sales. Often embezzlement of funds
from businesses of from the government All be possible:' Few undergrounds
have been able to survive by dependin:; solely upon non-coercive methods of
funding Unless they were large and had almost total support from the p6p...
ulatjon' 1.
More often than not, especially in the case of smaller, rhort-range
organizations, funds had to also come from use of coercive methods.
Coercive methods such as robberies or expropriations from banks,
" r; r
forced contributions from businesses or other organizations, and taxation
?
of the populace, will be used if popular support is iraufficient to
produce funds by non-coercive methods.
External sources of funds may be from foreign governments who are
either interested in the aims of the illegal underground apparatus, or
who desire to "capture" the apparatus for their own ends, or who interested
in creating problems in a metropolitan area at the expense of anotlier nation
and/or its allies. Sometimes this e:?ternal financial support will come
from a similar ethnic or political group abroad who went to support the
common "cause". Funds from external sources can be easily channeled from
one urban area to another through borders by the use of dummy corporations,
dummy bank accounts, and the use of highly valuable, easily marketable, and
hard to trace items such asl gems, gold, and drugs.
Funds may be transmitted and used in many different forms. Cash in
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the local currency is most usable but dangerous to the underground if '
stored or transmitted in large amounts. Cash in "hard" currencies such
as the British Pound or the US Dollar -- and currently the Japanese Ten --
are al] usable internationally and serve as a better substitute for local
currency than gems, gold, or drugs. Usually the use of counterfeit money
in avoided because it requires a complex operation to manufacture it and
its use may adversly effect the creditability of the underground apparatus.
1. Loritical ConrAderstions Within the Urban Undergrounl
Logistics in these types of activities involves the procurement,
storage, and transfer or materiali necessary for the,Aperatiopa of the
apparatus, ranging from ink to ammunition. Unlike the,rural insurgent,
,cl
most members of the urban appaiatus provide their own food, clothing,
and shelter, which they procure in the course, of their activities as
normal membere of the urban population.
The local blackmarket, if one exists, may provide a source of supply
for specific goods unavailable on the open market because of scarcity,
government control, or illegality such as medicines, certain chemicals and
explosives. Purchases from the open owket will provide components
which the underground can assemble into finished items such as batteries,
clocks, and wire for bombs. The Polish underground during WW II purchased
large quantities of fertilizer openly from the Germans and then used it
to manufacture explosives.
Weapons and explo/sives may be captured or purchased* In several
eases arms have been acquired directly from members of the security forces
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NOW'
(police and military) by purchase. This was true of IRA operations
during the period 1916 7 1923. The regular British soldiers were often
cooperative with the underground in these matters because they would be
returned to England for this offense.' The Black and Tans, a temporsry
paramMtary force introduced later in the conflict, provided no supplies
to tha IPA in this fashion.
Theft by members of the apparatus from their place of work will
supply many items as will robberies of shops and businesses.' These
underground supply activities may attract little attention from the security
forces because they are easily confused with normal criminal activities,
Because the needs Of the urban insurgent organization is Small, "snap"
inventoriesi etc.; may reflect only normal shrinkage andnot always be a
- ?
sound indicator of early procurement measures by an underground.' !aids
upon storage areas and upon government forces can produce numerous ,types
of material and weapons In this fashion a small extremist minority
group could develop a large arsenal in a short period of time.
Manufacturing is less significant in urban insurgent logistics act-
ivities because more components and more finished items which they can
use are readily available in an urban environment than they are in a rural
environment. If manufacturing is necessary it can be done in a variety
of places in the urban area where the activity woad be camoflagued, 0.8'4
flamethrowers could be produced in.a fire extinguisher factory. The
smaller apparatus will find it easier to procure most items through purchase
or theft thnn to bother to try to make them. Manufacturing always .presents
security problems in terms of space and noise.'
International commerce makes it easy for a small group to receive
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"WV
mall amounts of material from abroad hidden in shipments of legal goods
or in the vehicles crossing the fronteirs:'
Transfer of material is less of F.. problem in the urban 'area than in
the rural area because of the variety and quantity of transport available,
and use of the patterns of constant vehicular movement which charact-
erizes the modern metropolitan complex.- Certain types of movement Are 90,
regular that routes may be set up; and a steady flow of items thus esta
bushed.' Examples of this would be people going to and from work, publio.
transport systems; and commercial vehicles making their rounds.' Items
can be hidden in the load or disguised an part of the legal load: Illegal
organizations operating internationally face more sophisticated problems
in their attempts to move weapons-and explosives across borders by air or
,.;
, r
ground transport.' Activities of thir nature will generally call for reduc-
tion in size and clever disguise of those Items they need to accomplish
their missions.' Pistols hidden in hair dryers and explosives in aerosol
cans are examples of solutions to these problems '
Storage of material in an urban area is not the problem that it would
seem because large amounts of supplies are not required for illegal opera-
tions of a small groh.' Storage will become a problem if the aime of the
underground include developing a large organization and eventually arming
the masses for an uprising.' In that event; dumps and caches of some size
must be located or prepared. False walls, sewers, and portions of legal ware-
houses have all been used for these -purposes. Normally,- nothing chould
be stured by individual members it is be ter to centralize material
in small amounts in non-incriminatinrs iodations so that few persons will
be apprehended if the cache in found;
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ence Collection Within the Urban Un4cazo7n4
Intnnigence collection ly the illecal apparatus is an operational
function which is continuous and spread over the entire urban area:'
Certain membern of the underground may have professions or jobs -that -
offer direct access to valuable information; but all members of the
apparatus are encouraged to collect information about the government and
its security forces. This feedback allows the organization to feel the
pulse of the urban populace in order to plan other operations.?
A wealth of information is available from local open Aources such
as newspapers.; radio9 awl television pertaining to the government and its
reactions to activities of the apparatus: infiltration of the military;
police; and government bureaucracy is of prime imnoxtance to,the urban
insurgent and this network of cells will be organizekwith tightly
compartmented small cells arranged in parallel fashion; Counter-
.
infiltration or penetration by government security forces is one the biggest
dangers the illegal underground apparatus facesjso great attention is '
paid to attempts to infiltrate those agencies who might have information
concerning government informants;'
Collection of information for action operations is often very easy
in the city because of the density and flow patterns of the popu:i.ation.
Prevention of reconnassiance of a bank by an illegal apparatus wculd be
almost impossible and it is even possible that a small armed team might
be ab 3e to rehearse an operation by walking around and through thaobjec-
tive or objective area, Beth ofthese actions would-be screened ly normal
daily presence of the population,'
Other items and places providing information important to the urban
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apparatus would be maps(street; sewer; utilities, power; transport, etc:),
telephone books; and libraries.' Female members of the organization can
often get positions which offer them /tccess to information needed by the
apparatus without arousing much suspicion.' They can also be employed to
divert or seduce individuals whci have access to information useful to the
apparat7 or control over activities which can endanger or help the apparatus.
Currently in Northern Ireland one sub-structure apparently associated
with the IBA is composed completely of women who have collected information
in a variety of ways in addition to engaging in armed operations.' In
Uruguay ; female membership in the Tupamaros rose from an estimated 39
in 1969 to an estimated 77%; In 1972 while the male membership dropped from
61%;to 23%;-- an indicator of the-awesome potential forintelligence
,
collection this apparatus may now.porsess.'
S.
Children play everywhere in the city and little Atention in given to
their activities; so they have the opportunity to collect a great deal of
information that adults could not.' Likewise; the elderly person is
rarely suspected of collection ,activities; but often they produce excellent
intelligence because of the wealth of experience they bring to this
activity.
Both children and the elderly also generally have a great deal of
free _time and may move; play; or lounge at will.' Both make excellant
couriers because little attention is paid to children and generally
the eleierly are treated with respect.' Collection of information will
pose little problem for a broad-bascA4 apparatus, although a number
of perims will have to be found who have the talent; and can be
trained for the work of collating
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Ambushes; and. Terrorism in the Urban Environment
Most of the armed actions of the combat or operational cells are
either ambushes or raids:' All the elements normally present in the planning
and conduct of such actions are prrsent in the urban underground.' The
primary difference is that in urban ambushes and raids fewer personnel
gill be involved; the action will be shorter in duration and scope,* and
more imagination will be used in their planning and execution; The latter
is due to the fact that urban terrain offers far more diversity than does
the rural:.
The ambush will be use4 to harass security forces, block areas off
where a raid is taking place, and ao a tactic to deny areas of the city
to all but large formations Of the securityforces:' Ah,ten ambushes will
occur at close quarters and be characterized by a highyolume of fire from
automatic weapons and/or shotguns and command mines; AmbusheA can consist
of only a sniper or two, or one or two firebombers onerating from rooftops.'
Withdrawal of these small groups throueh urban terrain is easy..
Raids in the urban environment will also be linited in scope and
duration for the reasons we have mentionedi' Intelligence collection,
reconnassiance, and planning will be quite detailed; These armed operations
vill be conducted against banks for ands, against security forces for
weapons and equipment,' and in order to kidnap or assassinate seleced
personnel. Raids also demonstrate the strengt's of the uxylratus,' ettract
attenticu, and help to put the'covernment end the security forces nn the
defensive.' Tn ram urban.erean vehicle!, will be a neconsisV for eorduct
of these operations end a great number .f themmust be acquired fa!, use
by thP apparatus;' This can be done by stealing them in small numbers
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-^11?0
over a long period of tine; altering their appearance; and then storing -
them in a junkyard; used car lot; or around a filling station or garage:
Kidnapping may be carried out by normal raiding parties :' These
occur primarily either to raise funds or to attract publicity. Assass-
inatinns on the other hand; ate usually specialized operations using
select personnel.' The underground in Palestine used only one individual
to carry out the mission, he would be provided with the target's name
and address and the rest would be left up to him.'
Hijacking of aircraft began during the days of Castrosp.insurgency
against Cuba,;'. Since then it has been used for a variety of reasona and
accomplished in a variety of ways It seems unlikely that it can be
prevented; as long as some sort of safe haven is availablefor the imagi-
, ,? ,
native and determined hijacked :' Short of this; urban insurgents in a
metropolitan area always have the opportunity to halt or impede national
and international air traffic by threats and by attacks 'on the facilities
of the airport itself.. Thin is also true of other forms of transport
systems GI
Sabotage can be both active or passive.' Passive sabotage consists
of small deeds which gradually, make their impact upon the urban area and
the govc,rnment.' Strikes; boycotts; false tips to security forces; and
work slowdowns fall into this category: Active sabotage in the urban area
is planned and violent.' Usually it ia directed against facilities; vehi-
cles; and equipment of the government and the security forces. It ray
be dirteted against the physical plant of the urban area itself; (water,
power, transport, etc.) which is what most persons will think of when they
eon aider urban sabotage; however, this would constitute an attack upon the
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Noe
population because it causes them hardships and may lose the apparatus
popular support:'
If the population must be aggravr,ted and further allienated from the
governmult; the underground may net out to interdict food supplies to the
metropolitan area;.. This action could occur further from the urban area
and be a,lcomplished in such a manner that it would appear to be a result
of goverment inefficiency rather than an act of the underground apparatus:
In f';enerari such psychological operations by an urban apparatus go
far beyond the mere pasting of slogans on walls and the printing of leaf-
lets and underground newspapers Indeed; a well run organization will
consider the psychological impact of all of its methods and operations
before taking any action V Each act in the urban area can influence large
, . r
numbers of people in a short period of time:' This becomes more significant
with tho Advent of on the spot news coverage which nay 'haveinternational.
distribution:
Hence the apparatus will try to make the government overreact and
appear to be brutal in every possible instance;' Use of women and children
as "troop-halters" to "set-up" security forces for this type of effect is
common in urban conflicts in addition to development of situations where
large numbers of the populace will become innocent victims of indi'3crim-
'inate use of force by the .government) Terrorism is crucially important
in this effort to create over-reactionii'
Terrorism exists as both an operational function of an illegal appara-
tus and also in some cases a form of ill szal underground
The effectsof terroristic actions upon both the targets and the
users are quite complex and have been examined in numerous works However'
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'was'
Noe
a single comprehennive study has yet to appear:' Its main products seem
to be fear and immobilization in the individuals and groups against which
it is dlrected; inabling them to be controlled more easily:' As an
operational aspect of an illegal apparatus; it May be discriminate or
indiscriminate; and it may be used to eliminate or control bbth friendly;
neutral; and hostile elements in the urban area.;.
In some organizations terrorism is such a predominate feature of
their operations that almost all other administrative and operational
functions will be neglected; This 44111 either lose them what popular
support they have or prevent them from developing any popular suplort.'
S8
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'tow / w.
CHAPTER SIX
/RECENT TRENDS IN URBAN INSURGENCY
4)
Ai The Battle For Aleierst Itst /gaertmund and.Develepmentv
After World War II Algeria; although legally part of France, was
made up of two seperate oommunities( approximately eight million Moslems
and one million European Colonists(V The latter not only controlled most
of the landi businesses; and other sources of wealth in the oountry; but
also determined the internal and external politics of Alge4a:1
Moslem nationalistic organizations had existed for years but had
seldom been significant in the affairs of the country.' At the end of the
war French authorities ignored the aspirations of the Moslems and the few
promises of reform that Were made,fa3led to satisfy the Moslem political
leaders"; consequently tension mounted.'
In the city of Setif in May of 1945 a peaceful World War II victory
parade turned into a riot as French authorities attempted to stop the.
display of Moslem nationalistic banners.- Former Moslem soldiers went on
a rampage and killed over 100 Europeans in the towns of Setifi Kerrata;
and Guelma.
The uprising was put down by the French; using brutal method3 which
imprisoned most of the Moslem leaders in the area and resulted in the'
killing of between fifteen thousand to thirty thousand Moslem natives.'
French reaction clearly exceeded an7thing that the Moslems had done in
scope or degree As a result; when the Algerian revolt for indopendance
began in 1954 alnost all the leaders of the FIN had experienced some
form of romina3 tdue to French reaction after the rioting at Setif in
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%orie
Novi'
1945 .
In preventing the French forces from winning any big engagements,
the FIN sapped the strength of the army an as
d the French treury, while
also Wearing down the will to fight on the part of the French government
end the French people. By skillful use of propaganda; terror; and illegal
organizational techniques the FIN was able to gain the support of the great
majority of Algeria/s Moslems.
Illegal undergrounds were established in all the, key cities and in
1956 - 1957 the most important network was organized in Algiers. Opera-
tions in the autonomous zone of Algiers were conducted by a council con-
sisting of a political military chief and three deputies for political;
military; and supply and. liaison activities.' Each deputy had under him
three men responsible for carrying ,out his respective activity, in each of
three regions into which Algiers Was Each of these men; In turn;
had subordinates in each of three sectors into, which the regions were divided;
and each sector chief had subordinates in each of the three districts into
which the sector was subdivided.' In theory, a oevulc11 composed of the
heads of euch of the three activities was to be formed; but in practice one man
often performed two or perhaps all three activities.'
The armed operational cells of each region consisted of three groups,
each of which included 11 rent a leader; his assistant, and three cells
of three men each Including the regional chief and his deputy, there were
thus 35 armed men per regioni 105 in all of the city of Algiers.' In
addition to these "military" personnel; there were between 50 to 100
hard-core terrorists charged with protecting the members of the FIN and
their etrtiVities.' These men; in turn; often used known gangsters or the
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Nosi, Nse
_unemployed in terrorist operations' Although the French almost destroyed
this underground apparatus in late 1957; it was later reconstituted,
along similar lines; but on a much larger scale:' 4,
Communications among cities and between rural and urban areas de-
pended mostly upon couriers; Communication in the cities was eapy due to
the fact that the Moslems were always concentrated in one area and the
large families and dense population made word of mouth communication
particularly effective in informing large numbers of people in a short
period of timee'
Recruiting took, place not only in the cities of Algeria; but also
among Algerian Moslems living abroad in French cities :' These urbau
organizations emphasized training for acts of terrorism and propaganda;
while people were organized in Algiers for work in intelligence; propa-
ganda.; and supply activities. In the early stages of recruiting and orga-
nizing; known gangsters whose word was obeyed by the. Moslems were .used -
to help insure that FIN orders mould be obeyed:' The organization of the
Moslems in the Cashah was important not only for establishment and opera-
tion of the underground; but also for the psychologis'al weapon that it
gave the FIN when it wished to show that it spoke for the Algerian people:'
The FID-Was able; by the use of-mass organizational techniques; to organize
a mass demonstration of any nature at any time it desired o' These same
techniques of population control permitted the FLN leadership to prevent
any sort of demonstration by the Moslems in Algiers during 1961 - 1962
in re-sponse to indiscriminate terror attacks by the OAS; who nought to
incite* the Moslems to riot; attack Elropeans; and cause the French govern-
ment nnd nrmY to intervene and "keep Algeria French"Oi
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Vol?
FTI Oreratione. In theyPttle -rer_Algiers
An all Algerian labor union was formed; which drew workers away from
the Communist labor union.' Within France; numerous auxiliAry groups
were fcimed to assist in collection of. funds and intelligenbe.4 In the
major cities of Algeria the FLN underground collected taxes'and.assessments
from the people; often aided by force or the threat of force. Funds
came from urban areas in France; Belgium; and Tunisia anh Morocco.'
Security was enforced rigidly in all of the urban underground
networks. Traitors were punished by death." If any member of a three
man cell was captured; the other two members of his cell were sent to the
guerrilla units in the rural areas so that they could not be interrogated
by the French.'
Prvpaganda literature was printed in Cairo and Tunis for worldwide
distritiltion and the PIN actually opened information offices in important
cities throughout the world.' Members of the underground working in these
offices developed and exploited contacts with the local press and govern-
ment officials.' Within Algiers itself; each unit had a typewriter and a
mimeograph machine so that they could print propaganda.' Newspapers and
tracts printed by the FIJI were distributed in all the large cities of
France and these were supplemented by radio broadcasts."
The FLM conducted a number of bombings in the urban areas; primarily
for the purpose of creating general disorder and to show the inability of
the French to keep order.' Bombs were stolen from the French; but more
often manufactured by the underground.. Active and passive sabotrge was
. committed in the urban areas of both Algeria and France; especially in
those areas or industries that contained a high 'density of Algerian
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Moslems. The mere threat of violence produced psychological advantagee
for the FLIT.' In 1957 the PLN threatened to explode bombs on tourist ships
and airplanes leaving France, and warned foreign tourists to boycott
French carriers .i Although the acts of violence were not carried out, the
fear produced by the threat caused a loss to France of a great deal of
tourist trade.'
Intelligence was collected in the urban areas of Algeria by itetucting
the people to report on the daily activities of the French security forces
and by "turning around" agents used by the French against the FLU: Inform-
ation cculd be gathered from any place in Algiers that employed Algerian
Moslems.'
Initial French reaction to the FLN was inadequate because they did not
recognize that this might be a well-planned revolt led by people deter-
Mined to win national independence.' This underestimation of the actual and
potential strength of the FLN was further complicated by the French refusal
to conduct any sort of negotiations with the illegal apparatus.' An the
insurgency grew the French finally employed a variety of civil-affairsi
paeY:rie.t..0-1-lei rind military programs; which generally proved ineffective
againrt the apparatus in the long run;
In urban areas the French attempted to organize the people to insure
that they obeyed the laws and did not cooperate with the FIN.' The French
carried out large propapanda campaigns and in addition attempted to counter...
Orcarine the porulation:. The best example of military operations against
the illeral underground apparatus in an urban environment occurred ;during
the "Battle of Algiers" which took place in 1957. The FLN had extended
its operations throughout the entire city and the existing French security
forces were completely ineffective against the underground.' As a result
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gime' NOV
the Freneh assigned the military the mission of regaining control of the city
and French military units then entered Algiers not to reinforce the
civilian security forces; but to yeplpee thein's' 4
In getwrail the French military units committed to regain control of
the city of Algiers in 1957 were assigned sectors for which ,they were
responsible for population and resources control; intelligence collection;
and count organization of the populations The two latter missions
perhaps contributed most to the destruction of the FIN underground apparatus,
however they were also the two activities which proved to be the most
counter-productive in the long runs'
Population and resources measures employed in this werei-, for the most
part; eonventional in nature involving the usual methods of checkpoints;
control points; personnel and vehicle searches; "snap checks"; and
occasional raids based upon intelligence produced in intelligence collection
and population counter-organization aotivities
l/
Frennh Arajamtions Apainst the FLN
Albhough the regular French military units committed against the FLN
were to employ a rather wide range of collection techniques (to include use
of informers and penetration agents) one method of collecting
information concerning membership and activities of the FIN underground
was the apprehension of a mass of persons at random from the streets of
Algierso and then subjecting them t- a screPning interrogation.
A tyriPal mans apprehension might be of; say; 100 males from ages of
15 to 25 from one.unitls sectorS! Interrogation of this group would usually
renrlt in a number of suspects who would be detained for intensive_
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46w,
interror,ation while the otter personnel were released. The initial .
interrogation which served to screen this mass of people was often carried
out by company level officers and NCOs who might not have ute of an in-,
terpreter and rho were untrained in the techniques of interrogation;
It must he noted that there same men; to varying degrees; had as a rule
had some form of contact with; or knowledge of; both underground resistance
operations in various parts of the world during WW II and. experience
against the Viet Mihh in Indochina.' Obviously this system was ready-made
for occasional abuses./
If a member of any type of underground cell were found and made to
talk; usually only two or three other members of the underground would be
discovered. If action was taken rapidly enough, a few more members might
be tal,:env however the returns were normally small; because in short order
a cut-out would be encountered and thel.eadi whether -horizontal or
into the underground organization; would be broken. Even if reaction was
slow and the other members of the cell were Ole to escape; the PIN
underground made it a practice to exfiltrate "blown" cell members to the
guerrilla units outside the city. Consequently; even though only one member
of a cell might be in custody, the cell would be a loss to the underground;
thus frrther diminishing their strength and overtaxing other cells within
the organization; forcing them to risk additional exposure. This had the
effect of reducing the membership of the underground apparatus in Mgiers
even though the other members of the eell were not in custody,
reortunately; the apprehensim and generally rough treatment of; say;
the 90 men who were not detained for further intensive interrogation;
served only to alienate them from the French cause and to make them more
readily available for recruitment ,by the FLN underground when the French
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military wilts 'had finished their mission and returned control of the city
to the civilian authorities.' The underground members who had been com-
promised and exfiltrated from the city of Algiers were also4once atain
available for underground operations when the military was withdrawnh'
The counterz-organization of the population was the French military
effort to structure the population sl that they could control it and thus
force the FIN underground organization to reveal itself dnd its members.'
This counter-organization followed classic totalitarian methods of popu-
lation control; for. example identification lane.: lecle-es; street wardens,
bnilding wardens"; and heads of houScholds and making them responsible for the
members of the population under and around them.' Failure to report recent
arrivals and departures; suspicious activities; end known underground
members or activities was punishable by detention and in some cases by
death. Although this did have the effect of slowing down many activities
of the FLU underground it also proved to be counter-productive in the long
run because it systematically alienated the Moslem population of the city
.of Algiers; and when the French military units were withdrawn from the city
mo.ne r.ol.le were milling to assist the FIN undercronn&'
Thus it appears clear that the French military had to resort to tech-
niques tInd methods_ that are not traditionally military in order to destroy
an illegal nndercrolind appara.tvsi; and that this had far-reaching effects upon
the army and the French people. The substitution of the military for the po-
lice and other internal security organizations may have destroyed the under-
ground apparatus in one urban area !ill, the short-run but this action cOntr!.-
tilted far more to the loss of the conflict in the long-run.' Ultimately the
world-wide reaction to the French Army's tactics was so great that.deSpite
the 1107?entary defeat of the FIN in the streets Of Alders,' the war,wes
oe;
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!),; The TPA nn4 thp Rattle For Dublin
In contrast to the Algerian situation, the religious and political differ-
ences which divide the population of Ireland are far more eqmplex and
more deeply rooted in that population. ',These differences have surfaced
In an urban setting again and again with mounting intensity in the forms
of demonstrations, rioting9 murderi and rebellion. These actions have in-
volved a variety of illegal underground organizations whOse operations
have reinforced intolerance and communal segrgation.',
The most well known of these Irish organizations is the IRA which has
existed for over fifty years as an illigal apparatus.' The IRA conducted
its first operations during the period 1916 - 19239 in what has been
referred to as the "Irish Revolt". Of particular interest is the urban
uprising in Dublin on Easter Sunday in 1916. Although this particular
action was won by the British it insured the continued existence of what
came to be called the IRA; and established conditions that eventually
caused the British to negotiate for peace in 1923..
On Easter morning of 19169 between 500 - 1000 members of the IRA
seized the major public buildings in Dublin without resistence.' Although
these armed units had existed for some time9 they were equipped only with
rifles and grenades as opposed to th regular British formations equipped with
automatic weapons and artillery' They expected little support
from the local urban population an few of the citizene of Dublin paid
much attention to the initial actions of the insurgents. A reflection of
the fact that most of the population in Ireland were generally ready to
accept Home Rule. The reaction of the British military was swift, vielentt
and finally quite savaged
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Now
During their initial operations against the urban insurgents, the Bri-
tish lost a great number of infantrymen and cavalrymen because they did
not adapt their tactics to the terrain:' Finally they broudilt in artillery
and coupled with the tactics of house-to-house fighting they eventually
put an end to the uprising In five day's: Sections of Dublin'had,teen
destroyed by artillery and fire, and many civilians mistreated by troops
who did not take the time to distinguish between them and members of the IRA:
During the course of the action some of the populace of Dublin began to
praise the IRA for the fight they were putting up against such heavy odds:
Shortly after the end of hostilities the British began to courts-
martial members of the uprisingi always in private and without public
record: Most of the leaders were executed as soon as their death sentences
were conlirmed: As knowledge of these executions spread, so did popular
support for the Easter Uprising and the IRA: It has been said that the
British made the misteke of assuming that they were fighting the whole
population: By the time a Month had passedi IRA and nationalistic
Irish literature and tracts had become so popular in Dublin that they were
hard to find:. The members of the apparatus executed by the British had
become martyrs and the population was ready to assist the IRA: In one
detention carp holding 2000 people not originally IRA sympathizers, a
handful of actual IRA members were able to convert almost all others to
their side:
During the ensuing struggle the Irish were identified with the struggles
of small nations all over the world end the Irish were encouraged by
Wilsons 14 Points at the end of WWI. Tho Catholic church finally came
out against many of the practices of the British and many of its priests
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Nide
actively aided the undergreund.'
The British regular units on duty in Ireland apparently disliked :the
duty and many attempted to remain as neutral as possible.4Often the IRA
was able to obtain weapons and supplies from these units. The British,
organized a number of naramilitary units during the course bf the conflict
but had difficulty in coordianting their intelligence and action operations
directed against the IRA.'
In addition the activities of these units were characterized by brutal-
ity and lack of discrimination which further antagonized the population
of the cities.
The end result was the strenghtening of the legal Irish nationalistic
political organization to the point it could win an election and the.
influencing of world opinion against the British 9 because of their
methods of repression; thus forcing them to finally negotiate.'
It appears; now; that the British have learned from their mistakes
and that their Current operations in Belfast and other cities of Northern
Ireland are characterized by patience; restraint; and discriminating
use of force.' Careful attention is being paid to community relations
between the troops and the populace as well as the collection of intelli-
gence. It is evident that systems have been worked out to coordinate and
control both intelligence and operations at each civil-military level
and that all .personnel involved in security operations are aware that the
solutions are political; rather thar
.50 The Til arcs and the Battle Per Montevideo
In Uruguay; a struggle similar, to that In. Belfast reveals similar
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?
patterns The'Tupamaxos have?existcd in Uruguay for at least 10 yearn
and have become the principle security problem for that nation.' Their
most renowned leader has been; of course; Carlos Marighe1141
After an election defeat in 1962,' leftist elements began to pursue
their ends by establishing an illegal underground apparatus." In 1963 armed
actions such as raiding for funds and arms began to occur." These operations
continued until 1966 when the first deaths ?mired IL tilt course of a Tupa-
maro robbery.' The police sawthe Tupamaros an a danger but the government
did not take the organization seriously or consider it a mtential threat.
In 1968 after rove robberies and sabotage the Tupamaros conducted the first
of many kidnappings.'. Police actions produced few results and the Tupandros
appeared to be able to operate at
Violence continued through 1969 and in 1970 the Turamaros raided a
lit" facility for arms and amnunItion. This incident involved the
Uruguayan military for the first time and although they continued in support
of the police results were meager.' The government still had taken no
action in the fields of intelligence and psychological operations.' The
Tupenaros became bolder and initiated kidnappings of national and inter-
national personalities in order to demonstrate their power and to embarrass
the government.' Although the police did capture a number of leaders of the
apparatus the apparatus continued to function because these leaders were
able to run it from prison and some were later to escape.' Shortly after
this,th.3.murder of a USAID employee by the Tupamaros caused a shift in
popular sentiment away from the Tupararos.
In 1971 the government assigned the Military the mission of fighting
the underground.' Even though the undergroundactivities increased, in 1971
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NOir.
and 1972 the apparatus's use of terror and lack of public support were
operating against them. The military was able to take advantage of the fact
that they had been working with the ',once on intelligence,dince 1969 and
that troop units had had 'some experience In urban operations in support of
the police since 1970 ' .They were able to capitalize on these factors by
creatinr; a type of coordinating committee at each administrative level
whose responsibility was to coordinate all intelligence and operations
against .the Tupamaros." They were supported in these operations by legisla-
tion giving exoeptiOnal: or emergency powers to the security forces.. These
combinet1 operations were successful enough to cause the Tupamaros to
attempt to shift their activities to the rural environment.' They failed in
this and lost more strength to the security forces.'
Operations against the remnants of the Tupamaros continue; however
it appea'is that the coordination of intelligence and coordination of
operations against the underground have been able to make significant
inroads mron the apparatun and to exploit the Tupamarova failure to develop
?popular support while relying upon terrorist actions to achieve their ends.'
All of this has no doubt been enhanced by the attention that the Mil-
itary Ins paid to eduesting its personnel for these tyre of operations.'
AlvIt the nilitary recroT7e to the Tapararosi it has been written that
the theoretical and cultural develornert of the individual officer
proved important. His unde7rotanding of the real national situation and
hin l'alowledge of applicable legislation made it easy to prevent excesses
in that tyre of urban operations which is so delicate because of the re-
quired contact with the civilian population As indicated in Chapters
Eight and Vine.' the lessons to be drawn from Montevideo are readily trans-
latable into U.S Army training doctrine..
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Newire
Nine
6. Tho Operations of the Plank Sentomber Ornenizatten
Perhaps most sinister in recent trends is the action of the so-called
Plat* Septprber Movement.' From what little information is 'evailable
it aprearl that the Black September organization is the terror arm of the
Al Fatah, the Palestine Liberation rovement, rather than an independant
apparatus operating on its own.'
Generally, Black September operations have been sensational in nature
and intended to draw attention to the Palestinian political demands, free
captured members of the organization, or provide a display of torganiza-
tional power. Operations have been carried out internationally and have
been characterized by excellant intelligence, good planning, and ruth-
lessness on the part of the participants.' It is interesting to note that
these operations have never extended into Israel itself, perhaps due to,
problems of collection of intelligence,and of infiltration.'
The philosophy of this apparatus is still unclear.' It seems to
emphasize revenge against beth Israel and Jordan t however there also
appears to be an interest in influencing the structure of Arab political
angnmentpas demonstrated by its recent operation in Khartoum. 'Still, its
international terrorism is less well associated with its goals than were
the terror operations of the Stern Gang nearly 30 years ago, or the
current operations of the undergrounds in Uruguay and Turkey today.
So far there has been no headquarters located for this organization,
nor has there been any sort of.membership list captured.' It appears that
only a top level planning leadershi? exists, along with a number of cadre
scattered around the Mid-East. These cadre cells contain between 5 to 10
members each and are highly compartmented.' Estimates are that the entire
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Nue.
apparatus totals between 50 and 100 personnels, The cadre are carefully
screened and thoroughly investigated before being extensively trained in un-
derground techniques.' These cadre are the team leaders whecommand the
actual operattens.? Most .of these leaders have appeared to be well edu-
cated and possess seine technical skills.'
?nen the top leadership has prepared plans for an operation one of the
cadre takes the mission and recruits his team from established groups of
Palestinian guerrillas. Usually these team members are men who have
survived the fighting in Jordan in 1970; which was their "trial by fire"..
The groups then train in Syria or Iraq and usually the team membera learn
only at the last minute that they are conducting a Black September op-
erations Once in the objective area support nay come from either the Al
Fatah or the PLO.
Because the Black September is not an underground apparatus in itself;
but is rather a special operational arm of a larger Palestinian underground
organiTation; it does .vse many of the techniques of the traditional un-
dernmand rtyprtratml - particularly those that pertain to personal and
ornni!yational security but it evidently performs no administrative
function of its Own.' Therefore Black September operations are largely con
finel to what Is best described. as arced action operations; with other oper-
ational functions probably being performed by other elements of the larger
organi7ation.
Obviously.' no sincle national semrity agency or military forco can
elinim,te on apparatus of this nature.' Bladi.% September; Al Fatah; and the
PIO may'rell be a sophisticated model of an internationally dispen:eil under-
iur which leas itself to
strategically inspired urban insurgen-
or9 In the smn^e that enCh disporsedeperations Were described. in Chapter Two.
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SECTION III
NATIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST URBAN INSURGENCY
. .
Military tactics are like unto
water; for water in its natural
course runs away from high places
and hastens downwards. So in
war, the way to avoid what is
strong is to strike what is
weak. Witer shapes its course
accord irg to the ground over
which it flows the soldier works
out his viEt6ry ifi'relation to
the foe whom he is facing.
?
Sun Tzu The Art. of War
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CHAPTER SEVEN
4110,
US DEFENSE POLICY AND THE NATIONAL TRADITION
1. Yational Policy and Dual-Warfare Preparedness
As set forth in Chapter One, the Army is confronted by a'dual-warfare
mission which requires it to maintain preparedness for both conventional
warfare and interdictory warfare. In both cases, its mission is essentially
deterrent' its capability of waging land warfare would theoretically deter
conventional aggression against the US, and its capacity to interdict the
early stages of unconventional conflict would abort that process before it
could result in war. This interdictory effort was undertaken with varied
success in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. Its obvious strat-
egic risk is the danger of diversion, since the strategy of interdiction in-
?
? r
vites a counterstrategy of sponsoring subversion for the Iii;re sake of provoking
".;
interdiction.' Within the context of modern American life, this riskAs rag-
filled by the emergence of what has been labelled urban Insurgency. If it
is to maintain a realistic counter-insurgency capability, US Army doctrine
must be adaptable to this risk.
The counterinsurgency mission is governed by three considerations, of
which two are matters of national poliny and the third is national traditions
(1) In support of its allies and in pursuit of its own strategic ob-
jectives, the US is prepared to offer varied forms of assistance to foreign
nations confronted by subversion and insurgency.
(2) In providing this foreign assistance, the US will rely on a combin-
ation of rovernmental agencies, with maximum emphasis upon advisory assistance
and minimal involvement of US armed forces.
(3) Resistance against internal subversion and domestic insurgency is
the responsibility of security agencies other than the active Army, which by
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110.
tradition involves itself only with external threats to national security.
Within the context of these gene.al principles, the Army's role in
specific cases of subversion or insurgency will be dictated by current nat-
ional policy and the assessment of current events by those governmental
agencies rerponsible for determining policy. Its own responsibilities are
therefore threefold: to maintain advisory assistance capabilities, to ttain
itself for various levels of involvement, and to develop techniques and tac-
tics appropriate not only for its own elements but also fork those units
which it may be called upon to advise. In terms of the dual-warfare distinct-
ion set forth earlier, these responsibilities must be executed within the
context of other tasks, and hence.must be engaged in with optimal resources
o
ro
only. Such restraint governs all military planninr?"of.cburse, but its
im-
pact on.counterincurgency preparedness-is unusually sighificant -- for it is
within this context of limited resources and multiple missions that the Army
is confronted with unprecedented problems concerning the training and morale
of its own personnel. Analysis indicates these problems are at the very
heart of the urb.en insurgency issue.
While national policy colr,tr tte :irmy to multiple tasks, the strategy
of revolutionary warfare is predicated on the eroftion of a nation's armed
forces. To envision thislrosion as a process dependent on combat attrition
is to miss the point of revolutionary theory, however. The erosion prescribed
by Lenin being only superficially dependent on battle casualties, its real
sources are overextension? psychological colifusion and loss of d3rection.
This erosion may be accelerated by ambush and terrorism, of course -- but
its origins lie in the mind and the soul, and not in wounds to the body. In
those modern revolutionary campaigns which succeeded, this erosion has been
largely overlooked amid the analysis of battles, tactics and operations. The
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psychological turmoil suffered by the French Army in Algeria is also easily
overlooked, but it provides a most striking example of this erosion process
at work. Despite the heroism of certain "elite" units, despite the determin-
ation of its most celebrated generals, despite the stakes involved in pre-
serving Algeria's status as a part of France itself, and despite the fact
its 8001000-man force. actually suffered only incidental casualties, the
French Army was wasted away in the seven years of the Algerian War, its de-
termination eroded by nothing less than psychological and political confusion.
, ?
The war was lost. .But exactly where it was lost is the issues and the issue
is most decisive in confronting the challenge of urban insurgency. Facedstith
those preparedness responsibilities which national policy entails, the US
ke ,n7 r
Army cannot avoid the implications of this issue without 'risking? the erosion
threat so central to insurgent warfare theory.
This is, no doubt, a deeply sensitive matter. Within the context of
its own traditions and its own orientation? the US Army is not surprisingly
tempted to address the problem of urban insurgency in terms of organization,
tactics and equipment, while avoiding the psychologies 1 implications of rev-
olutionary warfare theory. As show, earlier, this theory -- first promulgated
by Lenin and thereafter circulated bhroughout the world -- stresses defeat of
governmental forces via erosion as a prelude to direct confrontation. The
success of the latter is dependent upon the impact of the former. And the
former is to be achieved, in Lenin's terms, via overextension of the armed
forces, VD( psychological confunicn in its ranks, and via loss of direction
and lbss of a sense of purpose on the part of its leadership eleqent. This
combination was examined in Chapter Three. The remarkable point about it is
that it can succeed, that it is adaptable to strategic insurgency and that
the US Aryls historical traditions, as well as its modern missions, make it
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Neaf
particularly vulnerable to this combination.
Mere is no special cause for alarm in this vulnerability, however,
since its recognition in largely the condition for its solution. In terms
of the present study, this recognition requires careful examination of the
interplay between urban technology, revolutionary theory and natj.onal defense
policy. For it is this interplay which makes the problem of urban insurgency
what it is, and it is this interplmy.uhich indicates why the problem is far
more than an isolated matter of organization, tactics and equipment. How-
ever sensitive the subject, the problem of urban insurgency is actually a
simple mattei- of matching national strategy against the specific challenge
of force erosion.
Once the problem is addressed in these terms, Gertain,fundamental re-
,
quirements emerge in the face of the urban insurgencylhreat. They are set
forth in the pages which follow -- but their intelligibility is dependent on
unremitting attention to the strategic significance of urban insurgency in
the dual-warfare scheme of things.
2. The Armyls role and the National Tradition
As with all armies, the VS Army is a product of its own history; as in
'all democracies, it is what the people make it; as with all human enterprise,
its activities are governed by concepts and ideas whose scrutiny is often
left unattended. The impact of these forces on the study of urban insurgency
is best illustrated by a problem whlch bears only indirectly on'tlie subject
at hands the problem of counter-maintenance. Equipped with weapons, vehicles
and an array of devises which reflect the technological style upon which Amer-
ican life is based, the Army is corsequently faced with an endless maintenance
task. Being a product of,the civilization which produced this technology, it
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limpf
approaches this task in terms or schooling, inspection reports and a careful
matching of the IQ's of prospective soldiers with the complex demands of its
own equipment. Influenced by the tradition or leadership, it relies on command
emphasis to do the rest. But no ons who has struggled with the maintenance
problem at the small-unit level is likely to claim the challenge has been met
as effectively as, say, the challenge of feeding a million men three million
meals daily -- although the magnitude of the maintenance problem is certainly
no greater than that of the messing problem. The explanation may lie no further
I.
away Oan the disposal dumps of any modern American city. 'One rinds there an
assortment of junked refrigerators, radios, electric stoves, trucks and auto-
mobiles -- all mute testimony to the counter-maintenance spirit of American
lire. The spirit is an inescapable byproduct of thd'technologg, industry and,
marketing systems which define Amrican life, and within.that context it is in
itself neither a vice nor a virtue. The Army context is another.thing. If its
personnel come to it with a counter-maintenance attitude already established,
it is no wonder that the Army faces a sustained maintenance problem, nor any
wonder that IQ tests, technical schools and report forms do not solve the
problem. The mesa problem is met with relative ease because American society
encourages attention to faod; the maintenance problem may well persist simply
becauF.e American society cultivates ft counter-maintenance attitude. One may
conclude that the urban insurgency problem will be met successfully only if
the Army considers its mission within the context of similar American traditions
and attitudes.
Three such attitudes bear directly on this problem: the traditional public
view of the American Army's role in national defense, the public view toward
the National Guard, and the pUblic attitude -- however transitory that attitude
may be at any given time -- about the relationship of the US to the rest of the
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'Arrow
world. Were urban insurgency :an insigni_fiee,nt matter, the Army might safely
? neglect these attitudes. Given the thr-reet potential it is unlikely that it
can safely afford .su-ah neglect. Wha-b is required is recognition Of the impact
these attitudes have upon the Army's ability to carry out its misvion.
Of these attitudes, the first is most per sistent. It may be traced to
its very origins in the Revolutionary Warfare period, and it is first suggested
. in the Federalist Papers which infiluencd the thought of that era. Angered by
their experienter with King George's soldiers, fearful of the internal police
role often played by European armies, and seeking refuge from foreign conflict,
a generation of colonists-turned-Americans debated fiercely over the perils of
maintaining an army of their own. The question persists into the present,
echoed in talk about "a standing army". The Federalist Papers encouraged
a practical coilpromine: maintenance of a minimal standing Army, civillan non-
trol or it activities." constitutional rstraint upon its support, and public
readiness to fill its ranks in the event of g.enuine threat. Powever challenged
by the turn of events, that formula has been endorsed to the present, through
nine wars and profound changes in Americen civilization. It is anchored in
the Cons titutibn itself, and it is echoed in -a public attitude which runs,
like a. thread, through two centuries of American life: while the Army is an
instrument to be used in the evert of need, it is to be resharpened only as
the need arises ? with that need -to bo - ciefiredeard identified by the populace
and its representatives., rot by the Army. This tradition is well known, of
course. What is most important in its reconsideration is what it ins with
regard to the Army's dual-warfare. preparedness mission, and hence what impact
it will have upon the Army's capac:Ity to cope with the urban insurse,ency threat.
This attitude. is spelled out in four_ forms, each veri fi able within current
public life a,ci governmental policy:
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(1) The US Army is not to concern itself with political matters, either
domestic or foreign. This exclusion being necessary if civilian control of
the military is to be possible, the Army must confine its mission preparedness
activities to matters of 'antic..? and weapons only.
(2) The US Army is to be maintained at minimal operational strength.
This restraint being necessary, its contingency planning is to reflect re-
liance upon its civilian-soldier reserve components, whose strength will
match its own, and for whose training it is responsible.
"(3) US military.strategy is to be determined and guid?Cl by civilian
authoritieS?Iwitil the military responsible for maintaining the level of pre-
paredness necessary to execute whatever roles this strategy. may dictate.
(h) The US krmed forces are to continue to accc%6'dp.tHiP values reflect-
ed in Am.lricf.n life. While it may well remain indiffe)-ont to matters of style,
the military must respect and incorporate into its awn practices those con-
cepts of law, human rights and individual freedom which are derived from the
Constitution.
While recognizable as byproducts of the general traditional attitude of
the American people toward its armed forces, these four requirements create
special hazards for the Army in its effort to execute the dual-warfare. pre-
paredne3s mission. And these hazards are virtually imperceptible, unless
_
seen- within the context of the low-intensity warfare threat. For the threat
Is dependent on an exploitation of political unrest, and by tradifdon the US
Amy is not to concern it:7.31f with political matters; it is dependent on a
vulnerability to over-extension, and by tradition the US Army mubt remain at
minimal strength; it is dependent on a loss of direction, and by tradition
the Army does not determine the strategies it may pursue; finally, it is de-
pendent on psychological confusion, and by tradition the Army must not tamper
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vire NO,
with national values,
the bnique traditions
erosion by sustained,
since it is this form
urban insurgency, the
even though those values invite confusion. In short,
of the America' Army make it specially vulnerable to
strategically-directed, low-intensity warfare. And
of warfare which defines the 'potential haz;rds of
Armyts obvious challenge to to guard against these
hazards without violating either the requirements of national tradition or
the derrande of dual-warfare preparedness. As with the problem of counter-
mainterance alluded to earlier, the challenge is rooted deeply in the Ameri-
can military traditiTi.
The chailenge is therefore e4sentially one of translating theoretical
awaren,ss into practical doctrine.' In what follows, this translation effort
is directed at three distinct points:- the role of tifd'National.Guard, the
military assistance advisory program, and the -political aspects af counter-
insurgency tactics.
3?The National Guard and the Strategic Problem
As with the active Army, the National Guard owes its special character
to its place in American history. And, just as the role of the Army is in-
fluenced by public opinion, so too is the Guard 2 reflection of tradition
and popular attitudes. In the case of the Guard, these attitudem have di-
rect bearing on thm problem of urban insurgency since it is the Guard, and
not tht active Army, which faces involvement in domestic insurgency.
Current national defense plannirg is predicated upon swift mobilization
and deployment of Guard units. With almost half of the one-Army's list of
tactical units being in the Guard, ard with little prospect of a Long post-
mobilization training period prior to any future deployment, the Guard is
faced wibh an unprecedented readiness task. It is no secret that the Guard,
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faced with this challenge, is seriously compromised in pursuing this readi-
ness miseion because of its Civil disturbance role -- a rqlre which follows,
quite naturally, from the American military traditions outlined earlier.
Historically, the Guard is an outgrowth of the militia units which
flourished in the post-Revolutionary period. With the active Army re-
stricted to cadre strength and 2 frontier-defense role, .and with the various
states ariuming responsibility for t).p maintenance of internal order, the
A
militia -- and, later, the Guard -- came naturally to serve two distinct
masters:. the state governors, who utilized it for internal matters, and the
commander-in-chief? who might integrate it into the active Army in time of
national crisis. In three of the four 20th Century wars fought by the US,
co,
this integration proved crucial in filling out the ranks pf tfrhh active Army.
Meanwhile, the role of the Guard in domestic matters Was grown increasingly
complex: as industrialization and urbanization worked their changes on the
national environment, the Guard has come to face an assortment of domestic
mi.ssiors -- ranging from riot control in a metropolitan area to poital service
in the midst of carrier strikes, from flood relief to fire fighting), from
traffic management to school integration. Since 1945, NationAl Guard units
have been called out in more than 2000 recorded instances of domestic need.
Its recruiting slogans emphasize the reliance which the states have placed
on it: one may sleep well because the Guard is there. Unfortunately, when
the dual mission of the Guard is matched againet the strategic demands of
modern warfare, one may be ill-advised to sleep at all. For them is evidence
that the Guard carrot simultaneously continue in its civil disturbance rola
and in its strategic back-up role without the national defense posture being
seriously jespordized.
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Three factors underlie this danger:
(1) Modern warfare having become more sophisticated, t6 Guard is
faced with an increasingly complex training mission while, simultaneously,
its post-mobilization training time is being decreased in strategic deployment
plans.
(2) Modern civilization having become more complex, 'the utilization of
the .Guard in domestic matters has become more frequent, and more distracting,
at just the time its national defense role has become more,prucial and more
demanding.
(3) As the population shifts more to an urban base, :the Guard must re-
ly more on R metropolitan populace to fill its ranks, while it is this very
populace which is the focal point of the unrest and disoAer underlying the
Guardts inere'aping role in civil disturbance.
Current events hint at the collision course spelle8 out by these factors:
Guard readiness tests reflect a serious difficulty in achieving bsttalion-
level training objectives; Guard performance in civil disturbance missions
reflect a need for more, not less, allocation of time for civil disturbance
training if this missidr is to continue; and, in the midst of all this, Guard
recruiting in the metropolitan area indicates an increasing relue-tance to
join, "ar organization which may at any time be directed against ones own
neighbor". An with the counter-maintenance problem alluded to earlier, the
Guard face,: an inescapable problem with regard to psychological confusion in
its own ranks -- for these ranks are being filled more and more with an urban
population, at just the time when urian unrest is increasing and its own role
in quellirg urban disorder is accelerating.
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Dependent on the Guard in the event of national mobilization, the
active Army is responsible for both training doctrine andiraining assistance
to the Guard. Its current regulations permit a minimal amount of time for
training in civil disturbance subjects -- not enough to prepare the Guard,
but stIll enough to deter from the Guard's mobilization mission. Its Mil-
itary Police school provides in the SEADOC program a ciiil disturbance
orientation course which outlines, for the Guard, a set of techniques to
be employed in riot control, crowd dispersal, urban disorder and civil dig-
,
turbance. Its FM's and training doctrine for stability operations are re-
flected in Guard operations. Its relationship with the Guard, in terms of
funding, equipment utilization, Federal status, and tr*ining priorities, ix
p.ret forth in a tangled web of public laws and military directives -- and
thus, el/en though the active Army must avoid involvement in domestic matters
1* order to accomodate its own traditions, it is at least indirectly drawn
into domestic matters via its identification with and responsibility for the
Guard. Indeed, the "US Army" identification tape has been worn on the breast
of every Guardsman involved in every recent instance of civil disturbance.
More important, it is drawn directly into the domestic issue once the strat-
egic iMplications of urban insurgency are addressed.
If the most important consequence of strategic insurgency is its eroding
effect, and if erosion involves over-extension, psychological confusion and
lack of direction, then the traditional missions of the Guard, vis ; vis the
sm. ???alp No.
Guard's accelerating importance. in natioral defense, result in ;..n increasingly
perilous US Army vulnerability to strategic insurgency. The dual mission of
the Guard, the Guard's difficulty in urban recruiting, and the Guard's in-
creasing uncertainty about its primary mission are a three-fold index of this.
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erosion vulnerability: To guard apainst erosion, then, only three
appear ope'n for the active US Army:
(1) It must rely far less on the Guard than its current mobilization
avenues
plans dictate, or
(2) It must seek to extract the Guard from a domestiC disturbance role
of any sort, or
(3) It mat develop more effective ways of assisting the Guard in ex-
ecuting two essentially conflicting missions.
Of these three alternatives, none is truly satisfactory. Given the
national traditions involved, however, it im the third alternativo which
appears most favorable, and. which is developed further, in Chapter Nine.
4, The Military Assistance Propram and the FID Problem
While tradition and policy govern the Army's role in natioral defense,
and while tradition and public attitudes influence the Guard's relationship
with the active ,Irmy, the influence of public opinion is, ironically, most
pronounced and most unpredictable in the one area of the turban insurgency
problem in which the US Army's role ie most specific and most immediate: the
Foreign Internal Defense program.
FID is a direct outgrowth of the dual-warfare mission: it is the frame-
work within which interdiction would take place since it involves, by defin-
ition, those military, paramilitary and non-military activities in which the
US government would engage, with its allies, to prevent or defeat subversive
Insurgency in a given foreign country. In terms of the basic natioral policie,
nutlined earlier, FID involvement on the part of the US Army must be essentially
advisory, with US Army elements directly committed in only the moril, extreme
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instances of i threat to US intereets. The doctrine which would govern this
involvement is relatively clear; it is the impact of public opinion on the ex-
ecutior of this doctrine which remains unclear. Civen the challenge of
erosion this impact must be evaluated; holeever, since it 5A this impact
which makee strategically-directed insurgency a potential ,threat.
In outline form, FID involvement is envisioned in three pkamee of
?
ascending commitment:
Phase I: the implementation of a security assistance program, via which
US personnel assess the subversive 'situation within tke foreign country and,
to the extent dictated by. US interests and host ccuntri needs, provide ad-
visory assistance in coping with subversion.
Phase II: the expansion of US assistance amid escalated insurgency,
with assistance provided in terms.of equipment, instructor personrel and;
if necessary, unit-level advisors trained in the tactics and techniques of
counter-insurgency operations.
Phase III: The commitment of selected US central purpose forces if
requested by the hort country and if absolutely required by US interests,
with the host country still providing maximum possible manpower aF the in-
surgent conflict becomes a war of movement.
Designed to provide maximum fleAbility, eurrent doctrine would permit
the Phase I/II employment of mobile training teams and other "forces trained
specifically for FID activities", with these US forces confined to an
advisory/arsietance role and, by implication, precluded from direct enrscement
in counter-insurgency operations. The most crucial tasks are therefore the
Phase I sssessment_of the threat and the host country's ability to meet it,
followed by the Phase II assistance necessary to improve that ability. In
both phases, the role of the US advisor is central; his success in assessment
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and advisory advisory assistance is clearly the key to success ir the interdictory
effort, sirce mistakes in Phare I or failure in Phase II could contribute
4)
to the emergence of Ph/ase III and, conceivably, to US involvement beyond its
. ,
OVA bent interests. Given the dual-warfare peril of over-commitment, and
giVOR the possibility that a strategic opponent might wen sponeor subversion
for the mere sake of eroding US military strength, the stakes involved in FID
are obviously great. The Army', tasks are therbfore.identifiable in terms of
the phases themselves:
(l)The developkent of adviecry personnel capable of ;messing both the ?
threat to US interests and the ability of the foreign country to cope with
this threat.
(2) The development of effective counterinsurgency techniques and the
_
training of advisory personnel te transmit these techniques when such
advisory assistance is required.
(3) The development of tactical doctrine applicable to host-country
forces and to US general purpose forces when and if such US forces are in
fact committed.
In theory, the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (FAOP) would Fatisfy
the first requircninnt; its countrrinsurgency doctrine, when matched with its
capacity to train advipors, would satisfy the second requirement; and its
stability operations doctrine, already applicable to its own forces, would
satisfy the third. In fact, however, the three responses are not fully ade-
quate, for they are predicated on an eseentially misleading assumption: that
the problems of insurgency, 'like the problems of conventional war, are
mechanically soluble in terms of tactical doctrine, equipment development
and military organization. The assumptiosis AO doubt deeply rooted in the
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American way of thinking, and is perhaps reinforced by the Army's carefully
guarded isolation from political matters -- but the overwhlAming evidence of
modern history is that it is falme. Since insurgency feeds' on political un-
rest, effective counterinsurgency requires constant awareness of the political
implications involved in every action, at every level. The failure of the
French Army in Algeria bears witness to this restraint, nd the advent of
battlefield TV virtually guarantees it in any future American operations.
Since successful interdiction will require profound attentipn to the political
nature of insurgent warfare, the Army's task is to incorporate political
awareness into all three of the preceding activities, without violating the
essential mearing of its traditional isolation from things political.
The task is by no OV!,2118 self-contradictory. It does require recognition
of three distinct factors:
(1) The execution of the Phase I military assessment effort requires
detailed awareness of the political objectives of the United States.
(2) The effectiveness of the advisory assistance effort in Phase II
depends on detailed awareness of the political environment of the host
country, plus awareness of the political impact which advisory activities
(as well as th- activities of advised units) can have upon the US public.
(3) The successful utilization of US gereral purpose forces in Phase
III will require the political orientation of all US personnel involved, with
careful attention to both the host country political environment and US
politica objectives, plum attentior to the political characteristics inherent
in US stability operations doctrine, rlum attention to the impact these oper-
ations can have upon the US public.
However tedious they may be, these requirements are an inevitable'
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consequence of the pelltical character of insurgent warfare. National trad-
ition may well encourage their denial, but to deny them iso avoid the
lessons of the Algerian War. Their achievement is therefore dependent on a
.realistic reappraisal of this tradition and its relationship, to the Armyts
FID mission.
Political Awareness and National Tradition
Six factors must dominate the reappraisal of national tradition and Its
impact upon the FID mIssionv
(1) The Army's exclusion from political matters is essentially the prod.
duct of a national tradition meant to prevent it from interfering in either
the domestic political process or the civilian determination of US foreign
policy.
() To the extent that its morale, its recruiting and its access to
material resources will be influenced by public opinion, the Army's ability
to execute its national defense role will depend on public attitude about
this role.
(3) Since specific FID activities will revolve around current foreign
policy, and since foreign policy is a political matter, the Army cannot
attempt to influence public opinion about specific FID activities without
interfering in political matters.
(4) US Army counterinsurgency activities of whatever degree will be
matched by a corresponding degree of media attention to these activities, and
will very likely be accompanied by a corresponding degree of public debate
over the justification of these activities.
(5) Because of the intellectual stress which accompanies urbanization,
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public debate Over FID .activities will very likely focus on moral issues and
will very likely generate moral confusion from which the Army cannot insulate
41
itself,
(6) Revolutionary theory and insurgent practice indicate the key to
success in insurgent warfare is the psychological erosion Of the opposing
armed forces and the withdrawal of public support from the activit!es of
these forces.
These six factors are by no means simple, nor is the resolution of their
conflicting nature a simple challenge. It is true, of course, that the ideal
separation of the military from the political is not possibly at the highest
level of government, where strategic decisions must reflect military capabil-
ities, and Where the ensuing dialogue between governmental and military lead-
ers is oAe which blurs the theoretical separation of the two. It is not
within this high-level arena of decision-making that the problem of erosion
occurs, however. It is within the context of public opinion that it occurs,
for it is there that the Army's role in counterinsurgency warfare is least
likelyrto be understood and most likely to engender public reaction. To the
extent that such reaction will compromise its ability to carry out this
mission, the Arms task is thus obviouSt it must develop methods of executing
the FID mission in such a way that public reaction is minimized. It cannot
set out to reconstruct public opinion; to do thin would be to violate the
national tradition. It cannot conceal its activities, because low-intensity
warfare precludes those secrecy .measures which characterize total war. Logic-
ally, then, its only 'course of action is to develop counterinsurgency tech-
niques which will satisfy the interdiction role and also satisfy public opinion;
thus preventing the erosion of its own status within a democratic society. As
the problem of Urban insurgency increases, this course of action will require
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constant awareness of the political impact inherent in every level. of FID
activity.
An outlined in the following chapter, the principle tOhhniques involved
in achieving this goal are tactical, since it is at the tactical level that
the political impact of counterinsurgenc37 operations is greatest. It is
there that the cultivation of political awareness is most likely to prove
decisive in satisfying public opinion, and it is also there that this goal
may be pursued without violation of the national tradition. Thus the intro-
duction of political restraint in counterinsurgency tactics, is one key to
solving the problem of force erosion within the context of urban insurgency
warfare. A second key is the training of advisory personnel capable of
adapting these tactical principles to a foreign environment, since this
adaptability is a prerequisite to 'success in the FID program. A third .key,
not to be forgotten in the overall strategic meaning of force erasion, is
the .Army's management of its relationship with the National Guard. These
last two aspects of the urban insurgency problem are dealt with in Chapter
Nine.'
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4lotto*
CHAPTFR .EIGHT
POLITICAL AWARENESS AND TACTICAL DOCTRINE
1. The Yeed for a Separate Doctrine
Combat in .cities is amply treated in US Army operaftonal doctrine.
Influenced by the lessons of World War Two, this doctrine cAlls'for the by-
passing and isolation of urban areas whenever possible, largely for the sake
of guarding against a dissipation of forces in street-to-street fighting. -
This peril is best illustrated by the German Army's disaster at Stalingrad,
and its implications for the Soviet Army are reflected in that Army's em-
phasis upon luring a land warfare Opponent into urban battle. Aware of
such peril, the US Army's most recent attention to urban warfare has re-
sulted in an exhaustive study matching Soviet tactical doctrine against the
detailed characteristics of the modern city -- *ith one result being an ex-
tenniAre ieconsideration of US Army tactic, equipment and 'organization for
urban combat.
Inevitably, such reconsideration must include the adaptability of
given tactical methods to given types of urban conflict, since land warfare
between conventional forces -- the form of conflict envisioned in NATO
planning -- would involve only a part of the urban warfare spectruN. This
spectrum ranges across an array of possibilities, each a special variation
on the distinctions involved: conventional forces versus unconventional
forces, defensive operations versus offensive (or counteroffensive) oper-
ations, friendly city versus enemy city. The scenario which portrays con-
ventional US forces couhterattackinr conventional enemy forces through the
streets of a friendly city is one: which reflects ,on)y a special combination
of these variables; at the other end of the urban warfare spectrum, one may
envision US forces copinr with insurreni terrorism in the midst of -en ;ccupied
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and hostile enemy city'. The spectrum mu-t also reflect the varied intensity
of theme engaremente, exemplified in the contrast between 9m day-to-day
terrorism faced by French Army personnel in Algiers and the ,unparalleled
attrition of the houme-to-houme, room-to-room combat of Stalingrad. Be-
cause of these variationa, no single set of tactics, nor single method of
operations, is likely to accomcdate such a vast range ef.possible situations.
When political factor? are added, the perils of relying on a single
method are compounded. The Russian Army's assault against Berlin, under-
taken in a style which had proven succemsful at Smolensk and Stalingrad,
nevertheless caused urban damage which long afterwards interfered with the
Soviet Unien's political and economic hold on East Germony. Similarly, the
French Army's counter-terror tactics, prompted by lessons learned in Indo-
china, contributed to political defeat in the Algerian War despite tactical
victory in the streets of Algiers. With its emphasis upon firepower, rapid
destruction of opposing forcem and the clearance of a built-up area, the
tactical doctrine appropriate for urban combat between two opposing con-
ventional forces is thus not likely to provide lasting success in urban con-
flict which involves political undertones. This is, however, the essential
character of urban insurgency, however much it may approach the violence of
street-to-street fighting between conventional forces.
Faced with the dual-warfare mission, the Army might hope to simplify
its tasks by applying the tactics of conventional warfare to interdictory
operations. To do this, however, woulci be to riek confusing Algiers,with
Stalingrad, as if urban counterinsurgency operations were little more than
a special instance of combat in built-up areas. Given that these types of
urban conflict are fundamentally different despite certain superficial sim-
ilarities, the tank is ito develop tactical dcctrine for each. In the case
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conventional urban combat, the resulting, doctrine must undoubtedly emphasize
firepowr and rapid clearance of an urban area -- but in thi Case of urban
counterinsurg,ency, tactical doctrine must reflect the political character of
such operations. It in in this sense that political awareness must be into-
grated into tactical doctri no and cultivated in the training of those personnel
who would employ this doctrine.
2. Factors Influencing Political Awareness
Two factors define the nature of the political awareness necessary in
count,- rinlurge ncy opera t inns
First, the Army must guard against internal erosion. Thus it must accom-
odate US public opinion, lest its counterinsurgency activities provoke public
reaction And endanger its own effectiveness. In this sense, politioal awareness
is sustained recognition of the interplay between tactical behaviour and US
public opinion.
Second, the Army must develop tactics which will meet the specific re-
quirements of interdiction. These must accomodate the foreign political en-
vironment within which they are employed, lest they accelerate the political
unrest whi01 underlies insurgency. In this sense, political awareness is
detailed recognition of the political forces at work within a foreign area.
Presumably, the tactics employed in counterinsurgency operations would
be those advocited by the Army itself, for even though its FID activities
are desired to preclude involvement of its own forces, its FID advisory
effort would inevitably reflect its own tactical doctrine. Thus, to the
extent its FID activities receive public attention, public opinion is likely
to hold the Army respOnsible for the tactL:al behaviour of whatever units are
involved, be they foreign or American. Tf this behaviour is thought to be
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reprehensible, the Arm will at best suffer guilt by associatien. Moreover,
it is actual human behaviour which is likely to receive pUl.?*c attcrtien,
for in the televized dramatization of conflict it is individual behaviour
which captures public attention, and in the intellectual stress of urbanized
life it is visible action, ond not complex policy, which is most readily sub-
jected to public scrutiny. These are environmental factors contra) to the
problem of urban insurgency. Thus, since it is specific behaviour which
provokes public opinion, and since it is tactical doctrine which governs
this behaviour, incorporation of political awareness in tactical doctrine
would depend on careful assessment of how specific kinds of tactical behaviour
will effect public opinion. It would also depend on certain general observatiens
about the foreign political environment within which this behaviour would
occur.
The most disastrous response to these separate requirements would be
tactical behaviour which alienates US public opinion and aggravates the
insurgent situation -- resulting in a need to increase US Army involvement
amid decreased public support. The most effective response would be tactical
behaviour which simultaneously satisfies public opinion and resolves the
insurgent situation, so that increased US involvement would net be relsired.
Th ? attempt to incorporate political awareness in tactical doctrine
need not degenerate into an assessment of day-to-day political trends vithin
the US. Dertain very general principles underlie these trends, providing a
basis for the realistic understanding of VS public opinion and the likely
impact or specific tactical behaviour on that opinion. At the same time,
certain general principles characterize these foreign environments within
Which the FID program might be undertaken. These, toe, provide insight into
i ? the tactical doctrine necesmarY to achieve political success in counterr-
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innurnenry warfare.
The three tendencies most pertinent to US public opintpn ;but counter-
insurgency operatinns will turn out to.be these:
(1) The US public respects effieieney in whatever one undertakes. . It is
this principle which underlies its attitude toward commerce and industry.
(2) The US public is not patient with complex political issues. Its
valuer encovreue a."good guy versus bud guy" simplification of such isrues.
(3) The US public does not glorify war in itself. Its ,political history
leads it to characterize war as a necessary evil at best.
These are, of course, generalizations -- but they reflect the technologic-
al and political traditions of American life. One may identify these prin-
ciples at work in van/cue attitudes toward the Vietnamese War, attitudes
which were initially independent of any disagreement about the virtue of
that war. In terms of counterinsurgency doctrine, they generate three quite
simple conch:51:ms: if public opinion is to be reconciled, counterinsurnency
tactics must be demonstrably efficient; they must be precise in target selection,
with zero impact on innocent bystanders; and they must be restrained in terms
of violence and use of weaponry. The full impact of these conclusions is
developed in the sectionewhich
?
In turn, the three factors which generally characterize those foreign
environments uithin which FID activities might occur .are these:
(1) The pmlitical unrest which would precede US involvement is very
likely to he nationalistic in tone.
(2) The foreigner is likely to have far more respect for his gun traditirns.
than he has for those of an outsider.
(3) Specific traditions will vary from ore foreign environment to another,
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with associpted differences in velues and morals.
Ar with the principles which underlie. US public opinionl-these faCtere
#41
yield specific conditions which must be met if the Armyte counterinsurgency
activittee are to he successful: the Army's presence munt be low-profilfe, it
must he accompanied by systematic respect for local values, and it must be
adaptable te extreme variations in tradition and custom. Surprisingly, these
conditions will be met best by the tactical measures already cited, for
efficiency, precise target selection and restraint in the use of violence
will prve to be the key to satisfyinfT these conditions.
Ti insure tactical behaviour which would satisfy US public opinion
and also insure FID succees? it is thus necessary to incorporate these.
factors in the details of tactical doctrine. Once this is done, and once
the FID personnel who would execute this decti-ine are led to understand
these factors, the necessary level of political awareness would be attained.
3. Tactical Efficiency and the Principle of Patience
Ideally, the FID program would be executed without the involvement of
any US forces and without the prevccation ef the US public. Thus the most
acceptable implementation of this program would be an advisory assistance
effort in which effective counterinsurgency techniques are made availsble
to the security forces of the fernign country faced with subversion or in-
surgency. Because epecially selected US forces eight be involved in even
the early phases of the FID effert? and because general purpose U8 forces
could eonceivably become involved if the insurgent movement is net contained,
the tacticsl techniques appropriate for advisory di;-;.tiiination must also be
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.appropriate for utilization by US forcee.. In any event, the ailidity.of
these techniques will be measurable in terms of their impact on the insurgent
movement and their acceptability to the US public. Within the framowerk of
the urbin insurgency threat, tactical efficiency must be meisured in the
same way.
In general, crunterinsurgency operations must have 60 goals: first
the containment of the insurgent thTeat? and then the elimination of the
insurgent movement. In turn, revolutionary practice is dedicated toward
expansien of the insurgent threat and thus insurgent tactics are meet
efficient when they produce a response which inadvertently bringe about
thie exparsioni Indeed, the principle objective ef urban terror is te pro-
voke a goverrmental resporse which will cause public reaction, create symp-
ithy for the revelutionary movement "and erode public support of the govern-
ment. The self-defeating futility of the Algiers counterinsurgency effort
illustrates this danger. One must IRSEUM5 that revolutionary or strategic
urban insurgency directed against US interests will ales be predicated open
this possibility, ard will therefert involve efforts to force a military
response which provokes the US public in such a way that its tolerance of
the counterinsurgency effort and its support of the military enterprise are
strongly effected. Given the special characteristics of the urban environ-
ment, and riven the impact of televinier and other mass media, the unrest
which underlies urban life creates a conditien within which this insurgent
tactical principle may flourish. A politically successful countrinsurgency
effort in therefore dependent on conztant attention to this peril. In effect, '
th-nso efficientlurban asunterinsurgenCy tactics will be these tactical pro-
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cedures which contain ,the insurgency threat without provoking reactionary
supnort fer the insurgent revement.
41
Containment without provocation is only one index of tactical efficiency
in urban counterinsurgency operations. A senond index is the effectivenema
of these operations in elirinating the insurgent movement itself. While
successful containment would prevent the expansion of the ineurgement
movement? the elimination of such a minrement would require the dissolution
of its structure and the resolution of its causes. Although this latter
requirement cannot be met by strictly military action -- betause the causes
which underlie :irsurTrmcy are generally political, economic and social in
nature the successful elimination of an urban insurgent movement will re-
quire sustained coordination of military and civic action. Unlike rural
guerrilla warfare, which permits the *battlefield separation of insurgent
combat from the causes of insurgercy, the causes of _urban insurgency are
likely to be present within the battlefield itself. Therefore the synthesis
of the military and civic efferte will require constant coordination at the
very lowest levels of urban activity. From a tactical standpoint, this means
:a recognition tnat tactics-alone eannot elirlinate urban insurgency.
Of course, the penetration of an insurgent structure and the capture or
death of its leaders can result in temporary suspension of the movement, but
this is not likely to guarantee it elimination; the French Amyl's destruction
of the FINts cellular apparatus did not bring victory in Algiers. Therefore
the second major irdex of tactical efficiency in urban counterinsurgency oper-
ations will be the effectiveness of these tactics in reinforcing and comple-
menting the civic action via which an insurgency movement is actually eliminated:
From all this, one may conclude that the containment and elimination of
urban insurgency will require extreme patience. Because the attempt tc seek
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*woe ,411p,
put and dee-troy en insbrgent apparatus is even more frustrating in an urben
environment than in a rural countryside, patience is easi14,spent and military
over-reaction is most natural. But ,provocation follows readily from the
mass detention of suspect persons, the armed entry into private dwellings,
,
the indiscriminate use of firepower and explosives, the establishment of
blockades, the interruption of traffic and business, and.the use of overt
torture9 'and when these measures are undertaken in the urban environment
their impact on an otherwise neutral populace can prove self-defeating. Of
course, the response required in any given counterinsurgency operation will
be 3rfluenced by the techniques of terrorism, ambush, propaganda, sabotage
and interference employed by the insurgent movement itself, but this response
need not be dictated by these techniques. Since containment and elimination
are dependent on non-provocation and the cooranation of military action with
civic action, patience must remain the fundamental principle of tactical
efficiency in urban counterinsurgency operations.
In considering this principle, it ir to be noted that efficiency in
an FID undertaking does not necessarily mean the swift resolution of ln in-
surgent threat; rather, it weans the containment and elimination of this
threat in such a way that the threat is not escalated and US forces are not
needed. Given the provocative impact of military over-reaction, tactical
patience is thus the key to non-provocation and non-escalatien, and hence
the key to FID efficiency. Because it would boa guard again:A the involve-
ment of US ferces? it is also the key to maintaining a low-profile American
preeence in the insurgent envirenvient, and hence the key to satisfying those
'nationalistic tendencies likely ti characterize any environmsnt within which
FM assistance would be undertaken,
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h. Target Selection and the principle of Discrimination
While tactical efficiency and the principle of patience are byproducts
of one American tradition, a second attitude weighing heavily onAhe tactics
of counterinsurgency iR the traditional Am-rican interpretation.of war as a
conflict between gond and evi. Even though the US interests threatened by
foreign inaurgency may well be economic only, and even tnough this threat
may be clouded inrterms cr complex foreign policy, the traditional tendency
to characterize war in less complicated moral terms is not likely to vanish.
The FID program is an example of the actual complexity of the world, but the
publics moralAustification of this program is not, of course, an Army con-
corn. It cannot be, because the Army is traditionally excluded from the public
political process. The Army Ar responsible for guarding against its own
erosions however, and is therefore respiondible for assuring that its act-
ivities do not provoke a moral reaction which could lead to public repud-
iation 4.2 the Arne. In terms of urban counterinsurgency, this means it must
guard against the indiscriminate use of force amid an urban populace. In a
tactical senses this means the principle of discrieination must govern target
selection.
The principle of discrimination is dictated by the "good juy versus bad
guy" distinction which dominates public opinion about complex matters of con-
flict and violence . In terms ?2 urban insurgencys the "bad guys" will inevit-
ably be those insurgent personalitiee who engage in terrcrisms ambush; sabo-
tage and similar acts; applying the principle of discrimination in urban
counterinsurgency operation e would therefore mean careful restriction of
tactical measures to those insurgent personnel who are clearly identifiable
as "bad guys". With the omniPrerent television camera likely to record every
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Nor
instance of counterinsbrgeney action, indiscriminate public arrest, mans de-
tention, house raids and return firm are likely to producesfn image of brutal-
ity, and hence likely tololur the public's visien of the counterinsurgency
process. This is especially true where women and children are involved _-
but women and children are everywhere present in the urban environment, and
Insurgent leaders seeking to capitalize on public sentimpnt have successfully
pushed women and children into ths forefront of many urban struggles, such as
_
Algiers and Belfast. I uading against these tactics and in responding to
the human features of the urban enviromsent, the security forces engaged
against an insurrent movement must exercise great care in identifying the
actual enemy, lest these security forces themselves become portrayed as
agents of oppressien and evil. In practical terms, this means the utmost
care in avoiding violence ag-inst v,men and children, in preventing accidental
harm to non-involved portions of the populace, and in guarding against damage
to public property. In short, it means precise target selection.
Precise target selectien is not only the key to guarding against reaction
on the psrt of the American public. It is also the key to preventing reaction
within the foreign environment. Because it is likely to respect its own customs
and traditions far more than these of an outside power, a foreign populace is
hot likely to sympathize with violence which can be traced to or identified
with a foreign power; if this violence is identifiable with a foreign power,
even to the extent that the foreign power is involved only iR an advisory
role, it is the foreign power which is likely to be blamed when the counter-
insurgency effort disrupts local life,. This disruption is far more implicit
within an urban environment than within a rural environment, simply because
?
the. separatien .t the ihsurgent movement from its popular base is far mere
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tedious within an urban situation. ln Algiers, the French Army seught to
isolate the FLT by blecking,off large areas of the city, b?iiip this isolation
(and the search and destroy operatione undertaken when it failed) so disrupted
%
local life that the French Army, and not the FLN, suffered blame for the in-
crease in unrest which renewed. If this increase is to be avoided, counter-
insurgency tactics must be governed by the principle of discriminetion -- and
this, again means utmost care in the selection of targets against which the
counterinsurgency effort will be directed.
Violations or this principle are meesurable in tPrrs of their impact
on both the local envirenment and US pvblic opinion. Rut tactical discrim-
ination is by no means simPle: it is primarily influenced by the pepulaticn
mix within which urban insurgency woUld occur, but it is also influenced by
the way in which urban counterinsurgency operations are likely to be pictured
on television, an well as the 'Fay in which the langu7.-ge used in describing
these operations is likely to influence the liublic response to this pictorial
content. The language of the Vietnam War is particularly stsspoct in this
regard: terms such as "free-fire zone" and "body count", when accompanied by
picturan of destroyed villages and stacks of dead (and ebviously y2ung) Viet-
ceng, can only impact negatively on a populace which seeks to understand in-
surgent warfare in morally mimple terms. "We had to destroy the village in
order to save it" may )16e a remark intelligible to those engaged in scounter-
inmurgency operotions, but the public's misunderstanding of such language --
and its coneequent:revulsion for the tactics employed, net to mlntion its con-
sequent revulsion fer the war itself -- canrot be overletked if lessens are
to be learned from the Vietnam war. One obvicus lesson is that the prevention
- -
of public reaction to urban counterinsurgency operations will require constant
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awareness of tthe political implications inherent in every incident and every
remark, with s-ceneequent need fer diecretion on the part ef every individual
a,
involved in thn counterinsurgency effort. In the strictly tactical mense,
this means the rtmomt care in target ielection if such viol'ations are to be
aveided.
5. Tactical Vielence and the Principle of Restraint
Besides patience and discrimination, restraint in the use of violence
is also necessary if urban counterinsurgency tactics are to accomodate US
public opinion and the characteristics of the foreign envirinment.
The very nature if counterinsurgency warfare runs against American
traditicn, of course, becaume that tradition results ir a view of war not
ieadily Ciipitible with ineurgency, in that it is not readily compatible
with a gradual emergence in conflict, with vagueness in the identification
of an enemy, ard with prolonged, low-intensity violence. Instead, the US
tradition is meet comfortable with a war which begins in abrupt attack
against the US, carried out by readily identifiable enemies who thereby
&eerye the violence necessary to vanquish such au,r,bsion. Even then, war
is not glerions: World War II was merely a necessary evil. Interdictory
vi.retiene can also be only a necemsary evil, and while they will make great
demands on the American tradition because of their unconventional nature,
it is apparent that a high level of violence in the Aidst of these operations
can orly further aggravate public opinion.
From the tactical standreint? this 0.-sne restraint in the .use of fire-
'"s explosiver in the effort to contain ard aliminate insurgency. Cnly
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if violence is retrained will this effart be .likely to atis.i."" U3 public
opinion. Moreover, er17 it is restrained will it b lily to aceemoiate
t112 ypeciel characteristics of any given foreign environment, within which
counterinsurgency operations are undertaken. Because values and customs
vary so much from one foreign locale te *nether, tactics which are predicated
upon the use of a high degree of violence are likely to 13, a guarantee for
diesster -- especially since the tactice, once refined, are net likely to be
adaptable to variations in culture. The use of a bayonet in the streets of .
Budapest means eomething altogether different from its usage in the streets
of, say, Montevidela -- and the same it true et tho sub-machine gun, the !land
grenade and the police dog. What is required is a tactical doctrine which
is highly flexible and highly adaptable to local custom, and hence highly
free of deperdence on the use of unreetrained violence.
Within an urban environment, this restraint becomess doubly important.
The French experience in Algiers indicates, for exemple? that the proeiccuour
use of the rub-mechine gun in urban cearch-and-destroy eprati.r. i elf-
defeatirg. Accompanied by the use of exrlesives in the effert to root out
the FL, the violence of the rub-machine gun merely drametized the conflict
of the Algerian War, causing censidereble damage to bystanders caught in
firefights between the French and the FLN, causing escalation in public
sentiment" causing increased sympathy for the revolutionary movement itself
bet causirg, in its wake, little real daeage to the FLN apparatus itself.
Moreover, the use cf physical violence -- particularly the use of torture
designed to extract information from FLN captives -- proved self-defeating.
For inevitably such violence made its way into French televisior are' 'Trench
journalipm? and again its impact was more on the French people and the rest
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In"
if the world rpther than tha FLF itself.
RcAraint is far more critical within anurban environment" than within
the context of rural guerrilla warfare, primarily because of the population
mix and the presence of television. .As with the principle of diecrimination,
the principle of restraint is dictatedAw the presence of women and children;
violence which impacts on them will certainly be recorded in detail, and can
?
only undermine the public's moral interpretation of the counterinsurgency
effort. TO prevent this accidental victimization of a surrounding population, .
precision in the Use. of weapons is one requirement. This mans, from a tactic-
al standpoint, the reliance on smaller, more controllable fire teams highly
trained in counter-sniping techniques. It means extreme care in the distrib-
ution of ammunition in crowd-control operations. It means reliance upon pass-
ive measures in blocking off crowd, with the careful avoidance of even a hint
of brutality, and hence the utmost restraint in the use of the bayonet, clubs
and other weapons. In terms of non-lethal weaponry, it means a renewed emphasis
upon incapicitating gases and other devices which would permit the containment
of an insurgency without undue violence. Perhaps most important, it means the
realization that the tactics appropriate for combat within a built-up area --
those tactics to be utilized by conventional forces in clearing out an
urban area are wholly unsatisfactory for urban counterinsurgency operations.
The one set of tactics is predicated on the need to bring maximum violence to
bear againit an opponent; within counterinsurgency operations, particularly in
the urban environment, it is precisely the opposite which is needed.
The principle of restraint is closely related to the principles of patience
and discrimination, in that the three principles reinforce each other, Thus the
successful containment of hostile fire -- for example, the containment of
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sniper fire whiarhas been directed against a serrity force from the roof-tops.
of a heavily populated residential area --. would require patience in the appli-
entice', of counter-fire, exixeme discrimination in the tergeis against which that
fire in directed, and recognition thnt'what is required in dounter-fire in not
volume, but precision. Unless such principles are obeyed, the impact on by-
standers can only result in further deterioration of the insurgent situation,
leading to an escalation in violence amid an inevitable decrease in public
support for the counterinsurgency effort.
6. Urban Counterinsurgency Tactics and the Principles of War
The need for patience discrimination and restraint is deeply rooted in
the political nature of counterinsurgency operations. In carrying out such
operations', the security forces involved aro confronted with demands wholly
unlike those encountered in conventional warfare, they must guard against
the provocation of a surrounding populace, against the aggravation of foreign
opinion, against an image of brutality. They must carry out operations within
an environment which in qualitatively different from that of the open battle-
field. In short, they must assume a role more like that of a police force than .
that of a military force. TO the extent it is identified with urban counter-
insurgency operations in either an advisory capacity or a participating role,
the US Arny must accomodate all these factors and even more o it must acknowledge
US tradition with regard to efficiency, moral simplicity and the nature of war
itself. Mereover, it must do all this within the mintext of its own theory of
war, and hence it is not surprising that the need for patience, discrimination
and restraint maken grave demands upon the Army's adaptability to the urban
counterinsurgency mission. For the tactical principles inherent in urban counter-
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'481, Nap:
insurgency operations would appear to violate the principles of war upon which
the Army'b concept of action is based and from which its conventional tactical
doctrine is derived.
Of the nine principles of war, no less than three appetir to be incompati-
ble with the demands of urban insurgency. The three are the' principles of
mass, offensive and simplicity. For the principle of mass calls for the
concentration of superior fire power at the decisive point in a battle, while
urban counterinsurgency operations must be marked by a careful restraint in
the use of firepower. The principle of the offensive calls .for swift and de-
cisive action, while the containment of insurgency calls for patience and
great deliberation* And the need for careful discrimination in the selection
of target n appears to conflict with both the principles of mass and offensive,
since the Careful choice of targets in urban counterinsurgency operation would
mean avoidance of massed fire and avoidance of the shock-action dictated by
the principle of the offensiVe. Moreover, underlying these considerations is
the fact that an urban counterinsurgency program can succeed in eliminating
the insurgent threat only if military action is carefully coordinated with
'civic action at every level -- but this coordination results in operational
complexity far beyond those limits ordinarily permitted by the principle of
simplicity. To the extent that the principles of mass, offensive and simplicity
are inconsistent with the demands of urban insurgency, execution of the urban .
counterinsurgency mission thus requires the deliberate suspension of these
principles in the name of patience, discretion and restraint. It is therefore
not surprising that the tactics appropriate for combat in a built-up area are
inappropriate for urban counterinsurgency operations.
It is in thin sense that a separate tactical doctrine is required. It
would necessarily be adaptable to both US Army utilization as well as utili-
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Now'
zation by a foreign army receiving advisory assistance. It would acknowledge
the specific principles of patience, discretion and restraint necessary for
counterinsurgency success. It would provide detailed recogqition of the
political character of insurgent warfare, and would thereby incorporate
political sensitivity into the tactical procedures to be employed in urban
counterinsurgency operations. In short, It would permit attainment of the
political awareness without which such operations cannot 'hope to succeed.
4
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Nose
CHAPTER NINE
eNvori
PRCBLEM AND SOLUTIONS
1. The Development of a Separate Urba.il Counterinsurgency Manual
Tactical doctrine par tinent to unconventional warfare is presrmtly
available in a number of US Army Finld Manuals. These manuals are primarily
addressed to rural guerrilla operations. As a result, they emphasize the
organization and tactics appropriate for rural insurgency and rural counter-
insurgency operations, with only passing attention to the characteristics of.
insurgency within a city. In the scnse that insurgency within a city is
only an adjunct to rural guerrilla warfare, this doctrine is adequate for
both the rural and urban aspects of guerrilla warfare. But in the sense
in which urban insurgency is something quite distinct, this doctrine is not
.adequate, From the standpoint of offensive insurgency -- that is, insurgency
to be undertaken by US Army elements in support of an all-out war -- it
reflects a commitment( to rural operations, and thus concentrates upon the
development, training, support and coordination of rural forces. From a
counterinsurgency standpoint -- that is, operations to be undertaken against
an insurcent threat -- it also concentrates upon rural warfare. In both
cases, its thrust is in the direction of organization, techniques of control,
and methods of .coordination. The tactical doctrine contained within these
manuals is essentially irrelevant to urban insurgency.
Equally unsatisfactory is the doctrine governing stability operations.
Although their scope differs from that of the manuals which deal with un-
conventional warfare, those manuals eevoted to stability operations never-
theless concentrate upon problems in organization and control, with little
attention to the political factors inherent in urban insurgency. It is not
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so much that the stability operations doctrine is irrelevant; it is merely
inadequate. Because it does not address itself to the problem of political
,41
awareness, this doctrine is virtually silent with regard to the principles
of patience, discrimination and restraint which must characterime a success-
,
fUl urban counterinsurgency effort. As with the doctrine which governs un-
conventional warfare, the stability operations doctrine reflects a preoccupa-
tion with rural guerrilla warfare, and therefore what is required is the
development of a separate, distinct urban counterinsurgency manual which
does stress the integration of political awareness with tactical doctrine.
A separate manual would enhance the recognMon that urban insurgency
is, in fact, a form of unconventional warfare essentially distinct from
either rural-oriented guerrilla warfare or guerrilla warfare which is accomp-
anied by a city-based underground. Moreover, it would permit the assembly
of those tactical techniques appropriate for urban insurgency, and would
thereby permit the rrognition that these techniques are fundamentally un-
like thoae appropriate for conventional combat in a built-up area. At
present, the absence of a single manual has resulted in the fragmentation
of the sUbject, with bits and pieces of tactical Insight scattered through
the various manuals Which deal with unconventional warfare and stability
operations. Their significance is lost in the process, because the manuals
in which they are -contained are devoted to an essentially different subject.
In effect, then, a separate manual would gather together these tactical pro-
cedures and would insure their integration with the principles of patience,
discrimination and restraint which would govern their effectiveness.
The development of a separate manual need not obscure the fact that
urban counterinsurgency operations must be tailored to the specific environment
within which they would be undertaken. What is required, within the scope of
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Aloe Nike
such a manual, is emphasis upon the procedures via which this,tailOring
effect could be achieved. Most pertinent to this tailoring effort is
the procedure for examining the special characteristics of a given urban
environment, the analysis Of those techniques which have recently failed
or succeeded within that particular environment, the production of command-
ers, guidelines which would incorporate this analysis, 'and the dissemination
of detailed, current guidance to all levels of the operation. In short, a
manual which deals with urban insurgency must address itself to the special
techniques necessary for providing tailored, up-to-date, locally relevant
tactics appropriate for the particular urban environment within which the
insurger.cy is being combatted.
Such a manual would address,itself not only to the training and qual-
.
ificatiOn of the individual advisors who would be involved in urban insurg-
ency operations; equally important, it would provide detailed procedures
for the trdning and orientation of the military units engaged in counter-
insurgency operations. Because the sustained integration of political
awareness and tactical procedures is crucial to the success of an urban
Counterinsurgency effort, assuring this integration will require careful
orientation of all personnel prior to their introduction into tto environ-
mst within wliCh this effort is being carried out; moreover, it will also
require the on-going review and adjustment of tactics, and hence will require
the continuation of training in the midst of the operation itself. Specific
procedares for the conduct of this training would be a central feature of
midi a manual. For example, the analysis of the impact of current operations
on public opinion would require the daily consideration of how those oper-
ations are portrayed on teli4ie1on; in terms of the on-going training of
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MISSING
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Nei
vase
units wculd have to undertake such operations as a secondary mission. Be-
cause Jf these factors, the most reasonable course of action would be to
HI
treat urban counterip'surgency as a secondary mission to begin with, to
identify those units which might feasibly assume this mission, and to do-
,
velop a training program via which preparation for this mission could be
integrated into the normal training of these units.
Since the FIB mission calls for advisory assistance in the initial
stages of an insurgency, unit involvement at that point would very likely
be confined to the deployment of mobile training teams capable of providing
instruction in special skills -- such as military police, military intelli-
gence, psyops, engineer or Special Forces subjects. Orienting these MTT's
in the special characteristics of urban insurgency could be achieved via
the development of a special program of instruction to be made mailable
prior to their deployment. While this instruction could be tailored to the
specific environment within which the MITts.would operate, its crucial con-
tent would be the detailed treatment of those political awareness factors
net forth in Chapter Eight. In effect, then, what ,is required is a rel-
atively brief POI -- probably no more than a two-week course -- which would
provide tactical orientation' appropriate for an MIT being deployed into an
urban insurgency situation. A similar POI of somewhat greater duration
could also be developed for utilization by general purpose forces being
deployed in the later stages of an insurgency.
While such instruction would be heavily oriented toward political
awareness, its content would be essentially tactical and its successful
delivery would therefore require the development of tactical exercises in-
tegrating the principles of political awareness with operational techniques.
The conduct of such exercises need not be dependent on the availability of
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exponsivo mock-ups of an urban area, however, for the most important training
aids in this program would not be buildings; what is cruciial in urban in-
surgency is the human element, and hence what would be required would be
personnel who could play the roles of an insurgent force and, even more im-
portant, the roles of an urban population caught in the middle of an in-
surgent-soperation. In the development of these exercises, the most effect-
ive training scenario would be one which demonstrates the meaning of patience,
discrimination aid restraint, which provides detailed experience in how to
avoid types of provocation, and which thereby amplifies the peril of escal-
ation. The development of this progran of instruction would require system-
atic experimentation with new methods of training, of course, but once
these methods have been developed tho resources required to conduct such
;training, could be drawn from personnel already available.
Measuring the full impact of this instruction would be difficult, pri-
marily because it would involve new techniques not yet tested under fire,
and also because the successful achievement of political awareness in any
given counterinsurgency environment would require attention to the subtle
peculiarities of that particular environment. Nevertheless, the minimal
impact of such instruction would be its capacity to create an awareness
that urban insurgency is, in fact, a form of conflict which differs vastly
from open warfare anzi which requires, as a result, a different kind of psy-
chological orientation on the part of those personnel engaged in urban
counterinsurgency operations. Once this awareness has been achieved, the
task would be to reinforce it within the context of the operation itself,
by means of the on-going training effort described earlier.
What is therefore most important about this orientation effort is the
recognition that a successful urban counterinsurgency effort does not re-
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quire specially designed units. Rather, it requires the psychological prep-
aration of whatever units are to engage in such operations, Thus the task
is to develop training techniques by means of which any given unit could be
successfully oriented with regard to the political characteristics of urban
insurgency. The identificaticn of those units likely to be required for
such operations -- that is?.the identification of those units which should
undertake urban counterinsurgency training as part of their secondary mis-
sion -- could then be carried out in the manner via which other fvrce re-
quirements are developed.
). Training For Urban Counterinsurgency Via the CPX Method
Training doctrine appropriate for the preparation of specifle units
is one thing. The development of techniques via which these units may coordi-
nate their activities with the non-military components of a counterinsurgency
effort is another thing.
This coordination is important in the containment of an insurgent threat
because military action must be integrated with civic action if undue provo-
cation and an accidental mushrooming of the insurgement movement are to be
prevented. It is equally important in the elimination of such a threat,
since elimination requires resolution of the various causes underlying the
insurgency, and Since these causes are most likely to be civic in oature.
Within the context of the urban environment, such coordination between the
military effort and the civic effort is far more important than it is in
rural counterinsurgency operations, simply because the battlefield is ident-
ical with the population base for whose loyalty the battles of urban insurgency
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ffew
are being fought.
Training in the techniques necessary to achieve such,Fooi:sdination need
not involve the actual employment of military units and civic elements. It
can be achieved through what amounts to a variation on the command post ex-
ercise method ? for a CPX played against an urban insurgency scenario could
readily provide the experience, and hence the expertise1 necessary to bring
about coordination between military and civic elements. Such a CPX wo.uld
involve representatives of the elements typically involved in the operation
of a city: the police and fire departments; the legal and Political offices,
the transportation and power agencies, the hospitals, the communications
centers, the schools, the churches. Indeed, a five-day CPX of this sort
is presently operated on a regular basis by the state of California in
-training representatives of such agencies against an urban disorder scen-
ario. At a specific moment within this scenario, participants in the Cal-
ifornia CPX are likely to be engaged in dispatching fire trucks to multiple
points, committing reserve police elements to break up riots at stilt other
points, making decisions about the evacuation of a flooded suburb, coping
with a make-believe hijacking incident -- in short, with any of the metro-
politan crises which daily require interaction of different civic agencies.
The most important lesson to be drawn from the California model is that the
mastery of coordination techniques is best achieved when such representatives
play roles other than their normal roles -- when a real-world police chief
Plays, for example, the role of a CM mayor, and thereby learns what the
mayor's role really is. A similar CPX conducted within the framework of
the FID program would have military personnel playing the role of various
local agencies, as well as th4 role of other US Goverment agencies likely
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to be involved in the' stabilization effort ? the end product being not
only an increased understanding of what these other roles jnvolve, but also
an increased awareness of how the military effort must be coordinated with
the civic effort if it is 4to be effective.
One of the immediate consequences likely to be drawn from such CPX ad-
ventures is that the initial burden of the counterinsurgency effort within
an urban complex is best borne not by _mn-it-ary units at all, but by local
police agencies and local security forces. Indeed, the case studies of
Section II indicate that the military escalation of urban insurgency --
particul:rly in Algiers -- has often been due to a military lack of awareness
as to how to improve or revitalize the capabilities and functions of a local
police force. Since the basic goal of the FID effort is to prevent unrest
and subversion from escalating into insurgency at alls the development of
self-restraint on the part of military advisory personnel could be one of
the most important byproducts of the CPX training program. If the Amy is
to avoid overcommitments and if it is to avoid the erosion process upon
which revolution (and strategic insurgency) would be predicated, guarding
against its own unnecessary involvement in such counterinsurgency activities
is, of course? most important. This means guardirg against the unnecessary
involvement of even local military forces, lest the insurgent situation be
thereby escalated out /Of control -- and hence it means the development of
advisory assistance techniques for reinforcing local security agencies other
than military force's. Indeed, learning how to rely on local polices local
security, and local government as opposed to relying on sheer military
force ? would be one of the central objectives of an urban insurgency CU.
A second objective of this CPX effort would be the development of mil-
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Niue' / Nal
itary commanders capable of coordinating the activities of their own units
with those of purely civic agencies if, in the end, US military forces were
drawn into on urban counterinsurgency mission. For if that mission were
actually undertaken, the day-to-day integration of the Armyls actions with
those of other agencies -- such as the local police and the local government
would generate problems not likely to have been encountered before. Again,
the role-reversal method of training lends itself to recognition of what
these problems actually involve.
Finally, the urban insurgency CPX format lends itself' to a detailed,
step-by-step exploration of the problems which the Army might encounter in
a specifically identified urban environment. Faced with the possibility of
involvement in the affairs of a particular foreign city, the best possible
command preparation for understaeding these affairs in advance would be the
utilization of a CPX training vehicle. In this sense, such .a CPX would be
an exercise in contingency planning. What would be required if, say, the
local police apparatus has been infiltrated, its intelligence system has
been eroded, its effectiveness has been undermined? Would military assumption
of the police role be preferable? Since theoretical answers are rarely re-
liable in such matters, the CPX format could be adapted to accomodate such
contingency thinking -- and, hopefully, could be expected to prodnce altern-
atives to military involvement. At the very minimum, it would produce the
techniques and attitudes which would be necessary for the coordination of
the military effort with the civic effort in a specific foreign environment.
Tho difficulties inherent in the mere concept of such a CPX indicate
why urban counterinsurgency is itself so complex;' As described earlier; it
is this complexity -- particularly in the matter of coordination -- which
means such operations can hardly accomodate the principle of simplicity
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which governs.thsoirideal conduct of ordinary warto*:e. Coming to grips with
this complexity would'be; therefore; an additional benefit to be derived
from the conduct of such CPA's.'
4 - The Feed to Develop von-military Counterterror Capabilities
The development of a separate manual, the preparation of a special in-
structional package, and the conduct of carefully designed CPX's yould assist
the Army in preparing for an urban counterinsurgency mission within the con-
text of the FID program. However, they would not meet the requirements of a
very special aspect of urban insurgency. the threat of sustained, carefully
coordinated terrorist actions; carried out across international boundaries
and effecting US strategic interests; undertaken in such a way the FID pro-
cram is vol-. readily-adaptable to their containment.'
The recent operetions of the so-called Black September organleatio!,
provide a hint of this potential threatV The terrorist action advocated in
Martghelll's Mintmenual illurltrates the methodology involved g asassination,
kidnapeing? hijacking, bombing. As described in Chapters Two and Three,
terrorist action of this sort could reach the intensity of an insurgent move-
ment without even appearing to do so, simply because of its dispersion through-
out a netqork of cities.' Because of this dispersion, and because it is not
identifiable as some localized problem, the process of containment envisioned
in the FID program would be essentially irrelevant to it. And yet, because
of the wey its diplomatic and technological interests are extended throughout
the world, the US is an ideal target for such terrorist action.' As a special .
form of urban insurgency-- and one which lends itself to future strategic
emPloyment -- such terrorism requires special consideration.'
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Combatting --*wilan terrorism within the US iti.o.p.f is not, of course, an
Army mission.' For is.it necessarily an Army mNssion within the cities of
a foreign country since there, as in the US, the proper coltainment of
terrorist incidents is primarily a function of local police agencies. Never-
theless-, the Army must be concerned with the terrorist threat for three
reasons. First; it is conceivable that within a foreign envtronment and even
within the context of the FID program, a police inability to cope with urban
terrorism could lead to a request for US Army advisory assistance in the
techniques of its containment.' Second- the possible involvement of the
National Guard -- and the Army's resrom7ibility for Guard reaflnels
results' in an indirect concern for even domestic terrorism.' And third, its
on-going need to assess the military significance of terrorism means that
its intelligence, apparatus must constantly evaluate these activities, lest
their possible Strategic importance escape notice.'
Although these three factors result in separate needs, they are still
interrelated in terms of the response required a close integration of the .
Army's resources with those of other agencies.
Domestically, the national task must be to insure police proficiency.'
This means the development of both local and Federal counter-terrorist teams,
whose skills would preclude the need for Guard involvement (or active Army
involvement) in such matters. To insure this, the Army's task is to encour-
age the development of such teams and -- to the extent it can do so without
aggravating public opinion -- to. assist in their technical training, if need
le.' Public opinion is of crucial importance, however, in view of the nation-
'al traditions citied earlierr thus the Army's assistance in such pollee-team
trabled must be carefully measured.' All this means close coordination between
the Army and various domestic security agencies to insure a proper response,
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1.11r, Nmly
by the prorcr agencies; to urban terrorism within the US.
Outside the US,' the task is essentially the same* the development of
adennate police capabilities. To achieve this, US governm4tal assistenee
would be primarily the function of nonmilitary agencies --sand thus the
Army's task is to encourage within these agencies the development of non-
'military assistance teams prepared to aid in the development of foreign
police capabilities.' When US interests are threatened id such a way this
assistance is not readily requested, Or when the terrorism is so dispersed
that such a need is not readily recognised; the problem of protecting US
interests without intervening in the affairs of a foreign nation becomes ex-
trendy difficult. Given the Antares traditional role in national defense; and.
given the problems associated with the preservation of its resources amid a
dual-warfare mission; it can be argued that the worst Possible reaction to
nuch a potential threat world be the development of special US Arm:if counter-
terror teams to be dispatched in the event of such an emergencY.' As with
domestic terrorism, the more appropriate solution would be the development
of nosnterterror teams by Federal agencies other than the Army. ? As with the
domestic nroblem, this nevertheless entails close coordination between the
Army and -ftese other Federal agencies, particularly with regard to training;
operational control and intelligence assessment:
Intelligence assessmentilhe third major factor governing US Army inter-
est in world-wide terrorism; is a far more difficult consideration. Because
of its dispersion; because it is ideally suited to the attack of 'modern
technolo,-icel functions (as described in Chapter Two) rather than geographic-
ally isolated targets; such terrorism makes new demands on the military recog-
nition of a strategic threat:. Indeed, part of the threat potential is this
difficulty in its recognition- Because of its uniqueness and because of the
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_ 411.t.
magnitude which Int could assume; this threat literally requires the develop-
ment of new techniques of intelligence collection and evaluation. The, con-
clusion to 'he drawn, then, is that here -- as in the develcqment of national
and foreign police. -- the 'Army's task is to eneotu7age the de-
velopment of an intelligence apparatus capable of engaging- in this particular
effort and, to the extent necessary, lending its own resources to this de-
velopmeni,.
Essentially; therefore; the general conclusion to be dram Main the
current study of terrorism is that its containment is not aurorriAely a
US Army m1ssion:1 To insure that it does not inherit this mission by defaulti
the Army must therefore devote attention to the threat in order to encourage
the development; by other agencies; of a more appropriate capability of
countering this threat;'
5, Problems for the Future
Of the major conclusions to be drawn from the study of urban insurgency,
the two most complex are those which center upon the problem of erosion, and
the problem of strategic diversion. These are, however, the most serious
problems underlying the threat of urban insurgency. For if the ultimate
meaning of the urban insurgency threat is that for the US it is not so much
a revolutionary matter as it is a matter of force stability and technological
survival, then the threat demands foresight far beyond the provisions of the
FID program and its associated doctrine.
In the sense described in Chapter Seven, the Army is vulnerable to
erosion because of the national traditions which define its character. *De-
cause of the urbanization described in Chapter Two, the US itself is vulner-
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Nur'
?
able to a carefully controlled attack against specific technological functions.
Because of all this, the US presents an ideal target for striatsegically-inspired
insurgency, whose goal vo.uld be the diversion and erosion of its armed forces,
plus the crippling of its economy. Ndne of this is likely to go unnoticed by
its enemies. The task, therefore, is to guard against this vulnerability.
One response, cited in Chapter Seven, must be the careful management of
the Nation al Guard. Although the active Army cannot be directly concerned
with domestic affairs, it is nevertheless concerned with the training and
peace time use of the. Guard. If the Guard is diverted into an excessive
domestic role, its mobilization readiness will be diminished accordingly; if
its execution of the domestic dis turbance role is not extremely skillful, it
will suffer severe recruiting and retention problems as well. The Guard is
therefore deeply vulnerable to erosion, and since the Guard constitutes half
of the Army's tactical strength (and half of its overall strategic reserve),
the Army's concern for its overall stability must lead to a greater concern
for the Guard's role in domestic matters. Essentially, this means the Army
must encourage restraint in the domestic utilization of the Guard. It also
means the Army must strengthen its training assistance, particularly with re-
gard to the development of realistic, non-provocative techniques for carrying
out the domestic role. In short, it must recognize that the principles of urban
counterinsurgency described in Chapter Seven apply, domestically, to the kinds
of stability operations in 1.hich the Guard would be engaged -- and, further, it
must insure that these principles are incorporated into Guard procedures.
Additionally, the Army must resist the temptation to become involved in
insurgency outside the US. If the problem of erosion is as severe as it
appears to be, the Arnw's task is not only to avoid over-commitment, but also
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mow
to avoid involvement in operations which would erode its own capacity to main-
. . ,
tain a strong conventional war capability. Half of this ta,ak would be, met by
the implementation of those principles set forth in Chapter ,Eight if, indeed,
the Army becomes involved in urban cotinterinaurgency operations. The other half
would be met by the development of a strong sense of self-restraint in seeking
such involvement.
This is not to sw that the threat will vanish if it is merely seen and
avoided. It is not likely that the future will be so kind. But it is to
recognize that the funamental principles of revolution -- those 7Arinciples
which new lend themselves to action which is not .so much revolutionary as it
is strategic -- are principles which begin with the premise that orthodox
military forces can be destroyed piecemeal if they can be drawn steadily, and
unsuspectingly, into action which is Assentially self-defeating. P.voiding
that outcome may .well be the most important single aspect of the struggle
ahead.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
-;
The following is a list of selected?books, articles, and aims
pertinent to the study of urban insurgency._ The list is categorized
by subject area. 7
STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINE
Barclay, C. N., The New Warfare, Clowes & Sons, 1953
Benson, L. W., Power Through Subversion, Public Affairs Press,
1972.
Brinton, C., The Anatomy of Revolution, Prentice-Hall, 1952.
Calvert, Peter, Revolution, Praeger, 1970.
Cross, J. E., Conflict in the shadows, Constable & Co., 1964.
Crozier, B.,6The End of the Cold War?'!' National Review, 16 Mar 73.
Crozier, B.,"The Soviet Involvement. in_Vtplence! Soviet Analyst,
London, 6 Jul 72
DPbray, R., Revolution in a Revolution, Pelican, 1968.
Eckstein, H., Internal War, Glencoe, 1964.
Hoffer, E., The Ordeal of Change, Harper & Row, 1963.
Kelley & Brown, Struggles in the State, Wiley & Sons, 1970.
Kiernan, B. P., The U.S., Communism & The Emerent World,
Indiana U., 1972.
Liddell Hart, B. H., Strategy, Praeger, 1967.
Lntz & Brent On Revolution, Winthrop, 1971.
Mvllin, J., Strategy for Conquest, U.-of Miami, 1970.
Miksche, F. 0.9 Secret Forces, Faber, 19500
Possony, S. T., Lenin Reader, Hoover Institute, 1966.
?
a
A Projection of Probable Communist Tactics for Takeover of
Developing Countries Through 1985, VOL I & II, ASDIRS 3350,
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71"I '4,100P
Strausz-Hupe, R., Protracted Conflict, Harper Bros., 1959.
Sullivan, J. D., Interntional Consequences of Domestic Violence,
Yale U. Press, 1969.
Sun Wu Tzu,ifire Art of War, Military Service Pub., Co., 1953.
Thompson, Robert, Revolutionary War !_n World Strategy, Taplinger,
1970.
Trotsky, L., The History of the Russian Revolution, Simon &
Schunter, 1932.
Wagner, S. P., The End of Revolution, A. S. Barnes, 1970.
Wermuth, A. L., The Impact of Changing Values on Military 0Eganizations
& Peraonnel, Westinghouse, Advanced Studies Group, Monograph #6, 1970.
TACTICAL PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINE
Barber, N., The War of the Running Dogs, Weybright & Talley,
1972.
Barclay, C. N.,"Countermeasures Against the Urban \ Guerrilla':
allitary Review, Jan 1972;
Barker, D., Grivas, Portrait of a Terrorist, Harcourt, 1960.
Chao, Kuo-Chun "Mass Organization in Mainland China': Am Pol Sci
Rev, Sep 1954.
Cuthbert, S. J., We Shall Fight In The Streets, Gale & Polden,
1950,'
DA PAN 550-104, Human Factors Considerations in Insurgency, 1966.
Farago, L., War of Wits, Funk & Wagnalls, 1954.
Firearms & Self-Defense: A M.indbook for Radicals, Revolutionaries
&.EaEv Riders.. International Liberation,Bert(eley, CA., UNK.
Giap, V. N., People's War, People's Army, Praeger, 1962.
Handbook for the I.R,A., available from Paladin Press, Boulder,
Colo.
Heckethorn, C. W., Secret Societies of ALL Ages and All Countries,
University Books, 1965.
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Nme
?011,
Internal Security Doctrine and Instructions, Aide Memoire for
Sub Unit & Detachment Commanders, (The Suppression of ,Unlawful
Distrubances), British Midfstry of Defence, Oct 1971.
*ow
Kedward, R.,'The Anarchists': Am. Heritage, 1971.
Keeping the Peace, Parts I & II, The British War Office, 1963.
Kitson, F., Gangs & Counter-Gangs, Barrie & Rockliff, 1960,
Kitson, F., Low Intensity Operations, Stackpole, 1971.
Luttwak, Egg Coup D'Etat, Penguin, 1968.
MacKenzie, N. I., Secret Societies, Holt, 1968.
Mallin, J., Terror & Urban Guerrillas, U. of Miami, 1971.
Marighella, C., Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, available from
Paladin Press, Boulder, Colo.
Mombiosse, R. M., Confrontations, Riots, and Urban Warfare., MSM
Press, 1969,
Moss, R.,"Urban Guerrilla Warfare: Adelphi Papers #79, Internationsl
Institute for strategic Studies, 1971.
Oppenheimer & Lakey, Manual for Direct Action, Quadrangle, 1965.
The Organizer's Manual, Bantam, 1971.
Perot, P.,"A Total Weapon of Limited War',' Royal United Service ?
Institution Journal, #617, Feb 60,
RAND, MO of Selected VCI, 1968.
Rocquingny, COL,"Urban Terrorism': Military Review, Feb 1959.
Rowan, R. Wog Secret Service, Hawthorne, 1967.
Rubin, J., Do It, Simon & Schuster, 1969._
Singh and Mei, Theory & Practice of Modern Guerrilla Warfare,
Asia House, 1971.
Terrorism in Cyprus,_Captured Documents, Her Majesty's Stationary
Office, London, 1957,
Thompson, R., Defeating Communist Insurgata, Praeger, 1966. .
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impri NOY
The Training Game (Urban Internal Security), War Games Section,.
Operational Research Division, Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Canada, Aug 1968, 'ASDIRS 2216.
Trinquier, R., Modern Warfare, Pall Mall, 1964.
^
Walter E. V., Terror and Resistance, Oxford, 1969
Webster, Secret Societies & Subversive Movements, Boston, 1955.
THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
Hall, P., The World Cities, McGraw-Hill, 1966.
Hoffer, E., The True Believer, Harper, 1951.
Lifton, R. Jo, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism,
New York, 1961.
Mayer & Kohn, Readings in Urban Geography, U; of Chicago, 1959.
Mumford, L., The City in History, Random House, 1963.
Mumford, L., The Urban Prospect, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968.
Von Laue, T. P., The Global City, Lippincott, 1969;
CASE STUDIES IN URBAN CONFLICT
Bocca, G., Secret Army, Prentice Hall, 1968,
Boyd, A., Holy War In Belfast, Grove, 1972.
Chalfont, A.,"The Army & The IRA': Survival, VOL XIII, No. 6
(Jun 71).
Halpern, M.,"The Algerian Uprising of 1949; Middle East Journal,
April 1948.
Henissart, P., Wolves In The City, SiMon & Schuster, 1970.
Kelly, G. A., Lost Soldiers, M.I.T. Press, 1965.
' Larteguy, Jo, New Patterns in Revolution in Latin America
(The Guerrillas), Signet, 1970.
Moss, R.,"Urban Guerrillas in Latin America': Conflict Studies #8,
Oct 1970.
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4MV Nue
Moss, R., Uruguay: "Terrorism versus Democracy': Conflict Studies
014, Aug 1971.
-;
d'Oliveira, COL S. L., Extremist' Activities in Uruguay,'Transliition,
UW File, 1970.
d'Oliveira, COL S. L.,"Uruguay & The Tupamaro Myth': Military Review,
Apr 73.
Preliminary Survey of Insurgency in Urban Areas, APP "JO, SORO,
1965, AD 465 680.
Preliminary Survey of Insurgency in Urban Areas, APP "B", SORO,
1965, AD 465 681.
Reilly, Urban Guerrillas in Turlea, USAWC Research Paper, UW Files,
1972.
R?port on Urban Insurgency Studies, VOL; 1, Sects: 1, 2, 49 5 & 6,
Simulmatics, 1966, AD486 906.
Report on Urban Insurgency Studies, VOL. II, Sec. 3, Simulmatics/
AIWA, 1966, AD 374 400, ASDIRS 1258.
Report on Urban Insvgencz Studies, VOL III, Sec. 7, Simulmatics/
ARPA, 1966, AD 374 401.
Sorenson, Urban Insurgency Cases, ASDIRS 1178, 1965.
Special Operations Research Office, Casebook on Insurgency and
Revolutionary Warfare, DA, 1962.
U.S, ARMY FIELD MANUALS
FM
Year
Title
19-15
1972
Military Police in Civil Disturbances
19-30
1971.
Physical Security
19-50
1970
Military Police inStability Operations
30-15
1969
Intelligence Interrogations
30-17
1972
- Counterintelligence Operations
30-31
1970
Stability Operations Intelligence
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Year
Title
FM
. 31-16
1967
COunterinsurgency Operations
31-20
1971
Special Forces Operational Techniquen
31-21
1969
Special Forces Doctrine
31-23
1972
Stability Operations Doctrine
31-50
1964
Combat in Cities
31-73
1967
. Advisors Handbook for Stability Operations
33-1
1971
Psychological Operations Doctrine
41-10
1969
Civil Affairs Operations
RECENT FILMS
Pontecorvo, G., Battle for Algiers.
Gavras, C., State of Siege (Montevideo),
Resnais0.A., La Guerre Est Fini.
Gordon, L., The War of Children.
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