THE BOLIVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT: AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00671R000300070005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 8, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Bolivian Guerrilla Movement:
An Interim Assessment
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its content; to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
August-S6
The Bolivian Guerrilla Movement:
An Interim Assessment
Summary
A guerrilla movement discovered in Bolivia in
March 1967 appears through its genesis, nature, and
tactics to be a concentrated Castro-style revolu-
tionary effort that appears more sophisticated and
more professional than similar efforts elsewhere in
Latin America. The insurgents' success to date,
is spurring Bolivia's neighbors into developing con-
tingency plans for military intervention should the
situation deteriorate drastically.
The guerrillas adhere closely to the revolu-
tionary theories espoused at various times by Fidel
Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and French Marxist
theoretician Jules Regis Debray. The insurgents
have received training, propaganda support, and some
arms and equipment from Cuba.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates
and the Clandestine Services.
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Additional propaganda assistance is now being
provided by the Havana-based Latin American Solidarity
Organization (LASO), which is championing armed rev-
olutionary activity throughout the hemisphere. Fur-
thermore, because worldwide publicity has been given
both to the alleged presence of Che Guevara with
the guerrillas and to the capture of Debray, this
insurgency movement will be kept in the public eye.
It could become a focus for the continuing polemical
debate in the Communist world over the wisdom of
political versus militant revolutionary action.
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BOLIVIA: Area of Guerrilla Activity
Cochabamba
Trinidad
//ante Cruz
Tarija
?.-
Cobija
uran
Guerrilla activity
reported
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1. Bolivia is a relative newcomer to the list
of Latin American nations where Communist-inspired
insurgency has become an acute problem. Prepara-
tions to begin guerrilla operations there first be-
gan to be reported in late 1966. Such reports were
initially received with skepticism by foreign and
domestic observers,
the prevalence of bandits in the tradi-
tionally wild and lawless frontier area where the
guerrillas were reported to be located, and the gov-
ernment's propensity for trying to distract public
attention from its more pressing internal problems.
2. After considerable prodding, army patrols
in early March began to follow up reports of groups
of bearded strangers in southeast Bolivia. On
23 March a patrol stumbled into a guerrilla camp,
and in the resulting battle seven army personnel
were killed and five wounded. In addition, the guer-
rillas took 21 prisoners who were released after
they were treated for wounds and interrogated. In
subsequent clashes, the army fared little better.
Effectiveness and Orientation of the Guerrilla Movement
3. Although much has been written and reported
about the Bolivian guerrillas since their discovery,
much more remains to be learned about them. Few re-
liable accounts of their activities have been obtained
from the guerrillas themselves, and the extreme isola-
tion of the areas where the guerrillas have been ac-
tive prohibits coverage by ordinary news media. Even
the number and nationality of the guerrillas remain
uncertain. The last estimate indicates that there
are about 100 of them, mostly Bolivians and Cubans,
with a few Peruvians. More than one group may exist.
They are apparently supplied with arms that have been
smuggled into the country through Chile, Peru, and
Brazil.
4. One major point is clear. The Bolivian
guerrillas are a well trained and disciplined group.
The insurgents are better led and better equipped
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forces. Moreover, it is evident that Cuban-style
training techniques have been used to prepare the
guerrillas for action. Many of them have been trained
in Cuba, and there is good evidence that a small cadre
of Cuban guerrilla warfare experts is actively fight-
ing with the insurgents. In contrast to the pro-
Castro insurgents active in Venezuela, Guatemala, and
Colombia, the Bolivians stand out because they usually
have been able to seize the initiative in encounters
with the military.
5. Another important consideration has been
Havana's willingness to become more directly involved
in providing tangible support to Latin American guer-
rilla groups. The Cuban involvement in the landing
of Venezuela on 8 May demonstrates that this recent
Cuban "escalation" has not been confined to Bolivia.
The Bolivian group, however, probably received a more
professional start because of a more direct Cuban
role from the beginning.
6. As a result of Cuban involvement, this pro-
fessionalism, along with careful preparation and
imaginative leadership, is readily apparent. Con-
siderable emphasis has obviously been given to train-
ing exercises, ideology, and tactics. All of this
is reflected in indications that the guerrillas
are highly motivated and that their morale is good.
Moreover, this professionalism has been attained
even though the guerrillas were discovered by ac-
cident well before they felt themselves ready to be-
gin actual operations.
Leadership and Doctrinal Guidelines of the Movement
7. A few known Bolivian Communists have been
identified as leaders of the insurgents. Other re-
ports from within Bolivia and elsewhere allege that
one of the leaders is Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the Ar-
gentine-born revolutionary who was a key figure in
the Castro government in Cuba until he dropped out of
sight in March 1965. These reports, which come from
sources of varying credibility, are in essential agree-
ment on the details of where and when Guevara is sup-
posed to have been with the guerrillas, but conclusive
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evidence of Che's direct participation has not been
obtained. Whether Guevara is a participant, or in-
deed whether he is even alive, it is plain in any
case that the guerrilla leaders are well-schooled in
the insurgency techniques and doctrines previously
espoused by Guevara,
8. These techniques and doctrines are basically
common to both Che Guevara and Fidel Castro. Recently
they have been given fresh emphasis with their pub-
lication in handbook form by Jules Regis Debray, a
young French Marxist protege of Castro, Debray's
book, Revolution Within the Revolution, was written
after conversations with Castro and was published
last January with Cuban Government backing. The
book's preface points out that Debray has shared the
life of the guerrillas in various Latin American
countries. This assertion was underlined in late
April 1967 when Debray and two other foreigners were
captured by the Bolivian Army shortly after leaving
the guerrilla camp. Debray is still awaiting mili-
tary trial.
9. The Castro-Guevara-Debray theories which
challenge the role of national Communist parties can
be briefly stated as four main revolutionary tenets:
(a) Latin America needs a dynamic, offensive, rural-
oriented guerrilla action; (b) there should be only
one major guerrilla movement, directed by a united
leadership and guided by one clear strategy; (c) guer-
rilla operations should be initiated, developed, di-
rected, and controlled from rural areas; and (d) the
guerrilla unit precedes the urban-based party and,
in fact, ultimately evolves into the "authentic"
party. Castro, Guevara, and Debray all have contended
that given the unique political, social, economic,
geographic, and cultural conditions prevailing in
Latin America, Cuba's revolutionary struggle is much
more relevant to the situation than the experience of
the Soviet Union and Communist China.
10. The recent interrogation of Ciro Roberto
Bustos, an Argentine free-lance journalist who was
with the Bolivian guerrillas from 6 March until his
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capture along with Debray by the Bolivian Army on
20 April,. directly supports other indications that
these Castroite revolutionary theories are being
implemented in Bolivia. Both Bustos and Debray have
claimed that Che Guevara was personally directing
this implementation. Indeed, Bustos has given a
rather full account of an alleged conversation with
Guevara on this subject in late March.
11. According to Bustos, Guevara defined his
strategic objective as the capture of political power
in one or more South American countries after insur-
rectional armed struggle had developed. Paraphras-
ing the Castro-Debray thesis, Guevara is said to have
explained that the guerrilla band must be the nucleus
of revolutionary impetus. It must be developed, con-
solidated, and expanded by its own activity in order
to proliferate. Amplyifing the current attacks of
the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO). on
imperialism as the real enemy of the people and the
organization's international revolutionary flavor,
Bustos claims Guevara told him that external political
support is necessary for any successful Latin American
revolution, although initially the struggle should ap-
pear to be strictly internal. As the revolution pro-
gresses, the theory goes, its "proletarian-revolu-
tionary-international character will become a simple
fact," or, in other words, outside assistance to the
revolutionaries need not and cannot be hidden or ob-
scured for long.
12. LASO delegates who are now meeting in Havana,
ostensibly to coordinate hemipshere revolutionary ac-
tivity, have apparently adopted the Cuban tenet that
"reactionary oppression" must be met with "patriotic
revolutionary violence." Following this reasoning,
the Bolivian delegate, Aldo Flores, a member of the
central committee of the pro-Moscow Communist Party,
implied that the Bolivian guerrillas were merely ex-
erting their patriotic duty in opposing US advisers
and materiel that had been sent to "oppressive forces"
in Bolivia.
13. The conference itself is basically serving
as a forum for Castro to appeal to Latin Americans to
band together in "Red Beret" groups in order to begin
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Typical terrain where guerrilla
activity is reported.
Oven found at original guerrilla
campsite at Nacahuasu.
Dense undergrowth in area of
guerrilla activity.,
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a true revolutionary struggle. The spectre of "Che"
Guevara, who was elected honorary chairman of the
conference "in absentia," personifies the militant
approach Castro wants the meeting to take and creates
worldwide sensational publicity. No particular em-
phasis has been placed on the success of the Bolivian
guerrillas during the proceedings; their continuing
progress, however, has certainly raised the morale
and affected the outlook of the delegates. The world-
wide play being given to the Guevara theme: and the
Debray capture, moreover, will help to maintain the
Bolivian guerrillas in the public eye long after the
LASO Conference ends. The Bolivian experience may
well become an important element in the continuing
debate in the Communist world over the wisdom of armed
action versus peaceful methods as the best means of
achieving power.
The Military's Role Against the Guerrillas
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16. In spite of the potentially volatile situa-
tion prevailing in the major urban and mining regions,
President Barrientos has sent several MAP-supported
units serving in those regions into the guerrilla
area. Bolivian Army efforts to reinforce the counter-
guerrilla units, however, have been hampered by ad
hoc organization of units without regard to unit
integrity and state of combat efficiency; assignment
to the guerrilla zone of a few officers and NCOs
trained in counterinsurgency tactics; and employment
n-
he
in orcemen s to date supplied to the
guerrilla zone has not materially enhanced combat ef-
fectiveness. At best, therefore, these troops locally
committed to the area are able only to harass and
make sporadic contact with the guerrilla forces.
17. Pressed by the public and by his advisers
to obtain immediate favorable results in the guer-
rilla area, President Barrientos is at present
mainly concerned with seeking an immediate spectacular
victory over the guerrillas. All his plans rest
mainly on the hope of obtaining modern firepower
from the US without regard to the need for concurrent
training and other logistical requirements.
Domestic Impact of the Insurgency
18. Thus far the guerrilla movement has elicited
only minor support within Bolivia, with most tangible
assistance having come from the far left. Leaders and
individuals within the pro-Moscow Bolivian Communist
Party (PCB/S) are directly involved in the insurgency,
and some individual members of the party are working in
liaison with the guerrillas. The rank and file of PCB/S
as well as other Communist and radical leftist groups seem
to have been taken by surprise by the insurgency. Except
for the Communist Youth sector of the Pro-Chinese Communist
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Party of Bolivia (JCB/C) which reportedly offered
active support to the guerrilla movement two months
ago, the others have only recently begun to make
tenative gestures of material support. Some ex-
treme leftist leaders of Bolivia's chronically dis-
contented tin miners have tried hard to establish
ties between the miners and the guerrillas. They
have had little success, although a few unemployed
miners have reportedly been recruited to join the
guerrillas. Many university and high school students
undoubtedly sympathize with the insurgents but so
far have not demonstrated this support to any sig-
nificant degree. There are no indications that the
Bolivian non-Communist parties of the left are
greatly interested in the movement other than as
the source of possible opportunities to improve their
own position. The extent of peasant support for the
guerrillas is unknown. It is known, however, that
the guerrillas have been circumspect in their treat-
ment of the indigenous population. In those instances
where they have found it necessary to go into town
for food and supplies, they have been scrupulous in
their dealing with the townspeople, often paying more
than the going rate for supplies. Doctors attached
to the bands often have treated local villagers,
at the same time propagandizing for the insurgents.
19. Guerrilla representatives are reportedly
in contact with one of the larger political opposi-
tion parties in Bolivia, the opportunistic Bolivian
Socialist Falange (FSB), which received 12 percent
of the vote in 1966. The guerrillas have reportedly
offered to collaborate with the FSB if the latter
would begin guerrilla activities in the cities.
FSB chieftain Mario Gutierrez Gutierrez has ordered
that three party members be sent to talk with the
guerrillas and find out the exact terms of coopera-
tion and what assurance the FSB would have of coming
to power if the guerrillas were successful. At the
same time, however, the power-hungry FSB has held
informal talks with government leaders with a view
toward joining the government.
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Impact of Insurgency on Bolivia's Neighbors
20. There is considerable doubt among Bolivia's
neighbors, especially Paraguay, Argentina, Chile,
and Peru that the Barrientos government can cope with
the insurgency problem;. Presidents Ongania of Argen-
tina and Stroessner of Paraguay are reportedly agreed
that if Barrientos is overthrown they may have to
intervene militarily. The Argentine Government has
provided Barrientos with food, clothing, and small
arms. There is no confirmation of recent press re-
ports that Bolivia has requested the assistance of
Argentine military troops. Argentina has sent military
and police reinforcements to the Bolivian border,
however, and a speedup in antiguerrilla training has
been ordered.
21. The sponsors and prime movers of the Bolivian
guerrilla movement--including Bolivians and Cubans--
have had a measure of success that will encourage
them to keep the movement on an active footing. Noth-
ing on the horizon would indicate that the guer-
rilla problem will ease soon or that the Bolivian
armed forces can quickly improve their capabilities.
This seems bound to lead to increasing tension and in-
stability within the country and more concern on the
part of Bolivia's neighbors lest the contagion spread
across their own borders.
22. The longer-run outlook may be a little
brighter if the Barrientos government manages to sur-
vive. Although this government, like its predecessors,
has had its political ups and downs, there is no sig-
nificant threat to the government at present. The
guerrilla activity has encouraged dissident political
groups somewhat, but the firm measures taken by Bar-
rientos late in June to quell the violence that broke
out at the tin mines may have served to show such ele-
ments that the government will crack down on them
just as firmly if need be. At present these opposi-
tion groups are even less united and less effective
than the government is, and as long as this situation
prevails, Barrientos will retain the upper hand.
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23. Bolivia's military capabilities may
gradually improve. Forces in the operational
zone are undergoing intensive retraining in anti-
guerrilla tactics, and a 600-man ranger battalion
now training in Santa Cruz is expected to be added
to the forces in the field in late September or
October. Guerrilla successes thus far have come
against ill-trained, raw troops, and it remains
to be seen if they are as effective against a well-
disciplined and organized force. Although the les-
sons the guerrillas are teaching the Bolivians are
painful ones, they could be beneficial if they help
the Bolivians and other Latin Americans understand
the need to devise new defenses against an elusive
enemy in a difficult terrain testing revolutionary
doctrine and tactics. On the other hand, should
the guerrillas continue succeeding in Bolivia, their
experiences and methods are certain to be emulated
in other Latin American countries.
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