THE SETTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00671R000300070004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Setting
As the battleground for a, rural guerrilla movement, Bolivia
appears to be an ideal setting. Geographically, the country is
split by ranges of the Andes) mountains into sharply different
areas of varying altitudes and topography which make land com-
munications especially difficult for conventional security forces.
The southeastern part of the country in which the guerrillas chose
to operate is sparsely populated, roads are few and far between,
and the terrain, with its narrow, shrub-shrouded stream and river
beds as the main travel routes, is ideal for ambushes. Bolivia
would also be an excellent base for international guerrilla opera-
tions since it borders relatively uninhabited areas of five other
Latin American nations: Brazil, Pargauay, Peru, Argentina, and
Chile.
Socially and economically Bolivia also seems to satisfy the con-
ditions for a communist insurgency effort. It has one of the lowest
levels of per capita income in Latin America. The social and economic
standards of Bolivian miners and peasants--remain
miserably low despite the radical economic and social changes brought
about by the 1952 Revolution. The growing discontent of the miners
has resulted in recurring clashes with government forces in the past
few years. And much of the Aymara and Quechua speaking peasant popu-
lation remain generally in the same isolated state of poverty that
they have occupied for centuries.
Perhaps most important from the point of view of those favoring
revolutions is the fragility and instability of the Bolivian political
system with its violently conflicting forces, its tendency toward
violent change of government, and its highly transitory political
support patterns. Any regime in power is thus particularly vulnerable
to the efforts of a relatively small group of dedicated insurrec-
tionists. Even before the emergence of a guerrilla movement in early
1967, the military-oriented regime of President Barrientos was already
unpopular with the miners and various other labor groupsdue to its
efforts to stabilize the economy and restrict the power of the leftist
labor unions. The regime was obviously heavily dependent for its
support on the ill-trained, ill-equipped and generally ill-regarded
military forces. Thus the defeat or humiliation of the military at
the hands of a small group of guerrillas could have a. devastating
effect upon the stability of the government.
In this setting of a backward isolated country, beset by
deep-rooted economic and social problems and ruled by a somewhat
shaky government, the guerrillas, under the leadership of Latin
America's leading guerrilla tactician, Argentine revolutionary
Ernesto "Che" Guevara, began developing their base of operations
in late 1966.
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The Guerrilla Victories
The hard core of the guerrilla band consisted of Guevara and.,
at their peak strength, some 15 Cuban and other foreign revolu-
tionaries, several veterans of Cuba's Sierra Macstra campaign, as
well as Cuban-trained Bolivian communists. The first of the
group moved into an area north of the town of Camiri in south-
eastern Bolivia. in November 1966. Their initial purpose apparently
was to develop a. well-trained and well-disciplined force that would
be capable of harassing or engaging elements of the Bolivian army
perhaps by September or October 1967. Purchasing a farm as a
logistical base, they moved north into the rugged, virtually
unpopulated region of brush, stream beds, and canyons to familiarize
themselves with the terrain. They were well. equipped with auto-
matic weapons, communications equipment (including short wave
facilities for contact with Cuba) and medical supplies. They
divided their force into vanguard, cente-P and rearguard; established
various base camps, guard posts, and hidden arms and supplies
caches; and set off on reconnaissance patrols.
The first real indication of the movemcntts existence came
in early March when two Bolivians who had briefly joined the
guerrillas deserted and were arrested by authorities whey they
tried to sell a rifle stolen from the guerrilla camp. Still,
their tale about the band and its Cuban leadership was viewed
with considerable scepticism by many. However, on. March 23, a
patrol of Bolivian soldiers stumbled upon a. section of the
guerrilla force and were quickly beaten in a sharp firefight that
left seven Bolivian soldiers dead and many more wounded and
captured.
The government now took the threat of a. communist guerrilla
movement more seriously. Additional army patrols were sent into
the area--with disastrous results. The untrained, poorly-
equipped conscripts were consistently routed by the seemingly
invincible guerrrillas. Taunting voices called from the brush and
the Bolivian troops often dropped their antiquated weapons and
fled. The low morale of the Bolivian army, undermined by its
purge following the 1952 Revolution and almost traditionally low
because of Its rather dismal list of defeats which had cost
Bolivia large portions of its territory, fell even further, par-
ticularly among the enlisted men. The guerrillas meanwhile
appeared to grow in confidence and strength. In July, they boldly
occupied the town of Samaipata for a day and disarmed the military
unit stationed there.
The guerrillas attempted to build popular support for their
cause. Now called the National Liberation A:nmy (at least by
Radio Havana.), they went to considerable effort to win the backing
oTe campesinos in the area. When commandeering food or
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supplies from local resident,, they paid more than the market
price for the goods. Several. of the guerrillas were doctors,
and they treated the children of the villages in an effort to
win over the populace.
In late April, French marxist theoretician Jules Regis
Debray was captured after he had visited the guerrilla camp for
several weeks and the guerrilla effort attracted significant
international attention, Debray's statements that the guerrilla
band was led and supported by Cubans and other professional Latin
Aifnerican guerrillas and might be under the direction of "Cho"
Guevara underscored the seriousness of the threat. In the eyes
of many who believed Guevara was really leading the. guerrillas,
"Che" vs. the Bolivian army seemed to be more than an equal
contest.
Increasingly alarmed, the Bolivian Government sought help
from the US and some of its neighbors--Argentina , Brazil, and
Peru. In response, the US provided a counter--insurgency training
program for the Bolivian Second Ranger Battalion,whi_ch moved into
the guerrilla zone in September 1967. The US also supplied some
relatively modern automatic weapons and other equipment to the
Bolivian army.
As the guerrilla movement continued to rack up successes in
its encounters with the Bolivian army, other dissident elements
in Bolivia agitated against the government. Opposition parties
criticized the Barrientos' regime for its inept handling of the
:insurgency problem. In June, miners of the Cata.vi-Siglo XX tin
mine urged solidarity with the guerrilla force. When the govern-
ment sent in troops to put down the minors' revolt, at least 16
miners were killed. The government outlawed the various Bolivian
communist parties (pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and Trotskyit(-)
The importance or potential of the fug rr illa movement was not
lost on t3o l i v r a, r ., ne:i ghdor?s . Arrgent i ne . Paraguay, Peru, and to a
Tosser degree Iiraz i ]_ began to consi der what steps they might take
t o prevent a commun:i_ st takeover in Beal i v i a which would threaten
their borders. Patrols in arras of Argentina, Brazil :t , and
Paraguay contiguous to the Bolivian guerrilla zone were -increased
and Argentina and Peru di-scum; ed. the possibility of sending troops
to assist the Bolivian Army in putting down the insurgency.
Paraguay and Argentina planned anti -guerrilla maneuvers near the
I3oli_vian border and Bolivia received some material assistance from
Argentina and Brazil.
the Guerrilla Defeat
By July, however, the :i.tuat_i on began to _inipr?ov Some
guerrillas were killed or captured as the Bolivian forces began
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to hold their ground in clashes with the insurgents. The Bolivian
army discovered one of the base camps of the guerrillas and
captured many documents, including photographs of an individual
among the guerrillas who bore a striking resemblance to "Che"
Guevara. Two falsified passports were found which carried the
thumb prints of Guevara. These documents hel.?ed build the
government's case for charges of Cuban intervention in Bolivian
affairs, which it effectively presented at the Twelfth Meeting of
Foreign Ministers of the OAS in September.
The government's first major military victory against the
guerrillas occurred on August 31,when the rear guard section was
ambushed by a Bolivian army unit while trying to cross the Rio
Grande. Nine of the 10 guerrillas were killed,.including three Cubans,
a Peruvian,and several Bolivians, among them militant Bolivian
communist Moises Guevara. The Bolivian troops suffered no
casualties in the ambush, which resulted from a combination of good
luck and good planning. The success buoyed the morale of the
troops considerably. During September, a guerrilla support ring
was broken up by the authorities in La Paz on the basis of captured
guerrilla documents. And on September 26, another clash with the
guerrillas left several dead, including prominent Cuban and
Bolivian guerrilla leaders.
In late September, the US-trained Second Ranger Battalion was
committed to the guerrilla zone. Its first victory was the most
spectacular of the campaign and probably marked the end of the present
guerrilla movement in Bolivia. On October 8 the Rangers clashed with
the main body of the guerrilla band. Some seven guerrillas, including
"Che" Guevara, fell in the battle.
Latest reports indicate that only a. handful of guerrillas--
perhaps fewer than a dozen--now remain, and these are trying to
escape from the guerrilla zone. They have reportedly forced local
residents to accompany them as guides in an effort to break out
of the area.
The Cause of Defeat
In retrospect, several errors on the part of the guerrillas be-
come evident. The guerrillas seemed wedded to the thesis of
rural guerrilla revolution as described in Deb_^ay's book,
Revolution Within the Revolution?, a romanticized and greatly over-
simplifie synthesis of the Castro success story. In this thesis,
the revolution must have its main thrust and authority in the
rural. guerrilla movement, to which will be drawn an increasing
number of patriotic followers. Formal association with the
traditional communist parties is to be avoided as the guerrilla
revolutionary process will produce its own political leaders. The
local campesino population will be won over and will support the
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guerrillas as the liberators from government (imperialist)
oppression.
The failure of the campesino to support the movement was
critical. Conservative, wary of outsiders, many owning their
own land, they were not openly hostile toward the guerrillas but
they did not support the guerrilla cause. Moreover, they
frequently reported the presence of guerrillas to the authorities
and. sometime;; acted. r~.s guides for the army, In Guevar?al c, d i_arrw;
captured In the October' el_~ash, he reportedly comments on the
difficulty he had In reaching the campusi nos wi til to s r_ evel.ut;:i_onar'y
message.
From the beginning, a lack of coordination between the.
guerrillas and the city-based communist parties was evident. Both
the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese communist parties publicly endorsed
the guerrilla. effort, but there were splLts within the party as
to the degree of actual support that should be rendered the
guerrillas. There was also some resentment that the movement was
Cuban rather than Bolivian-led and directed. Talk of urban
terrorism or the opening of other guerrilla fronts--moves which
would have seriously strained the government's ability to contend
with the insurrection--came to naught. Nor was it over evident
that the guerrillas in fact desired such cooperation, committed
as they were to the thesis that they themselves were the only
force from which the revolution could evolve. The same lack of
coordination was evident with respect to other dissident elements
on whom the guerrillas might have called for assistance If they
had wanted to--the miners, i;hco students, the urban employed. Of
course the quick and surpri,sing I y effective crack-down on the
miners in June may have tended to discourage efforts by either
the guerrillas or their prospective allies in this direction.
Another error, recognised as a weakness by "Ch(_," himself,
lay in the dominant role assumed by the Cubans in the movement.
Not only did this breed some resentment among Bolivian communists
but It made efforts to win the support and confidence of the
campos i_nos all the more difficult, It also provided the Bolivian
Government with ammunition to undermine the guerrilla cause by
playing on the Bolivians' extreme sense of nationalism. Even
those Bolivian d-iss.i.dents who might have been prone to join the
movement in its more successful days were probably rye sentful of
the foreign coloration of the band. Prco,>idcent Barr i ento s rcepeaLed
Lira s theme constant ly during; t iie r.nt:i -f;uc rr i ll i campa gn--Cuba ,
i t: ,,elf a puppet of a f orc_i gn ROOwer-r (tthce USSR) was now seeking to
extend Its control over iol.lvians, uc, the movement., to
Rol _i vi ans znd outsid.ers as well , .appear -'d less and less home-
f rown;, less the product of Injust-l ce and. poverty than an
aggressive adventure set upon by a foreign government. As this
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point was driven home, much of the romantic mystique of the
guerrillas was lost.
Without the help of the peasants to protect and support
them (particularly with food which was always in short supply)
and limited to a single force in a single area, the movement was
doomed. Even the lackluster Bolivian army forces stationed in
the area could eventually contain and destroy the band since,
after all, they outnumbered the guerrillas twenty or thirty to
one.
The Effect on Bolivia
With the destruction of the present guerrilla movement and the
demise of "Cho" Guevara, the Bolivians and particularly their
military forces are currently enjoying a rare sense of self-
confidence and pride. Bolivian leaders have themselves publicly
displayed surprise over their victory. In the past few months,
during the period of various successful encounters with the
guerrillas, President Barrientoa has been spared some of the
criticism and plotting of the non-corrtmun_i et: opposition.. IIowover,
i,hoae traditional internal problems can be expected to re coins' as
the bloom of the victory fades. Still, thore is no doubt that
Bar vientos t domestic position and popularity has boon greatly
strengthened, and he is now pictured not only as a defender of the
nation against external threat but as a defender of the southern
hemisphere as well. To emphasize this point, Barr:ientos is now
talking about the need for military action to rid the hemisphere of
the Castro threat. The success will also strengthen Barriento s t
key element of support, the armed forces. But a revitalized, newly
self-confident military force may also be less subject to tight
presidential control. Also it will probably deal more harshly
with other dissident: groups who might actively threaten the govern-
ment, particularly the miners. Some of the officers who were
directly involved in the anti-guerrilla operations reportedly scr
themselves as the true saviors of the nut Ion_., r'athor' than thocc'
who sat on high In La Paz and rseuod ordoce. They are comparing
themselves to flier Chao" War NOM A veterans who w-re to sub-
,_,rdunntly pave the way for the Bolivian rovel.ur,:i_on. rlyrpro are,
I'op ox,r.mp1a, ruruc vs I.t Ll, Colonel h ntonn , Uor hander' of the Eight
Army Division which participated in thn ant i -gunrrl I(a camprr._i CIL,
may be named foreign Minister, partly an a reward for his services.
The failure of the guerrillas and th,_ death or Cut yarn are
of course serious blows so the extreme left . Theses Jo Coa t e M I L
probably str ongthen the position of the more "moderate" eicmonK.
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of the communist partI o which opi,os,ed the hUeri:_i ~_~i, rnovc~rnt~nt a;
rash adventurism or opposed. its foreign. leadersh:ip.
However, the basic problems that make Bolivia a target for
communist insurgency efforts, be It rural or urban based, have:
not really changed. Poverty, backwardness, unempi.o:ment and
inherent political instability may have been momentarily forgotten,
but they are still there. The miners a se ;till a potential
source of agitation, the students .serna.in volatile, and the
political plottcrs and opportunists continue to seek power )y any
means. The defeat of a comtitunist :insurgency effort does not
alter this,, and a new movement, perhaps under the bannr:~r of the
?martyred" Guevara bat adopting tactics more sal table to the
Bolivian s:. !.- .nation, cannot c ruled out.
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