URBAN VIOLENCE CONTROL SYSTEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00671R000200220001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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RETIRED FILE
JOB
BOXFOILDER Q ~ 3
DESENSITIZED
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This publication is intended for general'guidance of official
Government personnel engaged in combating urban violence.
Emphasis in on "what to do" and not how to do it The inte t4
n ion
is to provide an overview and composite of all systems recommended for
urban violence control.
Concepts presented are in summary format only
An
attem
t
d
.
y
p
e
implementation of these concepts should not take place prior to con-
sultation with appropriate specialists.
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CONTROL SYSTEMS.. .... ..... .............................?
Psychological and Political ............................
- Terrorist ............................................
Sabotage ...... ..........................
- Propaganda and Agitation ............................... ?
Armed Violence.. . ...............................
Assassination and Kidnapping .........................
Infiltration ...........................................
Mob Violence ...........................................
CONCLUSION.. ........................... w...............
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Whether. nationalist or Marxist in ideology; many present da
sub-
y
rejected the rural-based guerrilla tactics advncate-1 by Man rcof+l,nn
11., %,111 1.1 anu r:rnesco -one-- uuevara, among other insurgent theoreticians.
The change to an urban focus is attributable to a combination of
factors to include (1) accelerated urbanization; (2) massive discontent
among students, intellectuals, labor. minorities, and impoverished rlhn++n
Iealucnts; (a) nun-adaptability of guerrilla tactics for largely passive
l
o
rura
p
pulations; (4) conspicuous failure of recent rural-oriented sub-
version; and (5) significant success achieved by urban terroristt* groups.
Thus, kidnapping, hijacking; assassination
bombin
riots
s
rik
,
g,
,
es,
t
and other forms of urban violence will probably continue to be familiar
political partisans. Success or failure depends on the partisan's ability
to induce a "climate of collapse" which stimulates the defeat or raver+hrnw
.ur a target regime. Such a climate is created by the effective use of
s
e
ode moral c
v
,
I
x/11 .7 ensus,
harden political battle lines, and &Stimulate radical right-wing response.
This violent battle of psychological manipulation is taking place
in Montevideo, Guatemala City, Sao Paulo, New Delhi, Calcutta, Saigoin,.
Belfast, Montreal and other cities. Urban violence has also occurred
with increasing frequency in the United States, but its scope and influ-
e
nce is far greater in the less developed nations.
Given the expanded threat, it is the purpose of this study to
explore the various forms of violence and recommend adequate control
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Most urban centers generally afford a "hotbed" for political
elements to include (1) idealistic students and intellectuals frus-
trated by the status quo; (2) underpaid and underemployed labor antagonized
by corporate exploitation; (3) religious, ethnic, class, or social groups
who suffer from inferiority complexes; (4) unemployed slum dwellers out-
raged by their inability to achieve even marginal subsistence within the
dissidence. The growth media is the various discontented population
existing social-political-economic systems; and (5) other groups who
sense some relative deprivation.
If any combination of the above circumstances exist, violence only
awaits the addition of leadership, organization, agitation, propaganda,
support, and development of a "cause". All of these factors can be
provided by a small clandestine cadre dedicated to defeat or overthrow of
the existing target government.
services are generally available from hospitals,.pharmacies, universities,
and medical students. Chemicals, explosives, arms and ammunition may be
These cadre can readily recruit action agents from among dissident
population elements. Funds are often obtained via kidnappings, bank
robberies, extortion, or other similar actions. Food and other basic
supplies can be purchased or stolen, as needed. Medical supplies and
purchased openly or on the Black Market. Failing this, these items can
be stolen from manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers or depots such as
armories. Intelligence on government forces may be obtained via human
or technical penetration operations, bribery, communications intercept,
and simple theft of documents.
Target acquisition is a relatively simple process since most
urban areas contain government facilities or installations, official
or diplomatic personnel, foreign embassies, business firms, etc.
Meeting places can be located in residences, offices, factories, parks,
public facilities, or any other location where small groupings of
personnel can gather with some degree of secrecy. Likewise, safe sites
and "drops" are also readily available in similar locations. Mobility
options include movement by foot, private or stolen vehicles, and
public transport. Route select ion is relatively simple given the quantity
of streets, alleys, and walkways. Cover and concealment is achieved by
blending with metropolitan population masses which accept "casual" contact
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ignore unusual activity undertaken by any
erall
d
r
y
gen
s an
with strange
individual. Communication techniques"include use of telephone, tele-
graph, mails, couriers and radios with appropriate, utilization of simple
rovide security. Terrain advantage can be
s to
d
c
p
e
o
word or phrase
gained by using tops of buildings. Underground structures such as base-
sed to facilitate movement
b
l
e u
so
ments, subways and sewer lines may a
or concealment.
In brief, a metropolitan area affords the total gamit of resources
(men, money, material and intelligence) needed for the conduct of violence
dient is the development of sub
i
ngre
operations. The only remaining
versive tactics, strategy and organization.
OPPOSITION TACTICS
urban violence is similar to rural-oriented
of tactics
r
I
,
ms
n te
From the communist point of view, the formed is
e
f
ar
.
guerrilla war
basically an extension of guerrilla principles to a metropolitan setting.
ability to
t
er cap
However, the rural-based operatives have a much grea
isolated or controlled "sanctuaries" to facilitate the
i
v
ng
er us
maneu
conduct of extensive paramilitary warfare tactics. The urban insurgents
aril
i
y
s necess
are confined to a potentially hostile environment. Th
limits their efforts to small-scale clandestinb acts of violence which
will avoid direct sustained confrontation with superior security forces.
An urban and/or rural-based subversive effort may be simultaneous
Primary oc r na p
It is for this reason that communist urban violence doctrine is not
particularly well developed. However, even if detailed concepts existed,
hes will vary
UUl. aCNar a4v, -111u(au I IJ .' rr?,..,...ZO -? - -
A t i 1 em hasis has been on rural-oriented guerrilla warfare.
there would be great variation of form since approac
according to the social, economic, political, psychological and security
ecific urban environment. The primary communist
r_ _L..._..
, ,+;
to n s
re
ng
p
o of
)
is
s~^?r-
input (from Moscow, Peking, Havana or elsewhere
otential or
the
p
training and limited support to dissidents who are
existing cadre for a subversive movement.
tion of various national cadre elements can result from
C
rea
recruitment programs conducted by external and/or internal forces of
onflicts
l
i
c
nterna
subversion, or the necessary leadership may arise from
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-
causing the aggravated "elite" citizen to seeks ways and means to over-
throw his government. In either case; communist models of revolution f
are usually duplicated because they offer the most prevalent example o
a proven means for dramatically and forcibly altering conditions per
ceived as being intolerable.
` Once the leader elements is created, the process of clandestine
organization may be initiated. The basic principle is that personnel,
mechanisms, modus operandi, ideology and goals of subversion must
necessarily remain secret to survive repressive government reaction.
F rther ex erience has proven that personnel can most effectively and
u
, p
safely function in small specialized clandestine "cells" each compartmented
from the other. Types of"cells include cadre, agitators, saboteurs,
terrorists informants and agents, propagandists, political activists,
chological and action elements, communication nets, support assets,
s
p
y
"front" or population organizers, and other functional units contributing
to the conduct of subversion. Sources of recruits are as indicated in the
previous section.
The existence of elite direction and effective clandestine organi-
zation thus facilitates the implementation of propaganda, agitation, and
action, programs designed to erode popular confidence in the target regime.
These efforts combine grievance exploitation and fear inducing terror
designed to cause a target population to ignore, condone or support sub-
"
which promises
versiveactivities. Approaches include (1) the "carrot
to somehow eliminate all those conditions the target populace conceives
- .. .. . . . .. I _ I_ --- ---
_--L,
to
d
an
government supporters and all those who resist the forces of subversion.
Both techniques are designed to allow a small activist force to gain
positive or negative psychological control over a population majority.
Once this situation is achieved, it is assumed that subversive elements
will have sufficient power to force the ruin, defeat, or overthrow of a
target government. Failing the achievement of these primary methods,
a subversive force may attempt coups, palace revolutions, election engineering
or induced social-economic-political "collapse" to accomplish an expedient
victory.
Examples of urban guerrilla tactics include (1) terrorism or the
systematic use of intimidation for political ends; (2) sabotage designed
'
s ability to
to disrupt socio-economic development and impede government
meet the population's "felt needs"; (3) propaganda and agitation oriented
toward creating a "crisis of confidence" regarding government's intent or
ability to resolve major problems; (4) armed violence intended to expose
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the weakness of government security forces; (5) kidnapping operations to
free political prisoners, extract concessions, capture publicity and provoke
controversy; (6) demonstrations, strikes, and riots to exploit popular
dissident population elements; and (7) infiltration and selective assassi-
nation designed to neutralize the effective functioning of security forces'
grievances or establish a mutuality of "cause'! between subversives and
or other government agencies.
Despite the multiplicity of tactical options, the perpetrators of
contemporary urban-oriented subversion have frequently failed to mobilize
popular support. This failure is due largely to the inability of sub-
versive elements to convince potential supporters that there are no
prospects for constitutional change or non-violent reform. Future doc-
trine on urban violence techniques may therefore concentrate on better
tactics to erode public confidence in any governmental system. .Possible
conceptual solutions include a massive breakdown of internal security,
economic chaos, and a polarization of political forces around the "law
and order" issue. Ideally, this approach would also cause target govern-
ments to implement repressive measures which would help convince the
population that non-violent change is impossible.
Urban violence tactics and strategy is thus in an evolutionary
process which has yet to produce the ultimate conceptual or doctrinal
.approach. Unfortunately, as various revolutionaries learn by trial and
error, previous weaknesses will be noted and appropriate corrective action
taken.
Despite the fluid status of urban-oriented revolutionary doctrine,
essential working principles should remain the same as those discussed
herein. Given.the validity of this assumption, we will attempt to out-
line appropriate urban violence control systems in the next section.
NOTE: Reference materials will include a listing of contemporary urban
guerrilla doctrine for individual officers who may be concerned with a
more detailed tactical or strategic analysis.
CONTROL SYSTEMS
Psychological and Political
Attitudes of the target population"must be manipulated to create
favorable impressions regarding government and unfavorable opinions of
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the urban guerrillas. In the battle for men's
'
oq
a
d
men o
"
mmms
II
-p
esigned to meet
felt needs"
.and resolve conditions perceived as bein
i
t
l
b
g
n
o
era
le by various popula-
tion elements;.(2) upgrading of security force capabilities to provide
population protection and freedom from fear; (3) effective utilization
of "law and due process" to convince the populace that government will
defeat the subversives without utilizing repressive measures; and (4)
creation of institutional and governmental mechanisms that provide the
means for effective "change" without violence.
The developmental or modernization
VI at, usli
hichwilla7r deuy rs urbs human,,
technological and capital inputs at a ratepw
agricultural and/or industrial
rowth
Thi
i
al
g
.
s
s a long-termandcomplex
solution which cannot be achieved
easil
ith
y w
out adequate savings, trade,
aid
, or credit. In addition to the above i
t
npu
s, markets must b2 developed;
producer incentives created; income
d
l
an
emp
oyment levels increased;
educational pro
rams
d
g
expan
ed; birth rates reduced to something less than
Gross National Prue,,.-+ ; r w -.-A _ _ , , .
e
b
mar . to l i
ms must
e assembled at the
production point. Apart from these overall development efforts, 'dissident
an im
poverished population el
r
ements should be provided with basic minimal
u ~. ~" plus the opportunity for s
i
oc
o-economic self-advancement.
Security improvement programs should b
b
e
ased upon legislative
actions which provide the police and"other int
l d
f
erna
e
ense forces with
appropriate increases in leadership, manpower, training, finance, commu-
nications mnhi l i+,. _ _ _
innovations will be discussed under the secti1onsronIterrorism,asabotage,
riots, etc. The fundamental basis for im
i
prov
ng security operations is
via better intelligence collection and coll
ti
a
on. Human /technical pene-
trations, agent -or informant operations, prisoner interrogation, communications-
intercept, and investigative tech
i
n
ques all provide essential information
inputs. Effective collatio
f thi
n o
s data should result eventually in the
identification of subversive cadre, action and support elements, ideology,
modus operandi, organizational
att
r
p
e
ns, strength, capability, plans or
intentions, facilities, mechanisms, and other details. In turn, the
finished intelligence product is used to provide targets or operational
leads and as legal evidence for judicial processing of subversives.
Regarding "law and due process", it is essential that judicial pro-
cedures be established to assure that violence control measures are
politically, legally and morally justifiable. This is particularly true
of methods used to arrest, detain, interro
ate
i
g
, conv
ct and imprison or
execute individual members of a subversive-movement. If repressive, brutal,
or illegal tactics are used b
the
y
government to attack subversive forces,
popular sentiment ma? fAVnr c'ini._ ,.r ~u_ ,_.
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Creation of adaptive and responsible institutions provide government
such organizations provide the basis for peaceful constructive cnange,
the perpetrators of violence cannot justify their methods to a target
populace. In fact, history has proven that the urban guerrilla cannot
long survive in. an environment where popular political, economic, or
social aspirations can be achieved by non-violent methods.
Subversion and social unrest thrives on the inability of a nation
to modernize existing private or governmental institutions in a manner
which will facilitate the effective, peaceful resolution of intolerable
conditions, It is therefore essential that government assure that there
is an adaptive organizational basis for reform, modernization and progres-
sive change. This process must include government bureaucracy, political
parties, unions, cooperatives, youth groups, and other private institutions.
Past experience has shown that governments or societies least vul-
(1) the most permissive and pluralistic because they are best able to
remove the causes of revolt; and (2) the most repressive and totalitarian
because they are best able to supress the first stirrings of revolt.
Since the U.S. must necessarily reject the latter, we have attempted to
outline effective approaches to the former, as indicated above.
Terrorist
Offensive terror tactics involve the use of discriminate or indis-
criminate violence designed to aid the subversive overthrow of a target
government, or to expand the influence of terrorist sponsors. By exten-
sive use of assassination and bombing, the terrorists' primary objective
government. As aresult, the terrorists hope to isolate the population
from target government influence for the purpose of control, or to erode
socio-economic development and effective employment of security forces.
.In addition, terrorist action may be undertaken to expand the potential
source of intelligence, recruitment, sympathy or support.
The strategic intent of offensive terror is oriented toward stimu-
lating massive population agitation over goverments seeming inability to
provide freedom from fear and developmental progress designed to meet
"felt needs". As previously noted, additional purposes are to eroae moral
consensus, harden political battle lines, and stimulate radical right-wing
response. Terror is thus primarily political in nature and normally a
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rs ve or criminal elements who seek viability and power by
____
r 4..
o
e
over
d
1111.,.... ?
g
creating an antagonistic barrier between a population an
To be effective, the terrorist is dependent upon clandestine organi-
nce
g
e
t
i
Z,-
, ---- - -
,
I IIt
p, L, aI ge
zation, Ieadersh
technical skills, cover and concealment, plus a neutral target population.
this latter requirement must be made for inter-
t
ti
o
on
However, an excep
national terrorists who operate from "base areas" outside the target nation.
erating
o
i
i
p
ons
zat
A current example is provided by Arab terrorist organ
against Israel.
Although the. objectives of international terrorists usually conform
to the norm, they may have the additional goal of influencing other nations
not to support a
subversion designed to erode the politicall,
i
fl
ng
uenc
It is a kind of in
'economic and defensive strength of any country the terrorists are attempting
to destroy.
Defensive terror is the employment of violence against the offensive
a target
taken b
d
l
y
er
y un
terrorists. This may be overtly or covert
government, or it may be employed by independent groups who are in oppo-
sition to terrorist forces and objectives. The key to defensive terror
is intelligence collection and collation for the purpose of identifying
the principal personalities and action elements of a terrorist movement.
Overt, covert or semi-covert operations may then. be mounted to eliminate
nisms
h
i
.
a
ng mec
violently terrorist cadre, functionaries and support
The fundamental problem is that terror begets terror and the
.general population usually becomes antagonistic toward, government
because of this consequence. Even if government is not the overt or
d accusation will
i
i
on an
c
covert sponsor of defensive terror, susp
eventually lead to an official image of brutal repression which does
not enhance the legal government's chances for survival.
Counterterror is often mistaken for defensive terror to which it
is only remotely related. The technique of counterterror employs
intelligence to identify terrorists who are then neutralized by
.organized controlled government forces within accepted parameters of
justice within the law. The basic ingredientsfbr an effective counter-
terror program are as follows:
a. Terrorist Profiles - can be used to provide security per-
sonnel with'a classic thumbnail description of individuals who warrant
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close scrutiny as potential participants in acts of violence. This approach
facilitates narrowing the focus of investigative and intelligence operations
designed to identify members of terrorist organizations. Further, the pro-
file improves routine observation by police and other authorities responsible
for.internal security.
An example profile of a potential terrorist might indicate
basic characteristics to include (1) male or female age 16 to 58; (2)
member of potentially dissident group; (3) person with emotional or
fanatical tendency; (4) individual who has evidenced violent behavior or,
emotional instability; (5) citizens who are isolated from the national
socio-economic or political "mainstream"; (6) radicals who have engaged
in demands for revolutionary change; and (7) individuals who obviously
have nothing to lose by engaging in terrorism.
Potential terrorist traits should be evaluated in accordance
with each particular local or national environment. The main objective
being to create a system that is easily developed and readily applied by
all security or intelligence personnel.
b. Documentation Controls - facilitate security forces in
their efforts to identify suspect terrorists and their supporters. Popu-
lation identification papers should be designed to allow the police to
,spot-check any individual's name, da$e and place of birth, residence, Family
status, employment, race, religion, and physical' description. Photographs
and fingerprints can also be added to documents'. In cases of emergency,
citizens may be required to obtain special documentation for travel and
resource control permits for the purchase of any item that might be used
to aid a terrorist act.
The intended objective of detailed documentation is to aid
the. screening of an entire population. When used in conjunction with
terrorist profiles aid when properly focused on areas where violence has
occurred, the system can be effective in providing investigative leads.
c. Biographic Registry - involves the establishment of a
central securityreference containing biographic card files or computer
data on all known criminals, subversives, terrorists, dissidents and
suspicious personalities. Each security and intelligence service would
provide appropriate biographic inputs, and have controlled access to the
complete registry. Sources and information would be protected by appro-
priate compartmentation and security clearance procedures.
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In effect, a national biographic reference is created to
facilitate collation of all-source intelligence on confirmed or suspect
rapidly determining any person's possible association with terrorist
or subversive activity. By establishing secure radio procedures for
sending queries to the biographic registry, any policeman with appropriate
communication can immediately validate the suspect status of individuals
stopped for spot-checks.
The biographic registry does not negate the need to investi-
gate or collect intelligence on potential terrorists having or not having
files, but it does preclude suspect persons from going unnoticed easily.
d. Personnel and Physical Sec!uLr
j - must necessarily be
provided for the indigenous leaders and government personnel who will
likely be targetted for terrorist violence. This requirement includes
protection of individuals from threats, coercion, assassination and.
bombing: the latter action will prompt the need for physical security
of offices, homes, meeting places and transportation facilities.
General defensive procedures include (1) personnel security
clearances; (2) entry and exit control for offices; (3) protective fences
for fixed facilities; (4) guards for personnel and buildings; (5)
screening of communications, mail and cargo; (6).use of metal detectors
for routine weapon's search; (7) utilization o1 bomb squads with dogs;
trained to smell out plastic explosives; (8) travel control procedures
emphasizing alternate routes and various methods of transportation; (9)
street patrols in the area of offices and individual homes; and (10)
other techniques appropriate to environmental situations.
The primary objective of such elaborate precautions is to
frustrate the effective conduct of terrorist actions and thereby prevent
those spectacular successes which encourage expanded future violence.
To focus defensive efforts better and conserve resource
allocation, it is essential that hard intelligence be obtained on
terrorist intentions and modus operandi. This intelligence effort
also provides the basis for offensive actions designed to negate terrorist
violence before it can be employed. Personnel and physical security is
thus achieved by a combination of defensive and offensive programs, the
latter of which can be the most effective. The offensive methods will be
discussed further in subsequent sections.
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e. Intelligence Collection - is essential to the conduct of
doomed to failure since the terrorists will be largely unaffected. Detailed
defensive or offensive actions. Unfocused countermeasures are usually /
zation, plans, intentions, ideology, modus operandi and support mechanisms.
upon government having some knowledge of terrorist personalities, organi
effective counterterror operations. Neutralization of violence is dependent
information on terrorists can best be obtained by clandestine human or
and reporting techniques related to terrorist activity.
prisoner interrogation; (6) monitoring of possible targets and suspected
terrorist supply sources; and (7) mass population education in observation
(4) search for weapons, explosives or other incriminating evidence: (5
gathered by alternate means to include (1) recruitment of informants; (2)
technical penetration operations. Failin this, intelligence must be
To narrow the focus of the above collection operations
those urban and rural areas which would not provide a hospitable terrorist
geographic areas where terrorists could reside and organize with some
degree of relative safety. Although terrorists may operate anywvhere,
they normally maintain their residence and meeting places among dissident
population elements who evidence negative or hostile reaction to government
security forces. This fact, therefore, allows selective elimination of
demographic data and terrorist profiles can be used to fix specific.
Physical data on roads, communication facilities, residential
needed to supplement the above efforts. The objective of these operations
Counterintelligence/counterespionage operations will also be
patterns, buildings and isolated areas can also be used to help determine
likely patterns of terrorist organizational activity within suspect geo-
graphic areas. Trash collectors, building inspectors, electricians and
other personnel with natural access can be recruited to aid collection
of this physical information. Again, this effort further serves to pin-
point where intelligence operations should be targetted.
include (1) penetrating and manipulating terrorist cells; (2) stopping,
disrupting, misorienting or negating terrorist intelligence collection
activities; and (3) developing passive or specialized defenses against
planned terrorist acts of violence.
In summary, intelligence and counterintelligence operations
form the foundation for counterterror campaigns. Those security services
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t?e-~i.cr
or personnel not familiar with essential clandestine tradecraft should
seek appropriate guidance and assistance.
f. Intelligence Collation - provides the detailed compilation
and analysis of information needed to help identify, arrest and convict the
perpetrators of violence. It also facilitates the location and elimination
of terrorist support mechanisms and other hard targets.
To function effectively, any collation center must have access
tQ all sources of information. This implies cooperation with all security
"source" protection
es
,
and intelligence services using appropriate clearanc
ters must have the legal right
h
e cen
and compartmentation. In addition, t
n collection or action requirements
si
d
g
as
to pinpoint specific targets an
to individual government components. Without such follow-on authority,
th n re ositories of unexploited
a
p
the collation centers become little more
intelligence.
should include (1) biographic
uts
tion in
f
e
.
p
orma
in
All sourc
data; (2) pertinent socio-economic, demographic and geographic publications;
d material resources; (4),
n
target assessments, ( ) ana y
'urinals dissidents radicals, sub-
(3) details on transportation, communications a
5 1 sir of terrorist organizations and modus
operandi; and (6) all reporting on cri
versives or terrorists. After collecting every scrap of available information,
f develnning ;inves-
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trained analysts then collate data ?with the objective o
tigative and target leads.
The primary advantage to central collation is simply that all
,,. -.u., 1,4A kn-Fnrc narcnnnel
a
-
-
a
s i
v.
r----- -
- -
g
avai table pieces o all rave
a composite intelligence picture
latin
f
g
ormu
experienced in the art of
which provides.the sharpest available detail on any terrorist organization.,
If this collation process is absent or fragmented, any intelligence product
ounterterror activities may
t
c
cannot be properly exploited and subsequen
imperative
efore
h
i
,
er
s, t
be expected to be largely ineffective. It
k to establish the best
that any government targetted by terrorists see
possible intelligence collation system.
uirements - generally include (1)
ce on Re
F
i
q
or
t
g. Secur
defense of official personne and physical facilities; (2) riot control,
otection from acts of violence; (3)
n
i
pr
o
bomb disposal and populat
enforcement of law and order; (4) preparation for national defense against
internal or external acts of aggression; (5) investigation leading to
iction
d
... ... ......._. _ _ ,
conv
Location, arrest an
terrorists; and (6) other actions required to resist lawlessness, violence,
state
th
id
.
e e
subversion and warfare originating withih or outs
 Approved Fdr Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200220001-7
The conduct of counterterror operations burden police forces
with the requirement to provide population freedom from fear and violence,,
v and punishment of terrorists after "due process". As previously
stated, the foundation for this effort is based upon adequate intelligence
collection which may be a primary or secondary function of various security
services.
Once intelligence leads are provided, the lengthy and arduous
process begins to obtain sufficient evidence for a court trial which will
prove the suspect terrorist guilty of accomplished or planned crimes of
violence. This requirement demands the skilled and extensive application
of modern criminal investigation. It is, therefore, suggested that appro
priate actions be undertaken to provide police or other security forces
with adequate authority, leadership, manpower, funds, training and equip-
ment needed to accomplish the task.
Defensive terror and other repressive acts can be covertly or
overtly undertaken by government security forces to avoid massive investi
gative requirements. However, both covert and overt actions prdsent the
definite possibility that populations concerned will become agitated with
their government. Further, some elements may actually sympathize with or
support terrorist organizations because of illegal acts of repression.
,(See comments on defensive terror.1
Under most circumstances, it is recommended that target
governments seek whatever resources deemed necessary to upgrade security
forces and give them the capability to deal with terrorists by acting
within existing legal parameters. Even though this is often the most
difficult course of action, it has proven to be the most successful.
h. Population Mobilization - is initiated by advising the
target nation's citizenry of the nature of any terrorist threat and
motivating mass popular participation in negating acts of violence. To
accomplish this objective, the populace should be organized and instructed
in the techniques of aiding security forces in the identification of
possible terrorists.
The latter may be accomplished by launching an aggressive
educational program designed to establish citizen procedures for
reporting suspicious activities.or personalities that are observed by
local inhabitants. Carried to its ultimate conclusion, each village and
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R00020022Q100:1-7
ci+v block would have resident protection committees with direct commu-
nications to local police forces. Possible investigative (Cads would
thus be immediately relayed for exploitation by security forces.
on the fact that local residents are most keenly aware of unusual events,
or the appearance of strangers in their neighborhoods. Another obvious
+
s
t
The unique advantage of such citizen participation is based
errori.)
benefit is the increase in the number of eyes and ears that
will be forced to avoid.
Actual techniques of population mobilization will vary
according to environmental situations and citizens receptivity or moti-
support fully security forces in their.conduct of counterterror operations.
1
+ ' all
is
i Judicial Base - is created by formulating those laws which
warning y
should not be attempted prior to consultation with appropriate specialists.
ra1, 1v11. rr ---
s stems " As stated in the introductory note, implementation
4
y,
.In addition, such laws should insure that all efforts are po
d
f?
h
s
o
met
legally and morally justifiable. This is particularly true o
used to arrest, detain, interrogate, convict and imprison or execute
individual members of a terrorist movement.
populations are not likely to support
As previously stated
,,1
fully and consistently any government that engages in brutal, repressive,
t
t
arge
.
illegal or indiscriminate actions, regardless of the intended
Sabotage
The essential function of sabotage is effective disruption of the
Fundamental objectives include (1) reduction of agriculture an ink u
trial production; (2) impeding the effective functioning of essential
services such as communication, transportation and utilities; and/or (3)
limiting the conduct of various government activities with emphasis on
internal security services and political machinery.
econ p
is targetted for ruin or overthrow. It is a tactic that may be employed
by urban guerrillas and terrorists, or by specialized "cells" of saboteurs.
1 d d s-
omic- o1itica1-security activities within a state whose government
Most sabotage is based upon covert destruction attack using explo
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(3). arson; (4) electronic interruptions; (5) pl irerage or vitial cU111NVriCIIi.a,
sives,combustibles, abrasives or subtle disruptive action. Other
mcfhnrk inritide (l) mechanical breakage; (2) use of damaging chemicals;
 Approve
For, Release 1999/09/24: CIA-ROP85-00671 R0002002200 . 7
(6) dissemination of incorrect information, falsification of data, mis-
or control procedures; and (11) use of laws,.courts, and parlimentary
rules to impede the effective functioning of government.
materials or equipment; (9) work slowdowns; (10) interruption of command
filing and records manipulation; (7)-tampering; (8) fatal "flawing" of
can have disastrous consequences on the economy and security of a state.
Further, the systematic employment of sabotage erodes population morale
and confidence in government while advertizing the faculty of subversive
the revolutionary with a relatively secure and inexpensive weapon that
The extensive employment of various sabotage techniques affords
forces.
logical and terrorist control systems discussed in the previous sections.
Effective control of saboteurs requires-a combination of psycho
materials, thereby risking identification during procurement activities.
tendency to become overly confident or aggressive, thereby exposing them-
selves. The lack of rigid compartmentation may stimulate the use of
saboteurs for violent acts which unnecessarily expose their cover. In
addition, saboteurs may be asked or forced to provide their own sabotage
of destruction. Individual saboteurs will frequently maintain the cover
of a normal life and commit their disruptive actions during the course
of regular work or tra'el. It is for this reason that sabotage is such a
potent revolutionary tactic. Fortunately, saboteurs have a general
. Recognition of sabotage is usually difficult since the ultimate
target may not be apparent, and specific evidence destroyed in,, the act
These techniques must be supplemented by extensive security procedures
for industry, communication and transportation facilities, government
saboteur, it may be necessary to install television monitors to observe
all human activity in the area of critical targets. Further, a rotating
"buddy system" can be used to assure that individual saboteurs are.con-
stantly observed by a fellow worker.
In sum, effective prevention of sabotage is a difficult but not
impossible task. Governments confronted with this problem will need
to seek further guidance and assistance on implementation of plant and
offices, or other lucrative targets. Emphasis is placed on physical
protection, repetitive screening of personnel, and strict control of
potential sabotage materials. If such systems still fail to deter the
physical security procedures. ,
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 Approved Fqr Release 1999/09/24: CIA-R b P85-00671 R000200 040i-7
corder +n him successful. most subversive movements must convince
r
n
op
e
it
,. rp
y V I u t.aI g
a major
exist are intolerable. This attitude will then provide the motivation
- . - . ------1- to
ruining or overthrowing any government.
and varied forms to include (1) leaflets;
man
s i
y
n
Propaganda come
(3) wall slogans; (4) rumors; (5) oratory; and (6)
ns
i
t
;
g
ter campa
(2) le
%-C or other media However, the latter forum exists only
e
of common interests they wish to protect or promote. By i en i ying
with their cause, the agitator can thus seek to exploit any known grievance.
e
reactions. e
student or other population organizations that have bandeddtoge ther because
of stimulating the development*of particular atti u es, a
individuals usually focus their attention on labor,
Th s
radius newspap
where free speech is guaranteed or for low-level efforts which might not
be supressed.
Agitation is usually accomplished by influence agents who seize
..upon controversial issue to inflame specific audiences for the purpose
?t d ctions or
afford one ac ive
agitation and propaganda. The most important technique being the guarantee,.
_ ~ .'. F., nnn_vi ni ont rac&I titi nn
the previously discussed psychological control systems
i
O
n,
nce aga
.9-C t means to negate the influence of subversive-sponsored
of institutional anu W k , F9 V VI.JJ J .
of conditions that any population segment conceives as being intolerable.
government should advertize merits of its
To enhance the above
,
efforts to institute reform and constructive change. They must
its counterpropaganda message.
4
Additionally, government can effectively utilize various me a y
avoid "playing" issues giving credibility to the subversive cause-
A
to conve
e er c p g
a
ship, and letters containing alternative opinions. Wall slogans can
be painted out, sand-blasted or sometimes manipulated by adding or sub-
tracting letters and words. Rumors can be distorted, discredited or
buried in an.avalanche of other rumors. Oratory is negated by argumen-
tative oratory. Media owners can usually be influenced or pressured to
v
discredit the su vers
major problems while defeating the urban guerrillas within established
parameters of law and order.
Any government also has the option of silence or direct counter-
propaganda activities. Leaflets can be discredited, manipulated or answered.
m ai ns may be countered by confusing the issues, mail censor
L tt
own
es and prove that government will overcome
b fi
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 ::Approved. For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-R
Agitator activity may be observed by low-level informants recruited
from among those organizations or institutions the former is attempting to
influence. Specific agitators can then be harassed, surveiled, detained
or arrested until they cease and desist their-activity. The government
can also recruit their own agents of influence to be targetted against
potential dissident groups. These individuals act as counteragitators
latter approach, of course, assumes that government is not repressive and
has provided some basis for reform.
their audiences to seek desired changes by legal and peaceful means. This
.who attempt to "dampen" subversive attitudes or actions, and convince
Snipers or "firing groups" of four or five men may undertake limited
Armed Violence
hit and run attacks to erode popular confidence in government security
forces and to force the initiation of repressive acts antagonistic to a.
and leaders of moderating forces are high on the discriminate list.
Indiscriminate targets are usually selected to incite population fear.
These armed action groups may also be used to undertake robbery, kid-
napping, assassination or other select activity in support of overall
subversive objectives.
target populace. Weapons include rifles, shotguns, pistols, grenades,
Molotov cocktails, explosives and other light-weight, easily concealable
items. Targets may be discriminately or indiscriminately selected.
Police, firemen, government officials, foreign diplomats or businessmen
also necessitate handling the two groups separately.
Effective intelligence collection and collation or other tech-
niques discussed under terrorist control may aid the apprehension and
arrest of snipers or members of fire teams. However, defeat of these
In the urban environment, such guerrilla action is at close
quarters for extremely short duration. Specific tactics will depend
on the targets,. the metropolitan terrain, attack opt ions, movement
alternatives, type of weapons, accepted modus operandi and the potential
for surprise/retreat. The net effect being a great diversification of
tactical approach from one situation to another.
The sniper or armed guerrilla squad often appear to have little
.distinction from terrorists; however, the latter are usually limited
to covert acts of assassination and bombing. Whereas the so-called
"fire teams" engage in more overt and flagrant hostilities that
separate them from the normal terrorists. A basic difference in tactics
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200220 O1-7
particular urban guerrilla components will require a major effort on
the part of internal security forces:
ecialized problem in themselves. The instant
re a s
i
p
pers a
Sn
a sniper opens fire, the police and/or other security elements must
11 11 nd safely
e a
f
ire zon
have the immediate capability to cordon the
remove all civilians or other targets enclosed within. Security
forces must then utilize available protective cover while moving to
locate, encircle and entrap the sniper. Any counterfire should be
L, red rifles with
e
y
buildings or helicopters. The overall objective eing o q
.efficiently eliminate the sniper while protecting the populace.and
avoiding any retaliatory action which could serve the guerrilla cause.
scopes. Massive amoun s o
endanger civilians and property while providing the sniper with addi-
tional targets. Terrain advantage may be achieved by use of multi-storied,.
and
b ' t uickl
undertaken only by skilled marksmen using III -pow
t f uncontrolled firepower only serve to
Fire teams are the urban guerrillas' paramilitary arm and must
usually be countered by employment of basic counterguerrilla tactics.
Police and other internal security elements will need the type-of
training, arms, equipment, communication and mobility that will prepare
them to undertake such action. This normally will involve some funda-
mental changes in the organization and deployment of all interna
security forces. An "initial reaction force" may be composed of
,specially augmented police squads"that are strategically deployed
throughout the urban target area. These units should be capable of
momentary response to any guerrilla attack and they must be prepared
to immediately engage guerrilla fire groups in a street battle. How-
4
civilian
n1
ever, counteraction must be delayed until such time
populace has safely escaped the fire zone.
s
initial reaction orce .
companies or specially trained military organizations held on a stand-
by basis. Such units can be called in to cordon and search an area or
they may be deployed to directly engage guerrilla elements. It is
also essential that military reserve forces be prepared to react against
a series of widely dispersed guerrilla actions designed to overwhelm
the police.
Reserve units should be created to provide a backup for the
The reserve is normally composed of police
f
Assassination and Kidnapping
.The urban guerrillas may employ a-ssassination and/or kidnapping
operations to eliminate "key" leaders within government or the private
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R00020022Q001-7``
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sector. Liquidation of existing leadership is the oldest method of
revolution and affords a relatively simple means to dislocate or dis-
organize political-social-economic institutions.
Targets may be limited to "heads" of state-, representatives of
government, local leaders, or other individuals who act to support the
.status quo. The primary aim of a systematic campaign of assassination is
to alienate a populace from their government by establishing the omni-
potent power of the guerrillas. Kidnapping operations may also be
designed to accomplish this same objective, and to extract concessions,
.capture publicity, provoke controversy or free political prisoners.
Targets for kidnapping may also include foreign diplomats or business
executives and various personalities who might be useful for propaganda
purposes.. In some cases, the kidnap victim may be executed after his
usefulness has ended, so the net effect is that of a combined kidnapping
and assassination.
Individuals or select three- to five-man guerrilla teams are
usually employed to conduct the above types of operations. Normally,
such individuals are selected on the basis of their proven courage,
dedication, resourcefulness and cunning. Preferably, they are not
persons wanted by the authorities, but ordinary citizens capable of
moving about freely. Assassinations or kidnappings are planned in
detail and special surveillance parties first check on the movements
of propective vistims. The target is shadowed to learn his habits,
hours, movement patterns and usual security procedures. When a pattern
is established, the guerrillas then develop and rehearse their specific
modus operandi,
subjects should not be at a specific location at the time guerrilla
elements might expect them to be there. Special security arrangements
may be required for routine travel between a target's home and office.
In urban areas where a high threat exists, special buses with armed
guards can be used to pick up and escort key leaders between home and
'To counter the threat of assassination or kidnapping, all potential
targets must be advised to constantly vary their routes of movement and
patterns of activity. Prospective security procedures should be devised
for all.: key personalities. Every effort must be made to avoid unneces-
sarily exposing potential targets. When they must be exposed, threatened
office. Physical security of offices can be increased and potential
target personalities, plus their families, may all be moved into a
protected residential compound with fences, guards, etc.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R0002002`20001-7
Additional countermeasures include the various control systems
discussed under the previous section-on terrorists. Primary emphasis
is on intelligence operations designed to identify assassins and
kidnappers.
Infiltration
The security and operational potential of an urban guerrilla
force is usually predicated on the quantity of intelligence obtained
by successful infiltration. If police and internal security organi
zations can be penetrated, the guerrillas may thus be forewarned of
actions planned against them. The infiltration of security forces was
seen by Lenin as one of the essential preconditions for a successful
urban uprising. Lenin's theory being that urban guerrillas would always
be outgunned unless they neutralized the police and other security elements'
by infiltrating their own agents.at all levels.
In addition, the subversive movement cannot be expected to succeed
unless it attacks and erodes any official programs designed to establish
or sustain population confidence in government. To help accomplish this
goal, the urban guerrillas will attempt to infiltrate all elements of
the target regime. The net objective is to obtain information which
can be used to plan disruptive or destructive attacks against socio-
economic development projects or other programs-designed to alleivate
.popular grievances.
Select infiltration operations may be used to obtain specific
target intelligence, particularly as regards procurement of funds,
weapons, or other supplies. Penetration agents can also provide
information on potential targets for terrorist, sabotage, assassination
and kidnap operations.
Classic clandestine "tradecraft" techniques are used as the
basis for organizing and accomplishing infiltration operations.
We are first concerned with human penetrations and to a lesser
degree, theft,bribery, technical penetrations and other ancillary types
of espionage. However, the primary danger is that guerrillas may obtain
a popular following from among elements of the population having existing
intelligence access. This situation will then create a more spontaneous
.flow of information which the urban guerrillas can use for protection .
or advantage.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R00020022a001,-7,,..
Thus, a major and essential function of target government is to
stop, disrupt, manipulate or negate rebel intelligence operations.
Accomplishment of this objective requires massive utilization of counter-
intelligence procedures and police investigative techniques. The initial
action is to identify specific agents, their guerrilla contacts, their
An effective counterintelligence operation requires (1) trained
tact procedures. Once a subversive agent is identified, an operation
may be carefully planned to attempt to double the agent. Failing this,
the agent should be apprehended, interrogated, convicted and imprisoned
according to "due process".
couriers and courier routes, dead drops, and other communication or con-
espionage officers; (2) secure communication and facilities; (3) bio-
graphic files to facilitate security clearances and name traces: (4)
pnysicai securit and document control systems; (5) human and electronic'
surveillance; (6) informant nets; (7) double agents; (8) "block warning
systems"; and (9) a variety of other specialized techniques. All of this
should be supplemented by modern criminal investigative practices usually
requiring an upgrading of overall police capabilities.
Mob Violence
Street tactics of the urban guerrillas include the instigation and/
or manipulation of demonstrations, mobs, and strikes. The objective is
to create a situation wherein peaceful protect groups can be agitated to
participate in acts of civil disobedience or riot.
-Agents of influence and subversive agitators may seize upon any
popular grievance to stimulate the formation of protest groups. The
next objective is for agitators to encourage the type of public demon-
stration that could easily "flare" into a confrontation with police.
Having created a proper environment, various guerrilla elements
can infiltrate the street mobs to incite a riot or undertake acts of
violence using the protestors for cover.
Guerrilla tactics are simple. Bottles, bricks, and stones can
be hurled at police. Hasty barricades may be used to block streets.
Business establishments, factories and/or government buildings can be
looted or burned. Snipers can be deployed to fire at police, hoping
they in turn will retaliate by'killing innocent members of the mob.
When the police attempt to arrest an agitator, a larger group of urban
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200220001-7
guerrillas may attempt to aid his escape. If internal security forces
effectively contain the riot, the guerrillas will retreat along pre-
planned avenues of escape.
.government to take strong repressive measures, thereby further alienating
the population. Promoting general disorder also helps to disrupt the
economy and undermine the government. Last but not least, by organizing
social discontent, the urban guerrillas induce the population to accept
their leadership while demonstrating the regime's lack of authority.
The primary objective of such group agitation is to force the
Basic ingredients for group agitation include (1) leadership
trained in mob psychology and tactics; (2) an executive committee
responsible for overall planning and execution; (3) propaganda efforts
to rally public sympathy for a cause; (4) compilation and continuous
review of exploitable grievances; (5) registration of potential dissi-
dents; (6) study of overall environment; (7) profiling of radical
organizations; (8) enlistment of financial and moral support; (9)
tactical training for agitators; (10) development of community support;
(11) recruitment of crowd-roving" orators; (12) preparation of music,
chants and slogans; (13) creation of demands and ultimatums; (14)
planning for pivotal events designed to precipitate conflict; (15)
public announcement of time and place for planned demonstration; (16)
stimulation of actions to incite media coverage; and (17) encouraging
demonstrators to participate in dramatic mass arrests.
control. The principal technique being to control effectively a mob
without repressive or brutal tactics which further agitate the population
By effective manipulation of mob psychology, the urban guerrilla
thus plans to push the aggrieved citizen into outright breaches of
law that will lead to heightened outbursts of violence. In addition,
all-out revolution must be rapidly precipitated or mob participants will
lose stamina in the face of prolonged adversity. To succeed, group
agitation must be carefully timed to coincide and "peak" with other
guerrilla actions.
A target government has only two types of countermeasures for
controlling group agitation. The first is to quickly and mercilessly
crush any protestors by use of totalitarian force. Obviously, this is
not feasible for any democratic society. A second option is to
institute political and psychological control systems previously dis-
cussed and to prepare internal security forces for non-violent mob/riot
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200220001-7
Throughout history, violence has been an-into ral =,+ -F -s-L,
g
developing the type of laws, custom, consensus and responsiveness which
limit the need or purpose of such hostility. However, no system has
eliminated violence on the periphery of its consensual and support base.
p o , e
Political
process. Urban guerrillavarfare is a modern popular form
of this activity advocated by communists and various national revolu-
tionaries. More civil and humane states have limited vi 1 b
When violence remains peripheral
police powers of th
t
t
r
,
e s
a
e a
e
.Usually adequate to "deal" with the problem in a manne b
t
l
pp r
consensus. Those governments which fail to perceive the significance of
0 1
I accep
s
e to
the population majority. If dissident forces are more than peripheral,
the typical response is one of absorption, cooptation, and acceptance
of essential reform as the basis for re-establishing a broad o ulq
p Fu at grievance are inviting an outbreak of violence. The same is
true for regimes that fail to move toward accommodation when they are
unable to
i
repress s
gnificant population demands for reform.
Even though a subversive conspiracy may exist it ' t th
An urban guerrilla organization cannot be a serious threat unless
it maintains a symbiotic relationship between themselves, as the tip
of the iceberg, and their underwater population base. Thus, any acts
of violence must be controlled politically as regards timing, target,
theater of operation and precise selectivity; the primary purpose being
augmentation of the subversive base and not annihilation of an enemy.
In essence, the damage to a regime is incidental to political objectives.
It is for this reason that subversive elements seek to force government
to engage in repressive acts which will alienate the population.
The incumbent target regime must avoid use of repression and take
those actions necessary to expand its political base commensurate with
+k +1,
revolutionaries or social deviates who cause the major problem. They.
.are merely the tip of an iceberg which government may take repressive
action to destroy. However, a new peak may be pushed to the surface
by that "base" of popular dissent which originally stimulated and
supported the initial violence.
e rest imposed by urban guerrillas. In this regard, the age-old
techniques of cooptation and absorption are often more important than
securit
y measures in dealing with the threat of violence. Hostilities
b
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do not alter effectively the political process, but intensify the diffi-
culty of coalition building to arrive at a consensual agreement. that
will create the basis for popular support. Only a totalitarian state.
has the potential for the type of complete repression that does not
require cooptation or adaptation. The absorption of an urban guerrilla
movement requires modification of governmental policy, which is seldom
l
i
y
ng ear
severe or detrimental to an existing regime if initiated dur
stages of violence.
Insum, we can conclude that increased government fire power or
external aid to a regime does not alter the political reality of the
situation so long as subversive forces retain minimal viability. In
the final analysis, the remedia' actions suggested in this study are
of little value unless accompanied by enlightened political solutions.
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