ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MES COMARADES SONT MORTS MY COMRADES ARE DEAD VOLUME II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00671R000200180001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 365
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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Instructions On Frier JOB y5-00(017 IR ST 33-153
FOLDER 0/7
DESENSITIZED
US ARMY
SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
??????????????????????????????????????????????
English Translation
of
Mes Camarades Sont Morts
'NY COMRADES ARE DEAD
Volume II
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MY COMRADES - IN - ARMS
ARE DEAD
PIERRE NORD
VOLUME II
INTELLIGENCE WARFARE
FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
by the
US ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
- OCTOBER 1963 -
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This second volume of "My Comrades are Dead: Counter-
intelligence Warfare," was translated from the French
original "Mes Camarades Sont Morts, Tome II - Le Contre-
Espionnage," by the United States Army Special Warfare
School in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with the permission of
Editions Artheme Fayard, 18 rue de Saint Gothard, Paris,
France.
The translation of the three volumes of this work was
done for the express purpose of providing information and
instruction to the staff of the United States Army Special
Warfare School, the personnel attending courses at this in-
stallation, and the United States Department of the Army in
general.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WHEN ONE IS MASTER
IN HIS OWN COUNTRY. Counterintelligence in North-
Africa From 1941 To 1944
I. The Essence of Counterintelligence 2
II. The Problems of Counterintelligence in North
Africa at the end of 1941 7
III. Conduct of Defensive Counterintelligence Missions
in 1941 - 1942 14
IV. Conduct of Offensive Counterintelligence Missions
in 1942 27
V. Counterintelligence and Politics 39
VI. Counterintelligence and Conduct of the War 43
CHAPTER II. BASIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE ENEMY-OCCUPIED
ZONE. Infiltration of the So-Called "Anti-
National Activities Repression Service"
I. Problems of the Counterintelligence Service in
Occupied France 49
II. The Infiltration of an Enemy Service Problems
and Failures 54
III. The Infiltration of an Enemy Service
Success - Results 70
IV. Attempt to Recruit an Important Double-Agent Its
slow starting Process 82
V. Attempt to Recruit an Important Double-Agent
Failure and Causes 102
CHAPTER III. ONE MONTH OF FRENCH RESISTANCE (MARCH 1944)
AS REPORTED BY GERMAN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
I. Situation in France in 1944 as seen by the Gestapo . . 138
II. Operational Report for March 1944 - Headquarters,
German Military Commander in France 148
III. Positive results obtained by the French Resistance
during March 1944 180
IV. Probable results achieved by the Resistance 187
V. Value of the examined Documents from a Counter-
intelligence view point 202
CHAPTER IV. THE ULTIMATE ACHIEVEMENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INTOXICATION
I. The work of Allied Double Agents as seen by the
German Army .
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205
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II. Double Agents 217
III. The handling of Double Agents by the French
Counterintelligence Service during World War II 224
IV. Intoxication by the Allied Services during
the D-Day Preparations 238
V. Double Agents in spite of Themselves 244
CHAPTER V. PROTECTION AGAINST INTOXICATION 275
I. A born Counterintelligence Officer 279
CI. The struggle against Enemy Double Agent in
1940 - 1942 282
III. In 1943 and 1944, the Old-Timers in Marseille
defend themselves against Double Agents, But... 291
IV. Intoxication destroys the Young Agence
Immobiliere 317
V. The "Fall Katalina" 325
VI. Italian Comedy 341
APPENDIX 360
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CHAPTER I
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
WHEN ONE IS MASTER IN HIS OWN COUNTRY
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN NORTH - AFRICA
FROM 1941 TO 1944
THE ESSENCE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
If a hundred intelligent and well-educated Frenchmen were asked
the question, "What is counterintelligence?", ninety-nine of them
would answer, "But,...it's the hunting down of spies, naturally!"
That would be as great an error as if one were to define mathematics
by its four basic operations. The arrest of enemy agents is only the
superficial and external aspect, the crudest and most elementary action
and sometimes the most awkward and inefficient method of counterintelli-
gence. The aims of a counterintelligence service goes far beyond this
and are much more important. The main goals are:
1. To insure the secret of our war intentions and actions.
2. To protect our own intelligence services.
But these constitute our simplest defensive tasks. It will become
obvious that a counterintelligence service is inevitably to play a dual
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offensive role which is very complex in nature.
3. To help the Intelligence Service (S.R.) collect information
on the enemy.
4. To deceive the opponent through "intoxication," to borrow
the key-word used during the last World War.
Let us examine the meaning of these schematic definitions:
1. The activities of the enemy and foreign intelligence
services must be countered while we are still at peace, not only in
the military services, but also in the factories, the laboratories,
and the public administration, etc. As a matter of fact, when the war
is declared or reaches its overt state, it is already half won or half
lost. Since we are only human beings, we realize this only after the
war. In short, we must guarantee the secrecy of our intentions, our
preparations, and our operations. It should be noted that, theoreti-
cally, if our secrets were well guarded, we could let enemy spies wander
about without fear; just as ?we know that germs have little effect on
a healthy body. This would be pushing logic to the absurd. Still this
fact alone leads us to understand that the hunting down of an enemy
spy is a secondary concern, and that preventive counterintelligence is
more important than spy repression.
2. Among the national activities requiring protection and
cover, that of our intelligence service is certainly the most threaten-
ed one. It is constantly spied upon and attacked by methods which
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require a special defensive technique. For example, it is necessary
to uncover and avoid the very particular ambushes set constantly by
enemy agents whose highest achievements are to establish relations
with the service to be hired by it, and to infiltrate it. The dangers
resulting from this can range from elementary ones, such as the risk
of getting robbed, to the very subtle, as producing a complete misunder-
standing of the intentions and capabilities of the enemy which could
lead to surprise and defeat. Here we are talking about a task which
requires from the counterspy much more than average intelligence, judg-
ment, shrewdness and knowledge of men. One must bear in mind that the
opponent is not only the scheming, petty soldier-of-fortune usually
found in spy movies. He is at least the equal of Otte Abetz. The rea-
son I say "at least," is because Abetz always smelled like a spy, even
from a hundred paces away, or when he was disguised as an important
journalist or as a high ranking diplomat. There were many others who
were just as sharp and not nearly as conspicuous.
But these are the lower spheres of the trade: it is at the higher
echelon that the more serious responsibilities come to Light.
3. The arrest, interrogation, and "brain-squeezing" of the
enemy agents will lead the counterintelligence organization to find out
what the enemy intelligence agency is interested in and what it is look-
ing for. From this it would be able to deduce the enemy's political
and military plans. Theoretically, it seems very simple. Practically,
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it is a very complicated game where a mistake can be easy and danger-
ous. For example, most of the collection plans sent by the British
Intelligence Service to its agents were captured by the Germans. These
plans gave considerable importance to Belgium and its coastline, errone-
ously leading the Germans to believe that the Allied forces were plan-
ning to land in Flanders.
It is a sin against good judgement to entrust mathematical-minded
individuals with making an estimate of the enemy, based on the enemy's
collection plan. Maybe one day it will be proven that this can provoke,
or at least accelerate, a military debacle.
4. Let us take another step into deception. If we can appre-
hend an enemy agent, "turn him around" and then release him, and if he
remains loyal to us, it is then possible to deceive the enemy. Let us
go even deeper. Why not have our own men join the other side deliberately
and systematically? It must be emphasized that it is these men who are
usually called "double agents," and not, as people often believe, traitors
in the pay of two opposing countries. Those who serve both sides are
purely and simply traitors. There is quite a difference.
On the day when our double agents, working in the enemy intelli-
gence agencies, will be quantitatively greater than the opponent's
loyal agents, our enemy will be "intoxicated" like a human body polluted
with harmful germs. Then we can hope to inform the enemy Supreme Head-
quarters in the manner chosen by our Supreme Headquarters and lead it to
its own destruction.
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This is the divine part of the trade; the truly divine. Quos
vult perdere, Jupiter demandat (Those whom he wants to ruin, Jupiter
drives insane.)
Counterintelligence always tries to intoxicate the enemy. Some-
times it succeeds.
Now we are very far from the hunting down of spies. Instead of
capturing them, it is better to direct, use and even create them, if
necessary. In any case, they must be captured alive.
During the later part of 1942, when the Germans were directly or
indirectly ruling France, no counterintelligence service could hope to
achieve the entire program which I have just described. Still the
"Agence Immobiliere," the counterintelligence operational organ left
in France by our Special Services, was certainly not going to stop
handling its double agents. They all fell, one after the other. Re-
cruiting new agents became a real problem. How much longer could the
chiefs themselves hold, endure, and continue to live? As far as the
recently created nets were concerned, all they could reasonably hope
for was to more or less safe-guard their own secrets and provide for
their own immediate security. All the rest was the responsibility of
London and Algiers.
Without a doubt, the reader is conscious of these problems. But,
unless he is a professional, he cannot fully realize thelr significance.
To understand them, let us look for a yardstick in North Africa. There
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we can see what can be accomplished in counterintelligence when one
operates on territory not occupied by the enemy and when one is
master in his own country. Then we will return to Metropolitan
France, which is the main subject of this book, and we will discuss
the capabilities of the "Agence Immobiliere" and of the nets of
Fighting France. We shall compare this with the means used in North
Africa, and we shall then be able to get to the root of the problem.
Finally, after having read a few adventures which took place in 1943
and 1944, you will be fully aware of the facts, and be able to evalu-
ate the characters and particularly appreciate the success of these
individuals, since this entire book is written from the point of view
of the results.
II
THE PROBLEMS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN
NORTH AFRICA AT THE END OF 1941
From 1940 to 1942, North Africa was actually a free zone extend-
ing beyond a large but passive anti-tank ditch. The 100,000 men making
up its army had absolutely no modern weapons and were stationed in the
midst of a country which had no existing industry capable of manufactur-
ing any. Its leaders claimed (and they were certainly right) that they
could not repulse a full strength German-Italian attack coming from
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Italian Africa or striking from the air. Material help from the
Allies would be absolutely necessary. If this support was suf-
ficient, North Africa could become a splendid springboard for the
landing in Europe, with the Mediterranean Sea becoming an Allied
lake.
This was why, from the end of 1940 on, North Africa became
the big hope and the center of attraction for the large share of
active underground fighters who did not want to join de Gaulle for
some reason or another. This hope became almost a certainty when the
United States entered the war.
After London, Algiers became the second pole of crystallization
for the French revenge. These poles, were often at opposite ends as
in geography, or repelling each other as in electricity. The French
officers with a healthy military tradition could only regret this
fact bitterly. For them, a nonpolitical attitude was more than ever
necessary since they were convinced that they the political discords,
encroaching on the sacred ground of national interests, had led the
country to progressive decay. The duty was: to bring the two poles
together. Such was the state of mind of some of my comrades in London:
Captain Fourcault for example, who multiplied the missions to France.
Such was also the state of mind - of the Armistice army officers whose
expulsion had been requested by the Germans, and who had been "parked"
in North Africa only by some magic trick, among them was Lt Colonel
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Baril, one of the many officers who could not hold out in this
army, and pulled all kinds of strings to get a command in North
Africa; Captain La Hone, for example; and finally those who
just purely and simply resigned their commissions and came to
wait for the right time. Such was the case of Captain Pillafort,
one of the most glorious cavalry men of the Moroccan campaign who
was killed in Algiers on 8 November 1942, shortly before Baril and
La Hone met the same fate. (1)
Major C. was prompted by the same desire, when in 1941, he took
over the control, or rather the reorganization of counterintelligence
in North Africa. C. had thoroughly considered the problems he would
have to face and knew what he wanted.
The French Intelligence Service (SR), officially disbanded ac-
cording to the clauses of the Armistice, but of course still operated
underground under the command of officers on indefinite leave of ab-
sence. The Army General Staff had undertaken, especially in Morocco,
the camouflage of large stocks of arms, the preparation for secret
and fast mobilization, and was even planning for the manufacturing of
weapons. These various activities had to be kept secret and it is in
this area that we returned to the two basic defensive missions of
counterintelligence.
These missions assumed a special aspect. They had a very partic-
uLar moral importance and they were to run into exceptional political
(1) See Chapter I, first part of Volume I.
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difficulties. Because of the Vichy and the collaborationist pro-
paganda, the scoundrels, the cowards, and the plain fools believed
that they could or even should establish contact with the enemy,
help him, and serve him. They had to be deterred from this whether
they liked it or not, through convincing arguments of force. Rea-
soning was not the business of counterintelligence, and it still
had some force at its disposal. We used it as brutally as we could,
without being disbanded by the public authorities, in order to keep
alive the concept of treason in France. This way the French would
realize that the Germans, and by implication the Italians, were still
the enemy and that those who dealt with them would have to pay for it
one day.
At the same time, the African "springboard"--this point of de-
parture--had to be protected from an invasion. Otherwise, the Allied
intervention would have to begin on the other side of a real sea or
at the other end of the Sahara desert, and God knows how many addi-
tional years of national distress this would have meant. It was thus
necessary to help the SR compromise the possible invasion plans of the
Wermacht. This was the third general mission of counterintelligence.
In 1941 Major C.?limited himslef to these initial goals. Later,
in light of developing events, he would see what else he could accom-
plish. He was cautious, realistic, had a well balanced mind, and
perfect self-control. He was exactly the opposite of the "violent and
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hot-tempered man" described by Rene Richard and Alain de.Serigny
in their book, titled The Bisecting Line of the War (1). His real
quality was the admirable energy which the authors of this very
interesting work attributed to him. He did not show it though.
As a matter of fact, he hid this quality with as much modesty as
a respectable woman would her breast. He had spent much time in
China. Therefore, as far as intrigues were concerned, nothing as-
tonished him. Whatever form they took in Algiers, he certainly
had seen something more complicated before. But far from having
developed a taste for intrigue, he disliked it deeply, as much as
he did political factions, divisions, and collusions, for in China,
he had seen where this led to. You could count on him to tell any
important leader with a quiet voice, but, if necessary, with a brutal
one (it was perhaps on one of these occasions that Richard and de
Sevigny caught him one day) "It is your duty to. or National in-
terest forces us to. But violence is a two-edged sword, and
before using it, C. always resorted to the highest dialectic resources
of a great mandarin, always courteous and patient, suave and pene-
trating, clever and shrewd. The most interesting thing in him was
that he felt just as comfortable playing the role of the lowest in-
dividual in the Chinese social ladder; the soldier. Eventually, he
landed on the Island of Elba at the head of an infantry regiment
(1) La Bissectrice de la Guerre, published by La Maison du Livre,
Algiers.
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and four years later he was a general in the Colonial Infantry.
Early in 1941, having determined his missions, C. made an
estimate of the enemy's terrain and capabilities, using the
sound habits of a military mind.
For the time being, his enemy included only the Italian and
the German Armistice Commissions. They had to be the local point
of all espionage activities and had to become the Trojan horse of
the invasion. But it was also necessary to work on Vichy's civil
servants, even the small fry, ranging from the gossiper to the
informer, and including all the various degrees of collaboration.
His means? Not negligible, provided they were not dispersed
as the Armistice clauses required. The records of the old region-
al counterintelligence sections which were created during the war
(Intelligence Centralizing Offices) had remained intact. Most of
the time, it was a nearsighted, bowlegged and not too bright office
clerk who solved the most complex problems. Simply by extracting
from his well-kept "morgue" a name card, an old police report, a
court record, or even a newspaper clipping, which did not neces-
sarily prove the guilt of the suspect; but at least helped us in
knowing his connections, his ties, his weaknesses and his habits,
furnished us with many a starting point for a serious investigation.
C. had the records sent to safe locations where they could be studied
with ease.
In Algeria, there still existed five small police detachments
specialized in counterespionage, the "Surveillance du Territoire"
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(Territorial Surveillance Sections), which came under the Ministry
of the Interior. Disbandment of this police force had to be avoided
at all cost. The Gaullist and other "dissidence" movements in the
French Empire offered an excellent excuse for retaining this police
force. The label "Surveillance du Territoire" was changed, and the
Germans were not to realize it until 1942. Then, they suddenly
noticed it, established the fact that this new special police had
never interfered with any political or Gaullist activities and they
made a lot of noise. But it was a little too late.
The Terrain? There were 120-million natives with a touching
loyalty even in such hard times but, who were not involved in the
current of European politics. Two million Frenchmen, almost unani-
mously anti-German but initially all the more convinced that Vichy
was working toward revenge even though they were far removed from
it, were convinced that their duty was to unite and obey the de facto
central power because they were only a small fraction of the Empire.
Finally Civil and military leaders were selected more and more for
their spirit of discipline and less and less for their capacity of
initiative, drive and independence. At least the distance from
France and the absence of the Wermacht made them regain some moral
strength. If X., as police chief commissioner of Paris, had received
instructions signed by "Laval" to arrest you, he would have probably
done so without giving time for hiS subordinates to warn you. However,
if you found this same man, as high commissioner in Africa, he would
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welcome you with due consideration and would sign without giving
you too much difficulty any order you might propose to him, even
to placing under house arrest a batch of spies claiming to be
working for Vichy. But it is true that actually it could not be the
same man. The 1941 Vichy Governor in Africa was too shrewd and too
much aware of the situation to let himself be assigned to this slaugh-
ter house which was the occupied zone in France. Only fools went
there!
The "Legion des Combattants" (1) was very active in North Africa.
Its paramilitary element was virulent and extremist. But, generally
speaking, North Africa was a very favorable terrain over which one
proceeded with soft and cautious but firm steps.
After this evaluation of the situation, Major C. got down to work.
III
CONDUCT OF DEFENSIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MISSIONS IN 1941 - 1942
At the same time as he developed the clandestine branches of
his service, C. immediately attacked Axis' the apparent intelligence
sources which had to be destroyed. In full agreement with Major Noel,
General Weygand's G-2, C. concluded that the most urgent and rewarding
action would be to completely isolate the Armistice Commissions from
the outside world. (Noel is the officer we mentioned previously, who
(1) Right wing collaborationist movement. (Note of translator).
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returned to France in 1943 and took charge of the third compartmenta-
lized branch of the Special Services, the Offices of Territorial
Surveillance).
Using the most courteous pretexts, members of the Commissions
were never alone. French officers accompanied them on the smallest
inspection in order to be able to notify the units and the services
concerned. I already mentioned the heroic Colonel Genin and the
valuable information that a professional specialist can obtain from
these painful contacts. Furthermore, the police kept a 24-hour watch
on the Italian and German offices. It kept a still closer watch, with
even more interest whenever any of the personnel stepped out. No
German could buy a box of matches without being followed by his guard-
ian angel. As soon as someone contacted the Commissions, the person
was immediately identified, card-indexed, and on the next day he was
summoned to the local police station where he was warned that an un-
favorable interpretation of his acquaintances could lead him to an
internment camp.
Here is an example. Mr. X. of Algiers wrote one day to the German
Armistice Commission offering his services. By return mail, he was in-
structed to go to a discreet bar where he was to ask for a Dr. Walter.
He went there, and immediately revealed the story of his life to the
so-called Walter, stressing particularly that he had already worked
for the German Intelligence Services.
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"I don't have to tell you, Herr Doktor, that I know all the
ropes."
"Oh! Good!" exclaimed Walter, "I am so interested in you that
I must introduce you to our big boss right away."
They left by car. At the entrance of a villa at El Biar, Walter
gave his last recommendations to his "protege."
"Try to make a good impression on the boss. When entering his
office, use the Hitler salute and shout, 'Heil Hitler'."
"Okay, Herr Doktor."
Mr. X. entered a room and was faced by a cold and tough looking
individual. He came to attention, did his circus act, and suddenly
got punched in the jaw. He woke up in a jail where he remained in
secret custody until the end of the war.
The postal censorship had intercepted his letter then and for-
warded it to counterintelligence. The man pretending to be Walter had
enjoyed duping X. into introducing himself to the "boss" with his comic
act. The "boss", not expecting X.'s visit, had acted with a sudden re-
flex.
The Germans eventually protested with extreme violence which proved
that they were hurt or at least embarrassed. From the many protests of
the Wiesbaden Armistice Central Commission, let us extract this portion
of letter No. 1554/41, dated 1 November 1941:
"Despite these protests, the disloyal and hostile
attitude of the French Services, which I have often de-
nounced, has not changed a bit. On the contrary, com-
plaints are increasing about vexations and apprehensions
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inflicted on Frenchmen, natives and foreign indi-
viduals just because they are guilty of having been
sometimes in personal contact with German military
personnel, or even only because they have talked to
them. Herewith is a list of individuals who were
arrested or threatened with expulsion just because
they had some personal relationship with the Germans.
The French Services succeeded so well in creating a
vacuum around these people that, in Morocco, for ex-
ample the craftsmen called upon to carry out urgent
repairs for the Control Commission as well as the
merchants who had sold goods to its members, found
it advisable to put a stop to these business rela-
tionships...
Also, as the population is being threatened and
forced to create this vacuum around the Commission,
the protective measures, supposedly taken in the in-
terest of the German Services, take on such a form
that it is evident they are only meant to undermine
the prestige of the latter. The real aim of these
measures is to isolate and bring discredit on the
members of the German Control...."
Only one grievance was not expressed in this relevant, justified
and perspicacious letter, but one could read it between the lines.
It was: "Under these conditions we will never be able to collect in-
telligence in North Africa. G.. dammit!"
In spite of the definite threats which closely followed the com-
plaints, the French Counterintelligence Service kept on operating with
the same steadfastness; but they added a little more tact to their work.
One must admit that they had sometimes lacked this quality, as in the
following two examples.
In January 1941, the Italians had adapted the bad habit of going
out in uniform which, as one knows, is more advantageous since a sol-
dier in civilian clothes loses the prestige of the uniform. They were
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warned, in a friendly manner, of the risks they were incurring.
They bravely disregarded the threats. A few days later, General
Boselli, President of the Armistice Commission, was found in
rather bad shape in the gutter (not in a harbor basin, as it has
been written). He received an official apology. Inquiries were
made about his health (it was said that he had yellow jaundice).
We promised that the guilty ones would be severely punished, while
pointing out that the commission had been warned. It is not neces-
sary to add that the investigation brought neither a result nor the
reason for the beating. The police had really gone too far. First,
they should have beaten up the general's chief of staff. At any rate,
the result was achieved. The Italians went back to their stylish
civilian jackets.
Some months later, a few young women who displayed a tendency
to "boudoir collaboration" were rounded up by the police, who shaved
their heads and interned them in the remote south. One of them happened
to be the daughter-in-law of the president of the collaborating "Legion
des Combattants." A perfect hit. After this, nobody could feel pro-
tected by Vichy. But we should not have sheared the girls before making
sure that we could not put their special talents to use in the interest
of the national cause. After all, what can one do with a shorn woman?
On this occasion, we had the opportunity to measure the so-called
Italian mettle. The fascist officer who came to complain to Colonel G.,
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chief of the French liaison, had a rather shy approach. He had a
beautiful head of hair which Colonel G. and his officers kept staring
at.
"I perfectly understand what you did," he said, "But you should
not have done it officially."
We would have eventually arrived at a comfortable coexistence
with the Italians. Unfortunately, the Germans understood this and
they arrived in North Africa like a locust plague, first within the
Armistice Commissions, then, from November 1941 on in the Consulates.
They insisted on personally inspecting the strength, the quarters,
the weapons, and even the training of the troops. This was at the
time when, in Algeria, a real clandestine mobilization was taking
place and when in Morocco alone the splendid "Direction des Affaires
Politiques" (1) had camouflaged as a police force almost 50,000 elite
soldiers ("tabors" and "goums"--indigenous troops), whose training had
reached its final phase during actual large-scale maneuvers held in the
Atlas Mountains. The situation was really serious.
Obviously, it was out of the question to come to terms with the
Germans as we had done with the Italians. They could not be neutra-
lized nor intimidated. The only thing left was to terrorize their
potential accomplices and, above all, create an atmosphere of tight
secrecy.
Major C. had the press publish the articles from the national code
(1) Political Affairs Committee (Note of Translator).
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of justice dealing with the breach of national defense secrets, even
if these occurred through indiscreet or imprudent acts. These were
followed closely by commentaries, so closely that they appeared like
elaborations on the code, establishing very firmly that the French
Armistice Services were the only organizations qualified to deal with
the occupants, and that any direct contact with the Germans was repre-
hensible.
Examples were made. For each agent liquidated right under the
nose of his masters, the newspapers announced under big headlines:
"Traitor Executed at Hussein-Dey," "Execution of a Spy at X.," etc.
Thus, the notion of treason was kept alive. It was firmly im-
posed, implanted and rooted in everybody's mind.
At the same time, a considerable training effort on the dangers
and methods of espionage was undertaken among the troop units where
frequent unannounced inspections corrected any cases of negligence
and laxity. It was hard to tell how much such an effort was needed
in France where a long period of carelessness gave way suddenly to a
brief attack of acute spy-fever.
One day a counterintelligence officer in Morocco noticed with
indignation that the paper container of chick-peas sold to his wife
by an Arabian grocer was nothing less than a secret document from the
headquarters located in that town. An investigation followed. Wrap-
ping paper was very scarce with a black market in this item florishing.
The office-clerk was a hustler, and the Headquarters personnel involved
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was.. .French, of course. After a few months of conferences, directives,
and exemplary punishments a good defensive state of mind was created.
Later, we shall see the results obtained
Then C. turned to the offensive.
In each of the five divisions in North Africa, a military counter-
intelligence section with a territorial surveillance detachment under
its control centralized the information supplied by a vast net of
collectors spread throughout the area. The collectors were selected
men from troop and service units, from the gendarmerie, the customs,
the navy, the forest wardens, etc., and their voluntary correspondents.
A complete counterintelligence organization could not have existed with-
out this essential and indispensable centralization process.
Here is an example. A certain Mr. Durand made friends with some
air force NCO's in an Algiers cafe. He praised their branch of service,
saying that an air force corporal was at least as good as an infantry
captain. He also insisted on the fact that he had never seen a plane
up close and he finally succeeded in being taken up for a first flight
from the nearby base. Perhaps Durand was only a loafer or an enthusiast
who had missed his vocation. God bless Durand! But if a month later in
Bel Abbes the same Durand was reported to be drinking with some foreign
Legionnaires, glorifying the legion, comparing a legion corporal to an
inEantry captain, and ending up becoming a close friend of the personnel
clerk, then Durand was a spy. A spy who was now finished.
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The counterintelligence officers managed to reconstruct the
organization of the German intelligence service, following through
on their discovery by arresting and subsequently interrogating sus-
pects. The simple checking of the hotel registers by the territorial
surveillance personnel produced knowledge of the movements of suspects
and enemy agents, and helped uncover their contacts. C. soon found
out, not without surprise, that the enemy's effort did not seem to be
controlled by the Armistice Commissions. This was perhaps the first
result of their isolation. But C. was as modest as he was cautious,
and he refrained from jumping to a hasty conclusion. It was possible
that the officers of the Commissions might have worked out some clever
cutouts in their nets and that only a small number of accomplices, still
unknown, were now pulling the strings. The matter had to be cleared up.
A few good amateur actors of both sexes were selected and were
taught the Nazi catechism. They were outfitted with a fabricated police
'record which would give confidence to a spy recruiter; they were supposed
to be overwhelmed with debts up to their ears and facing a scandalous
bankruptcy; or else they were chosen among people who actually had such a
background. Then they were sent to offer their services to these "gentle-
men." It was a dismal failure. The German Armistice Commissions operated
within the limits of their assigned control functions. This was so un-
believable that C. did not give up the idea of infiltrating them and
gave orders to maintain the few personal, intellectual or sentimental
connections which some of the German Commission members had made with
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our apprentice double-agents.
For a whole year this produced absolutely no results. Still,
the unruffled C. did not give up. It was incredible stubbornness on
his part. Indeed, all the interrogations of arrested German spies
were corroborating his feeling that all the links leading to the head
of the espionage activities in North Africa converged on one point:
the chiefs of the German intelligence service for North Africa who
were located in metropolitan France.
A first discovery rapidly led to others. As soon as the French
CI specialists could interrogate an enemy agent, they could tell you
the truth of the matter. They worked like this:
"You work for Dunker-Delage, the murderer of Marseille. You were
seen at his home on January 12. You're the one who betrayed citizen
X.."
It was more than likely that he would pretect himself by saying,
"It wasn't I. It was So and So," o "I swear that I only dealt with
Bauer from Toulouse."
Then they found out who were So and So, Bauer, and our enemies in
Toulouse. Soon they knew the complete structure of the German Intelli-
gence Services, - the location of these sections in France where our
comrades over there could watch and identify all visitors; locations
of their letter drops, the letters that had to be opened, the telegrams
that had to be read closely, and the telephone conversations which had
to be monitored; - their clandestine channels to North Africa, therefore
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the right places to spring our traps; the imperfections of their
forged identification papers, their secret inks, and their practices,
the slightest irregularities or sporadic manifestation of which were
sufficient to betray their agents.
It was from this moment on that we obtained full output from
our counterintelligence service.
The Algiers postal censorship organization could examine no more
than 3,000 letters per day, that is: open them, X-ray them, then if
anything suspicious was found, put them through the chemical test, and
finally seal them again without showing any trace of their having been
tampered with. Three thousand letters were nothing if taken at random,
but it was a lot if they were pre-selected. Sometimes, on an extra-
ordinarily lucky day, this enabled us to discover two enemy messages.
Let us assume that a letter written in invisible ink had just been
found. What clues did it offer to counterintelligence? To give you a
concrete example, we knew that a spy under the orders ?of a Tangiers
superior was operating among the many thousand inhabitants of Blidah.
That was all we knew. Since the agent had evidently not signed his
name nor given his address in the letter, he would seem to be as easy
to find as a needle in a hay stack.
It was not the case. The spy had a family and friends. He wrote
to them. It is well known that a hand-writing expert worthy of such
a qualification has a fifty-fifty chance of not being misled by a
clumsily camouflaged handwriting. Postal censors were handwriting
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experts. Right under their eyes, they had handwriting samples of
spies not yet identified. Let's observe a censor at work, inspect-
ing the content of a mailbag selected at random. He does not look
human any more. He becomes a kind of robot that sorts out regularly
and mechanically several thousand envelopes per hour. Suddenly the
machine comes to a grinding halt. Its two claws bring an envelope
close to a photograph. The head bends down. A spy is caught or is
going to be caught shortly.
Sometimes the identification was made by some more direct methods:
a small revealing detail contained in the first letter caught, a cross-
reference, or a remote connection with a fact or a man already known.
After all, it was necessary to write something above and below the lines
in secret ink. For instance, from one's window the air force headquar-
ters could be seen. This detail was enough to catch a spy, three days.
after his arrival in Algiers and only two days after his first message.
Be was no more stupid than any other. An important word can reveal to
an expert the writer's personality, since a sailor does not write like
a baker, nor an engineer like a poet.
A nervous or worried spy was at the mercy of the telephone moni-
toring units. The most elaborate commercial camouflage could not out-
wit for long the telephone control commission which had the time to
enlist expert personnel.
The "Territorial Surveillance" police, which possessed stability,
long experience and sufficient authority, always ended up by tracking
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down, driving into the open and killing its game. One day a spy con-
fessed that he had been put ashore from a fishing boat on the Algerian
coast along with three other agents. One of them was nicknamed the
Egyptian. Another was wearing checkered slacks, and the third one
had some relatives around Rio-Salado. That was all he knew about
them. Eight days later his three fellow-travellers were in jail
after being apprehended in three different spots. This was not due
to one of those dazzling tricks in the manner of Sherlock Holmes. It
was much less artificial, naive or childish than that and is not worthy
of being related. Its simplicity would disappoint the reader. It was
merely the result of well organized work by the French police whose
only secret was a sufficient number of informers, well spread over a
territory where the whiteness of one's skin was very conspicuous.
At the end of 1941, the Germans reinforced their effort by in-
filtrating teams equipped with radio transmitters. They turned out
to be double-edged swords for which our enemies were going to pay dear-
ly at the end. This is a long story which I will tell you in detail
later.
Under the coordinated blows of our different services, the German
espionage losses in North Africa became a catastrophe. In one year,
Major C. scored more than 200 arrests of important agents whom he
managed to keep in jail and who were to lead to other arrests. As far
as the "Legion des Combattants" was concerned, it was beaten. The
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"Parti Populaire Francais" (1) did not exist at all; its attempt to
organize in Morocco had been nipped in the bud when five of its leaders
were deported in July 1941. The recruiting center of the "Legion
Tricolore" (2) which had been imposed in 1942 by Vichy met with no
success. The basic counterintelligence goals seemed to have been
attained. I say "seemed," because we could not be sure until the break
of the big event toward which we were striving. The German Intelli-
gence Service appeared neutralized. Our military preparation had most
certainly remained secret. Only our intentions and our will were
evident. The Germans could not be mistaken about that.
IV
CONDUCT OF OFFENSIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MISSIONS IN 1942
Having reached this point, Major C. could now devote his efforts
to the Germans' intentions and to uncover what their preparations were
in North Africa. This was an important problem at the beginning of
1942, since it was felt that the Allied landing was, or soon would
be possible. Indeed, during the first few months of that year, it was
learned that the Anglo-Saxons were planning such an operation. The
joint offensive mission of the intelligence and the counterintelligence
services became both critical and urgent.
(1) Right-wing Collaborationist movement (Note of Translator).
(2) Pro-German voluntary military organization (Note of Translator).
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The feverish passion animating our counterintelligence service
developed its ingenuity to such a degree that its chief was soon in
a position not only to read the thought of the enemy but also to under-
take that action which, because of its creative nature, we have called
the divine task of the trade, namely: intoxication, with its seeds of
error, surprise, confusion and panic among the enemy.
This is where the story becomes beautiful: a small masterpiece of
wits foresight and persistance. I do not say that just to be obliging
or friendly, and I do not give in to the desire of being intellectually
and pleasurably satisfying. I am just stating facts.
One will remember that our double agents sent to infiltrate the
Armistice Commissions in North Africa had been politely rejected by
the German controllers who apparently limited themselves strictly to
their mission. After a year they still had not brought back any infor-
mation. Lt. Colonel C. (who had been promoted in the meantime) told the
officers who handled these double agents, "Keep them on the payroll, they
must continue the game." He had to have determination to give such an
order since very soon it would be called an attitude of stupid stubborn-
ness and an unexcusable waste of public funds. Most certainly it would
have been absurd (perseverare diabolicum) if C. had not attempted any-
thing else. However, he did not neglect to use various other methods.
He knew thoroughly the structure of the German intelligence service
in North Africa as well as its chiefs hidden away in their offices in
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France like distrustful spiders in shady corners. With the aid of
comrades who had remained or had been sent to France, the counter-
intelligence service infiltrated good double agents among the enemy
in metropolitan France. These agents obtained immediate results.
Partial successes came first. Here is an example: Although it
was evident that the German were seeking information about various
possible operations, most of which would never take place, an exami-
nation of the collection plans given to the German intelligence agents,
removed any doubt as to the fact that Hitler was going to use the first
pretext to seize the Toulon naval base and take over our war fleet.
Some will say that no document, study or deep thinking was needed for
such an assumption. This holds true for sound minds, but sick ones are
sometimes in command. After November 12, 1942, a few officers on the
staff of Bridoux, then the Vichy Minister of War (if we may associate
the word war with Vichy) had been seriously discussing with the Germans
the boundaries of a proposed, free "Greater Toulon," ?the defense of
which would be the responsibility of the French Navy. They were eagerly
bargaining about the forces to be authorized. Bridoux's men were even
hoping (it seems like a dream) to be able to camouflage their additional
units and equipment. I would not be surprised if they were still arguing
on whether they should accept as the eastern boundary of "Greater Toulon,"
the gulf of Giens or the bay of Hyeres when the Wermacht moved into the
area and appeared in the Cafe de la Rade, on the waterfront. One will
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therefore understand that in early 1942 it was rather important
for us to be able to prove unquestionably the bad intentions of the
Germans. Petain's reaction to total German invasion was foresee-
able, alas! But it would have taken only one daring individual, one
among the many blind men surrounding Petain, to give the order to sail
toward Algiers and carry it out before a counterorder was issued.
In Algiers, General M., Chief Signal Officer of the Army of Africa,
was testing with counterintelligence an entirely new concept in tele-
phone monitoring which would permit monitoring not only wire-transmitted
communications but also conversations held in a room. In short, it was
a microphone which did not require being installed (it could be hidden)
in evidence. We had started work on this early enough and for once the
invention was practically ready on time. In 1942, Lt. Colonel C. and
his assistants monitored every word that was said in the offices of the
Armistice Commissions.
Sometimes it was rather humorous. One day in May, 1942, the colonel
in charge of the German commission in Algiers, who had just returned
from Berlin, gathered his officers to give them an important briefing.
Hidden in a safe place, two French interpreters were ready to take the
speech in shorthand. Lt Colonel C. himself had the earphones on. It
was worth the trouble.
At first, they could only hear the noise of doors slamming, heels
clicking and vague mutterings. Suddenly the tense, electric silence,
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typical of military formations, filled the air. Then:
"Gentlemen..."
There were a few more barking sounds. The energetic and blunt
voice of the German colonel rose to high pitch.
"Our Fuhrer... The unending string of victories we owe to his
military genius... The limitless resources of the Ukraine... I want
to express the considered confidence and the conviction which inspires
me more than ever since my return from the dear Fatherland... Unshak-
able... Euroafrica will be.. .German for a thousand years to come..."
He sounded like a record of old Goebbels. C., dissatisfied, made
a long face. He had wasted a whole morning's work. But he was stub-
born. He had come to listen. Thus he would listen until the end.
Fortunately the meeting did not last much longer. Only five
minutes. Once more they heard the clicking of heels and shouts of
"Heil Hitler." One could almost see the stiff green torsos bowing with
progressibely diminishing sways. A door slammed shut. The two French
interpreters took their earphones off.
"Keep on listening," said C., "One never knows!"
There followed a few minutes of silence. Then they heard the voice
of the aide-de-camp whose voice was well known to the Frenchmen, inquir-
ing apprehensively, timidly and obsequiously.
"Sir, you seem to be tired by this trip..."
"Yes, X., I am tired. But I am mostly worried."
"Was it too hectic a trip, colonel?"
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"No, X., that's not it. No, you see my boy, I can tell you because
you keep a secret like a tomb. Well. We are finished. Germany is
finished-for a thousand years to come. It is frightful!"
This was followed by a few explanations and justifications which
were not new to C. But this took place in May 1942, and one can
imagine the comfort and the spirit it gave to our French patriots.
This was a simple moral satisfaction. tow let us talk about
the material results of this listening activity. Among others, this
monitoring enabled us to find out all the details of the German plan
for the occupation of Morocco. It had been prepared in 1341 and
Spanish cooperation was anticipated. Its successive modifications,
alterations and final touches were monitored closely. The first
stage was the seizure of the Meknes-Fez area by airborne troops.
Finally, and most important, C. found out that D-Day had been set for
the last days of 1942. This information was passed on at the appro-
priate time to the Americans who were requested to advance the date
of their landing.
Maybe the Americans did speed it up and this would explain and
excuse:
1. The excessive disproportion between the expeditionary force
promised to the Algiers conspirators by Murphy, the American Consul
General and personal representative of Roosevelt (500,000 troops sup-
ported by 2,000 aircraft and about 100 war ships), and the weak forces
with which General Clark actually landed on November 8.
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2. The relatively small scale of the North African operation
which caused a long and costly campaign for Tunis. Therefore, one
could consider this operation not as a strategic error but as a
daring attack which forestalled the enemy and took away from him
the advantage of initiative. Thus in spite of the casualties, it
would be a fortunate decision. Perhaps if this is the case, history
will ascribe the initial credit for this success to the French special
services. But our own records do not permit us to draw such a con-
clusion.
Another accomplishment of our monitoring service was that its
numerous reports enabled our crypto section, after several weeks of
mysterious puzzle work, to decipher the most secret Italian Navy code.
All its messages became clear to us and from then on we really lived
in the intimacy of our opponent.
The most serious difficulties of the special services did not
come from abroad but actually from Laval who, if we may say so, had
been reinstated in power. During
his disgrace, he had the time to
prepare his program. His first measures took the army in Africa by
surprise. He relieved the military of their police powers and concen-
trated these functions in the hands of Bousquet, his trusted secretary.
He succeeded in releasing a certain number of arrested spies before
they could be taken care of. Bousquet, complying with his agreement
with Oberg, the Gestapo chief in France, turned over to the Germans the
prisoners' files. These had the names of the police officials who had
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conducted the investigations. This amounted to signing their
death warrant. Early in November 1942, Bousquet had personal files
made on each and every special service officer, containing his per-
sonal address and that of his relatives. This was intended for the
Gestapo, but it was a little too late.
Nevertheless, during the critical period of preparation for the
landing, counterintelligence work in North Africa became difficult
and dangerous. This was all the more discouraging as Lt. Colonel C.
was at last reaching the final goal of his efforts. He was getting
ready to furnish intoxicating information to the enemy High Command,
something which could have had a decisive influence on the success
of the operation. What had happened?
From arrests and executions, the German intelligence service for
North'Africa which was controlled from France, had been decimated. The
metropolitan French counterintelligence had very readily filled the gaps.
The proportion between the traitors who had gone over to the Germans and
our own double agents had finally turned to our advantage. Had the Ger-
mans noticed it? Probably. Suddenly, within a few days, all our
candidate double agents, who for the past 18 months C. had retained at
public expense to hover over the Armistice Commissions, reported that
they had finally been accepted as German spies. The German intelli-
gence service had found a home in the Commissions. The recruiting was
done mainly by three newly established German sections in Casablanca,
Algiers and Tunis which obviously had been set up for this sole purpose.
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"It was logical and bound to happen," said C., "provided we
sufficiently damaged their existing nets. It was to be expected
that eventually the German command would ask 'these locally sta-
tioned gentlemen to start accomplishing something.' This is what
I was waiting for."
Were there still many spies left from the first teams? In any
case, the German High Command would consider much more reliable the
African intelligence originating from sections located within the
country than the reports coming from Paris and Marseille. Therefore,
it was the Armistice Commissions that had to be guided toward a false
conception and interpretation of the political and military events now
about to take place.
This became possible thanks to the gentle stubbornness of C. We
had captured the collection plans of the German spies. Naturally, their
first priority was for any clues of Allied operations, then on the iden-
tity of resistance members and their connections with the Americans and
the English. All we had to do was answer in our own way. Lt. Colonel
C. was pulling the strings of 29 important, direct German agents who
were entrusted with recruiting others and who knew the identity of a
thirtieth one. There could not be many more in the pay of the Commis-
sions and actually they hoped that there were no others.
Let us anticipate. After November 8, the questioning of captured
German intelligence officers and a close scrutiny of their records
proved beyond any doubt that there was no other agent. Therefore, all
we would have to do was to execute the thirtieth.
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Let us now go back to August 1942. Was the masterly work of
C. going to be compromised at the last minute by Laval's police?
Security measures were studied jointly by C. and the Algier leaders.
They had full confidence in each other. The conspirators hid nothing
from C. about their hopes, their plans and their conversations with
the Americans. C. protected them, civilians as well as military.
At that time the army included all those who fought the Germans.
Early in September 1942, police officer Begue was dispatched to
Algiers by Laval and Bousquet to keep an eye on the resistance circles.
He was a dangerous man. Not so much for his personal and professional
qualities but because he had the full powers of a personal representa-
tive of the highest authorities. His only task was to discover the
leaders of a conspiracy which had been in existence too long not to be
well known. In a city with only 300,000 generally exhuberant inhabit-
ants who lived outdoors or within a limited number of public places,
all he had to do was to sit down at the Cafe Aletti for five minutes
and listen to stories about the comings and goings of Lemaigre-Dubreuil,
the negotiations of Henri d'Astiers de la Vigerie, and the ideas of
Rigault. To neutralize Begue's effort, one had to resort to Asian
trickery, and C. decided to handle the matter personally.
C. gained Begue's confidence to such a point that the latter asked
him to send his reports to Vichy for him. That was enough. And when
Begue found out that the messages he wrote in Algiers were not quite the
same upon arriving in the provisional capital, he realized that he had
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been discredited in the eyes of his chiefs. He was considered a
romatic fool and a bluffer, sending "tall tales" just to show off.
Thereafter, he entrusted his messages to the Navy mail services.
But it was too late. He was already washed out.
However not as washed out as the German intelligence service
in Africa. In the last month of 1942, Begue had been like a blind-
folded boy playing a game of blind-man's-buff with cheating playmates.
It remains for General C. to relate how may times the Germans were
sent on a wrong track and found themselves at a dead end; how the threads
which they were following and which could have lead them to a serious
discovery were cut; why they did not detect what was going on around
them; and why they were lost and isolated in the crowded harbours oE
the Mediterranean coast as if they had been in the most remote desert.
But I shall not now spoil the subject of this book.
Let us only give the results. Until December 7, 1942, all the
estimates of the German intelligence service were based on the infor-
mation given to them by French counterintelligence and concluded that
the possibility of an imminent operation in North Africa was unlikely
until at least the spring of 1943. Of course Vichy confirmed this.
Considering what we had done before, this was to be expected. It was
easier to mislead our "dear comrades" than the hereditary enemy.
And finally the big day came!
When the twentieth century Armada assembled in the Atlantic and
sailed toward the East, both Berlin and Vichy asked themselves the
following question: "Dakar or Malta?"
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Even in Algier, on the evening of November 7, while Mast,
Montsabert, Baril, Jousse and Pillafort, on the military side,
Barjot on the navy side, Astier, Aboulker and the fellows of the
Youth Centers on the civilian side, and Murphy and Cole on the
American side, were all going to their combat posts, the Allied
fleet was sailing towards Algiers and Casablanca and the German
Army and its Armistice Commissions were peacefully sleeping. At
the Villa "Oliviers'," the taciturn and lonely Darlan probably
slept restlessly dreaming about the absolute power which never
was his to hold. The members of the Vichy "Legion des Combattants,"
their paramilitary force and the other Fascist groups were sound
asleep. Two journalists, Richard and De Serigny, who were in Algiers
at the time, described it as follows:
"Only a few hundred men lived intensively and
stayed awake in this large city of 300,000 people
who on this saturday evening November 7, had casu-
ally eaten and listened complacently to the careful
comments of Montmartre political satirists, and then
had gone to bed peacefully."
Nobody in Algiers, except the handful of conpirators, had the
slightest idea of the sensational event which was to take place off-
shore and in Algiers a few hours later. Nothing less than a reversal
of the war. Out of a population of 300,000, there was not a single
informer, stooly, or double agent who anticipated this event and warned
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the enemy. This was quite an accomplishment.
The blow of November 8, was like a flash of lightening out of
a clear sky. The German intelligence service was actually petrified
by the appearance in Algiers of the American war ships and planes,
and it never recovered from it. Several months later, the Sicher-
heitsdienst, the Nazi secret serviee, took advantage of this to over-
throw and destroy the Abwehr, the German Army secret service, which
had managed to remain autonomous. It actually replaced the Abwehr;
but, as we shall see later, it obtained no better results.
V
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND POLITICS
I don't think it is up to me to relate all the accomplishments
of Lt. Colonel C. and his men before and during the political im-
broglio stirred up by some Vichy circles in Algiers, and aggravated
and protracted after 8 November because of Darlan's presence. All
of this is General C. 's prerogative and deserves the writing of a
complete book. Nevertheless, I am sure that he will have no objec-
tion if I draw from the events his probable conclusion: the special
services did all they could to bring about a complete union between
all Frenchmen before the event which was to decide their national
future. Then, this task proving impossible, they succeeded in ac-
complishing it later on and better late than never.
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It was not because of the special services that all the French
leaders who held the power were lacking a complete agreement of ideas
which would have enabled all of us to welcome immediately the Americans
as brothers-in-arms and liberators, and which would have given us the
right to demand firmly to be treated on an equal footing as Allies.
Then whose fault was it? That of the French in general, because of
their indecision and division? Or was it due to the Americans them-
selves, because of their commercial mixture of suspicion and bluff
and of their series of abusive associations? For example, they went
as far as "contacting" Darlan, in October 1942 which was then followed
by hesitations typifying so well the action of their local representa-
tive, Murphy? We certainly were not blameless. But the Americans
were not either, with their decision to willfully ignore the existence
of de Gaulle, and especially with their exaggerated certainty of French
decadence.
The special services were not a decision making instrument, but an
advisory organization. At least this enabled C. to help establish a
feeling of confidence in the success of the landing and also to create
a close comradship between the French and American landing commanders
on one side, and the local military leaders of North Africa on the
other. He undertook this task early, without rushing, but he was always
ready to bring about contacts, exchanges of opinions, and liaisons when-
ever the conditions were ripe. His final goal was that of any true
soldier: a unified military action in time of crisis without which
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national salvation is impossible.
There was at the time, within Algiers, a true and real soldier.
Many Frenchmen were astonished aid have deplored the fact that General
Juin seemed to be completely surprised by the operation of November 8.
His intervention could have only led to one result: having everybody
agree that the most important thing was to win the battle of Tunis in
record time. Who could argue that this was not the most urgent thing?
Yet, General Juin seemed surprised and was forced to improvide. What
had happened? Let us hope that General C. will tell us one day how,
as early as October 1942, he secretly prepared contacts between Murphy
and one of General Juin's officers, - how he brought them together and
protected the rear of the French emissary by preparing his disappear-
ance in Tangiers, should the attempt fail. Why, and because of whom
these relations did not influence the course of events more than they
actually did, what conditions led him to provide these liaisons him-
elf, what Murphy told him at Guyotville, on 3 and 4 November, where
it seems that the American diplomat cut himself a few links of the
conspiracy he had plotted, and finally how, on November 9, the special
services arranged the meeting of Generals Giraud and Juin, which cer-
tainly decreased the confusion, prepared the truce of tomorrow and
hastened the entrance of the Army of Africa into the war. This was
the only important thing.
A complete Franco-American agreement was indispensable, urgent
and decisive. The American expeditionary force was insufficient.
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Tunis, the essential and rational objective, was impregnable. With
realism and composure, which were their greater strength (but became
virtues only when war is fought on one's national territory) the
American command had calmly envisioned that North Africa would become
the theater for some of those incoherent "hit and run tank raids"
stretched over 1,000 kilometers which had characterized the Lybia and
Tripolitania campaigns. They conceded that it was quite possible that
there would still be some fighting outside of Algiers, in November, O.K.,
O.K...
Thus there was not a second to lose in the coordination of all
efforts. The special services worked towards the agreement both poli-
tically and diplomatically. The Army of Africa also wanted this and
accomplished it at the tactical level. Almost by itself, without air-
craft or tanks, without shoes for the men this army protected for three
months, the landing of the Allied forces which were to clear a base for
the liberation of Europe. It was only in March 1943, near Tebessa, that
the Americans brought two to three full strength divisions to the front-
lines.
Looking back, and knowing fully well the danger incurred and the
final result, the intrigues and the negotiations of Algiers, before,
during, and after the 8 November assault, appear to us like an episode
out of the hesitating undercurrent of our National history. It seems
as if we were right in the middle of the Sixteenth Century religious
wars, or as we might say, in the middle of a medieval conflict. It was
inportant for me to state that the spirit which animated the special
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services during this agitated period was the very expression of the
desire for national unity.
VI
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AND CONDUCT OF THE WAR
The war in Africa was just starting and the victory was not yet
in sight. But this time, we were the masters in our own territory and
counterintelligence reached its most successful era.
There was no doubt that the Germans intended to use a fifth column
behind the fighting men in Tunisia. For those who knew them well, the
press and radio campaign proved this fact beyound question. The real
aim of the false news about the brutal occupation of the Yankees, about
the "resistance" by the settlers as well as the local population, and
about the "unrest in Africa" were not for propaganda purposes, but for
preparation for action. A great effort was necessary to recruit honest
agents, to give good excuses to the others, and to disguise treason,
sabotage, and other crimes as a political attitude. Actually, there
was no sabotage and not even one attempt against the rear of the Allied
Armies.
The German intelligence service had been beheaded in North Africa.
Infiltrated with double agents, it could no longer rely on its "hinter-
gelassene Agenten" (stay-behind agents), agents who were left purposely
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inside the enemy lines during a retreat, on their own, cut-off, and
lost. The Sicherheitsdienst tried to build a new network rapidly,
parachuting teams supplied with radio-transmitters, money and prop-
aganda material. Colonel C.'s reaction was quick and brutal. Any
individual having given support of any kind to one of those para-
chutists was shot in public in his village or douar within 48 hours.
Needless to say the actual spy himself suffered the same treatment,
as soon as we had extracted from him all he knew. This turned out to
be a real massacre; completely fruitless from the Germans. The number
of arrests is shown on the following chart which indicates clearly the
decreasing effectiveness of the German effort:
1943
1944
Algeria ? ? .
860
320
Tunisia . . ?
2,400
650
Morocco ? ? .
700
200
TOTAL for
3,960
1,170
North Africa
The enemy propaganda efforts directed toward the Moslem world
were nipped in the bud. In early 1944, several Moroccan leaders were
put in jail because of their proven relations with the Germans Their
goal was to create troubles in Africa during the landing operations in
Europe. This provoked a real uprising fomented by the "Parti Nation-
alist Marocain" (1). Fortunately, like the symptomatic appearance of
a disease not yet diagnosed, it compelled the local authorities to
weigh the seriousness of the situation which they ignored or wanted to
(1) The Moroccan Nationalist Party
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ignore. This happened in time, for a change.
The Germans contemplated giving up this useless struggle. We
soon had to push them, going as far as supplying them with volun-
teers or at least convincing the irresolute ones, so that there
could be a few more spies thrown into North Africa, allowing our
double-agents to complete the intoxication of the enemy services.
I will devote a whole chapter to this kind of intelligence warfare.
The French counterintelligence won this kind of war. In this
way, the German High Command was constantly informed by us. We for-
warded them our projects and our plans...SGDG (1). It appears that
contrary to sound French doctrine, they made the error of basing their
decisions on assumed Allied intentions, instead of the actual Allied
capabilities.
This assumption on my part calls for some explanation. Let us
therefore take a brief look at the field of tactics, especially since
the reader is free to accompany me or skip the next two pages.
But first of all, was there a French military doctrine as such?
If there was one, would not it be better to forget about it, like
some scandalous family secrets? Certainly not! It was an excellent
one, except for a certain shyness on the part of infantrymen in the
use of armor. Most of the American high level commanders and staff
officers will tell you, spontaneously, that their tactical doctrine
was based entirely on our theory. Since the end of the war, the
slightest 15 minute speech by a French tactician in a South American
75 Customary notation on all French patents indicating that the French
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country, will bring about a small intellectual revolution. It will
be necessary to have more foreign officers studying at our war
colleges.
The "amusing" repartee that undoubtedly several persons have
made: "...but then, why were the French soldiers defeated?" has
but a humoristic value. It takes more than a good doctrine to win
a war.
Especially when it is not being implemented. But this is
another story.
Let us get to the point. By now, our readers know enough about
intelligence to realize how dangerous it is to base a military de-
cision on the enemy's intentions. They already know how intelligence
is created, and how sometimes it is fabricated by the enemy. They
realize that an unconfirmed item of information is worth much less
than an eyewitness. They understand why it is necessary to have a
G-2 section between the special services which are seeking the infor-
mation and the commander who exploits it. This G-2 section is composed
of office personnel who smell the items of information, weigh them,
compare them, oppose them, sort them, and evaluate them in the still-
ness and the calm of an office where they can think. Sometimes they
reject the information altogether. This is what generally happens
to any paper stating: "The enemy wants..." or "The enemy is going
to...." This can not be checked nor double-checked unless the event
has already taken place, and then it's too late! It exists only in
the brain of the enemy leader, and if we are wrong or fooled, there
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will be a disaster, unless we are overwhelmingly stronger than the
enemy. But if this were the case, then we would not need information
any how. We would only have to rush ahead to destroy our foe.
On the other hand, the capabilities of the enemy are unequivocal.
They were written on the terrain. They can be read through the de-
ployment of the enemy forces, their center of gravity, the location
of reserves, the number of tanks and planes, the outline of its for-
tifications, etc. These capabilities are visible and tangible. To
estimate them, one is not at the mercy of men who might betray us.
We have at our disposal; ground observation, reconnaissance, search
of prisoners, then the air force, and even the information from diplo-
matic sources. All of this helps in estimating what are the enemy's
capabilities. It is for this purpose and not to avoid responsibili-
ties that, at all levels, the personnel of the French G-2 ended their
estimates on the enemy addressed to the commander by the following
words, "In view of their strength and their deployment, the enemy can
either do this or try that." At most they give a rank of likelihood
in their proposed probabilities. This permitted the leader to make
assumptions without being surprised by the possible implementation
of another hypothesis.
The enemy certainly did not possess this wisdom. Indeed, from
November 8, 1942 on, which was the turning point of the war, he
fought completely in the dark.
On the first day of the Allied offensive against Tunis, which
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pierced the center of the German organization, Rommel's reserves
were too far away to intervene on time, and his Panzers were massed
on the coastline. The landing in southern Italy had the advantage
of an unbelievable surprise factor.
Later, I shall talk in detail about the intoxication techniques
used against the German special services. But this goes beyond the
frame of this introductory chapter, where I only intended to say that
French counterintelligence in North Africa, with its double agents,
discreetly fed the German machine false information and "Spielmaterial"
from the Interallied Headquarters, and was the best promoter of the
crushing surprises which marked the end of the war and hastened the
common victory.
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CHAPTER II
BASIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE ENEMY-OCCUPIED ZONE
INFILTRATION OF THE SO-CALLED
"ANTI-NATIONAL ACTIVITIES REPRESSION SERVICE"
PROBLEMS OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SERVICE
IN OCCUPIED FRANCE
We have just seen what counterintelligence can accomplish when
you are the master in your own country. In short, it is a hunter's
job. On the other hand, after November 12, 1942, the intelligence
nets of Metropolitan France became the hunted game, waiting for the
horn of general insurrection.
"That's the only difference," Mr. Vauthier used to say sarcas-
tically to his section leaders gathered in Toulouse.
Yes. But this unique difference was an abyss. Counterintelli-
gence had become impossible. Still, it had to be accomplished. It
was more indispensable than ever: We probably would have to go back
to the great feudal lords of French history, to the Franco-English
dynasties, to the mayors of the Palace, to find a situation where,
qualitatively, betrayal and treason was so great.
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In invaded Metropolitan France, there was no "Surveillance du
Territoire." This old friendly police, so loyal and dependable,
had been forced to become just as clandestine as its military leaders.
The other branches of the "Securite Nationale" (French National Police)
and of the Paris Police Commission were more and more controlled by
the collaborationist clans. Bousquet, Laval's right hand man concluded
a real police alliance with the Gestapo commanded by Oberg, the butcher
of Paris. Naturally, we still had patriotic policemen, but they were
only subordinates, and despite their value, their help was not a bar-
rier to treason but only a series of improvised obstructions, easily
breached and quickly swept away. This was all the more so as special
police and "super-cops" organizations were created, increased, and
multiplied, resulting finally in the creation of Darnand's gang. Their
main goal was to deprive the old police of its political functions,
watch it carefully and make sure that it respected the lines of the New
Order.
In short, instead of finding support in the Ministry of the
Interior, the French counterintelligence organization had to include
an increasing number of policemen among its direct enemies, men who
were more deadly than the Gestapo. Indeed, these policemen sent you to
the same places, the same death camps, or the same gallows, but when
tracking you down, they had the tremendous advantage of being French.
As a matter of fact, all the public powers were behind them, in-
cluding the judicial branch with its weight of legitimacy influencing
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the weak, the humble, the undecided, the cowards, and the idiots.
Public funds were at their disposal to pay off the rascals. Public
force was with them to throw people in jail, with the occupying
power taking care of the rest, and the two well orchestrated propa-
ganda machines conducting a salutary intimidation. They had the
public services at their disposal to set traps all over the terri-
tory: postal censorship, telephone and telegraph monitoring, D. F.
units, priority use of tele-communications, planes and automobiles,
microphones, police laboratories, an intelligence centralizing on
organization, office, and personnel. To add a finishing touch to
this long list, we know that the enemy had access to the files of
the French special services which had been seized in Chateau de
Ledernon after the Clermont-Ferrand disaster of June 1943. Surely,
we had hidden them in a secret cave worthy of a detective story,
proving that we did not intend to use them for quite a long time,
and the files had been screened before hand. But to think that the
enemy had them! Actually beyond a certain point, this extreme mis-
fortune became comical and it sometimes happened that the victims
laughed about it.. .nervously though.
Generally speaking, there was no longer any physical means avail-
able to conduct counterintelligence in France. Let us compare this
situation in detail with the preceding chapter in spite of the fact
that it will not completely express the essence of the problem. To
do so, we would have to make further comparisons. Imagine a situation
where the army, the police forces, the gendarmerie, and the forest
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wardens would be outlawed by a ruling group made up of criminals;
a group so sure of itself that it would have inverted the legal
definition of crimes and offenses. It would be absurd and ridicu-
lous wouldn't it? Yet, this is exactly what happened in the limited
field of counterintelligence.
The only mission that the recently formed French nets could
attempt was to provide for their awn protection and that of the
known patriotic organizations. This was achieved first, by the
elementary means of infiltrating the enemy, then when more experi-
ence was gained and the war was apparently turning to the advantage
of the Allies, by recruiting or infiltrating the enemy ranks with
double, repentant or emboldened agents.
Theoretically, this seems simple. But under the prevailing
conditions just described, a tremendous effort was necessary to ob-
tain even the tiniest result, and sometimes it was compLetely in vain.
What was necessary was...let us point it out.
A lot of courage but no glory. Throughout the text which follow,
we shall witness our men hugging the walls and making simple efforts
of self-control in the course of thorny and dangerous conversations.
But there were always submachine guns behind the doors and pistols in
the pockets. My heroes have narrowly escaped the shots which could
have knocked them down permanently. They are the lucky ones. Many
of their comrades-in-arms have died in the dark. I chose survivors as
my characters in order to finish my story in their company.
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They needed a foresight which was more than human, and an
animal-like obstinacy. We will read about an agent implanted
in an enemy service, rotting there for two years in vain and then,
suddenly, becoming very valuable.
In addition, also needed was an understanding of the National
interest enabling honest people to use more tricks than their
crafty opponents and allowing men of honor to make promises which
they knew were lies. Yes. We must admit it: we needed a special
Rind of morality.
Finally for a doubtful, improbable, and, in any case, limited
gain, in the vague hope of saving an unknown friend some day, we had
to make a tremendous effort of thought, cleverness and intrigue. No
amount of ambition or interest would have made us do these things in
our former lives. We outdid ourselves. From the bottom up. Sneering
and gritting our teeth, in circumstances which were sometimes so im-
proper that one would have stopped in a shock of modesty and human
respect if it had been a personal affair.
These were sad days, when, in addition to every thing else, we
lied all the time. Days when God only knows whose hand we shook!...
Days when we would say to a man who did not stand a chance, "I will
save you if.. And all the while we could see on his face, lit with
hope, the unrelenting shadows of the firing squad.
I just reread this page. I almost tore it up. I will not read it
again to avoid the temptation, for somebody had to write it. Somebody
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had to write about the bastards we had to push around. And it is
because we pushed them around that many of our comrades are still
alive today.
II
THE INFILTRATION OF AN ENEMY SERVICE
PROBLEMS AND FAILURES
The reader will perhaps remember that in 1940 - 1942 Captain
Bardin was the Vichy "eye" for Lt. Colonel Baril who was at first
G-2 of the Armistice Army, and who was later sent in disgrace to
Algiers, where he participated in the preparation of the Allied
landing in North Africa.
At the beginning, Vichy was feeling its way around Everything
was being improvised day by day and was in a constant state of evo-
lution. The struggle for positions was at its peak and transcended the
ideas and doctrines. Currents of opinion were running against each
other, and no one could yet estimate his strength, discover his source,
count his factions, or foresee his final goal. Almost everyone was
underground and only heaven knew where they would emerge. The Resist-
ance did not know its limitations, its men, its allies, its political
and military roles, or even its name. In 1945, as soon as there had
been time to think, the surviving resistance fighters of the first
hour were just as astonished by certain unexpected and noisy people
at their sides as by the disgraceful and unexplainable absences of
others.
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Only one fact was obvious: it was still impossible to foresee
who was going to provide the necessary center of unity enabling us
to enter the war with the remaining forces we had, once the time had
come. Our numbers were so few that we could not allow ourselves to
neglect any one of them. The hour of de Gaulle had not yet struck
in Metropolitan France. Would it come some day? Who would have
dared say it aloud in 1940, even among those who wished it most?
Petain said repeatedly, "If de Gaulle did not exist, we would have
to invent him." It was advisable and wise to temporarily admit one
discrimination among the French people: those who wanted to fight
against the invader and those who didn't. To really fight, of course.
Not with words. Obviously, some would fight and some would go to sleep.
We knew them. They were always the same. And between the two extremes,
there was the infinite and diversified mass of those who might wake up
one day, depending on the circumstances.
This certainty required sending observers everywhere, especially
in the new police forces, to determine whether they were friend or
enemy of the Resistance. Often, they still did not know themselves.
Besides, who was going to lead them tomorrow?
In October 1940, Captain Bardin got on friendly terms with Colonel
G. who had suddenly become inspector general of the National Police and
was said to be a Cagoulard (1) which was not true; and that he was con-
sidered as an eventual Police Minister, which could be true. One day,
(1) Secret right-wing political society whose members wore cagoules
(hoods) at their meetings (Note of Translator).
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in the alleys of Parc des Sources, swarming with government office
seekers who were as numerous, yellow and agitated as the leaves
falling from the plane-trees in the autumn breeze, C. introduced
Bardin to a tall fellow, thin and sturdy, very well dressed, but
not overly so. In otherwords, he was not wearing what you would
call the latest fashions seen in the bars of the Champs Elysees,
which actually would hinder a man in the accomplishment of the most
elementary task.
"Mr. Detmar. This is Captain Bardin."
Detmar talked for a moment with Colonel G. Bardin, interested
by the new comer watched and listened attentively. He detected in
the manner and the voice of Detmar something unusually abrupt and
pre-emptory, overly self-confident, and as the saying goes, something
"vain." Curiously enough, it was just the opposite of what his cloth-
ing indicated. It seemed to Bardin that he had already met him some-
where. He mentioned it just before the other left.
"But, of course," replied Detmar," Do you remember a certain
last minute telephone call, back in May?"
"No," said Bardin, "I am sorry, but.
"I forgot the name of the village where it happened. But the
Kraut artillery had adjusted their fire on the place, and the area
was being evacuated in a hurry. You got out of a car and flew to an
artillery C.P., where only a communication team remained. You were
rushing to the phone when one of the men told you, 'We have received
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the order to withdraw, and that's what we're doing now!" Then you
replied, 'I'll be the one to give the orders.' This was followed,
in spite of your General Staff rank, by an argument which completely
disregarded the chain of command. An actual fight with a subordi-
nate. Then, at that time a battery sergeant-major came in, gave you
a hand, and finally you were able to reach 'Arthemise' or 'Aglae' at
the other end of the line."
"That's right," said Bardin. "It was the army command post, that
I was trying to reach and my message could have been important. How
could you or I know that the information was already worthless? But
why didn't you remind me of our meeting, old man?"
Indeed, why hadn't he talked about it? The incident was all to
his credit. Assigned as liaison NCO of an artillery unit retreating
in disorder and under fire, he had been the only one in the village
who had maintained his self-control, authority, and discipline.
Detmar shrugged his shoulders, did not answer and walked away
with determined strides. It occurred to Bardin that Detmar perhaps
did not particularly want to remember this because his only role was
that of a non-corn. But this was impossible. It would be pretentious,
childish, and very, very difficult to explain coming from a good soldier.
Nevertheless, it was the reason, and this personal trait explains
the whole life of the man, until his death from the bullets of a French
firing squad in 1946.
But we are in 1940.
"This guy is all right," said Bardin to Colonel G. "In any case,
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he did a good job on the front lines. What is he selling now?"
"Nothing, but he seems to know the Communists quite well,"
G. answered evasively.
was he one?"
"That's a question I am wondering about," answered G.
G. took Detmar in to his organization some time later. A few
months after G's rise in the police apparatus, his career was sud-
denly interrupted by order of the Germans, because he dared to arrest
their man Laval. Forty-eight hours after this small palace revolution,
or rather this "hotel revolution," it was Colonel G. and his colleagues
who were being pursued. They immediately dispersed. We were to find
them again everywhere, in London and in Berlin, at the front-posts of
the Resistance and in the worst collaborationist dens, and finally
among the "Companions of the Liberation" (1), as well as in jail after
the war. This certainly proves that in 1940 any intransigence was
premature.
Detmar was one of the people who did not sink in the Vichy quick-
sand. In 1941, he was entrusted with the task of creating the "Service
de Police anti-communiste," the S.P.A.C. (Anti-communist Police Force).
Bardin learned about it. Some of his old police friends talked to him
and complained about the autonomy given to this organization which was
independent of all administrative channels, dealt directly with the
Ministry of the Interior, and which, undoubtedly was responsible for the
replacement of the professionals by amateurs in the "Reuseignements
(1) Close collaborators of De Gaulle - Note of the editor.
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Generaux" (French equivalent to FBI). One of his friends also told
him, "Detmar is Pucheu's man, and Pucheu will probably make him
Assistant-Secretary of Police."
At this time, Bardin listened carefully. The star of Pucheu
was going up and the man was very peculiar. His attitude was con-
tradictory in appearance and incomprehensible from the outside. We
all know that he initiated, negotiated and even concluded truces with
well-known resistant leaders, only to break them later under pretexts
with obscure reasons which we could not uncover. Also, he was the
only member of the cabinet at the time to make anti-German remarks,
and that during his inspection tour in North Africa, he adopted atti-
tudes which made the Germans frown. What was he really up to? We
had to find out. Was he just a fat, nearsighted and clumsy bumble-bee?
Or was his ardor, restlessness, and even his carelessness indicative
of a strength which could be used some day, later?
Sometimes Bardin went to eat a steak - or rather half of one -
at the Hotel Parmentier with some of his loyal friends who had come
to join him in 'Vichy. This was where Detmar was having his meals too.
Bardin usually managed to sit at the next table to talk to him. They
became acquainted. Without too much pressure on Bardin's part, Detmar
confirmed the information Bardin already had on his section, except for
Detmar's allegiance to Pucheu, whose name he avoided mentioning. One
evening, Bardin casually said, "You should take A. with you. He is
a good man. I had him under my command during the war as a reserve
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lieutenant."
This was a bad maneuver. Detmar never took A. It was probably
because A. had a higher rank than Detmar in some chain of command,
did not have the attitude of a subordinate, and was taller than him,
namely, 6'1" or 6'2". After a while Bardin carefully put forward a
second candidate; but this time, he had the impression that Detmar
was beginning to distrust him. He did not insist.
Some time later, during a trip to Toulon, he received a note
from his private secretary in Vichy, Daniel Frantz. He wrote casually:
"...Imagine that Detmar has asked me to come and
work for him. I don't have to say that I told him to
get lost. Can you see me as a Vichy cop...."
Bardin answered, in a letter which was hand carried by a friend:
"...Do not go back and ask him for the position
you have just turned down. But, should he insist,
take it. And if you are not too stupid, you will
make sure that he asks you again. In addition, I
would like to remind you that there is such a thing
as a postal censorship, and that its chief, B., has
his eye on me. I would be very grateful if you would
stop spitting and vomiting on Vichy in the letters
you send through the post office, you darn fool...!"
Obviously, Daniel was not the best of information agents. He
came from an old lorrainese bourgeois family which had produced in-
dustrial leaders, good soldiers, famous lawyers, efficient mayors,
but not a single member of Parliament. Daniel was a man of honor.
Deeply devoted to Bardin, he accepted any mission from him. But
would he be able to fulfill them? Even his will to succeed could not
drive him to use trickery and wiliness. Actually, if he had been any
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different, Bardin would not have liked him as much, because Frantz
was only 22 years old, and to hell with machiavellian juveniles:
Therefore it was without much hope, or conviction that Bardin threw
his young friend into the winding paths of counterintelligence.
The plan worked. One day Detmar apologized to Bardin, who had
just returned to Vichy.
"You must be mad at me for having stolen your boy Frantz. I
wanted you to know..."
Bardin exploded, "Mad at you, no But damn mad at him: He must
have twisted your arm."
"No, not really..."
"You are too kind. He is a dirty little bastard. I never would
have expected that from him. I don't even want to see him again. But
incidentally, what do you intend to do with him? He has no experience."
"No. But he is honest and straight, and I need at least one of
this kind in my office."
Here, in a few sentences, a vastly successful infiltration was
accomplished. Not only did Detmar not suspect Bardin's intervention,
but he thought that Bardin was angry with Frantz. Actually he intended
to use Frantz in a trustworthy position.
A question remained as to Daniel's ability to fulfill his mission.
Bardin gave him lectures in private, advised him to be patient and
calm, and instructed him on what he expected from him. "Keep Pucheu
and his clique under surveillance. And let's hope for the best."
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In spite of all the expectations, nothing came of it for two
years. Absolutely nothing: And when an explortable opportunity
developed, it was in a completely different field than the one Bardin
had decided to explore. It was a completely different matter.
The first two years can be summarized rapidly. Daniel, unable
to hide his Lorrainese hatred for the Germans, and figuring that he had
only to make violent nationalistic speeches to remain "sacrosanct"
in a place so complex that even a shrewder man than he could not com-
pletely understand it, clashed rapidly with Detmar and fell into complete
disgrace. Detmar demoted him to a position as record-keeper in a base-
ment, as soon as his service was completely organized in Vichy. His
most important task was to handle old Communist files having nothing
to do with the Resistance activities at that time. When the Anti-
Communist Protection Service opened up in Paris, Detmar left Daniel in
Vichy. The young man never got close to Pucheu, and never even saw him.
Having avoided arrest by the Germans, on 8 January 1943, Bardin
disappeared from circulation and spent some time in Lyon under the name
of Mr. Bonnet, with the innocent and inconspicuous cover of a Catholic
seminary proctor. Daniel often joined him there. At each opportunity
he told Bardin of his intention to resign from the Anti-Communist Police
Service.
"I can't do it anymore. My brother John is doing a marvelous job
here (he was the chief of a forged papers section in the southern zone).
My cousin Maurice is commander of an action group in Paris. My friend
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Y is going to join the Secret Army of the Alps..."
"Shut-up," said Bardin. "Stay where you are."
"But, after all, Major, why?"
Why? Bardin did not know too well. The two men walked along
the Saone River banks, and crossed the crowded "foodless" market
which started at the Tilsitt bridge.
"Why:" repeated Bardin. "My God! If for no other reason than
the fact that you are carrying, without too much trouble, a package
which I could not possibly carry around without being in the greatest
of danger."
"Ah," replied Daniel. "That's true."
The package consisted of a small and beautiful carbine as well as
a bag full of bullets all wrapped up in a loose bundle of tent canvas,
which they were moving from one hiding place to another.
"Because you have a police ID card to cover you; because, if there
was a sudden police round-up, right now (which was very frequent at that
time in Lyon), that same police pass would also get me out of trouble;
finally because the conditions and the time for action are still too
uncertain for us to give up the positions we have achieved in antici-
pation of the final action."
Actually, this was all Bardin could find, on that day, to convince
Frantz to remain a Vichy cop. It was plain perseverance in a project
because its foundations were sound; This attitude was similar to C's
when he attempted - for a long time unsuccessfully - the penetration of
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the German Armistice Commissions in North Africa.
Here also, stubbornness was eventually fruitful. Suddenly,
everything changed for the better. Bardin, well cast in his new
role as Bonnet and certain of findings in Paris the French Army
Resistance Organization Headquarters, decided to leave Lyon. He
asked Frantz to join him in Paris, by asking for a transfer to the
headquarters of the Anti-Communist Service, whose scope of activities
had greatly expanded. Now, it was called the "Anti-National Activities
Repression Service" (S.R.M.A.N., in French) which clearly meant in
Vichy language, that its field of action included all Resistance
activities. By a newly acquired show of discipline and a certain
flexibility, Daniel finally obtained forgiveness and even his transfer
from Detmar.
When Bardin arrived in Paris, Daniel had already been there for
several weeks. The two friends met by a small pond in the Park Monceau.
Surprise. Even before greeting his commanding officer, the young man's
first words were,
"Finally, I am pretty sure that I can be of some use in this d...
job to which you assigned me for the last two years. But I tell you,
if it was not for you, I'd.. .Good morning, major."
These words were not due to any promotion. As a matter of fact,
Detmar, suspicious or vindicative, had put him back in a filing job,
without explanation. But now, the Anti-National Activities Repression
Service was closely centralized on the third floor of a building at
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69 Rue de Montceau. Daniel worked there among his "colleagues,"
heard all the conversations, scanned the mail, and kept himself
informed on some of the projects. This was quite important, since
in its growth, the Anti-National Activities Repression Service had
not escaped small rivalries and jealousies between its departments
which were disparaging and slandering each other. In his own office
there were even two young men disgusted with the job they had to do.
"Beacuase they are no longer satisfied with collecting information,
you know Sir. Under the pretext of efficiency they operate themselves,
and the word "Repression," such as it appears in the name of their
organization is not undeserved. And, I can tell you that even though
I complained of being "stuck" in the records section, if now Detmar
wanted to give me more active functions I would leave him flat, or
rather I would leave you flat. And even if you gave me a written order
signed by De Gaulle himself, I wouldn't set my foot back in there."
"I don't blame you because it would be a forged order. What in
the hell are your little buddies doing?"
"They are centralizing everything which has to do with De Gaulle,
Giraud, and the Communists. They deal with them in strict accordance
with the Bousquet-Oberg agreements, which called for an immediate com-
munication to the occupation forces of anything relating to their se-
curity. They work in close cooperation with the Boches and they are
starting to look like them. And they sure go at it hard, the bastards..."
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The public trial of the Anti-National Activities Repression
Service is still sufficiently fresh in our minds so that I can skip
the torture scenes. All of us must have read about it a hundred
times. But on that day, it was a new revelation for Bardin, even
though in his office of Rue de Monceau, Frantz, had only gathered
a small amount of second-hand information on the "exploits" of his
"comrades." What he related to Bardin were only scraps of overheard
conversations and malicious insinuations of rivals competing for
promotion. It had nothing in common with the horrors brought to light
at the 1946 trial. Moreover it is very probable that the Anti-National
Activities Repression Service, at its beginning, had not adopted all the
Gestapo's methods. But it suffered the usual and unavoidable fall into
degradation. A close relationship with the Nazi almost always brought
about moral degeneration. The picture that Frantz gave of the Anti-
National Activities Repression Service in the middle of 1943, represented
extreme police brutality; "...rough beatings" carried to such an extent
that fatality was quite possible. Actually there was one a few weeks
later. But the most revolting thing was not the extremeness of the
cruelty. Shame starts with the first use of physical force, and after
that, it is just a matter of degrees. What filled Bardin with indig-
nation and anger at this time was the fact that now he could put in con-
crete form and illustrate with a known face the abstract idea of a-
Frenchman betraying other Frenchmen to the Germans.
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Frantz had stopped talking. Bardin, morally and physically
depressed, his heart overwhelmed, forgot that he was there to
work and to build. He let himself drift away in a discouraging
meditation. Should he leave young Daniel in such an environment?
The two friends silently walked several times around the pool
brightened by a warm summer sun. Kids with pink and round faces
were playing around with their usual clumsiness and charm. Their
games were not as innocent as they looked, and Bardin, bitter,
thought he was suddenly discovering in them the obscure rites of
human antagonism. Even the kids were fighting hypocritically and
underhandedly. But it did not go beyond hitting each other's hand
with a toy. Happy age! But one day they too will have strength!
The lawn in the park was so greet that it made you yearn for the
country. It was nice and warm. A good time for a vacation: already!
When will all this damn filth be over?
"Major, do you want me to stay there?"
Bardin jumped. He looked at Frantz more carefully than he had
done for a long time.
He was so used to him! All he had in his mind was
a general picture, a wrong one perhaps. Everything changed so fast.
This young Frantz was all right. A well-bred fellow. Tall, blond,
well built, and clean cut. Clear and warm eyes. Perhaps a little too
sensitive, but he would get over that
would come. Full of enthusiasm where
the war, Bardin tried all he could to
. He was not practical, but it
it counted. At the beginning of
get him accepted in the Air Force,
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with his mother's consent. He must have been terribly unhappy in
this disgusting Anti-National Activities Repression Service. Dammit!
This was the first time this thought had come to Bardin's mind. There
was no longer any time to think. One had to be as hard as steel.
"Dear fellow.. .1 don't know what to tell you. We don't belong to
ourselves anymore. We can't chose our jobs."
"No, of course!"
A maquis leader would sure be happy to see this tall straight kid
joining him!
"Well! This is the way I see it. If you are going to continue
shovelling s.., on a s...pile fruitlessly, you can get the h... out
of there. It's all right with me. I will help you cross over to Spain.
But if you think you have a chance to be able to protect some of our
comrades, then you must pinch your nose and stay there, because nobody
could ever take your place."
"Ah!"
Would Frantz jump to the chance to get free that Bardin, in a display
of sentiment and weakness, was giving him. The young man's face lit
up. "Too bad," thought Bardin. But Daniel became gloomy again. Bardin
breathed better.
"OK Major, then, I must stay, because it so happens that I am
bringing you the names of half a dozen guys from Chatou who are going
to be picked up. Here is the list. But watch out. It is not enough
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to notify only those written down as a group leader. They undoubt-
edly are not all from the same group. Some are Communists. The
others, belonging to the Parti Social Francais (French Social-demo-
crat) are said to be in contact with Vallin, now supposedly in London.
here is a funny detail: the denunciation stated that Vallin had
changed hat."
"I see. This can be explained very simply. Before the war,
he used to wear the most fantastic hat."
"Well, by the way, the collaborators seem to have time to lose.
Do you know that they actually believe that a plane landed a few nights
ago on the Western Turnpike, at the end of the completed section, right
in the suburbs of Paris. They must be crazy?"
"Who knows, it could be true!"
Such was the beginning of an invaluable collaboration between
Frantz and the Eleuthere network which had just been organized by
Hubert de Lagarde and Bardin.
Bardin gave his personal address to Frantz, so he could reach him
in an emergency.
The young man did not seem to realize that this was
a sign of absolute trust. He never thought he might be forced to talk
under torture. He was to cross this rotten war of wolves without even
losing his extraordinarily unspoiled soul. This allowed him to last
one year in a service where everyone suspected him, and where he would
sometimes explode in vehemently anti-German statements which were immedi-
ately reported to Detmar. Probably his boss never thought that a
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Resistance agent would act so naively, and he sure must have been in
need of a young man who could read and write to keep his files up-to-
date.
Such a situation had to burst apart. But it lasted well beyond
all of Bardin's hopes.
III
THE INFILTRATION OF AN ENEMY SERVICE
SUCCESS
RESULTS
We cannot draw a complete balance-sheet of Frantz's activities
during the year he remained with the Anti-National Activities Repres-
sion Service. The records of Eleuthere, that we managed to save start
only in December 1943. Furthermore Frantz's information was immediately
explorted in the Paris area. If it affected the provinces, in order to
save time, the reports were sent through the channels of the French Army
Resistance Organization which were much faster. They were only trans-
mitted to London and Algiers if they had a long-term general value or
represented propaganda opportunity and if this did not risk compromising
the source. This last requirement was seldom satisfied.
Searching his memories, undoubtedly distorted and sometimes con-
fused, Bardin was able to remember the following on the period from June
1943 to April 1944, but excluding the last and the successful operation.
I hope that some of our still living comrades will recognize themselves
in the anonymity of these details.
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1. Several organizations were warned of an imminent danger.
First a few small groups in the Paris area, in Chatou, Le
Vesinet, Versailles, etc...
Then an escape net toward North Africa, which started in a
Marseille prison and operated through a hospital in the Boulevard
chave section. It was headed by the director of the prison himself
who had the prisoned patriots evacuated to the hospital where his
son-in-law was chief-physician. At this particular time, two Gaullist
officers and two Poles were getting ready to take off.
Also a retired general, directing a Red Cross organization in
southeast France, who was accused of squandering national funds for
the benefit of a Resistance Movement, whose leaders were known by
names, was also about to be "evacuated."
One of the first maquis was being formed in the lower Alps, under
the command of a regular army captain who made weekly contact in Nimes
at a particular hotel.
A whole group of "houses" which had been traditionally tolerated
by the police but which they were getting ready to close down. (perhaps
I should say open up) because they were used as letter drops for the
Resistance.
A Resistance cell organized around a police inspector of the
Estaque section of Marseille.
A group, within the Paris police brought about a problem of con-
science. Bardin thought that its leader who had been denounced as a
patriot, was actually a virulent Vichy man. He believed this was a
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case of pure and simple revenge by a colleague who was not as well
showered with honors by the new regime. He was still hesitating
when he found out that Detmar had closed the case, probably because
he was of the same opinion. They both turned out to be wrong, at
least partially. Bardin found out several months later that the
incriminated policeman had saved quite a few threatened Resistance
fighters. They were never to forget it.
And finally, there were small groups and isolated Resistance
fighters too numerous to list without boring the reader.
Of course, Frantz and Lt Bardin did not keep lists, but they
kept the "score" and remembered the totals. At the end of March
1944, 87 patriots, whose arrests would have led to others, had been
personally notified of the fate awaiting them. In April 1944, the
staff officers of a movement were also saved. They were to be
last ones.
2. A bold use of Frantz police pass helped on several occasions
to get members of the Eleuthere net out of difficult situations. Here
is an example. One day Bardin was going to city hall to pick up his
monthly ration tickets. The clerk inspected his card with unusual
attention, kept it, and without giving a word of explanation, took it
over to a man who was sitting on a bench near the only exit of the room.
He was obviously a policeman. Usually, Bardin could have taken care
of himself. A sudden blow with his right, then his left, followed by
a sprint and he would be in the street. But a subsequent investigation
the
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could bring troubles, not only for him but for the friends who
sheltered Bardin in Paris. The forging of the ration card was
not well done. The originating authority and the serial number
had not been changed. It was careless, but there was too much
to do to be that cautious. The mere checking with the originating
office of Marseille which had issued the ration card would reveal
that Bonnet was none other than Bardin, the terrorist. A search
at his old Marseille address, duly registered, would reveal the
location of an Eleuthere cell. Alas! Another imprudence! They
should have never placed a section in a house to where the Germans
might one day be led. This is how disasters occur. But this was
not the time to recriminate. Bardin hesitated. A clerk, a young
brunette, lively and charming (she was so pretty, this passer-by,
this shadow!)
obviously understood what was going on. She looked
at the suspect with an almost tender compassion.
"Miss," whispered Bardin, "call Mr. Frantz right away, Laborde
97-70. Tell him that a Mr. Bonnet wants him to rush over."
Twenty minutes later, the representative of the all mighty Anti-
National Activities Repression Service led the offender away, taking with
him the questionable ration card. Whew! That was close.
3. Wide-scale joint police operations against Resistance groups
or maquis, including one in Rennes, two in the Nevers region, and one
in the Orne area, were reported approximately eight days in advance.
This was done despite the fact that Detmar always kept the destination
secret until the last minute, even to his most intimate collaborators,
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with the possibility exception of the fat and pale Fourcade, as
discreet as a Seraglio eunuch, and incidentally looking like one.
But Frantz had noticed that, before each expedition, Detmar placed
local department license plates on his cars to avoid being spotted
during the action. Frantz was not certain as to the exact location
of attack, but as soon as the warning signal was given throughout
the department, it should have been sufficient to ward off the danger.
But was the warning received always or implemented?
In the Eleuthere document "Political Intelligence No. 291,"
sent to London and Algiers in February 1944, I read this paragraph
which was widely disseminated throughout the Metropolitan Resistance
as early as January 29:
Paris, 29-1-44, V. 36.
"From reliable sources, large police operations,
with reinforcements from Paris, will be carried out
within the next few days against compulsory work
dodgers, throughout the Savoie area. Similar opera-
tions will immediately follow in Lyon, then in
Marseille. All the Paris specialized personnel will
participate in these operations. License plates of
the department concerned have been installed on the
cars, to avoid drawing too much attention."
The now too famous Haute-Savoie operations started indeed in early
February, and you can read below the comic incident which preceeded this
tragedy.
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Gendarme Colonel Lelong, commander-in-chief of the operation,
was looking for a command post in Annecy. He finally picked a
hotel which he transformed into a fortress filled with automatic
weapons and surrounded it with barbed wires, for confidence and
trust were not the rule in these so called law and order forces.
There were a few customers in the hotel and they were requested
to leave right away, which they did quite willingly.
Lelong met them in the lobby, just before they left. They were
young people and looked like nice fellows. Full of remorse, the gen- 4
darme apologized courteously and offered them a car to move their
luggage. They refused after several overly polite remarks. This
first act ended with a noisy manifestation of support and the warm
wishes of the evicted people, for the success of the colonel's
mission which they affirmed with all their heart. Curtain.
The second act took place in the same hotel, several days later.
The first prisoner was brought to Lelong in his office. The papers
found on him proved that he was a liaison agent for a very important
maquis leader. Interrogation followed. Well... At least so it was
called. The man did not talk. Nothing doing. Lelong became angry.
"You are going to tell me where the command post of your leader
is, otherwise..."
The prisoner started laughing, leaving the policemen dumbfounded.
"Our leader? I can't tell you where he is now. But I know where
he was a few days ago."
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"Ah! it's finally coming out! Good! Where was he?"
"Right here!"
"Here? What?"
"Here. He was even sitting in your armchair..."
Well, everything had turned out for the best in the end. How-
ever, old unknown Annecy comrades! You should never have put your-
self in a position where you were so close to a living gendarme. You
could probably answer that Bardin should have had a well-forged ration
card and then add that the now dead gendarme had provided you with an
excellent joke which will make you laugh as long as you live - that
is, if you are still alive. Yes! True! It was very important to
laugh. Much more important than those who had an easier life will
ever believe.
But things could have turned out very badly, and you had been
notified, dammit!
4. London and Algiers were able to follow closely, the first
battles of the Resistance, thanks to the secret Vichy memos, reports
and orders. This enabled them to arrange for support of threatened
patriots and provide it on time. On the other hand, and most impor-
tant, the Interallied Headquarters was placed in a position to estimate
what potential contribution the Resistance could make to the landing
operations, and thus was able to base its decisions on more solid
foundations.
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Let us take for example, the combat operations of February and
March 1944.
Document No. 523 from Eleuthete, "titled," The Haute-Savoie
Operations as seen from Vichy" was an official document, "borrowed"
from the Ministry of Interior. Here are a few extracts.
"...The government authority (in Haute-Savoie)
remains in name only. Ninety per cent of the Savoyards
were supporting the maquis, and, if the German occupa-
tion forces had suddenly disappeared twelve hours would
have been enough for illegal authorities to take over
the regional government and the various other public
services, and control the whole department..."
It was too bad Vichy was not as good a prophet on the European
level.
"...The arrival of the police forces brought about
a state of overt war.
"The maquis includes:
1. The secret Army, composed of officers and
non-commissioned officers of the glorious 27th B.C.A.
who are leading one thousand young compulsory work-
dodgers.
2. The Communist F.T.P.'s,(communist guerrilla
organization) grouped in ten-man squads, bands (2 to 5
squads), companies, and battalions. A total of 1,000
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men... The United Resistance Movements are trying
to reunite these two groups..."
Even though they numbered several thousand men at that time,
the Haute-Savoie maquis made as much noise as an entire army.
"There was some disagreements between the F.T.P.'s
and the Secret Army. Before the Repression, the Secret
Army had publicly executed a few F.T.P.'s guilty of
banditry and terroristic acts. Should the German
troops have to retreat when the evolution of the re-
lations between the two organizations would lead the
Secret Army to fight the Germans while the Red com-
missars of the F.T.P. would take over the functions
of civilian authority over the area. The repressive
action seems to have brought about a defensive alli-
ance between the Secret Army and the F.T.P."
This was followed by detailed information concerning the order
of battle, the dispositions and the means of Lelong. It was evident
that, in the mind of a good infantry sergeant, Lelong would need the
genius of Napoleon in the Italian campaign to be able to handle this
operation by himself.
A second document contained this terrible confession:
"...The Secret Army has taken position in an
easily protected rectangle, the Glieres plateau limited
by the towns of Thorres, Saint-Philippe - de - Rumilly,
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Petit-Bernard, Entremont, Saint -Jean-de-Sixt, and
Thones. A request has been sent to the German
authorities to obtain the release of several ar-
tillery batteries and a number of planes from the
Armistice Army in order to destroy this stronghold..."
It was easy to forecast and we now know how the Germans replied
to this request. On March 12, they began bombing the plateau. Their
accomplices reported:
.The assault proves difficult because of the
technical qualities of the enemy leaders who were pro-
fessional soldiers, the rough terrain, and the few narrow
approaches leading to the stronghold. The Secret Army
in an offensive action, has captured fifty policemen
and killed a chief of the Mobile Republic Guard."
"...A Communist battalion commander, about 40
years old, captured and interrogated for several
hours, assaulted his interrogators, so that he would
be shot and not have to speak..."
There is something deeply touching and disturbing in this part
of the report. We are familiar with this kind of language. The Vichy
originators of this report respected too much the courage of the oppo-
nent for them not to be brave themselves. Was not this waste of living
strength a startling stupidity? It could almost make one cry. Were we
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going back to the vacuum of ancient Gaule after so many centuries
of unity which consolidated our strength and our greatness, and
while individually, we had not degenerated.
A little later, we were able to read this useful and disillu-
sioned synthesis:
"Tension is still very great and will probably
last several months. The situation of the police
forces is not very good and the action is diffi-
cult because of a shortage of weapons. Out of the
100,000 policemen stationed throughout the nation,
only 12,000 are adequately armed, in addition to
two regiments of curl guards amounting to 3,000
men, a few Militia units and sections of the Mobile
Republican Guard from the southern zone...
All available forces have been sent to Haute-
Savoie. They will have to remain there a long time,
and, yet, they are already required somewhere else.
Some Maquis units of similar size can be found in the
Cote d'Or (Montbard, Les Launes, Alesia), in Correze
and Dordogne. Some insurgent headquarters are installed
in big cities, especially in Lyon where the civilian
police seems unable to track them down.
Whenever the Germans will have to retreat, all the
vital points of the country will be occupied by the
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instantaneous arrival of the maquis in the cities,
an activity which most Frenchmen consider as the
highest mark of patriotism."
So Vichy was now tolling its own bell.
5. Another mission of Frantz was to observe the "Rue Lauriston
gang," including Chamberlin-Laffont, Bonny and associates. The first
items of information he brought, especially the special use made of
the basement refrigerators, were met with a certain amount of disbelief.
But soon his credibility was established. A few days before his police
career came to a brutal end, Frantz made the following report on May
4, 1944 (document: "Political Intelligence No. 529" from Eleuthere,
transmitted to London under record of dispatch dated May 13, 1944).
"A special police section has just been formed to
"direct" all "law and order services" in case of an
Allied landing. It is headed by Bonny, Malbiaut, and
Henry Lafont. They expect to recruit 5,000 natives
from North Africa at a tremendous price... The men of
good will who have nothing to do are reminded that
Bonny still lives at Boulevard Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, Paris,
XVII."
But the Eleuthere relations within the repression service, which
had expanded both in nature and magnitude, threatened, on this May 4,
1944, to turn into tragedy.
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IV
ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT AN IMPORTANT DOUBLE-AGENT
ITS SLOW STARTING PROCESS
One day during the 1943 - 1944 winter, Frantz arrived at his
bi-weekly rendezvous with Bardin, much more nervous than usual.
"Detmar asked me how you were," he said.
"What was the occasion?" grunted Bardin.
"He just told me point blank: 'How is Bardin?"
"And, of course taken off-balance, you nicely replied, just like
an idiot: 'Not bad, thank you."
"Not at all!" protested Daniel." "I am not a kid. I answered,
'I don't know... He must be in Africa or in Italy:' At that, Detmar
sneered unpleasantly and said, He is in Paris. And one of these days
he will end up in the clink if he keeps on playing like a... If you
can get in touch with him, give him this advice. Tell him I said to
get the h... out of there.' By the way, sir, contrary to what I feared
at first, Detmar does not seem to believe that we are in close contact."
Bardin pondered a while.
"All right. But what's his game?"
Frantz seemed absolutely positive.
"He is sincere. He is warning you. He also told me, 'I would
be very sorry if anything happened to him, especially since I would
not be able to help him out. He has really put himself in a bad spot.'
You know, sir, he means it."
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"Not a chance!" muttered Bardin. "Beware old chap!"
"No sir, he really likes you."
Somewhat offended, Bardin denied it. They argued over it.
"I don't know why, but you amaze him," replied Frantz, rudely.
"He calls you a 'Loyal adversary,' 'A guy who compels respect,'
'A man with guts and brain."
Deep inside, Bardin knew very well how Detmar had acquired
such a neutrality complex toward him. It was not due to deep-
rooted causes as Frantz believed. It was only superficial just
like everything about Detmar. But the result was the same. It
just happened by accident. Bardin had peculiarities which alienated
many potential friends. He gave the impression of believing in an
intellectual superiority which half a dozen friends granted him and,
on the other hand, of completely ignoring the opinion of others. He
was sharp, sarcastic, and sometimes ferociously ironic. If he was
deeply involved in a discussion, he crushed his opponent, whenever
he could. Only when the interest of the service was involved did
he stop being insolent. His relations with Detmar had only one aim:
the infiltration of his organization. For this purpose, he was always
careful to spare the hypersensitivity of the chief of the Anti-National
Activities Repression Service. During their few conversations, he
listened to him to the end (which was a torture), appeared to weigh the
policeman's arguments, refuted them tactfully and always without
sarcasm. Sometimes he even approved them seriously. Detmar, who knew
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the terrible reputation of arrogance of the officer, was touched
and flattered. That was all. But for Detmar, vanity was a drive
as powerful as ambition is for others. Frantz was right in his
conclusions.
said Bardin. "Let's assume you're right. Do you
really believe that he wants to warn me of a specific danger? Have
the Krauts talked to him about me?"
"I think he would have told me!"
"How does he know I am in Paris? Who told him?"
"I didn't dare ask him. But you have told me that you normally
run across four or five persons who know you every day."
It was true. Bardin had lived too long in Paris. He subjected
himself to such a security rule in all his movements (he walked 20-
miles each day to avoid using the subway) that, usually, out of an
average of five persons who knew him, two did not see him at all.
He had changed his appearance enough so that a third one, if absent-
minded, would not recognize him; but there were two remaining who
stopped him or made a friendly sign toward him. This was still too
much.
"O.K. Well then! Nothing has changed my dear Daniel!"
Bardin related this conversation to Hubert de La Garde, who did
not seem to pay much attention to it.
But several days later, unexpectedly, Lagarde asked him point-blank,
"'What did you decide to do concerning Detmar? Are you going to see him
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or not?"
Bardin was startled.
"I never said I intended to see him!"
"No, but that's what you had in mind when you said, 'I really
believe he won't turn me in."
"I said that?"
Lagarde smiled. Bardin frowned.
"First," he continued, "I am scared. Second, the question is,
what purpose would it serve since we already have an 'eye' in his
shop?"
"Actually, that's the only problem. Because your fear is just
like the coyness of an old cunning tart. You're not scared."
"Yes, I am. I can't explain it to you. It is due to an old
movie, The Mysteries of Chicago, or something like that, where some-
one called Bancroft would continually parley with gangsters. It was
terrifying. Just to think about it gives me the shivers."
Dear old Hubert, who never laughed, and who did not even know how.
Can one understand that 15-minutes of icy cold, out-of-place, and in-
coherent jokes could conceal the most serious thoughts and could help
maintain the mental equilibrium of the two friends?
"No," Hubert retorted. "It's because of your readings. You must
have read somewhere that the brave men confess their cowardice more
easily than the others. For the last month or two, you have stopped
your bravado and are continuously trembling. Are you going to go or
not?"
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"What do you think?"
"You should go. Your Frantz is O.K., but his functions are only
that of a subordinate and he has lost his boss' confidence. Detmar
is one of the 'wheels' of the collaborating police. If he is from
the Pucheu clan, as you think, maybe one day he will be fighting
against Bousquet, Darnand and the others. Who knows what will happen
in this basket of crabs? But, and this is important, didn't you tell
me that every Saturday Detmar usually has lunch with Blomelburg, the
number two man of the Gestapo in France?"
"Yes. He would make a terrific double-agent."
"I don't have to tell you. Can you contact him outside?"
"He moves about only by car, as you can guess."
"Too bad.
In this case, we'll have two comrades in a car waiting
in front of the post office at the corner of Boulevard Malesherbes and
two others on foot right at the corner of Rue Vezelay."
"When you go see Detmar, 69 Rue de Monceau."
"You think of everything," grumbled Bardin, "But why such a de-
ployment of forces?"
"First of all," exclaimed Lagarde, satisfied with himself, "to
give you a little bit of courage. But also to keep an eye on the cars
coming out of No. 69 after whatever time you go in. The only trouble is
the cops standing only a few feet away, in front of the Ministry of the
Interior at No. 61."
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I'll go," said Bardin, "But keep your men. Someone might
spot them and it would spoil everything."
Now that he had won, Lagarde became suddenly very serious
and cautious. He almost started raising objections about the
visit.
"I think it's all right," he finally said, "I have thought
a lot about it. We are in 1943, aren't we? and the war..."
...is about won, and everyone knows it. It does not seem
like it yet, but we are the victors. We can allow ourselves a
few capers. 0.K?"
The second floor of No 69 Rue de Monceau sheltered a secret,
invisible, and silent administration. It was completely different,
on the third floor landing, the visitor, having filled in the re-
quired form, was told to sit down on a bench against the wall. He
sat there under the cross-fire of the dark looks of two men armed
with submachine guns, in a first class gangster style. It was like
a small shooting gallery with one living target.
God only knows that Mr. Bonnet-Bardin did not deserve such flat-
tering attention. The glasses he wore for far-sightedness took away
the usual boldness of his bearing. He looked shabby. From his trans-
formation from Bardin into Bonnet, he retained modesty in his clothing
and a reassuring physical humility. In short, he had such a bored and
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sly look that it should have made him pass for an informer in this
house. Not to be recognized as one offended him, as it would have
offended an unknown and misunderstood actor.
A uniformed clerk, his cap stuck on the back of his head and
his behind glued to his chair, reigned over the waiting-room. He
had placed Bardin's form under his elbow and moved his cigarette
butt to the corner of his mouth to spit out, "the boss is busy. Wait
here."
Bardin had replied," Thank you sir; thank you very much. I am
in no hurry."
This was a consummate lie. He wanted to be out of there fast.
He was really scared. There had been too much talk about it But,
above all, he was feeling completely disgusted about himself, the
situation, everything, which was translated into peculiar, absurd
and nostalgic mirages. Reminiscences of the best hours of his military
life loomed suddenly. Who is that idiot who said, "A happy remembrance
is the best remedy in time of stress." This is all wrong. It leaves
you even more bitter and sad.
Remembrance! The departure for the attack early, in the brisk and
fresh Moroccan mornings. The first bullets making a "Tak-k, Tak-ko"
noise and the haze curtain rising on adventure. The high, naked and
stormy peaks on which he would climb, full of expectancy, to find
only a pile of still warm and empty shells left by the bastards who
had missed you. Good old General Dufieux saying one day, "Bardin,
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I know that this terrain is hell, but I do hope that the ragamuffins
who gesticulated in front of your tanks were not native guides on
duty."
And the dry reply, "General, these men you saw up there were
my tank leaders and myself. We don't let anybody else open our way,
even though you have said that we are not 18th century cavalry com-
manders. And anyway the tanks are dirty. I am sorry."
What a pleasure it was to have the last word with a superior!
But it was not fair to have been that impertinent with General Dufieux,
the best "old man" in the army. Good God: It would be necessary to
add several chapters about "military obligations" to the French Army
Manual written before the revolution by Mr. de Vigny! In those days,
they knew all about "grandeur." Unquestionably... The last word...
But as far as obligations were concerned, they did not know a thing. In
1815, to end one's career as a captain was considered a catastrophy!
They did not know that later, an entire generation of military men
would be quite happy with attaining this rank and would not give a
damn about becoming general. General of what? Was the military career
in France returning to this shameful masquerade?
Hold it! Steady! Avoid all thoughts! For nowadays, each time
you start to think, everything goes wrong. Result: Confusion--chaos...
depression.
Half an hour went by. Bardin was now taking an interest in the
comings and goings on the third floor landing. Thanks to his
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conversations with Frantz, he could identify the Anti-National
Activities Repression Service personnel. The one with the
meridional features, dark, but livid and sickly looking, was Larrieu,
who was responsible for the death of at least ten men in Poitiers.
As far as physical appearance, Bardin liked him better than the
chubby and red-haired Fourcade. Nothing is more disgusting than
a cruel fat man. But to see a girl in there was quite intolerable.
All the more so since she was a good looking kid, healthy and gay,
full of laughter, exactly the type with whom to spend a Sunday after-
noon at Robinson. Bardin adored women. Consequently, he was rather
unconcerned, indulgent and skeptical towards their intellectual and
political views. He knew well where they came from. Not from their
head. He found himself wondering who would be the best qualified
among the comrades of the network to bring her to our side; this poor
little lamb. It would take both a "sweet talker" and a well-built
fellow for the job. But she had just married one of the hirelings of
the Anti-National Activities Repression Service.
late, or perhaps too soon!
These thoughts were interrupted at the precise moment when they
were taking on a frivolous and pleasant turn, by a man coming out of
the chief's office. The receptionist went in and came out ten seconds
later. He suddenly became polite with Bardin. Detmar had probably
reacted as expected when he read on the introduction card: "Major
Bardin." The latter had thought that it would be quite original and
Too bad! It was too
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would show a decisive, self-assurance if he were to introduce him-
self under his old and real name. It pleased him. The clerk un-
doubtedly had identified him now, but too bad!
"Come in, sir."
Everything was fine. Bardin was not afraid anymore. Not even
butterflies. In ten seconds, it was certainly impossible for Detmar
to take any hostile measures. But Bardin's sudden calm was by no
means reasoned or forced. It was a relief, a release of tension
brought about by the action itself. When he first looked at Detmar,
Bardin even felt that he had completely regained his self-confidence.
Why? He couldn't tell. It was instinctive.
The chief of the Anti-National Activities Resprssion Service was
standing behind his desk, embarrassed, uneasy, visibly stupefied and
undoubtedly without any immediate bad intention. He was the one who
lacked assurance. Very funny!
"Hello, Mr. Detmar."
The clerk left and closed the door.
"Are you out of your mind?" shouted Detmar.
ftwhy?tt
"Because, during the past month, two persons have informed me
that you were "wandering" in Paris."
"Informers?"
"Not at all. But some will find out, and others possibly know
already. I told this to Frantz. Didn't he warn you?"
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"No. I don't see him any more. Besides, what risk am I running?
I am--how should I say--retired from business..."
"Tell that to your mothpr:"
Detmar would never bellieve him. He shouldn't go too far. He
smiled to belie his words and erase his too obvious ruse. Careful:
One blunder already:
"Moreover," Detmar said, isn't it true that you have actually
a German death sentence hanging over your head? so..."
"You well know what I did in Vichy..."
"I am not talking about Vichy but about what happened in Marseille..."
"That was a typical case of miscarriage of justice!"
"I was right: You are completely crazy: In order to have a mis-
carriage of justice, you need normal justice. How can you talk about
judicial error at a time like this!"
"No, Mr. Detmar. No. You are the one who is crazy. As far as I
am concerned, I have one chance out of two to hold on until the end.
But you.. .you won't be able to save your neck after it's over. You
know it perfectly well."
Now it was Detmar's turn to question.
"Why?"
"Because the Germans have lost the war, because Vichy will be
crushed, and because you are too smart not to know it."
This was probably too fast, too direct and too brutal an approach.
But one word brought on another. Actually, everything was going just
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fine. Betmar, frozen until then, was now relaxed.
"By the way, I didn't even shake your hand nor did I congratu-
late you about your promotion. Please sit down. But, should you
really be congratulated? major! With ideas, such as yours you
would be a general if you had left. Well no one can say if you
are benefiting from your ideas, major."
Bardin's heart started beating faster. He felt he had won. Why?
Because of a very small but significant detail. Mentioned after three
years have passed, it seems ridiculous. Never had Detmar had the
courtesy, a rule between casual acquaintances, of addressing him by
his rank. He probably did not know that the "Mon" in front of rank
designations was only an abbreviation of "Monsieur." He undoubtedly
thought that it was a subordinate's way of address and felt it would
lower him to use it. Therefore the fact that he was using it today
meant that he instinctively saw in Bardin a forerunner of the victors.
Retrospectively, it does not make any sense. But, at that moment
it encouraged Bardin to say modestly, "I really can't complain. I
heard that I made lieutenant colonel. But I have not received the
official notification yet. The 'Journal Officiel' is late, you under-
stand."
A characteristic usurpation of rank. But it was necessary that
he looked important.
"You are not doing too bad for a man retired from business!"
"Oh! You know I was kidding. You know me."
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"Sure! And I won't ask you: Gaullist Secret Army? Army
Resistance Organization? Franc-Tireur Partisan?" (1)
"Good. If you asked me, it would give me the impression that
you were questioning me professionally, and that would disturb me."
They both laughed. The ice was finally broken. Everything was fine.
"Yes, Mr. Detmar, the Germans have lost the war..."
Bardin then started to prove this in a friendly manner and by a
very clever argument he had prepared with Legarde. It was not neces-
sary. Detmar was convinced. Bardin was sure hoping for it. The
only reason why he had dared come there was that no more than one
out of a thousand Frenchmen still believed in the German victory.
Still, Detmar could have been that one; the one who still wanted to
believe, because he had nothing to hope for. In any case, Detmar
wanted to talk some more. He had just phoned to cancel an appointment.
Bardin breathed a little.
"Interesting," said Detmar, But there is one possibility you seem
to forget, and that is a seperate peace. The Russian threat is such
that..."
Again that well known, but already obsolete tune, which was the
great hope of Vichy.
"What would happen to us in all this? Who would lead France? Have
you ever asked yourself that question?"
(1) Franc-Tireur Partisan (FTP), Left-wing guerrilla organization.
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"It's pointless."
Bardin became as mute as a fish. They had now reached a
subject which he had expected to bring up only at a second inter-
view, at which time he had planned to find out what ideas and what
leader he should bring up in order to get something out of Detmar,
or if it was enough to promise him personal safety. Detmar rambled
on confusedly. He was not at home when discussing abstract ideas.
His small, narrow tough-looking and stubborn head, towering over his
tall, thin and powerful body really made him appear as a magnificent
man of action. But he wore glasses. Thick, egg-head glasses. This
was going to ruin him.
Nevertheless, Bardin continued to listen with the same interest
which had won him Detmar's good-will. On that day his benevolence
was not calculated. Though Detmar's remarks were all desultory, they
gave him away, thought the French officer. Not very complicated that
Detmar. He was like one of those people who are driven to extremes
by an hypertrophied evangelical virtue or a mortal sin. With him it
was pride. It explained everything. Not only his faults, but also
his qualities; his courage for example. Even his political ideas.
He had a natural, almost complusive tendency to exercise authority,
to praise the use of force and to look down on his fellowmen.
His wild hatred for communism was not natural. He readily used
the word "social" while biting the table with his fist. He would have
made a good "People's Commissar" during the great era. But the practice
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of his profession had transformed his passion into a second nature.
When he spoke the word "commies" he looked like he was vomiting, and
the "tricolor masquerade" made him yell like a pig.
All of this had to be taken into account. Bardin got up.
"Would you mind if I came back to see you? I am deeply inter-
ested by what you say. I would like to do something for you..
Detmar frowned. The authoritative tone in this hunted man's
voice disconcerted him more than it irritated him. He stiffened.
"Why should I mind? I serve only one man; Marshal Petain. As
far as I know, he is not the one who sentenced you."
"No. His way would be to repudiate me. If you can give me the
name of only one of his subordinates for whom he stood up in the course
of his long career.. .well, you've got a free meal in the restaurant of
your choice."
Outside, Bardin breathed cheerfully and forgot to respect the
military rule: "See before being Seen," which he had carried over to
his walks in Paris. Was this venture going to be a success? Perhaps!
It was strange that Detmar had not asked, "To what do I owe your
visit?" He must now have been asking himself that question, without
finding an answer. Funny as they said at the Anti-National Activities
Repression Service.
Ten days later, there was a second meeting. Bardin started with
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a few sneaky perliminaries.
"...Another restoration. Under whose leadership? I don't
know. It's not any of my business. But what I know is that France
will need all her men and on that day it won't be the time to get
shot, jailed or exiled. Let's not forget about that!"
"I will never run away," replied Detmar. "I will not hide.
I don't have to repudiate what I am doing. If they come to arrest
me, I will defend myself, weapons in hand."
He was to keep his word, exbept for the last detail.
"This is stupid. Help us, and I promise you that..
This was one of the occasions when Bardin was not equal to his
mission. His leaders had told him, "Yes, you can promise him the
protection of Algiers and London:"
Bardin had sneered, "And Moscow's also, perhaps?"
Everyone had a good laugh. Actually, the question had been con-
scientiously asked through the chain of command. It was unbelievable
that the reply had come back so fast.
"Of course! Go right ahead:"
This mysterious and anonymolls chain had operated almost only
one-way for the past few years.
It became routine. If on the next day one of Bardin's good agents
were to ask, "Can I promise the moon to Bousquet if I bring him to
our side?" Bardin's answer would be, "Naturally!" and he would after-
wards consult his superiors only out of a deep-rooted sense of discipline.
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It would be easy for him. He did not know Bousquet. He had
never seen him. Nor had he ever seen the famous mandarin of the
game of conscience. Does everybody know this questionable society
game? Well, you ask your friends, "If all you had to do was to
push a button in order to cause the painless death, at the other
end of the world, of a contemptible, centenarian mandarin who is
a total stranger to you, but who has bequeathed you a billion
francs, - and furthermore, if you were absolutely certain that no one
could see you press the button, would you do At?" You will always
find a few hypocrites who will answer, "Never."
Yes. It was a self-defense reaction. Too many of our comrades
were dying every day. We could not defend them by being honorable with
an enemy who had no honor. Theoretically, Bardin had long forgotten
these prejudices of the victor. Incidentally, was it of the victor
or of the vanquished? He forbade his men to have such prejudices.
An actual fact, he would not even think about them himself, if it was
only a question of giving an order--or pushing a button.
But there he was, face to face with Detmar! Looking in each
other's eyes, as they say. Bardin well knew that all the promises
he made would drift away with the tide. Detmar was going to die,
swiftly and surely. As sure as done. So, it was hard for Bardin to
lie. In vain, he said to himself, "Dangerous weakness," "sinister
sucker," and many other things impossible to repeat. All he could
utter was, "I promise you that I will defend you."
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"With whom?"
"This is the same as asking me the name of the organization I
belong to."
"Isn't it the least you cat do?"
"No. But I'll answer you anyway. You can take my word for every-
thing I say."
Actually, this devious answer was close to the truth. Eleuthere
was a network of the London based BCRA (1). But Bardin also belonged
to the G-2 section of the French Army Resistance Organization, which
was linked with Algiers at that time. Lagarde, who was hand in glove
with Bardin, was the G-2 of the French Forces of the Interior Head-
quarters which was directing all the resistance in France, Guerrilla
and Partisan Forces alike. Bardin suddenly realized that he was even
more rational in his behavior than he had ever thought. He was so
apolitical, that he was a little bit of everything. What a joke!
"Anyway, I don't care," said Detmar, I am not asking for anything.
What do you expect of me?"
"To save endangered patriots."
"I'll do it for nothing. I would do anything for Giraud; nothing
for de Gaulle, and everything against the 'commies."
We were to see later. For the time being, Bardin strengthened the
position he had reached.
O.K. Could you find out for us the whereabouts of Magda Fontanges
(1)
Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (Central Office of
Intelligence and Action). A purely French organization controlled
by General de Gaulle. Translator's note.
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who left her Boulevard X. residence, and could you tell us if the
people on this list right here, are German agents?"
All of this was nothing but a test of Detmar's good faith.
Through Fontanges' nurse who lived in the Seine et Marne department,
we were able to arrest the fugitive spy. The list given to Detmar
included only well-known spies, except for two men who were just under
suspicion: a ragman from the slums, somewhat of a hobo, and his son-
in-law, a former policeman who had been fired some time before. Fon-
tanges and the latter two had offered dubious services to Colonel
Zarapoff, the military leader of the "Liberation-Nord" organization.
Moreover, it might be a good thing if the corpses of a few German
agents were to lay between Bardin and Detmar. For example, those of
the ragman and his son-in-law, particularly if their death had been
the result of Detmar's actual fingering. There is nothing better than
a few skeletons in the closet to insure certain friendships.
The first reaction was good. Even excellent. Ten days later,
Detmar confirmed all the informations of Eleuthere. He backed them
up with absolute proof. So-and-so was a lawyer having contacts with
the Resistance who had made a trip to Spain, on a Gestapo mission from
such and such a date. Another was a naval reporter with an assumed
noble name who was being paid in such and such a way not only by the
Germany but also by Japan, something we didn't know. The hobo-ragman
and his son-in-law were, indeed, agents-provocateurs. Colonel Zarapoff
would gain a few months of life and action out of this. Alas only
a few months. But undoubtedly "Liberation Nord" escaped a complete
slaughter.
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"You don't mind if we liquidate all these people, do you?"
questioned Bardin.
"Nov" answered Detmar.
"Splendid:"
Hardin was now regularly visiting Rue de Monceau three times a
week. Detmar punctually answered the intelligence request. Some-
times he even took the initiative; for example, concerning Frenay of
the newspaper, Combat and concerning General R., commanding the French
Army Resistance Organization. He disclosed that the Germans knew about
General R. 's connections with the Secret Army. Known also to the Germans
were some of the talks which took place in Lyon early in 1943, between
General Frere, General R. and the representatives of the various move-
ments. Detmar proved it with a document which could lead to the source
of the "leak." He gave warnings concerning the planned wind-up of all
general and superior officers of the former Armistice Army, but it was
too vague to persuade all concerned to go completely underground.
It was impossible to make him mention Pucheu's name. And Bardin
did not force him to do so. He did not think it was important anymore.
He knew that Pucheu, under the aljes of Pourrien. (In French: "For
Nothing" and the future was to give its meaning a prophetical sense
of ferocious irony), had arrived in Cassablanca from Spain in May 1943,
and had drowned in the African political stream and now was probably
under house-arrest somewhere in the south. He thought that the last
current of Vichy dissidence and its unfortunate attempt to establish
ties with Algiers would now be of interest only to the historians. No
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premonition warned him that Pucheu's dead body was going to wreck the
big project he was slowly building in his mind, and that it would
lead him very close to his own destruction.
V
ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT AN IMPORTANT DOUBLE AGENT
FAILURE AND CAUSES
Within a short time, all the positions Bardin had consolidated
on Rue de Monceau, either on his own or through Daniel Frantz, were
going to be lost during one of these crises without killing, without
shooting, almost without fuss, with only soft-spoken conversations,
purely mental excitment, and only nervous efforts--but the slightest
slip, a wrong word, an insignificant and humanly unavoidable mishap
would start one of these terrifying dramas which caused the end of so
many of our comrades and the end of so many of our organizations.
Bardin had decided on January 1, 1944, as the deadline for the
completion of his main goal: to convince Detmar of "doubling" the
Germans. But on January 15th, nothing was accomplished yet. In the
course of his last meetings with the policeman, Bardin had felt his
way, had "beaten around the bush," but each time, he gave up, put it
off, and evaded the issue. He gave his reasons to Lagarde who re-
proached him for it and pressed him to go on.
Lagarde was right. Chapter IV of this book will show to the
reader that a highly and well placed double agent can accomplish more
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than one thousand good ordinary agents. Detmar would be the ideal
and unhoped for double agent. His repression service had just
been reorganized and expanded so as to better inform the Germans.
This was his job. Every Saturday he had lunch with Blomelburg,
()berg's brain, who had offered a car as long as a city block to
the Anti-National Activities Repression Service Chief. In France,
there was not ten individuals more desirable than Detmar to be used
as double agents. The confidencethe Germans placed in him would
have made him more precious in this role than many higher level
collaborators'. This even included Laval, because the Germans were
a little suspicious of their Auvergnat.
"What are you waiting for, buddy?" said Lagarde.
Bardin found it difficult to explain. It was hard to define,
due to some kind of timidity, restraint, and discomfort caused by a
stiffening of Detmar's attitude.
"It's only your impression," mumbled Lagarde. "Nothing tangible."
"Yes, there is something, protested Bardin," He always answered all
my questions; but now, he no longer tells me anything on his own initi-
ative. Only through Frantz did we learn that they were planning to
attack the Nivernais maquis. I pointed out to him acts of excessive
violence by his repression service. And instead of getting milder, it
is spreading and worsening.
"Nonsense! You are losing your guts! And it's quite annoying.
We had requested a seat on a plane for London, for either you or I, in
order to have Detmar accepted as a double agent and to bring back to him
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his first package of "Spielmaterial." They are going to think
that we are "screwballs" just like the others.
Deeply stung by this remark, Bardin promised to try again at
the first opportunity, although, as he strongly stated, it was
against his better judgment. Immediately afterwards, Lagarde felt
like backing down, conscience stricken, something which happened
every time he succeeded in convincing his friend to do something he
was against.
"You could go at it progressively. After all, there are several
ways of handling a double agent, or rather there are several catego-
ries of double agents. Starting with the unconscious one to whom
false information is fed and who will pass it on to the intended tar-
get..."
Bardin interrupted Lagarde.
"In such a case, who is the real double agent? It is perhaps re-
grettable but a counterintelligence officer does not operate himself
without an irremediable loss of prestige extending to the entire service.
This ?type of job is really too equivocal. The more a trade is rightly
or wrongly discredited, the more its leaders must be differentiated
from the actual performers, and stand far away beyond the splashes.
The Monarch used to choose his police chiefs within the traditional aris-
tocracy. They were among the greatest civil servants. It was also a
practice in Imperial Germany: 'Intelligence work requires high-class
people.' Great Britain recruit for Scotland Yard at Oxford and Cam-
bridge. And our own remarkable counterintelligence service of the
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Third Republic gladly allowed the Criminal Investigation Bureau
to handle any repression."
"I never thought about it, but you are right," admitted Lagarde,
"But then, what do you suggest?"
"The only thing that an officer can do in this job. Go bluntly
at it with a straight and clear proposal, letting both parties know
where they stand. Besides, if there is but one chance to succeed,
that is it. Detmar is too experienced to play jumping-jack without
being the wiser. Furthermore, he still clings to the idea that he is
the prominent representative of a still-existent regime. I bet you--
and its an important nuance--that he does not address Blomelburg by
calling him "Herr Oberst" anymore than he calls me "colonel." This
way he places himself on an equal footing with him. He negotiates as
between powers and carries out a political police fact. Maybe he would
feel lowered if he was "giving tips."
"In this case, your direct proposal would fail as well."
"My God!" sighed Bardin, "That's what I really believe. Other-
wise, I would have asked him long ago. But you are right. It must come
to an end. What risk am I running? To see him angered at me and to lose
him as an "honorable correspondent."
"Yes, of course. Does he know where you live?"
"No. But he can find out in 24-hours. However, we have not reach-
ed that point yet."
"No," said Lagarde, "No, of course not."
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To go at it straight forward was an easy thing to say. Yet for
the last ten minutes, Bardin and Detmar had been talking about trivial
matters in the anteroom of the Rue de Monceau office, and the officer
could not bring himself to take the first step beyond the point of no
return. Indeed, after the first word was uttered, it would be impos-
sible to turn back, to stop; still it had to be done. Straightforward-
ly! Bardin took a deep breath and--almost unconsciously?approached
the question indirectly.
"By the way, Mr. Detmar, if some day you were to receive certain
information leading you to search a particular place--if you were to
"find" some documents there which would somehow get to the Germans after-
wards--and if later these documents were to reveal themselves partially
false (I repeat, partially), then the Germans could not blame you for
it. You would be in no way responsible."
Detmar had a shoulder motion, perhaps not quite a jump, but surely
more than a start.
"Do you really think that I give information to the Germans?"
"No. But it can be a very respectable job. All depends on the
information you give them."
"Whatever it is, it would still disgust me," replied Detmar abruptly.
It was exactly what Bardin had feared. God only knows in what
unsuspected corners one's points of honor could hide. Detmar turned
French people over to the Germans, but to do the same with papers made
him blush with shame. He was willing to help his fellow patriots
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struggling against the invader, but only in a certain way, and up
to a certain point. And not all patriots. He intended to choose
them. He played both sides at the same time, to serve political
ends as well as personnel interest, but not in all cases or in all
circumstances. What about today? Today he had answered too spon-
taneously to have made any profound calculation. It was really a
point of honor. He was as touchy as he was crooked. There was nothing
left to do but to change the subject and to later think over the con-
sequences of this obvious failure. Both men parted coldly, setting
their next meeting for three weeks later, instead of the usual ten days,
at Detmar's request.
For the first time, Detmar missed the scheduled rendezvous. He had
left for Annecy with about 50 men. He had not said a word to Bardin
about this project, nor has he given any implications of it. Frantz was
the one who gave the warning concerning this operation in Haute Savoie.
It was obvious that Detmar was avoiding Bardin and was suspicious of him.
Why? Bardin and Lagarde could not find any logical explanation to
this sudden change. Neither could they foresee any alarming consequences.
They decided to wait and see. In any case, such a course of action was
imposed by the circumstances. In February and March 1944, Detmar made
only brief and unexpected trips to Paris. Bardin knew about them from
Frantz, but he could not show up at Rue de Monceau during each one of
Detmar's fleeting appearances, without revealing that he had an "eye"
in the place. However he tried twice. The first time, Detmar had already
left. The second time, the clerk returned with Detmar's apologies. He
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was in conference with his superiors. Hum...
Lagarde and Bardin, absorbed with other tasks and other worries,
forgot about their disappointment. In March, the Pucheu trial opened
in Algiers. I know little about the case and have other things to do
than to extract and study the court files. I have no opinion as to
how severe the sentence should have been. But, objectively, it is a
fact that in 1944, Vichy was no longer recruiting members and that it
was not necessary to discourage the collaborationists. Another fact
was that Vichy noisily and cleverly exploited the execution of its
former Minister in order to stop the desperate flight of its followers
gifted with the well known instinct of rats on a sinking ship, by crying
out to them, "Too late!", and thus holding them back. One must admit
that it was partially successful. My total ignorance of the whole
question and the accusation of opportunism which will undoubtedly be
thrown at me, cannot deter me from having a categorical opinion on the
subject. It was certainly the opinion of my comrades then at grips
with the difficulties of the domestic struggle, and for whom the output,
the result--in short, the liberation--prevailed over ideological prin-
ciples. The Pucheu trial should have been delayed until a later time.
Whatever can be revealed to me, even if Pucheu was another Himler-would
not make me change my mind.
The Eleuthere net alone lost several new and precious intelligence
sources; witnessed the sudden closing of doors which had just partly
opened on military secrets; and felt the difficult and dangerous sta-
bility of its security jeopardized.
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Bardin said to Legarde one day, "I wonder if the prosecution
against Pucheu does not explain Detmar's attitude."
"I have thought about it," answered Lagarde, "But I am certain
is: doesn't. Detmar was still helping you after Pucheu was under
arrest in the south. When he 'dropped' you, the situation had not
changed, and nobody was talking about a trial."
"He could have had 'tips' we did not have."
"Not a chance!"
The two men forgot about Pucheu and Detmar.
In March 1944, all that remained at 69 Rue de Monceau were three
or four sleepy clerks and a busy one; Frantz, who was feverishly copy-
ing the files of the Anti-National Activities Repression Service in
order to complete those of the Eleuthere net. He was also watching out
for the reports from Haute Savoie in order to intercept them.
At the same time, the activity of the Eleuthere Counterintelligence
Section was almost completely engrossed in a detailed census and a
survey of all the houses occupied by the Germans and their friends in
Paris, while their comrades in the intelligence service were concern-
ing themselves with the defensive works within the capital: the block-
houses, the fire plans, etc. This mission had been ordered by the
French Army Resistance Organization which had emphasized its importance
without explaining why. It was not necessary. Obviously, it was aimed
at neutralizing the whole German garrison in one move on the insurrection
day. Lagarde had an idea.
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"You should try to contact Detmar again," he said to Bardin.
"The national uprising might bring about belated double agent vo-
cations. Detmar could, for example, notify us on the hour and the
place of some important Gestapo council, lure a few big wheels in-
to an ambush, or even.. .well the possibilities are unlimited. How
do you feel about it?"
"Greats I think it's tremendous," answered Bardin.
Lagarde was carried away.
"Can you see us rousing Oberg in his bed one of these mornings.
If I were you I would 'feel-out' Detmar as soon as he returns.
would whisper in his ears that the time for the settling of accounts
is nearing and that his positive accomplishments are very little."
Bardin lived in the apartment of the charming Mejane, who, before
the war had assumed the terrifying responsibility of handling the love-
lorn letters of the late magazine Marie-Claire. She left in 1940. Not
a single soul, even when in deep trouble, called her any longer in 1944.
Bardin gave the telephone number to only three friends, including Frantz.
Furthermore they were to use it only for important and urgent matters.
On a morning of April 1944, the telephone rang for the first time
in two months. Bardin dashed to the phone and picked up the receiver.
It was Frantz' voice.
"Is this you? Would you come and have a drink with me?"
"O.K."
"We'll meet at the Villiers metro station."
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"I am leaving right away."
It was eleven o'clock. Bardin had to give up going to a meeting
with a correspondent which he could not notify. That was extremely
unfortunate. But Frantz did not abuse the telephone. He had used it
only twice in a year, and every time it had been for a good reason.
Bardin rushed to the Villier subway station, trying in vain to think
about well-known, well-studied and well-established troubles.
Eleven twenty. Frantz was pacing along Boulevard de Courcelles.
He seemed nervous.
"Big trouble?" asked Bardin.
"On the contrary. A real stroke of luck!"
"You should have tried to let me know about it right away over the
telephone! I was really worried."
"Does a National Movement of War Prisoners and Deported (M.N.P.G.D.)
exist in the Resistance?"
"Yes; and in importance, it comes right after the large well-known
Movements."
"Who is the leader?"
"For Pete's sake, what's the matter?"
"Well, they have been infiltrated to the core and completely sold
out. I have the proofs with me."
A counterintelligence agent has always a perspective of his own.
For him, when the underground fighters are discovered, the "staggering
blow" becomes a "stroke of luck" if the denunciation is intercepted.
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Before passing judgment on such a peculiar way of thinking, let us
remember the miracles that have occurred in the army, thanks to
esprit de corps.
The two friends sat down at a corner table in a small cafe at
the Prosper-Goubaux Square.
"We don't have much time to act, major."
"Well, tell me the facts in a few words."
"Police inspector C. (1) came to the Anti-National Activities
Repression Service at 10 o'clock to deliver a report concerning the
M.N.P.G.D. which he had been able to infiltrate. Since all the chiefs
were absent, he handed his report to O., one of the two Resistance
sympathizers I told you about. O. gave me the report so I could give
the alarm. But I must give it back to him no later than 12-noon, be-
cause he has strict orders in such cases. A document of this nature
must be carried before lunch to a certain X. de V. who belongs to
Darnand's staff.
A voluminous roll of papers was trembling on Frantz' lap.
"I hope it's not a plant," said he.
"What gave you such an idea," Bardin asked, surprised.
"That ape C. has an ugly mug."
"Well!"
"On several occasions, during the last three months, the other
Resistance sympathizer in the Anti-National Activities Repression
Service, L. has been advising me to be more cautious because my
(1) Since this man has not yet been tried, I will give only the in-
itial of his last name.
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activities were suspect to the other guys in the office."
"You have nothing to worry about from within the Anti-National
Activities Repression Service."
"Why?"
"Because I have something on Detmar."
"Aren't you a little too optimistic?"
Bardin smiled, reassuring. Frantz shook his head.
"Major, Detmar may be one of your agents, but he would never for-
give me to be one also."
"What do you know!" exclaimed Bardin, pleased with his disciple.
"You did understand that! You are making progress, my son. Obviously
Detmar deserves a Fuhrer's mentality. Give me the loot. And make sure
anyway that you have not been followed."
As soon as Bardin glanced at the report, he too showed signs of
feverish agitation and nervous shivering. There were more than eighty
handwritten pages, almost illegible, with no paragraphs and no titles
to lead to the interesting parts. The first two pages, full of "I"
and "Me," were a Vichy article of faith. Only on the third page did
the writer start telling, among a jumble of useless details, how he
joined the National Movement of War Prisoners and Deported. Several
hours would be needed to decipher all that mess. It was 11:30. Still
everything had to be read. Leafing through other pages with a trem-
bling finger, Bardin discovered names, addresses, and actual facts.
"S...!" he said, "I 'm going to keep it until tonight. To hell
with it!"
"Impossible," protested Frantz.
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"Son, this is serious. It so happens that I know at least
the name of the leader of the M.N.P.G.D., Michel de C. and he is
mentioned in here on every other page."
"O.K.," said Frantz, "You are the boss. But in this case, you
better keep this garbage forever because I will not be able to re-
turn to Rue de Monceau if this document does not reach Darnand's
office by noon. This, by the way, is quite all right with me!"
Bardin hesitated. He could not rely enough on Detmar to
lose a good observer within the Anti-National Activities Repression
Service. In such conditions, Frantz' disappearance, would endanger all
his family, especially his brother, chief of the forged papers lab, in
the southern zone, who was still living under his real name in Lyon,
and who was so unconscious of dangers that he would probably refuse to go
into hiding.
Bardin swore under his breath. This wasn't the time to analyze,
to weigh the pros and cons and to foresee the future. It was 11:40.
He had to make a decision right away. The major looked at the report
which seemed so huge to him.
"I'll be through with it by noon. If not, you'll take the first
train to Sologne where we are going to start organizing a few maquis.
They do not accept people for England or Africa anymore."
"All right," said Frantz. "But it would be better to..."
"Shut up!"
Bardin got up, walked across the room, and locked himself in the
toilets, determined to stay there until he was through, or until a
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rescue-squad forced him out. Fortunately, it was light enough in
there to be able to read despite the lack of lights. The first
minutes were disappointing. 11:45. Bardin still had not found any-
thing useful. He became nervous. He felt dizzy, his ears were
buzzing, his heart beat faster and he felt sick to his stomach. It
was strange, but he was more shaken than if he had been faced by some
personal danger. He swore then felt better. He read diagonally, pick-
ing up names and addresses, grasping at the main facts. He thought!"
After all, if I can't finish it now, it will only cause another family
to go completely underground. Wait a minute! Not only one. Two.
S...!
Bardin had forgotten that his own parents were hiding at Frantz'
mother's home. They were 75 years old but it wouldn't stop the Germans
from arresting them as hostages. S...!
11:55. Knock.
"Shut up! I am sick."
He was talking to an impatient and furious customer.
Noon. Knock.
"I am telling you I am sick, dammit!"
"Well, it does not stop you from barking." grunted the other guy.
Ten past noon. Bardin came out and walked across the dining-room
in an atmosphere of chilling reprobation. From now on, he promised him-
self to be more indulgent with people who were too long in the toilets
and to be less grudge-bearing toward the teachers of his school years.
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The training he gained in handling papers while preparing his exams
was at least useful for once in his life. He had "sifted" the docu-
ment thoroughly.
A small incident but an affair with big consequences. It was a
pure treason, well done by a clever man. The policeman C,, stationed
in Vichy, had penetrated the M.N.P.G.D. under the cover of a captive
friend who had vouched for him. Probably, in the beginning, C. did
not intend to betray the movement; he expressed his adoration for the
marshal too violently. In any case, he had drawn important sums of
money from the National Movement of War Prisoners and Deport, to or-
ganize an intelligence service which he was now heading. Little by
little, he had gained the confidence of the patriots. After a while,
all "compartmentalizations" were open to him, and there were no cut-
outs between him and the head of the network. He knew its leaders
Michel de C., supposedly related to General de Gaulle; his assistants,
D., V., and others; the places where the meetings were held, including
the most secret one (Rue de Turbigo in Paris, if Bardin's memory was
exact); the forged documents lab; the cells for the Paris area and the
center of France; the goals and the achievements of the network. - Actu-
ally, he knew everything, everything indeed. And he was turning all
this information over to the Anti-National Activities Repression Service
pell-mell, in the form of personal statements which revealed his cun-
ningness, his stupidity, his venality, his depravity, and his burning
desire to be promoted to commissioner. Why not him, after so many
others?
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It was obvious that the National Movement of War Prisoners
and Deported was finished unless an ultimate compartmentalization
remained. But Bardin did not think so. However, there was still
time to save the men. About 30 names and corresponding addresses
were mentioned by C. These were the main leaders. They would
warn the others.
Bardin walked (or rather jogged along) a few paces with Frantz
towards Rue de Monceau. The young man opened his mouth, taking up
the conversation where he had been stopped earlier.
"It would be better to spread the suspicion among others than
0. and myself, since we are the only ones who handled the document.
I hope there will be a few guys in the office. When I go in, I'll
shout, 'splendid! tremendous! that's what I call work' and hand
the document to them. It will be enough that they just glimpse at
it to be as involved as 0. and I, should this thing 'kick back'."
"In the next war, you'll be all right, son. Go back there and
be cheerful and smile!
At 1 FM Bardin was writing brief individual warnings which the
Parisian patriots would receive in the afternoon and which would reach
the people in the provinces the net day, most of them in the Vichy-
Clermont area. Lagarde was reading them over his shoulders.
"You forgot to tell them who denounced them."
"I did not forget," replied Bardin. "I am concealing it. Should
C. get killed, my friend, Frantz could be shot in retaliation."
"You are always dramatizing."
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"No Hubert. Don't forget, this is the Anti-National Activities
Repression Service. Frantz is already a suspect to them. He handled
the document and..."
"Well, then, you only have to specify "Don't do anything to C...
until further orders."
"And he'll be dead within 24 hours. You still believe you are
in a light infantry battalion."
"Hum.. .but it's going to be dangerous then. Our comrades from
the M.N.F.G.D. are going to continue dealing with C."
"I know."
"Furthermore, if Frantz you and I don't live through this war,
your C. may end up as Police Commissioner of the Liberation regime."
"0. K. That's why it is not completely useless to have a few
central organizations: National Committee of the Resistance, Military
Organization Committee, etc... and that you're a member of them. They
will always find a way to get out of troubles without any harm. So
study with the Bureau for the Infiltration of Public Administrations
the necessary measures to neutralize C. discreetly."
There was a silence. Then!
"G.. dammit! Just to think that it could happen!"
"What?"
"That such bastards as C. could become considered as a great
resistance fighter!"
Therefore, C.'s name was not given right away to the patriots he
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had betrayed. Several days later Lagarde received a very reassuring
report. It seemed that everybody had received the warning in time.
Michel de C. was supposed to have left for London by plane. There
had been no arrest except that of two followers from Auvergne (and
that information had yet to be confirmed). The police was supposed
to have discovered the warning note in their pocket, which would be
an inexcusable mistake on our men's part. But it was probably a false
rumor. We shall see in the next chapter how, in 1944, the Eleuthere
net used to obtain without too much delay the German police reports
of the Stulpnagel headquarters. These analytical and apologetic re-
ports complacently listed all the arrests. They gave their big boss
everything, to the last detail. He must have had some time to waste.
Lagarde and Bardin examined these reports. All they could find con-
cerning the National Movement of War Prisoners and Deported was the
following:
29 April, Paris.
"Rue Montmartre. Forged Papers Center of the
Organization, 'Movement of War Prisoners': un-
covered."
No arrests were mentioned. Fine. It was a successfully completed
action for the Movement. But for Eleuthere, it was just the beginning.
Meanwhile, Detmar returned to Paris to stay indefinitely. He had
a long interview with C. who had come from Vichy. Immediately after
the informer's departure, he called 0. in his office. Stiff, cold,
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certainly more dangerous than if he had been angry, he told him,
"The guys from the National Movement of War Prisoners and Deported
were warned and took cover. The leak came from this office. You
and Frantz were the only ones to know. What have you to say in your
defense?"
O. protested. C. himself could have made a mistake, he could
have been suspected by his comrades of the Movement. They could
have been informed through another source. Maybe Darnand's office...
"I have no time to lose!" interrupted Detmar sharply. "I know
what I am saying. The leak came from here."
"Then," said O., "I don't know. I am not the one. Let's see.
Who saw the file? Frantz did, yes. And M."
Detmar flinched. M. was a conceited imbecile, whom he trusted
fully.
"Then there was X. too, " continued O., "And Y. I believe that's
all. Hum, no...there is also Z..."
"Thank you," said Detmar, who, after a start of surprise, had re-
gained the face of an impenetrable and chillingly cruel judge.
O. became scared. So did Frantz whom Detmar did not call in his
office. Obviously he was making an investigation. Bardin was worried.
His joke about Detmar having a Fuhrer's mentality wasn't quite untrue.
Detmar displayed the morbid symptoms of self-overestimation and of mis-
trust toward those around him which characterized the small paranoiac
corporal. Such a man wants to be a demi-god to his subordinates, and
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can be driven to any extreme when he feels flouted by one of them.
Freedom, and the lives of others had little meaning for the Anti-
National Activities Repression Service.
Bardin met Frantz every evening. The young man had to stick
it out. This meant not only that he had to stay put, but also that
he had to appear as unruffled, gay and inconspicuous as usual. The
two men spent a week-end together in the country, in Sologne, to pre-
pare their possible retreat. They poached for relaxation.
When he returned to Rue de Monceau on Monday morning, Frantz
found his desk and drawers forced open and his papers in disarray.
Detmar called him in.
"I am firing you. You have 15 minutes to leave this office."
"But..."
"Shut up!"
Frantz should have demanded an explanation. But Detmar's face was
so distorded and convulsed with rage that Daniel did not dare. He was
scared and not without justification. He had been too long in this
organization to believe that it was all over and that he could get away
with so little damage. He knew that they had adopted the disconcerting
habits of the German police. They made their arrests on door-steps.
They gave beatings in the stairways. They even.. .well, one shouLd not
think, as Bardin would say.
Under the close surveillance of the two armed men from the waiting-
room Frantz gathered his personal belongings, walked toward the landing
and started going down a few steps. Fifteen more seconds and he would
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be in the street. Freedom, the big wide world would start at the
first street corner.
"Hey Frantz!"
The young man's blood ran cold. He turned around. Inspector
Herbert Bontoux was calling him. The old routine. Frantz went back
up. Bontoux's face was frozen.
"Say: The boss asked me to tell you that if anything should
happen to a certain guy you know, you and your brother will be shot."
"I don't understand," said Frantz.
"Neither do I. That's all."
Bontoux turned and walked away. Whew! Bardin had been well in-
spired to spare C. temporarily. If C. had been killed, Frantz would
already have been dead for a few minutes. And if two members of the
National Movement of War Prisoners and Deported had been arrested
carrying the warning notice, and if this notice had mentioned C.'s
name, Frantz would have been dead for several days.
He rushed downstairs. As in the final act of a play in which the
writer does not refrain from melodrama, on the second-floor landing
Frantz met Bardin who was walking upstairs with a frown on his brows
and an absent look behind his thick glasses. The armed men stood
watching over the handrail. To hell with it!
"Good morning, sir," said Frantz.
"Morning."
"I just got thrown out. Be careful," whispered the young man
rapidly.
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"Good. It's better than to be thrown in the clink. Go to the
duck pond."
Bardin gestured discreetly to Frantz, and went his way grumbling
aloud, "Already you have finished your day's work? Nice job you haves"
He always pretended to treat Frantz as a scamp when he met him at
Rue de Monceau. The livid face of his young friend had given him quite
a turn. What was going on? Was he arriving too late. He had come that
morning to try to get Detmar under control again in accordance with La-
garde's plan. Was the project surpassed by current events?
Worried to death and extremely nervous Bardin entered Detmar's office.
"I just fired Frantz."
Bardin burst out laughing.
"I am not a bit surprised. He is a good-for-nothing. I always
told you so."
"But I almost had him arrested."
"Ah! Something serious?"
Only now did Bardin feign to notice the withdrawn, mean and hostile
attitude of Detmar who had remained standing. The officer settled down
comfortably in an armchair. He became serious.
"What is it all about?"
"A bunch of 'screw-balls' from the Resistance who were making
troubles. I am convinced that Daniel warned them of a denunciation."
"In that case, Detmar (it was the first time Bardin called him
by his last name), Frantz saved you the trouble of passing the tip on
to me. Because it's what you would have done, isn't it?"
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A few seconds of silence followed. Detmar, who had shown signs
of nervousness in the beginning of the conversation, suddenly calmed
down.
"I would not have bothered these people," he said.
"Then, it is only a small incident. I don't understand why you
seem to attach so much importance to it. Furthermore, you gained
something out of it. You are now rid of Frantz who is as lazy as a
three-toed sloth."
"I am not through with him yet. I don't like people to make a
fool of me. I hold both he and his brother responsible for anything
which could happen to my contact."
C. might not get very far. All this could end up badly. Bardin
decided to take a strong position. This matter had to be settled, filed
and buried before his departure from this office.
"Listen Detmar, you and I are not the kind of group leaders
who can take the law into our own hands. Frantz' family and mine are
friends. His mother is like a sister to me. I don't want anything to
happen to him or his brother even though it could be proved that he has
been indiscreet. I insist on it."
"Does he work for you, by any chance?"
For a fleeting moment, Bardin was in such a state of excitement
that he felt the bellicose and crazy impulse to say, "What of it?"
But an obscure instinct stopped him. With a cheerless voice, he uttered
the long prepared reply to this expected question.
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"No, he is too stupid." But a vindictive impulse pushed him
to add, "I only have intelligent and important people working for
me..."
He let a moment go by, then casually continued, "You, for ex-
ample."
The two men glared at each other during the many interminable
seconds of a heavy silence. Detmar had his hands in his pockets
and one could see the bulge they made. His fists were clenched.
Fugitive and strange thoughts crossed Bardin's mind. They were less
ideas than formulas and words. I leave them to psychoanalyst ameteurs
to explain. For example: "Army of Italy - Very far. - Strained to the
maximum. - Too strong. - How was the tone of my voice? - Moderately
categorical."
"I should say something now," he thought. But about what? Hardin
felt the urge to stop there for the day and postpone "sine die," the
ultimatum (there is no other word for it), which, in full agreement with
Lagarde, he had come to present. It obviously was not the right time.
He got up. But suddenly he could see Lagarde sneering at him,
with pursed lips. He could hear him say "chicken." He sat down again,
filled more with anger than with courage, but still in control of himself.
"Today is a wrong day to tell each other off. So let's not argue
if you don't mind; but instead, let's speak completely freely. As far
as I am concerned, I can say it to you in a few words. You don't give
me a damn thing anymore. You didn't inform me about the Savoie operations.
Your people have been accused of having used much brutality there..."
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"It's absolutely false. The most they did was "beat up" a
few "commies."
"These are fighting Frenchmen."
"Against you, my poor man! What they are really up to is to
get rid of their political opponents, to plunder, to extort, and to
prepare their revolution."
"When you say 'poor man,' I know that you really mean 'stupid.'
Our apolitical position might not be as over-simplified and blind
as you think. It is rational, voluntary, and it even requires a lot
of courage. I know just as well as you the doctrine of the Third
International concerning national defense. I know that the party
has not deviated from it since the Congress of Tours. It was anti-
militarist until 1935, because France was a so-called capitalist
country. It was even traitorous during the fighting in the Morrocan
Rif, because this was what they called an emancipation war. It was
"war-all the way" at the time of the Franco-Russian treaty because
France was an ally. It was defeatist immediately after the signature
of the Germano-Russian treaty. Finally, after May 21, 1942, it was
again patriotic because..."
"So?'
"So? So, if you 'catch' Thorez one of these days (which I doubt)
I will not intercede in his favor. For all I care you can roast his
feet if you wish. But please leave alone all the little guys who are
fighting on our side. Even when they were screaming against the
'd...army' I could not be mad at them very long. This is because I
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have the practical and actual experience of a man from the ranks
which is much superior to yours. Look at my left hand. Do you
see this scar? It was made by the bullet of a Rif Communist."
"You seem to bear no ill feeling."
"Yes.. .1 do. Sometimes. But not always. Back in 1926, in
Morocco, I took as a driver for myl tank; a guy who was supposed
to be a revolutionary propagandist. During his first mission, that
little bastard sabotaged my 37-mm gun which obliged me to take a few
risks, and caused this wound on my hand. Fortunately for me, it was
only a flesh wound."
"What happened after?"
"Then, I bashed his face in with the other hand instead of having
him court-martialed. This happened on May 24, while we were attacking
the Doukken plateau. Nobody found out about it. On July 14, on top
of the Tastert Mountain, in the area of Taza, he saved my life. Every-
body found out about that. In September, he refused to return to Meknes
with the guys who were to be demobilized soon, preferring to remain
with me and participate voluntarily in the attacks of Arbala and Bou-
Atas in the Middle-Atlas."
"What does that prove?"
"Nothing. Everything. At least, there is always something that
remains when one has fought for his own country. You surely know that
one gets more attached to people whom one helps unilaterally, and also
to the causes one serves voluntarily and completely."
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Detmar did not protest. He said, "They could screw you..
"Perhaps. Especially if you and others, let yourselVes be
compromised by Vichy. If you give the impression that you are
only defending material or class interests, or some international
cause, as they are doing. In which case, individuals like myself
will not see any difference between them and you. And that would
be terrible, Detmar. We must save all those who fight the enemy,
and our enemy is the occupation force. Truths are pouring in on
you, so get your red umbrella ready!"
Again, a moment of silence, during which Bardin was surprised
to find himself breathing so hard and so fast. Detmar was blowing
like a grampus. Was he affected? Was he off balance? Bardin at-
tacked.
"I am very, very busy! In high places I am being reprimanded for
your carelessness, and your service is considered one of the worst.
I am reaching the point where I am wondering if I can still keep my
promise to defend you."
"I don't care."
"I believe you. You are not a coward. But I care."
Detmar started suddenly to gesticulate again. Pacing around his
office back and forth he violently declared, "After what General Giraud
did for Pucheu, whom he had called to Africa, I have no illusions as to
what I can expect from Lt. Colonel Bardin, who only told me, 'I will
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defend you.'"
Bardin, caught off guard, forgot to protest.
"As a matter of fact, that's the way you got me," continued
Detmar. "If you had said 'I will save you,' I would have laughed
in your face. I would have taken you for a dirty liar, and would
have ordered you to stay out of my way."
Bardin knew it was true. At least it was a truth that Detmar
had built up himself and which had become real--which amounts to
the same thing. Yet, the officer had blamed himself for not having
tried to bluff more than he had. Now, amazed, he listened to the
disclosure of a succession of his own errors, in dealing with Detmar.
He had been so sure to treat him in the best psychological manner.
If he ever made some progress froM the beginning, it was only due to
sheer luck. He had not understood Detmar at all.
First, he had to hide his surprise. The policeman (let's not
forget that he was giving himself away through emotion and anger)
uttered that enormous word, the zenith of Vichy propaganda.
"Among patriots like us," he continued, "...and among individuals
of our social class, we must put ourselves above differences of ideas
and passions, and we must talk. You were on one side, and I was on
the other; but you had my personal trust. You would have betrayed
such a trust by hiring Frantz behind my back. You did not..
Bardin thought there was an interrogative tone in the voice. There
was no doubt. It was a question.
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"I don't have to repeat myself," declared Bardin.
"O.K. But don't think that I can get in trouble with Vichy
because of the information I might have given you. Do you know
anyone either in London or in Algiers who would believe my word
against yours? Well! Here on this side...."
Bardin started to have a cold sweat. In his first bellicose
impulse, he had almost admitted brutally his relations with Frantz.
This would have been a declaration of war.
"...When I hear your talk about 'commies,' I understand every-
thing about you and your de Gaulle who is turning our country over
to the riff-raff. I am not surprised any more that you assassinated
Pucheu."
Pucheu again. There was the problem. This name, which Bardin
never wanted to mention had become Detmar's war cry. It made him
wild. His small eyes were shining hatefully behind his thick glasses.
The same type of glasses that Pucheu wore. Pucheu was the reasen for
everything. Bardin felt inside him the slight tremor of intuitive
discoveries. Unbeknown to him, his dealings with Detmar had certainly
always depended on the police of the Pucheu clan. It was not to the
Resistance, but to the man who claimed to be for Algiers rather than
London (this was found out after a thorough investigation) that Detmar
had rendered his services. Pucheu had hoped at the time to play a role
in Algiers. When Gaullism had won in Africa, Bardin became an adver-
sary. His efforts in trying to stir ideas, to call upon the reason and
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the heart of the policeman, and to convince and move him had been
useless. His pretension of leading the game had been ridiculous.
He never had the smallest influence, the smallest part in the evo-
Lution of his relations with Detmar. They were entirely determined
by the fate of the Algerian political game.
But...to think of it, now that Pucheu had been shot, Bardin did
not interest Detmar anymore. Yes, he did. As a hostage!
Suddenly Bardin felt incredibly alone, weak, defenseless. He felt
an undefined, light but lasting tingling in his loins. It was moving
toward the small of his back. Today it would have been necessary to
have comrades in front of the Boulevard Malesherbes post office and
around the corner of Rue Vezelay. Indeed, it was always at the wrong
time that one thought about being careful.
What started to reassure Bardin was the fact that Detmar kept
on vociferating and spitting his anger. He spoke to much. The officer
regained his self-control. He had one trump left, perhaps even two.
His personality was one Detmar always said: "Between men of our social
standing...." Good! Things were not so dark. As long as Bardin was
in the mood for a joke, everything was O.K. Besides, he was the victor
wasn't he? He suddenly remembered a German officer he had captured in
June 1940. Humiliating recollection: his inferiority complex when
facing the disdainful prisoner.
"My dear friend," said Bardin, "we are living in an era which is
fascinating for personalities such as yours and mine. Fascinating..."
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Bardin never wished so hard to have yet to be born!
"...providing that we can say later what Sieyes answered when
asked what he had done during the Revolution. 'I lived.' But you
are wasting too much time with me. I'll be short. Honestly, it is
my duty to tell you: My dear friend, I will not be able to intercede
in your behalf later, unless you render in the very near future, some
tremendous service to the Resistance..."
"What Resistance, by thunder!..."
"There is only one. And now, this service would have to be some-
thing big. I don't know,...something like...liberating all the pri-
soners of the Fresnes prison.. .getting rid of the Gestapo.. .its up
to you to decide, my dear friend."
Bardin thought that he must stop saying "my dear friend" every
few words. There is nothing more suspicious than a man who suddenly
addresses another in such a manner several times in a row.
"It's all over," said Detmar. "Your friends have built a wall
between us."
"Think it over anyway. Do you want me to come back and see you
at the beginning of June?"
Come back? That was another problem! Yes indeed!
"Very well. Adieu."
In the alleys of Park Monceau, always swarming with adorable and
playful little brats, Bardin breathed deeply. He kicked a kid's ball,
to the great indignation of the liliputian players. Young Daniel, who
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had recovered his natural complexion, welcomed him with a smile,
near the pond.
"0. caught up with me in the street. He promised to 'tip'
me as long as he will stay in the place."
"That's very good. You are all right my son. Give me his
personal address and take the first train for Sologne; I don't
want to see you any more until the Liberation."
Bardin felt that he needed to have a talk with Lagarde. At
that hour of the day, Mr. Sebastiani-Lagarde was probably at the
Hotel des Ventes (Auction-Palace) where now days he spent most of
his time.
If Captain Count Hubert de Lagarde had earned his living in
the antique business, he would have ruined himself, like any good
soldier. But Mr. Sebastiani was only using that trade for a cover.
Therefore he was successful.
That's life for you. Success had come
to "Chez Swan" zooming, overwhelming. No more haggling over the price
for some second-rate deal. Now, Swan's customers included all the
Paris neo-capitalists, these champions of the black market, stars of
all collaborationists, Fritz from the Gestapo or from the occupation
forces, all of whom were at a loss about investing their newly acquired
fortunes and were searching for so-called real investments. Sometimes,
a distinguished Frenchman entered also. But it was then to sell...dis-
creetly...quietly. He was well received. He left happy. A few of
our readers will perhaps remember seeing Mr. Sebastiani, who worked at
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49 Rue de Cambon, in a shop bearing the nostalgic sign of "Chez
Swan." Mr. Sebastiani, a head "a la Clouet" perched on top of a
long and lean body, always bending under a heavy load of thoughts
and worries (perhaps also because of a premonition); a man with
the courtesy of the well-bred, but always rushing, always absent-
minded and so unbusinesslike.
Such an incongruous medley of customers presented a danger.
But they could no longer manage without the basement of the shop
where they kept the records, where they had their photo-lab,
and the sleeping quarters for the liaison agents and the sub-net
leaders passing through. The sleeping quarters looked like a mu-
seum. One slept in a Duchess Du Barry canopy bed (a reproduction)
and when the place was overcrowded, the youngest could lay as best
he could in the Marie-Antoinette sleigh (it was authentic but no-
body believed it).
The least important drawback caused by Swan's success was that
the shop was emptied in a few days. It had to be restocked. That
was the reason why Mr. Sebastiani spent most of his time at the Hotel
Drouot(1) where he finally decided to hold most of his underground
meetings, for the place revealed itself discreet and safe. Bardin
found him there, in a room where people were fighting over a Louis
XV chest of drawers with such ruthlessness that it would give one
doubts as to the efficiency and objectives of the Anti-Jew Crusade.
He whispered what had happened into Lagarde's ear, while the auction
(1) A large Auction-Palace in Paris.
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cross-fire crackled around them.
.In short, in this undertaking I walked like a blind man,
from the first to the last step."
"Does it surprise you?" said Lagarde. "You were doing counter-
intelligence work without an army, without a police force, without
money and without information as to the situation. In addition, your
liberty and freedom of action were only precarious and temporary.
60,000!"
"60,000 what? Ah, on the chest of drawers! You could listen
to me, you damn second-hand dealer."
"I am listening. What surprises me is that you got away. I can
confess it now. I always thought that this affair would end up badly
for you. Sorry I didn't tell you before. You know I never pay any
attention to premonitions as far as my safety is concerned. 70,000!"
Mr. Sebastiani had eyes only for the chest of drawers. But in
no way did this fact prevent Lagarde from thinking about the Eleuthere
missions.
"We'll try to link up with 0. But you're not going to do it.
Detmar is convinced that Frantz was working for you. You are the only
one he knows in the Resistance. He is going to hold you responsible
for what happened to his Pucheu. It already looks like your goose is
cooked. It's starting to smell. Tonight you get the hell out...
85,000!"
"No. There is no danger."
"Dammit!" exclaimed Lagarde. "You are really a pain in the neck
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with your Resistance stories."
"What's the matter?"
"You made me unconsciously bid twice as much as this chest
of drawers is worth. Now this time, it's really mine."
Some eight or ten days later, on May 21, 1944, Bardin barely
escaped getting arrested at his home. Lagarde always remained
convinced that the operation was instigated by the Anti-National
Activities Repression Service. Bardin never thought so. He was
right, for it was formally confirmed two years later.
Our story stops here, abruptly. We are not dealing with a
novel for which we can choose our own ending. Often this is the
only difference with real-life stories.
What I want to show is that the role and the handling of an
ordinary counterintelligence agent, which is the elementary task
of the trade, presented considerable difficulties and dangers during
the enemy occupation. As far as recruiting important double agents,
without whom counterintelligence could not work efficiently, it was
the same as if we were throwing ourselves in a game of chance while
in a state of semi-consciousness. Sometimes, the game was over be-
fore we realized that we had risked everything on a single play.
In France, from 1940 to 1944, intrigues, by the hundred, most
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of them more complex, more deadly, and more effective than ours,
were being hatched, brought to a head and unravelled each day.
How is it possible to grasp the overall significance, the swarm-
ing activity of this intense secret life? The Frantzs could be
found by the thousands and the Bardins by the hundreds, all of them
precariously watching over tens of thousands of patriots, and trying
to protect the birth of a true insurrectional army. For one Frantz
and one Bardin who survived, how many are dead? To find out, it would
be necessary to check the enemy files, inside his counterintelligence
achieves.
It just happens that we can do just that. For several months in
1944, the Eleuthere net was able to obtain both the German counter-
intelligence and the Vichy police documents through sources similar
to those mentioned above. Thus, we could discover everything the enemy
knew about us, without losing any valuable time. We are now going to
change place with the enemy and borrow his shoes for one month.
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CHAPTER III
ONE MONTH OF FRENCH RESISTANCE (MARCH 1944)
AS REPORTED BY GERMAN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SITUATION IN FRANCE IN 1944
AS SEEN BY THE GESTAPO
"Gentlemen," said S.S. Colonel Bickler, "The essential point of this
course, the main idea which must be present at all times in your profes-
sional and personal life, is the following: 99% of the French population
1
is openly or secretly hostile to us. The French people hate the Germans.
% They will never forgive us for having treated them in such a kindly manner
for the past four years."
A murmur of indignation rose from the audience which included 70 desk
officers from the Section VI of the "Main Office of the Reich Security"
and 6 members of the foreign services. The most "Franzosenfresser," those
who spat on every thing that was French, gritted their teeth. The others
just nodded approval. The Gestapo discipline would have been enough to
insure such a unanimity in the reprobation of the unjustified French atti-
tude. But it was reinforced in this case, by a deep and general conviction.
If the 77 men gathered here did not understand France, who could ever? For
a long time, this had been their job.
The Reichssicherheitshauptamt, literally "Main Security Office of the
Reich," was the holiest element of the Gestapo in France. The mission of
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its most secret section, the Abteilung VI was to "furnish to the
Reich government all the elements it needed to be able to improve
the situation in France." This was the definition of the mission
as given by S.S. Colonel Doktor Knochen at the beginning of the course.
This definition was typically German; undefined, if we may say, vague
enough to be applicable to any situation. Doktor Knochen had been more
precise about the particular measures to be applied. He had added,
"This includes: 1. The infiltration of V-agents (undercover agents)
in the Feldkommandaturen (Field Occupation Headquarters) to eliminate
worthless individuals; and, in the Wehrmacht, the Todt Organization,
and the Gestapo Special Groups, to root out the pessimists and the
defeatists. 2.. The introduction of French V - double - agents, not only
within the French Resistance and the Communist Party, but also in the
government; with the Jewish organization, the Freemasonry; the clergy;
the public administration; the economy; the professional association;
and the peasant and youth Movements, etc."
He had really added "Etc," to be sure of not forgetting anyone.
National French unity, this sacred union which we had been unable to
accomplish for the first time in our contemporary history, this German
had achieved in his point of view as Gestapo chief.
The Section VI, a political superpolice, had a monopoly in recruiting
French double agents and German stoolies. Colonel Bickler was virtually
its commanding officer. The 70 desk officers (Referenten) and the 6
foreign service members had gathered there to survey the situation in
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France. They were not only trusted members of the party and S.S.
dignitaries, but they were also specialists (Fachleute). Their
specialty was to rule France through the use of intermediaries.
One could find among them protagonists of the pre-war Franco-German
associations, important journalists, businessmen, former consular
agents, big firms representatives, and numerous students and gradu-
ates of our universities, who in 1939 had pretended to be Francophile,
supposedly persecuted by Hitler, and who, when we had said a few
sympathetic words to them had always answered bending over us in ad-
dressing our belly-buttons. Now they were taking their revenge by
delivering us to their Abteilung IV colleagues the Repression Section
so that it would be our turn to bow our heads.
They knew everyone in France, down to the lowest, hard-working
reporter, the smallest businessman in trouble, the embittered penny-
a-liner who would go as far as to publish the diary of his own slut-
tish mother to sell more than 4,000 copies, the crooked small town
politician, the corrupt civil servant, the so-called lady of the world
selling her services, and the failure who had become a bartender. They
had lived with us for so long, knowing fully well what they were after.
We were to read, with the unavoidable feeling of admiration for a job
quickly and efficiently done, the "Otto List" which was published by
the Propaganda Section during the first days of the occupation bearing
the signature of one of their French puppets. It was a small book list-
ing all the literary works which the French people were forbidden
to read. No subject was forgotten and nobody omitted. It started with
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Adolph Hitler, himself, for his "Mein Kampf", and went down to the
most obscure French novelist of Franco-German adventures, Pierre
Nord. It was really too much honor.
"Gentlemen," resumed Colonel Bickler....
(But the ironic reader will undoubtedly raise the question, "Was
the author listening under the table?" No. He was not there. But
I have in front of me a list of the names of the desk officers attend-
ing this conference, as well as the minutes of the sessions. The Agence
Immobiliere obtained this information by a particular means which can-
not be revealed at this time. All the sentences which I put in the
mouth of Germans were actually spoken by them, word for word, or are
accurate summaries. Thank God, they made a few mistakes and I did not
make any change. The reader will make the corrections themselves. Now
they should be able to. They know enough about the play and the actors.
Even the German names mentioned here are true.)
"...Gentlemen, I call your attention again to the
other lessons you must remember from this course. S.S.
Colonel Keller talked about the technical administrative
procedures. I shall insist only on one point. The file
of each of your agents must include, in addition to the
already required information, typical pieces of correspon-
dence showing the man's own writing style. The enemy
has "turned around" to many of our V's, and we must use
all means available to find the forged documents trans-
mitted by these W's (let us repeat that "V" means"double
agent" and "W" refers to a "turned around double-agent").
"S.S. Colonel Weizel talked in length about both
the friendly and the enemy intelligence services; so I
shall spend little time on them. The Japanese intelligence
service in France is not important. The one to watch is
the Italian intelligence service, which has established
contacts with the French intelligence service. The neutral
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intelligence services are nothing but disguised enemy
intelligence services. The Swiss service in particular,
is nothing but a branch of the British intelligence
service (I.S.). The Catholic Church intelligence service,
under the leadership of the Dominicans and the Jesuits,
must never be underestimated. The British intelligence
service has only a few representatives in France, but
they have a lot of French agents at their disposal. All
the active members of the Communist Party are used by the
Russian intelligence service and we have not yet been able
to arrest a single one of their net leaders. The American
intelligence service is nil but is undoubtedly working
under the wing of the French G-2. The Belgian intelligence
service, M.O.D., is to be feared: its main office and its
commander,D., are in Paris; it is exclusively controlled
by the Belgians, but most of its agents are French. The
Polish intelligence service is also well organized, but
has less personnel. As of today, we have seen almost
nothing of the Yugoslavian intelligence service.
"I kept our main enemy for the end. The French G-2
which was abolished publicly and with great noise at the
Armistice, was reorganized as early as August 1941, under
the cover of the B.M.A., an organization supposedly work-
ing against bolshevism. In reality, its only goal was to
send agents into Germany under the disguise of laborers.
"Since this activity was discovered, it was forced
to disband again in 1942. It was replaced by the military
security service, which concealed its officers in the
youth work camps and other vital projects. At the same
time an active intelligence group was formed under the
command of Captain Vauthier who has now fled to North Africa.
Parallel to the military survelliance service was another
intelligence organization stemming from the G-2 which was
called the Agence Immobiliere. Apparently, this Agence
Immobiliere has been organized in conjunction with the
British intelligence service and it uses the same agents.
We have captured an important part of the intelligence
material from the French G-2.
"Each French Resistance group has its own intelligence
service, but they have had little success until now. This
is why the War Ministry, in close liaison with the I.S.,
has organized in France a resistance movement which is under
the control of the I.S. and is called the "French Section."
It is composed of Frenchmen under the command of British
officers. Its sabotage and radio activities, its air-land-
ings and parachute drops, in order to conduct guerrilla
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warfare in case of a landing, have all been described
to you earlier. You are well aware of its nine branches.
The "French Section" maintains close relations with the
Communist Party and supplies it with weapons. The section
also keeps in touch with bourgeois resistance groups.
They have 11 regular planes and 14 landing strips at their
disposal.
"Colonel Noseck has told you that you were to keep
close social contacts with the members of the collaborationist
parties. He expects that you will prove the double-dealing
of both the French Government and the regional Prefects, for
most of them have sent secret reports to the French G-2.
He wants you to infiltrate North Africa through the former
colonists and the numerous Moslems residing in France and
to make contacts with Frenchmen living in foreign countries
(especially in Spain, Portugal, and Turkey) through their
collaborating relatives.
"We must anticipate an Allied invasion. Therefore, a
network of "hintergelassene Agenten" (stay-behinds) must
be in position as soon as possible. It has to be composed
of agents particularly reliable and undoubtedly still un-
known to the enemy. The Germans who desire to remain in
France after the final treaty has been signed, must prove
from now on that they are capable of doing good intelligence
work.
"S.S. Captain Gutekunst has recommended a close co-
ordination with the propaganda staff." Captain de Kunze
has dealt with the surveillance of the French administrative
employees. The Milice collaborationists can be trained in
the use of weapons but none of these weapons must remain in
their possession. The POW organizations must be watched
carefully since they are infiltrated by many chauvinistic
elements. "Captain Alesh has explained to you the importance
of the information gathered in Spain and in Portugal. Your
agents must not only contact the Phalangists, but they must
also find informers among the 300,000 Spanish Reds. Channels
originating from the Basque National Party are leading to
the British intelligence service, and we should infiltrate
them. Captain zu Christian has shown you that the only way
to find out the real intentions of the enemy is (1) to in-
filtrate his network. This is the reason why we are here.
We must be successful in infiltrating the enemy.
(1) Cf. part VI, chapter I "Counterintelligence and Conduct of the War."
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"Because, gentlemen, all over France there blows
a wind of madness which could end up in a 'manifestation
of collective hysteria,' similiar to what happened in
the times of the 'St. Barthelemy Night' or the Great
French Revolution. The compulsory deportation of French-
men to Germany leads even the most cowardly among them,
slowly but surely, to a state of fury where he may be
driven to accomplishing rash actions. In addition, we
must remember that Vichy is the world's most unpopular
government; a mixture of reactionary narrow-mindedness
and of clericalism. Petain does not enjoy the public's
confidence in the country in spite of what a few still
believe. He is considered as an old rag by the majority
of the population. Laval is in contradiction with him-
self. He is the most parliamentarian of all parliamen-
tarians, but he is so convinced of his own importance
that he cannot tolerate any rival. Our propaganda in
France has been a complete failure. On the other hand,
the enemy propaganda is becoming more and more effective
because it is tailored to the French frame of mind. The
authority of the government is disintegrating. People
are refusing to obey. One of our immediate requirements
is to make a detailed study of all the symptoms of the
disease affecting the French Nation. France is the
forward defense line of Western Europe. What is happening
here is of great consequence on the evolution of our poli-
tical and military situation. We must therefore, get to
know the "French environment" in its most precise form.
It is the elementary basis of any intelligence effort. You
must understand this task without any preconceived opinion,
put yourself in the shoes of the enemy while remaining the
men that you are now, and make reports free of any undue
optimism. Gentlemen, heil Hitler!"
I will not weaken Colonel Bickler's extraordinarily lucid presenta-
tation with any comments.
I only deplore the fact that other foreigners, those who were our
friends and allies, did not judge us with such objectivity and such
psychological penetration. Yet they were in a position to observe us
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more easily than the desk officers vho informed Bickler. They only
had to read us, listen to us, and watch us.. .and, naturally, to be-
lieve us a little bit too. Indeed it seems rather comical to note
that a single copy of Bickler's report on Vichy would have been more
useful to the White House than the entire Leahy mission. And Bickler...
perhaps they might have believed him in Washington.
It is obvious that Bickler's information was good. We shall now
summarize it breifly for the month of March 1944. It would have been
more interesting to study what he received in April and May. But,
through means which we cannot describe any more than the presence of
the Agence Immobiliere at the "conference" of the desk officers, the
Eleuthere net was successful in capturing the complete Gestapo reports
for March, and thereafter was only able to obtain incomplete information.
As an introduction, a few words are in order.
The German documents seldom gave an overall view of the situation
in France. It was not that the Germans did not see enough of what
happened in France alas! to be able to figure out the rest and to as-
similate it in a complete picture as Bickler had done. But Bickler was
a brilliant exception. The numerous intelligence and police services--the
Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police) the Sicherheitsdienst (Security
Service), and Sections IV and VI of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Main
Office of the Reich Security-Gestapo), the Abwehr (Army Intelligence
Service), the Feldgendarmeric (Military Police), will remind the reader of
a jungle and their inter-relations appears like a pitiless struggle for
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life, in that same jungle. Each service possessed a margin of initia-
tive going sometimes as far as virtual autonomy. They were all jealous
of one another and were competing and fighting between themselves. In
order to look good, each made the most at the expense of the others,
and they all tried to supplant and destroy one another. The Abwehr led
against the Gestapo a covert and ferocious battle which paved the way
for the generals' plot on Hitler. In spite of 10 years of almost abso-
lute authority, after a "night of the long knives" and other massacres
and despite the enslavement of the staff and other feats, the Third
Reich was still subject to the inner convulsions of a Germany which
had remained amazingly medieval, feudal, epic and romantic. By their
repercussions on the intelligence services, they hindered the centrali-
zation of intelligence.
There was more to it. Often two police services reported in a
different manner and with a different interpretation, similar elementary
facts. They did not even agree on the number of arrest in a given
operation. Obviously, each service held back some information and kept
its prisoners in order exploit them for the services' own advantage.
And there was even more to it. It seemed, even at a level as high
as the Supreme Military Headquarters in France, efforts of synthesis and
complete accuracy were not required in counterintelligence reports. Those
reports remained analytical and obscure; the ideas being lost in a list
of facts both incomplete and endless. When we went back to the sources,
the reports of the subordinate echelons, we could not understand why a
certain incident had been reported to the comander while another more
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important one was not even mentioned. One had the impression of an
incoherent and intense life, of a seething state of ebullition. Once
more the similarity with the life in a jungle became most evident.
Again, we thought, "If there had not been any traitors, our work
would have really been a joyride."
I wrote in one of my novels, (1) which was fiction, but neverthe-
less included a few teaching points the following:
"To succeed at any cost in finding the leaders of
the resistance organizations, the Gestapo connected
together systematically and arbitrarily the most varied
matters, made groundless confrontations, buried them-
selves in preconceived ideas, mixed the files, and ended
up by mistaking the men, jumbling everything, and loosing
all trails. Afterwards, in order to get out of that mess,
they usually condemned in mass and at random. The French
people were somewhat astonished by this incoherence and
did not realize (they really did not have the time to do
so) that it was difficult for a German to believe that the
smallest action could be spontaneous and carried out with-
out an order from some higher authority.
And this helps us understand or rather it explains
the savagery of these people. It was the savageness of
a Colossus having the brain of a child. Unable to find
the truth, to discover all the elements they were looking
Eor, they resorted to torture in order to loosen tongues.
Unable to assert themselves mentally, they resorted to
physical slaughter."
But I think I have gotten carried away from my goal, which was
simply to say that I was forced to cut down, then to reconstruct several
German documents together, so that my description of March 1944 would
not be one of these gigantic frescoes where the eyes could only be at-
tracted by successive details. The documents discovered in our files
were the following:
(1) "A man has betrayed"
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1. The March report of the Main Office of the Reich Security;
the listing of "malicious" acts on railroad tracks; and the listing
of air attacks (Eleuthere documents # 444, 448, and 447 transmitted
to London under record of dispatch signed "D.U.R." on May 3, 1944,
and to the French intelligence service on May 2nd).
2. The March report of the Stulpnagel headquarters, and an ad-
ditional ulterior note of the Reichssicherheitshauptampt (Eleuthere
documents # 496 and 480 transmitted to London under record of dispatch
signed "D.U.R." on May 24, 1944, and to the French intelligence service
on May 23rd).
Long extracts of these reports will be quoted and may overwhelm
this chapter. I did it purposely for our resistance fighters who will
find in them traces of missing comrades and recollections of their own
adventures as seen from the German point of view. The enemy texts are
set off by wider margins which will help the hurried reader to go through
them rapidly. But I wish that a certain attention be given to them be-
cause, until the conclusion of this chapter, I will intervene only to
correct the most obvious systematic or involuntary inaccuracies made
by the Germans. I thought that as far as the rest is concerned, facts
and numbers speak for themselves.
ii
OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR MARCH 1944
HEADQUARTERS, GERMAN MILITARY COMMANDER IN FRANCE
According to the preliminary figures given by the
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Sicherheitsdienst
Commander and by the Sicherheitspolizei, these two
organizations performed during the month of March:
6,143 arrests,
of which 3,444 for Resistance Movement Activities;
1,035 for Communist or Marxist activities;
1,664 for activities against the Reich.
In addition, the French police arrested 844 individuals
for the following reasons:
121 for activities in resistance movements;
477 for Communist activities;
246 for activities against the Reich.
Finally, 400 terrorists and Resistance members were killed
and 153 were shot following Military Court sentences."
Mese figures are incomplete as it will be proven many times as we
go further. They did not include the arrests made in the North of France,
for this area was under another German Military Commander. None of the
Agence Lmaobiliere members arrested in March were included in this detailed
list. The countless round-ups which were going on everywhere in France
(20,000 men arrested in Paris in March of whom 1,500 were held) and which
were not all aimed at feeding the Compulsory Labor Service (S.T.0.), track-
ing down of Jews, and the "preventive" political arrests; all of these were
not included. In March, the Lyon F.F.I. area alone had approximately 80
persons-killed (current action report from this area for March, Eleuthere
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document #491, transmitted to London on May 24, 1944, and Vichy
report on the Haute-Savoie operations, Eleuthere document #523,
transmitted to London on May 30).
As to the precentages of dead among these prisoners the German
military commander was not at all interested. This was the extermi-
nation camp commanders' concern.
I. FRENCH RESISTANCE
An increased activity within the resistance movements
is noted.
The "Unified Resistance Movements Committee" has joined
the command committees of "Resistance" and "Defense of
France."
This organization has the following mission:
1. Immediate action against occupation troops, with em-
phasis on attacks of all possible enemy targets, and prep-
aration of the resistance on a national level;
2. Defense of the interests of France and the French
Empire by means of the underground press;
3. On the basis of a just Constitution for all social
classes, the rallying of all forces available for the
benefit of the Fourth Republic.
According to other sources of information, it would
seem that there are tangible differences of opinion be-
tween the national resistance groups and the Communists.
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The national organizations maintain that the armed
uprising should be prepared first, and then spring
forward with or after the invasion, while the Communists
want it to precede the landing. For this reason, we
notice here and there, that in their preparation for
the Allied landing, the national organizations are taking
measures to prevent the Communists from taking power.
11. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
1. In Bordeaux, Sicherheitsdienst V agents have infil-
trated the intelligence service of the Algiers Inter-
Allied Headquarters, and six persons were arrested.
2. Following arrests in the Correze area and in Marseille,
the Sicherheitsdienst succeeded in infiltrating the French
section of the I.S. in these two areas.
I wish to underline how vitally important it was for the Resistance
to receive such information without delay; but I don't think it is neces-
sary to explain it.
3. On March 21, a British officer was arrested in Paris
along with his liaison agent, during an investigation
directed against a London controlled organization. This
officer was the War Office representative attached to the
resistance movement.
4. In the "Aspirant" spy case, 10 persons were apprehended
in Paris. Among them a French officer who can be considered
as the secretary of the organizations' leader. During this
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same operation, the number of arrests reached 69 in
the Orleans area.
5. In the Roy case, 26 persons were arrested in Paris.
Important equipment was seized. A printing shop where
we found copies and proofs of the printing of the anti-
German leaflets "New Organization of France" was closed
down. The owner and his employees have been arrested.
6. In the Mesnier case, six Frenchmen were arrested
in Paris. They were working for the British intelligence
service, and their mission was to take certain measures
in connection with the invasion. Several leaders of the
youth organizations are among them.
7. In Paris, five high officials from the National
Broadcasting Company have been arrested on the grounds
that they belonged to the Resistance. Their mission
would have been to take over the broadcasting service
on D-day, during the transmitting, and to put it at the
allies disposal.
8. On March 9, in the Marquis spy case, 10 persons were
arrested and an important amount of resistance equipment
was seized in Paris on March 6 (?).
9. In Paris, on March 9, in the Hannibal resistance case,
24 persons were arrested, and 800 leaflets and 3 pistols
were seized.
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10. In Alfortville (Seine department), 25 members of
the Communist Youth Organization who had joined a Red
Cross section were arrested.
11. In Nancy, two employees of the Military Building
Maintenance Service were charged with espionage.
12. We have been able to infiltrate an important POW
escape organization in the Nancy military zone. It is
probably led by a resistance movement having its head-
quarters at the Ministry of the Colonies in Paris.
Francois V., a former Nancy High School teacher, can
be presumed as its leader. An investigation is going
on. The French official authorities knew about this
and closed their eyes.
13. On March 13, six Poles and three Russians suspected
of Communist activities were arrested in several mining
communities.
14. In Besancon, three leaders of "Combat," including
a regional delegate, have been arrested.
15. In Troyes, both the liaison agent of the London
based "Central office of Intelligence and Action" (BCRA)
and the leader of the "National Front Movement" were
arrested.
16. In Bar-sur-Seine, 14 persons belonging to the move-
ments "Liberation" and "Those of the Liberation," were
arrested.
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17. In Troyes, on March 20, four members (including
the leader) of Group IV of the Francs-Tireurs and
Partisans Organization of the Aube area were captured.
18. In Epernay, a forged passport center was discovered;
we seized 28 official stamps and seals and the mail of
a resistance organization; 2 persons were arrested.
Those arrested were the brave Jean-Marie B., alias Canard, from
the Eleuthere net, and his courageous young wife, who were arrested on
March 17 in their Rue Saint-Remy workshop. Although Canard was odiously
tortured during eight successive interrogations (as they called them),
one lasting 12 hours, he did not speak, nor did his wife. The case did
not go any further.
19. On March 10, In Chalons-sur-Marne, L., leader of the
National Front Movement for both the Cote-d'Or and the
Saone-et-Loire departments, and B., regional military
commander for the same two departments, were arrested.
20. Four members of the Syrdey (?) terrorist group from
the Cote-d'Or area were arrested, including a priest who
had concealed 15 weapons containers in the church steeple.
We found 16 other containers hidden in the attic of a Red
Cross building. In that same operation, a total of 32
persons were arrested, and 32 terrorist attacks of various
types were clarified.
21. In Orleans!, the Loiret area leader of "Liberation,"
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as well as three leaders and an important liaison agency
between the "Liberation" headquarters and the Maquis
organization was arrested.
22. In Maine-et-Loire, an operation against the "Resistance
United Movements" enabled us to arrest other section leaders
and members of "Liberation." We uncovered the political
section, headed by a former Angers municipal councilman.
Other leaders were captured, including the city hall em-
ployment director and the school registration secretary.
The operation is still going on. Up to now, the number
of arrests amounts approximately to 70. The arrests of
Liberation liaison agents between the sub-areas M3 and M4,
and of the Le Mans Presiding Judge helped us discover the
M4 sub-area of the resistance movement. Ten persons were
arrested, including a High School teacher who was the leader
of the M4 sub-area, the leader for the Sarthe department,
the M4 headquarters G-1, the teacher's assistant and six
section leaders. Furthermore, a certain number of team
leaders were arrested. We know the addresses of the Orne
and Mayenne department leaders; they will be arrested very
soon. The gathered information shows the "United Resistance
Movements" are trying to unite all their forces to control
all resistance troops. They are trying to send all their
members into the large forests. In the Sarthe department,
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the designated assembly areas are the Sille-le-Guillaume
forest and the area between la Brete and la Suze. Their
aim is to support the landing forces.
23. In Le Mans, the western area leader and four of his
agents were arrested in the Ajax spy case. A large
quantity of radio equipment and files were captured.
24. In Blois, 16 persons were arrested for Communist
activities. Moreover, a civil servant and a Prefecture
employee were arrested for organizing activities within
the Patriotic Youth United Forces (?).
25. In Angers, we arrested the "Liberation" movement
intelligence service chief of the Indre et Loire depart-
ment.
26. In Bourges, in the "Fighting Forces" case, we have
already arrested 39 persons including 9 military group
leaders. We have uncovered connections between "Revenge,"
"Liberation," "Those of the Resistance," and the "National
Front" movements.
27. In Malestroi (Morbihan department), arrest of Cavalry
General A. who was hiding in the maternity center of a
private clinic was made.
General A. was in close liaison with the Eleuthere net, and he had
been of great help in its expansion in the Nantes area.
28. On March 11, in Saint-Nic (Finistere department) eight
Communists, who were trying to demoralize members of the
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11th East Unit of the Mitte Training Regiment, were
arrested.
29. We have been able to establish that among the pas-
sengers of the fishing boat "Jouet-des-Flots" arrested
in Plogoff (Finistere Department) on March 3, there was
a French citizen named Emile B., born in Dunkerque on
December 19, 1890, who, for the past four months, has
been General de Gaulle's representative in France, as
well as a French citizen named Brossolette, who belonged
to the de Gaulle Committee, in London and who was de Gaulle's
delegate.
30. In Rennes, in the Maurice spy case, through infiltra-
tion of the Giraud intelligence service, we have been
able to arrest its Brittany leader and one liaison agent,
and to seize two radio transmitters and one receiver as
well as an important amount of equipment.
31. In Torigny-sur-Vire (Manche department) 16 members of
the military and civil Organization, including the regional
leader who is a major, and the local leader have been
arrested. They were on stand-by at a number of local farms.
32. On April 16, in the Rouen area, after a long investi-
gation, 50 members of a resistance group affiliated with
the British intelligence service were captured, including
a British captain who was the radio operator. Five trans-
mitters and all the messages sent and received from London,
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300 drums of a new type, 7 containers of various sizes,
a few mortars with ammunition, and 9 "Tellerminen" Ger-
man mines were seized.
33. In Le Havre, while arresting a high school teacher,
an underground printing shop was discovered as well as
some "information material" concerning the harbor forti-
fications. We have clarified several sabotage acts
against important defense installations. An important
stock of munitions was discovered under a building, and
two leaders were arrested.
34. Arrest of 21 members of a resistance group who were
spying on the German defensive works between the Seine
and Orne rivers estuaries were made. Their cover was a
construction firm which was, until then, considered as
pro-German and had German contracts to fulfill.
35. In Limoges, chief engineer, H., alias Pigeon, a Jew,
was arrested. He was the intelligence service chief of
the United Resistance Movements. As chief engineer of
the P.T.T. (French Post Office, Telegraph Telephone System),
and had made a precise plan for the destruction of the P.T.T.
communication system as well as placing agents in all the
important centers.
In the same town, the terrorist Lauriere, perpetrator of
five political murders and other criminal actions, and
Grosheim, member of a terrorist organization, were killed
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while trying to escape during their transfer to Paris.
36. A former captain, leader of Area VI of the Unified
Resistance Movement, was arrested in Vichy. The investi-
gation led to the conclusion that the attempts to reunite
all the resistance movements have failed in the northern
zone but have succeeded in the southern zone. The best
organized area seems to be Clermont-Ferrand. It is headed
by an executive committee composed of a representative from
each of the following movements: "Combat," "Liberation,"
and "Francs-Tireurs." The committee is said to control the
following services: Maquis military leadership and strength,
intelligence, armaments, supply, radio system, immediate
action, propaganda, and liaison with the labor unions.
Concerning the air drops, it is believed that the area is
in liaison with the C.O.P.A. (Landing and Air Drop Organi-
zation Center. (new name: S.A.P. Landing and Air Drop
Service) leaders. The French general staff is scheduled
to send two officers from London: a military delegate to
take care of the air drops and a chief of military operations
to prepare the D-Day insurection. We have known about these
organizations for a long time. The regional leader, who has
been arrested, had already made contacts with the military
delegate of Area VI.
Again in Vichy, five persons were arrested for Communist
activities, including a secretary of the Strasbourg
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University. In the same town, the technical chief of
the Vichy transmitting station was arrested, and a
"Mannerland" receiving set was seized.
37. In Clermont-Ferrand, arrests of six members of an
intelligence and spy organization which is supposed to
have at its disposal a forged paper workshop and a radio
transmitting network were made. Also arrested were six
other Frenchmen who had helped them.
38. In the Haute Loire department, 13 members of the
Secret Army have been arrested, including the assistant
department leader of the United Resistance Movements
and a few district leaders. Active Communists were found
among the prisoners.
39. In Saint-Etienne, during a French police raid, 46
members of a Communist youth group were arrested. Among
them were 9 Poles and 7 Japanese.
40. In Montravert (Loire Department), the French gendar-
merie arrested 42 members of a Communist youth organization.
41. Following General L.'s confession, we were able to
arrest, in both the Deux-Sevres and the Vienne departments
32 members of the "Liberation" movement.
In the Charente Maritime area, arrests of nine members of a
Remp (?) team, including four important officials were made.
43. In Bordeaux, we were able to arrest the intelligence
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regional leader wanted in the Ajax case, together
with his secretary and three agents. The regional leader
committed suicide at the time of his arrest. During
another operation, 60 persons were arrested, including
the whole headquarters of a resistance movement (Biscoya
case). In a suitcase, we found a report dated February
14, addressed to London, relating to the situation of the
organization.
The subsequent exploitation of this "Biscoya" case brought
to 104 the number of arrests made. Among these prisoners
we have Colonel E., G-1 of the Military Area, who was at
the same time the new military and civilian organization
leader, and the F.F.I. (French Forces of the Interior) G-4
for the southwest of France. Five French gendarmes were
also arrested in connection with this operation.
44. In Toulouse:
- The Seraphin organization regional leader was arrested
with his radio operator, four liaison agents and one
secretary. The radio files and one radio code were seized.
Other arrests will follow very shortly.
Five persons, and thereafter 13 others, were arrested be-
cause they belonged to the radio center, "France Bouliste" (?).
- Seven Frenchmen and Dutchmen were arrested because they
belonged to the "Peyrehorade," an E & E organization.
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- In the "David" case we have been able to uncover 11
escape channels.
The Jew, L., leader of the Secret Army, and a French
gendarme have been arrested.
45. In Montpellier, the local leader of the Secret Army has
been arrested. In his house we found orders for the Sabotage
of the telephone lines (yellow plan), for the railroad net-
work (red plan), as well as instructions for the setting of
roadblocks.
46. In Montelimar 10 members of a Communist cell have been
arrested.
47. In the "Alliance" case, on March 7, a radio listening
post able to pick up London, North Africa, and Moscow was
discovered. It was exploiting the monitored information.
The chief and two of his assistants were arrested. We seized
three radios and a few loud-speakers and typewriters.
48. In Avigon, we arrested two priests and a teacher from a
Jesuit college for dissemination of Catholic leaflets.
49. In Camboulive (Correze department), we discovered in a
hotel, the editorial center of the propaganda magazine "La
Terre," a rural publication of the French Communist Party.
50. In Lyon
- We arrested a German speaking Communist journalist while
editing "Soldat an Mittelmeer" (The Middle-east Soldier).
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He is a deserter and a former Vienna student. The printing
press and printed material were seized.
- On March 16, the Sicherheitsdienst, together with the
Milice, raided the United Resistance Movement, headquarters
and arrested 63 persons, including its leader, a Jew. This
clarified a large number of terrorist and activities. Im-
portant material was seized, including 15 letters to the dis?
sident leaders in North Africa, a list of the members, and
all the books which showed that the movement had 73-million
francs at its disposal to carry out its operations. During
this operation shots were fired on our forces.
- The exploitation of this operation called the "Kubala case"
led to the arrest of three armed liaison agents, carrying
maps and mail. Three other Frenchmen carrying important
documents were arrested at a meeting place. Following the
confession of one of them, another office was discovered and
six liaison agents, as well as the leader of the Franc-Tireurs
Group for the Lyon area, were captured.
In the same case, a stock of munitions and explosives were
discovered in a at Lyon-Villeurbanne garage. The garage owner,
a Spaniard escaped. His wife has been arrested.
Subsequent exploitation of the Kubala case: Eight other
persons were arrested. We have captured all the material
of the bureau for "Infiltration of Public Administrations"
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which had been camouflaged after the arrest of the Jew,
Marc B., a history teacher.
From March 13 to 17, an operation undertaken by the French
police, the Mobile Republication Guards, and the Militia
permitted us to check 36,520, fifteen of whom were arrested
and are awaiting various judiciary dispositions.
In the "Montplaisir" case, five persons were arrested, in-
cluding a United Resistance Movement leader who had been
wanted for a long time.
51. In Grenoble, on March 13, a police and German troop
operation resulted in the arrest of 24 persons for terrorist
acts.
52. In Annemasse, an arrest of a Frenchman who was hiding,
in a suitcase was made and an important amount of military,
political, and economic espoinage material which he was try-
ing to take to Switzerland was seized.
53. In Marseille, Police Superinfendant R., implicated in
the Ajax case, has been arrested. The investigation disclosed
the following: the Ajax net is composed of police employees.
It included a command center (Ajax) and three branches (Aja-
Mobile, Aja 2, Aja-3). Aja-Mobile is the intelligence flying
team, to be used at strategic points. Whenever required, R.
was sending the intelligence data to inspector 0. of the Nice
criminal investigation department, who is presently on the run.
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The activity of the enemy intelligence services is very
great in the Marseille area, especially the activity of
Giraud's independant service. It is watched by infiltrated
agents and by monitoring their radio transmissions. With
the arrest of the members of a radio organization sponsored
by Giraud and the Americans, we were able to uncover the
Riviera - Corsica liaisons with North Africa and Switzer-
land. The Algiers - Riviera liaison is to be accomplished
by Generals M. and C. d'I. According to certain rumors, these
generals are still in North Africa.
The reader will find in chapter V a detailed account on the work of
the French Intelligence Services in Marseille, and will notice that:
1. It was a fact that the German counterintelligence had successfully
infiltrated double agents in the French nets, and that: 2. In March
1944, they still had understood absolutely nothing about the organization of
the resistance in that area. The preceding paragraph is particularly
interesting. It is evident, that an arrested patriot had tricked the Ger-
mans with his "confession," and had led them toward an unlimited number
of false trails. General M., who was then only a colonel, had been arrest-
ed several months before by the Germans and they seemed to have forgotten
it. General C. d'I. did not exist.
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TERRORISTS
1. General situation:
One hundred twenty-six expeditions were conducted against
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camps.
2. Dordogne and Correze departments.
a. Synthesis from the Stulpnagel Hq.
A large scale operation has pacified the terrorized areas
of Perigueux, Brive and Bergerac.
Seventy-five camps and 35 houses have been destroyed. One
hundred and sixty-six terrorists were killed, 208 were arrest-
ed and executed, large quantities of weapons, munition, auto-
mobiles, equipment were seized.
In reprisals for the civilian population's manifestations,
of sympathy toward the terrorists the Village of Rouffiniac,
near Perigueux, was burned down. The operation is not over.
Our losses amount to 9 killed, 1 wounded, 2 missing.
b. Special report of the German police.
...in the Dordogne department the terrorist bands activities
are more and more intensified.
First, let us note that the total number of camps attacked is the
same as the partial number concerning the Dordogne department: seventy-
five. It is obvious, on one hand, that the Germans considered as terrorists
the murdered women, children, and old people (if we did not know, it before
we can guess it through the lines of this short document), and on the other
hand, they minimized systematically their casualties, a fact which I will
prove later.
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The contradictions between the Stulpnagel Headquarters and the police
could perhaps be explained. But what can we think of a staff analysis in
which we can read, at a few lines interval, "area pacified" and "operation
not terminated." Isn't that really the language of a childish or idiotic
colossus?
In any case, the operations were just starting. The German police
report for the month of April 1944 (Eleuthere document #480) indicated
that they had extended operations to the Haute-Vienne department, and that
some other operations were starting in the Ardeche, Isere, Drome, and Allier
departments. They were to end only with the flight of the German murderers.
As to the character of these operations, it was very faithfully ex-
plained by the Germans' accomplices. Bulletin No. 6 of the Vichy "Law
Enforcement Agency," dated April 23, 1944, was seized by the Eleuthere
net, and numbered as document # 525, transmitted to London and to the French
Intelligence Service on May 30. Here are a few extracts:
c. Report of the Vichy "Law Enforcement Agency."
The number of executions following trials by the German
authorities seems to be increasing. The number given for the
second ten-day period of March is 200 shot by firing squad.
According to the Stulpnagel Headquarters, the number was 153 for the
whole month. (See above).
...The operations against the maquis and its supporters
have been carried out by occupation troops, in the entire
southern zone through multiple local actions which in no
way could have been anticipated by the enemy except in the
case of one large scale operation conducted in the Dordogne
department. In the Ardeche, Isere, Drome, Savoie, Haute-Savoie,
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and Allier departments, the occupation troops conducted
small local operations against hamlets and villages, each
of these missions resulting in the execution of 4 to 5
persons per village for complicity with the maquis. In
almost all cases we found dead bodies which were impossible
to identify... In the Drome department, the Montelimar
and Grignan areas were particularly affected. In most cases,
the occupation troops operated following denunciations and
went directly to the suspects' houses, after having before-
hand, immobilized the French gendarmerie. The Dordogne
department was closed to vehicular traffic, even though the
order was strictly enforced only to the north of Perigueux
(Thiviers, Terrasson). For the last three weeks, Georgian
Russians commanded by S.S. officers have been conducting a
systematic mopping up of that area and of the Bergerac dis-
trict. They engaged in battle a certain number of maquis,
generally without decisive success, but they relentlessly
hammered on the villages' population. Almost everywhere, they
rounded up the men to check their identification papers.
Those who were not cleared, or who had been denounced as
maquis supporters (even if it had been against their will)
were either arrested or mutilated (noses or ears cut off as
in the Terrasson district), or executed (5 to 15 men per
rural community). Many houses and most of the stores were
ransacked.
It should be noted that these denunciations were directly
brought about by maquis fighters who visited their sympa-
thizers without taking any precaution. Thus, they are
responsible for their deaths. Strict orders of prudence in
their relations with the civilian population must be given
to them for the latter's safety (Sic).
Large concentrations of occupation troops are reported in
the Correze department, in the Isere department and in the
Vercors area.
On March 6, the city of Limoges was completely isolated
from the outside, and both the French and German police con-
ducted searches of persons, and houses, to verify identity
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papers. Seventy-five arrests were made.
Similar scale operations are announced for Lyon at the end
of this month. It is probable that these operations will
extend to all the big population centers.
3. Haute-Savoie department:
a. Analysis of the Stulpnagel Headquarters.
...Continuing an operation started by the French police and
the militia, German forces, including the 157th Reserve
Mountain Division, belonging to the reserves of the Western
Theater of Operations Military High Command, have mopped up
the mountainous plateau of Les Glieres near Annecy, and the
neighboring valleys. Between March 27 and 31st, 54 terrorists
were killed and 263 were taken prisoner; 95 of them by the
French police.
The following material was seized: 1 heavy
machinegun; 9 light machineguns; 1,011 sub-machineguns; 722
rifles; 160 pistols; 2 anti-tank rifles; and a large quantity
of ammunition. Our casualties amounted to 14 dead.
b. Special report of the German police.
The police operation against the Haute-Savoie terrorists
could not be completed due to the condition of the snow...
A unit of the French Mobile Republican Guards was attacked
by terrorists on March 15, at Entrement: 2 were killed on
each side, including the Guards commander and the terrorist
leader; but 60 guards either surrendered or deserted, and
left with the terrorists. The Sicherheitsdienst's investi-
gations are not yet completed.
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The operations were not completed either. The 157th Division was
well "pinned down." The following report of the German police (above
mentioned Eleuthere document # 480) will indicate that in April the action
spread all the way to the outskirts of the Geneva Lake and into the Jura
department. It was to end in the same manner as the operation in southern
France.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS.
Nimes area. The 53rd Waffen S.S. attacked three terrorist
camps and their supply centers. Three terrorists were
killed in action and 16 were hanged at the outskirts of
town.
Le Creusot and Montchanin areas. Fourty-nine terrorists,
including a district leader, were arrested.
Dijon area. In Magdalena, a joint action by the army, the
Sicherheitsdienst and the feld-gendarmerie resulted in the
capture of a camp. Twelve terrorists were shot, 4 farms
burned down, 3 automobiles and some ammunition seized.
In the Drome department, a maquis camp was burned down. Great
quantities of arms, ammunition, and important F.F.E. docu-
ments, including orders for D-Day, were seized,
Tarn-et-Garonne department. Joint action by the army, the
Sicherheitsdienst and the feld-gendarmerie against a maquis
camp resulted in 10 terrorists shot and 3 farms burned down.
During the exchange of fire with a group trying to hide some
new parachuted equipment, there was one killed on each side.
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One vehicle and numerous containers were seized.
Clermont-Ferrand area. Thirty-seven terrorist were
arrested and one was killed.
In the town of Clermond, 183 persons were arrested in
reprisal for an attack on March 8 against a marching
company, during which, 37 soldiers had been wounded, some
of them quite critically. Quick application of military
justice against 50 enemies of the Reich was taken and
sentences were executed.
Intensive police action was taken against seven terrorists
camps newly discovered in the area.
This listing is very incomplete like the others. The Lyon F.F.I.
district alone, in its immediate action report for the month of March
(above mentioned Eleuthere document #491), mentions in addition to the
Haute-Savoie large scale operation, about ten other operations of some
importance. These operations, and a particularly successful train de-
railment, cost the Germans approximately 100 lives and the French fighters
80. It was difficult to evSluate the number of murdered civilians. It
was certainly much higher. On March 3, the population of a hamlet was
completely exterminated because the Bir Hakeim maquis, from the La Bastide
caves (Ardeche department), had stopped there for a few hours. On March
6, the Germans fired on the civilian population at Font-diArc.
5. Conclusion of the Stulpnagel Headquarters analysis.
The population, when it is not contaminated by communism,
considers the German action as a relief from harmful pressure.
(1) Compliments from the author to this ultra-modern maquis.
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The use of volunteer battalions from Eastern Europe
(Russians) has proved to be ineffective. These troops
easily evade their commanders' control during the house
searches, and set the population against the German
troops by their violence, their cruelty, their senseless
burning, as well as their plundering.
This is no longer the language of an idiot, but that of a completely
insane person. In listing the facts, only one reaction of the civilian
population was reported, and this was a manifestation of sympathy for the
Resistance (In Rouffiniac). Yet, in the concluding paragraph, they attri-
buted to the population entirely opposite feelings.
They have admitted slaughters and fires. However, they looked with
disgust upon the Russian mercenaries who did the same thing.
We recognize right there the fit of madness and the criminal outbusrt
of the defied tyrant. We glimpse at the bottom of that muddy and putrid
abyss, which is unfathomable for us, the soul of the victorious Boche.
But to fully understand it, there should not exist an antagonism of so
many centuries between them and us.
V. SABOTAGES.
- Sabotage against the railway network is constantly in-
creasing. In the Limoges Transportation Command area, the
terrorists do not only unscrew the rail sections; they stop the
train in open country, force the passengers and the personnel
out, and blow up the locomotive or else they direct the train,
without its engineer toward a track which has been previously
dynamited...
Many canal lock-gates are now being attacked in northern
France. The sabotage of the Tulle power plant by explosives
has brought to an end the manufacturing of ammunition which
is extremely important to the German war machine.
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I 0
0
CO
0
0
0
0
0
0
LIST OF SABOTAGE CARRIED OUT DURING THE MONTH OF MARCH
NATURE
Sabotages against railroad
Sabotages against transmission
c? Cables
CO
CL
C) Attacks against members or
OC
ci
installations of the Wermacht
Incendiary sabotage
Attacks against power plants
Sabotages in factories
0
0
Theft of weapons and explosives
Resulting German casualties
0
u_
French police and militia casualties
0
0_ Casualties among Pro-German foreigners
0_ and members of the French judicary
Other French casualties
)
)
Northern
Zone
Southern
Zone
114
211
29
13
64
44
109
14
49
94
58
82
17
21
60 dead
15 dead
2 missing
76 wounded
REMARKS
8 missing
91 wounded
30 dead
50 wounded
176 dead
111 wounded
40 dead
114 wounded
Sabotage is increasing compared
to February (a total of 205).
They are mainly aimed at power
plants, factories producing air-
plane gears, bauxite, gun-powder,
and high-voltage towers.
0
0
0
CO
0
0
C%1
0
0
0
CD
0
9
co
Cr)
?cr
C?1
CO
171)
L-
0
LI-
0
L-
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For once, we may recognize that the German figure pertaining
to the railroad sabotage is correct, within an error of ten, which
could be a typographical error. Eleuthere always checked them by
obtaining the "List of Malicious Acts" established by the S.N.C.F.
(French National Railroad System), (document # 448).
The average was ten attacks per day. The record for March was
made on the 8th: 23 attacks. I am giving below an extract from the
S.N.C.F. document to bring back to a few comrades the memory of those
nights when we led a double life. And also, I am doing this to some-
how explain the number of casualties admitted by the Germans.
March 7 1944
Creil-Pontoise, between Persan-B.
and Boran (North)
Nancy-Ville Longuyon, between
Fiquelmont & Gondrecourt (East)
Annecy-Albertville, between Ugine
and Marthod (S.E.)
Lyon-La Voulte-Nimes, between
Soyona and St. Peray (S.E.)
Vesoul-Lyon-Arbois (NE)
Paris-Toulouse-Betivaux (S-W)
Paris-Marseille, between Bedarrides
and Sorgues (S-E)
Creil-Beauvais, between Montataire
and Carmoisy (N.)
Limoges-Ussel, between Beynat-
Ambrugeat & Jassonoix (S.W.)
Limoges-Angouleme, between
St. Victurnien & Verneuil (S-W)
Paris-Marseille-St. Fons (S-E)
Several rails were found
unbolted.
The locomotive and two cars
of a train were derailed.
Following an explosion, a rail
was cut for a length of 50-cm.
Explosion while a train was
passing the tracks were cut
along 1.50-m.
Armed men cut telephone cables.
Telephone cables were cut, a
ELF locomotive was stopped by
armed men and was sent adrift.
Ten 37-mm. shells were found on
the tracks.
The locomotive and seven cars of
a train were derailed.
Train was stopped by armed men
and sent adrift.
The rails had been cut and the
whole train fell into a ravine.
Train was stopped by armed men,
four cars were sent adrift to-
wards Limoges. Rails were cut
along 1.50-m. by explosion.
Track No. I was cut by explo-
sion.
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March 8 1944
Laroche-Nevers, between Laroche
& Bonnard-Bassou (S-E)
March 7 1944
Castelnaudary-Rodez, between La
Gerrie and Carmaux (S-W)
Paris-Boulogne, between Pt. Remy
and Longpre-les-Corps Saints (N)
March 8 1944
Eygurande-Zerlines-Brive, between
Ussel and Aix-la-Marsalcuse (S-W)
Limoges-Perigueux, between Malaveix
and Thiviers (S-W)
Amiens-Boulogne, between Abbeville
and Noyelles (N)
Paris-Boulogne, J.M. 133-335, on
the Somme River bridge (N.)
Amiens-Rouen, between Nampa and
Fanechon (N)
Paris-Maubeuge-Longueil-Annel (N)
Livron-Briancon-Allex-Grace (S-E)
Chalon-Dole, between Chaussin and
Neublans-Petit-Noir (S-E)
Dijon-Bourg, between Ste-Croix and
Fontenaud (S-E)
St. Jean-de-Losne-Lons-le-Saunier,
between Pleuret and Chaussin (S-E)
Paris-Marseille, between Laroche
and St. Julien-du-Sault (S-E)
Sens-Rovigny, between St. Savinien
and Malay-le-G. (E)
Paris-Marseille, between station
# 4 of Valence and km 620,000 (S-E)
Paris-le-Treport, between Blanguy-
sur Breale and Longroy-Canaches (N)
St. Pol - Bully - Grenay - Hensin -
Couplgny (N.)
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The locomotive and 16 cars
of a train were derailed.
Seven cars of a train were
derailed.
Rails were unbolted and the
locomotive, the tender, 10
coaches, and 3 cars of the train
were derailed.
Derailment of 11 cars of a
train.
Derailment of 20 cars of a
train was caused by explosion.
Two unexploded mines were
discovered on track # 1.
Explosion at the passage of
a train.
Derailment of the locomotive
of a train.
An explosive device was dis-
covered on track # 1.
Derailment of four coaches of
a train.
Derailment of a train.
An unbolted rail was found on
track # 1.
Derailment of a train.
Derailment of the locomotive
and 12 cars of a train.
Derailment of the locomotive
and 6 cars of a train.
Unexploded devices were found.
Derailment of the
and two cars of a
Three cars loaded
burned down.
locomotive
train.
with hay
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Perigueux-Agen, between Les
Versannes and La Gelie (S&O Dept)
Lille-Valenciennes, between
Templeuve and Fretin (N)
Paris-Toulouse, between La
Souterraine and Fromental (S-W)
Charleville-Givet, between Haybes
and Vireux (E)
Paris-Brest, between Tregon and
Plouaret (W)
Rennes-Redon, between Grichen-
Bourg and Flechatel (W)
Lyon - La Voulte-Nimes, between
Sarras and Arras (S-E)
March 9 1944
Gray-Chalon, between Allerey
and Ecuelles (S-E)
Brives-Capdenac, between Mon-
valent and Rocamadour (S-E)
Paris-Marseille, between Valance
and Portes (S-W)
Paris-Marseille, near Tonnerre
(S-E)
Paris-Maubeuge, between Rieux-
Augicourt & Pont-St. M (N)
Creil-Epluches, between Borrain
and Precy (N)
Dijon-Bourg, between Louhans and
Brauailles (S-E)
March 10 1944
Lyon-Grenoble, between Moirans
and Voreppe (S-E)
Paris-Marseille, between Tournus
and Uchizy (S-E)
Toulouse-Capdenac-Tessonnieres
(Rail depot) (S-W)
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Derailment
a train.
Derailment
and of two
Derailment
seven cars.
Explosions in an underground
passageway, track number 2
was cut, and a supporting wall
cracked.
Derailment of the locomotive
and two cars of a train.
Derailment of a locomotive and
14 cars.
Explosion at the passage of a
HLP Locomotive, track number 2
cut.
of seven cars of
of the locomotive
cars of a train.
of a locomotive and
Rail unbolted.
Derailment of 4 cars of a train.
An unexploded device was found
on track number 2.
Stockpile of hay and straw have
been destroyed by fire.
Unbolted rail, derailment of the
locomotive and of six cars of a
train.
Rail unbolted, derailment of the
locomotive and of 16 cars of a
train.
Derailment of the locomotive
and of 12 cars of a train.
Rail unbolted,
locomotive and
train.
Rail unbolted,
locomotive and
train.
Six locomotives
explosion.
derailment of the
four cars of a
derailment of the
12 cars of a
damaged by an
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Calais-Boulogne (N)
Tulle-Ussel, between Neymac
and Maussac (S-W)
Le Teil-Ales-St. Julien-1es-
Fumades (S-E)
Le Martinet-St. Julien-Les
Fumades, at km. 8,100 (S-E)
Valenciennes-Blan-Misseron,
between Onnaing and St.
Saulve (N)
St. Pol-Bully-Grenay, between
Houfain and Bruay (N)
Paris-Bordeaux, between Liguge
and St. Benoit (S-W)
Lille-Valenciennes-Orchies
(Rail depot) (N)
Locomotive of a train damaged by
an explosion.
Single-track line cut by an ex-
plosion.
An explosive device was found at
447.900-km.
Two explosions heard, but the
train kept on going without inci-
dent.
Derailment of the locomotive of a
train.
Explosion and rail cut along 50-cm.
Derailment of the locomotive and
of 15 cars of a train.
Two locomotives damaged by explo-
sions.
We see that, in most of the cases, this sabotage was serious and not
simple manifestations of against the occupation. Furthermore, the
German trains, the destination, and schedule, both were easy to find, were
of course the principal aim. Therefore it is certain that there has been
more than 75 Germans killed in March. They certainly were not immune.
On March 2nd, in Fleurville (Saone and Loire department) 20 German bodies
were counted, lying dead beside a derailed train.
The readers who are veterans of the war must have undoubtedly been
surprised by the German casualty report concerning the Clermont-Ferrand
attack: 37 wounded and no one dead! This would have been a miracle.
We know what to think about their account of the operations against
the maquis.
The III Reich's general propaganda impudently minimized the casualties
of the German Armies and population. Still, we don't cover up when applied
in top secret documents. Did the German police fear being accused of not
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doing its job, if the truth was exposed?
But there are many other things which we will never understand about
our Eastern neighbors.
VI AIR OPERATIONS
It is only fair to mention the air operations about which we know
that generally their extensiveness was due to the cooperation between
the Allied Air Forces and the Resistance. I am summarizing the analysis
of the Stulpnagel HQ.
- The great increase in air activities, especially against
railroad installations, marshaling yards, and airports.
- The violent and systematically repeated attacks against the
marshaling yards in north western France have caused great
losses of men and equipment. There is severe damage to loco-
motives: 344 in the north-west, 50 in Amiens and Petit-Therain,
59 in Le Mans, 83 in Hirson, 35 in Trappes, etc.-
- One thousand railroad cars have been destroyed in Chelles, and
almost as many in Amiens and Petit-Therain...
- Fifty-five airports have been attacked, and those of Chartres,
Chateaudun, Biarritz, Cazaux, Merignac, Tours, and Courcy are
out of commission for some time.
- The harbor of Toulon has been severely hit.
- The armament factories of Albert and B.M.W., the aviation
factories of Les Mureaux, Melun (Messerschmidt), and Chateauroux
have been greatly damaged - the Nadella ball-bearing factory,
near St. Etienne is destroyed - the Michelin factory in Clermont
is 407. destroyed - in Le Mans, the arsenal has been burned down
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- the Renault workshops have been heavily damaged - an engine factory
in Lyon suffered great damages - the powder factories in Bergerac and
Fleac were severely hit, and the one in St. Medar was attacked.
VII AIR DROPS AND RADIO TRANSMISSIONS
Supply drops to agents have reached a record of 300 flights in
March.
- The number of radio transmitters has increased again. The
rate of word groups transmitted by the enemy agent radio sets
has increased several times as compared to the February rate.
- Obviously, the objective of the increased enemy activity is
to prepare and equip the Resistance Movement and its spy nets
in the event of an invasion.
- Several thousand containers, full of weapons and English sabo-
tage equipment have been seized. Up to now, we have not found
any signs pointing to a particular major effort.
- On February 24, during the meeting of the Oberkommando West
W.F.R., (German Army Headquarters), for Western France, it was
decided that in case of invasion all radios would be confiscated
from the civilian population, by whatever means the Kreis - and
Feld-Kommandanturen judged necessary to accomplish this task.
The necessary orders have been established in advance.
VIII WORKER STRIKES
- In Paris, a few short strikes, and only one for a political
reason.
Let us salute these men animated by a courage rarely encountered at
that time. Indeed as one must admit and regret, there were not many
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strikes in France between 1940 and 1944.
III
POSITIVE RESULTS OBTAINED
BY THE FRENCH RESISTANCE DURING MARCH 1944
While continuing to refer to the same enemy documents, even if I
have to comment and discuss them when necessary, I would like to try and
determine the results of the efforts and the sacrifices mentioned pre-
viously. Some of them are unquestionable. Others can be questioned.
Let us begin by examining the first ones.
I STRENGTH:
As early as March 1944, the French Resistance was neutralizing im-
portant German forces, while Germany was in the midst of a manpower
crisis. The first part of the Stulpnagel HQ. report (above-mentioned
Eleuthere document # 496) confessed it readily.
- 1. Concerning the organization and the employment of
security troops (Sicherheitstruppen).
- The first regiment of mobile troops (Schnellen Verband) has
been formed with two battalions and a reconnaissance detach-
ment, without supporting artillery and without the anti-tank
company. The organization of other units is planned but they
are not yet operational, due to lack of equipment and personnel.
However, this is absolutely essential because large areas have
been emptied of troops.
Of 7 security battalions being organized, only 3 are ready.
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There is a severe shortage of heavy weapons. One battalion
has been assigned to the 7th Army, one to the Generalkommando
IVX, and the third one will be assigned soon.
Seven battalions have been borrowed from the security forces
of the Supreme Military Headquarters in France, to be assigned
to the special security forces of the various Armies. The 7
remaining Landesschutz (Terroitorial Defense) battalions (the
503rd Battalion having been sent to the South-East) cannot
be used as security troops since they are involved in the
guarding of 37,000 colored prisoners.
- The 5th and 95th Security Regiments have reverted to the con-
trol of the Supreme Military Headquarters in France and are
used to protect the vital Lyon-Dijon-Avignon railway line,
and the Paris area railways. The increase in locomotive sabotages
has forced us to keep under military guard a great number of
locomotive depots (66 at the present time). The guards of the
largest armament factories have been reinforced.
- Thus, all the guard forces available are committed. The
protection of other objectives will only be possible by the
assignment of new security forces.
One can not over emphasize the importance of this fact, and one
understands why it was the first subject mentioned in the report to
Stulpnagel. According to his Staff it was a force numbering at least 5
Divisions that was insufficient to guard the railroads and the vital
spots. If we add to this the units committed against the maquis, as
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mentioned earlier (157th Mountain Division in Haute-Savoie area, S.S.
units, volunteers from Russia and Feldgendarmerie dispersed everywhere
in the Center and in the South), the total is about ten Divisions.
This does not include the numerous personnel of the Services that were
neutralized by the French Resistance as early as March 1944.
To give the reader an idea of the number involved, let us recall
that in 1939 the French Army had deployed 100 Divisions against Germany.
II TRANSPORTATION
- Railroads. - An acute transportation crises has been
created by destruction of the railroad network, of eight
important marshaling yards, and of several hundred loco-
motives. Nine hundred trains have been damaged. On
March 7, we had to stop all transportation of material
for fourteen days. The industrial requirements are 170,000
cars a week, but we could only furnish 110,000 cars last
week, and we will only furnish 40,000 cars a week, in the
following weeks. Result: the transportation of coal
greatly reduced, - only a small part of the necessary trans-
portation required for transporting food supplies and to
save the 1944 crop will be provided. Should this present
state of affairs continue, it would mean the complete
stoppage of the armament and lumber industries, as well
as all the war industry in France.
- Despite this situation, the Wermacht transportation needs
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have increased, and 65,000 cars had to be placed at
its disposal instead of 50,000, in order to offset
last week's delays.
- It is imperative that the Reichswehr stop its less
important shipments and make available to us a certain
number of locomotives and cars, in order to clear out
the marshaling yards and to open up the traffic.
- Road Transportation. - The fact that, in the Greater
Paris area, only 67, of the trucks have been found ser-
viceable for the Army, shows how bad the situation is.
The three critical areas are: tires; (after the Dunlop
and Michelin bombings), lubricants, and the lumber
supply... The requisitions by Sauckel of Civilian Trans-
portation supervisors and specialists poses a grave threat...
A German police report adds a few significant details:
- ...Two hundred locomotives in need of repair were brought
from Germany and will be used in France after they are over-
hauled. The transportation of merchandises is interrupted
until April 10 (March 21 according to Stulpnagel
The Paris-Chalon-sur-Marne traffic has been completely
interrupted for five or six days. Shipments from the
Reich have stopped... The St. Etienne-Le Puy line was cut
for two days. The traffic has been stopped in St. Quentin
on the Paris-Liege line.. .traffic interrupted in Trappes...
the train station at Le Mans is out of service for several
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weeks.. .the traffic has been interrupted from Hirson to
Busigny, Laon, Aulnoye and Liard twice this month...the
Marseille-Vintimille traffic is interrupted, etc..., etc....
This transportation paralysis was even more important than the
immobilizing of the German troops. It was a "sine qua non" condition
for the landing as Eisenhower wrote (see Volume I, chapter 5, part 2),
and it was well on the way to realization in March.
III THE INDUSTRY.
- Important orders have been placed with the French industry
which has furnished an important and increasing assistance to
the Reich. The overall situation is dominated by the trans-
portation difficulties. In spite of the priority given to coal
deliveries, the quantities are not sufficient to operate the
factories. At the end of March, the chemical and glass factories
had to close. The stoppage in the transportation is going to
cause a reduction of at least one third of the production. The
supply of mining timbers for the coastal front lines is threat-
ened, even though no other timber delivery is authorized. The
disbandment of the Youth Camps is aggravating the trouble.
- The critical coal situation and the sabotages of the high
voltage lines, resulted in more electricity restrictions in
the Greater Paris area.
IV FOOD SUPPLY - AGRICULTURE
- The food supply is scarce in the big cities. Only 607 of
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the normal rations of fats (butter, oil, etc...) could be
distributed; the butter deliveries were reduced because of
the cold and dry spring; only non-fat cheese could be dis-
tributed; the planned margarine program was not fulfilled
for lack of coal; the supply of beef fat has dropped.
- The 120 grams (approx. 4 ounces) weekly meat rations were
not available everywhere.
- Potato deliveries to the civilians and even to the kitchens
of the Rue factories had to be stopped to fulfill the needs of
the Army.
- Cereal deliveries by the farmers have been sufficient, but
the transportation crisis renders the situation extremely
difficult in the big centers.
Up to April 1st 1944, French deliveries for the supply of the
Army have been as follows:
494,000 tons of wheat (bread)
439,000 tons of Oats
115,000 tons of meat
324,000 tons of potatoes
13,000 tons of fats
6,000 tons of cheese
287,000 tons of hay
215,000 tons of straw
81,000 tons of vegetables
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The number of Wehrmacht members that were fed exceeded
500,000, on April 1st 1944. The Army deliveries, which
were maintained in quantity, have certainly decreased in
quality.
We cannot say, from any point of view, that this chapter on food
supply was an aspect of the French Resistance. No more so was the
chapter on the strikes, or rather the strike.
V EFFECT ON GERMAN MORAL
I have quoted the essential parts of the reports that Stulpnagel had
on his desk in April 1944. They were incomplete. They made concessions
to propaganda, and to the bragging and justification of each writer.
Service. For example, in an additional report document #480, the Orleans
police did not hesitate to announce that the Resistance was "crushed,"
- the Montpellier police stated that "the Secret Army had only a few
members left."
Propaganda might perhaps increase the strength of a nation, in a state
of euphoria resulting from victory, but it is a dangerous thing just like
any illusion. When exaggerated, it becomes as harmful to the individual
as an overdose of stimulant. The official truth was not sufficient to
create a feeling of security among officers and soldiers. They sensed the
hostility of a population from which the only people they knew and came
in contact with were the rabble or so-called aristocracy. They felt that
everywhere they went they were shadowed, watched, spied upon, and trapped
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in a net of hatred ready to close on them at the first sign of weakness.
In France, as soon as they reached the point when they did not feel pro-
tected, anymore, the rear troops, terrorized by the maquis, even though
inferior to them in number and arms, had only one idea in mind: look
for regular soldiers and surrender. Fighting units did the same thing,
such as the 18,000 men of General Elster, who could have easily crossed
France, perhaps not with rifles on the sling, but definitely with their
machine guns ready to fire. They turned round and round in the center
of France, and stopped as if fascinated on the banks of the Cher river.
The commanding general surrendered his men to Colonel B. of the Resistance
Army Organization, a leader of courageous men, but very few in numbers.
Everyone knows about this, and even our Allies were willing to pro-
claim that the resistance gave an appreciable contribution to the common
victory. I believe that Eisenhower valued at 20 divisions the support
given by the F. F. I. But one should explain it further by saying: 20
divisions deployed beforehand behind the enemy. (1)
IV
PROBABLE RESULTS ACHIEVED BY THE RESISTANCE
This is not all. There was another contribution, less visible, less
(1) The Eisenhower report, which I read after writing this chapter,
states: "Our Headquarters estimated that the F.F.I. support during
our campaign was equivalent to that of 15 Divisions. The great sup-
port they gave us in helping to accelerate our advance across France
has confirmed this fact."
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definite, unmeasurable by nature, but which was perhaps, more important
and yet nobody has mentioned it. The French Resistance undermined,
sapped, and destroyed the confidence and will-power of some of the most
important German military leaders in France. It defeated them psycho-
logically, and in some cases, this was enough to defeat them later on
the battlefield, without fighting, Otherwise, how could we explain,
for example, the Sologne surrender, even if we grant that there is some
intelligence which we never got and may never have (since it is now on
the other side of the Atlantic). Nor can General Von Choltitz's atti-
tude in Paris be explained.
I think I understand how the idea of defeat began and grew in
Choltitz's mind. It is possible that I may be carried away by my imagi-
nation as I go along, but I doubt it seriously.
Just for once let us leave the solid ground of facts.
We are all familiar with that monocled ruddy, short and stocky type
of man. He was not a Nazi, but a Junker. That is, regardless of what
one may think, he was a soldier. He did not chose a military career for
the purpose of surrendering, one day without a battle, a conquered capital
which he had been ordered to defend at all cost. He was not an anteroom
or desk officer. He had won several promotions on the front lines, in
Russia, before suffering a half-defeat in front of St. Lo. This caused
him to be transfered in semi-disgrace to Paris.
When he arrived in Paris he inquired about the general situation which
he knew partially. France was stirring. This was a surprise, for this
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front line officer. Probably his first reaction was to tell the chiefs
of the various police agencies: "You are going to take care of this
matter, right away." Then the various German documents previously men-
tioned were summarized for him.
The repression? It was going fine. Ten thousand arrests per month.
Thousands of executions. One could hardly do better.
"Good," said Choltitz. "Consequently, everything is going to return
to normal."
An embarrassed silence followed. The attitude of his subordinates
became reticent. After all they could not let the chief believe that this
mission was an easy one, and almost completed. It would be asking for
trouble. Somebody probably volunterred:
"OZ course, General, this does not mean that we should not be diligent
about the matter. It is not over yet..."
Choltitz looked closer at the reports, and asked for comments. He
could not avoid noticing that the increasing number of arrests did not
reduce the number of sabotage, attacks, and skirmishes. On the contrary!
The constant and striking victories of the combined Army, Feld-gendarmerie
and S.S. operations had not prevented the expansion of the unsafe area
(twilight zone) from month to month. On the contrary, it looked as if the
German violence had unleashed the French fury. There was something ter-
ribly impressive in these endless lists of terrorists. One could find
side by side Jesuits and Communists, steel workers and lawyers, officers
and women. It seemed that for each man shot, there were ten new candidates
for martyrdom.
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One conclusion was obvious: the repression was a complete failure.
It was ineffective, and something else had to be done. But what? How
about this Vichy government, these collaborationist parties which made
so much noise, could they be of any use? Undoubtedly the following
answer was given to the commander.
From Bickler, or some other S.S. Colonel (minutes of the
conference of desk officers, section VI, Reichssicherheitshaupt-
amt):
- Vichy is the world's most unpopular government.
From the Staff, (Report of the Stuppnagel ILO., above-mentioned
Eleuthere document # 496).
- The collaborationist parties have very little importance
and influence.
The following figures, which they gave themselves, are so
exaggerated that it is difficult to determine their actual
strength:
French Popular Party 15 to 18,000 members
(Right wing political party)
Franc ism
(Petain Ideological and Political
Movement)
10 to 12,000 members
National Popular Movement 6 to 7,000 members
(Right wing Political party)
Collaborationist Party 2,000 members
The other groups are quite insignificant.
The strongest and most active element fighting against
terrorism and communism is Darnand's Milice which is composed
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of 10,000 "activists." As a law enforcement-agency, the
Milice seems to gain strength.
They had the respect of certain segments of the population,
but certainly not their sympathy.
From the S.S. Supreme Fuhrer and the Police Chief, in the
territory of the Militarbefehlshaber in France (report signed:
"by order: Knochen" and seized by Eleuthere and dispatched
as document # 445 to London on May 3rd and to the French
Intelligence Service on May 2nd.)
In case of emergency, we must realize that today, less than
ever before, we cannot expect assistance in any way from the
French police for the protection of German interests. On the
contrary, it is to be feared that the French police will take
advantage of an allied operation against the continent to at-
tack the occupation troops in the back, directly or indirectly.
They have contributed in the fight against the Communist enemy,
but this activity has decreased since the Communists have
identified their struggle with the national cause...
The distrust had reached such a point that a whole series of orders,
prepared in advance and ready to be issued specified: the disarming of the
uniform, the plain-clothes police; the Gendarmerie, and the traffic police;
the assignment to Fort de Montrouge of a German officer who was to "command"
Gendarmerie General Guilbert, etc., (copies sent by Eleuthere to London on
June 17 as a part of document #578).
"The whole French nation is involved then," thought Choltitz, "and
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not, as I believed when I was in my front line H.Q., just the Communists,
the Jews and the Freemasons, whom we crushed so easily in our own country."
Yes, it was all of France.
- All over France blows wind of madness which could provoke
a manifestation of collective hysteria, like during the time
of the Saint-Barthelemy Night or the Great Revolution. (State-
ment made to conference of the Section VI Desk Officers, already
mentioned above).
The Great Revolution? In a Junker's mind, these words could only
cause a feverish complex of horror, disgust, and fear. It bore no re-
semblance whatsoever to the "cool and gay" war which he knew, which he
liked, and for which he was trained. These were unworthy and incompre-
hensible adversaries. Scum who shoot you in the back, who poison and murder
even when they are the weakest, and should respect the rules of war. Vile
and fanaticized mobs which cannot be controlled, which hurl themselves to-
wards you defying all rules of military art, and which have to be annihi-
lated in never-to-be forgotten pools of blood! Carnage with no glory. The
work of Nazis. Implacable hatreds: The mob, and this hatred, which in the
end always managed to win, as did Nazism in Germany. What bitter memories
for an Imperial Army officer. Humiliating retaliations, insults, public
degradation, and women who slapped you and threw stones at you. It was one
thousand times worst than the firing squads, when one could at least choose
his attitude - the guillotine where one was sheltered from the mob - and
tumbrils where one could stand up straight, out of reach of the spitting
mob.
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But.. .are they sufficiently armed?" asked Choltitz.
He was given a figure of dropped containers and of weapons caches
of the former Armistice Army. For each one seized, how many remained
hidden? Sure, the Secret Army complained that the Interallied Head-
quarters did not fulfill its obligations concerning the air drops. But
assurances had been given ot a "torrential" arm drop on D-day, and it was
known that plans had been prepared for mass suicidal actions in order to
capture the police and even the German Army depots. (Eleuthere document
# 496).
"My God. Those people are crazy," declared Choltitz. "They can't
conduct guerrilla warfare in the area of the tanks especially in a country
where there is at least one good road in every square kilometer."
Let us admit that the opposite concept was a little confusing for a
military officer who was used to dealing with a war problem as an economist
would a business project, to finally end up with the conclusion: "Good
deal," "Too expensive," or "Catastrophic."
There was undoubtedly a subordinate officer, conscious of his respon-
sibilities who replied:
"Their plans are quite realistic, and their leaders are Isachvertandige
Leute' (efficient men)."
"Their plans?" exclaimed Choltitz, "You're telling me that they know
what they want, these anarchist Frenchmen who are unable to organize them-
selves? Impossible:"
They could not let the Paris Commander remain unaware of the great
synthesis called "Organization and plans of the Resistance Movements"
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which had been prepared by the Staff of the Militarbefehlshaber in
France. It was given to Choltitz.
The Eleuthere net had intercepted and transmitted a copy of this
synthesis to London under message No. 443 on May 3rd 1944, dispatched
to the French Intelligence Service on May 2nd. The exact date when this
document was written was not mentioned on the stolen copy, and could never
be established.
Let us look at the five typewritten pages of this top-secret document.
Together with General von Choltitz.
I. MISSIONS:
- 1. Preparation and organization of the D-day uprising, as
an essential preliminary condition for national liberation
and rehabilitation.
- 2. For the French people, D-day means the critical moment
at which time the occupying forces are to be ousted, the Vichy
government overthrown, and the power seized by the Resistance
Movement. They anticipate that this period will last a certain
length of time, and it could start on different dates, depend-
ing on circumstances. This will depend on military action
(see paragraph IV) which will be triggered by the Allied H.Q.
II MEANS:
- 1. The German defensive system and the French administrative
system will be paralyzed.
- 2. The Pro-Vichy civil servants will be immediately removed
and replaced by members of the Resistance Movement.
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- 3. All traitors will be tried by Special courts.
- 4. The provisional government, de Gaulle will be supported
by important mass demonstrations that will give him a demo-
cratic and popular base...
III MILITARY ACTION:
- Its execution is the responsibility of the F.F.I. Secret
Army (sic) according to a plan established in cooperation
with the Allied General Staff; battle of the rears...
"Donnerwetter!" swore Choltitz, "What confidence they have! Army!
General Staff! Battle of the rears! This is not the language of a
lieutenant, not even of an army colonel on reduced pay status. Battle of
the rears, indeed!"
This is something rational, a "basis of truth" - as one says - in
the belief that certain words have power in themselves. They are not magic
words, but they contain an inherent strength. They are key-words. Words
which are so accurate that they can transport one instantly to the core of
a difficult problem, and which at the same time are so explicit that they
can make one realize immediately all the consequences. "Battle of the rears"
is one ot these words. This is remarkably "meaningful" to a military mind.
At the origin of almost all lost battles, there is an outflanking,
an outline of an encirclement, a simple turning movement, or a wedge in
the rear. Sometimes, Napoleon improving this pattern, moved his very
mobile army along the enemy communication lines. Then the war was over.
Such an eventuality is not conceivable now with the gigantic front lines,
and National Armies stretching from sea to border. These armies have
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become too heavy to turn around and fight their battle facing Reserved
front lines, as in the past. Wouldn't a national insurection cause the
rebirth of a situation so perfectly improbable and catastrophic? All
this, and also many other things, are included in these words "Battle of
the rears," and they are truly surprising and terrifying when joined un-
expectedly. The only threat considered as being possible to the rear lines
in 1944, was an airborne Division capable of conducting a simple, limited,
combat operation. This word "battle" gave the idea of considerable action
with important results. Why not? When you think about it. It was really
something to be frightened about, especially after the Saint-Lo defeat.
"It's really true that there will be 40 million of them on our backs,
these pigs!" thought Choltitz.
He kept on reading.
- ...Military action will only start upon instructions from the
Allies.
No improvised, direct, and insufficiently armed attacks...
(but it is necessary) on the other hand that all German forces
be immobilized to the maximum and moreover that, all traffic be
paralized: 1. Prevent all normal rail or road traffic.. .2..
Prevent the rapid re-establishment of all destroyed couuunica-
tion lines, either by directly engaging the enemy or by cutting
the network somewhere else...
3. Disrupt all liaison and communication systems...
"Kreuz Donner Wetter" swore Choltitz, "That part, they have already
done it!"
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IV. TECHNICAL ACTION.
"Plan" Infiltration of Public Administrations" Objective:
"To paralyze the Vichy government Administration..."
"With or without the plan 'Infiltration of Public Administrations,'
is already accomplished" remarked Choltitz.
...Seizure of the executive power...Formation ot liberation
Committees.. .Occupation of the post office, telegraph and
telephone centers.. .disconnection of all lines used by Germany,
the Vichy police and administration...occupation of all Pre-
fectures...the French radio networks... Assignment of desig-
nated "Infiltration of Public Administrations" leaders in the
Police Departments.. .arrest of all suspected officers of the
"Gardes Republications Mobiles, the Garde Mobile, and the Gen-
darmerie" without requiring assistance from the Secret Army
which must not be diverted from the battle of the rears, the
infiltration of these services should be sufficient to over-
come the difficulties...
"Well, they have not done that yet, but it will undoubtedly be accom-
plished," thought Choltitz. "If they can find so many people to fight and
get killed, they will surely find many more than they need to take over
the hign positions, the important functions, the good jobs."
V. MASS POLITICAL ACTION.
- ...A national uprising is the only means for our country
to regain its independence. The communists think that it must
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take place before the invasion.. .The national organizations
want to do it in conjunction with the invasion...In any case,
the order has been given to the Liberation Committees to
immediately take over and control by themselves the spon-
taneous movements of the people which could easily become
anarchistic...
- Paragraph 1 - The popular masses are going to be used as
intimidating forces...
- Paragraph 2 - A general strike is going to be used as the
effective force...
"G.. dammit!" exclaimed Choltitz, beside the military, they sure have
some dangerous politicians in their Resistance. They are so confident that
they are no longer trying to provoke but are already trying to slow down
and channel the uprising of the scums. Has it reached that point already?"
IX. VARIOUS HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE MILITARY ACTION
- Paragraph 4. If one or several bridgeheads are established
and the Wermarcht is fighting fiercely and withdrawing step by
step, the nearest F.F.I. forces will start operations against
the enemy's rear. With spirit of absolute sacrifice, under the
following conditions...
- Paragraph 5. Except in the case outlined above which would
justify a rapid uprising in a particular area, the general up-
rising will start when the Wermacht is sufficiently weakened
and unable to counterattack.
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- Paragraph 7. - Anticipation of retreat measures in the
maquis...
- Paragraph 8. - If the occupying power withdraws along one
of the following Resistance lines, prepared in advance...
Teufel! But all this makes sense. These people are perfectly aware
of our movement intentions. Have we been betrayed?"
I shall stop: I am resisting the temptation to further romanticize
the scene, as credible as it may seem. The temptation is really strong,
because all the elements of an epic drama "a la schiller" are gathered...
The Schiller of "Wallensteinstod" and of "Piccolomini," one of these
dramas which, in modern times, can only be found in the German essence.
First of all, my reason for continuing is because I do not want to overwork
my talent. It is also because this story aims to be a true testimony, a
rigorous presentation of authentic documents about the work of the intelli-
gence nets.
But I am personally convinced that the potential force alone, of the
affirmed will of the French Resistance has spared much combat and a lot
of allied blood in 1944. I am sure that many surrenders and defections
were primarily caused by psychological and moral reasons, similar to the ones
I have just sketched above. In any case, the starting point and the base
are obvious. It is namely what the German command thought of the French
Resistance. And in this matter I have only quoted the German documents.
Did I then exaggerate? Did I distort and enlarge the inner struggle
of the responsible German leaders? This is a field where one cannot find
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absolute proof. The reader will have to judge for himself (1).
In any case, we have just spent a month in the offices of the
occupant, with the operational cells that the Agence Immobiliere and the
Eleuthere net had daringly placed beyond the barbed wires, the machine-gun
sentries, and the reinforced concrete Bunkers. There we found proof that,
as early as March 1944, directly through sabotage, and indirectly by guid-
ing the allied air force, the French Resistance has been the main contri-
buting factor causing the German transportation crisis, this condition was
a prerequisite for the landing. We found proof that the Resistance con-
tributed to virtually cutting off all the French industrial support to the
German war economy. The enemy manpower problem became acute, all of these
facts being a prerequisite to our victory. We drew out of this at least
a serious presumption of the drepressing influence it had on the will of
the German command which (and this is a fact) did not conduct the battle
of France with its usual ardor.
At this time the despicable war-dodgers of 1941-1944, the jealous
weaklings, and the profiteers of the still-born Vichy regime begin to speak
in almost loud voices about the masquerade and the swindle of the Resistance.
It becomes necessary to say all this. It seems that these people are a-
rousing echos among the discontented, the worried, and those unable to adapt
(1)
Since I wrote these lines, I read the Eisenhower report about the
operations in Europe. "The F.F.I., through their continuous harras-
sing actions, surrounded the Germans with a terrible atmosphere of
danger and hatred, which, little by little, diminished the assurance
of the leaders and the courage of the soldiers." This statement, had
I known about it earlier, would have encouraged me in carrying my
"script" a little further. But the essential points have been indicated.
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themselves to a 4th Republic which, one must admit, looked much more
beautiful while living under the Vichy regime. Under the 4th Republic,
the same thing holds true of that magic State which they are now dream-
ing about.
Because the times are hard. Most certainly, life is not "all pink"
In any case, it is not the fault of our dead comrades, who are almost
as numerous as the Resistant fighters still alive in August. In defer-
ence to their memory, and in spite of whatever weariness and disgust we
may have for these quarrels, we shall demand that the words "French Re-
sistance" be respected.
Since I was trying to avoid interrupting the thread of my story too
frequently, I did not emphasize enough the inportance of the various
analyzed German documents which were transmitted to London and Algiers in
April or May 1944.
Combined with the political intelligence bulletins on France and
Vichy, they were a "gold mine" for the "Psychological Services" created
by the Anglo-Saxons. An innovation which seems to have had a great effect
on the general conduct of the war. These reports contributed to a successful
orientation of the interior defensive propaganda and the offensive propa-
ganda among the enemy and the neutrals. It is possible that even the
diplomatic services found a few useful elements in them. In any case,
they served to define the German relationship with France:
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1 On the strictly military level:
1. They helped coordinate the bombing plans of the allied air force
with the sabotage activities of the Resistance fighters. This enabled
the allies to produce maximum effectiveness.
2. They gave a rather exact idea of what the future "battle of the
rears" would be like a battle which the F.F.I. was going to win beyond
all hopes.
3. They helped us gain a better knowledge of the enemy, his capa-
bilities, his will, and even his intentions.
V
VALUE OF THE EXAMINED DOCUMENTS FROM
A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VIEW POINT
From the counterintelligence point of view, which after all was
then very objective, the previously listed intelligence documents were
a treasure. Not only because they indicated with precision the Gestapo
order of battle and prepared its destruction on D-day; but it also pro-
vided our immediate defense, from day to day.
I spared the reader many details, however, I casually mentioned these
paragraphs: "In Bordeaux, the Sicherheitsdienst has infiltrated the
intelligence service of the Algiers Interallied General Staff..." and:
"Through arrests in the Correze department and in Marseille, the Sicher-
heitsdienst has succeeded in penetrating the French section of the I.S.
in these areas." This was enough to expose the doubles or "turned around"
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agents, and to save nets and hundreds of patriots in great danger. A
complete study of these various reports would reveal many less evident
indications, but just as useful.
I did not want to bore the reader, so I neglected to say that we
were able to get all the plans, orders, and reports of the Technical
Services of the staff of the Law Enforcement Secretary General, Darnand.
This was an element of the utmost importance for the safety of the maquis.
The big operations against the maquis were always known in advance and
appropriate warnings were given. I could even mention several cases of
enemy double agents, going to a camp with the intention of betraying it,
and who were disposed of upon their arrival.
I am sorry I cannot reveal now by whom, how and at what price these
results were obtained. But one should not think that they were always
bought. and paid for with money alone.
Oh! Generally, it was none of these hollywood-type raids or even
housebreakings. But there are certain games which, even though they are Arnik
played with words, are as dangerous as a sub-machine gun duel. It required
another kind of courage, and sometimes as much courage as needed in combat,
to walk at a given time, with a pipe turned upside down, under the Arch
of Triumph of the Carousel, - to display three specific newspapers on a
cafe table, - to approach a stranger wearing a feather on his green hat,
when one knew that it was the first step in an enemy environment.
Some even risked their honor. They went deep into the enemy element
with only the moral cover of their immediate leader, who after all was
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mortal. How mortal! I will not give any name. There are a hundred
reasons for this discretion. One is enough. I have too many deaths
to mourn among my family, and it is a great happiness for me to say
that I do not have to defend the honor of any of them.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ULTIMATE ACHIEVEMENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INTOXICATION
The operators whom we have seen at work up to now, were plain
counterintelligence agents. Some of them were infiltrated in the enemy
camp for preventive reasons, as we saw in chapter II. Others were re-
cruited from directly inside the enemy services. All of them occasion-
ally cracked a safe or searched a paper-basket; this was the subject of
chapter III, which, while it gave no indication as to how it was done,
at least it showed the results. In all cases, it was enough for these
men to have and use their eyes, ears, and limbs. Of course, above average
self-control and daring qualities were useful to them. In a pinch and as
long as they knew how to be discreet, they did not have to be too smart.
Sometimes it happens that an enemy agent was willingly or unwillingly
hired by our services. Still more frequently we succeed in having the enemy
hire as a spy one of our men. This is the prefect, rare, and precious
species of the double agents, of whom we can and must ask infinitely more
than we do of ordinary agents.
A Counterintelligence Service cannot be without double agents. Pre-
ventively speaking, they are the only ones who can certify for us the focus
of the enemy spy effort and make it possible for us to defend ourselves
against the enemy other than by guessing and groping "haphazardly." From
the repressive point of view, we can say, from past experience, that we
owe to them almost half of the arrests of the regular spies, generally the
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most important ones, and eighty per cent of the identifications of
enemy double agents.
They are also valuable as auxiliaries of an intelligence service
in the latter's offensive mission of intelligence gathering. They bring
us the enemy collection plans. An intelligence study of the latter was
sometimes sufficient to understand the true and false enemy plans, and
his real and ultimate intentions. During a declared war, the double
agents are the only men able to live and travel in the enemy territory,
this was impossible for our ordinary agents.
There is a third and last role for a double agent; this role was
found essential during the last war. It is a offensive role, more so than
the preceding one, they were used as the advance guard of our Special
Services. From 1940 to 1944, it was designated by one of these key-words
which seemed to possess an inherent strength: Intoxication.
The mere presence of a certain number of traitors in the enemy ser-
vices is toxic, if only because of the loss of time and money involved.
Sometimes it can result in the practical neutralization of the work of
certain sections. This represents only partial deficiencies of sight and
hearing. When the parasites increase in number and virulence, they attack
the whole organism; thus the bad agents destroy the action of the good
ones in two ways: directly by giving false information, and directly by
contradicting the true intelligence already gathered. The sensorial system
of the adversary becomes distorted, visual aberrations begin, while un-
easiness, doubt, indecision, and confusion reach the enemy brain. Let us
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increase the dose of inoculated poison. The time will come when all
we will have in front of us will be a blind enemy, deaf to any other
voice but ours. If he does not know how to neutralize the poison in
time, we can lead him ourselves right to his own destruction.
During the last war, the recruiting of double agents played an
important role in this operation. The operational handling of them by
the Allied Special Services, the supplying of information to them by the
Interallied General Staff, which alone was qualified to determine the true
facts that could be passed on and the lies which had to be believed by the
enemy, all this high level and subtle game was done in a masterly manner.
It certainly shortened the length of the hostilities and reduced the price
of victory. Perhaps it even prevented partial failures from turning into
defeats.
For the readers who do not believe that actual life is suited to so
much machiavellism, I will start by proving that it is nevertheless true.
I will show the results, thus putting the furrow before both the oxen and
the plough. Then I will only talk about the unusual world of double agents.
I will determine the French part in the positive box-score of the counter-
intelligence effort. Finally, I will tell in detail the strange and lucky
adventure of a successful double agent mission.
1
THE WORK OF ALLIED DOUBLE AGENTS
AS SEEN BY THE GERMAN ARMY
It is necessary to start with a certain number of facts which I
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shall recall:
1. When the Allies pierced through the Tunisian front lines, then
rushed toward Tunis the German reserves were too far back to help, and
Rommel's armored units were deployed along the coast lines, in empty
space.
2. A powerful German Army fiercely defended the Italian hills, foot
by foot. The advance was so difficult that one wondered what would have
happened in Sicily if the Wermacht had been facing us on the beaches at the
right time. The Wermacht was there a few days earlier, but had moved out.
3. Eisenhower considers as one of the decisive factors of success
in France, the fact that "the large forces which the Germans had in the
North were only shifted in July, since the German Headquarters had believed
until then, that a second landing was going to take place in the Pas-de-
Calais area, an illusion which, incidentally, was fostered by the Allies. (1)
4. The Germans were focusing their attention on Genoa when the Franco-
American troops landed in Provence, - and toward the eastern part of the
Mediterranean when the Anglo-Saxon fleet was sailing toward Algiers.
In all cases, the surprise was total, not only as to the date, but
also as to where the attack was to happen. This was due to gross miscal-
culations about the capabilities of the Allies. For example, the Germans
did not think that the Anglo-Saxons were capable of physically shipping
an Army to North Africa, if we believe the figures of the Vichy Navy
(1) When I wrote this chapter, I only read the summary of the Eisenhower
report, published by "Le Figaro." I have read the whole report since
in which he states. "The 15th German Army (North) which, had it been
committed in June or July would have undoubtedly beaten us because of
its strength, remained on a stand-by basis during the entire critical
periodf L11e ca "
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Intelligence Service, which was inclined to give credit to all intelli-
gence data from German sources (see chapter 1, part one of volume I).
Even layman cannot believe that such a black series of events for
the Germans was purely accidental. Who was responsible for these aber-
rations? The German Intelligence Service, obviously. This was whispered
in the German Headquarters in 1944. But no one dared to say it loud.
After the failure of the plot against Hitler on July 20, the Nazi party
finally succeeded in suppressing the Abwehr (Army Intelligence and Counter-
intelligence Service). The Gestapo, represented by the Reichssicherheits-
hauntamt, became the absolute master in the intelligence field. To criti-
cize anything done by the Gestapo, meant an attack on the most sensitive
Nazi group and was as good as signing one's own death warrant.
Obviously it was not the Army General Staff which could take such a
chance. Hitler always hated his generals more than he hated all the French,
Poles, and Czechs put together! He successively destroyed all the Army
chiefs of staff, Blomberg through ridicule and scandal, Fritch through
disgrace and probably with a bullet in the back, Beck by having him hung
by the throat on a butcher's hook, and Brauchitch with disparaging remarks.
Before July 20, it was said in the Reichswehr that if one tried to hold
his head high, even from a distance, it would fall like that of Rommel.
After July 20, nobody said anything at all.
Goering had made the Luftwaffe an Annex of the Party.
Hitler always handled the Navy with care. He used to say, "I have a
national-socialist Air Force, a christian Navy, and a reactionary Army."
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He treated his pilots with cordiality, his sailors with respect, and
his Generals like dogs." (1)
At the end of 1944, only the navy could dare express doubts about
the efficiency of the Gestapo in the field of military intelligence.
They waited until March 1945 to do it, timidly. It was too late, to
rectify the Gestapo mistakes when the beaten German Armies were retreat-
ing in confusion from the West and the East, toward the deadly refuge that
was the Reich. When the extreme gravity of the situation gave them a pre-
text, an excuse, a reason to question the actions of the Gestapo, these
actions were as hard to interpret as a political intention.
Still they did it in the end. What did they expect to achieve? Con-
sidering the fact that the war was lost, were they trying for the benefit of
history, to make the Reichssicherheitshauptamt responsible for the total
absence of the fleet during the landing operations? Or perhaps still keep-
ing an ultimate and weak hope, were they trying to destroy the legal mono-
poly on intelligence held by the Gestapo? Were they trying to play their
last hand with a maximum of trumps? Was it only a shy administrative echo
of Colonel von Stauffenburg's bomb? Or perhaps more simply, was it just
the routine work of a Staff, continuing to fulfill its mission with a pro-
fessional insensitivity?
Whatever it was, on March 23, 1945, in dossier # 3.626/45., and under
the stamp "Secret Command matter", the Navy German Supreme Command sent to
the Reich's highest authorities a message limited to seven numbered copies,
which was entitled:
(1)
Statement reported by Raymond Cartier, in "Les Secrets de la Guerre
devoiles par Nuremburg';" The Secrets of the War as revealed by the
trials at Nuremburg (Librairie Artheme Fayard).
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STUDY ON THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE DATA GATHERED BY
THE REICHSSICHERTEITSHAUPTAMT ON THE ENEMY LANDING
PLANS IN THE BAY OF THE SEINE RIVER, PRIOR TO THIS
SANE LANDING.
Let us analyze this document. I would like the reader to pay
attention and concentrate. It is really worth it. We read in the
heading:
" - The purpose is to verify if the informers' reports are
useful...to the Navy..."
In the first part, basing their knowledge on the gathered information
from all sources; from espionage activities, air reconnaissances, radio
monitorings, and observation reports (especially that of Gibralter),
etc.. .the writers of this study have rebuilt the allied operations plan,
this they could do, and should have been done on time. We note that the
Germans had received plenty of warnings.
Their aviation had clearly detected the center of the allied troop
concentrations, the tonnage of the landing-crafts, and the naval forces
in southern England. Their Army had been extremely surprised by the fact
that the mouth of the Seine river had not been included in the Allied
mine-laying operations along the French coast, in November 1943, and
again in May 1944. Agents infiltrated in the F.F.I. revealed to the
Germans the particular importance given to the Normandie, Le Havre and
Britanny resistance units. These units were organized and trained as
combat troops behind the German Army. They found out that the allied
deployment for the invasion had started in September 1943 and was
virtually completed by April 1944.
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" - The preparation of the necessary tonnage reserve
was so advanced that, as early as January 1944, it was
possible to realize that a large scale operation was
being planned."
In April 1944, they even came to the conclusion that the invasion
could possibly take place in May.
Other information, of vital importance and infinitely more accurate,
over which we will throw a veil, was given to them by their counter-
intelligence. They got this material through some of their double
agents and from the confessions of couriers sent on missions to France.
These couriers were arrested by the German police some time before the
landing.
This first part of the German study does not clearly formulate a
conclusion, undoubtedly in order to avoid an open attack against the
Gestapo. But this conclusion is obvious. It was: "by digging in the
mass of information gathered from all sources prior to June 6 1944, that
we were able in March 1945, to reconstruct the allied landing plan. It
is exactly the one which has been applied, with only one uncertainty con-
cerning the possibility of an operation on the channel coast before the
main attack (diversion), or simultaneously with said attack (support) or
else after (if required). Why didn't we make this easy estimate before
June 6? What blinded us?"
The last part of the study devoted to tactical lessons learned
from the landing, proves absolutely that the surprise was complete.
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The second part of the document offers an explanation. It starts
with a detailed, endless, and relentless list of all the information
furnished by the Reichssicherheitsbauptamt agents, in other words, by
the spies, and only them. It inclUdes thirty single-spaced typewritten
pages, in which each informer is given an efficiency rating, and each
"information delivery" is followed by a value rating determined from
past events. Further in the book, we shall examine the latest entries.
I regret that I cannot disclose to the readers who have become captivated
by this kind of work, the pseudonyMs of the spies and the relating notes
and remarks. They would become paSsionately involved at guessing who
was this "Perlinpinpin" who talked of the British fleet as if he was
its commander-in-chief, this "PickWick" who lived right in the middle
of the Weston-Super-Mare harbour, this "Avenger" who certainly belonged
to the Giraud Staff, or perhaps to :the intimate circle of de Gaulle.
Indeed a thorough study of the pseudonyms often gives an indication as
to the identity of those who bear that name. One can understand that
my intention is not to provide a little society game for family evenings.
Or at least not until the Allied Special Services have identified, tried
and shot all the enemy agents, after having cleared their own.
Following the presentation of all intelligence data gathered by the
spies, the Navy Supreme Commander computed a box-score and added his
comments to it. I am translating:
INFORMANTS REPORTS TOTAL NUMBER
173
I.
Accurate
14
=
87
II.
Partially true
24
=
14%
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III. Possible. Cannot be checked 26 = 15%
IV. Too vague, therefore not usable 7 = 4%
V. False 102 = 59%
NOTE: From the reports under category I, only one gives
the exact location of the landing and three others indicate
an almost exact date. Among the reports in #2, there are
only three which closely predicts the date and the location
of the invasion, amidst many false indications.
The Navy Supreme Command then concluded, as follows: (I decline re-
sponsibility as to the phraseology, which I translate textually).
- The percentage of inaccurate reports is therefore higher than
the percentage concerning the landing in Southern France which
amounted to 52%, while the proportion of reports confirmed by
actual events remains the same, 8%. The conclusion previously
drawn from this fact is still valid. We cannot expect an im-
provement in this area because the prevalent political situation
renders the work of the informants extremely difficult. We are
forced to admit that an increasing number of informants are
double agents who are supplying us with intelligence "fabricated"
by the enemy. At the present time, this danger is particularly
serious, even with the informants who, were considered until now
as probably reliable. Some of them, assuming that a German de-
feat is unavoidable, will undoubtedly try to go over to the
enemy while they can, or at the very least will cease to do a
job which has become too dangerous, and they will furnish only
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invented information. These considerations must be taken
into account when evaluating their reports.
I am adding my own conclusions. They present a certain interest,
in spite of my personal insignificance. Because, for the moment at least,
I do not have to fear the reaction of the terrible Gestapo through its
Reichssicherheitshauptamt. I can speak "on the level." I can tell
what the Supreme Command of the Reich's Navy apparently thought.
The German Special Services have had, under their eyes, more in-
dications than required to foresee exactly the place, the date, and the
pattern of the large allied landing. Confused by our double agents, they
let themselves be drowned in a flow of contradictory information. They
did not see the true items, which were quite numerous, they believed
those which were false. Undoubtedly there was more of the *latter, as
they were better introduced (which was the least the interallied General
Staff could do), better corroborated, better cross-checked (it was not
just anybody who was in charge of coordinating this "mirage"), and also
because they were brought in by people of quality. These people were
respected for their intelligence, culture, unselfishness, and Nazi
fanatism, or because they seemed incapable of inventing anything.
I will go even further. Whatever might have happened, the German
Intelligence Service in 1944 was already neutralized. If Germany had
wanted to build another one, they would have had to do away with virtually
everything that existed and start from scratch. This means that at best,
they would not be ready until the next war. The Navy Supreme Command
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sent the following strict warning in vain: "All these considerations
(increasing possibilities of betrayal by the agents) must be taken
into account when evaluating their reports." It was too late. The
sentence is almost a confession. It implies such a mistrust, and so
casts such suspicion on the whole Intelligence Corps that it makes it
impossible to work with it any longer. The agents' superiors could
not afford to trust them. Even assuming that through some miracle they
could miraculously purge their ranks and recruit new men, they would
still throw the "information items" in the wastebasket, for fear of re-
sponsibilities.
The German distress was so deep at that time, that the G-2 of the
German Navy Supreme Command, after studying another document (No. 3/S.K1
F. 1. - 3,180/45. Secret Command matter), concluded, on the basis of:
- 79 reports received since the beginning of the invasion
on the landing intentions in the German Bay, in Denmark, and
in Norway, that these undertakings were all equally possible.
- Due to the fact that the enemy's plans are closely linked
to the development of the Western front operation, it is
impossible to determine the value of this information. Events
which have not yet occurred does not mean an imperfect or
false report...
To receive an answer "a la Normandie," that is a yes, no, or maybe
answer; that means that their Intelligence Service had completely failed.
It was not necessary to maintain a costly organization, just to find
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that everything was possible. All they needed to find this out was to
read the newspapers and listen to the radio of the other side.
Since I started writing the beginning of this chapter, I have
learned about a press release according to which Admiral Raeder wrote
in his memories, published in England, that the allied landing had been
exactly foreseen by the Germans. I have carefully re-read the German
documents 3 SK1 - F.L.B. No. 3626/45 and 3 SKL - F.L. No. 3180-45. Un-
questionably, Admiral Raeder was not in agreement with his Staff which
established beyond any doubt that the moment, the place and the forces
of the allied landing all constituted many surprises for the Germans.
For various reasons, I believe the Staff; one reason I believe the staff
is that the rough work sheet of a Staff will always be closer to the
truth than personal memories. Therefore, I have not changed a word in
my first draft of this chapter.
II
DOUBLE AGENTS
I certainly need not inform the reader that I will refrain from
indulging in personalities under this title. If there is really a field
where discretion is a rule, this is it. The names and pseudonyms will
be fictitious and the anecdotes interchanged. In the following chapter
which deals with enemy agents, I ahall be able to accurately place the
stories in proper sequence.
This being settled, I would like now to outline a classification of
double agents.
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Among the mass of professionals, I shall make a distinction between:
1. The double agents initially recruited by us. 2. The "turned-
around" enemy agents; a certain country called the first ones "V agents,"
and the others, in all graphic simplicity, the "W's." 3. The spontaneous
double agents, who made their appearance during this war. 4. The occa-
sional, and unconscious double agents.
The next question is: is there, or can there be a patriotic double
agent? Is this an honest man's job?
My goodness! I apologize to a few men who in any case will probably
excuse me. For they know very well what I personally think of them, and
furthermore, they are by habit or disposition, totally indifferent to the
opinion of others. One must admit that while some people of high morality
have become double agents, it is not an honorable career.
It is a job which usually ends in disaster, one way or another. A
job in which, one way or another, nine men out of ten became bad. One
has to be an angel in order not to get soiled, and one must also have
his wings so as not to be sucked into bogs and quicksands. There are
but a few angels on earth. Not many of them are available to the Special
Services which, has very little appeal for angels.
Fortunately, there is always the man who tells you calmly: "My
doctor says that I do not have much longer to live. I am looking for a
useful occupation which would make me "forget my problem," and help me
break away from my thoughts. We are at war, and what makes it worse is
that I can't even fight. Can't I be useful some other way? I have money,
connections, and time to spare..."
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Then, there is the man, and more often the woman, who confesses:
"O.K., O.K. You're right! Yes, I admit it. I like intrigue in itself.
Am I peculiar? If you want.. .perhaps. But only to a certain level. Be-
cause after all, I don't have any other vices.
Let us go down a few rungs in the intellectual ladder. There we
find the romanticists, those who have a vivid imagination, and the exalted
ones. There are plenty of them around. We better be careful. Their
motives are by far infinitely less solid and durable than the others.
They must be eliminated as soon as possible.
Finally, there is the mass of naturally devoted people, thoroughly
faithful all the way to the gallows. People who are a little soft and
weak, and whose lives are only a reflection or a shadow of other lives.
It is among those that the Intelligence leaders recruit most of their
agents. Women especially. Don't make any mistake about it, they can be-
come very touching and respectable heroines. The scholars who graduated
around 1900, those specialists of "fashionable adultery," did not suspect
the power of love as a basic motive.
So it appears that this book, which I started with a promise of com-
plete truthfulness, is turning into a romantic novel, Well, if it seems
that way, it is because the existence of a double agent is a novel...
A novel which may be a little dull when the person concerned has a lot
of luck. But all it takes is a slight incident to start the action roll-
ing, just such action as the intelligent imagination of a good playwright
could produce.
In any case, I wish to repeat that these patriots who have risked
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their lives in such a job are definitely entitled to our friendly
silence. Their adventures could not be told without disguising every-
thing with extreme care.
I have tried to do it in other writings. I am not looking for
publicity in bad taste to sell my little novels. I ask the reader to
believe me when I say that these books are out of print and that there
is no paper available to reprint them. But those among you who are
interested in intelligence work could perhaps find, bashfully hidden
behind a row of serious literary works: "Double Crime sur la ligne
Maginot" (Double Crime on the Maginot Line), "Terre d'Angoisse" (Land
of Distress), "Peloton d'Execution" (Firing Squad), and "Un Homme a
Trahi" (A Man has Betrayed). Their starting point and their central
characters are real, only the development of the intrigue and the con-
clusion are in the form of a novel. "Double Crime sur la Ligne Maginot"
is about a German serving in our army on the Maginot line, - the second
and third stories tell about two Alsatians one of them making a career
in the Imperial Police before 1914 and the other in the Gestapo before
1939; and in the last novel I relate the story of a German agent trying
to "turn around" before the final catastrophe. It is said that Colonel
Passy, in his memoirs, wrote humorously that these books were his only
training in intelligence matters when he took over the G-2 section in
London, and that he soon found out that they did not correspond to reality
in the least. Wrong! Wrong! If Passy had been dilligent, he could
have gathered from them some useful teaching points, useful for him at
least, and even more, a few ideas. After these few innocent jokes, I
should also add that in 1941, Passy had other things to worry about than
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to try for the "ultimate achievement" of the trade. One can under-
stand why he abandoned that phase of counterintelligence.
It is only upon men such as I have described in my books that a
Counterintelligence Service can absblutely rely on its dealings with
doubles, - something which should not be confused with double-dealings.
Their reports, the only ones on which it is possible for a Counter-
intelligence Service to put on the upper left-hand corner of their reports
the mention "Reliable Source," which is a serious act of responsibility.
So serious in fact that no counterintelligence chief could paper the
smallest alcove of his apartment with all the documents on which he has
affixed this "qualification" during his entire career.
The patriotic double agent is too rare. The professional or the
mercenary always ends up betraying, unless he quits before finding him-
self in a corner. Reason dictates it. First, he must really have no
morals on decency to contemplate earning his living in such a way. If he
has not resisted such temptation, why would he not succomb to the further
temptation of increasing his income? If this man had not already lost all
his scruples, his daily life would take care of it gradually, imperceptibly.
His life is infinitively more false, deforming, and demoralizing than the
life of an actor: His thoughts are mostly vile. The exterior world brings
no support: He is despised by everybody who knows him well. He generally
starts because of laziness and cowardice. It is an easy job, a loafer's
job. He has to do nothing on his own. A Frenchman would give him a pack-
age to carry to a German, and the German would give him a package which he
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brings to the Frenchman. He gets paid from both sides and hopes for
a substantial raise. Perhaps he swore to himself that he would pass
on to the enemy only the information that his friend instructed or
allowed him to give. But one day, short of cash, he passes on an
additional tip which he thinks is of little value. Then another tip
follows more important, and soon he gets caught in the mill and tells
everything.
The life of a mercenary double agent, suspect by definition and
constantly in contact with the enemy, is more dangerous and, above all,
infinitely more nerve-racking and depressing than the life of an ordinary
agent. At first he believed that both sides gave him protection. This is
an illusion which disappears rapidly after the suspicious looks from each
side. It is well known that professional traitors cannot be taken care
of according to a graduated, human code. Sometimes, when he is compro-
mised, he finds a way to get out of trouble. This way is work for the
enemy as well. Then he becomes a double agent., in the dishonorable
meaning of the word such as the public understands it.
The mercenary double agents are mostly recruited from among the
various Slav and German populations of Central and Eastern Europe. This
can be explained easily. The Oriental man is too conspicuous and first to
be suspected. What the Services look for are persons not necessarily highly
educated but who at least possess a certain varnish, a "polish," some
gumption and plenty of ease in handling themsleves. Therefore they
generally are former or unsuccessful bourgeois, persons who have lost
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their social positions, or whose life was a failure and who were
stopped in their social climb. They are most likely found in countries
where nationality has not yet been definitively determined (including
Germany), and where the society has been the most uprooted by invasions
and foreign rulers or by interior political crises.
The small European countries, other than the Slavic, nations fur-
nish a rather strong quota, but their nationals are not as clever,
brilliant or gifted for a life of intrigues as the Slays who also have
the additional advantage of speaking all European languages equally bad.
Much can be said about the third Republic and the French middle
class, but the fact is that, while they furnished their quota of traitors,
between 1940 and 1944, these were ordinary political traitors. They
were not enemy double agents, who are morally of a lower breed. If there
were a few of these among them, they were, - in all the cases known to
us - resistance fighters turned around by torture, physical weakness,
moral pressure and blackmail involving their families. Please refer to
the chapter: "How a network survived - The case of the Agence Immobiliere,"
(Chapter IV, Volume I) where I mentioned all that had to be said on this
sad subject.
Later, the increasing use of electronic equipment enabled us to
play the double agent game mechanically, without the complicity of men.
The only thing necessary was to capture their transmitter and their code.
We remember how the Germans used the radio of Navy lieutenant Lavalle.
We did much better. I shall prove this a little later.
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Finally, invaded Europe, with its displaced persons and mixed
populations, provided the Allied Services with a real army of unaware
double agents: German or Italian officers from the Armistice Commissions,
enemy or neutral diplomatic or consular officials, collaborators, members
of puppet - governments of the etc.. .We could be sure that the "tips"
which we conveniently leaked with a calculated and feigned innocence
were not going to be lost. We will encounter several of them a little
further in the previously analyzed German documents, and study them in
detail.
III
THE HANDLING OF DOUBLE AGENTS BY THE FRENCH
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SERVICE DURING WORLD WAR II
If there is an activity which requires a top level guidance and a
skillful orchestration, it is the employment of double agents. I men-
tioned already that only the supreme commander or the command of an
army at war is qualified to determine: 1. What they want the enemy to
believe, - 2. The amount of truth which can be disclosed, (because,
naturally, not everything must be false in the "Spielmaterial" ("chicken
feed" - deceptionmaterial) supplied to the agent; otherwise the enemy
would fire him. It is therefore necessary for the commander to have
his staff establish a general intoxication plan, just as there is a gen-
eral operations plan, a general war - production plan, a general trans-
portation plan, etc.. .As a rule, the commander should sign this plan and
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thus assume the entire responsibility for it.
The general staff, helped by the counterintelligence bureau, has
the delicate task of producing the deception material and false docu-
ments of genuine appearance, between reports from creditable agents.
In sentences discreetly entered during a conversation inside observa-
tion reports, etc.. .It can range from diplomatic information which an
ambassador may be tempted to include in his periodic situation reports,
to the crumpled piece of paper from an ordinary spy on which the latter
has sketched the emblem of a division transportation company going through
his town.
The Counterintelligence has the task of recruiting the necessary agents
in sufficient number and quality to insure the forwarding of this "manna"
to the enemy Intelligence Service. This requires a lively imagination
controlled by an acute sense of realities, a very wide experience and
a great deal of individual self-control, because a good team of double
agents is a socially and intellectually select group.
Their employment has greatly increased and improved since the 1914-
1918 war when the German Intelligence Service chief, Colonel Nicolai,
wrote: "To be useful, an agent 'within the lines' must have a high
level position." This sentence could lead to believe that this uncon-
tested master in the intelligence field had not yet conceived the con-
cept of total intoxication, and only expected information from his double
agents. Indeed, the intoxicating agent is not necessarily an important
personality. The important thing is that he makes himself credible.
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The Allies did not do any better in 1914-1918. We must admit
that the French intelligence chiefs had retrogressed since Napoleon
and his extraordinary spy Schulmeister, who was the ancestor and the
master in this field.
This was partly due to circumstances which were not favorable to
an offensive use of Counterintelligence. The two enemy blocks were
separated by a rigid and impenetrable front, and they could remain
in contact or penetrate each other except through Switzerland, Spain
and Holland, and then under the suspicious eye of the pollee of these
countries. Each fighting Nation had an unquestioned national govern-
ment, as well as solid, traditional, and long established administrations.
People were unanimous in their will to fight and win.
A similar situation existed from September 1939 to May 1940. It
was impossible to infiltrate the enemy to the point where he could be
completely fooled. Thus, even though the intoxication had already been
planned and tested on a small scale in peace time, and its doctrine
established by the French Counterintelligence, the latter concentrated its
main effort on the execution of its defensive missions.
Those missions were carried out perfectly. We were able to cope
completely with the German Intelligence Service. One day it will be
necessary to knock down that hysterical "gossip" of a 5th column composed
of military spies which supposedly operated during the battle of France.
The Germans were able to parachute agents or to have them infiltrated
the shifting and hollow front-lines. But the French Counterintelligence
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was able to state positively as early as 1939 (and this was formally
confirmed in May 1940) that there was not a single German Intelligence
agent planted in France who was not being watched by our Counterintelli-
gence. It was not due to the latter's fault that a political 5th column
came into existence. In October 1939, the Interior Ministry refused the
C-5 section (Counterintelligence) permission to arrest Deat, Luchaire,
Brinon, Benoit-Mechin, Mayol de Luppe, etc.. .and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs also refused the permission to expel the Italian diplomats from
the combat zones.
The French Counterintelligence warned about a hundred factories
working for the war effort which were watched by the enemy, and it was
possible to establish an efficient protection plan for the vulnerable
areas of National Defense. Since we knew perfectly well the courier
and radio liaison procedures used by the German spies, we were able to?
focus the work of the postal, telephone and telegraph control and to set
up a monitoring and decyphering system.
Counterintelligence, through its double agents, helped to a consider-
able extent the French Intelligence Service. This service succeeded in
fulfilling its mission. Again, this is another blinding truth which
requires proof. It would be very easy, but isn't my subject, and I
will only say a few words about it. Positive proof does exist in various
forms. The complete order of battle of the Wermacht, and its deployment
were rigorously kept up to date (and I mean: day by day) in the daily
information bulletins of our Supreme Headquarters. These bulletins still
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exist. The German war material was known, described, marked and
photographed in a G-2 "catalog." It is still there. The tactical
employment of these weapons and equipment was studied in a G-2 report
about the Polish campaign, which appeared prophetically in June 1940.
It is still available for reference. The German offensive plan against
France, and the focus of its main effort to breach our lines and use
the shortest route to the Oise river gap, become apparent when looking
at the German deployment sketches, attached to the information bulletins
of our Supreme Headquarters in 1940. These sketches are still available.
Of course, the job of the Counterintelligence double agents was
a contribution to this overall Intelligence effort. It was a very im-
portant one. Here are a few examples. During the last 3 month-period
of 1939, the Counterintelligence gave to the G-3 (operatLons) of the
Supreme Headquarters, a study concerning the collection plans given by
the Germans to their spies. It was emphasized that the Germans were pri-
marily interested in Belgium, in our Northern defensive organization,
especially the Sedan area (width of ditches and anti-tank obstacles,
maximum load capacity of bridges, etc...) and finally in our order of
battle in these areas. Hitler changed the offensive date several times
on account of the weather and not to try our nerves. The offensive was
not a surprise. Among many other indications, we knew that the German
Intelligence Service in Brussels were calling in some of its informants
from Switzerland, because a new operation was going to take place in
Belgium, which had been clearly and carelessly disclosed some time in
advance.
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In a very sporty manner, the British Intelligence Service admits
that the work of the French Special Services, (started in September
1939 by G-5, continued under the cover of the Armistice Army and re-
sumed in Algiers), was very superior to that of all the other allied
organizations until the beginning of the second semester of 1943.
Some partial intoxication attempts had succeeded in 1939-1940.
Among these, from 1 September to 30 October 1939, our Counterintelligence
in liaison with Colonel R., the Supreme Headquarters officer in charge
of guiding its activities (this was the future General R., commander
of the Army Resistance Organization), had succeeded in fixing the atten-
tion of the Germans on the coast from Boulogne to Cherbourg, while the
landings of French Union and British troops were taking place further
down in the South.
The German spy net was overcrowded and drained to our advantage.
For example, a certain Major X., chief of one of the most important
Abwehr's Section working against France, was exclusively handling ten
agents: five of them were doubles working for us, and the others were
regularly arrested in their first missions. Our Counterintelligence
service controlled ten German transmitters. In September 1939, Counter-
intelligence was able to inform Colonel R. at the Supreme Headquarters,
48 hours before the start of our operation pompously called: "Offensive
of the Saar," that the German Intelligence Service knew about its goal,
the date and the time. Finally, during all that rotten war, our double
agents were able to travel in Germany.
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The Special Services considered the 1940 Armistice only as a
temporary cease-fire in the armed conflict, and consequently, they
felt it was necessary to increase the intelligence war. I showed,
in chapter I, Part I, of volume I, how my comrades conceived and
fulfilled their task. Some more precise information is required here.
The use of our double agents, under the eye of the enemy, became
dangerous and physically very difficult. The patriotic double agents
became discouraged, skeptical and sometimes disturbed by the Vichy
propaganda. The professional double agents became tempted to change from
V to W status with Vichy's blessing, - the candidates decreased in number
- and an invasion by enemy spies became probable.
At the very time when we were threatened with the loss of this
operation, the field research and spying and the chances of success in-
creased considerably. It is exactly what happens to a gambler with little
money when the stakes suddenly go sky high. The Germans became infini-
tively more vulnerable once they moved part of their war machine into
France, and thus by mixing with the French people, gave a temporary
trust to a few of them, even just by talking to them.
It was not the time to give up the game. It was
on and stick with it at any price.
In a patient and courageous manner, the Counterintelligence organi-
zation rebuilt its net, and eventually it won this struggle where only
the mind would be relied upon.
In January 1942, we were handling 90 double agents, including a few
half-
necessary to hold
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important ones. It was not enough because there was at least 40
intelligence cells operating against us, within our territory. Some
of them were not sufficiently infiltrated, for example, the Germans
in Nantes, the Italians in Berne, the Japanese in Casablanca, and the
Spanish in Tetouan. But this would only be a matter of time.
Defensively, we scored a few points in 1941. First, we had to
neutralize the tremendous effort of the Abwehr which tried to infil-
trate the French, British, and interallied Intelligence Services.
"This country must be paralized." We need more than 30,000 agents,"
is what the German Counterintelligence chief in France used to say.
He was far behind that figure. We could say exactly where he stood,
because all his important double agents were identified, as I will
prove in the next chapter. Our own double agents were faithful. In
twelve months, they gave us 10 million francs which were rewards they
collected from the Germans, and this money was sufficient to insure the
operation of our own network, which did not cost the French budget a penny.
By continuing to imperturbably execute all German spies, the struggle
to keep alive a concept of treason in France was won. This we awed in
part to the double agents. For example, they were responsible for 56
of the 153 arrests made in 1941 by the Territorial Surveillance
Brigade of Marseille.
They kept on helping the Intelligence Service. By analyzing the
German collection plans, the French Counterintelligence was able to
answer certain questions for the French Intelligence Service. Here are,
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at random, a few of the certain facts provided by our double agents.
Since the beginning of 1941, the Germans had in mind their in-
tention of taking over our fleet in Toulon, at the first opportunity;
and also thought of invading Morocco. The Italians were kept almost
completely in the dark about the German political intentions; they did
not know a word of what was said at Saint-Florentin: and their defeatist
complex was such that they had no illusion as to the future of North
Africa: they would have liked to know the probable reaction of Vichy
when the British would reach the Tunisian border. The Spanish gladly
collaborated with the Germans in Morocco, but would probably not remain
passive if their own territory was invaded. The international diplomatic
game was played carefully but although Vichy received enough warnings,
it never took advantage of them. For example, on August 4, 1940, our
Counterintelligence reported that the British and the Russian Intelli-
gence Services had attempted to make contact with each other, on January
12,1941, that a complete collusion between these services had taken place,
this was a premonitory sign of a vital importance. In spite of the most
extraordinary efforts at secrecy by Hitler, the Counterintelligence re-
ported, on April 28, 1941, that the German offensive against Russia was
imminent, etc...
There were also other announcements, they were of a moral and poli-
tical nature, which the French Counterintelligence service had the courage
to furnish to the chiefs of the "de facto" regime. It is not without
interest to recall them, and it will only briefly divert us from our sub-
ject. For example, on July 10, 1941, the first Agence Immobiliere chief,
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P., a young captain, dared to send a report through the chain of
command about the state of mind of the population in the occupied
zone. I read:
- The main tendency in the general evolution is.. .a deep
disaffection toward the chief of State. The same people
who, at the time of the Armistice, were worshipping him
and had confidence in his judgment and respect for his past,
have now lost all faith in him.
The Marshal's entourage had first aroused anxieties, they
have now become vehement accusations.
The hostility toward the occupation troops has now changed
to hatred.. .The same hatred is felt for the Frenchmen who
are collaborators...
The English cause seems to be gaining the sympathy of the
people...
...One year after the defeat, the painful conflict of con-
science created by the Syrian affair has become an unim-
peachable test of the state of mind preveiling in the occupied
zone. The attitude of the Marshal had been attacked while
the English agression is excused by a strong majority. -
So much for the French state of mind!..
In 1942, the Counterintelligence chiefs regained confidence in their
double agent system, and they studied carefully the extraordinary prospects
which the evolution of the political and military situation offered. We
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shall see the profitable results of this meditation which can be
summarized in the following manner:
"The net of double agents which the Agence Immobiliere
cultivates is good. The Agence Immobiliere has overcome
defeat. It is operating at full speed. It works in close
liaison with the allied Intelligence Services, the British
Intelligence Service in Marseille and Lisbon, the American
Office of Strategic Services in Vichy, and in Tangiers, with-
out mentioning the numerous contact points between subordi-
nate agents. It is strongly infiltrated in the German In-
telligence Service which it is already starting to control.
For example, it is one of our agents who has been entrusted
by the Abwehr with reorganizing their unit destroyed in North
Aftria. The liaison agents of the German nets in our other
African colonies are working for us. We have infiltrated all
the Abwehrstellen (Abwehr cells) in Dijon, Angers, Nantes,
Paris, in the North of France, Belgium, and in Holland. We
have cankered to the core the Italian Intelligence Service,
already rotten in itself."
"This is only the Counterintelligence aspect of a gen-
eral military phenomenon. By spreading all over Europe and
by monstrously extending itself, Germany lost its hard-core
cohesion. It is showing cracks, opened flanks, fat and flabby
bellies, and even underbellies; as Churchill has aaid. The
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German Counterintelligence chief is wrong to want 30,000
agents in France. He will be completely rotten before he
can recruit 1,000 of them in places other than jail."
"When the German General Staff was making an intelligence
evaluation of the Sedan plan, they only paid attention to
air reconnaissances, monitorings and identifications made
by a limited number of old and well-known agents, who were
watched and under strict control. Their supervision re-
quired no more than a leader and a few Prussian officers.
After all, a miscalculation of a few French Divisions was
permissible, since the Wermacht was so much the stronger
and had the initiative."
"All of this has changed now. The political and
occupation needs have forced the Germans to recruit a real
army of almost unknown agents. The military services are
working more and more with foreign governments and their
intelligence organizations, such as the "Government Infor-
mation Center" of Vichy. With the Germans losing battles,
each defeat will cause an epidemic of defections, desertions,
and betrayals. The German agents will try to join the Allied
Services at all cost, and try to be useful enough to save
their skins."
"Conclusion: It seems that the time has come for the
French Counterintelligence, to play the big game of the
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intoxication."
This reasoning was good. It proved to be correct.
After its establishment in Algiers on 8 November, the French
Counterintelligence noticed that the Interallied High Command had
organized a control element to guide the intoxication. All the French
had to do was to place themselves at its disposal. Experience was not
lacking. There was no personnel shortage either.
We started working right away. We know the results. The French
contribution in agents was a major factor of the success.
It required a lot of courage for the Agence Ituniobiliere members who
had remained in occupied France to continue the handling of their double
agents. We will
by his betrayal.
Nevertheless, it seems
see how much destruction only one of them could cause
that
the
best results were
obtained by the
German spies from North Africa who had been discreetly arrested and then
turned around to our side. Here is what we obtained out of one of them.
He was alas! a Frenchman whom we unmasked. Due to his high intelli-
gence, and the important positions he had held before his downfall and
because of his connections, it was believable that he could have gathered
strategic intelligence. We fabricated some for him. He passed it on to
the Germans during the Tunisian battle and the Italian campaign. There
is no doubt that he was trusted. Especially when cross-checking details
were transmitted to the enemy Intelligence Service by lesser spies, and
most of this intelligence material checked out. Since we knew, through
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our double agents, the details which were considered true by the
enemy, there was nothing wrong in confirming them. Also, there was
no damage done if a report loaded with true and very important facts
did reach the Germans after the event had taken place. The delay could
be blamed on a liaison failure, and the agent's reputation remained
safe, his position was strengthened, and he could become indispensable
in the future.
No matter how well the game was played, we really did not expect
that our man would retain the complete confidence of the Germans during
the French campaign. Yet, they kept on listening to him like an oracle,
from the Normandy coast to the Rhine river. God only knows, all the
things we made him tell them.
When the Rundstedt counterattack started in Belgium, the initial
German successes were serious. We then decided to take chances on com-
promising and sacrificing our agent. We made him turn over to his former
masters some very important false information which was likely to in-
fluence the tactical, and even the strategic situation. The Germans and
the P.P.F. (Right Wing Collaborationist Party) profusely thanked him.
The employment of this man and the results he obtained require a
detailed study both from a psychological and a military viewpoint. Due to
lack of time, however, I had to abandon it, because it could not be
separated from the complete strategic and tactical history of this war,
about which I do not know enough. I will start it again one day, if God
permits it.
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IV
INTOXICATION BY THE ALLIED SERVICES
DURING THE D-DAY PREPARATIONS
In order to show the insiduous and destructive action which can
be exercised by a great number of agents such as the one I just men-
tioned, let us move into the enemy camp. Let us list and summarize
part of the intelligence data which fell like a heavy rain on the
Reichsicherheitshauptamt during the short and special period, of the
fortnight preceding the Normandy landing.
The German Navy General Staff gave each item a value rating, after
the event took place: I = True. II = partly true. III = possible, but
cannot be checked. IV = too vague, therefore useless. V = False.
They are as follows:
- 1. The invasion will take place in Belgium, between May 15
and May 22, (V).
- 2. On May 5, I found out that the landing will take place
within the next 8 days on the Atlantic and Pas-de Calais
coasts...(V).
- 3. The English landing and troop transport fleet anchored
in various English harbours, has completed its loading operation
and is ready to sail at any time... (I).
- 4. For the last two weeks, large troop movements have
occurred from both the North and the Center of England toward
the Plymouth area. Even though England is seized by an in-
vasion fever, this invasion at the present time is impossible.
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The following technical reasons forbid it... (I)
Let us remember this last piece of information which the German
Navy classified as "True," in spite of its last sentence. We will talk
about it later on.
- 5. First invasion wave planned for the night of May 16.
Probable target: Cherbouzg. Landing of the main body of
the invasion Army around May 20... (III).
6. Invasion in the West as soon as weather will permit.. .(IV).
- 7. Anglo-Saxon landing between May 20 and June 10...(I).
8. From May 10 to May 21, landing between the Somme river
mouth and Southern Belgium, as a diversion maneuver. Depend-
ing on the results obtained by such diversion, there will be
a large scale operation within the following four weeks. The
main sector has not been determined yet, due to a disagreement
between the U. S. and British General Staffs (V).
- 9. No landing before July-August (V).
10. The competent Vichy political and military circles
(several names followed) anticipate a large scale landing for
mid-May (V).
11. Invasion on May 19 and 20. On the 20th, the first air-
borne troops will appear in the North of France (V).
12. A second front will be set up through a landing operation
of the Allies in Denmark. This will be put into execution be-
tween now and June 15 (V).
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13. ...At the present time, the "Channel" plan is
viewed with preference. This is a joint navy-air force
operation on the Channel islands, probably aimed at Isigny
in the North of Coutance. This is an encirclement operation
in order to isolate Cherbourg (II).
14. Landing postponed, due to increasing defensive power of
the German coastal fortifications (V).
15. If the weather permits, commando actions will take place,
on May 28, near Dieppe, Abbeville, Boulogne and Dunkerque (II).
16. Invasion will not take place before the period of June
20 to 25 (V).
17. Invasion attempt between May 31 and June 20 (IV).
18. Invasion this summer with the left flank against Denmark
and the right flank against the North of Belgium. Main effort:
Hamburg. Because of the election of U.S. presidential electors
on June 20, it is possible that the operation will take place
prior to this date (V).
Invasion postponed to autumn because the allied air forces
are in insufficient strength. (V).
20. Invasion expected during the night of May 22 -23, by new
moon and at low tide. Landing sites unknown (V).
21. No invasion is to be anticipated in the very near future (V).
Let us put ourselves in place of the G-2 who was responsible for
sorting out this horrible mixture, and determining the right note in
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this cacophony. It is really hopeless. There is nothing to do but
throw the whole thing in the waste basket. Nothing can be gained from
this.
Later, it would be discovered that the only true items were No. 3,
No. 7, and No. 4 which was probably an English scheme of extreme foxi-
ness, aimed at creating among the Germans a prejudice against the truth.
They were lost in a maze of "false tips," which were sometimes utterly
ridiculous, (the work of mediocre agents not knowing what to write),
which sometimes appeared authentic (drafted by an Allied General Staff
officer). The Vichy gossipers were used unbeknown to themselves, and
they played their part in this war of news that had boomeranged against
its originator. Out ofcharity, I did not mention any names. But they
are listed in the German documents and they are the names of men who had
been chosen to transmit unconsciously a truth "made in England."
Item No. 5 is strange and disconcerting. It gives the first real
target of the Allies, Cherbourg. But since it mentions the date of May
20, nobody will take it seriously, once that day has passed. It is not
impossible that this information also came from an allied double agent;
but it would have to be from a British agent. Only the English were
capable of such boldness and of such an extensive shrewdness. Didn't
they go as far as asking their Prime Minister to insert, in his public
speeches, certain paragraphs of the Interallied Staff, general intoxi-
cation plan? Moreover, Churchill was very willing. He will remain the
undisputed "boss" of the 20th century intoxication agents.
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But what is even worse, when indications impossible to camou-
flage such as the indelible signs of allied preparations were revealed
P
1
to them by collection organizations other than their spy-network, these
0
indications and signs were doubted or disregarded, because their intelli-
gence contradicted and neutralized them.
On April 24, 1944, the Luftwaffe intelligence Service reported:
- ...The preliminary movements of the enemy invasion Armies
and its Air Force formations aimed at the large scale attack
on Europe is completed. It seems obvious that their maritime
transport preparations have also entered their final phase...
On May 9, 1944:
- ...The enemy deployment at sea is almost completed...
On May 13, 1944:
- ...The enemy air activity, which has suddenly increased since
the end of April, is characterized by heavier attacks against
our defensive installations between the Seine river mouth and
Cherbourg...
On May 29, 1944:
- ...The main effort of the enemy air force is concentrated on
the destruction of air means of transportation behind our lines
in the Channel area (the Seine river bridges), and in a North-
South direction (Angers, Tours, Orleans). This must be con-
sidered as the beginning of the final phase of the invasion
preparations...
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On June 1, 1944:
- ...A landing exercise which took place on the southern
English coast, at low tide, could be an indication of the
enemy's intention of avoiding the German obstacles placed in
front of the French coast line...
Again on June 1, 1944:
- ...The weapons drops have greatly increased since the full
moon of May 28. We must consider the period starting June 12
(last quarter of the moon) as critical.
On June 4, 1944:
- ...Massive enemy air and navy forces engaged our naval_
operations in the Channel.. .The enemy is increasingly success-
ful in protecting England's southern coasts against our air and
naval reconnaissances. They are in the process of probably
deploying their means of transportation for the invasion.
On June 5, 1944:
Using all the means of the war of nerves, the enemy command
keeps on trying to stop us from determining what they are up
to...
- ?All information coming from the USA indicates once more
that a continental Europe harbor has already been designated
as the next port of debarkation for U. S. troops...
On June 6: D-day.
When the German Navy General Staff finally found time to study the
landing operation and draw conclusions, they wrote:
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- "Secrecy and the surprise factor were strictly protected
by the enemy during the preparatory phases and the landing
itself - (Note 3.626/45 G. Kdos)"
In view of the above-mentioned intelligence furnished by the
Luftwaffe this seems unbelievable. Yet, it is true. And for it to
be true, it required that the allied Counterintelligence Service re-
duced to nothing through the use of intoxication, not only the German
Intelligence Service directly, but indirectly all the other enemy in-
telligence organizations.
V
DOUBLE AGENTS IN SPITE OF THEMSELVES
It should prove interesting to leave the theoretical and histori-
cal aspects and to make a little excursion in the practical field. Here
is an example.
It is an eventful, and mysterious story. It could be related ex-
actly like an adventure novel or like a suspense thriller. Let us
choose this last formula. It is the most entertaining one, and the
reader has a right to a compensation after this long and rather didactic
presentation where I could hardly avoid sounding like a boring professor.
The first act takes place in Paris during the gloomy spring of
1943. The Legion of Anti-Bolshevick French Volunteers has set up its
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offices in a house on Rue Saint-George. It is far from being crowded.
But they are trying to make it look that way, just as they do on the
movie sets, with a frantic agitation of extras, skillfully staged by Mr...,
let us call him Albertini, who is the king-pin of the Organization. He
is a former military administrator in the Quartermaster Corps, a penpusher
who has just discovered a way to satisfy his excessive needs for cash,
which have been repressed for too long.
A shrewd man, he makes the legion candidates come at least six times
to his Headquarters. They are a sad, half-starved and deadly bunch; a mixture
of stoolies of the "Parti Populaire Francais," of salaried recruiters, drag-
ging a few gangsters behind, of tramps, madmen, and alas! of some genuine
war aces who have a weak mind and have never been able to adapt themselves
to peacetime life. Not many of them will go to the training camps, and
even fewer to the Eastern front. It is like Gueretis Tricolor Legion, which
was truly a fraudulent failure. This will become obvious in the end. But
for a few months, the staging will impress favorably these stiff and scorn-
ful German officers who, sometimes, cross the halls without getting dirty,
their way being cleared by the obsequious French secretaries of Abel-Bonnet
and Benoit-Mechin.
On that day, a man who did not have the appearance of a mobster entered
the den on Rue Saint-George. Among the latin, African or other indescribable
S.S. candidates, he looked like a cock-pheasant lost in the middle of a
flock of ungraceful and disgusting black crows. Let us observe him for a
moment, while he gives his calling card to the clerk and glances somewhat
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amusedly at his shady neighbours. He is worth looking at. He is
tall, blond-haired and carries himself well. He has a charming dimpled
smile. He attracts women. Too much so as a matter of fact, according to
his friends who begrudge his fondness for only rich women, or at least
presumed to be so (because, sometimes one can make a mistake, especially
at the beginning).
"Belair? Oh! He loves rich women. Well! Some like them blond,
you know. It's a matter of taste..."
You can believe that had Belair been anyone else, this disapproval
would have been expressed more sharply. He was so frivolous, so impul-
sive, so perfectly unconscious that it was impossible for anyone to get
angry at him. Nobody could. Not even the comrade who gave him shelter
and whose wife Belair took or rather "borrowed," while getting engaged
to that gentleman's sister, and then several days later breaking up this
engagement to turn his temporary attentior toward the wife's sister.
"You are the worst bastard I ever met" his host told him.
"It is true."
Belair answered "What I did is terrible. Kill me. Rat..."
As usual in such a situation, a weary and melancholic smile appears
on his face. Then he collapses. It seems that he expects you to kill
him. Your fist, your foot, or your whip are stopped in mid-air. You
have the feeling that he did not do it out of malice at all, that he
did not even realize what he has done, that between the kid who stole a
spoon full of jam and him, there is no...but this cannot be explained.
You have nothing left to do but turn your just and legitimate anger
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toward his female partners with whom it may be possible to have a
real argument.
The office clerk of Rue Saint-George comes back rushing and bows
in front of the distinguished visitor. The door leading to the General
Secretariat is now wide open. Standing in the door-frame, Mr. Albertini
welcomes him with open arms.
"Lt. de Belair? What a pleasure!"
Understatement of the year! Mr. Albertini is radiant. It is the
best day of his mercenary career. A lieutenant! A real one! A man
whose name appears in the Army Year Books. Old Year Books, it is true.
But nevertheless it counts.
Albertini offers him an arm-chair (requisitioned), a cigar (a Havana
manufactured in Hamburg), and calls his secretary (He is not to be dis-
turbed by anyone). A few preliminary courtesies (they are society people
after all). Then Albertini comes to the heart of the subject:
"Lieutenant, you are aware of the sad situation prevailing in North
Africa. It certainly must have caused some anguish to a patriot, an
officer, and an old Moroccan soldier like you."
"Don't tell me! It's terrible."
"North Africa is economically of European domain but politically it
is French. The Germans are very reassuring on this last point. They
have no political aims in Africa, none whatsoever. All they are asking
for is that North Africa enters the eurafrican economical cycle where
its presence is indispensable due to its essential raw material: vegetal
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oils. But North Africa is in the hands of the Americans. They will
only leave after having entirely conquered it in their hypocritical
way, that is through money.. .Or force. There is a need for a French
mission to Morocco made up solely of French officers, a splendid task
to undertake: the safeguarding of France's domain. And that's why I
thought of you."
"Good! Thanks!"
"But France right now has no means of action. So Germany will fur-
nish the equipment, the money, hum.. .confidentially, all the money you
want..."
Then with a motion of his arm, Belair sweeps away these sordid details.
One is an aristocrat after all!
"Very well!" resumes Albertini "The Germans will transport the mission
to the site. Its aims: Through propaganda in European and local circles,
through...special...actions...hum...sabotages!"
Belair has a nice indignant movement of the chin.
"...against the Anglo-Saxon enemy, exclusively. There is no need
to say that it...well...using all means available, to develop and then
direct the European and local dissidence against the invader. It does
exist. It is conscious and powerful. It is only a matter of taking
control over it. O.K.?"
"O.K. But with one strict condition: that nothing is to be under-
taken against French interests in Morocco. Nothing all all! Otherwise..."
"But, certainly! Of course! In working for Europe, you will be
working for France."
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All this seems unreal. But this conversation between a crook and
a kid actually took place on Rue Saint-George, around April 15, 1943.
These childish and yet sinister sentences were indeed spoken, word
for word. Save a few approbations, there is not a word of my inven-
tion in this dialogue.
The wheels of the treacherous machine work rapidly. A short while
later, Albertini introduces to Belair the team he has recruited for him
among the Legion of French Volunteers. What a team! It is enough to
makeome sick to his stomach. Its most beautiful ornament is Massue, a
not-so-young-a gorilla who has quite a past: he killed with a revolver
two guys from Belleville who were insulting him because he paraded
around in a German uniform. Right after such "showmanship" he was pro-
moted to second lieutenant.
Laquet is a stupid young man who has never received religious in-
struction. He is one of those who really cannot live without it. No
one ever took him to see the priests. But later, he was fed on Hitler's
speeches. In it, he saw the "light." Now he is more "boche" than a
German born S.S.
Caramel, a former member of the Legion's Paramilitary Organization,
is a larva. Less idealistic than Laquet, he is shrewder. He is also
a former communist and a somewhat homosexual.
Poux, a former member of the "Parti Populaire Francais" of Oran
is insignificant. He is just a stand-in.
All these "lovely" people chatter, gossip, make the Hitler salute,
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kick heels, profess nazi beliefs, boast of extraordinary exploits on
the Eastern front, and inquire about their pay. Belair is thoroughly
disgusted with them. The ex-lieutenant judges his associates as
"sectarians," "ardent germanophiles," and inside himself he calls them
vicious scoundrels. For the first and not the last time, he has the
urge to withdraw. But he changes his mind. He will manage to get rid
of these scoundrels. Physically he is not a coward and he has been in
command during battle. He has discovered right away the main character-
istic of this riff-raff: they are all braggarts. It will be easy to
deflate them, except Poux, the quiet one, who has served honorably in the
Air Force as a radio-operator.
Belair sighs with relief a few days later when his detachment re-
ceives two additional men who are, according to him, "Officers" and
"leaders." He chose the first one himself. His name is Bertrand and
all we have to say to qualify him is to mention his missed calling. He
Is one of these unfortunate people who dreamed all during their youth,
of becoming an officer, - who had flunked out of the academy, out of
0.C.S., and out of the regimental training schools, - and his only chance
now was in a somewhat murderous war. Intelligence being by definition
the ability of making a choice, Bertrand left it up to Belair whom he
admired for having entered the Army through the front door, to chose
everything for him.
The second one, Picard, is brought by B., the General Secretary of
the African Ex-Phalanx who is only looking for a way to extract funds
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from the secret or overt treasury. What B. really wants is to take
over Albertini's role as promoter of this exciting and much sought
for mission. It has been given a name and a beautiful one at that:
"Carthage." Picard is a real man, the first one in the lot up to now.
He is the Verdun type infantry platoon leader who became a colonial
civil servant, then a settler. After the November 8 landing, he was
cut off from Morocco, his adopted country. He knows everybody in Vichy
where he has a flattering reputation of being a Maurras follower.
Actually he has too much personality not to worry Belair who thinks
that he is "withdrawn," "independent," "mysterious," and even a "schemer."
It is perhaps simply because Picard has judged too well his mission chief.
In any case, Picard is useful. Not only to counter-balance the
"sectarians," and thus by giving him the cue, to allow Belair to gargle
himself with words and convince everyone that they are going to serve
eternal France, but he is also valuable because of his practical knowledge
of the African world and because of his connections. After a two-month
discusion on how to get to Morocco, as soon as Picard enters the game he
finds a solution in a minute. He introduces his friend Le Gorgeux, an
important settler of the Sous area, who offers his estate as a drop zone.
The farm house is away from the roads, hidden and sure. Le Gorgeux is
a hothead scatterbrain. He is bursting with rage since he arrived in
Metropolitan France. He has come back here for the first time in twenty
years, to attend this great convention of the P.P.F. which started approx-
imately at the same time as the Americans were landing in Africa. He
does not want to have anything to do with the mission schemes. All he
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wants is to go back home which he intends never to leave again. What
happened at the convention has disgusted him with politics for the
rest of his life. In any case, his project is excellent. DZ markings
are planned. Favorable and unfavorable neighbours are identified. A
time schedule is proposed. Everything is there. The plan is adopted.
The first act ends by a formal presentation of the team to the
Germans, by its delighted God-father Albertini. He has eliminated B.,
the man from the Phalanx. He will receive the iron cross upon the de-
parture of the mission.
The Germans are Colonel Schmitt and Captain Gahrken (real names)
from the Abwehr Amt Ausland (Foreign Section) located in Munster. They
are spy chiefs who really look their part. This does not scare in the
least the servants of eternal France. The following scene takes place
in Hotel Commodore, Boulevard Haussmann, in a private suite.
Speech by Albertini: Europe, France, Germany...
Speech by Gahrken: Germany, France, Europe...
Noddings of approval by the Colonel.
Then they came to serious things.
Gahrken: "From now on, all members of the Carthage mission are
pledged to serve the common interests of France and Germany. Soon, you
will be leaving for a training course in Germany (various reactions).
You still can change your minds. During the training period, you will
have to comply with the prescribed discipline. Afterwards, you will be
totally committed and you will not be able to withdraw."
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As he speaks further, his tone of voice becomes harsher:
Gahrken: "We are going to set up a contract with special ad-
vantages, special allowances..."
Belair (disgusted and ready to give up everything). "Our pay
from the Legion of French Volunteers will be enough."
It was true that there would be the funds for the operation of the
mission, and other money to be parachuted afterwards...Massue who will
not be able to control it has a disappointed look.
Belair: "We are not mercenaries, but French officers. In this top
secret enterprise, of which I am the responsible leader (this for the
benefit of Albertini who is bragging around about 'his' mission, and
has told Brinon, Bonnard and Darnand about it), I request that before
we accept anything, the following condition be stated in writing:
Nothing contrary to French interests will be asked from us."
Gahrken (suddenly cunning): "But that goes without saying. Of Course."
He is not risking anything. He holds his puppets well in hand.
Their joints maybe a little stiff yet, but they will release! No need
to break the threads brutally. It is as good as settled.
We may imagine the meeting ending with shouts of "Long Live France!"
It is not mentioned in the minutes of the meeting which I have in front
of me.
Act II. The setting is located in the comfortable and mysterious
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villa, "Queen's Sea" on the edge of a nostalgic Prussian lake, ten
kilometers West of Brandeburg, shelters one of the Abwehr's "beehives."
Mission Carthage arrived here in the evening of July 15, 1943 and as
early as the 17th, the leader and his men start regretting their trip.
This dissatisfaction is going to turn to sour and will reach the verge
of dissidence in a few days.
The reasons are different according to the individuals. Belair
is dissatisfied because he expected, if not an introduction to Hitler
himself, at least the possibility of associating with some Wermacht
Oberkommando chiefs such as Keitel or at least Jodi. Picard and Bertrand,
his "officers," as he calls them, are dissatisfied because they came here
to follow an instruction course on the situation in North Africa. It is
obvious that they are regarded just as ordinary spies, and receive no
more consideration than those who preceded them. Indigenous personnel
from Asia Minor or from the vicinity of Mourmansk. This is too much.
His "non-commissioned officers," Massue, Laquet, Caramel and Poux
are furious because discipline is strict at Queen's Sea. They must learn
lessons, listen, submit to interrogations, and even work physically.
It is not like Paris where they could decide the fate of Europe and
Africa in a heady atmosphere of power and genius.
These modern companions of Ulysses are assembled, early in the morning,
by first lieutenant Muhlmann, who asks them to rub off the rust with a
little bit of violent sport (what a thing to ask of these brains!).
Then he turns them over to the house specialists. Herr Doktor Willike
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especially. He is a "Doctor in demolitions," who teaches them how
to blow railroad tracks, cars, locomotives, and how to place under-
water charges, well, everything in that field. Then they go see a
movie with Muhlmann who shows them various Moroccan architectural
works, and points out their weak points with such evident lust that he
salivates, slavers and stammers. An odd type of Herr Doktor. A medi-
cal doctor then teaches them how to apply bandages, garrots, makeshift
splints, and how to give shots, this causes panicky reactions among
the "non-commissioned officers," who had all supposedly been heroes on
the Eastern front. Herr Fischer and other technicians who did not take
the trouble to introduce themselves, initiate them in the ciphering of
messages, and the use of invisible inks, the developer for this ink can
be found only in Berlin, also in identifying Anglo-Saxon units, and in
preparing themselves to the dangers of the French Counterintelligence.
Kruger, the radio instructor, and Poux "squawk" all day long. They
fire all possible weapons. Herr Kraveliki is at the disposal of these
gentlemen to fabricate all and any forged papers they might want. Last
but not least, is Doktor Frohlich, the great German specialist on North-
African matters. Are they finally going into serious business? At last!
Not at all. It appears, after one hour to Belair and Bertrand, and
after 5 minutes to Picard (who after all is a scholar in Arabic, having
spent twenty years in Africa, and having been in daily contacts with
Moslems whom he liked as only a Frenchman could like natives) it is clear
that the eminent professor is nothing but a pedant and narrow-minded archi-
vist. What does he know about Africa? The Badeker (tourist guide).
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And he knows it by heart! Belair, who is getting nervous, proves to
him that he has never looked an Arab in the eyes. Then, Frohlich
steps in prudently and, pulls from his brief case...some documents
about sabotage objectives. Again!
If Belair knew the German type only as theoretically as Frohlich
did the Moslem, he would shout "Vor Tish, las man anders!" (It is not
the treaty that we read before the banquet). It is the most startling
image of the most diabolical, natural and unconscious German hypocrisy.
Schiller gave it only unvoluntarily. But Belair does not think that
far ahead. There is something of a horse in him, an animal which is
at the same time the most touchy and the least conscious. His feelings
are hurt. He only says:
"What the hell...Who do they think we are? Spies?"
For the tenth time, he feels like abandoning everything, but this
time he proclaims it, and asks after Gahrken.
The captain comes running. In a few minutes everything is settled.
The course was only given to kill some time. The German Supreme Head-
quarters is going to send to Lt. Belair a thorough synthesis of the
situation in North Africa, from a very high level point of view. The
long time it took the Headquarters to write it proves the exceptional
importance attached to the Carthage mission. France and Germany...Ger-
many. and France...Europe...Has Lt. Picard thought of making propaganda
pamphlets for the natives? It is of vital importance. Yes. Picard is
Misting the Koran so as to make it more appealing to this new brand of
Christians.
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At that time, Air Force 1st Lt. Paulus arrived with a bunch of
parachutes and a Junker 52. Everyone boards the plane, straps him-
self in the "umbrellas," including Gahrken who sets the example, and
the restless Le Gorgeux who has just come to Queen's Sea for a few
days. It is understood that he will arrive in Morocco before the team,
to make their "reception" arrangements and will be routed by the Germans
via Spain. Therefore, he has no reason to get initiated in parachute
jumping. This settler has pride. Since a German is jumping for nothing,
he will jump also for free.
The plane circles a few times above the blue-grey-tin colored lake
and the flat and sandy moors. During the first circle, Laquet starts
vomiting abundantly in his head-gear. During the second one, between
two hiccups, Caramel talks about an old belly-wound. During the third,
Massue, the top ace of the Eastern front begins to suffer from old and
glorious foot wounds. Belair, who has his own opinion, advises them to
be careful.
As the plane approaches a small bare area on the side of the lake,
Paulus shouts "Raus."
Belair jumps. He is followed by Picard who is close to fifty-years
old and is covered with wounds, real wounds. Then comes Gahrken who
jumps because of his sense of duty. Then Le Gorgeux who does it only
for sport. And Poux who is given a little push by Bertrand, the last
man on the stick. Belair asked him to do it.
Actually, the "non-commissioned officers" are right to be frightened
about jumping. The DZ, which was badly chosen, is too narrow. The
Y were
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landing on roofs, fences, trees. Results: Le Gorgeux has a dis-
located shoulder, and Gahrken a fractured instep. In short, it is
a draw.
Before the departure of the ambulance with the wounded, Belair
obtains permision for the "non-commissioned officers," to be withdrawn
from the mission, all except Poux whom has risen in his esteem. Reasons:
cowardice, lack of discipline and other superfluous unfitness, the
listing of which would make one laugh, if it were possible to do so
in such a story: "complete misunderstanding of the North African ethnic
and geographical conditions," "lack of judgment and intelligence," etc...
Only Gahrken could find this highly comical. But he has a broken
instep. Let us mention that this is the first positive result of the
Carthage mission. An Omen of the Gods.
Act III brings us back to France. The act is a little hollow,
empty and garrulous. But I am a slave of the truth.
The Carthage mission condensed and reduced to Belair, Picard,
Bertrand, and the radio operator Poux, who is waiting for the departure order.
Le Gorgeux, escorted by a German, is on his way to Barcelona, from there
he will be transported by sea to Casablanca or the Sous river mouth.
Belair is getting nervous. He threatens to break down, just like
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a very light weathercock during a storm. At the slightest pretext,
he threatens to resign. One day, it is because Albertini did not
find another dummy for his "window," and is exhibiting him outward-
ly in the high society of collaboration. Another time, it is because
the German Staff did not always answer his questions. A leader such as
as himself, entrusted with so heavy political responsibilities, some-
thing of a Crusade in fact, has to clear up these questions before
going into action: Where are the rebellion centers against Americans?
What does the Sultan and Belair's future adversaries, i.e., de Gaulle
and Giraud, think? What extortions, ransackings, and atrocities did
the yankee invaders commit? etc...
Was he a leader or not! To command it is necessary to anticipate.
If Picard, who is consistent, in his ideas and Bertrand who des-
perately hangs onto the leader of his own choice, were not holding Belair
back, God knows where the latter would go. With de Gaulle perhaps. He
has thought of it. Perhaps on a honeymoon. He is thinking of marrying
again. Belair is a "Triplepatte" turned traitor. (1)
One day, in Vichy, Picard introduces him to his friend Lesel, an
intelligent and even brilliant man. If the Germans couldn't, then Lesel
could describe the actual situation in North Africa to them, orient them,
guide them, and finally allow them to prepare a serious, precise and
thorough plan, productive in historical events. Nobody knows the Africa
problem better than Lesel. Meeting him is providential. He was. .let us say,
(1) "Triplepatte" French play by Tristan Bernard and A. Godfernausc (1905) .
about an undecided and weary young nobleman (Note of the editor)
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Vichy sub-perfect in Algeria. He escaped right after the landing, via
Spanish Morocco and Spain.
Can he be trusted? Picard vouches for him. Belair does not hesi-
tate any more. He discloses his intentions and asks him for advice.
What can be done within the scope of the Carthage mission? Is it possible
to do something useful for France? What way can this something be done?
"Are you out of your mind" exclaims a startled Lesel.
Stupified, he looks at the two men with whom he is conversing. It
is evident that he has no taste for adventures. Undoubtedly his escape
was nothing but a flight. Picard, a rather close friend of his, has the
impression that he has joined Vichy only because he has collaborated a
little too much with the Germans to make a quick turn around and thus run
the risk of being arrested in the South.
. "My Gosh! You really think big! " says Lesel with a voice and a
look which was openly admiring.
It is in such cases that Belair feels recaptured by his vocation of
rebuilder of Empires.
"I admire you" continues Lesel, "I cannot tell you the comfort you are
bringing to men like me, who have left their wives and children behind to
come and tell France about the great misery in the Empire invaded by
foreigners. But it is my duty to shout to you,stop! You are running to-
wards a catastrophe."
"Pooh" replies Belair.
"There isn't a doubt," admits Lesel, "that there is a great unrest
over there..."
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The situation is not quite as desperate as the Germans paint it.
No doubt that the Americans have taken over the mines and the rail-
roads, but it is not too obvious. They are rude, drunkards, and un-
likable, but they do not take away all the food. The food supply of
the population is normal. As far as the English are concerned, they
are perfect. Leclerc's Army is a wonder. And he concludes:
"Of course, the French in Africa are completely demoralized. That
is why I left. But you are going to have the hardest time in the world
to make them listen to you, because a terrific propaganda mixes every-
thing up Believe me. Just stay away. In spite of the purity of your
intentions, you will be unanimously considered as German spies."
By now, Belair is completely defeated. That very night, he signs
to...take-off for Spain with Gaullist comrades who trust him fully. He
is not going to betray them. As far as treason is concerned, he has his
own ethical rules.
He has decided to leave. It has almost happened. Perhaps if it
happened, he would now be a hero. As we have already said, he is a brave
man.
But now Lesel is the one who stops him, by suddenly changing his
opinion. This schemer does not seem to have received from Vichy the re-
ward he expected for his faithfulness which was extraordinary in such
an era. He has been offered only another remote sub-prefecture. He has
refused it with dignity. He is bitter and full of venom. Oh! This is
not the reason he gives to justify his sudden change of heart.
"I systematically toned down the truth to you, the other day, because
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it bothered me to see my old comrade Picard throw himself in a dangerous
adventure. But I thought it over and today I say to you: "Go." A
magnificent task is awaiting you and the success is possible. Giraud
cannot cope with the events; he is at the mercy of the Americans who
submerge him, and are dealing directly with the Sultan. They are re-
placing our Indigenous Affairs Officers, and are causing our disarmed
troops to rot in their barracks. Under these conditions, military draft
is not very popular. Natives and even Frenchmen are seeking refuge in
the mountains. The dissidence is hatching in Le Tafilalet, in the Zaian
country and in the Rif. French sovereignty is in danger. This is the
truth. The hatred against the Americans is increasing. They are brutes!
You can't imagine how they are They respect nothing. In La Calle, for
example, I saw them shoot holes in wine casko with their pistols, get
filthy drunk, thereafter, rape a young native girl in a public square.
They ended their exploits by killing a herd of cows just for the fun of it.
This may seem unbelievable but, one night, some American officers who had
been invited by a Frenchman, had their hosts stay in a room at gun point,
and then they raped their wives. But when it comes to fighting, there is
nobody left. In Tunisia, the French had to be the first ones to fight
and expose themselves in combat."
Belair is getting more excited.
"Ah! To achieve African unity, what a task that is! I would really
like to go with you," continues the long-winded Lesel. "But I am a marked
man over there. It is not very nice for me here either. I don't know
where to go or what's going to happen to me."
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Picard has an idea. For a long time, in their relations with the
Germans, the members of the Carthage mission have wanted to do away
with Albertini, that horrible collaborator, that swindler, that gossiper!
Why not replace him with Lesel? His escape from Algeria will appeal to
the Germans. They will be glad to have him, a man who knows so much about
Africa, and who is well educated and reliable to interpret the information
sent by Carthage. On the other hand, what a safeguard it would be for the
mission, because, after all...
After a noticeable moment of hesitation, Picard decides to reveal his
secret, which Belair had vaguely guessed since their first meeting:
"...after all.. .when receiving our messages, my dear Lesel, you could
only give the Germans what you thought was useful, to them and pass on the
whole thing to the Vichy Navy Intelligence...hum...for which I work."
Belair is stunned. He did not know that he had within their group
such a complex subordinate.
"Well! Well!" says Lesel, Bravo! The sailors are sure patriots, and
in Vichy they are the only ones you can rely upon to fight against the de-
clining Germans and the threatening Judeo-Communists. This may be the
future. But.. .do you know that this is wonderful!"
"Wonderful!" echoed Belair.
In short, everyone has, or is going to give oneself several masters.
Does one really know for whom one is working? Since one does not know for
what cause!
In any case, Lesel is the most gifted of the three. After being
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introduced to the Germans, he bluffs them, fills them with enthusiasm
and startles them. He tells them, and they believe it, that he almost
became a Vichy Under-Secretary of State. But he was discouraged by the
atmosphere of "King Petaud's Court." They approve. Through his intelli-
gence and his self-assurance, he convinces the Gestapo men that he is an
element of value "in the superior levels of the collaboration." They put
Albertini aside and make Lesel the only correspondent and handler of the
Carthage mission. They give him, as a reward the management of an editing
firm in Paris, and tell him that he will go further than Brinon, if he is
capable of discipline of mind.
Everyone is pushing someone else! To the point of suffocation!
Act IV - Entirely in the air. It starts on October 15, 1943, at
2200 hours, with a Broadcast from a Paris Radio, broadcast which is re-
peated again one hour later. It is brief, loud and heroic. It is:
"Rodrigue, have you any courage?" Some readers may remember the ridicu-
lous reply "cocorico" of the inspired speaker. Personally I remember it
as if it was yesterday. The message was for Le Gorgeux, and it meant that
the Carthage mission was going to be parachuted the following night, over
the area which he was to have prepared and beaconed in his Sous estate.
Let us say casually that the comical or familiar conventional, sen-
tences of the Allies did not show any imagination. It was: "The little
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girl's hat," or "The carrots are cooked." Air pick-ups, drops and "tube"
operations were routine night work for thousands of lads who were looking
on war as a prescribed necessity. They were defending themselves. Their
leaders did not need to convince them daily that the adventure was magni-
ficent. But in the German case, they were working in the sublime.
"Rodrigue, have you any courage?" This exhilarating effort which comes
over the unconscious and ridiculous speaker, reveals the excitment and the
anxiety of the enemy due to the endless B.B.C. broadcastings to the under-
ground. Their mystery caused such a pressure on the invader that it was
for him a real relief to know and to have the world know that he too was
conducting the secret war. This sentence must be understood in free trans-
lation: "All! See! We do it too!" Rodrigue, Carthage, all of this is a
mirage. But I am anticipating.
In Bordeaux, everybody is busy in the hotel Royal-Gascogne where the
team has been sent. There is quite a crowd. The Munster Abwehrstelle is
represented by Garrken whose instep has healed, by the pompous Frohlich,
Muhlmann, Paulus and other less important lordlings, and the Gestapo in
France by Lesel. Even though it is German, the mission is found to be not
well prepared. Things have to be improvised. Lesel and Bertrand who is
to be the coder, have to determine at the last minute the conventions for
the sending of radio messages: call signs, key-group arrangements, and
wave-length, which they will be the only ones to know. Should one of them
disappear, Poux, the radio operator who was briefed too rapidly, might make
the mistake of broadcasting needlessly.
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All the equipment is weighed several times, in order to distribute
the loads equally. The pompous Frohlich gave his recommendations and made
a speech. Then comes the numerous administrative paperwork procedures.
Each man is given a Colt, 50 rounds, a pocket one-lens field-glass, a
compass, a first-aid kit, a flash-light, etc.. .but someone has brought
the wrong set of maps. Then comes the organizational equipment. It is
out of this world. For example, there is a box fitted with wheels con-
taining 2 automatic rifles with silencer, enough ammunition for MO years
of active campaigning, and, a complete assortment of false seals, and
stamps, among which the "Military Permit" stamp alone is a real stamping
machine weighing 15 lbs. God knows what else! Total weight amounted to
several hundred kilos.
Belair gets mad and strictly refuses to take these impedimenta with
him. On the ground, a camel caravan would be needed to carry it.
The funny part is provided by Frohlich, who solemnly gives to "sehr
geherter Herr Picar" several boxes containing moslem-written pamphlets. He
is quite sure that this is going to stir up a religious war, and spread just
like a wild-fire, from Moulay-Idriss to Mecca. Picard upset, only takes a
sample of each pamphlet which he will leave on one of the tables in the hotel
lobby.
After five months of a laborious preparation the part of: the German
Staff, the Amt Ausland of the German Intelligence Service, the Brandebourg
School of Espionage, and the Legion of French Volunteers all working together
were finally successful, on October 16, 1943, the Carthage mission appears
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on the scene of the secret war. It takes off from the Merigna airport at
2200 hours sharp, in a Focke-Wulf Condor which certainly never before
carried so many German hopes. The chief pilot is Major Liman von Sanders.
Truly it is possible that the Germans, these fetishistic primitives, did
it on purpose. Liman's ancestor, who was the organizer of the pre-1914
Turkish Army, never missed the chance to have his name followed by the
noble title bestmed on him by the Tures: Liman von Sanders Pacha. The
odd combination still symbolizes the "Drang nach Suden" ( the drive to-
ward the South). Dream. Mirage. Carthage.
Four hours and fifteen minutes of flight at 12,000 feet of altitude.
It is very cold. Bertrand, flyer by profession, and interested by the
activities of the crew of this magnificent plane does not mind too much.
But later he reported that "Belair, Picard, and Poux remained bundled up
in their flying clothes and curled up on themselves, "they were sick and
cold."
Were they sick from the cold only?
Undoubtedly the Germans are thinking about that carefully locked train
which, in 1917 was carrying Lenin and his companions from the Swiss border
across Germany and up to the Eastern Steppes.
No incident. No machine-guns fired at the plane. The jump-off point
is spotted right away. The beacon-lights are well placed. Good old Le
Gorgeux!
0215 hours. The Carthage companions jump into space from an altitude
of 1800 feet. The plane turns back. "Dogs are howling," notices Bertrand.
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Act V is excellent. Perfect! One must allow me to be enthusiastic.
In this act, my position is much less that of a writer than of a drama
critic.
Bertrand, who is the last one to jump, makes a rough landing. He
rolls on the ground, hits invisible obstacles, and is a little "stunned."
These damned hounds are still howling. Bertrand stiffens, frees himself
from the ropes and stands up. Two helpful persons assist him. Well!
They are not his carthaginian friends. Two strangers. Undoubtedly, they
are Le Gorgeux's assistants. Good old Le Gorgeux!
"Everyone is fine" says the first one "They are all here!"
And the second adds:
"Go to this building in front of you, young man."
Five minutes later, in a room of Le Gorgeux's farm the four members
of the Carthage mission, with their hands up under the threat of a few
pistols, are lined up against a wall. I can imagine that their faces
made no contrast with the white-washed background...but my role is not to
imagine things.
Several rough but visibly satisfied civilians are inventorying the
bunch. They make a roll-call. And they use real names, not pseudonyms.
"Belair?"
"That's me!"
"Bertrand?"
"Here!"
"Good. Then you must be Picard. And the youngster is Poux. Good.
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Everything is O.K. We have the weapons and the equipment. Let us see:
one Colt and 50 rounds."
Picard is reprimanded because he gave 25 of his rounds to Lesel.
"...field glass, compass, pocket-flash-lights.. .hey, chief, is this
considered war spoils or not? No. Too bad! First aid kit. Maps.. .Good
everything is all right. It's all there. Now let's see the loot, 300,000
francs. Fine."
Then comes the following which sounds like a dream:
'Where in the hell did you put the automatic rifles with silencers,
the stamps, the kit and the pamphlets? Ah, that's true. At the last minute
you refused to take it with you. Correct?"
Let's recall that this "last minute" happened less than five hours
earlier.
Poux whose legs are giving away is pulled up roughly by the chief of
the policemen.
"Stay up, young man. It is no time to snooze. There is work to do now.
Otherwise, it would be useless to have made you come from so far. Unpack
your radio. As for you Bertrand, aren't you the coder? We will use this
wave-length. Don't pull any trick with your key-group. It would not work
and it would be dangerous for you. The message for a good arrival is..."
The chief scans through a notebook.
"...Ah! here it is: 'It was in the horror of a dark summer night.'
Let's go boys."
An inspector laughs:
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"Hey, chief, where do they find their blabbing? There is nothing
horrible about a summer night."
"That's what you call literature" answers the chief in a scornful
manner. "Let's go Bertrand, I am spelling: It was.. .Capital I...."
The Carthage mission thus began its career. It was obscure and use-
ful. It lasted five months, which is pretty good. It contributed to the
intoxication of the Amt Ausland which was, I repeat, the German command
organization in quest of intelligence in foreign countries.
Belair was not a bad cover for false information. Having served in
Morocco for quite a long time, it was not impossible that he could discover
the secrets of the French Staffs in North Africa. The German commoners of
Munster imputed to his noble title a Prussian like power and radiance. They
thought this particle opened for him the most restricted diplomatic circles.
Belair's personal charm, well known and tested, justified the fact that any
woman could make him any kind of confidence.
And he did see, hear and report a lot of things! We can say that for
five months, he was one of the best German agents.
But there is an end to everything. It is probable that Carthage would
have lasted longer if it had not been for an unvoluntary indiscretion from
a person outside Counterintelligence. In March 1944, during the Pucheu
trial (that trial again!) an improvised defense attorney, who did not need
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such arguments to have his client shot, and who was carried away by
his neophyte zeal far beyond his assigned objective, undertook to
severely criticize Vichy and the Vichy double game: "It's a Double
agent" he exclaimed, "Is it a double game again, this dropping of four
French officers whose chief bears one of the great names of France, on
October 16, 1943, in the area of...? This was false, not only as far as
the Military Year Book was concerned, but also according to the Who's
Who. It was also false in the terminology and the interpretation of the
facts, but the public prosecutor could not know it. It would not have
been important, if it had not revealed the truth to the Germans who were
listening.
The defense attorney aggravated the damage by making the following
statement: "Soon, the guilty ones will appear handcuffed in this court."
By evaluating approximatively the time necessary for the investigation and
the Inquest, the Germans were going to understand that the arrest of Belair
and his associates had taken place several months earlier. This rendered
void all the long-range intoxication work of the mission and could endanger
the operations under preparation.
Not including some deadly and useless danger's hanging ipso facto over
useful mortals.
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But I almost forgot to give the key of the problem. The careful
reader has probably found it. Having to respect the truth, I could not
make the mystery intricate enough and its solution progressive and well
camouflaged at the same time.
Intellectually, only two persons, perhaps three, could conduct such
a complex plot. Obviously it could not have been the coward killers elim-
inated at the beginning of the school sabotage course. Nor Bertrand who
was only a shadow. Nor Poux, a bit-player. Nor Belair because this is
not a novel and such a feather-brained person couldn't in reality make
such a shrewd double agent. Nor any of the Germans, otherwise I would have
presented him in more detail. Nor Albertini, nor B..., because, after all,
it would be known by now.
Remaining are Le Gorgeux, Lesel and Picard.
Physically, it cannot be Le Gorgeux. He was away from Bordeaux before
the departure of the mission, and could not possibly have given the police
the list of the equipment which was taken or left behind.
It cannot be Picard either. Oh! It is not because the Territorial
Surveillance Detachment arrested him when he landed with the others. There
would have been many reasons to let him share for a while the fate and the
jail of his companions. But let's go back a few pages. I was writing that
in Bordeaux: "Lesel and Bertrand, who is to be the coder, have to deter-
mine at the last minute the conventions for the sending of radio-messages:
call signs, key-group arrangements and wave-lengths, which only they will
know. Should one of them disappear
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Since the policemen knew all these secrets, Lesel was the one who
warned them. Besides, had Picard known all these details, he would not
have had the time to transmit them.
Furthermore, after an exceptional success such as the taking-over
and the utilization, to our advantage, of a mission which took five months
of preparation by the German Intelligence Service. One is not about to
leave the scene of one's success. One continues until the end. One has to
try to establish a second and a third mission. One has to advance. One has
to try to infiltrate the enemy secret councils. One would perhaps succeed,
if it were not for the errors of others. One risks everything, up to the
end.
Had Picard been our man, he would not have returned to Morocco with
"Carthage." Undoubtedly, he really would have never retruned there. Never.
Finally, all the "salt" of this story...
Therefore, it was Lesel. Lesel who had been selected for his extreme
intelligence and dropped in Metropolitan France with a very broad mission
"against" Vichy and the collaborationist circles. With men of this caliber,
one does not circumscribe a mission rigidly, nor does one limit their free-
dom of action.
In Vichy, he met his old friend Picard. The latter introduced him to
Belair, who told him right away: "The Germans are going to parachute me in
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Morocco in order to bring North Africa back to France." The first
reaction of our stunned Lesel, was not to make fun, to get mad, or to
shout "Stupid! "He was trained to control himself. But he was taken by
pity for this simple-minded friend of his. Thus he toned down the desper-
ate picture of North Africa which he had begun to outline. The desperate
version was intended for collaborators whose confidence he wanted to gain.
And so he said to Belair: 'Forget it.'"
After he had left the two Argonauts, he started thinking it over.
He is not pleased with himself. He had lacked reflexes. Due to pity (in
his job it is called weakness), he had missed the most unexpected occasion
to penetrate by using Belair, the most inaccessible German spy circles.
This was an opportunity to send to his comrades in Morocco a splendid
mechanical double agent.
He caught up with Belair. "Go," he said, and he managed to enter the
group as the commander.
Fifteen days later, he was regarded by the Germans as a great man, a
comer.
He met Belair again on the plane at Marignac. It was even possible
(I have greatly shortened this story) that he prevented his leaving for
Spain with a hand of Gaullist officers on their way to join the Free France
forces. As soon as the "Condor" was airborne, Lesel transmits the fresh
news to Algiers, as he usually did every night.
Lesel was not arrested by the Germans when they discovered what happen-
ed to the Carthage mission. What happened to him? That's asking me too
much? It is his own business.
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CHAPTER V
PROTECTION AGAINST INTOXICATION
By now, the reader has undoubtedly been able to convince himself
that the double agents are the most subtle, insidious, and dangerous
weapon of the Secret services. Then how do we protect ourselves against
them?
We must admit that it is very hard. Before meeting their almost
unavoidable fate, the double agents always have the time to accomplish
a certain amount of harm. By definition, they are a select group among
the operatives of the Intelligence Service and no single method, way,
or recipe can detect those working for the enemy. What then could be the
criteria, the test or a simple clue to indicate their treason?
Relations with the enemy? But this is part of the man's job. The
documents he is holding? He is no more responsible for their contents than
a mailman is for the content of the letters he delivers. His curiosity?
It's a manisfestation of his initiative. His rather disreputable acquaint-
ances? Are you kidding? His sudden wealth? The suspect will say that it
comes from trafficking in foreign currency or smuggling: and, this will
probably be very true. The job enriches its man indirectly by giving him
a footing in several countries and easy passage from one to another. The
testimony of an enemy who has been arrested or that of a "colleague?" The
accused will claim that it is an enemy scheme to eliminate your best agent,
and this will make sense. The person capable of unravelling the infinitely
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confused and tangled web of the life of a double agent, from mission
to compromise, will have to be a really clever individual.
In a job which is a pretense at betrayal, the real treason is an
inner one. It can only be found in the very deepest part of the man's
heart and mind. How can one see that deep! Impossible!
Impossible? Well, it may not be absolutely impossible for certain
Counterintelligence chiefs. But it requires a combination of personal
resourcefulness and qualities which are hard to find.
First of all, it requires a broad and profound experience of life,
as well as of the world and the era. This is quite rare in the military
circle, because they are closed within themselves. The reason is not be-
cause of class consciousness which is a mere historical remembrance. It
is really because of poverty and the absolute material necessity of a con-
fined life of a dignified small bourgeois. It has been a very long time
since the traditional military families represented the wealthy classes.
It also requires, but this is only a corollary, a rather broad mind
to tolerate certain weaknesses, defects or even vices among others, while
observing for oneself a moral, almost religious code of no compromise.
The difficulties, - one of them, - is that knowledge of human passions
is not transferable through words or study. It must be experienced by one
even if it is only to a homeopathic degree, and it must have been seen,
tasted, known completely, and totally mastered. Or else, one has to be
gifted with foresight, such as the infallible diagnosis of the thaumatur-
gist. Is this possible if the healer does not constantly practice with
patients or if the Counterintelligence officers do not constantly deal with
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irregulars, adventuresses, and corrupted people?
The picture of a good double agent employer is now taking shape.
It is obvious that he must not be too young. He does not necessarily have
to be a "gung ho" career officer. It would be better if he had been a
civilian for quite some time. Nevertheless, he needs to have a thorough
military background because he is going to deal with various problems
and will have to detect what is false in a wide variety of documents,
which will require the
General Staff officer.
forgive everything but
skills of a line captain as well as those of a
(1) Like those fashionable mundane confessors who
a lack of faith, he has to be easy, indulgent, and
kind under the sole condition that one must be perfect while on duty. Be-
sides, it is impospible to fail in this because one cannot lie to him at
all, even by omission. To risk it would be extremely dangerous and one
knows it.
However, contradictory these qualities may be, it is necessary to
find a few men who have them to direct Counterintelligence Service, because
they represent the only solution to the problem. A perfect organization and
dilligent work may be sufficient to detect the ordinary spy, but this could
never make up for the "nose," as one says, which is required in the struggle
against double agents.
I will start by showing a natural Counterintelligence officer right
in the middle of his disintoxication mission. First I should add that to
(1) Since I wrote these lines, I read in a magazine that a department of
the National Police was in charge of the "intoxication" and the han-
dling of the double agents. I have police friends whom I respect very
highly. But this will not prevent me from saying that it would be as
absurd to give the Police the Counterintelligence function as it would
to give to the Army the functions of the "Renseignements Generaux"
(equivalent to U.S. FBI).
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completely fulfill his mission, he should have at his disposal the re-
sources of a well-organized Service, the base of which is a filing
system centralizing all information compiled over many years. If the
circumstances of war, scatter the Counterintelligence organization, render
the liaisons difficult between the head office, its branches, and the
organization it has to protect then the enemy has the advantage. This
is what happened in France, from 1943 to 1944. The consequences can be
summarized as follows:
1. The old timers of the Agence Immobiliere, i.e. good Mr. Vauthier
and his well experienced assistants, defended themselves in the best way
they could, and their net survived.
2. The organization which was set up to replace them in case of bad
luck, the young Agence Immobiliere, made up of eager professionals but who
lacked experience, was entirely destroyed by the enemy double agents.
3. As far as the newly created Resistance nets were concerned, they
were found to be extremely vulnerable.
4. The Allied Services which came to operate in France after the
landing, an unknown terrain, because intoxicated with the suddenness of
a childhood illness.
I have been looking for examples to illustrate these four statements
which are basically the same idea. It just happens that the most striking
of these took place in the South-East of France. I shall link them together
and this will present a particular interest: it will demonstrate in broad
outlines but without very large gaps, the story of the defensive struggle
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of a Resistance Area against the German Special Services.
A BORN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER
Let us note that the chapters of the first volume of this work, in
which I studied the general conditions of survival of the old Agence
Immobiliere and of the Eleuthere net, are not overlapping the chapter
where I intend to elaborate mostly about the defense against double agents.
But, while telling about the struggle for life of the Agence Immobiliere,
I spoiled somewhat the effect of my best example, that of Mr. Vauthier-
Laforet, a model Counterintelligence leader who
doubling. I shall only repeat quickly so as to
only weapons are the "nose" and, in the absence
Lerat, a former
infantry platoon leader, a
discovered an attempt at
underline it that the
of it, the experience.
good soldier in 1940, came
from a good family, and after the Armistice was one of the first to join
a Resistance Group which did not have a name as yet. He was a contact-man
in a section of the Armistice Army Intelligence Service.
Mr. Vauthier would say today: "Personally, I never wanted him as an
associate." If you asked him: "Why?" he would make a evasive gesture
and change the subject of conversation. Let us answer for him: "Because
this boy was too thin, too weak, and under his frizzy hair, his face was
too young, and too naive to be thirty years old." That is all.
We could say that these were not good reasons. But they were. It was
more than enough reasons to avoid giving him important responsibilities.
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his physical appearance alone would have been sufficient to prevent him
from managing a hardware store. He would have been given a try-out,
just to see. Was he going to be given the responsibility of handling
old timer spies then? No!! Impossible! He would have to be given a
liaison agent job to start. Then, it would be necessary to wait until
he found out the fundamental things. Particularly, he had to find out
about women whom he seemed unable to handle. Consequently, it was abso-
lutely necessary that he learned. There was no other solution.
Lerat, was getting impatient, joined newly created units of the
Resistance.
As soon as he got hold of a few pennies besides his military pay, he
was "hooked" by the first adventuress he met. It was normal, it was almost
unavoidable and psychologically inevitable that he would meet a woman who
was not respectable. She had to have something different in her feminine
specialty to appeal to him. However, she could have been less of a bitch
than this Arlette, who had almost all the vices, including the most un-
pleasant ones. She was a perfect "immunologist." Lerat was lucky: he
lost his illusions faster than the average of his comtemporaries. After a
year or perhaps a few months, he was totally disgusted with Arlette,
thoroughly immunized against her types, he started to be a little more
useful to the service.
He was not useful for very long. He was confused by a false sentimen-
tal passion, which generally happens to adolescents, when he was arrested
by the Germans. Undoubtedly, it was because of Arlette that he did not
have the courage to die, when death presented itself to him under conditions
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that would have seemed merciful to our comrades who are now dead. No
torture or almost none; a military court where the judges saluted you
after giving the sentence; then a firing squad, without the ignominy of the
camps. Again, because of that slut, Lerat did not have the salutary re-
action to confess his weakness to his superiors and to ask for a "position
of sacrifice and redemption." He was free again. But at what price!
He claimed to have escaped. All his comrades welcomed him as a hero.
Nobody around him was suspicious. His first gesture was to marry Arlette.
I told how Mr. Vauthier, without even trying to explain his decision...
by impulse, attempted to take Lerat to North Africa, and, when he did not
succeed, raised an iron curtain between the funambulist escapes of Fresnes
and the Agence Immobiliere, except for the Clermont-Limoges Section which
had to be disbanded. In doing so, he probably saved all the rest of the
Agence Immobiliere, the Army Resistance Organization, and the nets linked
to it, the Eleuthere net was one of those which lost only one man, as a
result of this action.
On the other hand, to my knowledge (and I don't know everything of
course!) two of the large Resistance Movements, four French nets, a
Belgian net plus one Interallied net connected to the Anglo-Saxon Agency
of Berne, were going to lose some feathers. However, their French or Allied
leaders, were not babies. The first ones mentioned were learning a new and
difficult job; the others only knew somewhat the environment in which they
were working. Especially, the Algiers and London Counterintelligence
Central Offices which could not pass on to everyone concerned the information
and the warnings of a few specialists who had remained on the spot, and thus
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could not "expose" the traitors.
All there was left to do in France was to destroy them whenever
they were discovered.
II
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ENEMY DOUBLE AGENTS IN 1940 - 1942
ThefAfrican_Army, the Armistice Army up to its disbandment, and the
Resistance organizations in contact with our Special Services (for ex-
ample, the Combat Movement) until the total German occupation were all
efficiently defended against enemy double agents. The doubles were
rapidly detected, and disposed of or discreetly abducted and sent to
Africa. As early as 1941, it became a real slaughter. The reason is
simple: the right men were in position and were able to work under re-
latively normal conditions.
It will only be necessary to multiply the example below several
hundred times to realize the atmosphere of this particular kind of com-
bat until November 1942.
The ex-air force Belgian lieutenant.. .let's call him Huizen, became
a correspondent for the French Special Services after the Armistice.
From 1940 to 1941, he performed a certain number of intelligence collection
missions for them as well as the setting up of escape channels in his
country. He returned to Belgium frequently and was working for the prepa-
ration of active resistance when our story takes place.
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One day in July 1941, in Bruxelles he unexpectedly met a former
air force NCO named yolks who used to belong to his squadron. If he
had been able to do so, he would have avoided yolks because the latter
was a notoriously currupt character. He had deserted the Belgian Army
to enlist in the Spanish Republic air force. He deserted again just
before Franco's victory. He came back to Belgium, claiming he had shot
down a forever changing number of Italo-German planes and endlessly
cursing the Reds. The least one could say was that he had a certain
tendency toward treason. In civilian life, he did odd jobs and had
failed in everything he undertook.
Face to face with yolks at the corner of a street, Huizen was obliged
to exchange a few words with him. Well! The war and the invasion erased
many things between fellow-countrymen. Suddenly Huizen discovered an un-
expected interest in the conversation. No doubt, yolks is violently and
passionately anti-German. There were words and gestures whose meaning
could not be doubted. They started to hit it off. Soon yolks whispered
that he belonged to the Intelligence Service. Due to the magic power of
these two words, a masterpiece of British propaganda, Huizen was very much
impressed.
"I am taking care of the escaping of prisoners" said Volks.
One confidence led to another.
"Me too" replied Huizen.
These two words have cost the life of so many men. It gave such
pleasure and a feeling of pride to pronounce them in the mole-like life of
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the underground fighter.
"But we don't have the same boss" continued Huizen.
"pooh! My poor lieutenant! I think I know why" answered Volks.
Hush! Not another word. I am discreet. But it might be a good thing
if you could meet a British chief who just happens to be in town. This
could widen your field of action."
"You think that he will accept?"
"Surely, I'll vouch for you."
Several days later, Volks introduced Huizen to Mac, a rather dis-
turbing big fellow who did not look very much like a Britisher. His
hair, his skin and his eyes were dark. He had a long, hollowed and
wrinkled face. His staring look became rapidly embarrassing. He seemed
determined, "Just like a cop" was Huizen's first impression. But as soon
as Mac spoke, both men felt attracted to each other. Obviously, Mac was
extremely intelligent: He was a master in the intelligence game, profuse
in good advices, and admirably informed on the Belgium situation and the
Resistance capabilities. He gained Huizen's esteem. Huizen accepted,
at that first meeting, his financial support for the organization of the
Belgian armed groups. The three men met again on several occasion in
August, and Huizen started recruiting the leaders for an operational net.
In September, he re-established contact with his French leader in...
let's say Sete. When the main business was taken care of, he briefly
reported that he had met a certain Mac of the Intelligence Service.
"What's he like?" asked the officer.
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Huizen described him rapidly. The chief insisted on more
details. He wanted to know everything about Mac, from his dental plate
to the shape of his ear lobes, his taste, his habits, and his mannerism.
tt ...what else?" asked Huizen his patience running out. He knows
all about criminology, and he often quotes Locard."
"Ah! said the Frenchman "Well! Does he also speak one of these
rare and odd dialects?"
"He does. The Kiniwaeli dialect. I discovered it quite by accident
while talking about the Congo where I was born."
"Hum... Who introduced you to each other?"
"One of my former NCO's, a fellow named, Volks."
"Give me a description of him."
"Flemish; average height; blond; fat, weighing over 180 pounds; blue
eyes, reddish complexion...and...no scars. But.. .do you know them?"
"My dear friend, I have the impression that you have bumped right
into a Boche agent.. .or two."
"That's impossible!"
"Everything is possible. We'll speak about it on your next trip.
Until then, cut off everything, that's a strict order."
"All right. But..."
"Cut off everything!"
"All right."
Huizen crossed the demarcation line enclosing occupied France and the
first thing he did was to go see yolks, who had been in Paris for some
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time, and tell him about the crazy suspicion of the French officer.
The two fellow-countrymen talked about it in full confidence.
"It's completely stupid! stated Volks," It's obvious that Mac
belongs to the British Intelligence Service. Well You saw him. You
know him. The truth is that these Vichy Frenchmen can't stand the
English and the French G-2 is not only envious but also extremely jealous
of the British Intelligence Service!"
"That's the truth, all right!" said Huizen. "No need looking any
further."
The same day, at 1700 hours, he went to a second rendezvous with
yolks, in a harmless-looking house of Rue de la Pompe. He rang, went
in, and found himself in an office face to face with a German superior
officer accompanied by a junior officer who looked just as German and
who was Mac, and by Volks who was laughing his head off.
"Huizen" said Mac "you are caught in the mill. You gave me more
information than required to have you shot by the Allies. Unvoluntarily
you say? I, myself know it. But who will believe it on the other side?
All you have to do is to continue working for us voluntarily and make
money out of this job. Besides, you are just like Volks, you belong to
a German ethnic group, and you could have your place in the sun within
the Great Reich. I give you two minutes to think it over."
In short, what happened next was not a thing one can tell with
pleasure. Huizen came out a turned-around double agent in the pay of
the Germans. He had disclosed the order of battle of the French
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Intelligence Special Services which the superior officer (probably
Colonel Reile, Oscar, III F/Leiter of the Paris Abwehrleitungstelle,
i.e., the chief of the German Intelligence Service in France) in an
enthusiastic impulse called "goldwert:" worth its weight in gold.
Huizen had signed up.
Would he, at least, regain his self-control? No. Back in Brussels,
undoubtedly watched, but free, he could have warned the resistance organi-
zation members, which hadbeen established by Mac, himself. Huizen ended up
doing this, but too late, and it is estimated that he was responsible
for approximately one hundred and fifty arrests.
to blow his head off? No, not even that.
However, in the so-called free French
Was he at least going
zone, the Counterintelligence
machine started to move. Oh: It was very simple. Yet since it was a
centralized service normally organized, it was ;also perfectly effective.
A report was sent to the chief of the Sete area. A few groping moves
while looking in the records of the Cambronne Command Post, in Marseille.
Several files were taken out, and two of them were selected. A five minute
conversation took place between the big boss and the Marseille section
chief who had been called at Cambronne. Results:
1. The Marseille section cheif, for whom yolks had been employed,
suspected his former agent of treason, among other misdeeds. yolks was con-
sidered responsible for the theft of a new type of English radio-trans-
mitter, and for the arrest, by the Germans, of a Air Force Intelligence
Service officer. Now there was no doubt that he was an agent working
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for the Germans because:
2. The so-called Mac was identified beyond all doubt as F. from
Luxemborg, probably a naturalized German, one of the most deadly oper-
ators of Colonel Oscar Reile, the public enemy number 1.
Phew! Fortunately this good old Huizen had been warned thought
the Frenchmen.
Much sooner than expected, Huizen came back to Sete, where his wife
had taken refuge. He was asked if he had had an accident. He answered
that nothing wrong had happened. But he indicated his intention to give
up the game and take a little rest. The French who remained human in such
a savage war would have respected his decision. But Huizen did not ex-
plain it in a manner which could have satisfied and believed by his chief.
He looked troubled, frightened, and dazed. He was hiding something. He
became a suspect.
Everybody was careful not to speak to him about Mac and Volks. They
all pretended to have forgotten the incident. He was watched discreetly
and with untiring perseverance. Nothing happened for more than a month.
Finally one day a visitor who came to his home was reported and rapidly
identified. He was yolks. The two fellow-countrymen were left alone un-
disturbed. They were arrested and "worked over" separately. It was very
easy to get them to the point where they accused each other. From that
moment on, all they had left to do was to confess, each for himself.
Volks was there of course to summon Huizen, who was running away, to
come and see his German chiefs.
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Mac in this case had made several glaring technical blunders. He
had been recognized through his mania of showing off his knowledge of
criminology and his uncommon linguistic ability. Having employed one of
his double agents in the task of turning-around an ordinary French agent,
he had made the mistake of letting these two remain in working contact.
He had given Huizen a "free hand" before he could completely rely on him.
Well, this goes to show that no one is perfect.
We too were going to make some mistake in this case. For some time
we had been shedding our previous searching formalities. Yet, we usually
did not liquidate these agents with the speech mentioned in my example of
Devillers, this traitor of "Combat" had been arrested, charged, tried
and shot in Lyons, in less time than it takes a policeman to write a
traffic ticket. (This suggests that the aforementioned operations did
not always occur in their logical order).
There was one extenuating circumstance: it was probable that we
wanted to "exploit" Volks completely. It was tempting. We thought that
the man was a "gold mine." It was true. It was proven, but only four
years later. Since he was Mac's liaison agent with Spain and Portugal,
he could have told us, as early as 1941, haw and through whom the Germans
infiltrated the Lisbon British Intelligence Service. How an Englishman,
with a temporary rank and title of captain and gentleman, picked up by
the awaiting enemy after he had been parachuted at Chailly-Oen-Biere, got
out of his predicament by betraying his French agents, was later disclosed.
How did the German Intelligence Service submerge Spain...etc? yolks
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should not have been kept in Sete which was still within the protective
shadow of the Gestapo. Surely, the boats which escaped harbor inspec-
tions were all overloaded at that time. But yolks deserved a priority
ticket, even if it was in a torpedo tube. There is no use elaborating on
this. We did treat him, as we had the others who were not as valuable.
One day, five officers convened, and quickly, discouraged the oratory
impulses of the two rather skeptical defense lawyers, and sentenced yolks
to death and Huizen to hard-labor for life, in order to maintain the mean-
ing of treason in France. But of course the Germans were within hearing
range.
Bousquet, Lavel's elegant policeman, intervened. This time we could
not prevent him from doing so. Let us mention in passing that the German
ambassador to the Secretary of State for the Police was Chamberlin-Lafont,
the butcher of Rue Lauriston. Can you imagine, without bursting out
laughing - the gigolo and the killer bowing at each other in a government
office. They were going up in the world.
Several days later, in Chalon-sum-Saone, some decent policemen,
dismayed and mute, turned over the two prisoners to their gardian angels:
Chamberlin and the cream of Rue de Lauriston. The gang had set up a
buffet in a corner of the railroad-station, with a lot of champagne and
even flowers, just as for heroes. yolks, a repulsive coward in jail, was
now exulting and exploding:
"I warned you" he said to the Frenchmen:
"No ill-feeling, do you want a drink?"
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"No, our train..."
"Well, we'll see each other again buddy, and until then!"
In fact, they were going to see each other again. Because, in this
trade you always ended up meeting again. Besides, this was one of the
major reasons why the old-timers were so vastly superior to the newcomers
They were like old shepherds who are capable of recognizing all the sheep
of the flock by a tuft of hair, and even of calling them by names.
III
IN 1943 AND 1944, THE OLD-TIMERS IN MARSEILLE
DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST DOUBLE AGENTS, BUT...
November 12, 1942. Total invasion of France by the Germans.
I already mentioned all the difficulties of the underground Counter-
intelligence. I want now to emphasize those concerning enemy and friendly
double agents.
The former increased very much in number. The Gestapo utilized
all kinds of atrocities to turn-around the friendly ones. One could only
rely on oneself and on one's "nose" to detect them. Did we succeed? It
was impossible to warn all the patriots concerned. They were scattered
in secret and compartmented organizations. The positive proof of the
guilt or the obtaining of a confession, this absolute certainty which alone
allows civilized men to dispense justice themselves. It was because we no
longer had any authority, prestige, or help. We did not have files any
more, these precious documents which sufficed in the case of Huizen-Volks.
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The French Counterintelligence records, which were crated in early
November 1942, were found equivalent to a mountain weighing forty tons.
We know how they had to be vaulted in the cellar of a castle in the
Gard department, where the Germans captured them in July 1943, but
thank God they had been carefully screened beforehand.
In November 1942, the members of the Special Services who had re-
mained in Marseilles received the strict order to "lay low" until further
notice and take the maximum precautions for their personal safety. For
once the duty was a negative one: survival. It must be remembered that
from 1940 to 1942, Marseille had been the seat of the Counterintelligence
General Staff.
The Villa Eole, which is now destroyed, had been the Central Command
Post from August 31, 1940. Most of the members of this Service knew it
only by its code name: Cambronne C.P. Very few people from Marseille
knew the underground activity of this house. It had been evacuated rap-
idly on August 30, 1942, as soon as the date of the landing in North Africa
was made known for sure. The important leaders had started their wandering
life.
On 12 November 1942, only the following organizations remained in
Marseille:
1. The regional section "Glaieul" of the Agence Immobiliere, whose
commander, the shrewd Philippe-Auguste, later promoted to Inspector of
the South-East Agence Immobiliere under the name of "Soleil" turned con-
trol over to Captain Mordant. The captain was as intelligent as he was
vigorous and bold. He looked like a tough character with a Phd. in
mathematics. "Glaieul" was scattered in several places, above the Turkish
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bath of the Rue Canebiere, Boulevard Rabateau, Boulevard Perier, Rue
d'Anvers, etc...
2. The chief and an operational cell of the Military Security
Service, which from 1940 to 1942, had been the cover for the Special
Services. This leader, Captain Ledroit de Regle, calm, cold, and sure,
was an "aristocrat". He and Major R. chief of Military Justice for the
area, an old soldier, a tough guy, had both assumed imperturbably for
two years the responsibility of eliminating German spies. If there had
remained but one man to execute them legally, R. would have been that
man. He had more than 350 of them brought to trial. Regle had caught
88 spies in one single raid, after having captured the German officer
Lynckx, who was their paymaster, and had seized the pay-voucher file on
his person. The two accomplices had quite a sense of humor and when they
could not catch red-handed Captain Ramstetter, the German spy leader in
their sector, they had him sentenced to eight years in jail for.. .indecent
behavior, sadism, and other petty offenses. This completely flabbergasted
the Germans.
On November 8, Regle sorted out and hid his archives, and left his
Rue Roux-de Brignoles office. It was taken over by an innocent looking
Navy section, entrusted with the settling of war-prize disputes dating
back to World War I (or even from the war of 1870, but I am not sure),
while the Military Security organization disappeared underground with a
reduced personnel.
3. The Self-Defense Groups (G.A.D. or G.A.M.), recruited for speci-
fic missions by the Special Services in the Armistice Army, had remained
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in full strength of course. Officers of disbanded troop units offered
valuable help to them. There were excellent sabotage and intelligence
networks, among the civilians; for example "Andalouise."
All the Resistance Movements had not as yet become fully operational.
The most active one was "Combat" organized by Captain Frenay. This re-
presentative in Marseille was Lt. Chevance of the Colonal infantry. The
latter was cleverly working under the cover as a dispatching agent on the
piers. Let us recall that the "Liberation" and "France-Tireurs" movements
had joined up with "Combat" in September 1942 to form the Resistance
United Movements" (M.U.R.) and had merged their respective forces into
one Secret Army. The presence of the Germans was going to speed the re-
cruiting in the South-East area.
They were faced by a Gestapo which had taken residence, in a block
of houses at the corner of Rue Paradis and Boulevard Rodocanacchi. The
block became a real fort, with a S.S. garrison. But several advanced
parties and numerous reconnaissance groups had preceded this mass movement.
Such as the foreign sailors, Mr. and Mrs. Vauthier's neighbors in the
Hotel de Bordeaux, whom I mentioned earlier. And also other more deadly
units. Vichy had authorized a German technical mission to try to detect
with their D.F. equipment the clandestine posts of the British Intelligence
Service, and of the Communist party in the Southern area. The Ministry
of the Interior had given French identification papers to its members.
It was obvious that the Marseille Gestapo knew its sector perfectly and
represented an immediate threat.
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In fact, it started badly, slowly and inefficiently. In spite
of its fortified castle, its herd of officers, its Ph.D. Herren
Doktoren, its arrogant and cruel S.S. men, its torture chambers and
its wads of money, the Gestapo was paralyzed from the beginning. No
doubt that this situation was the result of the Counterintelligence work
from 1940 to 1942. The Gestapo in the South-East area perhaps would
have merely been an additional administration, making arrests and mas-
sacring at random, if it had not been for the arrival, in January 1943 of
the S.S. Scharfuhrer Dunker Hans, alias Hackenschmidt Fred, alias Senach
Wilfried, alias Weber, alias Deichen, and especially alias Delage, because
it was under that name that he was going to become notorious.
When he arrived at the Saint-Jean railroad station, he was nothing
but a scared subordinate. He had been on the borderline of catastrophe.
At the end of 1942, serving as interpreter for the Rue des Saussaies Ge-
stapo he had been convicted of dealing with the French and even suspected
of complicity with one of his friends, a British Intelligence agent, or
at least he was accused of this action. I heard from a reliable source
that, caught by fear, he had toyed with the idea of hiding-out in the
Paris area maquis, and had started to put his strange idea into execution,
but changed his mind and turned himself into his chiefs. He came out of
this with a small jail sentence and a compulsory transfer.
Obviously, he was a resourceful fellow. He was an intellectual and a
morale acrobat. He was to give his full ability against the French, in
Marseille, to make up for his past failure in the eye of the Party. He
was one of these men who has lived in all sorts of environments, done
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everything, been everywhere. He had thoroughly mingled and associated
with those of his contemporaries, whom I referred to previously as being
predisposed for Counterintelligence work. If I add that he was a bar
manager in Berlin, a chief receptionist clerk in a big hotel, an inter-
preter, and, of course, an early member of the Party, one will understand
why Marseille was, for him, such a well chosen working ground.
He was in his early thirties and looked like a rather typical
modern German: average height, the slight plumpness of the home front
soldier who lived "Wie Gott in Frankreich" precisely in France. He had
a baby face not yet marked by time and a pink complexion, his hair a
little darker than usual for an S.S. but very stiff, and above all these
detestable blue-green eyes, mean and lifeless. He was cunning by a secular
habit of servile obedience, and cruel by nature. Those who only saw him
at his trial, in 1946, will not recognize him by this description. Dunker
had changed a lot in two years, as even probably in a few days, a few
seconds.
He did not lose any time in the comfortable offices of Rue Paradis.
Even though he was German and a S.S., he would be able to do his job,
have power and exist there only on the very day he could establish him-
self as a gang leader, i.e., a big shot, he rapidly recruited a gang of
his own. Under the command of Holtz, his assistant, the most typical of
Marseille cells was soon in business, with its "little moll" Maggy Magnan,
its body-guards, Tortora the Boxer and Olivieri the Corsican, who patronized
the Dom Bosco Club between every other raid, its roughnecks, and its in-
formers: Chach the Nicois, Gaston the Dasher, Brown the Flyer, Sala the
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Engineer, the fake policemen Ramieu and Dewaenne, etc..., etc...
From then on, Delage was a big wheel in Marseille.
At first he weeded the police out. He did it with a perspicacity
which will surprise no one. The personnel formerly specialized in
Counterintelligence i.e., the Territorial Surveillance, was condemned
not only to clandestinity, but to inaction. If one of its members
attempted to go beyond a 500 yard radius of the "Dance" bar belonging
to R. (who had just been arrested, but fortunately under a false identity
which stood up miraculously under investigation), he was shot full of
holes. But this was not enough for Delage. The ordinary National Police
was warned, with the arrest of its assistant-commander, that the only
alternative left was to go straight along the path of the New Order.
Then Delage started practicing on the Resistance Movements. As early
as April 20, 1943, he hit them at the top. With his gang, he burst into
13 Boulevard de Strasburg in Toulon, the home of Colonel Deboin who was
the Secret Army regional chief. The Colonel committed suicide with a
cyanide pill. Had there been a justice on earth, the investigation would
have ended there, closed, filed and sealed in the glorious coffin of the
old soldier.
Unfortunately, during this raid Delage arrested a rather important
member of the Secret Army, Zunel, alias Richard. He succeeded in turning
him around. At last he had the man who was missing in his gang, the first
one who was not, by his background, limited to police routines. The
aleatory who had connections with the "underworld" and the doubtful in-
formings; he had a double agent, a real one, and a big one who was working
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in the Resistance and held the trust and the confidence of its leaders,
since he was a leader himself.
This was when Delage's great "era began. In may 1943, he made 29
arrests, at the rate of one per day, including Sunday, in spite of the
Lord's day of rest which was scrupulously respected by his colleagues.
One has read or will read in De Benouville's book, "Sacrifice du Matin"
("Morning Sacrifice"), the story of the arrest and escape of Chevance,
and, if my memory serves me right, of the attempt to arrest Fred, the
American O.S.S. chief, which turned into a "Schiesserei," wasted shoot-
ing match in a dark room.
These exploits might become the subject of an spic in the future.
I personally cannot see their poetic characteristics. I lived the part
too much. Also, it was made up of scenes that would never satisfy the
old French instinct. It is impossible to give a colorful illustration
of these Chicago type movie episodes: Seen from the outside it happened
the same way. The dialogue could not bring the action to a higher level,
because there were no words spoken. Whatever difference existed was an
invisible one. Some of our dead who had scoured the sky with Guynemer and
charged the enemy with Bournazel were now playing Scarface. Everybody has
seen Scarfare at the movies. Let us change the subject.
However.. .in spite of my feelings, time has started its work of
false restoration. In fact, far from hiding and tarnishing a past of
struggle and action, as painful as it was, time glorifies and brightens
it, provided that it has ended well. This must be the reason why I now
think back with a trace of nostalgia about a time when I often felt that
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it was better to die right away. It
five years older, that such memories
colors of my recollections are still
is certainly not because I am
are exalted. Well! While the
honestly dark and sincerely dull,
while there is still time to tell the truth, I am going to end this
story rapidly.
Let us see! I was planning to demonstrate that in 1943 only the
organizations which had an experienced chief and the protection of what
was remaining of the former official Counterintelligence services were
able to resist infiltration by enemy agents.
While the Secret Army was being beheaded by Delage and the newly
formed organizations were decimated, the Agence Immobiliere went through
the year of 1943 without catastrophe. Behind it, the Military Security
Organization was being reorganized. The Self-Defense Groups were organizing
themselves strongly. Whenever the Agence Immobiliere was faced with a
crisis, it was not due to the infiltration by double agents who knew the
organization intimately. Thus, the damages were limited, the organization
saved and the work was performed without interruption.
Prior to December 1943, the losses suffered by the Agence Immobiliere
were accidental. For example, the loss of a radio-operator who had pro-
bably been detected by the German D.F. team "sponsored" by Vichy. He was
caught on November 1942
Interlude.. .The day following his arrest, a small,skinny,and old man
wearing thick glasses and carrying a black umbrella; very much the same
college professor type, shyly entered the house of the radio -operator
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which was open to all winds. He found himself face to face with two
mean looking giants. He saluted them with a courteous but slightly
sharp tip of the hat just as they were pointing two machine-guns in
his direction.
"Papers!"
"Sir, I was sent by the Saint-Fereol real estate agency since I
wish to rent this villa. But please would you mind lowering these
"fire arms" with which you are so imprudently playing."
The expression "Fire-arms" amused the two gorillas. They bursted
out laughing at the visitor's look of offended dignity.
"Gentlemen! I don't see what is funny about my being here."
This time, the laugh became delirious. When the two Germans finally
caught their breath, they said "Raus" and "Los, Los," and pushed him out-
side, with precautions so as not to injure him.. .Philippe-Auguste, In-
spector of the French Special Services for the South-East area.
Such an act is not recommended to amateurs. Philippe-Auguste was
Mr. Vauthier's best assistant. We shall see him appear in the midst of
other disasters, by pass the traps, skirt precipices always with that
same and odd nearsightedness; in the absurd but fascinating novels of
Wallace, who are always present at the right place, say nothing, but
finally turn out to be the "unexpected hero" of the story.
In the weeks following the occupation of Marseille, there was no
other arrest. Both Philippe-Auguste and Mordant breathed a sigh of re-
lief. They were handling a whole network of double agents in Germany,
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Italy, and the collaborationist parties; plus a company of ordinary
agents, and a battalion of honorable correspondants. They did not
dare hope that their organization had not been infiltrated by one or
more enemy doubles.
Well! There was none. Extraordinary but true.
"Let's work!" said the impetuous Mordant.
He started by adapting his section "Glaieul" to the circumstances.
I am going to reproduce thereafter a sketch explaining the organization
principle. It was a good one. In short, it was the waterproof partition
system which was applied to the smallest cell, just as in some boats. The
vulnerable radio team was completely isolated, even from the deciphering
section. The liaisons were integrated in order to be reduced, were sub-
jected to strict regulations, and carried out by specialized personnel.
Each man had to keep his personal address secret. (See document in Appen-
dix).
Philippe-Auguste concentrated all his efforts on Nice, where his
section "Bleuet" was up against the Italian Special Services. He almost
completely succeeded in neutralizing this secondary enemy who would have
been able to do harm otherwise. All that can be said about this under-
taking is:
1. It was conducted according to the most classical process of
intoxication, in a favorable and impressionable environment by an organi-
zation having the finest and most judicious concept of its national role.
Namely that the main mission of an Intelligence Service, in Italy, was to
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inform the High Command, as early as possible, of the most favorable
moment for the Italians to switch sides. And also that if a mistake
was made, it would be better for it to happen too early than too late.
2. This action had a lasting result and was advantageous to the
entire Resistance, long before fascist Italy had taken up again the
tradition of the Duke of Savoie who, as Saint-Simon said, "rarely finished
the war in the same camp where he started it, unless he had changed sides
twice in the meantime."
My comrades from the South-East area will certainly remember that
the 0.V.R.A., just as rough and even meaner than the Gestapo, started by
creating a regime of terror. It caused drastic losses to the Navy In-
telligence Service and to the Resistance organizations, which was its
mission. But it also put in jail, for no reason, the Armistice Commission
liaison officers, and, at random, officers and soldiers stationed in the
Alpes-Maritimes department, then finally, so as to be sure of not missing
anyone, a number of innocent civil servants. Suddenly after that, the
services of Major de P. fell into a "dolce farniente" (sweet idleness)
and were to come out of it only spasmodically, when the Germans shook them
somewhat brutally. We can now state precisely that, if there were a few
more imprisonments, they were ordered by the Germans. After the rather
suspect death of Major de P., his successor V. managed to create only a
semblance of activity. Long before July 25, at which date it seems that
their turn about-face was covered and approved by a strict superior order
the Italian Special Services were already working against Germany and were
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preparing their future with the French. Good work!
In Marseille, everything was going fine.
At the beginning of February 1943, a submarine has let ashore in
the vicinity of St. Tropez, the first Algiers emissaries who were bring-
ing money, directives and radio-transmitters. Fred, representing the
American Special Services, had been greeted by the Agence Immobiliere
which provided him with hiding places, identification papers, food ration
cards, radio-operators and most of all plenty of advice. He needed it.
According to his French colleagues, he was "active and energetic but a
little inconsistent and careless," and according to Delage he was a
"boisterous crack-pot." But he was an Ally and really had the guts of a
cowboy out of a Western movie. Therefore, we helped him to get started,
something which he might not have been able to undertake alone. Then, he
was left on his own. After that, we seldom saw him again. The friendship
had been on the surface and for a specific motive.
Mordant, his Glaieul section well .established and camouflaged, began
working. His double agent net in Germany was found to be difficult to
handle. Most of his men gave up a game which was too dangerous and offered
no respite. The other agents were fired by the Germans one by one, for
they were not providing any satisfactory information. For lack of liaison,
Algiers and London could not supply any. Mordant was not authorized to
"fabricate" them on behalf of the Interallied General Staff. Glaieul was
losing its vital substance. But no one betrayed. The too modest Philippe-
Auguste reported later:
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"Finally the net was only made up of ordinary agents
and honorable correspondants. They were chosen in respect
to their ability to provide the protection of the patriots:
National Police and Prefecture Administration officials, Gen-
darmerie officers, individuals connected with the Control
Commissions, etc... During the first months of 194:3, the
output was good. At the beginning of the winter, many doors
became closed to us because of the arrests in the service; the
population's weariness and skepticism, the propaganda of
Philippe Henriot which was exploiting cleverly the discords
of Algiers, the-air raids and the errors of the maquis...We
also had to compete with organizations which were much richer
than us. The honorable correspondant as known by the old timers
had ceased to exist. People were working for money and were
looking for the best offer. They were willing to give infor-
mation, but they wanted to be paid for it. At the Liberation,
the only ones left on the breach will be the fanatics."
Philippe-Auguste speaks too much of the uncompleted tasks, and too
little of his successes. He did not have to apologize for not having in-
toxicated the Germans in Marseille as he did the Italians in Nice. In the
matter of direct action, his sections "Glaieul" and "Rose" (Toulouse)
proved to be very efficient. They gave protection and support to all the
patriots. For example: To the military maquis, such as the commando unit
P. of the Army Resistance Organization whose intelligence service was led
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by an officer from "Rose"; to the civilian maquis, among others the one
at Lodeve which received a timely weapons drop due to their intervention;
to the military nets, the "Compagne Dubourg" for example, a transport
company which was a front for the w2apons camouflage service of the ex-
Armistice Army, whose leader Colonel M. was warned in advance of his
imminent arrest; to the allies-the crew of a flying forteress which had
been shot down over Faire-les-Oliviers was rescued and routed toward Spain
through the "Rose" escape channels which were operating full-time; and to
the civilian organizations, particularly to "Combat," etc..., Finally
valuable information on the enemy order of battle and its fortifications
was gathered and transmitted to the Air Force and Navy Intelligence Services.
Despite the danger, the remaining existing double agents were utilized
to the maximum. Those who were fired by the Germans were "injected" into
the collaborationist parties and the hostile police organizations, where
the Agence Immobiliere could direct their activities. The best among the
old timers and those who were still being recruited against Germany were
sent to North Africa, to be placed at the disposal of the Central Agency
which was the only service authorized to handle them in agreement with the
Allied General Staff. This seems quite simple, now but it required some
courage from the section leaders. We shall see further that Mordant had
only one double agent in Germany, by the end of 1943 and that the latter
was enough to bring Glaieul to the brink of disaster.
On the other hand, the former Military Security chief, Captain Ledroit
de Regle, having narrowly escaped arrest on January 8, 1943, had received
orders from Algiers to prepare quietly and cautiously the reappearance of
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his service, but not before the landing. From that moment on, he had to
be ready, to clear the area of spies, traitors and collaborators.
This passive role did not suit Regle. He took on a reliable assistant
who could take over his job, should he disappear. In accord with the
Agence Immobiliere, he handled the liaisons with the civilian Resistance,
and took an active command position in the self-defense Groups, which were
a form of the Army Resistance Organization in the South-East. He
departmental chief for the Bouches-du-Rhome department, under the
of Major A., a hard-headed corsican, who had been one of the last
became
command
Moroccan
companions of Bournazel. His counterpart in the Alpes-Maritimes department
was
was
Colonel Journois,
detained in Nice,
of a Major, since the
a magnificent soldier with unforgettable eyes who,
and had voluntarily put himself under the command
latter had more freedom of movements. The Germans
were eventually to assassinate him. Within the self-defense Groups, there
was an elite group of officers who belonged to the great French military
tradition. One could be sure that they had only one idea in mind: orga-
nize a united insurrectional Army, even at the price of pretending to obey
the "overnight promoted" generals and colonels. They intended to direct
them without letting them know; that was all.
In October 1943, the self-defense Groups of the South-East controlled
a coherent, strong and expanding organization. The departments were divided
into sectors, each one of them having a maquis base area, a drop zone, and
camouflaged weapons' caches. The sector leaders were in position. The
recruiting was underway. The necessary automobile transportation means
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were surveyed and their requisition prepared. The liaison with the
Secret Army of the Resistance United Movement was intimate and trust-
ful. The previous discords with the Francs-Tireurs et Partisan started
to disappear and true comradeship began to appear.
Yes, everything was goLng fine in Marseille.
In December 1943, after more than a year of strenuous effort and
fruitless searches, Delage succeeded in delivering the first blows to
the Special Services. This was really a stroke of luck for Delage.
The counterintelligence exploitation of a case which had started
in the Toulouse area led the Gestapo from that town to inform the Gestapo
in Marseille that a Jewish soap manufacturer in Marseille was suspect.
Delage arrested him and placed one of his French agents at the factory
to answer the phone instead of the accountant who had also been imprisoned.
The traitor was clever enough (he had to be, because he really was dealing
with a tough opponent) to lure the first person who called to a rendez-
vous. It was another Sew. Let's say his name was Fahrking. Nothing
very implicating resulted from his questioning. What could the Jews do,
in 1943, but meet to cry together? However, Delage, who was still suspi-
cious, had Fahrkind tortured. The man gave up at the first round. "Hold
it" he said "I am a secret agent of your Wiesbaden section. Leave me
alone, otherwise you'll be sorry." They checked. He had told the truth.
There was nothing else to do but let him go and apologize.
"Wait a minute" said Delage "Just to be sure, you will not leave
before we give you the "verscharfte Vernehmung" (literally: the rein-
forced treatment. In short: torture).
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He had the extreme audacity to carry it out. If he was mistaken
it would mean the Eastern front lines at the very least for him. But
his intuition was right. Fahrkind collapsed before the end, and it was
a catastrophe, for he was a French double agent, the last one from
Glaieul working against Germany.
Normally, the section should have been wiped out in Twenty-four
hours. After that.. .God knows! The others could be smashed too!
What happened then was one of these fierce and intricate conflicts,
which are moral, intellectual, and physical. This conflict deserved to
be mentioned in a book by Kostler. Cornered, Fahrking spoke, confessed,
shouted, denounced, wept, accused himself, and sold out the whole world.
Delage took notes, sent detachments in all directions, set traps, con-
ducted raids, was too busy to sleep, too busy to eat, and was weakening
fast. In the end: not a single other arrest! Fahrkind was much more
shrewd than he was weak!
On December 11, 1943, Delage's hopes rose again. Another man had
called the soap factory and agreed to a rendezvous at the "Prado" bar,
located on Prado Circle. Would he come? Delage dispatched a reception
committee to the spot: one S.S. man (in civilian clothes, of course),
Sala the engineer, and Lunel who, having no one else to denounce, was
now compelled to do a killer's job. They were surrounding the soap
manufacturer who had received the order to point out all the cafe cus-
tomers he knew.
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Mordant was the one who had called. He had only been half-fooled
by the traitor at the other end of the phone. He sensed a trap. But
he had to take the risk because his concept of a leader's role did not
allow him to hesitate when faced with a questionable danger. He demand-
ed that his subordinates be scrupulously punctual at all times. Thus
he had to set the example. The soap-factory was one of his letter drops.
After all, it was quite possible that the manufacturer had to go away
on business and that he had instructed his accountant to tell Mr. Mordant,
should he call, to go to the "Prado" bar. It was also very possible that
the man had a cold which could explain his hoarse voice. One must chance
it and trust to God!
At about the same time, under the same circumstances, for the same
reason, that is, the absolute respect of the mission, the tall Marchand
was entering the "Cascade" cafe, in Paris where he was almost sure to
come out with his feet first. Which is what happened.
Before closing this digression, I wish. to add that a different motive
a less noble one, threw other comrades into traps as if they had been
hypnotized. Some times the uncertainty turned into a morbid distress,
and unbearable weight, and one would rather take eight or nine chances
out of ten of getting killed with only one or two bringing you the
opportunity to regain almost immediately the possibility of breathing
and sleeping, and the peace of mind and heart. For a few days, at least.
Therefore, Mordant entered in the "Prado" bar. Three policemen
surrounded him almost immediately. He jumped toward the door by pushing
them aside, went out and fled toward the center of the town. He would
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possibly have escaped if that beast of Lunel had not taken a shot at
him. Hit in the thigh by Lunel's bullet he fell down.
Delage took charge of Mordant Rue Paradis. The interrogation as
they call it started badly. Due to an unfortunate similarity in the
pseudonyms, Mordant was mistaken for another Agence ImmobiLiere member
who was working in the Toulouse area, where the conditions of the
struggle were such that this other man had to start an anti-German re-
pression somewhat permaturely (1). He was to execute 78 Germans or German
agents before he was killed himself. In 1943, he had not yet reached that
figure, but he was already the Terror of the Gestapo. In spite of his
wound, Mordant was subjected to the "verscharfte Vernehmung." He only
talked to say that he was not a terrorist. But his physical appearance
was enough to credit him with the exploits of the Toulouse Mordant.
Fahrkind might have saved him from the worst by revealing the true identity
of the Glaieul leader.
A very clever investigation by Delage, initiated by a set of keys
which had been found in Mordant's pockets, permitted the German to dis-
cover one of the hideouts of the French, located on the sixth floor of a
building on Boulevard Rabateau. There on December 12, he apprehended
Chief Warrant Officer Morel, who was one of Mordant's best collaborators.
A second interlude, very similar to the first one. "Bis repetita
placent" (Repetition brings acceptance), I know it, but I will justify
this insistence.
(1) His real name was Marcel Taillandier. Benonville wrote about him at
length in his book "Le Sacrifice du Matin" but he omitted to mention
that Taillandier belonged to the Army Special Services.
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On December 13, at eight o'clock in the morning, the two Germans
who were waiting in the trap at Boulevard Rabateau, went out to lunch
for fifteen minutes. Perhaps they were the same men who one day, neg-
lected to take seriously a small man wearing thick glasses and carrying
a black umbrella against his body, and
that
had been hidden in a secret place
The Gestapo machine
was rolling.
disappeared with a few documents
known to him.
This time, Glaieul was
condemned.
Under torture Mordant finally talked. It happened in a very peculiar
way. At a certain moment, without transition or precursory indication
of physical decline or moral distress, Mordant suddenly held his head
out of the bathtub where he had been put in and said: "I have enough.
I am going to make a complete confession," and let Delage rub him per-
sonally in a warm bathrobe, dress his wound (it was time) while he was
smoking his enemy's cigarettes, and.. .yes indeed: There is no other word
to describe it, he started to befriend the S.S. Scharfuhrer.
However shrewd Delage was, he must have been fooled that time. He
must have believed that he was faced with a superior adventurer of his
own kind fiercely but secretly individualistic, playing the conformist
game of the moment, i.e. patriotism, nationalism, discipline, etc...,
yet well determined not to sacrifice himself like an imbecile. He pro-
bably did not understand that Mordant had reached the safety limit where,
undoubtedly, his comrades were safe, their pseudonyms modified his offices
emptied, his letter drops changed, his last rendezvous broken and all
possibilities of "backhanded blows" and "lucky strokes," excluded. Delage
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observed Mordant intensely and noted his state of "euphoria." He
imputed it to the cigarette, the warm bathrobe, and the return to a
life after having almost lost it. In reality it was the relief of
a man who knew that his friends were saved and his mission was accom-
plished.
I have two documents in front of me. The first one bears the
rather humorous title of "Annex 1. My confession, by Mordant." It
is a small (twenty-page) notebook in which nothing has been forgotten.
The second one is the corresponding Gestapo official minute report. It
is far less complete than the first document. Delage had made a selection
of the information given by his prisoner. He firmly believed that this
time he had only to make a final raid to suppress all Resistance in the
South-East.
Well This operation had reached a dead-end, it was finished and
over. The "confession" of Mordant neither gave a man, a document, nor
the beginning of a lead. Nothing at all. Mordant spoke for hours, and
even days. But he did not endanger anyone. He had learned at Mr. Vauthier's
school. He did not have to improvise.
Furthermore, Delage was to be the victim of this strange struggle. He
even lost his gang. Mordant, without leaving his "Les Beaumettes" cell
almost succeeded in taking over the command of the gang, failing only by
a hair, and succeeded in dispersing its members and injecting a destructive -
germ in the last group still faithful to the Germans. It is an extraordinary
story, just like a Dashiell Hammet novel. Let us summarize it.
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First, from his cell, Mordant succeeded in sending reports on the
Gestapo activities to his friend de Regle. That could bring results
as important and as successful as the sheets of cigarette paper which little
Marchand sent from Fresnes to Mr. Vauthier. When Delage's men came to
escort him to the interrogation room, he insulted them and predicted a
fatal doom awaited them with such conviction that two of them, Sala the
engineer, and Brown the flyer took fright. One evening at the end of
January, they personally visited Mordant in his dungeon...and ...asked him
for their pardon in exchange for his freedom. Just imagine the scene! The
unbelievable self-control of this prisoner playing the thundering Jupiter,
and acting the part so successfully!
"I accept," agreed Mordant, magnanimously, after simulated fore-
thought. "But under two conditions. Of course, you will free all my
comrades with me, including Colonel M. (the leader of the Armistice Army
weapons camouflage Service, who had finally been arrested some time before).
Furthermore, one of you will remain here with Delage as a double agent.
There is no reason to have both of you compromised."
He really had to be dedicated body and soul to the Service and to
want, not to give up. He almost succeeded. Only the clumsiness of Brown the
Sala who attracted Delage's attention by their unusually frequent visits
to the jail, caused their unbelievable plan to fail. Sala and Brown were
able to escape. Brown was executed after his capture in May 1944.
Delage, a sporting spirit, just as all the individuals who do not
take their job as a sacred vocation, complimented Mordant on his "beauti-
ful maneuver," and his only punishment was to put him in rigorous solitary
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confinement.
It did not stop Mordant from contacting a courageous Red Cross
nurse, Miss G., who was allowed to bring parcels to "Les Beaumettes."
With her help he undertook a real counterintelligence collaboration
with his former section and his comrade de Regle. His messages
covered several full pages impregnated with delightful familiarity,
which sometimes denoted, and only when the others were concerned, the
virile sensitivity of a born leader.
"...Yes, inspector Untel works for the Gestapo. But they
have beaten him and arrested his wife and five children as
hostages. Therefore it does not seem that he has betrayed
before his arrest and that of X. and Y. I will keep you
informed of my cogitation on this subject...
...I am sending my affectionate trust and my admiration to
Mr. Vauthier, whose advices have proved to be excellent...
...For Paulo. Delage is eagerly looking for you and for
de Regle. Get lost. I'd rather stay in the clink alone than
to see you join me. Since we are not considered as terrorists,
we might not be shot after all. Should I die, I want Morel,
in view of his very gallant conduct, to be posthumously pro-
moted to 2nd Lieutenant, so as to insure for his wife and his
child the social level of an officer...
...No. Leave Tortora alone, for our lives probably depend on
his staying in good health.
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...On February 15, the Gestapo went to the drop zone to
catch an English parachutist who did not come. They had
captured the previous drop (food, cigarettes, chocolate).
Impossible to find out details on the drop zone. But
perhaps this will be enough of a clue for you...
...Below is a list of the Marseille Gestapo agents...
...Yes. Le Blond seems to be all right. Talk to him about
patriotism, instead of money. The Alsatian interpreter
seems friendly but will he accept? Three Alsatians are
among the sentries, and all three are soldiers to prevent
reprisals against their families. Favorably inclined, but
are they going to take the risk? We will..."
From the depth of his jail cell, the Glaieul section leader of the
Agence Immobiliere was able to successfully continue, his intelligence
war against the all-mighty Gestapo.
His arrest had only put Glaieul to sleep for a few days. Lieutenant
Lafforgue had taken over its command. He, in turn, was arrested acciden-
tally, on April 22 1944, at the "Bar de l'Avenue," on Place Castellane
along with his assistant and his radio-operator. -The wound was deeper
than the first time, but once again they were able to stop the hemorrhage.
Captain S. took command. Glaieul was to carry on and operate until the
Liberation. And we were going to see Mordant, Lafforgue and Morel again.
Third interlude. "Perseverare diabolicum"...but my defense can be
found later on. On April 23, the day following the arrest of the three
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section cheifs of Glaieul, a little man with thick glasses, a little thinner
than in December, knocked at the door of one of them and called: "Eh, X..."
He glanced through the key hole. What he saw made him take off on the run.
The street was deserted and the next corner much too far away. Philippe-
Auguste could already hear the burst which was going to shoot him down,
he could feel its wind. Suddenly he had an idea. He stopped, turned
around, and walked back toward the door where he came from holding his
umbrella under his elbow and trying to look as calm as possible. His face
must have really looked calm, because the submachine gunner who suddenly
appeared in the entrance of the occupied house, asked him casually:
"Was it not you who called X.?"
"No, Sir" replied Soleil.
And he continued his walk.
The reason why I gave all these details is because theLr reoccurrence
was the very life of the first pioneer agents and their accumulation re-
presents and gives an idea of the luck of the survivors. The luck.. .which
was a personal and congenital quality, which was part of the individual.
This is the very opinion that I wanted to substantiate without pretending
to convince everybody and asking my friends not to try to convince me that
I am wrong.
Let us summarize. In 1943 and 1944, the Old Agence Immobiliere in
Marseille,
had weeded
toxin, and
having remained healthy organically as well as internally,
out or neutralized the double agents, the only true deadly
had overcome all outside attacks, whatever their strength. But...
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IV
INTOXICATION DESTROYS
THE YOUNG AGENCE IMMOBILIERE
'de may recall that, upon his arrival in Algiers, Major P., chief
of all the Counterintelligence Services, justly worried about the future
of the Agence Immobiliere, had decided to organize rapidly a second com-
partmented service, the young Agence Imuobiliere. He put Captain Vellaud
in charge of it. The latter, called Toto, was a fiery infantry officer
who thought that nothing was impossible. Vellaud selected his assistants
in his own image. He assigned Captain Avallart, called Jean-Marie, to
the important "Larva" section, which, in Marseille, had to work in paral-
lel with "Glaieul," and furthermore ensure the Mediterranean maritime
liaisons, particularly through the "tube" (submarine).
Avallard landed in the vicinity of Saint-Tropez during the night of
7 to 8 May 1943, with only one assistant. "Glaieul" welcomed him frater-
nally, supplied him, as expected, with quarters, identification papers,
radios, support and advice. Then, when "Larva" seemed well established,
and a little impatient to shake off the guidance of the Old Timers, they
separated, in application of the very principle for the establishment of
a young Agence Immobiliere, i.e., its reason for being: the distribution
of risks.
C must declare right now and also convince the reader that, in the
following story, I have no criticism in mind whatsoever to pass on to
those of the Young Agence Immobiliere. This is not only out of respect
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for very pure heroes who all died except for a few, because (and from
past experience I am positively sure of it) no one in their shoes would
have done better, and furthermore, they did not have much competition
for the job. If I did not think so, I would have cited other examples.
There were so many of them!
An imaginative he was annoyed by his chiefs caution. He thought it
was far too exaggerated and sometimes referred to it with words somewhat
short of being seditious. Let us call him Durand. The epithete "young"
added to the famous initials "A.I." held an irresistible attraction for
him. This was his opportunity. His drive pleased Avallard who took him
as his assistant. He did not have much of a choice. There was very little
time to evaluate the conditions of the daily struggle. They had to get
organized while they worked, and work while they fought. It would have
been a miracle for him to find and retain the wise, the old, the kill-joy,
the cautious, the Cassandre who would have been better for him than Durand.
All the more so because in Algiers too, in the beginning, when there was
no news from France, people sometimes became nervous and wondered what the
h... the "slow-pokes" who had stayed behind were doing. Durand should have
explained the situation to Avallard every night and talked to him about
security before thinking of production. Yet he did exactly the opposite.
To obtain iimiediate tangible results, he recruited an extraordinary
agent for "Larva," whose true value had been underestimated by the old
timers who had kept him aside as if he had a contagious disease. One must
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admit that Max de Vos (1) was brilliant. He knew everything. He had
been everywhere, in Belgium, from where he pretended to come from,
Russia where he was born, Germany where he had been a sales represen-
tative Ear the Luftwaffe, France where he had been a Lowe-Radio sales-
man, Spain where he had practiced bootlegging, etc.. .He spoke every
language in the world and knew everybody. He was extraordinarily re-
sourceful. With him, all the problems of the daily life in occupied
France, such as housing, food, traffic clothing, forged papers, were
solved miraculously. He was a magician. He immediately satisfied even
the most ridiculous wants, like coffee, tobacco, and chocolate, one had
only to ask for it. In short, he had all the attributes to make an in-
telligence agent.
Of course, he had been one. And it goes without saying that it was
on the French side. And if he had given up working for the S.R., it was
really, as Durand knew so well, because nothing could be done with this
bunch of old hens without imagination, initiative, money, and guts. Durand,
hypnotized, listened and approved.
Urged by pure patriotism, de Vos had even gone as far as endangering
himself in the deadly game of double agent. As early as 1941, he had
enlisted in the services of the Stuttgart Abwehrstelle, accomplished one
mission for them in Algeria, entirely under French control. He had the
same kind of work done by his mistress in Morocco, and fooled the Germans
(1) After this chapter was written, the man referred here as De Vos was
sentenced to death in Marseille (May 1947). Therefore we can now
mention his real name, Max deWilde.
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upon his return by turning over to them documents which had been entirely
written by the French Intelligence Service. Then he started all over
again in Spain, etc..., etc.. .He could have been such a real gold mine
if he had been properly utilized. Durand, fascinated, continued'to
approve. Even more so because De Vos had shown himself capable of making
a survey and a map of an entire sector of coastal fortifications. He also
obtained the order of battle of the Gestapo in the South-East Area in
record time. In such a short time in fact that it worried the "old
"slow-pokes" who had been faced for a long time with the practical dif-
ficulties of the job.
Everything he claimed to have done was indeed true. No lies were
told for lies could be easily exposed by a radio check with Algiers. He
had told the truth.
In spite of the wonderful qualities of the prodigious de Vos, the
French officer who had handled him from Algiers, the quiet, ?serious, lucid,
and perspicacious Captain Letranger, had politely but firmly told him that
his services were no longer required. He would have preferred to "put him
in the cooler," but, actually, he had nothing on him. Letranger did not
want him any more, for the same instinctive reason which made Mr. Vauthier
be repulsed by Lerat.
He suspected him. It could not be explained. The fact that someone
looks like a pig is not a reason to disqualify him as a spy, is it? De
Vos looked unmistakably and shockingly like a pig. He had a gas mask pro-
file. Between a receding forehead and almost no chin, his enormous nostrils
and blubber lips formed one single appendage, protruding, moving, projected
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like an antenna, as if the sole function of a man was to sniff and
lick. His eyes, were small slanted, mocking, vicious and mean.
Letranger could not really justify to his chiefs, his decisions to get
rid of de Vos merely on account of this ugly physical aspects. De Vos
reported scrupulously:
"There is no reason for me to believe that "Le Sauvage"
(pseudonym he had given him) is not fulfilling his mission
properly, but I do not trust him, and consider him dangerous."
Letranger was right and anticipated far ahead. Perhaps de Vos had
played the game correctly in 1941, and perhaps still in 1942, but he and
his mistress were suspected by the Germans, and had been arrested but were
released for lack of evidence. They were arrested again on the order of
an officer, under the pretext that they knew too many people in the Gestapo,
and they were involved in too many money and business scandals as well.
They finally had turned to the side which, at the moment, was the most power-
ful. Under German probation in Marseille, de Vos was looking for a way to
rehabilitate and save himself. There he found in Delage, the master he
deserved, and in Durand, the victim he needed.
Because of his experience in half-failures with the Old Agence Immo-
biliere, and having undoubtedly gotten back into favor after his successes
against other organizations, Delage at this time was in no hurry. He let
the young Agence Immobiliere run for several months, with an extraordinary
patience and a trust in de Vos which was bordering on carelessness. He
was convinced that with people capable of facing the "verscharfte Verneh-
mung," or of thwarting it, and perhaps swallowing a cyanide pill, it was
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necessary to know everything about them before their arrest.
During the night of 26 to 27 November 1943, the small columns of
travellers on their way to Algiers who were walking toward the submarine
embarkation beach of Cap Camarat, ran into patrols which opened fire.
In the last volume, I will tell in details the tragic adventure in which
a sixteen year old girl, one of general Giraud's children, could have
lost her life. The immediate damage was limited beyond all hopes. But
the liaison system with the outside was upset and it took months to re-
build it again.
The survivors of the Agence Immobiliere are still talking about the
cause of this surprise attack. For a long time, everybody thought it
was just an accident. Anyway, that was what Delage had finally told his
prisoner, Mordant. Delage bragged, during their friendly conversations,
of knowing everything concerning the submarine traffic and of having pre-
pared an ambush at the right time, on November 26.
"I was bluffing," he said "to make you talk, I admit! Yes, frankly,
it was just a stroke of luck."
As for myself, I am convinced that it was a trap, and that Delage
informed by de Vos, had been its instigator. He cautiously retracted
when he started to suspect Mordant of communicating with the outside, or
when he became certain of it. The reasons why I am so sure are the fol-
lowing:
1. Durand, Avallart's assistant, knew all the "tube" movements for
he was in charge of the reception.
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2. He had an absolute trust in de Vos who had become Larva's
"Chief of Staff," according to the expression of a survivor of the
young Agence Immobiliere. There was not a thing he did not tell him.
3. It was through Durand that de 'los had wormed his way into Larva.
He also awed Durand the influence and the importance which he had gained
in it. Should Durand dissappear, de Vos would lose his protector and his
sponsor. However Durand was arrested several days later. Why did de Vos
sacrifice him right at that moment? Was it not because Durand was making
up the list of people who had heard about the projected submarine operation,
and that, perhaps, at last! He was going to suspect de Vos (1)?
The current judicial inquiries will perhaps establish this small
historical point. Poor Durand, who was deported under the sign "Nacht
und Nebel" (into darkness and fog) will never know it. The Allies liberated
him, but he only surdved for a few days.
The above-mentioned can be considered only as presumptive evidence.
However what follows has been proved and reinforces it very much.
De Vos, who had gotten rid of Durand but who was deprived of him at
the same time, had to make new friends inside the young Agence Immobiliere.
He succeeded. In a few months, he became indispensable. Particularly,
he found for each one of them a place to stay which was wonderfully appro-
priate for an underground life. He had a duplicate key of all the apart-
ments. One must admit that Judas looks like an apprentice compared to him.
During the night of December 1943, the custodian of the code used in
radio transmissions between the Agence Immobiliere and Algiers was absent
(1) See also last paragraph of extracts from a German Police Report
captured by Eleuthere, Chapter II, section II.
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from home. De Vos went into his house with two Germans. The three
men calmly photographed the code, page by page, as well as all the
other various documents they found. They carefully put everything
back in the proper place. The Frenchman never suspected anything.
The old and the young Agence Immobiliere had the same code. The
blow could have been deadly to both organizations. It turned out to be
so for the young Agence Immobiliere. From then on, the Germans knew
almost everything which was transmitted by radio between the Algiers
Special Services central office and its section in France. Fortunately,
the radio was only used sparingly and in case of emergency. On the other
hand, the air liaisons were operating more and more successfully, which
limited the damages. Nevertheless it was a disaster, the consequences
of which cannot be estimated yet. It lasted for several months. And
nobody on our side suspected anything (1).
It was only on April 25, 1944 that the Germans decided to crush
Larva. Captain Jean Avallart was shot in Buchenwald. His whole organi-
zation disappeared with him.
Within a few days, the enthusiastic and stubborn national chief of the
young Agence Immobiliere, Captain Paul Vellaud, who had just been parachuted
over France for the second time, was arrested in Paris. He was shot in
Buchenwald, on October 5, 1944.
In March, the second team of the young Agence Immobiliere which was
working in the Northern area in Liaison with London, had been destroyed.
(1) See also last paragraph of extracts from a German Police Report
captured by Eleuthere, Chapter II, section II.
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Its two leaders, Lieutenant Leon Lheureux, alias Joie, an apostle in his
profession, and Army cadet Charles Bellet, were shot in November 1944.
Sometime later, ensign Yves le Henaff, alias Fanfan, was captured.
He was not a man who did things half-way. He had plastic surgery done
to his face to disfigure it, so as to increase his chances of not being
recognized in his native Brittany, where he organized the liaisons by
sea with England. He died shortly before the landing.
We know that, as early as December 1943, the entire Nantes team,
which was under the command of Lt. commander Lavallee, had been arrested
and that nobody survived. We are still wondering, - and we'll find out
one day, who was responsible for these deaths. It could very well have
been de Vos, on a temporary mission in Paris, under a new name.
In Lyon too, the section of the new Agence Immobiliere was discovered,
and its leader, Lieutenant Heush, was shot.
The national leader, the regional leaders, and the sections of Lyon,
Nantes, Brittany, Lille and Marseilles, all were discovered. The young
Agence Immobiliere was destroyed six weeks before the landing. Major P.
requested Major Vauthier to gather those who were left and to incorporate
them into the old Agence Immobiliere.
Time spares only what is done with time.
V
THE "FALL KATALINA"
Meanwhile, organization of the armed insurrection in the Bouches-du-
Rhone department had progressed in the Franc-Tereurs and Partisans
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Organization, as well as in the Secret Army of the Resistance United
Movements, and in the Self-Defense Groups. In October 1943, Captain
de Regle, leader of the latter, had reunited his sector leaders in his
home, 5 Rue de Valence, and had defined everyone's mission in accor-
dance with the directives of the new regional leader, Captain L. alias
Sapin. The reconnaissance for the final preparation of the sabotage,
destruction and guerrilla plans were immediately started. In December
1943, they were ready. The special task teams started training, and the
total strength was increased by the spontaneous collaboration of small
resistance groups which had sprung up everywhere.
Finally, in Januray 1944, the efforts of unification were success-
ful. The Resistance United Movements, the Franc-Tereurs and Partisans
Organization, and the Self-Defense Groups merged to form the South-East
F.F.I. In March, de Regle was promoted to F.F.I. chief of the Bouches-
du-Rhone.
Well-organized drops provided a first supply of arms. But the vigi-
lant surveillance of the roads by the Milice, the Gestapo and the Wehrmacht
rendered difficult the transporting of this equipment to its various re-
cipients. Nevertheless, in April, each sector could equip 70% of its total
strength, and 4000 men were fully armed, conventionally, and ready. For
training purposes, a few sabotages which were part of the green plan were
carried out successfully.
At the beginning of June, a few experienced leaders were getting
ready to come and help de Regle in this Marseille area, which they knew
better than anyone else. From the train which was taking them to Germany,
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toward the execution wall and the crematorium of Buchenwald, Captain
Mordant, Lieutenant Lafforgue and Chief Warrant-Officer Morel, - those
three stubborn officers finally - succeeded in escaping. Morel wrote
how it happened in a beautiful and simple style.
"We left Marseille on Pentecost day, on the 7:45 p.m. train
for Paris, from there we headed for Compiegne. Upon leaving
Paris, Captain Mordant asked us to sing the "Marseillaise,"
which we did, in front of a crowd of civilians and under the
threat of rifles.
We left Compiegne on June 4 for an unknown destination,
and it was during this trip that I escaped along with several
other companions, in the vicinity of Vitry-le-Francois.
Our car held 80 prisoners. It was carefully locked from
the outside. S.S. men armed with machine-guns were guarding
us from the roof of the cars. At night fall, a prisoner pulled
small saw blades out of his shoes and started making a hole in
the car wall to enable us to open the doors. The car leader was
Father L, the curate of Maisons-Alfort. With authority, self-
control and calm, he gave us all the necessary information to
facilitate our escape. In case of a successful escape, I asked
my leader captain Mordant for instructions, and we selected a con-
tact point in Lyon. As soon as the train left Chalons-sur-Marne,
the door was opened. It was 2:00 A.M. We started jumping off
the train. I was number 12 and Lieutenant Lafforgue was number
20. The train was doing 50 kilometers an hour, and was going
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toward Vitry-le-Francois. Everything went without incident.
I reached the village of Pringis after a swim across the
Marne river. In that village I met Lieutenant Lafforgue and
a man from Manosque named N. At the presbytery, Father M.
sheltered us, gave us money and food, then we went to a place
he indicated to us. It was a farm in the middle of a forest,
seven kilometers from Pringis, where the people took real good
care of us. The next day, we went to Lenrhee (Marne department)
where the priest gave us identity papers, working permits and
1500 francs. Then he took us to a local gentleman-farmer who
gave us 2000 francs each. Finally, from Fere-Champenoise, we
took the train for Paris, and from there, we separated to go to
Lyon.
I did not find my wife, who had fled from Marseille, and had
joined the Basses-Alpes department maquis, where she worked as
a nurse.. .Since I did not receive the instructions which I ex-
pected from Lieutenant Lafforgue, I asked M.D., an honorable
correspondent of the Service, to give me weapons and I joined an
F.F.I. unit, with which I fought, especially at the capture of
Bourgoin..."
Lafforge could not have sent instructions to his comrade. He was
dead. After such a display of efforts and courage, just when his dream
was about to become a reality i.e., to take Alp arms for the final fight
in the area where he was best prepared for it. A stroke of bad luck made
him fall again into the hands of the Germans. This time, after they
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tortured him, they shot him without delay.
Moreover, filled with rage they killed everybody they arrested.
And, on June 7, they had just captured almost all the General Staff of
the Resistance in the South-East area. Such a catastrophe could only
have been the work of a traitor who had infiltrated the F.F.I. forces.
In front of me, I have the final report sent by Delage to his chiefs
concerning the operation which he named "Fall Katalina," the Catalina
case. Its boldness and the hypocritical camouflage of the pure and simple
murdering of the prisoners make it clearer and more crushing whan any anal-
ysis. To comment on the behavior of the courageous Irmgard Reybaud or
that of Marius Arnaud would only be superfluous literature.
This German document on French courage could not remain buried in
the files. Here it is:
"The Commander of the Sicherheitspolizei and the Sicherheitsdienst,
in Marseille."
"Marseille, July 6, 1944."
"Final report on the Catalina case."
"According to items of information given by an offended and
shady leader of the Resistance, whom we shall refer to as
"agent Erick" and who has come over to our side. We were able
on June 6, 1944, to undertake the operation known as the Catalina
case, against the Giraudist (1) Self-Defense Groups, and the
(1) The epithet "Giraudist" given to the Military Action Groups (G.A.M.)
or G.A.D.) a small example of Delagets narrow-mindedness. The G.A.D.
were armed forces to be used in the battle against the Germans. They
were opened to all volunteers, and totally devoid of political connota-
tion.
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"At 5 P.M. on June 6, 1944, agent Erick informed us that the
red plan (assembling of all Resistance forces in the maquis) and
the green plan (starting of the acts of sabotage as of 2400 hours
June 6, 1944) were cancelled. The plan for the landing of dis-
sident troops which was expected to take place on June 7 and 8,
1944, in the South-East of France, somewhere in the Frejus-Saint-
Raphael area, was also cancelled. The information of agent Erick
concerning the red and green plan later turned out to be one hun-
dred per cent true. The arrested Resistance leaders were also ex-
pecting the landing on the 7th or the 8th, one must admit that the
North African dissident forces, with approximately 300,000 men had
really planned to land at the indicated time, but were not able to
do so for unknown reasons. (1)
"On June 6, the F.F.I. in our area were decimated by arrests and
by the destruction of their groups."
"1. GERARD, Andre, alias Gervais and Gerbau, lieutenant on
active duty, 22 years old. Born in Lyon. Bachelor. Catholic.
He was the G.A.M. chief in the Bouches-du-Rhone department. Arrested
in his apartment during the night of June 6 - 7. In his room we
seized his luggage which had been prepared for his departure to the
maquis, 2 submarine guns, 1 pistol, 12 mm Colt, a stamp of our L. IV
Service, and an exact copy of our Kommandeur's signature. The docu-
ments found on Gerard proved that he had received, on the evening of
June 5, the order to put into execution the red and green plans,
(1) Of course, no landing was planned for that date. It was only a de-
plorable and tragic mistake in the conventional transmission of - orders.
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which were to be set into motion by the two following sentences:
"We will roll on the lawn" and "Beware of the bull-fighter.
"General was shot and killed on June 10, while trying to escape."
"2. CHAVE, Alberic, alias Mazarin, French. Married.
Catholic. 45 years old. Born in Marignane. Electrical contractor
in Martiques. He was the F.F.I. sector chief for Marignane,
Martigues, Port-de-Bouc, Istres. He was shot and killed on June 10
while trying to escape."
"3. RICHARD, Georges, French. Bachelor. Catholic. 24 years
old. Born in La Seyne (Var). Ensign on active duty. Living in his
castle at Ranes (Orne).
Regional delegate of the Resistance for maritime matters. His mis-
sion was: 1. On landing day, to destroy all German sea-going crafts
and ammunition dumps in the sector. - 2. To prevent the Germans
from sinking the ships upon their departure. He was shot and killed
on June 10 while trying to escape."
"4. DANGEY, Robert, Alias Landes. French. Married, Catholic.
28 years old. Born in Parentis. Teacher in Martigues. We seized
in his home two submarine guns, several pistols, some very accurate
plans of the German coastal defense system and a file on the collab-
orators working with the Sicherheitspolizei.
Shot and killed on June 10 while trying to escape."
"5. ARNAUD, Marius-Francois. Married. Catholic. 29 years
old. Born in Marseille. Farmer in Saint-Pierre-Martigue.
Captured at Dangey's home during a meeting of F.F.I. members who
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were getting ready to join the maquis. He immediately opened
fire on our agent # 233, through his trousers pocket. Was killed
in the fight."
"6 to 12. ABBADIE, Barthelemy. French. Bachelor. Catholic.
26 years old. Born in Pas-des-Lanciers. Farmer.
BARTHELEMY, Joseph, French. Married. Catholic. 37 years old.
Born in Martigues. Airplane assemply mechanic.
DILORTO, Paul, French. Married. Catholic. 37 years old. Born in
Mart igue. Teacher.
LOMBART, Paul, French. Married. Catholic. 41 years old. Born in
La Ciotat. Docker.
TOUMOND, Lucien. French. Bachelor. Catholic. 25 years old. Born
in Revin (Ardennes department). Teacher in Martigues.
TRANCHIER, Henri. French. Bachelor. Catholic. 26 years old. Born
in Marseille. Teacher.
LAZARINO, Henri. French. Catholic. 55 years old. Born in Saint-
Germain-Cluson. Owner of a bar in Port-de-Bouc. F.F.I. sector
chief of Port-de-Bouc.
The six first men were arrested at Dangey's, and the last one in the
street. They were shot and killed on June 10 while trying to escape.
In Martigues, we seized 9 submachine guns, English light submachine
gun, 2000 rounds of ammunition, 100 grenades, 30 kilograms of explo-
sives. The other F.F.I. members succeeded in their escape. But the
Resistance in the sector of Martigues - Marignane - Port-de-Bouc-Istres
can be considered as totally crushed."
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"13. ROUSTAN, Marcel, French. Divorced. Catholic. Retired
Captain. 48 years old. Born in Saint-Chamas.
Chief of the Salon-St-Chamas-Graus-Aix sector.
Only revealed the truth on June 12, after all the members of his
organization had fled. Whereas, on June 15, he was to show us
where to find the two tons of air-dropped equipment hidden on the
local farms and in the forest, we discovered that this equipment
had been removed elsewhere and had been distributed among the ma-
quisards of his sector. Was killed on June 15 in the vicinity of
Salon while trying to escape."
"14. CABRIER, Gaston. French. Married. Catholic. 52 years old.
Mayor of Aurons (Bouches-du-Rhone department). Arrested in one of
his fields on June 15. Was in charge of an ammunition dump. Was
killed on June 15 in the vicinity of Salon while trying to escape."
"15. MORGAN, Jules. French. Married. Catholic. 48 years old.
Farmer at La Faurie. Was in charge of an ammunition dump.
In this sector we were only able to capture 5 submarine guns, one
thousand rounds of ammunition and 35 kilograms of explosives."
"16. On June 10, agent Erick gave us precise information on the
maquisards hiding out in the "Chaines?-de-Cotes" forest between
Charleval and Lambesc. On June 12, beginning at 4:00 A.M., we were
able, with the cooperation of the 244th Infantry Division the Luft-
waffe and a Divisionary Artillery Regiment, to besiege the camp and
to partially annihilate it.
Results of this one day-long action: 96 enemies killed and 43 pri-
soners.
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The loot was left to the troops."
"17. On June 16, agent Erick succeeded in resuming contact with
an enemy radio operator from the G.A.M., URIATE, Michel. French.
Bachelor. Catholic. 23 years old. Born in Hendaye. Warrant-
Officer on active duty, residing at La Motte-diAigues (Var depart-
ment), also known as Octave de la Mort d'Aigues, Octave, Michel, A
Aigrette, Richard and Girardot. The "Little game" played with this
radio operator in the Vaucluse department (1) had to be stopped be-
cause, on June 21, the Milice and the Wehrmacht had started hunt-
ing the maquisards between Cademer, Lourmarin, Cucuron and la Tour-
d TAigues.
Uriate had been parachuted in January 1944.
He was arrested before he had a chance to use the grenades that
were beside him.
We seized the following in his home: Two Mark II transmitters, two
codes printed on silk handkerchiefs, and 8 crystals.
He was turned over to the Sonderkommando A.S. for further interroga-
tion."
"18. REYBAUD, maiden name DRUCK, Irmgard. Alsatian. Married.
Catholic. 36 years old. She was F.F.I. sector chief, particularly
for la Motte-delAignes. At her home, we found a great amount of
seditious leaflets in German intended for our troops. We discovered
that Mrs. Reybaud had three brothers of German nationality. Two of
them died on the Eastern front, and the third is still fighting on
(1) This consisted of radio transmission from Erick to Uriate who was
unaware of Erick's treason.
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this front. Nothing has been heard from him for the past three
months. In spite of this fact, the Reybaud woman admitted having
for the last five months, and up to the time of her arrest, she
had organized and directed the Resistance in her sector. She had
a profound hatred for the Hitler regime. Furthermore, she was know-
ingly hiding resistant patriots in flight, and for a period of four
months, had let Uriate use her house for his radio transmissions.
She carried his luggage whenever it was necessary to pass his trans-
mitter through the Wehrmacht check points. She was shot and killed
on June 21, while being transferred, as she was trying to throw a
British grenade which she had surreptitiously picked up."
"19. Count LEDROIT DE RECLE, Paul, French. Married. Catholic. 44
years old. Major on active duty. Alias Marquis and Kerjean. Top
G.A.M. departmental leader and Espionage chief in Marseille. Very
much wanted by us. Described as being the man in charge, arrival
of German troops in the South, of counterintelligence under the
name of A.V., (Agence de Voyage). (1) (Travelling Agency) As the
15th Area Military Security chief, he planned, until the operations
to be undertaken by this organization on the day of the landing. We
know that he had prepared the escape of Resistance officers, kept
prisoner at Les Baumettes with the help of the leader of a gang,
of killers G. and of the Red Cross nurse, G."
"In compliance with orders froM the B.D.S., Paris dated July 5, the
following individuals will be turned over to the M."
This is evidently the Agence Immobiliere, which means that they made
a double error, since de Regle was the chief of Military Security and
not of the Agence Immobiliere in Marseille. Who shuffled the cards?
Probably de Regle himself.
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"20. D., Aime, married. Catholic. 32 years old. Unemployed.
French double agent in our services, the Milice and the P.P.F.
It was from D.'s safe-conduct PASS that count de Regle had our
seal copied to manufacture the
Arrested by the French in 1942
leased and put to work against
He made use of his weapons and
numbers # 160 and # 207)."
"21. G., Jean-Marie, Catholic, Corsican. 39
stamp which was found at Gerard's.
for double dealing and theft, re-
us in April 1944.
was
killed by our agents (Serial
years old. Assistant
to the departmental chief of the Bouches-du-Rhone and leader of a
gang of killers in Marseille."
"22. G., Madeleine, French, Single, Catholic, 40 years old. Director
of the Department for Assistance to Internees and the Welfare Ser-
vice of the Red Cross in Marseille.
She knowingly passed on to the Resistance, written and verbal mes-
sages from the "Les Baumettes" prisoners. Was informed of the
escape plan of two prisoners and suggested that a third one be in-
cluded.
She will be sent to a concentration camp."
"23. Z., Antoine, Married, Catholic, Corsican. 48 years old.
Section chief at the Marseille Prefecture. Supplied Count de Regle
with identity cards duly registered, but bearing false names, to be
given to resistant patriots. Gathered intelligence for the Algiers
Intelligence Service.
Wanted by the chief of the French police, Darnand."
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"24. LAFFORGUE, Pierre, French, Bachelor, Catholic. Regional
espionage chief. Seems to have escaped while being transferred from
Compiegne to Germany. Arrested again in the street, on June 19,
in Aix."
The following individuals could not be arrested:"
1. J., Max, alias Maxence, lawyer, F.F.I. regional chief."
2. X., alias Circonference, Reserve Major. 50 years old.
Military Regional Delegate."
3. L., alias Sapin, alias Perpendiculaire, 25 years old,
on active duty, regional G.A.M. chief."
4. X., alias Michel, U.S. Captain. Managed to get away,
14, during our skirmish with the bandits, at Vinon, South
etc...etc..."
"10. M Joanne, Count de Reglels assistant.
Fled when we came to arrest him at his home. On the premises, we
discovered some remarkably well done espionage material concerning
the German troops and the fortifications of Port Saint-Louis du-
Rhone at Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer.
He must have had at his disposal the files and documents newly
established by Count de Regle for the Liberation, but those could
not be found."
"11. and 12. Major X., alias Philippe-Auguste and Commander Y.,
Army and Navy Espionage chiefs whose actions were directed against
the Armistice Regulations, etc.., etc..."
"51 and 16. A. ROBERT, former Police Chief of Marseille, and P.,
Captain
on June
of Manosque,
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his secretary. Intelligence Agents working for Count de Regle.
In flight."
"After these arrests, it seems interesting to summarize the situ-
ation in the 15th Military Area. There, the Mavis is divided into
three zones:"
1) The Provence Maquis. It is in contact with the Italian Maquis.
The "Provence" Maquisards number 7,000 well-armed men. Their
mission was to encircle and capture the German troops stationed in
these two Departments, on June 8, anticipated day of the landing."
2) The "Maquis Area of Influence," including the Department of Vau-
cluse, the Northeastern part of the Bouches-du-Rhone, the Northern
part of the Var and Alpes-Maritimes Departments. In this zone, it
was not determined positively that the 4,000 armed maquisards would
be sufficient to hold the German troops stationed in the area as
prisoners."
3) The "Area of Operations," including the remaining part of the
Bouches-du-Rhone, Var, and Alpes Maritimes Department. This is
where the decisive battle between the landing troops and the Germans
were expected and the Maquisards were to operate with extreme caution
using guerrilla warfare and carefully planned sabotage."
"All the camps were near a landing and drop zone, to facilitate the
reception of the landing troops or equipment. The activities of the
Sicherheitsdienst, the Wehrmacht, and the Milice have badly hurt the
Maquis of our Area, and the fact that the landing did not take place
was enough to cause the patriots to lose confidence.
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"This is why L., alias Lincoln, U.S. Officer, who had been
parachuted on June 14, near La Motte-d'Aigues (Vaucluse De-
partment), issued immediately after his arrival, the order to
all the Maquis units he was able to reach, to go back home and
resume their normal occupations. During the action undertaken
in cooperation with the Milice on Jure 21 and 22, in the Vaucluse
department, we have been able to establish beyond the shadow of
a doubt that the Maquis had complied with this order and turned
their arms over to their respective Maquis chiefs. The weapons
must now be scattered in numerous small caches.
signed: Dunker
S.S. Scharfuhrer
Dunker-Delage was arrested in May 1945 and at the time he was not
showing any sign that he planned to go back to his native land. He pro-
bably intended to settle permanently in France where he was finally
feeling at home, perfectly at ease, especially Boulevard de la Chapelle.
He was sentenced to death in January 1947.
During his first interrogations, he coolly pretended having rendered
services to French patriots. He pretended in particular, to have saved
the life of Major de Regle. Actually, a few days after the arrest, the
surviving prisoners, except for Miss G., were piled up in a bus under the
guard of ten S.S. troopers. The bus started off on the road to Signe.
Half way between Marseille and Signe, a car caught up with it. An officer
came out and asked for Major de Regle and Captain Roustan. The above
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document establishes the fact that this was only due to additional
data requested by higher authorities, and not as a result of Dunker's
initiative. Besides, what would this prove but that Dunker-Delage
had perfectly realized that the war was lost. The readers who know
the Germans well will detect this between the lines of his report in
the terminology he used: We found only once the word "bandit," and
never "terrorist;" on the other hand, the words "patriot" and "re-
sistant" made their appearance in the Gestapo vocabulary. In any case,
mitigating circumstances could only have been considered if all the pri-
soners had been saved. De Regle was the only one to barely survive. He
does not have the slightest idea where his comrades were ignominiously
assassinated.
As far as traitor X., alias Erick, alias Pierrefeu, alias Noe, was
concerned, the Germans shot him down like a mad dog in July 1944, pro-
bably out of disgust, or perhaps to save the few millions francs they
had promised him.
We just saw how three different groups of patriots, equally coura-
geous, emerged, lived, fought and sometimes died in the same area while
fighting against the same enemy. It is very obvious to us that their
organic immunity to the virus of treason was in proportion to their length
of service, to the close relation of their liaisons with the traditional
central counterintelligence, and to the experience of their leaders. It
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can be compared to a grown man who is less susceptible to contagious
diseases than a child. Is this surprising?
But there is another idea which I would like to point out. It is to
say that only at home can one perform good Counterintelligence. This
irksome task of "house cleaning" requires a deep knowledge of the land
to be cleaned, and of the population to be purged, of its customs, its
habits and its beliefs. One can only wash badly other people's dirty
linen.
The movies have thoroughly convinced us that the American Counter-
intelligence is the world's best, that is within the United States. When
the American Special Services officers started to work in the South of
France against the Italians, it turned out to be a farcical - tragedy.
Only God alone, would have been able to tell at any time, to which side
each of these agents who changed masters more often than shirts belonged to.
The Germans, because they are European, in a purely geographical way,
outwitted the Americans every time.
I should add that I am convinced that the French have not done any
better, and would not do better on the American continent, should it need
to be liberated.
VI
ITALIAN COMEDY
One day in January 1945, Colonel C. (the same C. we have seen in
Algiers) dispatched, to Lieutenant Colonels Laforet-Vauthier and Bardin
now under his direct command, a first hand report on the activities of
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the German Special Services in Italy, where the Kesselring army was
slowly falling back towards the Alps. The German offensive espionage
effort was feeble and fully concentrated on France through the Alps
as well as by sea. This made sense. Kesselring had more than adequate
means at his disposal to face any frontal attack. But an Allied Army
coming from the Po valley, behind him, would mean encirclement, capit-
ulation, and catastrophe.
"They have concentrated all their field units and their trusty
stooges in San-Remo" said C. "What a basketful of crabs! They have
already started devouring each other. Look! Buchholtz has been re-
lieved of his command because he neglected to leave some rear-posts in
the South of France after August 15. Von Stagen, who was implicated in the
generals' putsch, has been arrested while trying to escape to Switzerland."
"I wonder" said Bardin; "who is that Belgian agent, Felix, who was
'thrown in the clink' because he had warned him of the danger, but later
released through the intervention of Kapitanleutnant (Lt Commander)
Sessler. He is a guy who knows how to get around and fend for himself."
"It is double agent Volks, sentenced to death by us and retrieved
by the Germans" asserted Laforet. "Sure. He has a mole on the tip of
his chin, a vertical scar on the left temple, and..."
"The bastard!" exclaimed Bardin. "He probably has a nice pile of
money stashed away, half a dozen good identities and as many hide-outs.
I can just see him in Sicily: The sun, the sea, the slippers..."
"We shall meet him again," prophesied Laforet: "He is a professional.
A curse hangs over the heads of the professionals. A certain Pierre Nord
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wrote in some novel a phrase which is unbelievably true, that he must
have heard in one of our best places and noted on his cuff: 'The
priest at the top of the moral ladder and the mercenary spy at the
bottom, have this in common: they remain what they are for eternity.'
Volks will come and offer his services to us."
"But.. .he is sentenced to death."
"He is used to it."
The German Special Services Headquarters was at Merano, but all
the units and the operational sections were in San Remo, only 20 kilo-
meters from the French border. The little town had lost its mediterra-
nean gaiety, its insouciance, and its charm. The curfew started at 7:00
P.M. as in all of Liguria. It was a useless precaution. The inhabitants
were hiding even during the day. San-Remo, once a charming town, was now
entirely overtaken by sad and anxious Gestapo lesser chiefs. They were
busy watching a bunch of Wehrmacht and Kriegsmarine officers, under sus-
picion since July 20, and reigning over a small army of fleeing western
traitors, spies and jacks of all trade. Fifty transmitters were being
used there, as well as the monitoring service of American radio-trans-
missions. Just imagine that the warden, the guards and the convicts of
a large penitentiary, have agreed to take over a small resort town and to
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live in it together in a climate of temporary good fellowship, and
you will have an idea of San Remo in 1945.
In the "Villa Draga," facing the trolleybus station, reigned the
ferocious S.S. Sturmbahnfuhrer Goal, the most feared representative
of the party. At the "Villa Alix," his first assistant, Obersturmfuhrer
Sommer, alias Senner, was in charge of politics and propaganda. This
meant that he was trying to reestablish contact with the elements of
the French Popular Party and the Milice which had remained in France.
He managed it with the help of his team leader, the notorious Jeannot
Carbone, He had about one hundred agents quartered at "Villa Alix"
and "Villa Verde." He had already dispatched to France sixteen small
boats loaded with spies. Early in January, Goal's second assistant,
Lieutenant Salm, in charge of sabotage, had smuggled across the mountain,
at Luceram, 18 spies whose mission was to destroy the Marseille pipeline.
The "Villa Aloha," 103 Corso del Impero, housed the Navy Intelligence
Service camouflaged as a Red Cross Organization. Its chief, Kapitanleut-
nant Georg Sessler, was considered in his country as the German Alain
Gerbault. That's all they had for their version of a "Gerbault." Had
Sessler deserved to become a legend, it would have been under the name of
the "Blue Beard of Espionage." His first fiancee, an American, had been
implicated in the Hurwitz spy case and executed in the United States; his
affair with the girl had enabled him to obtain a blue print of the "Sperry"
sighting device which was installed on the Stukas. His second fiancee, a
Bulgarian, had just been shot by the patriots of her country. The third
one, a Corsican, was not very far from the same fate.
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In addition to Navy Intelligence, Sessler had been entrusted with
the practical organization of border crossing channels towards France
for the agents of all the services. His most trusted lieutenant was the
Belgian Felix who was the chief of a gang of about thirty adventurers,
most of them Italians.
A kommando of torpedo men were living in hotel Malfada, - the coastal
defense system Services had settled in the villas "Lodola" and "Egea,"
- the patrol-boat teams in hotel "Exelsior," - the monitoring services in
hotel "Savoy", - the Italian "black shirt brigades" at the "Diana" inn,
etc...
Much more deadly than all the elite personnel listed above were the
French Popular Party groups commanded by "Baron" Barthelemy (long time
collaborator of Doriot and Darnand) and the Milice bands which haunted the
Corso del Impero and had the wild look of wolves exiled from their hunting
grounds.
We shall now take a quick glimpse at the intrigues of all these "fine
people." I hope the reader will be able to understand it. He will have to
give his undivided attention.
On January 3, 1945, in villa "Aloha" during the absence of Sessler
and his German assistant, the Belgian Felix, who had been allowed to stay
in his masters' home was having supper alone. The butler Augustin came to
tell him that two Italians were insisting on seeing one of these "gentlemen"
at once. Felix received them in the lounge. As he looked at the youngest
of the two, Renato Pierra, Felix demonstrated the usual bad temper of the
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upset servant of the master race, who are known to be more arrogant
than their employers themselves. Renato, a Vintimille fisherman, had
already come that morning to offer his boat for the crossing to France.
"I told you that we will let you know if we need you," grumbled
Felix.
"Si, signore. But it's my father" answered Renato. "He has some-
thing very important to tell you!"
Old man Pierra was a rather alarming fellow. He looked like a tall
Calabrian bandit. He had a brown, narrow, and mean looking face, streaked
with deep vertical wrinkles. His look was that of sly shrewdness and re-
strained violence.
"I killed a spy" he said.
Suddenly Felix showed interest;
"Are you sure he was a spy?"
"Yes. We live at the naval station of Vintimille. This morning, a
stranger, pretending to be an Italian officer, offered me 250,000 French
francs to smuggle him to France in my boat. He was living and seemed at
home in the empty house of the fisherman Hamilcar Vivetti, on the beach.
I went in there with him this evening. I noticed that he had some plans
and a radio in his possession. I realized that I was with an anti-fascist
officer and I killed him with an ax."
It was a strange coincidence that, this very morning, the son Renato,
had come to offer the use of the family boat to the Germans. It looked as
if they had tried to cover up a premeditated or already accomplished murder.
But the man could well be a spy. It had to be checked. Felix called the
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Gestapo, and together with the Oberstunmfuhrer Sommer, ten armed men
and the two Italians, he left in a car for Vintimille.
A small stream of blood was running across the front room of Vivettits
house and was ready to drip under the entrance door and on the porch.
Following it, the Germans came to another door. They opened it.
"Good God!" exclaimed Felix.
The stream was running all across the other room. At the opposite
end, in a kind of small den alcove used as a dining-room, a man was laying
on his back, in the middle of a pool of blood. This was the disgusting
work of a timorous butcher, who had been in a hurry and unable to finish
what he started. Felix bent down:
"But.. .he is gasping! He is still alive." he said.
They sent for a German doctor, who found out that the victim had been
hit four times in the back of his neck with an ax. The man was too weak
to receive a blood transfusion.
"Is there a volunteer to finish him up?" asked the doctor.
There was one. Yeoman William S., fired two pistol bullets in the head
of the dying man...Meanwhile, they had inspected his rucksack. It was a
good catch. The man was the Italian reserve captain Gino Punzi, an engineer,
living in Monte-Carlo, agent of the chief of the American Special Services
of the Alpes Theater of Operations, whom we shall call Joe. The latter had
instructed him to organize an intelligence network in the Vintimille-San-
Remo sector, and to conduct liaison with the different Italian maquis con-
trolled by the Americans. Gino Punzi had gathered valuable information,
especially a very precise survey of the German main line of resistance
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facing to the West, on the Roya river, the firing plans, the Command
Posts, the possibilities of intervention of an armored train, etc...
But, he was only an amateur insufficiently prepared by his chiefs to
fulfill his important mission. They found on him a detailed diary
and the names of all the people connected with his net, including a
fascist General Staff major assigned as liaison officer with the German
Military Command of the area. A note-book listed all of Punzi's sched-
uled contacts. Between the pages, Felix discovered a loose sheet on
which the following was written in Italian:
"Wait for us, we'll be there in two or three days."
The only things they were unable to find were Captain Punzi's money,
his radio and old man Pierra's ax. The latter probably because it was
hidden in the same place as the rest. The idea of a possible cover for
their crime had only come later to their minds. The crime was signed.
In the back. The excuse was excellent. The two Pierra's had calculated
well and won. Temporarily, that is.
"Say, my good Felix, what about that note?" said Sommer.
"It's probably Joe's agents who are announcing their arrival at Punzi.
Undoubtedly, they'll come here, to this liar."
"O.K., let's set a trap."
Felix had the Pierras' clean the house. They would probably be willing
to clean anything. The Belgian left three men there, the NCO's S. and
Sch., and the radio operator Nino, with the mission of capturing the visitors
without harming them.
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"Load the body in the car" said Felix.
He looked at the corpse, and this time, we can venture to say that,
however hardened he might have been, his voice was a little shaky when
he said:
"He is still alive."
A second round of mercy shots were needed to finish Captain Gino
Punzi (his real name).
The next day on January 4, at 6:30 AM, Felix went to get the news
at Vintimille and found a new corpse lying in Vivetti's house.
During the night, three men had landed on the beach, approached the
refuge, but at the last minute, as they caught sight of the Germans hid-
den on the terrasse, they attempted to flee. The Germans had to shoot.
Dominice, the teams's radio operator was killed with a bullet in the back.
His assistant, Eros Gardoni, got one in the tibia. The third man, Hamilcare
Vivetti the fisherman, owner of the house, who had brought them over in his
boat was captured unharmed. Loot: one transmitter, radio codes, weapons,
explosives.
At this point Kapitanleutnant Sessler took over.
"Felix" he said, "since Vintimille is evacuated, except the old quarters,
last night's incident will likely remain unnoticed. In any case, let's
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assume so. Because this is a fabulous opportunity to fool Joe. We
know him. We are told that he "barely belongs to the class of a
whisky salesman. All he is good for is loafing all day long, wearing
slippers and fooling around in the bedroom of his shack at Belgrano,
surrounded by a bunch of whores. The Allies are nuts to have entrusted
him with such position." (1) We must take advantage of it. I have de-
cided: 1. Nobody will be arrested; 2. We are going to turn Eros and
Hamilcare around."
They were turned around without any wasting of time or money. They
roughly cost 24,000 liras per month. It was chicken-feed. First thing
the following day, the first message of the Eros-ex-Dominico mission was
sent to Joe from Hotel Mafalda where Eros was being nursed at the torpedo
men's quarters.
"Gino Punzi cannot be found. Dominico killed in a bombing. Eros,
wounded, but able to transmit messages of Hamilcare who is the only one
capable of moving around and work. Send support and help."
Joe's answer was prompt. It was roughly as follows:
"Keep your chin up. Am sending you all you may need."
It was promising. Felix, who was in charge of controlling Eros, had
only one worry, and it was the possibility that the Italian radio operator
had, in sending his message, given a pre-arranged warning signal indicating
that he was working under enemy control. Eros doggedly insisted that such a
warning sign did not exist. Unbelievable but true.
(1) The portion in quotes does not represent the opinion of the writer, but
a German point of view, fully reproduced here according to the very
principle of this work, but not without regret.
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Germano-American relations became confirmed by frequent and im-
portant shipments of medical supplies, whiskey and American cigarettes
dropped in a certain spot on the Italian coast. Sessler, who knew his
job, felt that everybody trusted each other and he was ready to get down
to serious business. He had Eros send the following:
"Hamilcare has recruited a first class agent. He will bring him
over to you."
The so-called agent was the Italian Captain Hugo Luminati, holding
a law degree, a very clever and versatile man who, in 1945, was still
devoted to the German cause. Perhaps he was implicated too deeply. He
was to try to win Joe's confidence and then take over Captain Gino Punzits
position, whose fate still remained unknown in the North-Italian Intelligence
Organization, and in the liaison with the Maquis. The project was feasible.
To make it a success would be a master stroke. We must tip our hats.
It should have been a success. Its failure was unfortunate if one
considers espionage as a fine art. It was an ironical insult to logic,
to justice, and in a certain way to plain morality. Because if the pro-
ject failed, if Joe did not beat the world's record for intoxication, it
was due simply to his negligence on the job. Here are the facts:
Eros, or rather Sessler, notified Joe that:
"Hugo, guided by (the faithful) Hamilcare, will land on a particular
spot of the coast, near Menton, on such and such a day, and at such and
such a time."
Eros, added, which would seem unnecessary to serious-minded people:
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"Take all necessary precautions to ensure their safe landing."
The two Italians arrived at the pre-arranged spot on time, and
were greeted by gun shots. Hugo Luminati was killed instantly. This
was the only truly comical aspect of the whole story. Hamilcare was
wounded and taken prisoner. Explanations started. The Americans apol-
ogized to him. He was hospitalized in Nice and treated like a king.
A perfectly unique feat in the history of this small and special kind
of warfare: Hamilcare wasn't turned around a second time. Having be-
trayed Joe for Sessler, he did not betray Sessler for Joe. I carefully
verified this unbelievable detail. I must admit that it is true. For
a long time I searched for possible explanations. I could only find two.
Either Hamilcare, considered as an unfortunate hero, did not want to come
down from his pedestal. Or else, sissy and revengeful, he did not for-
give
Joe for the bullet he had been hit with.
The following morning, Eros and Sessler received a radiogram from Joe
confessing to the accident, with a shower of courtesies and apologies.
Sessler trowned. Had he made a mistake? Could Joe have been a profound
humorist playing stupid? Was he really behind the whole thing?
Of course not. Sessler regained confidence. It was impossible. For
Joe talked, on the radio, with a more and more confident and touching
familiarity.
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On 9 February 1945, he sent two new agents to Eros. This time,
one of them, known under the name of Captain Leo, was an American,
and what had been nothing but a burlesque comedy up to now, even with
all the bodies involved, was becoming more serious. Leo and his assis-
tant Mannini (I am using his real name as I did for Punzi and we shall see
why later) arrived at Villacrosie near Vintimille. They fell into a
trap set by Sessler. Leo refused to surrender. He opened fire, shot a
German and scared the others away. But he was hit himself by a bullet
in the chest. Mannimi put him clandestinely in a clinic at Bordighera.
Two days later, when the Germans came to pick him up after tracing him
down, good old Mannimi sneaked him away at the last minute. The Germans
never found them. It must have been a very tough and courageous per-
formance. It was later discovered, through the clinic staff, that the
bullet which had hit Leo was lodged in the spinal column area and could
not be extracted. I was unable to find out whatever happened to him and
his companion.
This did not worry Joe a bit and he never stopped showing confidence
and satisfaction concerning the reports he received from Eros and which
were fabricated by Sessler.
On February 15, the situation could have turned completely to his
advantage. A reliable Italian agent of Sessler, the young Pierre Rossi,
crossed the Alps for some kind_of mission in Nice. He voluntarily sur-
rendered to the Americans and spilled everything to Joe, who, as we can
well imagine, was stunned. The opportunity was great. Since the Germans
thought they had Joe, all he had to do to intoxicate them was to divulge
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false information to Eros. They would be labelled "reliable source."
The only precaution to take was to keep Rossi in prison. Darn it!
Joe should have began to know the human elements of this game.
But, he didn't. He recruited Rossi. He gave him a lump sum of
500,000 French francs which was equivalent to the six-month budget of
the Eleuthere net for all of France in 1943. He entrusted him with a
mission against the Germans, and in order to get their recognition,
furnished him with a certain amount of information which he was sup-
posed to have gathered in Nice.
Rossi returned to San-Remo and tried to play the role of the American
double agent. His first words made Sessler suspicious. It may seem un-
believable, but one of the items of information Rossi gave him on Joe's
instigation was that General Clark was in command of the city of Nice.
One can guess the probable intention: to make the Germans believe that
an Army was being formed in Provence. But the news in itself as it was
offered, was just as inconceivable as General Leclerc's promotion to the
rank of quartermaster clerk. Sessler let him talk. He was convinced by
then: this was a naive, childish and grotesque attempt of intoxication.
He slapped the Italian a couple of times and the latter confessed.
We could go on, because this is not the end yet. This resembles those
deplorable boxing matches between kids who don't have the strength to fin-
ish up but scratch each others and bleed like pigs. Sessler did not aban-
don the hope of making Joe believe that Rossi, a German agent of the highest
caliber, only came to see him in Nice to make a false allegation in order to
get at the truth and to challenge him. He had Eros imply it. Joe was
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shaken up, etc...
I have said enough to support a conclusion.
These months of American on-the-job training in Italy had some
unfortunate consequences. They might have been more serious, had the
Allies not already been winning.
Without even mentioning the destruction of the entire anti-German
net and the arrest of escape of several Italian officers and policemen,
excellent spies or double agents, the Germans knew the Allied Special
Services thoroughly, the American radio system, the monitoring net under
the control of the Villa Elizabeth Center in Cannes, and even the habits
and the keying peculiarities of Joe's radio operator. They knew the
latter's code, his key and the frequencies used. They discovered Joe's
liaisons with the Curto, Ivanof, and Arturo Maquis. They turned around
the liaison agent of the Curto maquis who stopped by to let them photo-
graph and censor all his dispatches. They knew that the supplying of
weapons was done at the Amibana bar, in Bordighera, and could stop it
any time. They had some orders and seals from Joe, which enabled them to
send to Paris several agents bearing papers which could open many doors
to them, etc.. .etc...
Fortunately, the German defeat was taking shape. The best collab-
orating forces were shaky.
In February, at a time when the radio contacts between Joe and Eros
were still going on, the Belgian Felix was instructed to interrogate
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seven Frenchmen arrested at the foot of the Alps. They pretended to
be from the French Popular Party but were suspected of being French
Intelligence Service agents, looking for contacts with the Italian
Maquis in order to initiate weapons drops. This was true. Pretty soon,
it was so evident that the team leader B. admitted it.
Then Felix had an idea.
"Listen" he said to B., "It's true, I worked against France. But
this will enable me to be twice as useful to France now. I would like
to go back there, to rehabilitate myself (sic) and live quietly with
my girl-friend. If both of us come to an agreement, we can be there
tomorrow. You'regoing to suggest to Obersturmfuhrer Sommer that he let
you guide me through the evasion channels used by the French agents in the
region of Tende and Saorge."
On 25 February, Felix, B., a German Warrant Officer, and two S.S.
soldiers, dressed in civilian clothes, alighted from a car at Piena and
started climbing on foot toward the frontier crest. Along the way, Felix
stopped to talk with the surveillance posts guards, all the while taking
notes on the lighting systems and the mined zones.
He gave his instructions to his small detachment; and addressed the
Warrant Officer:
"We're arriving. Watch this path, and you men, watch the other one.
Look out Stay on your toes!"
The Germans did not quite understand what was expected of them. But
that didn't matter, they were used to it.
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Are they still waiting, like Charlie Chaplin in a forward trench
out of his famous movie?
Felix said to the French officer who interrogated him at Sospel:
"Besides, I'm rather well known to your services under the name
of Volks. Why don't you phone Paris? They'll reply: 'Send him!"
This is how the story of the double agent yolks ended, and as a
consequence, the unfortunate transformation of the American Special
Services in Southeastern France into an involuntary German information
agency.
VII
The reader, if he has not been too disheartened by the sometimes
didactic quality of this work, has now a better knowledge of the Special
Services job than a company grade officer usually does. Furthermore, he
has a better general idea of the French Resistance output in the intelli-
gence field.
There remains to tell the odyssey of the men who established the
ground, maritime, aerial and radio liaisons, and without whom the enor-
mous and costly effort of the secret war would have been completely use-
less, and lost.
It is imperative that a study of the immediate preparation for D-Day,
- in full strength (which was the business of the Allies), and by surprise
(which was partly up to the French Resistance) - be presented next. Once
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this operation was successfully concluded and in organization with the
progress of the Allied Armies, the men of the intelligence nets joined
their comrades of the direct action networks with a delirious joy, in
order to participate directly in the battle. Their disguise had not been
for fun. One cannot keep quiet what they did then.
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Finally, since I wanted to talk about intelligence warfare only
to demonstrate the effective results, I have neglected to talk about
the personality of my characters. I would like to show, before time
alters my memories by drying them up.. .or idealizing them, how my com-
rades behaved when faced with the critical problems of the resistance
fighters. The observation of their reactions is extremely important,
for this war did not resemble any others we had fought. There was no
pre-established hierarchy, no obligation, almost no human respect, no
strict discipline, no awards, no glory, no parades, no brass bands, no
communiques, not even witnesses. The cowards lived peacefully, covering
themselves with dignity behind the moral approval and encouragements of
the de facto authorities. What counted, what drove men and women, and
what destroyed them from within what was the flame which made their
hearts beat, and their minds think. Yes, this was a war in which no
longer the collective but the individual and solitary sentiment were the
only driving forces.
I will penetrate deeply into the intimacy of some of my characters.
The pages I will devote to their state of mind and their inner struggles
should not be construed as literary essays. They are the only close obser-
vations which I consider necessary. If this was not also said, nothing
would need to be said, and those succeeding us would not understand.
This will be the subject of the third and last volume of this work.
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APPENDIX
In the original version of this volume, a number of documents
appeared in this section. They included original copies of messages
received and sent (on official message form or in handwriting of orig-
inator), which are in great part, already translated in the text, of
examples of sketches which accompanied the message, of intelligence
reports, and finally photographs of some of the principal members of
the nets.
However, due to the poor quality of the reproductions as well as
the fact that most of these documents are not indispensable to an
understanding and to the continuity of the story, all these enclosures
have been eliminated from this translated version. Only one exception
has been made in regards to the diagram of the "Glaieul" Section of the
Agence Immobiliere, which gives a good example of compartmentalization
and cut-outs. A translated version of this originally hand-written
document appears on Page 361.
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0
CL
0
P3
ar
0
0
h3
1st Operator
_&
Radio
coSupervisor
o
2nd Operator
Annex VI
Diagram of Glaieul
Legend
Compartmentation
Personal living quarters known
only by individual concerned.
Internal liaisons
Office
NOTE: DESTROY AFTER LEARNING
ITS CONTENTS
Daily Contact point between liaison NCO
and Cryptographer.
Letter Boxes
-e
-e
Diagram of compartmented and "cut out" organization of the "Glaieul" section of the Agence Immobiliere.
Z-1.00081.00Z000t114900-98dCIU-VIO : 'PO/60400Z eseeiati JOd peACLICIdV