OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA FORCES

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• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE INFANTRY--'I SP)Er
Fort BenmmOg, Georg
September I9
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OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA FORCES
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THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
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September 1950
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OPERATIONS AGAINST
GUERRILLA FORCES
FOREWORD
Guerrilla warfare is one of the oldest methods of waging war.
Throughout the ages it has contributed to the victory and defeat
of nations. It forma an important part of the strategy and tactics
of many modern powers. A knowledge of guerrilla warfare and the
means of combating guerrillas is therefore necessary.
The term "guerrilla warfare" is used loosely to describe all
kinds of irregular warfare. It is generally associated with
broad movements that may be briefly described set
I. A people's war or revolution against existing autho-
b. A war conducted by irregular forces (supported by
an external power) to bring about a change in the social-politi-
cal order of a country without engaging it in a formal, declared
war.
c. A war conducted by irregular forces in conjunction
with regularly organized forces as a phase of a normal war.
d. Operations, generally of short duration, conducted
by detached regular forces in the enemy's rear areas.
This manual is concerned primarily with the type of guerrilla
warfare described in o above.
The first three chapters of the manual cover the general
characteristics, organization, and operations of guerrilla forces.
To enable the reader to understand guerrilla warfare better, the
underlying factors that foster guerrilla forces are briefly dis-
cussed.
Chapter 4 develops the principles for combating hostile
guerrilla forces. Since the scope of the manual applies to com-
manders on all levels, and because the policies of all echelons
of command n the success of a command as a whole, the
principles developed extend from a national level down through
the command echelons within a theatre of operations.
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Paragraph
page
2
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
Section I. Introduction ..............?....
1-3
4
Ili, Examples of guerrilla activities
in World War II ..............
4-7
5-7
III4, Various aspects of guerrilla
warfare ......................
8-12
8-14
CHAPTER 2. GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
13-34
15-23
CHAPTER 3. GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
35-50
24-34
CHAPTER 4. COMBATTING GUERRILLAS
Section I,, General .......................
51-57
35-41
II4, Forces employed ...............
56-61
42-43
III, Intelligence ..................
6.2-65
44-46
IVo Administrative measures .......
66-68
47
V,, Security ......................
69-75
48-55
VL, Offensive action ..............
76-86
56-63
VII4, Special anti-guerrilla twits ..
87-92
63-66
VIII1 Special considerations ........
93-104
67-75
APPENDIX I. REFERENCES .....................
76
II. ADVICE TO INSTRUCTORS ..........
77
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL
Section I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this manual is to acquaint commanders on all
levels with the organization and tactics of guerrillas and to
provide a guide for combating and destroying guerrillas.
a. Guerrilla warfare may be defined as the military,
political,, and economic operations of poorly armed and equipped
forces against recognized civil and military authority, acting
either separately from, or in conjunction with, regular forces.
While regular forces may at times adopt guerrilla tactics, such
operations are not included within the definition of guerrilla
warfare as used in this manual.
b. In past wars, it has been common for groups and in-
dividuals to engage in subversive or overt activities against
hostile armies. Any attempt at distinguishing between types of
subversive or overt activities is confusing. The general terms
"guerrilla" and "guerrilla warfare" therefore are applied to all
these organizations and individuals and to their operationst
(1) Fifth column
(2) Guerrilla
(3) Irregular
(4) Partisan
(5) Resistance group
(6) Saboteur
(7) Underground
3. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
History proves that guerrilla warfare has often been the
"grain of sand" that stopped powerful military machines. In the
Peninsular War (1808), Spanish guerrillas were a formidable foe
to Napoleon's army. The Russian Cossacks, masters of guerrilla
warfare, helped out the French Grand Army to pieces on its re-
treat from Moscow (1812). The British war in South Africa (1899-
1902) was prolonged about two years by the guerrilla tactics of
De Wet and Botha. American military history is replete with ex-
amples of "guerrilla" and "anti-guerrilla" warfare from the time
of the American Revolution through the Indian campaigns, the
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campaigns in the Philippines (1898-1901), and the Punitive Ex-
pedition into Mexico led by General Pershing just before World
War I. The alrabs, led by Colonel T. E. Lawrence, gave us a very
good example: of guerrilla warfare during World War I (1914-1918).
Guerrilla forces during World War II were employed on a larger
scale than ever before (fig. 1). In Europe the notable examples
were in the B3oviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia, Italy, and France,
while in the Far East guerrilla warfare was effective in China,
Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines.
Section II
EXAMPLES OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN WORLD WAR II
4. U.S.S.R.
a. Before the German invasion, the Soviet government
prepared To,carry on guerrilla warfare. Supply caches were es-
tablished within the Soviet borders and Communist Party members
were trained in the missions to be performed in the event of
enemy occupation. Although the Germans' initial rapid advance
caused widespread disorganization,the Communist Party members
went underground and succeeded in recruiting and organizing
partisan bands. These bands at first avoided major operations
against the enemy, and confined their efforts to systematically
interrupting; field communications, derailing trains, blowing up
bridges, and removing or destroying crops and material of value
to the enemy, German counter-measures against these groups were
largely ineffective.
b. In 1942 the partisan groups were given additional
assistance by Moscow, and integrated into the Russian military
plans. A tremendous growth of the movement followed, and the
tempo of operations against the Germans Increased. At one time
it was estimated that between 80,000 and 100,000 partisans were
active behind the German Army Group Center alone. The Germane
committed larger and larger forces to guard their rear areas, but
without success.
a. During the Russian counter-offensive of 1944, the
partisans cooperated extensively with the Red Army, operating
against the German supply lines and routes of withdrawal. On
some occasibne partisan armies numbering tens of thousands en-
gaged in large-scale operations against major German combat units.
5. ITALY
a. The resistance movement in Italy had some interest-
ing and unusual aspects. Italy was at war with the Allies;
nevertheless by subversion, propaganda, and timely exploitation
an effective guerrilla movement was developed. Following the
armistice with Italy in 1943, trained allied personnel were para-
chuted behind the German lines to organize and lead those Italians
who were seeking to support the Allied effort. Arrangements were
made for supply by air to these units.
b. By September, 1944, it was estimated that 85,000
partisans mere engaged in guerrilla warfare in the mountainous
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Figure 1.
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regions of Italy, and an additional 60,000 patriots were engaged
in sabotage in towns throughout Italy. In April 1945, cooperat-
ing with the Allied 15th Army Group offensive, the partisans
killed or wounded over 3,000 Germans, made over 100 attacks
against the enen7,liberated over 125 towns, and carried out count-
less "oounteracorch measures" (preventing the destruction by the
enemy of key supplies and installations).
6. PHILIPPINES
Soon after the Japanese landed in North. Luzon, small bands
of cut-off Filipino and American soldiers, constabulary members,
and civilians began harrassing the enemy. Some of these groups
gained radio contact with United States Armed Forces Far East
headquarters on Corregidor and were authorized to organize as
units of the Philippine Army. From this beginning took place a
gradual consolidation of small, poorly-organized and poorly-
trained groups into large, well-organized and well-trained units
until at the time of the return of the American forces, a force
of 28,000 existed on Mindanao, a force of 20,000 in North Luzon,
and smaller forces elsewhere on Luzon and in the Visayan Islands.
Radio contact with the outside, lost after the fall of Corregidor,
was reestablished with South West Pacific Area headquarters in
Australia in late 1942. From this time on, General MacArthur's
headquarters, using radio-liaison teams infiltrated into the
Philippines by submarine and small boat, brought successive units
into contact. Supply of needed arms, ammunition, and medical
supplies by submarine followed, and by the time of the American
landing on Leyte in October 1944, all units in the islands were
in contact with and functioning under South West Pacific Area
headquartersr. These forces furnished intelligence about Japanese
activities and movements, maintained weather and ship and plane
watching stations, and rescued many downed American airmen.
Philippine guerrilla forces played outstanding roles in the re-
conquest of.the Philippines by blocking and harassing Japanese
movements, furnishing intelligence, and serving as guides, scouts,
and flank guards. The North Luzon guerrilla force functioned as
a regular combat division in its assigned sector and had U.S.
Army supporting units attached and under its command.
7. BUNNU
The Ch:Ln, Kachin, and Naga tribesmen in the mountains of
northern Bunma carried on widespread guerrilla activity during
1942. In 1943, however, long Range Penetration Groups, specially-
trained forces of regular American and British troops were sent
behind the enemy lines for both guerrilla and regular type war-
fare. These forces were supplied and their casualties evacuated
by planes. These planes often operated from air strips construct-
ed behind the enemy lines. Native guerrillas assisted the groups.
The value of these groups is still a subject of debate. They were
able to infLict serious damage upon the Japanese and to facilitate
the advance of the main forces. However, the air supply to the
forces created a tremendous logistical problem. Casualties due
to non-battle causes were high. Merrill's Maurauders, which left
India with 2899 men, ceased to be an effective fighting force after
four months.
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Section III
VARIOUS ASPECTS 0J? GUERRILLA WARFARE
8. CAUSES FOR GUERRILLA ACTIONS
a. ainet an invadin ower. In general, the will of
the people the wor over ais to rea s an invader. This charac-
teristic, if fostered and exploited, forms the basis for guerril-
la warfare. The military, political, and administrative measures
and policies of the invading or occupying power may further stimu-
late the people's will to resist. Guerrilla warfare against an
invader builds up more quickly and surely if it has previsouly
been planned and prepared for by the defending power.
b. Against existing authority. Guerrilla warfare occurs
when the people revolt against existing authority on military,
political, economic, or administrative grounds. These movements
may be instigated, aided, and abetted by outside influence.
Generally, resistance of this nature, if not assisted from out-
aide, does not present a serious threat to strong military powers,
though it may cause grave political and economic concern. How-
ever, if heavily supported from outside and particularly if co-
ordinated with open attack by an outside power, it can present a
serious threat to the existing authority.
9. APPLICATION
Guerrilla warfare may be resorted to when one party to a
conflict is inferior to the other in one or more of the essentials
of modern warfare -- armament, resources, regular forces, or
strategic position. On the other hand, guerrilla warfare may be
used by powerful forces, either separately or in conjunction with
regular forces, to achieve speedy and economical fulfillment of
their military, political, or economic aims,
a. The broad aims of guerrilla strategy are:
(1) To capitalize on the enemy's inability to de-
fend himself and his important installations at all places at all
times by making use of surprise, mobility, deception, evasiveness?
and concentration of force.
(2) To inflict casualties upon his troops.
(3) To cause damage to his supplies and installations
and delay to his operations.
(4) To lower, his morale and prestige.
(5) To maintain (or destroy) the morale and the
will to resist of the population.
b. This strategy forces the enemy to divert to anti-
guerrilla operations forces and materiel that would otherwise be
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available for other operations. Guerrilla operations ar
'themselves inca able of gaining a military ecision. n _be
a a nm%n c a military decision, guerrilla operations are al-
ways preparatory to or in support of a regular offensive effort.
Guerrilla operations, on the other hand, can be of great value
in assisting; the defense and preventing the defeat of friendly
regular forces.
a. Guerrilla forces may be expected to adopt strategic
objectives that.assist and are closely correlated with the
general military and political strategy of a power that they are
supporting.' Time, space and logistical factors, and the strength
of availablei forces will dictate the strategic objectives of
guerrilla forces, as well. as where, when and how missions are to
be undertaken. Although guerrilla warfare may, from an overall
strategic v'.ewpoint, be either defensive or offensive, guerrilla
operations are generally characterized by offensive action. Un-
like regula? forces, guerrillas do not seek to impose their will
on the enemy by destroying his forces in normal combat. They
seldom seize or defend terrain objectives. Usually they are in-
capable of such achievements. Major decisive actions that cha-
racterize normal warfare seldom occur in guerrilla operations.
Guerrilla warfare consists principally of small scale, usually
brief, operations conducted over a broad area, usually in the
enemy's rear, by well dispersed forces. Guerrilla attacks make
maximum use of surprise and shock action, and are followed by
disengageme;it and withdrawal as soon as the enemy begins to offer
effective resistance. Objectives of guerrilla warfare may in-
ludes undermining (or maintaining) the morale and will to re-
sist of the population; gathering intelligence; disrupting the
economy, politics, and industry of the enemy occupied area; in-
terrupting lines of communications; wearing down armed forces;
or a combination of all.
d. The general characteristics and the strategic nature
of guerriTla warfare are shown in figure 2, which represents a
nation's total war effort. The brain represents the command,
administrative, and political forces that direct the war effort.
The heart is symbolic of the economic and industrial resources
necessary to support a war. The arm and the mailed fist repre-
sent the armed forces and the striking forces of a nation. The
arteries are symbolic of the vital lines of communications so
important to waging war. The germs of guerrilla warfare may at-
tack any of the vital organisms of a nation's war effort. If
blood cannSt flow its prescribed course through vital arteries,
the most capable brain and the strongest arm soon become inert
and paralysed in spite of a powerful heart.
11. F61TURE EMPLOYMENT
a,, To consider probable future applications of guerril-
la warfare it 1s first essential to consider why guerrilla war-
fare became a potent strategic weapon during World War II. The
reasons are:
(1) The vastness of the global area over which
World War :CI was fought in comparison with the number of troops
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 Figure 2. Guerrilla Warfare attacks the war effort of a nation.
(Text keys para 10)
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employed resulted in a war of detachment, fluid battle fronts,
long lines of communioations,and large over-run areas that could
not be occupied and defended adequately. This provided the ideal
setting in which guerrilla warfare could flourish. Quick thrusts
by powerfdl striking forces frequently isolated large numbers of
trained soldiers and quantities of materiel that became available
for use by guerrilla forces.
(2) Modern signal communication greatly influenced
guerrilla warfare. Highly developed radio communication per-
mitted ced.tralized control of widely separated units and aided
close cooaeration and coordination with regular forces.
(3) Modern methods of supply by air and water en-
abled guerrillas to become less dependent on local resources.
It placed:means at their disposal to develop strong striking
forces capable of great achievements.
(4) The ideological aspect given to the war by all
sides, fostered by widespread propaganda, developed among civilian
populations the will and courage to actively participate in ac-
tion against the enemy or to give active support to guerrilla
forces repisting the enemy.
15. Future war may be more global in scope than any war
of the past. Strong airborne and highly mobile shook units, used
in conjuniation with strategic and tactical air, will likely be
given the:missions of delivering quick, paralyzing blows to vital
nerve centers with little or no concern being given to occupying
and holding large land masses. Such a war of detachment will un-
avoidably result in guerrilla warfare in its broadest aspects.
The era of atomic weapons and other mass destructive means in-
creases the importance of guerrilla warfare from the view of both
defense and offense. Scientific developments are constantly pro-
ducing new means and weapons that readily lend themselves to
guerrilla use. Nations benefiting from the use of guerrillas in
World War II can be expected to use guerrilla forces as an in-
tegral part of their military plans and strategy; they can be ex-
pected to make advance preparations for the organization, train-
ing, command, supply, and employment of guerrilla units in po-
tential areas of operations. In any campaign of the future, the
participant who fails to take proper cognizance of guerrilla war-
fare, either in the planning or execution stages, may suffer
severe a4tbaoks, if not eventual defeat.
12. LEGAL STATUS
The question of the status of guerrillas under the laws of
war has arisen during almost every war in modern history. The
rules of'land warfare, that branch of international law applic-
able to i;he problem, are to be found in the written conventions
and in ciLstoms and practices followed by civilized nations. For
the rulej? of land warfare of United States Armed Forces, see FM
27-1u.
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a. Applicable rules of land warfare.
(1) International law does not denounce guerrilla
tactics. The commitment of bodies of soldiers to the role of
guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines during course of a war
is legal. The major question of legality evolves around indivi-
duals taking part in guerrilla warfare. Whether such persons,
operating against an invader, are entitled to belligerent status
d pnds upon tie following-i-
(a) Whether they are commanded by a person
responsible for his actions and subordinated to an established
enemy government, whether they respect the laws and customs of war,
whether they bear distinctive insignia recognizeable at a dis-
tance, and whether they carry arms openly. While guerrillas are
generally commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates
and responsible to a recognized (or unrecognized) government,
their respect for the rules of land warfare varies, and the ques-
tion of whether or not they wear distinctive insignia and carry
arms openly or not is usually determined by the requirements of
their own situation. During past wars, guerrillas have shown
no compunction about disguising themselves as unarmed civilians
when circumstances so dictated. This poses the question whether
the guerrilla must wear insignia and carry arms at all times to
qualify as's lawful belligerent. A regular soldier may disguise
himself as a civilian to act as a spy and is, of course, subject
to death if captured while spying. However, if he subsequently
regains his own forces, he regains belligerent status and, if
captured later, must be treated as a prisoner of war. From this
precedent, it would appear that the fact that a guerrilla often
disguises himself as an unarmed civilian would not bar prisoner
of war privileges to him if captured while openly carrying arms.
(b) Whether the guerrilla uprising occurs in
a zone of operations or in territory already occupied by the enemy.
Under international law a levee an manse that takes up arms to
resist an invader has the sta ua o pa belligerent, while inhabi-
tants of _o_ocu_piied territory who rise against the occupier are not
entitled to belligerent status. However, the rules of land war-
fare place upon the occupier the responsibility of making his oc-
cupation actual and effective by overcoming organized resistance
dnd promptly suppressing guerrilla operations. It is therefore
arguable that the existence of an organized guerrilla movement in
an occupied area is in itself proof that the occupier has failed
to make his occupation effective. The rules of land warfare are
not clear as to the status of persons who, after the occupation
of their country, join a guerrilla movement that had its inception
prior to the occupation.
(2) The rules of land warfare are specific about the
status of individuals or groups who engage in or assist guerrilla
operations in support of an enemy of their own country. Such per-
sons are classed as war traitors and are subject to severe punish-
ment, including death. They may be tried and punished under AW
81 if their activity takes place within the military jurisdiction
of the U.S. armed forces. A?war traitor may be tried and punished
even though captured long after the commission of his offense.
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(3) The rules of land warfare place upon the civilian
population of an occupied area the obligation to take no part
whatsoever is hostilities and authorize the occupier to demand
and enforce compliance. The occupier is also permitted to carry
out reprisals against the civilian population for breach of his
regulations and to take hostages to compel observance of these
regulations., He may place hostages in the leading trucks and
engines of his convoys and require them to precede his patrols.
The foregoiq;would appear to bar the civilian population from
willingly supporting a resistance movement. However, guerrilla
ususually maintain the fiction that they are commandeering
services and supplies from the civilian population. If the oc-
cupier grants to the guerrilla forces the status of belligerents,
he cannot force the civilian population to provide him information
regarding the guerrilla forces.
b. Legal status of guerrillas during World War II.
(]) Participants in World War II determined the
status of guerrillas not so much by the rules of land warfare as
by their own aims and the exigencies of the situation. German
and Japanese policies included the following:
(a) On July 4, 1940 the Reich Commissioner for
the Occupied NetherTands issued the following order: "The proper-
ty of persons or associations that have furthered activities hos-
tile to the German Reich or Germanism, or of whom it must be as-
sumed that they will further such activities in the future, may
be confiscated in whole or in part."
(b) In Yugoslavia the German commander in
chief issued the following decreer "Any person who undertakes
to commit any acts of violence or sabotage against the German
armed forces, its members, or installations, shall be punished
by death."
(c) On March 8, 1945 the Japanese Fuji Army
Group issued an order stating: "Shoot guerrillas. All who op-
pose the Emperor, even women and children, will be killed."
Ld) On many occasions the Japanese accorded
captured Euerrillas prisoner of war status, particularly when they
were former soldiers. On other occasions, to induce surrender,
the Japanese announced that all guerrillas surrendering during
stated periods would be granted prisoner of war status. Sometimes
this promLse was kept, sometimes it was not. Although the Germans
were not ,as lenient, in several eases they were forced to grant
prisoner of war status to captured guerrillas by fear of reprisals
on German prisoners held by the guerrillas.
(2) Members of a defeated force who have been or-
dered by their commander to surrender may decide to continue re-
sistance against the enemy as guerrillas. The question arises
whether they are guilty of disobedience of orders and desertion
from their own forces. This question has not been legally de-
cided. However, precedents from World War II indicate that no
legal penalty is attached to such action.
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(3) Both General MacArthur and General Eisenhower
at various times during their campaigns announced that guerrilla
and resistance forces in certain areas were considered as parts
of their armies and warned the enemy that they must be treated
as belligerents.
c. Legal status and fate if captured is usually of
little concern to guerrillas and seems to have little effect on
their decision to join guerrilla units. Guerrilla units likewise
seldom feel bound by the rules of land warfare. When, as did the
Japanese in World War II, nations at war fail to give proper
treatment to prisoners of war and otherwise show a disregard for
the rules of land warfare, the question of the legal status of
guerrillas and their supporters ceases to have real meaning. The
llhellhood of both cut-off soldiers and civilians engaging in guer-
rilla warfare is greatly increased.
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CHAPTER 2
13. HUMLi FACTORS
a. The human factors that influence guerrilla warfare
include courage, the breaking point of human endurance, and the
value placed on life. Successful resistance movements can only
exist among people who have the courage and stamina to withstand
privations, endure hardships, and face imminent death while
fighting back against innumerable odds. Command and leadership
are essential to, and must be considered in conjunction with,
these basic factors. Although the people individually may pos-
sess favorable characteristics, leaders must emerge to transform
these characteristics into positive action.
b. A spirit of resistance and a belief of ultimate suc-
cess is also necessary. This spirit is necessary not only among
the guerrillas but among the civilian population as well. The
people must tie convinced of the possibility of ultimate victory
or liberation. Public opinion must be molded into a sympathetic
and supporting mood. In a country overrun by the enemy, civilian
support. either voluntar, n uce , or Imposed, is a so u e
essen a o ma' n a n guerrilla forces for a on erioa of ime.
To-gain and h-ol-d this support, a resistance movemen mua be
unified in spirit, politics, and ideals. Friction in these con-
cepts leads to petty jealousies, internal conflicts, and even
civil war. As resistance movements are usually nationalistic in
character, political considerations often have great influence
on guerrilla warfare.
14. EFF.CT OF TOPOGRAPHY UPON CONTROL OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY
a. Terrain influences both the organization and opera-
tions of guerrilla forces. In general, open terrain with a good
road net is not difficult to control by adequate regular enemy
forces. quick-moving detachments and strategically located
garrisons, or strong points, normally suffice. However, if the
open terrain is vast in comparison with the number of troops a-
vailable to occupy it, then control and security suffer, and con-
ditions exist that are favorable for guerrilla warfare.
b. Inaccessible terrain such as mountains, forests,
jungles, and marshes is difficult to control; in these difficult
areas occupying forces are usually able to secure only limited
areas along vital lines of communication. This leaves vast un-
controlled areas that provide ideal protection and strongholds
for guerrilla forces.
c. Generally, rural areas are suitable for large com-
pact units engaged in overt operations. Urban centers usually
restrict smaller units to covert activities.
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15. SOURCES OF SUPPLY
e. Food. An adequate food supply is essential to the
existence of a guerrilla unit. Farming areas capable and willing
to provide food must be within reasonable distances of guerrilla
bases of operation. Although farming is impractical for active
guerrilla units, they may become inactive while the men assist
with the planting and harvest on neighboring farms. Necessary
items of food not obtainable from local farms, must be obtained
from neighboring communities or from other areas.
b. Shelter. ter and tfie type neededClExceptewheerethe tclimate necessity particular -
17 vigorous, shelter does not normally create a serious problem
for guerrillas. Shelters are constructed from local materials.
Civilian houses are commandeered, or the guerrillas live out of
doors or in caves.
c. Weapons and nmmunltion. Weapons are necessary for
offense and defense. If sn area Teas been the scene of heavy
fighting or if a defeated force has retreated through the area,
abandoned weapons and ammunition can be salvaged by guerrillas.
Lax supply discipline and weapons security on the part of the in-
vading or occupying force will make additional arms available to
the guerrillas. Sporting-type rifles, shotguns and pistols as
well as explosives for mining and road construction will be uti-
lized by guerrillas. Natives of uncivilized countries are capable
of making effective use of such primitive weapons as spears bolos,
and poisoned darts. However, for a force to operate effectively
over a long period of time, resupply of arms and ammunition from
outside sources is necessary.
16. CHARACTERISTICS OF ENEMY FORCE
The characteristics and policies of the enemy forces have a
great effect upon the likelihood of successful guerrilla warfare.
When the energy is a traditional foe, when he is of a different
ethnic group, or when he does not speak or understand the local
language and customs, the will to resist is promoted. When the
enemy's policies and actions are so harsh and unjust as to offer
no alternative except resistance or if they are so soft as to
give the impression of weakness, the likelihood of guerrilla war-
fare is also increased.
Blind resistance soon becomes meaningless. Only when a guer-
rilla unit has acquired a mission with measurable relation to
ultimate victory or liberation can it have the necessary framework
upon which to build an effective organization. The local leader
may formulate the mission or the commander of the friendly regular
forces may set up the mission.
18. ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR USE OF GUERRILLAS
Guerrilla warfare is given great impetus if it has been
planned and prepared for in advance by either a defending or
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attacking force. Such preparations may include the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Propaganda and indoctrination.
organizing resistance cells.
Organizing commands and staffs.
organizing units.
e. Preparing and distributing training literature, arms,
and equipment.
f. L'atablishing caches of arms, ammunition, and supplies.
Making arrangements for future supply.
Organizing communication systems.
h. 7!raining personnel.
i. Preparing orders to cover courses of action to meet
possible contingencies.
19. PHAS~:S OF ORGANIZATION
When little or no advance preparation has been made for fos-
tering guerrilla warfare, the organization of guerrilla forces
normally progresses through several phases. The final organiza-
tional level is influenced by the various factors already dis-
cussed in parUgraph 14. In general, guerrilla forces progress
from the stago of improvisation to that of a completely military
organization.
20. FIRST PHASE OF ORGANIZATION
The firsi; phase of organization is alien individuals band
together under local leadership. Their main concern is shelter,
food, and weapons. Shelter is provided by isolated buildings or
villages on the outer limits of enemy controlled areas. Food is
obtained from the local populace. Weapons are collected locally.
The activities of these small bands are limited to propaganda,
small-scale attacks, and sabotage.
21. SECOND PHASE OF ORGANIZATION
In the sadond phase of organization, the number and size of
units increase. Small units unite under common leadership. The
ranks of thesis units are further strengthened by additional volun-
teers, individual soldiers, and army units out off in the course
of combat. Command and leadership improve when tested local
leaders emerg.s as commanders and as trained personnel, out off or
infiltrated from the regular forces, are added. The quantity of
war materials is increased by battle-field salvage and raids on
enemy installations. Efforts are made to establish contact with
allied regular forces or with a sympathetic national government.
Wide-spread sabotage, raids, and ambushes result in greater enemy
pressure. Enemy countermeasures often break up smaller units,
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and dispersed groups join better established units. Guerrilla
bases of operation are shifted to inaccessible areas or deeper
into uncontrolled areas.
22. THIRD PHASE OF ORGANIZATION
a. During the third phase of organization, unified com-
mand is established over certain areas. This may result from a
strong leader emerging as the recognized commander, the presence
of a recognized senior military leader, or as the result of re-
cognition or infiltration of a commander from regular allied
forces. Control and coordination both within the guerrilla forces
and with regular forces are established by communication and
liaison.
(1) Within guerrilla-controlled areas, command,
combat, and service installations are organized and protected.
(2) Effective intelligence and counterintelligence
nets are methodically developed. Strict security measures and
stern discipline are enforced.
(3) Extensive control is imposed on the civilian
population. Additional personnel may be drafted for service in
guerrilla units.
(4) Intelligent propaganda is employed to counter
enemy propaganda and to stimulate the morale of both guerrillas
and loyal civilians.
(5) The effectiveness of individuals and units is
improved by training, engaging in operations, and obtaining tech-?
nical personnel locally or from external sources.
(6) Military equipment is augmented by infiltration
from allied regular forces.
b. The guerrilla forces supported by an external force
develop an ability to tenaciously defend certain areas and to
strike strongly at selected objectives. The activities carried
out by the guerrilla forces during this phase are normally con-
trolled by general directives from regular forces.
c. In the second and third phases of organization, units
increase rn size, consolidate, and unify commands; this does not
necessarily mean mass concentration of personnel. On the con-
trary, small units remain dispersed in depth throughout the area.
Now, however, guerrilla commands can assemble large forces at
will. The extent to which unified commands develop is influenced
by the topography of the country, enemy dispositions and control,
political and administrative considerations, and policies of the
regular allied forces supporting the resistance movement.
23. EFFECT OF PRIOR PLANNING
The extent of advance preparations influences the progress
of guerrilla organization. Extensive preparations may permit
immediate entry into the third phase of organization. Less in-
tensive preparations may preclude all or any part of the first
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and second phases, or merely hasten development and organization
through these phases. The full value of a guerrilla organization
cannot be exploited until completion of the third phase of orga-
nization.
24. SOURCES OF MANPOWER
a. The populations of all countries are divided into
various groups by occupation, wealth, education, race, and ideo-
logy. A war effort, or any force, that seeks to enforce a new
order on the population of an area will receive support from some
groups and resistance from others. These various groups provide
the medium for a resistance movement and a potential source of
manpower for guerrilla forces.
b. The various groups will show different degrees of
willingness to actually engage in guerrilla activity. Generally,
the rural dwellers, the poorer city dwellers, former soldiers,
and fanatical idealists are initially the groups who are most
willing to undergo the hardship of being guerrillas, while the
more prosperous and sophisticated groups usually prefer to support
the movement in a covert role or join after the movement is strong.
c. When guerrillas exercise complete control over large
areas, they are able to conscript men from the passive elements
of the population.
25. SITE OF UNITS
a. Guerrilla forces organize along the general lines
of regular forces. The organizations, as well as the particular
names applied to units of various sizes, are influenced by the
military knowledge and national backgrounds of the guerrilla com-
manders. Strategic missions, combat and logistical factors, and
topography further influence guerrilla organization. The size
of guerril:a units cannot be deduced from the military terms
division, regiment, or battalion used to designate units. Normal-
ly the strength of these units will be less than that of regular
unit] of tho same designation and these units will not have the
heavier weapons normally associated with such units. However, all
guerrilla organizations have a basic unit that is given tactical
and logistical autonomy. Usually this unit is called a company
or detachme,'zt. The strength of these basic units may vary from
40 to 200 m-en. When large, they are normally subdivided into
platoons, groups, and squads.
b. The over-all size or strength of a guerrilla force,
as well as the potential of this force, is difficult to estimate.
The armed organization and its supporting services are only one
component of the entire force. Sympathetic civilians, collabo-
rators, agents, and informers must be taken into consideration
when such forces are analyzed.
26. COMMAND
a. Successful guerrilla campaigns have invariably been
characterized by intelligent leadership. Guerrilla organizations
that develcp with little or no advance preparation are led by
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recognized local leaders. They may or may not have a military
background. When a recognized over-all guerrilla commander lacks
military background, allied forces may infiltrate qualified per-
sonnel to serve as military and technical advisers to the guer-
rilla commander. By so doing, the military capabilities of the
guerrilla forces are efficiently exploited without destroying the
command structure of an established organization.
b. Guerrilla forces that are organized as the result of
advance planning and preparation are normally commanded by of-
ficers appointed by higher military authority. Commanders ap-
pointed from other than local sources, use local personnel whc.
thoroughly know the country and the people.
a. The terms guerrilla, partisan, and irregular warfare
often suggest bodies of individuals entirely lacking in discipline.
Actually the contrary is nearer the truth. Spontaneously-formed
units may have poor discipline in the early stage of their or-
ganization. Unless these units learn early that discipline is
essential, they meet with disaster. Undisciplined troops, whether
fighting in large bodies or small isolated groups, disintegrate
when faced by stiff opposition. Without discipline, security
suffers; the price invariably is in lives and equipment.
b. Effective guerrilla organizations maintain strict
discipline in all essential matters. Ordinarily it will far sur-
pass the discipline found in regular units. It is enforced by
quick and severe action without recourse to formal investigations
and trials. Serious infraction of orders or neglect of duty are
often punished by death. To achieve surprise in operations and
to provide security for their commands, a guerrilla commander
must insist on implicit obedience to orders.
a. Morale is of prime importance in guerrilla warfare.
It is a factor that must be considered for both the guerrilla and
the supporting civilian. Enemy propaganda readily reaches all
civilians and guerrillas. The guerrilla is not provided with the
systematic supply and evacuation facilities that support regular
units. The civilian is denied protection from enemy reprisals
and generally there may be no pardon for the guerrilla if taken
alive. Both the supporting civilian and the guerrilla realize
the fight is to death.
b. The belief in ultimate victory is the most important
morale factor for guerrillas and civilians alike. The constant
nearness of the enemy makes every success or reverse felt through
all ranks. When the cause is commonly believed to be hopeless or
lost, guerrilla warfare is doomed.
c. Leaders conduct propaganda work to maintain the mo-
rale of guerrilla units and their supporters. All encouraging
news from the main war front is widely disseminated while claims
of enemy successes are refuted or depreciated. News of local suc-
ceases and victories is widely distributed. Outstanding exploits
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of individuals and groups are publicized and honored. Where the
situation pormita, paraaes, ceremonies and social events ai'e held.
Regular per:.ods may be devoted to political indoctrination.
29. TRILINING
a. For guerrillas to operate successfully against modern
military 3`o:?ces without heavy losses, individuals and units must
receive tra:Luing and acquire certain skills peculiar to guerrilla
operations. The command, staff, combat, and service echelons
strive to al;tain the same proficiency as regular units.
b. Guerrilla forces are often capable of attaining great
proficiency under the most adverse conditions. Individuals and
units recei^re training in areas uncontrolled by or inaccessible
to the enemy Technical training is accomplished by dispatching
special instructors to subordinate units. The combat skill of
guerrilla individuals and units is further achieved by initially
assigning rolatively easy missions to them. As the subordinate
commanders and individuals acquire oonridence and skills peculiar
to guerrilla operations, they are assigned progressively harder
missions.
a. The continued existence of a guerrilla organization
and the ex--ant to Which it may be exploited strategically and
tactically depends on adequate supplies and equipment. In general,
guerrillas ,Live off the land. The availability of food limits
the size of the force that may be concentrated and the staying
power of such a concentration.
b. Food is procured from the local populace by systema-
tic levy. :Raids on enemy supply depots and convoys supplement
the local food levies. Other supply needs, including clothing,
blankets medical supplies, fuel, and communication equipment,
are obtainel locally. Arms, ammunition, demolitions and other
war materials come from local caches, battlefield salvage, raids
on enemy installations, or external sources. Guerrillas operate
small factories to produce war materials and to repair equipment.
o.: The extent to which a resistance movement can flourish
while depending solely on local supplies varies greatly. How-
ever as a general rule, the full potential of a guerrilla orga-
nization cannot be exploited in modern warfare unless adequate
supplies are infiltrated from external sources. The amount of
external support may vary from small and irregular shipments to
total logistical support.
d The means used to deliver supplies to guerrillas from
external sources depend on the topography, enemy situation and
guerrilla dispositions. Logistical support may be supplies through
obscure land routes, by air by submarine, and by surface vessels.
The most cannon methods during World War II were air and submarine
shipments.
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a. Medical support in guerrilla warfare is often non-
existent. Lack of evacuation facilities, hospitals, medical sup-
plies, and trained personnel may preclude the organization of
adequate medical support. Guerrillas may use existing civilian
facilities to care for their sick and wounded, in which case the
patients pose as civilians while undergoing treatment. On the
other hand, guerrilla organizations have been known to develop
highly effective medical supporting units and installations.
Their organizations have paralleled those of the regular forces
and have included field hospitals located in inaccessible areas.
They have recruited doctors, nurses, and technical personnel from
local civilians, and have obtained medical supplies from the lo-
cal populace, from raids, and from external sources*
b. Guerrilla forces normally do not need the same medi-
cal support provided regular forces. Most guerrilla operations
result in relatively few casualties. Employing surprise and
mobility, and basing their operations on excellent intelligence,
the guerrillas strike weakly defended objectives or an enemy who
is unprepared to offer resistance. However, this advantage is
offset to some extent by increased need for medical care for
sickness and infections resulting from exposure to the elements
and inadequate diet.
c. When guerrilla forces are committed to operations
approaching normal warfare, their casualties increase and they
need more medical support. Generally, when so committed, the
proximity of regular allied forces and increased outside logisti-
cal support takes care of this need.
32. TRANSPORTATION
Guerrilla forces may use transportation of every known type.
They develop a cross-country mobility hard for regular forces to
equal. The extent and kind of transportation is limited by the
area the guerrillas control, the means at their disposal or made
available to them, and the topography. Guerrillas have made ex-
tensive use of mounted and pack animals, animal-drawn vehicles,
and different types of boats. Forces that reach a high degree
of organization and that control large areas may be expected to
use motor vehicles and aircraft. Guerrilla forces normally rely
on foot movements and hand-carried loads, using civilian carriers.
Communication is as important to guerril-e Lvrees as it is
to regular forces. Unified guerrilla commands establish efficient
communication systems to exercise command, control, and coordina-
tion and to permit the flow of information. Intelligence, counter-
intelligence, security, and propaganda likewise depend on oommuni-?
cation. The nature of guerrilla organization and operations makes
radio the most flexible and effective way to fulfill the complex
communication requirements.
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34. MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
Modern, light, long-range radio transmitter-receivers pro-
vide excellent communication for guerrilla forces. Other con-
ventional and improvised communication means are used. These in-
clude wire, visual signals, and messenger service. Depending on
the topography of the guerrilla operational area, the enemy situa-
tion, and the facilities available, the guerrillas will use both
mounted and foot messengers. Land communication routes through
enemy-occupied territory are cleverly organized and operated.
Women and chLldren are often employed as messengers. Every con-
ceivable ruse is used to conceal documents on the messengers.
These same land routes may serve as the main arteries for the
movement of personnel and supplies.
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CHAPTER 3
GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
35. CHARACTERISTICS
a. Guerrilla warfare employs surprise, shock action,
mobility, and distribution of forces in depth to demoralize the
enemy and upset his current and projected operations. It seeks
to paralyze the enemy gradually rather than to destroy enemy
forces in normal combat. Guerrilla operations follow the same
principles and methods of war as regular operations; only their
application differs.
b. Surprise is a major requirement of success in guer-
rilla operations. To offset the enemy's superiority of forces
and equipment, guerrillas strike where the enemy is weak and where
he least expects an attack. Operations that achieve surprise are
based on reliable intelligence and sound security. Night opera-
tions are used extensively to further achieve the element of sur-
prise. Darkness and intimate knowledge of the terrain also adds
to the guerrillas' security.
e. Mobility is another important factor upon which suc-
cessful operations are based -- not mobility as applied to regu-
lar forces, but mobility due to the small size of guerrilla units.
During World War II, Russian partisan units were capable of moving
40-45 miles per day. Mobility helps guerrillas to achieve the
all-important factor of surprise; it is also one of their strong-
eat security assets. They can strike and be many miles away be-
fore enemy reinforcements arrive.
d. Distribution of forces in depth is a principal cha-
racteristic of guerrilla warfare. Normally guerrilla operations
are small-scale operations carried on over a broad area. Guerril-
la warfare is a war of detachment rather than a mass contact,
a war of quick, paralyzing blown followed by swift withdrawals.
Generally, guerrillas avoid pitched battle and seldom defend ob-
jectives. If hard pressed, they may disperse among the civilians
and then reassemble at a prearranged place. "Nowhere yet every-
where," the motto of a guerrilla unit that operated against the
Japanese in North Luzon, Philippines (1942-45), could well be
applied to guerrillas in general.
a. When acting under outside commands
(1) Missions assigned guerrilla forces are deter-
mined by the specific political and military situation. Based on
the over-all strategical and tactical plan, allied governments or
regular forces assign missions to guerrillas. The assigned mis-
sion may be strategical or tactical. As the area of operation of
regular allied forces approaches the area of guerrilla operations,
missions assigned to guerrilla forces become more tactical in
nature. The effectiveness of guerrilla operations increases as
the degree of control and cooperation between guerrilla forces
and allied regular forces increases. To avoid unnecessary
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and naval coordinate
duplication
missions with the regular forces air, closely
operations.
rilla (2) In formulating guerrilla missions, regular
forces allied to guerrilla forces are guided by several considera-
tions. Amon:; the factors considered are: the general capabilities
and limitations of guerrilla warfare; the capabilities and limita-
tions of the particular guerrilla forces in relation to enemy
forces; and the capabilities of the supporting forces allied to
the guerrillas. These considerations also govern the time that
such a mission is to be executed. The time factor is of great
importance. Premature outbreak of overt action by guerrilla forces
may result in their destruction; severe retaliation may also be
taken against the supporting populace that may jeopardize the ef-
fectiveness of the entire resistance movement. Although there are
many limiting factors, guerrillas are, nevertheless, capable of
giving valuable assistance to regular forces. Normally the mis
that alone may assigaed guerrilla
organl organization, areas ofroperations, conduct,ea
development, and coordination. Missions may direct overt opera-
tions to inflict damage on enemy forces, installations, produc-
tion, communications,and morale. Covert operations may Include
intelligence, psychological warfare, counterseorch activities,
and aiding qacaped prisoners and disabled air crews.
b. When acting independently:
Generally the missions assigned when guerrilla
units are acting independently are similar to and based on the
enin the above ough informationaandrability for
asasme the factorai as
commander described
guerrilla those
correctly interpret the situation. However, purely local factors,
like obtaining food, security of guerrilla hide-outs, rivalries
with other juerrilla units, and possible enemy retaliation against
friendly civilians, influences his decisions more than they would
otherwise.
37. A91AS OF OPERATION
a. In general, the areas of operation and the type of
operations conducted are influenced primarily by the degree of
guerrilla control that exists. During the course of a campaign
this degree of control fluctuates as the result of hostile and
allied action, the guerrilla forces, and the attitude of the popu-
lace. The likely over-all operational area of guerrilla forces
extends from the supporting areas of the combat zone back through
the communication zone and the zone of interior. Areas and opera-
tions conducted in them fall into three categories (fig. 3):
(1) Areas controlled effectively by guerrillas.
Normally the headquarters and camps are located in this area.
Determined resistance is offered to enemy forces seeking to pene-
trate the area.
(2) Areas controlled effectively by the enemy. Guer-
rilla activities in this area are normally restricted to under-
cover activities by small groups or individuals.
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 Typical guerrilla area of operations.
(Text key: pars 37.)
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(3) Areas not controlled effectively by either
force. This is the principal area of guerrilla offensive opera-
tions. The guerrillas seek to bring more and more of this area
under effective control. They do not offer determined resistance
to the enemy's entry into the area but harass his movements
throughout the area.
b. If regular forces allied to the guerrillas draw
nearer or 1f requirements elsewhere force a reduction in the
enemy's garrison, the areas controlled effectively by the gueril-
las may expand to the extent that the enemy is in a virtual state
of Beige.
c. Normally, areas of operation are divided among various
subordinate guerrilla units. Within tbe.se areas each subordinate
unit carries out assigned missions, exercises control over the
civilian population, and collects food and supplies.
38. INTELLIGENCE
Guerrila intelligence organization and operations are in-
fluenced by 'two major considerations; intelligence essential for
the guerrillas' own operations, and the production of intelligence
for allied regular forces.
a. A sound intelligence system is vital to successful
guerrilla planning and operations because guerrilla tactics
stress striking the enemy where he is weak and where he least
expects to Vs hit. Guerrilla intelligence includes a detailed
study of the terrain and of enemy strength, movements, disposi-
tions, armament, and habits. Immediate dissemination of informa-
tion, especially up-to-the-minute changes, is a necessity. Be-
sides combat intelligence, guerrilla forces are interested in
strategic considerations like the enemy's political, economic,
administrative, and propaganda policies and measures.
b. Guerrilla activity readily lends itself to supplying
valuable Information to allied forces. During certain phases of
a campaign, the primary mission assigned guerrilla forces may be
that of intelligence. Regular forces allied to a resistance
movement may be expected to infiltrate personnel and equipment to
aid and direct the guerrillas, to collect and evaluate information,
and to produce and disseminate intelligence. Unless supervised
by trained personnel, guerrillas normally lack the ability to
correctly evaluate reports and often pass on exaggerated informa-
tion as true.
c. The organization of guerrilla intelligence staffs
and nets normally parallels that of regular forces. To collect
information;, the guerrillas use extensive, organized nets of spies,
informers, and agents. Civilians living near or working in
enemy installations report on industrial operations, equipment,
weapons, dispositions, habits, and morale. Government officials
supply valuable information on the enemy's political, economic,
administrative, and propaganda measures. Agents and observers
located at strategic points report on ground, air, and naval
movements.
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39. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Counterintelligence in guerrilla operations is as important
to security as intelligence is to operations. Through propaganda,
orders, and threats, guerrillas discourage individuals from col-
laborating with the enemy. Guerrilla agents and loyal civilians
methodically seek out enemy spies and informers. Guerrilla coun-,
terintelligence agents are used extensively to cover all zones of
guerrilla operations. They are placed in all fields of activi-
ties. Traitors to the cause are punished harshly or ruthlessly
eliminated. Personnel joining the guerrilla ranks are screened
thoroughly. Normally they are required to undergo a period of
close observation before they are accepted as members of an
organization.
Security is achieved through intelligence, counterintelli-
gence, mobility, dispersion, organization of the civilian
population, and the routine measures normal to regular forces. As
a resistance movement expands, the problems of security become
more complex. Headquarters, cempa,and various other installations
are located in inaccessible areas. All installations are kept
mobile and are surrounded by an elaborate guard and warning sys-
tem. Alternate locations are prepared in advance so that any in-
stallation threatened by enemy action can be evacuated quickly
and become operational in a safer area. Radio stations are moved
frequently to avoid being located. Important areas may be pro-
tected by a series of organized positions to meet and delay small-
scale enemy thrusts. Travel of unauthorized individuals in cer-
tain areas is restricted, and information about installations is
normally limited to personnel who actually man or have direct
dealings with them. For example, a platoon member may not know
the exact location of his company headquarters. Seldom would he
know the location of his battalion headquarters. The application
of this principle throughout the structure of a guerrilla organi-
zation limits the amount of information that may be extracted
from captured personnel. False information about guerrilla
strength may be disseminated to the enemy in order to make him
cautious. Frequent ambushes make the enemy reluctant to move ex-
cept by day and in large numbers.
41. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
The existence of a unified guerrilla force depends on the
accord that can be brought to the various sympathies and interests
of the populace who support a resistance movement. Morale stimuli
and guidance, provided by an outside power to a guerrilla force,
are fully exploited by the guerrillas to strengthen the common
bonds of a resistance movement. Also, the enemy's psychological
efforts to undermine the guerrilla forces are countered. Psycho-
logical warfare is carried on by rumors, by meetings, by indoctri-
nation courses, by news reports and handbills, and in some cases,
by clandestine broadcasting stations. Regardless of the media,
guerrilla propaganda is circulated to foster high morale among
friendly troops and civilians, to promote loyal, energetic sup-
port from the populace, and to undermine enemy morale.
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42. CIVILIAN CONTROL
a. To insure support and loyal cooperation, guerrilla
forces exeroise control over the civilian population. Guerrilla
control policies and measures may include:
(1) Propaganda, orders, and threats.
(2) Violent action against individuals and communi-
ties that fail to cooperate.
(3) Organization and regimentation of the civilian
population.
b. Guerrilla forces use intelligent propaganda to gain
and maintain civilian support. They appeal to the people's
national and patriotic spirit. The most effective psychological
methods, however, seldom prevent a dangerous percentage of the
populace from collaborating with the enemy. To control civilian
activities and to discourage collaboration, the guerrillas publish
orders and policies and enforce them by acts of violence. Indi-
viduals who fail to comply with these orders and policies are
ruthlessly killed or severely punished. Often communities that
show antiresistance tendencies are destroyed. Normally the guer-
rillas make a few ruthless examples to influence a large area to
comply with their desires. The guerrillas may resort to taking
prominent individuals from a community and holding them as hos-
tages. The people are made to understand that no harm will come
to the hostages as long as the community remains loyal to the
cause and cooperates with the guerrillas.
c. The organization of the civilians into units under
local leaaership is one of the most effective guerrilla methods
to extend control over the civilians and to insure their loyal
support. Every individual, male or female, young or old, is made
to feel he is a part of the resistance movement. A portion of
each supporter's time is devoted to some task in support of the
guerrillas, The danger of spies, informers, and collaborators
is stressed, and everyone is charged with the responsibility of
detecting and reporting all suspects. Besides these counterin-
telligence missions, organized civilians may be used on intelli-
gence missions, civil disturbances, sabotage, security details,
and supply work. Civilians who are organized and committed to an
active part in a resistance movement in conjunction with guerrilla
forces seldom turn to the enemy. At the proper time the civilians
provide th;3 mass of manpower that can be exploited against the
enemy.
43. CIVIL DISTURBANCES
To hamper war production and enemy morale, agents and sym-
pathizers of guerrilla forces may be expected to organize and
instigate labor strikes, slowdowns, protest meetings, and riots.
Under the cover of this instigated confusion, industrial property,
machinery, products, and raw materials may be sabotaged. Power,
communication, and transportation facilities are damaged. Govern-
ment officials, industrial leaders, and military leaders are ab-
ducted or assassinated. Communities that collaborate with the
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occupying force or refuse to support the guerrillas may be
punished. This punishment may include the destruction or looting
of local food supplies and stocks or blocking the movement of
food supplies from rural areas. Bombs may be exploded in public
gatherings, communication centers, or administrative offices.
Arson is often used to destroy entire communities, thus warning
all the surrounding communities to support the resistance move-
ment. Officials or soldiers of the occupying force may be killed
and the corpses may be displayed in a pro-enemy community. The
discovery of the bodies exposes the entire community to investi-
gations and punishments. Unjust or misplaced punishment to coun-
ter civil disturbance is vigorously exploited by the guerrillas
to gain sympathizers and strengthen their cause.
44. SABOTAGE
Sabotage is used to attack the enemy's war potential. When
conducted under a well-organized plan and on a large scale, it
becomes one of the guerrillas? most effective weapons. Sabotage
can readily be expanded from the guerrilla ranks to the hands of
all sympathetic civilians. In a short time it is capable of pro-
ducing material and morale disintegration. Its scope and appli-
cation, in relation to both. objectives and areas, are unlimited.
Industry, government, administrative offices, power sources,
materials, transportation, public services, agricultural produc-
tion, and communication agencies are examples of possible objec-
tives. Sabotage may be carried out from the zone of interior
extending through all areas to include the combat zones. Sabo-
tage readily lends itself to guerrilla warfare because it may be
accomplished with means at the disposal of guerrillas. It re-
quires neither elaborate equipment nor logistical support from
outside sources. Methods and means used by guerrillas vary from
the most common to the most unusual. Destruction or removal
of cables, machinery, and rails is a common form of sabotage.
Arson, varying from the most basic means to the most elaborate
devices (such as clockwork) is utilized against goods, installa-
tions, and raw materials. Explosives in the form of bombs or
charges are widely used to destroy buildings, bridges, and road
beds.
a. The ambush is the most common guerrilla method of
attack. ?t is based on thorough intelligence and detailed plann-
ing. It is executed with surprise, shrewdness, and violent de-
termination. Guerrilla ambushes are directed against rail and
motor troop and supply movements and against closed foot columns.
Defiles and ravines in mountainous or wooded areas are good sites
for ambush. Road signs may be altered to lure convoys onto suit-
able side roads. The guerrillas, if possible, employ sufficient-
ly strong forces to enable them to completely smother and destroy
the enemy by quick shock action. Commanding ground, concealment,
and camouflage are fully utilized. Attacks are usually made at
close range to compensate for poor marksmanship and to gain maximum
effect. Automatic fire is employed to cover the entire target
in depth. Shotguns and grenades may be used. Road blocks, demo-
litions, mines, or recoilless weapons are used to halt fast-moving
columns or trains at the desired place of ambush. (Fig. 4).
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ELEMENT TO HALT LEADING
.VEHICLE OF MAIN COLUMN WITH
FIRE, ROADBLOCKS OR MINES,
Figure 4. Typical guerrilla ambush.
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Silence and immobility are scrupulously observed in the area of
the ambush. Small enemy advance guards are usually permitted to
pass through the ambush position and are dealt with by a separate
element. Fire is opened, and the attack is launched upon a pre-
arranged signal, usually given by the element charged with halt-
ing the head of the column. The action is usually violent and
short lived. If the enemy is incapable of counteraction and there
is no threat of local enemy reinforcements, the guerrillas quick-
ly salvage usuable supplies and equipment, destroy the remainder,
and withdraw.
b. The guerrillas use extensive security measures to
cover movement to the ambush position and to conceal the action
and the withdrawal. Seeondaty ambushes, some distance from the
site of the principal ambush,are frequently used to destroy or
delay enemy reinforcements.
c. When the guerrillas are not strong enough to destroy
the enemy completely, action is terminated by a prearranged sig-
nal when the enemy's counteraction begins to form. A planned
withdrawal covered by security detachments is ordered. Often the
guerrillas withdraw by detachments in several different directions
to frustrate and complicate enemy pursuit. Prearranged details
are used to maintain visual contact and to report on enemy pur-
suing units. Subsequent ambushes often delay or destroy enemy
pursuing forces. In favorable terrain and during periods of low
visibility, guerrillas may simultaneously ambush enemy columns
moving toward one another. After deceiving the enemy and inducing
a fire fight, the guerrillas withdraw, leaving the two enemy
forces fighting each other.
d. For defense against ambush, see paragraph9 73-74.
46. RAIDS
a. Guerrilla forces conduct raids to destroy or carry
away arms, equipment, and supplies, or to capture or kill person-
nel. The raiders also destroy important installations like
guarded-bridges, power plants, and communication centers, or ha-
rass and demoralize the enemy. The raid, like an ambush, is based
on thorough intelligence and detailed planning, and is executed
with surprise, shrewdness, and violent determination. The guer-
rilla force making a raid is usually organized into three princi-
pal elements. Each element is assigned a specific mission. One
element eliminates the guards. As surprise is indispensable for
the success of an operation, ruses are used to approach and elimi-
nate the sentries before they can sound the alarm. The use of
firearms in this task is forbidden. Following the elimination
of the guards, another element of the force kills or captures
personnel and destroys or carries off materiel. A third element
of the guerrilla force covers the operation and the withdrawal.
Often the guerrillas may use a fourth element in raids. This ele-
ment infiltrates agents into an installation and their action from
within is closely coordinated with all phases of the operation.
b. For defense against raids see paragraph 72.
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a. Guerrilla forces that have attained a high level of
organizatTorL, and are adequately armed, equipped, and supported
logistically, are capable of attacks in force against isolated
enemy garrisons, combat units, and installations. Guerrilla
operations of this nature closely parallel regular offensive
operations mind are guided by the established principles of offen-
sive combat. Guerrilla forces may often be more effective against
certain objectives than. regular forces of comparable strength.
The guerrillas, by exploiting their organization, mobility, in-
telligence of the enemy, and detailed information of the terrain,
can often attack objectives from both without and within. Agents,
small units, and loyal civilians are infiltrated into the objec-
tive area. Coordinated surprise attacks are launched simultaneous-
ly against every echelon of the enemy to include his security,
command, supply, and communications. These operations may be
closely supported by allied air, land, and sea action of regular
allied forces. Normally the guerrillas attempt to isolate the
objective from adjacent areas. The roads, railroads, and wire
communications leading to the objective area are methodically
interrupted, Guerrilla forces establish road blocks and use sabo-
tage and ambushes to intercept, delay, or destroy all troop and
supply movements into the objective area. Attacks in force be-
come more frequent and are conducted on ever-increasing scale as
the combat ;gone of friendly regular forces approaches the effec-
tive zone of operations of the organized guerrilla forces. Such
attacks are effectively exploited by the guerrillas during the
critical periods of enemy operations that require unusual move-
ment of supplies and troops. During these critical periods,
guerrilla forces are particularly capable of great achievements
and of prov:Lding valuable assistance to allied regular forces.
b. The principles for defense against guerrilla attacks
in force ere the same as those used in ordinary defensive combat.
a. Guerrilla forces can operate against enemy lines
of communioations. They deny their use to the enemy, and harass,
delay, or destroy all movements over designated routes. Units
are assigned sectors of the line of communications to be blocked.
Within each sector the bridges and road bed are destroyed. Trees
are felled and slides are caused to further block the route.
Mines and demolitions are used extensively. Guerrilla tactical
units are deployed on a broad front along the line of communica-
tions. They engage small enemy forces and prevent the route from
being repaired or cleared. They ambush enemy supply and troop
movements. If superior enemy forces are massed against any sec-
tor, the guerrillas withdraw and seek another sector of the line
of communications that is less strongly protected. By constantly
shifting th-air forces to the enemy week points, a line of communi-
cations may be so thoroughly disrupted that the enemy is forced
to abandon the route or to employ sizable forces to protect it.
b. Even though a guerrilla force may be unable to
completely 'block a line of communications,it may disrupt and de-
lay traffic. Properly timed, such action seriously hampers enemy
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operations.
c. Protection of lines of communications is discussed
in paragraphs 73-74.
49. 12FENSIVE COMBAT
a. Defensive combat is an exceptional form of combat
for guerrilla forces. Guerrillas normally lack artillery, anti-
tank weapons, and other means to face modern forces. As a general
rule, they avoid a prolonged position type of defense. When com-
mitted to defensive combat, they modify the principles of defen-
sive combat to best meet their needs and to offset their deficien??
ties. The guerrillas select terrain that gives them every possi-
ble advantage. They seek terrain that denies or restricts the
enemy's use of armor and complicates his logistical support. In
conjunction with their position defenses, the guerrillas raid,
ambush, and attack the enemy's lines of communications, his flanks,
reserve units, supporting arms, and installations. Camouflaged
snipers fire on officers, messengers and other worthwhile targets.
Routes of approach are mined and booby-trapped. Diversionary
actions in adjacent areas are often intensified to distract the
enemy. The guerrillas use skillful ruses to lure the attacking
enemy into dividing his forces. Guerrilla forces may be expected
to engage in defensive combat to prevent enemy penetration of
guerrilla-controlled areas, to gain time for their forces to ac-
complish a specific mission, or to assemble their main forces for
action. They may resort to defensive action to contain enemy
forces in a position favorable for attacking the enemy's rear or
flanks. Guerrilla forces may be given defensive missions to hold
objectives pending the arrival of regular allied forces.
b. Attacks against guerrillas are discussed in para-
graphs 76-86.
50. PRISONERS OF WAR
Guerrilla policy on taking prisoners is influenced by many
factors. The treatment given guerrilla prisoners taken by the
enemy may affect the guerrilla attitude. The guerrillas' ability
to secure, guard, and feed prisoners may often be the guiding
factor. If the guerrillas control large areas where the prisoners
may be accommodated, or if they can evacuate prisoners to allied
regular forces without jeopardizing guerrilla operations, then
they may take prisoners. The characteristics, religious beliefs,
and mental attitudes of the tribes or races that make up a guer-
rilla force have a great bearing on the attitude and action of
the guerrillas. Many races place little value on human life and
may be expected to treat an enemy accordingly. Often the guer-
rilla engaged in combat works himself into a blood-thirsty frenzy
that is not conductive to taking enemy prisoners.
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CHAPTER 4
COMBATING GUERRILLAS
Section I
GENERAL
a. To be successful, anti-guerrilla operations must be
based on a broad, realistic plan that coordinates not only the
political, administrative and military phases of the operation
but also the activities of adjacent areas and anti-guerrilla com-
mands.
b. Preventing the formation of a resistance movement is
much easier than dealing with one after it is formed. Putting
down such a-movement is much easier during its early stages than
when it has reached full development.
c. Except in the immediate vicinity of a front-line com-
bat area, guerrilla units cannot exist without the support of
some segments of the civilian population. Anti-guerrilla opera-
tions must therefore include appropriate measures against these
supporters of the guerrillas.
d. A firm, and if necessary harsh, attitude is necessary
in dealing with guerrillas and their civilian supporters.
e. Adequate intelligence about the terrain, the popula-
tion, and the guerrillas is essential.
f. Continuity of command and policy are necessary.
gg An area confronted with a serious guerrilla menace
is as much*a combat area as are the front lines. Commanders and
troops in such an area must maintain the same alert and aggressive
attitude as front-line troops. A "rear-area" psychology makes
it easy for guerrillas to employ one of their most potent wea-
pons--surprise.
h. Purely defensive security measures allow a guerrilla
movement TO grow and become strong. They are justified only when
the importance of the area does not justify, or the lack of ade-
quate forces permit, offensive operations. Even limited offensive
operations are preferable to a purely passive attitude. Offensive
action should be continuous and not interspersed with periods of
inactivity.
I. Points of greatest guerrilla vulnerability are:
(1) Support of the civilian population.
(2) Food supply.
(3) Leadership.
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(4) Communications and organization.
(5) Morals.
(6) Arms and ammunition supply.
j. Guerrilla security is apt to be poor during darkness
and inclement weather. Those periods are therefore excellent for
attacks against guerrillas?
k. Secrecy of movement and surprise are essential in
attacking guerrillas.
1. The aim of anti-guerrilla tactics is to destroy or
capture tfie guerrillas and their leaders. Envelopments and en-
circling movements are therefore the rule.
m. Conditions permitting, one of the most effective
ways to fight guerrillas is to wage guerrilla warfare against
them. Elements of the population friendly to our forces are
valuable for this type of operation.
52. THE OVER-ALL PLAN
a. To prevent, minimize, or combat guerrilla warfare,
doctrine To formulated and plans developed for a specific area
threatened by a guerrilla menace. This doctrine, based on a de-
tailed analysis of a country, the national characteristics, and
the customs, beliefs, cares, hopes, and desires of the people,
must be realistic. The political, administrative, economic, and
military aspects of the doctrine are closely correlated into an
over-all plan. Within the over-all plan lies the beat solution
to prevent, minimize and combat guerrilla warfare. Political, ad-
ministrative, economic and military policies, intelligently con-
ceived, wisely executed, and supported by appropriate propaganda,
will minimize the possibility of a mass resistance movement. In
many areas mass cooperation may be generated; if this occurs, a
sympathetic resistance movement may be organized. If such a re-
sistance movement is exploited, a friendly guerrilla force may be
developed to combat hostile forces. Although such a project would,
require superb diplomacy, it is possible in any country that is
made up of opposing factions. On the other hand, an ill-conceived.
and poorly executed over-all plan may turn the populace against
an occupying force. The administrative measures and the force
applied to control an area may arouse the hatred of the people.
This hatred may bring about hostile guerrilla warfare.
b. The German Invasion of the Soviet Union in World War
II is a cTassic example of an invading power operating under a
short-sighted and poor over-all plan. Politically and economical-.
ly, the Germans were favored by two major conditions. The first
condition concerned the minority groups on the perimeter of Great
Russia (Ukrainians, White Russians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and
Estonians). These minority gm ups resented the domination imposed
on them by the Soviet Union and hoped for independence or a govern-
ment in which they would have a greater voice. The second condi-
tion was the unpopular collective farm system imposed on the pea-
sants throughout the U.S.S.R. These two conditions, if intelli-
gently administered, would have given Hitler a potent wedge with
which to alienate the masses from the Stalin Government. Millions
of Soviets and people dominated by the Soviets would have fought
and cooperated with the Germans to defeat the U.S.S.R. Hitler,
however, insisted on sheer German military might and a short cam-
paign to defeat the Soviet Army. He insisted that German policy
remain silent on the two major political and economic issues.
This policy, coupled with the brutal, arrogant, and confiscatory
attitude of the political administrators and police, generated
hatred against the Germans. Even those people who welcomed the
German invasion forces at first, were finally organized into the
greatest partisan army in the history of war. The over-all plan
of the Germans defeated their military might.
c. The plan must provide for coordination between ad-
jacent commands engaged in anti-guerrilla operations. The
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boundaries between such areas, often located along mountain ridges
or other inaccessible areas, are ideal centers for guerrilla camps
and headquarters because commands often neglect to carry their
operations clear to the boundaries of their areas. It is of
little use tor a command in one area to carry out vigorous anti-
guerrilla operations if a nearby command is passive. The guerril-
las will move into the quiet area until danger has passed and then
return.
a. Our National Government is responsible for formulat-
ing dootr'rn-e and policy toward foreign countries. The President
of the United States administers our national doctrine and policy
through the various government agencies. It is obvious that the
policies followed before hostilities have a great bearing on the
psychological plan to be followed in time of war.
b. After hostilities break out, our national aims and
policies To be imposed on occupied or liberated countries are ad-
ministered through the Secretary of Defense. When a theater of
operations ;La organized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the
Secretary of Defense, specify the mission and responsibilities
of the theater commander. The mission may set a definite course
of action or it may authorize freedom of action under a broad
concept of contemplated operations.
c. The major responsibilities of a theater commander
include administering the civilian population. Normally he is
given great latitude in the formulation and execution of policies
to establish positive control of the civilian population, civilian
inatitution13, and their resources. Besides the directives from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the theater commander follows the ob-
ligations of International Law (FM 27-10).
d. The theater commander's policies are implemented by
the theater staff and the major subordinate echelons of command,
for example- armies, area commands, and communications zone com-
mands. The psychological plan and the policies to be followed
must be clearly announced and must be thoroughly understood from
the highest to the lowest echelon. When such policies are found
to be detrimental to operations, these facts together with recom-
mendations i8hould be immediately reported to the next higher
echelon. Lower echelons of the command, being in close daily
contact with the people can often detect early signs of unrest.
Early detection and prompt action are essential to minimize or
prevent the spread of popular unrest. If permitted to grow, such
unrest may develop into hostile guerrilla warfare.
e. Responsibility remains with the highest echelon of
command to anticipate, detect, and evaluate a guerrilla menace,
and to insure understanding of policies and uniformity of action
against a dissident populace and hostile guerrilla forces.
54. ES^.'IMATE OF THE SITUATION
In assessing the guerrilla menace in an area and the action
to be taken, the following factors are considered-
a. Terrain and weather.
(1) Suitability of terrain and road net for guerril-
la operations and for anti-guerrilla operations.
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(2) Existence of possible hideout areas.
(3) Effect of weather and seasons of year on guer-
rilla operations and on anti-guerrilla operations.
b. Inhabitants
(1) Loyalty of various segments of the population
to the enemy. Morale, strength of will to resist, and willing-
ness to undergo hardship of each. Particular attention is given
to the following groups.
(a) Farmers and other rural dwellers.
(b) Criminal and "tough" elements of urban
areas.
(2) Size and proportion of population likely to
engage in guerrilla activities.
(3) Size and proportion of population likely to
assist our forces.
(4) Existence, of strong personalities capable of
organizing a resistance movement. Present activities of such
persona.
(5) Susceptibility of various segments of popula-
tion to enemy propaganda and to our propaganda.
(1) Capability of area to furnish food for guerril-
la forces, particularly if many men are not present to work the
crops.
(2) Capability of our forces to control harvest and
storage of food.
(3) Availability of water and other necessities
for existence in or movement through certain areas.
(4) Availability of arms, ammunition, demolition
materials, and other necessary supplies for guerrilla forces.
(1) Possibility of enemy plans for guerrilla resis-
tance in the area.
(3) Capability of enemy to send organizers and sup-
plies to the area.
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a,. Existing guerrilla units
(1) Strength.
(2) Morale.
(3) Personality of leaders.
(4) Relations with civilian population.
(5) Effectiveness of organization and unity of
(6) Status of equipment and supplies.
(7) Status of training.
(8) Effectiveness of communications.
(9) Effectiveness of intelligence net.
f. Size and composition of forces available for anti-
guerrilla operations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Own forces.
Forces available from higher headquarters.
Units at rest camps in area.
(4) Police and special anti-guerrilla units orga-
nized from local population.
ff,., Existing policies and directives on treatment of
civilian population and resistance movements.
h, Importance of area to over-all objectives of our
forces and effect on other areas if it becomes a base for guer-
rilla operations.
1. Suitability of following courses of action, singly
or combined, for dealing with guerrilla menace:
(1)
communications.
(2)
(3)
Limited offensive activities against guerrillas.
All-out offensive operations to destroy guer-
(4) Propaganda campaign addressed to neutral and
friendly elements of civilian population.
(5) Propaganda addressed to civilian supporters
of guerrillas.
(6) Propaganda addressed to guerrillas.
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(7) Operations against civilian supporters of guer-
rillas and guerrilla sources of supply.
(8)
Taking hostages.
(9)
Organization of special anti-guerrilla units
(pars 87-92).
(10)
Promotion of conflict between rival guerrilla
(11)
Arranging truce with guerrillas (Para 75).
55. PLANNING
The planning of a campaign takes into consideration the
threat of guerrilla warfare. When an estimate of the situation
indicates a guerrilla menace within an area, adequate provisions
must be made to counter it from the forwardmost combat elements
to the rearmost base. Guerrilla warfare may well influence the
over-all strategy of a campaign and dictate the tactical steps
of the strategic plan. This menace influences troop requirements
in the combat, communications, and occupation zones. The effort
to combat and destroy a resistance movement absorbs a tremendous
number of troops and creates the need for special training and
equipment. Logistical methods and means are influenced by guer-
rilla warfare. Everyone involved in planning must clearly under-
stand that guerrilla warfare, if improperly resisted, will make
itself felt in every headquarters and unit.
56. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
a. The basic military principles are applicable in com-
bating guerrillas, but the doctrine and tactics must be modified
to meet the peculiarities of guerrilla forces and their operations.
This manual covers only the special aspects of guerrilla warfare
as a possible guide to commanders in applying modified doctrine
and tactics against guerrillas.
b. The basic objective of anti-guerrilla measures is to:
(1) Isolate guerrilla forces from the civilian
population and from each other.
(2) Deny guerrilla forces contact with and support
from allied forces or a sympathetic national government.
(3) Destroy the guerrilla forces.
e. The isolation of guerrilla forces from the civilian
populace may be greatly influenced by the treatment given the
civilians. In all areas there are people who want peace and
quiet. Friendly and cooperative elements of the populace are
carefully cultivated. The news of good treatment spreads rapidly
and is an important factor in establishing trust and friendly
relations between the civilian population and our military forces.
The populace is encouraged to band together to resist extortion
and threats from the guerrillas, and cooperative elements are
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protected. Law and order is established and strictly enforced.
Peacefulness is further stimulated by encouraging the people to
resume their normal pursuits. Idleness and unemployment are
dangerous. Restrictions imposed on the movement of civilians
must be wisely and carefully applied. Religious freedom is as-
sured. The basic essentials of food, shelter, and clothing are
provided. Tyrannical action by either our forces or the local
government is prohibited.
d. Propaganda plays an important role in winning the
good will end trust of a people. To be effective, propaganda
should concern the basic problems of the people. The media and
methods of disseminating propaganda are carefully selected.
Generally, the most effective propaganda is imparted man to man.
The soldier of the ranks may be a valuable medium of effective
propaganda if his actions and relations with the civilians are
controlled. This type of psychological warfare is more fully dis-
cussed in I'M 33-5.
e. In areas where the civilian population is hostile to
our aims ar..d where they stubbornly resist pacification, stern ad-
ministrative measures and aggressive military action are used to
establish control. Firm and impartial treatment from the outset
will tend to minimize the belligerency of the populace. These
measures are closely coordinated with aggressive military action
to isolate the guerrillas from the civilian population and allied
support and then destroy them.
a. Operations against guerrilla forces generally follow
a normal sequence. A commander, charged with combating hostile
guerrillas and extending control over a country, moves his assign-
ed forces into the area, establishes local bases of operations,
and takes appropriate security and administrative measures.
b. Military government is established. Our war aims,
together with the measures governing political, economic, finan-
cial, social, and industrial functions, are clearly publicized.
Information and propaganda should stress that the people's coopera-
tion and acceptance of the announced policies will determine the
amount of assistance and freedom of action given them. The grant-
ing of an amnesty to hostile guerrillas for a limited period of
time should be considered. If granted, the terms of the amnesty
are widely publicized and scrupulously observed.
c. Offensive operations in force are next launched
against areas controlled by hostile guerrilla forces. The opera-
tions are characterized by bold aggressive action against gueril-
la units and their command, communication, and supply. Offensive
action is continued to prevent reorganization and resupply, and
to destroy dispersed guerrilla groups. Throughout countergueril-
la operations, emphasis is placed on the capture or destruction
of all guerrilla commanders and staffs, and their civilian coun-
terparts. Propaganda is used to destroy guerrilla morale and in-
duce surrenders.
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Operations are continued until the hostile guerrilla
forces haV been destroyed and control is extended throughout
the country, including sparsely populated regions and inaccessible
areas. Lulls in guerrilla operations or failure to establish
contact with guerrilla forces should be regarded with suspicion.
These conditions may well indicate inadequate methods of operation
rather than complete success. The collecting and evaluating of
information should be carefully reviewed to improve the entire
intelligence net. Special combat and reconnaissance units may
have to be organized and used. Stopping anti-guerrilla operations
too soon may nullify months of rugged fighting. Continuous pres-
sure must be maintained until the guerrilla menace ceases to ex-
ist.
a. The force assigned to combat guerrilla forces and
to establish control over an area must be adequate. Its size and
composition depends on the size of the area, the topography, the
civilian attitude, and the hostile guerrilla forces. To assign
insufficient forces may later necessitate the employment of many
times the original number. The quality of the troops is also
important, not only from a military standpoint, but from a politi-
cal and administrative standpoint as well. The Germans during
World War II used second-rate, poorly-equipped troops against the
Soviet partisans. These forces often became the laughing-stock
of the populace and instead of discouraging resistance, encouraged
it. Finally the situation in many areas forced the Germans to
withdraw front-line divisions to combat the partisans.
b. Infantry normally is the principal arm employed in
active counterguerrilla operations. Available supporting arms
and services are used in accordance with the situation. Air-
transported and airborne units may be used effectively in many
situations. All troops, both combat and service, committed to
areas threatened by a guerrilla menace must be trained in the
special aspects of guerrilla warfare and the active and passive
countermeasures to be employed. Regular troops must be indoc-
trinated never to underrate guerrillas. Otherwise, they are apt
to look down on guerrilla forces as inferior, poorly-equipped
opponents. Such an attitude breeds carelessness and may result
in severe losses.
a. The continuity of command and units within an af-
fected area is essential. The rotation or relief of commanders
and troops works to the advantage of the guerrillas. Commanders
and troops need time to become acquainted with the detailed topo-
graphy of the area, the civilian population, and the organization
and operations of the hostile guerrilla forces. Special skill and
teamwork are acquired through actual operations against the guer-
rillas and in dealing with the civilian population. This know-
ledge and skill is difficult to impart to new commanders, staffs,
and troops.
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b.. The Japanese, throughout 1942, maintained continuity
of command and troops against the resistance movement in North
Luzon of t:3e Philippines. By 1943, the Japanese commanders and
troops had become thoroughly familiar with the most inaccessible
areas and had acquired considerable skill in combating the guer-
rillas. They succeeded in all but destroying the resistance
movement in North Luzon. However, in the middle of 1943, the
Japanese high command relieved these seasoned commanders and
troops with units that had recently arrived from Japan. The re-
sulting lu'Ll permitted the resistance movement in North Luzon to
reorganize on such a firm basis that the Japanese could no longer
cope with it.
Whenever possible, allied troops native to a liberated area
should be employed against hostile subversive elements within
that area. Their familiarity with the country, people, language,
and customs makes them invaluable. Total responsibility for con-
trol over liberated areas should be rapidly transferred to the
local government. Premature transfer however, may threaten the
stability of the re-established power. Close liaison and ample
support is provided for the re-established government and its or-
ganized forces. This may be administered through advisory and
liaison teams.
a. Combating a guerrilla menace requires the diversion
of tremendous manpower. Friendly elements of the population
should be used as much as possible to conserve regular forces.
Active employment of enemy nationals may include:
(1) Intelligence agents and informers.
(2) Propaganda agents.
(3) Government and key civil positions.
(4) Local police and constabulary forces.
(5) Security forces.
(6) Labor and service units.
(7) Special anti-guerrilla combat units.
a,. Use of enemy nationals must be based on sound in-
telligenc and planning. The premature organization and exploi-
tation of such forces may invite treachery. To avoid damaging
repercussions, a commander must first establish an efficient
counterintelligence organization and use it to find those enemy
nationals upon whom he can safely rely. Hostile guerrilla forces
may be expected to infiltrate agents into locally organized units
to obtain information and to exploit these units in conjunction
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with guerrilla operations at opportune times.
d. When there are some doubts about the loyalty of
enemy nationals to our cause, it may nevertheless be possible to
use them for non-sensitive duties that will release regular
troops. It may also be possible to use them in other areas where
they do not have close relationship with the local population.
e. Within some areas, sympathetic enemy nationals may
be nonexistent or too few to assist much in combating a guerrilla
menace. There remains, however, still another possibility to
ease the task of combating hostile guerrillas and so reduce man-
power requirements. Within a national resistance movement it is
not uncommon to find guerrilla forces opposed to one another over
political differences. Clever diplomacy, propaganda, organiza-
tion, and support may widen the differences between these factions.
Such action will limit unification of the guerrilla forces. Pro-
perly maneuvered, the factions may even be induced to fight each
other. In any case, a resistance movement split by internal strife
is far easier to deal with than a completely unified guerrilla
force.
Detailed intelligence is essential in combating guerrilla
forces. To conduct counterguerrilla operations without sound in-
telligence wastes time, material, and troop effort. The intangible
aspects of guerrilla warfare, together with the sympathetic sup-
port given the guerrillas by the local populace, create intelli-
gence obstacles that can only be overcome by patient determination
and the utmost resourcefulness. Extensive and intensive means and
methods are used to organize the intelligence net and to collect,
evaluate, and disseminate information. The general doctrine,
methods, and procedures of collecting, evaluating, and disseminat-
ing intelligence are covered in FM 30-5. Only the special aspects
of intelligence as they apply to counterguerrilla warfare are
developed here.
A larger number of Intelligence and counterintelligence
personnel is required for counterguerrilla operations than for
normal operations. Special attention must be given to obtaining
trained interpreters. A command combating guerrillas is greatly
handicapped if forced to procure and rely on local native inter-
preters.
a. An intimate knowledge of the terrain is necessary.
Only when the anti-guerrilla forces' knowledge of the terrain be-
gins to approach that of the guerrillas can they meet the gueril-
las on anything like equal terms. Terrain intelligence is con-
tinuously collected, recorded and disseminated. Up to date photo
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maps are prepared. Terrain models are constructed and used for
briefing subordinate commanders. Particular effort is made to
collect information of the following:
(1) Areas likely to serve as guerrilla hideouts.
Such areas have the following characteristics:
(a) Difficulty of access, like in mountains,
jungles, or marshes.
(b) Protection from air reconnaissance.
(c) Situation which favors defense and
covered withdrawal.
(d) Location
e
small civilian settlements that journey
food and act as outposts.
(2) Roads and trails approaching suspected or known
guerrilla areas.
(3) Principal trails traversing and passing along
the circumference of suspected guerrilla areas.
(4) Principal routes connecting separate guerrilla
(5) Roads and trails near our installations and
line of communications.
(6) Location of fords, bridges and ferries across
otherwise Impassible rivers; seasons of the year when rivers are
in flood.
(7) Areas where drinking water is not available
or where foot travel is difficult or impossible.
(8) Location of all small settlements and farms in
and near suspected guerrilla areas.
(9) If guerrillas are known or suspected to have
contact with the enemy, location of areas suitable for air-drops
or boat or submarine rendeZvous;roads and trails leading into
enemy-held areas or neutral countries friendly to the guerrillas.
to. Personality files on guerrilla commanders, members,
and civilian supporters are built up. Names and data of persona
likely to be connected with the guerrilla movement are collected.
Efforts are made to obtain rosters and organization data of guer-
rilla un11;s. The names and locations of sweethearts, families,
relatives, and friends of known guerrillas are obtained. These
persons are valuable as sources of information and as hostages,
and traps can be laid for guerrillas visiting them. In communi-
ties friendly to the guerrillas, some persons are usually respon-
sible for collecting food and other aid for the guerrillas and
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for furnishing message centers and safe houses for guerrilla mes-
sengers. Every effort is made to discover such persons. It is
usually preferable not to arrest them immediately but to watch
their activities and contacts and seek to apprehend guerrilla
couriers.
c. Communications provide the essential link between
guerrilla forces and their allied forces. Control, coordination,
and logistical support within unified guerrilla commands and with
allied forces all depend on communications. Radio is normally
the essential means of communication in guerrilla organizations.
Special consideration is given to monitoring and locating guer-
rilla transmitter-receiver stations. Intelligence efforts should
ificlude the operation of special radio stations that enter the
guerrilla radio net using guerrilla call signs and procedures.
If cleverly operated, such stations may obtain valuable information
or transmit messages to mislead the guerrilla forces. Radio
direction finders together with mobile radiogoniometers are used
to locate guerrilla transmitter-receiver stations. Guerrilla radio
frequencies may be jammed to deny the use of radio channels.
d. Special effort is made to collect information that
will lead to thecapture or destruction of guerrilla commanders.
The over-all commander and the major subordinate commanders play
a vital part in guerrilla warfare. A resistance movement may
never recover from such a stunning blow as loss of its commanders.
e. Special agents may be infiltrated into guerrilla
forces by a wide variety of methods. Agents disguised as liaison
personnel from guerrilla allied forces may be parachuted at night
into guerrilla commands. Agents disguised as downed air crews of
guerrilla allied forces provide an effective penetration method.
The Germans, for example, infiltrated so many agents into guer-
rilla forces that civilians, loyal to the resistance movement,
refused to establish contact between the guerrillas and the legiti-
mate allied agents parachuted into the area. The Japanese dis-
guised agents as liaison personnel from the South West Pacific
Area. These agents succeeded in obtaining complete rosters of
guerrilla units and prominent civilian contacts in the Fhilippines.
65. RECONNAISSANCE
The use of regular units on reconnaissance missions against
guerrilla forces will seldon produce satisfactory results. In
many instances, such reconnaissance may even do more harm than
good. Unusual reconnaissance activities, occurring in conjunc-
tion with operations, will invariably alert the guerrillas and
warn them of the coming operation. Special anti-guerrilla units
are used on reconnaissance missions as outlined in Section VII.
Reconnaissance missions, whenever possible, should be assigned
to units with a routine mission which is habitually executed
within the area and which they can continue at the same time.
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Section IV
ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES
Rigid, military government control and stern administrative
measures Ere imposed on a populace collaborating with hostile
guerrilla forces. The extent of control and the degree of stern-
ness imposed on the civilian populace depend on the situation
within the area. Information about public attitude must be
gathered end judged with sensitive perception. Control and re-
strictione are relaxed on a populace in direct proportion to its
efforts to cooperate. The sincere will of the civilians to oppose
guerrilla coercion should be adequately supported. The basic
objective, to isolate the guerrillas from the populace, must be
kept in mind. Administrative measures and punishment are exer-
cised with realistic discretion. If the people become so frus-
trated as the result of control and punishment that they feel
their lot might just as well be thrown with enemy guerrillas,
then the purpose of the measures is defeated and only the guer-
rillas benefit. (See FM 27-5 for details on civil affairs and
military government.)
Administrative measures imposed to suppress an unfriendly
populace and minimize its ability to collaborate with hostile
guerrillas may include:
I.- Registering and photographing all civilians.
t:. Requiring individuals to carry identification passes.
C,. Controlling and restricting all movement.
d.. Curfew (allowing no one out during hours of darkness).
e. Confiscating weapons and war materials.
f,. Controlling all communication to include private
ga,. Controlling all means of transportation.
h.. House-to-house searching for contraband.
i. Controlling and rationing all foodstuffs, clothing,
and medical supplies.
,j. Completely evacuating designated areas.
k,. Taking hostages.
68. }UNITIVE ACTION
Vigorous enforcement and stern punishment is applied to
carry out administrative measures. Half-heartedness or any sign
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of laxness will breed contempt and defiance. Violators are ap-
prehended and justly punished. Care is taken to punish the true
offenders. The guerrillas may initiate acts of violence in com-
munities that are earnestly cooperating to provoke unjust retalia-
tion against those communities. Unjust or misplaced punishment
at the hands of the occupying force is vigorously exploited by
the guerrillas to gain sympathizers and strengthen their own
cause. Every means is used to publicize the nature of offenses
for which punishment is imposed. The populace is made to realize
that the action taken is not arbitrary, but necessary to enforce
law and order.
In areas threatened by a guerrilla menace security measures
are taken to safeguard our troops, installations, and lines of
communications. The populace and its institutions and resources
are also safeguarded. Failure to do this exposes them to guerril-
la coercion end exploitation. Vigilant security and sound defen-
sive measures will not only minimize our own losses, but tend to
discourage guerrilla operations.
Troop security is a command responsibility and function. All
echelons must be thoroughly briefed on known or suspected hostile
guerrilla forces. Combat security measures, including extensive
patrolling, are employed on the march, during halts, and while in
bivouac to minimize losses from guerrilla ambushes or attacks.
Troops in rear areas may acquire a sense of false security and re-
lax their vigilance even though guerrillas threaten them with
dangers as great as those in the forward areas. Commanders of
units that have not experienced or witnessed a guerrilla attack
will have to exercise methodical supervision to maintain security
discipline. As guerrilla operations may be spasmodic, long quiet
periods will further tend to reduce security vigilance.
Supply discipline is strictly enforced, and it is emphasized
to troops and units that supplies lost, traded, or thrown away
will be recovered by the guerrillas and used against our forces.
Arms and equipment are salvaged from battlefields and from civilians
who have collected them.
72. INSTALLATION SECURITY
a. Installations of all types are secured from guerril-
la aacks and sabotage. Special attention is given to the se-
curittty of arms, ammunition, and other equipment of value to the
guerrillas. To economize on manpower, it is important to select
mites for installations that readily lend themselves to defense.
installations should be grouped together so that they may be
guarded as a unit. To further conserve personnel, maximum use is
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made of physical obstacles and aids like wire, mines, alarms,
illumination, searchlights, and restricted areas. Fields of fire
are cleared and field fortifications are constructed for guards
and security forces. The guard or security system should be
supplemented by a vigorous patrol system. All soldiers, including
headquarters and service personnel, are trained in anti-guerrilla
tactics. Specially-trained dogs may be used with guards and pa-
trols. RLgid security measures are enforced on native labor, to
include screening, identification, and supervision, as a defense
against sabotage within installations. All security measures are
maintained on a combat basis, and all soldiers keep their weapons
available for instant use. The routine means of securing an in-
stallation are altered frequently to prevent guerrilla forces
obtaining detailed accurate information about the composition
and habits of the defense. Fraternization of military personnel
with the .civilian population is discouraged or prohibited.
I** The size, organization, and equipment of security
detaohmen s are dictated by their mission, the size of the hos-
tile guerrilla forces, and the attitude of the civilian populace.
Security detachments in remote areas will necessarily be larger
than those closer to supporting forces. Patrol requirements
likewise Influence the size of security detachments. Remote de-
tachments are maintained with a supply level to meet the con-
tingency of isolation from their base for a long time. Security
detachments should be independent of the local populace for supply.
Special arms and equipment may be provided. Reliable oommunioa-
tion is e,9tablished between the responsible headquarters and se-
curity detachments.
,3. Positions are organized and prepared for all-around
defense. 'Adequate guards and patrols are used to prevent sur-
prise. Precautions are taken to prevent guards being surprised
and overpowered before they can give the alarm. Concealed ap-
proaches-to the position are mined and booby-trapped. Areas from
which short-range fire can be placed on the position are cleared
and mined'. Personnel are provided with auxiliary exits and cover-
ad routes from their shelters to combat positions. Buildings
used for shelters are selected with care. Generally, wooden or
other light constructions are avoided. If they must be used, the
walls are reinforced for protection against small-arms fire.
Supplies are dispersed and stored in protected caches. Adequate
protection is provided for communication installations and equip-
ment. Combat proficiency is maintained by training and alert
drills. ;natives are not permitted to enter the defensive poai-
tions, and natives residing in the vicinity are carefully screened
or evacuated. Informers may be established along routes of ap-
proach to installation. An example of a security outpost is
shown in figure 5.
A. Lines of communications are difficult to secure in
guerrilla infected areas.. Limited manpower usually prevents
adequate security for long lines of communications.
Is. Railway installations and rail traffic are secured
by establrahing defined areas of responsibility from theater
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OPENING TO
PIT BENEAT1
WALLS CONCRETE .1
OR REINFORCED WITH__
EARTH OR SAND BAGS
~?~TF?ENCH
REMOVAI?LE BARRICADE
A t?C)DS LEAKED
CL ARD
STREAM_? BANIkS
BOOBY= TRAPPED
CONNECTING
t- TRENCH
,HILL.. SUMMIT AND
FORWARD SLOPES
EARED AND MINED
~~ ;.ate
TRAIL BOO Y-TRAPPED
Figure 5. Security outpost prepared for all-around
defense against guerrillas.
(Text key: Para 72.)
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command down through subordinate commands like army, communica-
tions zone, and area commands. Standard operating procedures,
to include security measures, are announced by theater directives.
Within the areas threatened by hostile guerrillas, security mea-
sures are i;aken to protect designated installations, railway re-
pair and maintenance crews, and rail traffic. Important installa-
tions like bridges, underpasses, tunnels, water towers,, marshall-
ing yards, and round houses are secured. The right of way and
area within 300 yards of the tracks is declared and posted as a
restricted zone. Civilian inhabitants living within this zone
are evacuated and unauthorized persons are forbidden to enter.
Underbrush and thick forests are cleared from the sides of the
road bed. Block houses and security units may be established
along the ;right of way. Frequent patrols are made along the right
of way and to the flanks to discourage trespassing in the restrict-
ed zone, tD detect mines and sabotage along the rail bed, and to
give warning of guerrilla operations. Armored railroad cars may.
be used to supplement patrolling. Railway inspection, maintenance,
and repair crews are provided with armed security detachments.
Trains are provided with security detachments to defend them from
guerrilla attacks. When passing through areas of likely ambush
(ravines, defiles, forests or areas overgrown with heave under-
brush) automatic weapons keep up a continuous fire to the flanks
until the danger area is passed. Such fire, however, is opened
only on the command of the convoy commander. For added protec-
tion against sabotage and mines, an engine, pushing cars loaded
with rocks and earth, may be run ahead of important trains. The
security detachments guarding the right-of-way have their own
communications system which is tied-in to the administrative
railroad communication system.
c;. Highways through hostile guerrilla areas are secured
by the aVl;licable methods used for securing a railroad right-of-
way. Lone vehicles and convoys not capable of providing their
own secur'..ty are grouped and escorted through danger areas by
armed security detachments. All traffic through danger areas is
controllecl by traffic control stations.
74. CONVOY SECURITY DETACHMENTS
ca. These units are specially organized and trained to
protect convoys from the hostile guerrilla actions. They have
adequate righting power to counter likely guerrilla attacks. A
detachment may be organized into two or more parts, a holding or
defending element and an attacking element. The size of the
detachment and composition will vary with the topography, the
capabilities of hostile guerrilla forces, and the size and composi-
tion of the convoy. A typical convoy security detachment may be
organized as followss
(1) The headquarters detachment provides the staff,
communications, and medical facilities.
(2) The armored element provides increased fire
power and shock action.
(3) The infantry detachment may be organized into
a holding, element and an attacking element.
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(4) The combat engineers supplement the holding
element and are used to make minor bridge and roadbed repairs.
They are also used to detect and remove mines.
(5) The armored infantry company is particularly
suitable for this type of mission.
b. Before entering the danger area, the convoy command
responsibility is clearly fixed. The commander is briefed with
the latest information about the area to be passed through. He
formulates his plan and issues orders to include formation,
interval between echelons and vehicles, rate of, travel, and de-
tailed plans of action if guerrillas should attack. All elements
are briefed to act initially according to prearranged plans, as
there will seldom be enough warning for orders to be issued on
the road. Canvas covers of trucks are removed and tail-gates are
left down. When practicable, personnel are placed in vehicles so
that they can detruck rapidly. Arms and weapons are readied for
immediate action, and senior personnel in each vehicle are charged
with the responsibility of seeing that all passengers are on the
alert when passing through danger areas.
o. The formation of a security detachment and its inte-
gration into a convoy may and should be varied. Guerrillas may
be expected to observe convoy habits and will prepare their am-
bushes to cope with expected formations. The holding element of
the security detachment is distributed to provide close-in de-
fense throughout the convoy (fig. 6). Armor leads the convoy as
a precaution against mines. When armor is not available, a heavy
vehicle with sandbags placed on the floor beneath personnel should
lead the convoy. Hostages may also be placed in the leading
vehicles. Armor also is distributed in depth throughout the column
to strengthen the defense of the formation and to provide sup-
porting fire for the attacking elements. Armor also provides a
ready means of ccumunication throughout the convoy. Troops riding
in trucks may be protected by sheet iron placed on the aides of
the trucks. Convoys may be escorted by reconnaissance aircraft
or have combat aircraft on call. An advance-guard formation pre-
ceding the convoy is normally ineffective against guerrilla am-
bushes. The guerrillas will allow the advance guard to pass the
site of the main ambush, then block the road and deal with the main
body and the advance guard separately.
d. When hostile guerrillas are the governing factor,
the convoy speed is kept slow (10 to 15 mph) in areas of likely
ambush. When passing through these areas (ravines, defiles,
forests or areas overgrown with heavy underbrush) automatic wea-
pons keep up a continuous fire to the flanks until the danger area
is passed. Fire is opened, however, only upon the command of the
convoy commander. At the first indication of an ambush, vehicles
atop, taking care to remain in the tracks of the vehicle in front
(fig. 7). No effort is made to clear the road by driving to its
side or shoulders. These may be mined. Personnel, other than
drivers and assistant drivers, detruck as rapidly as possible,
not waiting for the vehicles to come to a stop. Drivers turn off
ignitions, brake their vehicles to a stop, set hand brakes, ana
leave the vehicle in gear before detruoking. Assistant drivers
are alert to help if the d jver becomes a casualty. Personnel
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ELMTS
OF
CONVOY
ATTACKING
ELEMENT INF
Figure 6. Possible formation of a convoy in
bostile guerrilla area.
(Text key: Para 7$.)
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Figure 7. Automatic veapoos keep up a continuous fire to
the flanks vben passing through suspicious areas.
(Text key: pare 74.)
Figure 7 (continued). When ambusbed, personnel detruck
as rapidly as possible, take
positions, and open fire.
(Text key: pare 74.)
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Security detachment commander
makes hasty survey of situation
and issues orders to commander
of attack element.
(Text key: Para 74.)
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Figure 7 (continued). Attack element makes prearranged
attack, usually an envelopment.
(Text key: para 74.)
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upon detrucking take cover and open vigorous fire on suspected
targets. ;Tanks open fire and maneuver to the most favorable
ground in the immediate vicinity. The security detachment com-
mander, after hastily surveying the situation, issues orders to
the commander of the attacking element to begin one of the pre-
arranged attacks, preferably an envelopment. The fire of the
holding force is coordinated with the attacking elements by pre-
arranged communication. After driving off the guerrillas, securi-
ty details. are posted to cover the reorganization of the convoy.
The convoy commander reports by radio to a road control station
a brief account of the engagement. Guerrillas captured in the
.action are interrogated about the location of the rendezvous
where the unit was to reassemble.
a. After an ambush, patrols Ere sent to apprehend,
interrogate, and, if necessary, make reprisal against civilians
living near or along the routes of approach to the ambush posi-
tion.
f. The following instructions apply when a convoy is
not escorted by a convoy security detachment. Part of the avail-
'Me troops are placed well forward in the convoy, and a strong
detachment is placed in a vehicle that follows the main body by
about three minutes. Radio contact is established between the
two groups if possible. Fairly fast speed is maintained. Defiles
are traversed at fast speed. Sharp curves, steep grades or other
areas where slow speed is enforced are reconnoitered by foot
troops sent ahead. At the first indication of ambush while the
convoy is in motion, leading vehicles, if the road appears clear,
increase speed to the maximum consistent with safety in an effort
to smash through the ambush area. Drivers or assistant drivers
of vehicles disabled by enemy fire or mines seek to direct their
vehicles to the sides or off of the roads in order that vehicles
in rear may continue through. Troops from vehicles stopped in
the ambush area dismount and return fire. Troops from vehicles
breaking through the ambush, dismount and attack back against the
flank of the ambush position. The rear guard of the convoy, upon
learning that the main body has been ambushed, dismounts and at-
tacks forward against the flank of the ambush position. Both
attacking groups exercise care that they do not fire on each other.
If the guerrillas allow the main convoy to pass through and then
ambush the rear guard, troops from the main body return and re-
lieve the rear guard by an attack against the flank of the ambush.
During World War II, truces existed between guerrillas and
occupying forces in some areas for considerable periods. In some
cases these were arranged by formal agreement between the two
commanders. In other cases they came'tacitly into existence.
They usually took the form of a division of the area between the
two forces, or of a guerrilla agreement to stop offensive action
in return for the occupying forces' stopping certain operations
against the civilian population. The occasions when a truce
gives advantages equally are very few, and no such arrangement
should be accepted without careful consideration and the approval
of higher headquarters. The truce may be offered to tide the
guerrillas; over a period of serious weakness, to permit them to
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receive supplies from outside, or to perfect plans and arrangements
for a subsequent operation. A truce should never be offered to
the guerrillas, as this would be taken as an admission of weakness.
In no event should intelligence and counterintelligence efforts
cease during such a truce, and there should be no hesitation in
ending the truce when it is advantageous to do so or when the
changed situation makes offensive operations possible.
A guerrilla menace should be countered at the earliest prac-
ticable time by aggressive offensive action. Continued reliance
on security measures against guerrilla forces results in an ever-
increasing commitment and dissipation of forces and gives the
guerrillas an opportunity to unify, train, and develop coordina-
tion and logistical support. It also leaves the initiative in
the hands of the guerrillas, who can concentrate superior forces
against security forces, inflict severe casualties, and lower
morale. Successful offensive action, on the other hand, forces
the guerrillas to devote most of their efforts to self-preserva-
tion. It lowers their morale and disrupts their command struc-
ture, communications, and supply system. It weakens civilian
support for the guerrillas and increases this support for our
forces. Offensive counterguerrilla action is bound by the prin-
ciples and methods of regular offensive combat, but their applica-
tion is modified to meet the peculiarities of guerrilla warfare.
The purpose of offensive action is the destruction of the
guerrilla forces and their will, as well as the will of the popu-
lace, to continue resistance. The commander selects objectives
like guerrilla concentrations, headquarters, communication cen-
ters, and food and supply sources. Specific objectives are
sought that will facilitate concentration of forces, coordination
of effort, surprise,and the capture or destruction of the maximum
number of guerrillas. Unlike normal operations, the capture of
ground contributes little to the attainment of the objective
since, upon departure of our forces, the guerrillas will infil-
trate back into the same areas.
Continuous pressure is maintained against the guerrillas by
successive operations and vigorous patrolling. This keeps the
guerrillas on the move, disrupts their security and organization,
separates them from their bases of supply, and destroys their
morale. On the other hand, offensives, followed by withdrawal
for long periods, allow the guerrillas to lick their wounds, re-
establish themselves, and resume offensive opperations.
Surprise is sought in all operations. Against well-organized
guerrillas it is difficult to achieve and requires that every
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echelon of command employ the most ingenious and often the most
unorthodox methods. Surprise may often be gained by conducting
operations that differ from past operations and are unorthodox or
unusual, like attacking at night, attacking in bad weather, at-
tacking through difficult terrain, employing small specially
organized units, and the like. Caution is exercised throughout
planning, preparation, and execution of operations to prevent the
guerrillas fx'om learning their nature and scope in advance.
Special security restrictions are applied to the movements of com-
manders, communications, reconnaissance, movement of troops, and
concentration of supplies. Lower echelons, upon receiving orders,
are careful not to suddenly alter their dispositions and daily
habits. Cover plans, ingeniously exposed to guerrilla intelli-
gence, are used to deceive the guerrillas as to the purpose of
necessary preparations and movements. Real care is exercised to
keep civilia:i supporters of the guerrillas from learning our in-
tentions and reporting this information to them. Where necessary,
prisoners advance
civilian salong tamporary route'of
to prevent rtheird
and the inhabitants held
giving an alarm.
80. 140EILITY
Mobility is essential in counterguerrilla operations to of guerrillas.
siderationrAsigiven dtoothe type and size lof3units employed; then counter the selection, training, and equipping of individuals and units= com-
munications; and administration. These variable factors are then
considered in relation to the hostile guerrilla forces, the mis-
sion of the various command echelons, the topography, weather,
and climatic conditions. The situation confronting a commander
is carefully analyzed. A commander develops the desired mobility
through initiative, improvisation, and aggressiveness.
81. FORMS OF OFFENSIVE ACTION
The usual forms of offensive action against guerrillas may
be broadly classified as encirclement, attack, and pursuit. The
variations in technique necessary to accomplish' these maneuvers
in guerrilla warfare are covered in detail in the following para-
graphs.
82. ENCIRCLEMENT
The encirclement of guerrilla forces, whether they are large
or small, is the most effective way to completely destroy them.
The encirclement is made in depth with adequate reserves and sup-
porting arms to meet possible guerrilla attack in force and to
block all avenues of escape. Complete and effective encirclement
operations require a relatively large number of troops regardless
of the number of opposing hostile guerrillas involved. If ter-
rain or inadequate forces preclude the effective encirclement of
the entire guerrilla area, then only the most important part of
the area is encircled. The planning, preparation, and execution
of the operation are aimed at a sudden, complete encirclement
that will totally surprise the guerrillas.
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83.1 MOVEMENT TO LINE OF ENCIRCLEMENT
a. All forces used to make the encirclement should
reach the line of encirclement simultaneously (fig. 8). Movement
from assembly areas may begin in darkness to gain surprise, but
the operation is timed to insure the arrival of units and their
organization of the line of encirclement during daylight. The
tactical formations adopted in advancing from assembly areas to
the line of encirclement are governed by the terrain, hostile
forces, and security considerations. Normally, tactical deploy-
ment progresses from march security formations to full deployment
of the elements that are to organize the actual line of encircle-
ment. The density of troops of the advance echelons is progres-
sively increased and lateral deployment is gradually extended to
cover the entire zone of advance as units approach the line of
encirclement.
b. Support and reserve units are committed to insure
sufficient density of troops and to establish and maintain lateral
contact between units. The reserve is reconstituted during the
organization of the line of encirclement.
C. Throughout the early phases of the advance to the
line of encirclement, speed is emphasized. Commanders are es-
pecially bold and determined in their decisions, rapid and cal-
culating in directing the movements and deployment of their units,
and demanding on the physical endurance of their troops. Such
action involves risks and does not permit thorough combing of the
area covered by the advance. Resistance is countered with bold
aggressive action. Determined pockets of hostile resistance are
by-passed by the leading echelons as rapidly as possible. Reserve
units are used to contain and destroy any by-passed pockets of
resistance. Less rapid and aggressive action in reaching and or-
ganizing the line of encirclement gives the guerrillas an oppor-
tunity to escape.
d. Upon arriving on the line of encirclement, units
occupy de?ensive positions. The most critical periods in the
execution of the operation are during the initial phase of occupy-
ing the line of encirclement and at night. Large guerrilla forma-
tions may be expected to react violently upon discovering that
they have been encircled. The guerrillas may be expected to seek
or feel out weak points or gaps. At night they may be expected
to escape through gaps or attack weak points to force a gap.
Units organizing the line of encirclement push strong patrols out
to their front to reconnoiter and give timely warning of the ap-
proach of guerrilla formations. Air reconnaissance is used to
supplement ground reconnaissance. Support and reserve units are
located in depth to cover likely guerrilla escape routes. Reserve
forces are committed if guerrilla forces succeed in breaking
through the line of encirclement.
84. DESTRUCTION OF ENCIRCLED FORCES
a. The encircled area may be narrowed by all forces ad-
vancing simultaneously from the line of encirclement to succes-
sive designated lines in the center (fig. 9). This method Can be
used when the area of encirclement is small and the guerrilla
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Figure 8. All forces make simultaneous movement
to the line of encirclement.
(Text key: Para 83.)
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Figure 9. Destruction of guerrillas
tightening encirclement.
(Text key;; Para 84.)
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forces are comparatively weak. When vast areas are involved or
the hostile forces are strong, this method has disadvantages.
It is difficult to move units over varied terrain along a broad
front without creating gaps through which the guerrillas may
escape. When the guerrilla forces are strong, the advancing ele-
ments are vulnerable to attacks which may create gaps in the line
of encirclement.
ts. Encircling forces may hold their positions while
other forces drive spearheads into the area and out it into smaller
parts which are then. cleared of guerrillas by one of the methods
described above (fig. 10). This method is suitable when the
encircled area is large and sufficient forces are available. Units
driving spearheads into the circle must be particularly vigilant
against ambush.
c:: Designated units of the encircling forces may ad-
vance to successive lines to compress the guerrilla forces against
units that maintain their positions on the line of encirclement
(fig. 1l)q. This "hammer and anvil" method is especially suitable
if part of the line of encirclement includes natural obstacles
like a river or difficult terrain that can be held by a small
force disposed for defense, while strong forces advance and drive
the guerrillas toward. these defended obstacles. The advancing
forces user a formation in depth with adequate reserves to meet
guerrilla attacks in force and to close gaps that are created
during the advance. This method can take advantage of supporting
arms to assist the attacking elements.
L. When information indicates that effective guerrilla
forces maf defend strongly fortified positions, the encirclement
is completed and units maintain their defensive positions. A
strong assault force advances into the encircled area and attacks
known or located organized guerrilla positions (fig. 12). After
it overruns all located organized positions and effectively dis-
perses large guerrilla concentration throughout the area, the units
holding the line of encirclement are advanced to compress the area
as discussied above.
e. In all encircling operations various precautions must
be taken Vy all echelons of command. Once the encirclement is
firmly established, the destruction of the guerrilla forces is
conducted.methodically thoroufly and without haste. The units
that advance from the Initial line of encirclement are impressed
with the necessity of thoroughly combing every possible hiding
place for guerrilla personnel and equipment. Successive echelons
are used to comb the terrain again. Areas that appear totally
inaccessible like swamps or marshes must be penetrated by utiliz-
ing special equipment or improvised means. Guerrilla ruses dis-
covered during the course of operations are reported promptly to
all interested units and agencies. Every native, man, woman, or
child, found in the area is held in custody. They are released
only on orders from proper authority. All units, supporting arms
and services, and rear installations are disposed and secured for
all-round defense. Adequate security measures are used to protect
supply convoys and communication from guerrilla raids and ambushes.
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Figure 10. Destruction of encircled guerrillas witb
spec beads cutting area into smaller parts.
Text key: pare 84.)
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1
ElYGIRCL-V
F:Lgure 11. Destruction of encircled guerrillas
b hammer and anvil method.
Text key: papa 84.)
Figure 12. Destruction of fortified guerrilla
position within encircled area.
(Text key: pare 84.)
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a. Often lack of time, inadequate forces and the nature
of the terrain prevent encirclement operations. Surprise attacks
followed by aggressive pursuit may prove successful in these
cases. The position and strength of the guerrilla forces are as-,
certained by intelligence methods before launching the operation.
Reconnaissance is disguised so that the guerrillas will not be
alerted. The operation is conducted to achieve maximum surprise
and the destruction of the guerrilla forces. The chances of
completely surprising a guerrilla installation or unit with forces
ev@n as small as a company are rare, unless native guides, who are
thoroughly familiar with the terrain and guerrilla dispositions,
can be induced to collaborate and guide the attacking forces over
concealed routes that by-pass guerrilla outposts. In order to
bring maximum fire power against the guerrillas as soon after con-
tact as possible, distances between elements are kept at a minimum
and automatic weapons are kept well forward.
The leading elements of the tactical
to gain contact without being discovered.Ifsuccessful,o try
they
withhold fire, remain in concealed positions, and send back con-
tinual fragmentary reports of essential information like time of
contact, location, size, composition and disposition of the guer-
rillas, and the character of the terrain. Unless otherwise ordered,
they. stay concealed and prepare to guide troops into attack posi-
tions designated by the commander. When contact is gained with
unalerted guerrilla forces late in the day, or at night, it is
usually better for the main forces to complete the movement into
attack positions during darkness and launch the attack at the
first light of day. Guerrillas often stay in camps or bivouacs
during the day and move at night. Part of the main forces is
maneuvered and deployed at the earliest practicable time to block
such movement.
c. When advance echelons contact alerted guerrillas,
they act To counter guerrilla reactions. If the guerrilla forces
try to withdraw, the leading elements open fire at once, seek to
envelop the position, and place fire on routes of withdrawal
pending the arrival of the main forces. If the guerrilla forces
attack, the leading elements immediately warn the main forces and
maneuver to keep contact with the guerrillas and maintain posi-
tions between the guerrillas and the main forces until the main
forces can go into action. The reactions of the advanced elements
are similar to those of an advance guard in normal operations.
The success or failure of the whole operation depends on the quick-
ness and aggressiveness of the advance elements and the speed of
the main forces in joining the action.
d. When the situation permits, double envelopment is
used in tfie attack of the main forces to produce the greatest
possible shock and confusion on the guerrilla forces and to limit
their withdrawal. The objective of completely destroying the
guerrillas, rather than taking ground or dispersing them, must
be kept foremost in mind. Unlike normal combat, the attack forma-
tions seldom need great depth. Reserves and support units are
used to block possible routes of withdrawal and to pursue relent-
lessly any dispersed guerrilla remnants. As guerrillas normally
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lack supporting weapons, the attack should be pressed and the
attacking forces should close more rapidly than is customary
against regular forces in normal combat.
86. PURSUIT AND MOPPIIIG UP
a.' Combat groups are organized and held in readiness to
pursue guerrillas who succeed in withdrawing or who are dispersed
during the course of the main operation. To match the mobility
of small guerrilla groups, the pursuit combat groups should be
specially equipped and supplied. Artillery and air support is
provided when the situation permits. During these relatively
small-scale operations, the situation will often change with
lightning speed. Adequate forces are held in reserve to assist
units threatened by superior guerrilla forces. Their effective-
ness depends on mobility and adequate communications.
b After a successful attack on a guerrilla-held area,
the area Ta not relinquished immediately but is combed for con-
cealed guerrilla personnel and equipment. Documents and records
are collected for intelligence analysis. Traps and ambushes are
established. along trails in the area, and are manned both day and
night. These will catch many guerrillas who escaped the main
attack and are confused about the situation. The period after
guerrilla Forces have been badly mauled and broken up into small
groups is 8n excellent time for planes to drop propaganda calling
upon them to give up the helpless struggle and surrender.
87. GENERAL
Special anti-guerrilla units are organized, equipped, and
trained to combat guerrilla forces by using guerrilla methods.
They are an effective means of carrying on offensive action with
relatively small forces. Under many conditions they are more
effective than larger conventional troop units. To prevent
detection they avoid contact with the local populace. They march
at night and remain in concealed camps during the day. Through
necessity most of their operations are conducted during darkness.
After an encounter or detection, and at frequent intervals, they
move to new concealed camps. The chief value of these units is
not their numerical strength, but the abilities of the com;nander
and the individuals to develop special skills and teamwork. The
effectiveness of a special anti-guerrilla unit increases as it
becomes thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the habits of
the hostile guerrillas and the supporting populace.
88. CAPABILITIES
d,. Special anti-guerrilla units are used for missions
like reconnaissance, security, destruction of guerrilla forces by
raids and ambushes, and disruption of guerrilla communications
and supply.
b. After strong guerrilla concentrations have been
dispersedrin.to inaccessible or uncontrolled areas, special
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anti-guerrilla units are committed to harass and destroy the
smaller guerrilla formations and to prevent their reorganization.
c. Detailed missions within defined sectors may be as-
signed to special anti-guerrilla units. In general, however, the
missions and area of operations of these units should be broad
in scope. Commanders should be given great latitude and freedom
of action. Normally, sector boundaries should not limit their
area of operation. Special anti-guerrilla commanders are trained
and encouraged to exercise ingenuity and to exploit opportunities
to deliver crippling blows against hostile guerrillas. Special
anti-guerrilla units may operate effectively in areas through
which the guerrillas move, in areas where they requisition their
supplies or receive them from external sources, and in objective
areas that are commonly attacked by guerrillas. They cannot be
used against well-organized, fortified and strongly-defended
guerrilla positions unless adequately supported by larger units.
A number of special anti-guerrilla units coordinated with other
forces in the area, and with each other, can, however, neutralize
or destroy a guerrilla menace.
d. In particular circumstances, it may be possible for
special anti-guerrilla units to masquerade as guerrilla units and
gain the confidence of actual guerrilla units and their civilian
supporter:. They may also be able to confuse the civilian sup-
porters as to which group they can support and trust.
89. PERSONNEL
a. Individuals are selected, preferably from volunteers,
who are at qualified for anti-guerrilla warfare. They aho+ild
be intelligent, self-confident, and physicallyfit. Personal ex-
perience with unusual terrain is an asset but not essential.
Hunters, trappers and combat-seasoned veterans are particularly
well suited. Their ability to work harmoniously within the group
is more important than their individual inherent or acquired as-
sets. Units must be organized that will operate without friction
for prolonged periods of time under unusual strain. Specialists
and technicians for communication, medical, demolition, and in-
terpreter needs are included in each team. Once the unit is or-
ganized, it lives, trains, and operates as a team.
b. Carefully screened enemy nationals are used whenever
possible 'for guides, interpreters, and supply functions.
90. ORGANIZATION
The organization of special anti-guerrilla units will vary
according to factors like topography, climate, radius of opera-
tions, logistical consideration, mission, hostile guerrilla
forces, native population, and friendly supporting troops. The
illustrated organization (fig. 13) may serve as ^ guide for
planning purposes. The unit is organised into a headquarters and
three or more squads. The strength of the unit is kept at a
minimum to insure cross-country mobility. This also makes con-
cealment easier and simplifies the supply problem. When necessary,
a special weapons squad may be attached to the unit.
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SPECIAL
ANTI.GUERRILLA
UNIT
?
SPECIAL
(WEAPONS I
I COMDR
I LDR
I PLAT SGT
I LDR ASST
I PLAT SGT ASST
I RMAN AUTO
I RADIO OPR
I RMAN AUTO ASST
I RADIO OPR ASST
5 RMEN
I MED NCO
I RIFLE AUTO
I MED NCO ASST
I SMG CAL 45
2 WSGR
7 CBN CAL .30
_
rSUF'PLY DETAIL 1
NATIVE GUIDES &
INTERPRETERS J
2 9MG CAL .45
7 CBN CAL .30
Figure 13. Typical organization of a special
anti-guerrilla unit.
(Text key: Para 90.)
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91. ARMS AND EQUIPMENT
Units are armed and equipped to live and operate for a pro-
longed time in the field without returning to their base.
Balanced with staying power, the need for mobility dictates light
portable loads. Armament should include light automatic weapons
like the automatic rifle and sub-machine gun. The carbine may
replace the service rifle in close country, jungles, thick forests,
and mountains. Normally crew-served weapons are not used. Hand
grenades should be carried by nearly everyone in the unit and each
individual carries a knife. The terrain and climatic conditions
dictate the need for special clothing and equipment. Each unit
is equipped with a light portable radio to communicate with its
base headquarters and with other friendly units operating in the
area. This same radio can communicate with army aircraft to ef-
fect air-ground support, artillery support, and supply air-drops.
To facilitate control and coordination within special anti-guer-
rilla units, the squads and unit headquarters are equipped with
low-powered portable voice sets.
a. The training of anti-guerrilla units, like their
organization, is as flexible as needed to best prepare individuals
and units for operations in specific areas. It is assumed that
all men have been specially selected; that all have completed
basic training; and that the technicians are fully trained and
qualified in their special fields. Throughout training, emphasis
is placed on individual initiative to encourage men to take pro-
per action when alone and specific orders are not available.
b. Training procedures are adopted which increase the
men's confidence in the officers and noncommissioned officers
of the unit. This may be accomplished to some extent by having
the officers and noncommissioned officers undergo a special pre-
liminary course in anti-guerrilla warfare. Units are then or-
ganized around these specially trained officers and noncommis-
sioned officers who in turn conduct the individual and unit train-
ing of their own unit. Throughout the training period, men are
closely observed to detect misfits; these are promptly replaced.
o. Although the training courses vary to meet the
special conditions of various areas of operations, some subjects
are common to the individual and unit training of all anti-guer-
rilla units. Improvisation is stressed throughout training.
Training subjects include:
(1) Field craft (adapted to the terrain and climatic
conditions of the area).
(2) First aid.
(3) Water skills.
(4) Weapons.
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(6) Physical training.
(7) Map reading and sketching.
(8) Scouting, patrolling, and sniping.
(9) Communications.
(10) Air-ground operations.
(11) Artillery sensing.
(12) Unarmed defense.
(13) Demolitions and booby traps.
(14) Security.
(15) Night operations.
(16) Special tactics (ambushes, raids, etc.).
(17) Intelligence.
(18) Hostile guerrilla forces.
(19) Native populace.
(20) Language.
(21) Questioning guerrilla prisoners and native
(22) Use of native guides and collaborators.
(23) Supply and administration.
(24) Field exercises.
? Section VIII
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
In anti-guerrilla warfare the emphasis shifts from the use
of large units to the use of small, highly mobile unite. The
strategy, tactics, and techniques of regular combat are modified
to cope with the irregular aspects of guerrilla warfare. Special
consideration is given to command and leadership, morale, organi-
zation, equipment, training, supporting units (ground and air),
communication, logistical support, and operation methods. To
outline all the factors that might receive special consideration,
however is beyond the scope of this manual. Even the following
discussion of factors and principles that deserve special con-
sideration In anti-guerrilla operations is not to be regarded as
final.
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The general principles of command and leadership are applic-
able to anti-guerrilla operations, but the techniques of their
application must conform to the conditions imposed by various
situations.
a. Morale of forces mngaged in anti-guerrilla warfare
presents problems quite different from those encountered in nor-
mal combat. Operating against an elusive, violent destructive
force that seldom offers s target, that disintegrates before op-
position, and then reforms and strikes again is quite different
from operating against the more tangible forces encountered in
normal combat. Visible results can seldom be observed. The com-
forts of remaining passive in garrison will often seem preferable
to tramping the hills in search of an evasive enemy. Units placed
on anti-guerrilla duty during periods of rest from front-line duty
will be resentful. This will result in a temptation for men and
junior leaders to make only half-hearted efforts to locate and
eliminate the guerrillas. This problem must be countered by
strong and capable leadership, by indoctrination in the importance
of the anti-guerrilla effort, and by utilizing reliant and daring;
junior leaders.
b. Anti-guerrilla warfare requires the use of many
small patrols and detachments, often for considerable periods of
time. Being separated from their major units and surrounded by
a hostile and unfriendly population has a deteriorating effect
on the morale of the men In these small groups. Once again,
strong leadership and thorough indoctrination, plus maintaining
the offensive, assist the commander in dealing with this problem.
This problem is also minimized when troops are kept in the area
long enough to become familiar with it and when small units are
granted a great degree of initiative in developing methods of
combating the guerrillas. Heroism and excellence in anti-guer-
rilla operations must be given the same recognition and reward as
in regular combat.
a
c. Commanders of all echelons find themselves operating
for prolonged periods of time on independent missions where much
of their support, both moral and material, depends on their own
ingenuity, skill, knowledge, courage, and tenacity.
d. The scope and nature of a commander's mission may
include political and administrative aspects seldom encountered
in normal operations. The methods and technique of combat that
commanders have been trained to apply within their parent organi-
zations may have to be modified or even disregarded.
Infantry units have a very difficult task in anti-guerrilla
warfare. operations in Inaccessible terrain frequently deny them
the normal support of artillery, armor, mortars, and heavy machine
guns. To develop cross-country mobility, they may be compelled
to operate with hand-carried arms and equipment. Reduced loads,
necessary to prolong the endurance of the men, result in a serious
decrease in -striking power. They are denied much of the individual
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and unit equipment that enhances the comfort of the soldier in
the field. In vast areas that lack adequate roads and trails,
resupply and care and evacuation of wounded are factors that not
only materia:.ly affect operations but pose grave morale problems.
Even in the best trained units, morale may be quickly undermined
by the lack of means to evacuate casualties. It is comparatively
easy to penetrate guerrilla-controlled areas with relatively small
regular unitia, but to maintain and support those units so that
they can accomplish their mission is more difficult.
a. The terrain in which guerrilla forces take refuge
will usually limit or prevent artillery support of ground units
in the conventional manner. However, the demoralizing effect
of artillery fire on guerrillas will often justify its use when
there is little possibility of its inflicting material damage.
Before artillery support is ruled out, all limitations are care-
fully studied and analyzed. Flexibility and ingenuity will often
make artillery support possible under whatare seemingly the most
adverse circumstances. Range and trajectory capabilities, the
cross-countr,,f mobility of tracked prime movers, and the capabili-
ties of radios and army aircraft are fully exploited. Pioneering
work may permit the use of trails and dry steam beds to reach the
interior. All leaders down through section must be skilled in
reconnaissance, pioneering, and field expedients. Thorough aerial,
map, and gro,and reconnaissance aids surprise. Ground reconnais-
sance is accomplished by a limited party disguising their inten-
tions, and positions are occupied quickly just before the attack.
b. A combat-tested way to use artillery against guer-
rillas is illustrated in figure 14.
(1) Artillery is emplaced around the perimeter of
the area to be cleared -)f guerrillas. It may be used by batta-
lion, battery, platoon, or section. Positions are set up with
barbed wire obstacles for all-around defense. Additional person-
nel may be required for this. A computer is stationed at each
firing position. A firing chart (either from observed fire or
built up from a map or aerial photograph with gun positions in-
dicated by survey or inspection) is maintained at each position.
As survey of the target area is usually impracticable, angle-
of-sits comrutations and accurate target location are quite diffi-
cult.
(2) The decentralization of artillery units and
their control places a burden on communication and fire control
facilities that can be met only by improvisation. As radio is
the most flexible and mobile and at times the only possible means
of communicaition in guerrilla terrain, it may be necessary to use
army aircraft as radio relay stations between the guns and the
forward observers with the infantry. Observers in army aircraft
may also function as a flying fire direction center (FDC) to
control and mass fires. In this situation, the observer in the
aircraft not only relays and monitors, and at times observes fire
missions, but he also decides which guns can best handle the
mission. Guerrillas retreating from the fire of guns on one side
of the perimeter may be hit by artillery fire from the other side.
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 Figure 14. Use of flying fire direction center
to control and mass artillery fires
a ainst guerrillas.
(Teat key: Para 96.)
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(3) Transportation is limited in most anti-guerril-
la operations. The greatest use possible is made of army air-
craft to trsmaport all types of supplies including ammunition.
97. USE, OF ARMOR
a. Security or offensive forces can often use armor
effectiveTy,, The mere presence of enemy armor is demoralizing to
guerrilla forces. The poor terrain normally occupied by guerrilla
forces, however, usually prevents the massing of armor.
b. Armor used against guerrillas must be closely sup-
ported by infantry. Guerrillas in the past have ordinarily lack-
ed adequate and effective antitank weapons. However, they are
quite skilled at improvising means to destroy or cripple tanks
and the devo lopment of recoilless weapons and light rockets has
changed the;Lr potential ability to combat armor.
98. US3 OF AIRBORNE UNITS
Airborne unit a, when available, can be of tremendous value
in anti-guerrilla operations because they possess the advantages
of 'surprise;, mobility, and shock action. Attacking airborne units
may be dropped inside the security perimeters of the guerrillas,
thus increasing the possibility of surprise. Use of these units
permits encircling movements that the nature of the terrain and
routes of approach (fig-15) would otherwise prevent. Airborne
units may be dropped to out off guerrillas being pursued after
an attack qr to relieve a distant detachment besieged by guerril-
las.
99. USE OF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
The principles governing the use of reconnaissance aircraft
are applicable in counterguerrilla operations. In areas where
hostile air and antiaircraft weapons are ineffective, slow-flying
army aircraft are better suited to observe scattered guerrilla
installations and small, slow-moving formations than are the con-
ventional combat reconnaissance planes.
100. AIR-GROUND SUPPORT
Close air-ground support is highly flexible and effective
in counterguerrilla operations. To provide it, special considera-
tion is given to communication and the organization and employ-
ment of tactical air control parties (TACP). The use of conven-
tional TACT' is impracticable when a great number of small mobile
units are operating on. a broad front, because of the large number
of TACP that would be required. To provide air-ground support to
any number of small ground units, an improvised, highly mobile
and flexible system must be devised. A description of a system
that would provide support under these conditions follows (fig-16):
a? Two radios are installed in each army aircraft. One,
a very hii frequency (VHF) set, permits communication with Air
Forces tacl;ioal aircraft. The other, a ground high frequency
(HF) set, permits communication with ground combat units. The
pilots and observers in these aircraft are used as mobile TACP.
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Figure 15. Use of airborne units in encircle-
ment of guerrillas.
(Text key: pars, 98.)
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 ApprovF.a -
Figure 16. Use of tactical air control party liaison
plane for close air-ground support.
(Text key: pars, 100.)
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b. Each ground unit is equipped with HF radio to com-
municate with its headquarters and with TACP aircraft.
C. A ground unit wanting air support requests an air
strike through channels in the manner prescribed in FM 31-35. If
the request is approved, the air strike is set up and the re-
questing unit is notified that a TACP liaison plane will circle
the position at a designated hour, contacting the unit for fur-
ther target information and directing the air strike.
d. A TACP liaison plane is dispatched to the combat
unit's area before the scheduled air strike. On arriving over
the ground combat unit, it circles the position, contacts the
ground unit by radio, and is briefed on the target mission.
e. The TACP liaison plane stays over the target area
until the-combat planes arrive. On their arrival, the TACP liai-
son plane contacts the flight leader and directs the air strike.
Two or three TACP liaison planes, with their great flexibility,
can furnish close air-ground support to any number of ground cam-
bat units in a broad area of ten to fifteen thousand square miles?
lul. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT BY AIR
Light loads increase the mobility and endurance of anti-guer-
rilla units but reduce their staying power. Improvised ground
resupply systems may require excessive manpower. Aircraft,
however, can usually supply units of all sizes. Small units may
be supplied by army aircraft. Sick and wounded may be evacuated
by helicopters, or if suitable landing sites can be prepared, by
airplanes. Although logistical support by air is flexible, it
has limitations. Operations against guerrillas often take place
in mountains, woods, Jungles, and marshes. It will often be
difficult to select drop zones. Inclement weather may also ham-
per air supply missions. The rapidly changing situations that
characterize anti-guerrilla operations may require the location
of drop zones to be changed on short notice. This is difficult
unless radio communication is maintained with ground combat units.
The danger of supplies falling into the hands of the guerrillas
is a constant danger that must be minimized by detailed planning
and meticulous execution.
The helicopter h wide application in counterguerrilla
operations. Its ability to land in a small clearing or hover
above a point on the ground makes It highly suitable for recon-
naissance, liaison, supply, and evacuation. It is extremely
valuable for transporting, supplying and evacuating small units
over inaccessible terrain.
103. INTERFERENCE WITH GUERRILLA SUPPLY FROM REGULAR FORCES
a. Hostile guerrilla forces often depend on logistical
support by air. Men and supplies are delivered at night by para-
chute, transport, or glider. Interceptor aircraft are used to
disrupt or destroy enemy supply planes. In areas known to be used
by guerrillas for aerial resupply, all-weather fighter units are
used to prevent this resupply.
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b. Another frequently used channel for supply of guer-
rilla forces is submarine. The waters of all coastal areas ad-
jacent to guerrilla areas that are favorable for submarine con-
tact should be patrolled and mined. In the absence of wharfs,
submarine cargos are transferred to shore in small boats. The
activities Of all small craft belonging to civilians must there-
fore be rigidly controlled. The rapid transfer inland of large
submarine cargos requires great numbers of civilian parties.
The concentration of large numbers of male civilians in a coastal
area should therefore be regarded with suspicion.
The dispersion of units in counterguerrilla operations
places a strain on communication facilities throughout a command.
The greatest difficulties are in the lower echelons. Operations
are expanded throughout all echelons and this increases the com-
munication requirements. Local facilities are fully utilized to
help expand the communication nets. These facilities, however,
are not reliable. They are not only extremely vulnerable to
guerrilla attacks but are also exposed to guerrilla use. Radio
is the most flexible of the communication means. Special consi-
deration is given to the need for additional and special communi-
cation equipment over-and above standard allowances.
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APPENDIX I
REFERENCES
FM 27-5, UNITED STATES ARMY AND NAVY MANUAL OF CIVIL AFFAIRS
MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
FM 27-10, RULES OF LAND WARFARE.
FM 30-5, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--COMBAT INTELLIGENCE.
FM 30-10, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--OBSERVATION.
FM 30-15, EXAMINATION OF ENEMY PERSONNEL, REPATRIATES, CIVILIANS,
DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL.
FM 30-20, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--MILITARY MAPS.
FM 30-21, AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY MILITARY APPLICATION.
FM 30-22, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--FOREIGN CONVENTIONAL SIGNS AND
SYMBOLS.
FM 30-25, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
FM 30-28, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY CENSORSHIP.
FM 30-30, RECOGNITION, PICTORIAL MANUAL, AIRCRAFT.
FM 30-40, RECOGNITION, PICTORIAL MANUAL, ARMORED VEHICLES.
FM 30-50, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE-RECOGNITION PICTORIAL MANUAL,
NAVAL VESSELS.
FM 31-35, AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS.
FM 33-5, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS.
FM 100-5, OPERATIONS.
SR 320-5-1, DICTIONARY OF UNITED STATES ARMY TER1.
DICTIONARY OF UNITED STATES TER69S FOR JOINT USAGE.
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APPENDIX II
ADVICE TO INSTRUCTORS
1. SCOPE
The scope of this manual is so broad that there will be fa-
occasions when the entire manual is applicable to a particular
teaching situation. The following advice is offered to instructors
as a guide in using this manual to meet training problems in the
subject of anti-guerrilla warfare.
2. GENERAL
All students should be familiarized with the general character-
istics of gu3rrilla warfare. For this purpose the material in
paragraph 10 and paragraphs 13-50 will be of value. All students
should be made to full realize that errilla warfare can
ser ous interrere with e____~~o~pe__r__a__~~ons o reg ar forces. The
van ages au disadvantage s guerrilla warfaree s =Tbe
stressed as a basis for future instruction in the principles and
tactics of Enti-guerrilla operations.
3. INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL UNIT TRAINING
The most important lesson to be taught is that constant
alertness is the best protection against the effects of guerrilla
attack. The. defensive tactics of anti-guerrilla warfare as
described in paragraphs 72 and 74 should be well covered by
lecture, demonstration, and practical application.
4. TRAINING OF LARGER UNITS
The application of the offensive and defensive tactics of
anti-guerrilla warfare as described in paragraphs 69-74 and para-
graphs 76-86 should be covered in training larger units. Guerrilla
warfare situations should be included occasionally in field
exercises and maneuvers.
5. OFFICER AND STAFF TRAINING
The command and staff requirements of anti-guerrilla operations
should be included in this type of training. The material in
paragraphs 111-104 will be valuable for this purpose.
6. .MILITARY GOVERNMENT TEAMS
I
The admdnistrative aspect of anti-guerrilla operations should
be emphasized in training these teams, and the integration of
anti-guerrilla policies with other occupation and military govern-
ment policies should be thoroughly covered and discussed. The
administrative aspect of anti-guerrilla operations is described
in paragraphs 51-57, paragraph 61, and paragraphs 66-68.
7. SPECIAL ANTI-GUERRILLA UNITS
Besides the material described in paragraphs 3 and 4 above,
the special material in paragraphs 87-92 will be of value.
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Paragraph Pale
Action, offensive .................... 76-86 56-63
Action,puaitive 68 47
Administrative measures .........?..?.. 66-68 47
Agents, special 0.0 ... ................. 64 44
Airborne units, use of ?..?.?.......... 98 71
Air-ground support .................... 100 71
Allied forces ...... ........*.~~~~~~~~~ 60 43
Armor use of ......................... 97 71
Artillery, us,*;!*
se of ..................... 96 69
Command and leadership .....,......???? 94 68
Communication ................ ........ 104 75
Considerations ........ ........~~~~~~~~ 56 40
Enemy nationals ....................... 61 43
Forces, continuity of .. ............... 59 42
Forces employed ...... 58-61 42,43
Files, personality ....?.......~,~,~~~~ 64 44
Helicopters ........................... 102 74
Infantry units ........< ............... 95 68
Information, special .................~ 64 44
Inhabitants ...........< ............... 54 37
Intelligence 62-65 44-46
Logistical support by air ............. 101 74
Measures, administrative .............. 66 47
Measures, special ..................... 67 47
Military government, establishing ..... 57 41
Nationals, enemy ........ ............. 61 43
Offensive action:
Attack ............................. 85 62
Continuity ......................... 78 56
Destruction of encircled forces .... 84 58
Encirclement ....................... 82 57
Forms of ........................... 81 57
Mobility ...... ........... 80 57
Movement to line of encirclement ... 83 58
Purpose ............................ 77 56
Pursuit and mopping up .... 000000000 86 63
Surprise ............a..........?.~. 79 56
Operations, conduct of ...............~ 57 41
Operations, offensive .... .............. 57 41
Personnel .........?....u .............. 63 44
Plan, over-all .........> .............. 52 36
Planning ..............................
8
8
Definition ,...........> ...............
2
4
Historical examples .,.> ...............
3
4
Human factors influencing .............
13
15
Legal status ..........> ...............
12
11
Reasons for importance in World War II.
11
9
Instructors, advice to ...................
App II
77
Liaison plane, tactical air control party.
100
71
Manpower, sources of, for guerrillas .....
24
19
Morale importance of .................. ...
28
20
Operations, guerrilla ....................
35-50
24-34
Organization, guerrilla ...,....r..........
13-34
15-23
Organization, phases of ..,. ...............
19-22
17,18
Planning, effect of prior ,. ..............
23
18
Preparations, advance, for guerrilla
warfare ..................,......... ......
18
16
Rules of land warfare .....................
12
11
Strategy guerrilla ......................
10
8
Supply of guerrilla forces ...............
30
21
Supply, sources of for guerrillas ........
15
16
Terrain ..................................
54
37
Topography, effect on guerrilla warfare ..
14
15
Training of guerrillas ...................
29
21
Truces ...................................
75
55
Units, guerrilla, size of ................
25
19
Weather ..................................
54
37
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