PROBABLE INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00664R000300110004-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 27, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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TS# 142225
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
27 January 1961
D RAFT
INTERNAL ONE ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Probable International Reactions to Certain
Possible US Courses of Action against the Castro
Regime
Introduction
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to assess the inter-
national risks involved in various types of action the US might
take to weaken or overthrow the Castro government -- especially
the nature and magnitude of possible Bloc countermoves and the
possibility of serious adverse reactions on the part of Latin
American countries or others in the Free World. We must empha-
size that actual international reactions might be greatly in-
fluenced by circumstantial factors which cannot be accurately
foreseen -- by the precise nature of the US action, by the manner,
speed, and success with which it was carried out, by new develop-
ments in the situation which might affect international opinion
I/CDF (d c: ID 134244)
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III
regarding the justification of the US action or (in the case
of the Bloc) the possibilities for countering it without undue
risk. Nevertheless, we C'elieve some valid generalizations can
be made, on the basis of the situation as it has developed so
far, regarding certain broad lines of action open to the US.
Vqrious steps have already been taken by the US against the
Castro regime: the sugar quota has been eliminated; virtually
all other US economic trade with Cuba has been placed under
embargo; political and diplomatic moves have been taken to
isolate and condemn Cuba in the American community; and, most
recently, diplomatic relations have been broken. Thus, for
purposes of this memorandum, we consider that any US effort to
greatly increase the pressures on Castro would probably involve
moves, unilaterally or with the support of other Latin American
countries, to (a) establish a naval and air blockade of Cuba;
(b) provide active support, of varying degrees of magnitude and
overtness, to an attempt by Cuban opposition elements, internal
and in exile, to overthrow Castro; or (c) undertake an overt
military invasion of Cuba.
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Sino-olloviet Bloc Reactions
2. Bloc interests and prestige are by now aeeply involved
in Cuba. Bloc leaders from the start have recognized the value
of a revolutionary, pro-Communist Cuba as a source of irritation
and embarrassment to the US, as an example for revolutionary
movements elsewhere in the hemisphere, and as a center for
Communist as well as Cuban agitation and propaganda throughout
Latin America. Indeed, the Cuban example has assumed increasing
prominence in Soviet and (even more so) Chinese Communist
assessments of the world situation. Cuba is being depicted as a
prime example of the Communist thesis that colonial regimes are
inevitably toppling under the impact of revolutionary national-
ism, and that Bloc strength can prevent the imperialists from
re-intervening to reverse this process. Further, in the Bloc's
view the Castro regime is farther alcrag toward the. next stage --
the advent of Communist power than any other Free World
country. The Bloc has provided Castro with extensive political,
ecoar=:sic, and military support, including tanks and artillery as
well as extensive quantities of small arms. While carefully
avoiding firm commitments, Khrushchev has further involved Bloc
prestige in several statements designed to create the impression
that the Cuban revolution is under the protection of Soviet
missiles.
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3. For these reasons, the Bloc would regard Castro's
downfall as a substantial political defeat and would respond
vigorously to any major US move -- overt or covert and whether
or not supported by others -- to bring it about. Such
reaction might include the dispatch of additional military supplies
to Castro, if need be by submarine or aircraft. In the event of
an unresolved military struggle between Castro and US-backed oppo-
sition forces, it is conceivable, though we believe unlikely, that
the Bloc might even seek to introduce a few "volunteers" to handle
specialized equipment. In any event, the Bloc would probably
issue generalized warnings of the possibility of wider hostilities,
perhaps accompanied by nav ral redeployments and other military
demonstrations.
4. However, we believe that such Bloc military moves as
were undertaken would be primarily political acts designed to
heighten the crisis so as to play on worldwide fears of general
war and that the Bloc would carefully avoid a direct military
confrontation with US forces. The Communist leaders almost
certainly recognize that Cuba's geographical location sharply
limits their ability to counter US military moves there and that
US sensitivity regarding Cuba would make the risks of general
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war particularly great. Thus Bloc efforts would probably be
primarily directed at heading off the American threat to Cuba
by political means, exploiting in the process all opportunities
to exploit political reactions against the US. Its campaign
would probably stress emergency action by the UN to curb and
censure the US. Given certain circumstances, it might seek to
establish some sort of international control mechanism for Cuba.
5, If the US succeeded in bringing Castro down, the Bloc
leaders, and particularly the Chinese Communists, would feel
themselves under pressure to offset this defeat (and impress the
US with their displeasure) by initiatives elsewhere. At least
the Scvi