S.2284-NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT OF 1980

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010012-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 8, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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February ~, 1980
is much too late to be of assistance to
farmers throughout the Southeastern
United States. Many of these farmers
begin...planting corn in late February.
Orders _'r seed, fertilizer, pesticides, and
other necessary items for planting must
be placed several weeks prior to the an-
ticipated planting date to insure ade-
quate time for delivery. How can these
farmers be expected to make rational
planting and marketing decisions with-
out knowledge of the administration's
plans regarding a crop diversion pro-
gram in 1980?
Mr. President, on several occasions I
have expressed my support of the sus-
pension Of grain sales to the Soviet
Union. However, I have also strongly
voiced my views that farmers should not
bear a disproportionate share of the
burden. It seems to me that forcing them
to make critical planting decisions-de-
cisions that have the potential of bank-
rupting many farmers should they seri-
ously miscalculate-is clearly unfair and'
unnecessary.
Mr. President, this is a very real and
serious problem. In 1978, the value of
corn produced for grain purposes in
South Carolina exceeded $68 million.
The farmers of South Carolina cannot
afford to make decisions of such great
magnitude in the state of suspense they
find themselves in today.
Findings of a survey, completed just
prior to the announcement of the sus-
pension of grain sales to the Soviet
Union, indicate that South Carolina
farmers planned to increase corn acre-
age by 19 percent in 1980. Today, these
farmers have no idea of what they
should do.
Several days ago, I sent a letter to
Secretary of Agriculture Bergland,
which other members of the South Caro-
lina congressional delegation cosigned,
urging a prompt announcement of any
decisions pertaining to acreage diversion
programs in 1980. Today I ask all my col-
leagues in the Senate to join me in ex-
pressing the urgency of announcing
such decisions as soon as possible, and I
am now introducing an appropriate
Senate resolution for this purpose.
The administration has committed it-
self to insuring that the American farm-
ers not be forced to bear a dispropor-
tionate share of the effects of the grain
embargo. Yet, Southeastern farmers are
today being forced to do just that. This
situation is most unfair and cannot be
allowed to continue.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that my letter to Secretary Berg-
land be printed at this point in the
RECORD. I also ask unanimous consent
that the text of this resolution be printed
in the RECORD following these remarks.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C., January 31, 1980.
HOn. BOB BERGLAND,
Secretary of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SECRETARY BERGLAND: The present
March 1st deadline for announcing any de-
cisions concerning acreage division programs
for the 1980 crops of feed grain and wheat
is a point of great concern to the South Caro-
lina Congressional Delegation.
Farmers in South Carolina, as well as in
the rest of the Souhteast, are currently at-
tempting to formulate planting and market-
ing strategies for the 1980 crop year. In fact,
many of these farmers normally begin the
planting of corn in late February. In order for
supplies to arrive at the appropriate time,
the farmers must place their orders with
farm suppliers several weeks in advance of
their anticipated planting date.
The farmers of South Carolina and the
Southeast have been placed in a very awk-
ward position as a result of the late an-
nouncement date for a decision on acreage
diversion programs in 1980. We feel that plac-
ing these farmers in such a state of uncer-
tainty is completely unfair. They cannot and
should not be expected to make rational
planting and marketing decisions under the
existing conditions.
In view of these facts, we strongly urge you
to announce a decision on any acreage di-
version programs for the 1980 crops of feed
grains and wheat as soon as possible. Fur-
thermore, we urge you to implement any pro-
grams necessary to protect producers of other
agricultural commodities that may be ad-
versely affected by the Administration's re-
cent decision not to issue export licenses for
any agricultural products to the Soviet
Union.
With kindest regards.
MENDEL DAvIs,
BUTLER DERRICK,
JOHN W. JENRETTE, Jr.,
STROM THURMOND,
CARROLL A. CAMPDELL, Jr..
FLOYD SPENCE,
KENNETH L. HOLLAND.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the resolution.
The resolution (S. Res. 366) was
agreed to.
The preamble was agreed to.
The resolution, with its preamble,
reads as follows:
S. RES. 366
Whereas American farmers have been ad-
versely affected by the suspension of grain
sales to the Soviet Union; and
Whereas the future effects of the suspen-
sion on the sale of grain to the Soviet Union
are uncertain; and
Whereas farmers in the southeastern part
of the United States need to begin ordering
supplies, preparing their acreage for plant-
ing, and making other necessary plans for
the 1980 crops of wheat and feed grains; and
Whereas American farmers cannot make
rational planting and marketing decisions
with respect to the 1980 crops of wheat and
feed grains without adequate information
concerning the executive branch's plans for
an acreage diversion program for such crops:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Sen-
ate that the Secretary of Agriculture should
announce promptly his decision on whether
there will be an acreage diversion program
in effect for the 1980 crops of wheat and feed
grains.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
move to reconsider the vote by which
the resolution was agreed to, and, Mr.
President, I move to lay that motion on
the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
S 1305
S. 2284-NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ACT OF 1980
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I
Lm joining with the Senator from In-
diana (Mr. BAYH), the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee, Senator GOLD-
WATER, the vice chairman, and Senator
MATHIAS, to introduce the National In-
telligence Act of 1980.
Senator MATHIAS, as vice chairman of
the Subcommittee on Charters and
Guidelines, and I, as chairman, are act-
ing at the direction of the full commit-
tee. Shortly after President Carter was
inaugurated, the full committee met
with the President and agreed to work
together to write a legislative charter
governing the intelligence activities of
the United States. We all agreed that a
consensus was desirable between the
executive and legislative branches in
order to write a statute that would have
the widest possible support. The Na-
tional Intelligence Act represents end-
less hours of work over the past 3 years
by members of the Intelligence Commit-
tee, the intelligence community, the Jus-
tice Department, and the White House.
This effort has been thoroughly biparti-
san; regulation of intelligence activity is
much too vital to our national interest to
be lost in partisan wrangling.
With only one major exception which
I shall discuss later, the committee and
the executive branch have indeed reach-
ed a consensus on the conduct of intelli-
gence activities. The positions in this bill
are not mine or the Intelligence Com-
mittee's; they represent the joint prod-
uct of the executive branch and the sub-
committee. In his state of the Union
speech, the President called for "quick
passage of a charter to define clearly the
legal authority and accountability of our
intelligence agencies." The National In-
telligence Act is that charter. For the
first time in history, a nation has set
down in law what it expects from its in-
telligence agencies.
The National Security Act of 1947, the
current "charter" for intelligence activi-
ties, is vague and cursory. As Clark Clif-
ford, a primary author of that legisla-
tion, told this committee, that act was
considered interim legislation that would
be replaced once the Executive and Con-
gress better knew what was required.
Here, we have given the intelligence com-
munity authority to do what needs to be
done.
We set forth the mission of the prin-
cipal agencies in as much detail as
needed. The role of the National Security
Council in defining intelligence policies
is clearly spelled out. As under the
President's Executive order, a central
figure-here called the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence-is given the author-
ity to coordinate the foreign intelligence
functions of separate entities of the intel-
ligence community including the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Secur-
ity Agency, and the Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Specific authority is given to these
agencies to carry out the kinds of intel-
ligence activities which are required in
today's world. This includes collection of
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foreign intelligence through both techni-
cal and human source's. It includes ens
gaging in counterintelligence and coun-
terterrorism activities. And finally, it also
includes, when important to the security
of the United States, the conduct of spe-
cial activities, or covert action.
Although there are restrictions and
limitations on intelligence activities, the
act authorizes all intelligence activities
which the, agencies believe are necessary.
Unwarranted restraint on the CIA is
removed. For example, the Hughes-Ryan
amendment which requires admittedly
excessive reporting to Congress on covert
operations overseas would be modified to
limit prior notice only to the intelligence
oversight committees. Similarly, CIA has
complained of unnecessary burdens
caused by Freedom of Information Act
requests. Yet all agree that the FOIA
has helped make the CIA accountable to
the American people. In the context of
comprehensive legislation, the account-
ability of the CIA is insured by stand-
ards and- procedures, congressional over-
sight, and the annual public report of the
Director of National Intelligence. Thus,
we have been able to modify CIA's re-
sponsibilities under the FOIA in the con-
text- of a comprehensive charter; CIA
would have to furnish information only
to Americans asking about themselves
or to those requesting finished intelli-
gence reports.
Instead of restrictions, the act stresses
a system of oversight and accountability.
No more could any intelligence agency
conceivably be out of control. By insur-
ing accountability, we hope also to in-
sure that decisions are made by the right
people, at the right time. There is not
excessive detail here, either. The Presi-
dent, for example, is required to approve
only two types of activities which by
their nature require the highest-level
attention-covert actions and using co-
vert techniques to obtain essential for-
eign intelligence from an American who
is not a spy.
In investigating Americans, the agen-
cies are told what is proper and what Is
not. Clear instructions to the intelli-
gence agencies are necessary to dem-
onstrate that intelligence activities are
fully supported by the Congress and
the executive branch. Restraints on ac-
tivities affecting Americans are neces-
sary and, at the same time, these re-
straints are designed not to affect the
agencies' major task of collecting and
analyzing foreign intelligence.
Under the provisions of this bill,
there is a presumption that Americans
will not be investigated unless they are
acting on behalf of a foreign power or
committing espionage. Searches and
seizures of the possessions of Americans
are not permitted without a court order,
although I might add that the commit-
tee should take a further look at the is-
sue of surreptitious entries. One excep-
tion to the general presumption against
collecting intelligence on innocent Amer-
icans is made in the charter. In extraor-
dinary cases, when an American per-
son possesses information which - the
President believes-to be essential to the
national security, the President may ap-
v
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE February 8, - 1980
prove such collection using "covert
techniques," a term which I hope will be
construed broadly. I have some doubts
about the propriety of such a provision
because it permits the Government to
collect information by intrusive means
on innocent Americans, but the execu-
tive branch has consistently maintained
that this authority is needed for unfore-
seen circumstances where there is a
grave danger to the national security
and there is no other way to secure the
needed information.
The foundation of this charter enter-
prise is congressional oversight. The
minimum necessary to insure that secret
activities will be conducted in accord
with the Constitution is effective over-
sight. Because intelligence operations
are secret, they are not subject to pub-
lic scrutiny and debate, as is normal for-
eign policy. Thus, the intelligence com-
mittees must play key roles as repre-
sentatives for the American. people in
overseing intelligence. Full access to
timely information and prior notice of
significant activities are the prerequisite
for intelligence legislation. Without it
there can be no assurance that careful
scrutiny of intelligence activities will be
given by the legislative branch.
The bill introduced today acknowl-
edges the committee's rights to be fully
and currently informed and to receive
access to necessary information. Of
course, we understand the grave respon-
sibility we have undertaken to act on
behalf of the Congress and to protect in-
telligence secrets. In the 3 years the In-
telligence Committee has been in exist-
ence, we have achieved a reputation for
keeping intelligence secrets and in fact
have been congratulated by President
Carter for our record in this area.
The one fundamental disagreement
with the executive branch in this entire
charter in fact deals with oversight lan-
guage; it is this disagreement which has
prevented introduction of a wholly
agreed bill. The bill contains a provision
requiring prior notice to the Intelligence
Committees of covert activities. We have
also provided for a waiver of the usual
prior notice procedure in extraordinary
circumstances; prior notice would be
provided only to the two intelligence
committees' chairmen and vice ghairmen
and also to the Speaker, the Senate ma-
jorty leader, and the two minority lead-
ers:. As of this moment we have not
reached an agreement on this issue with
the administration, and thus the Intelli-
gence Committee directed us to introduce
the bill without executive branch agree-
ment on this particular issue.
The committee believes that at times
covert operations are necessary, as does
the President. At the same time, investi-
gations of the covert action program car-
ried out. by the U.S. Government since
1947 and the experience of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence to date
gives strong support to the view that co-
vert actions pose great risks to the
United States if they go wrong, or if they
are ill-conceived or ill-advised. Such
high risk activities that can seriously af-
fect the interests of the United States, its
policies, or its reputation require the in-
volvement of the Congress through its
oversight committees. At the same time,
this committee believes, that it is in the
national interest to inform the Congress
prior to undertaking covert U~tivities.
The consideration and advice of-the com-
mittees would further the best interests
of the United States. It is in the Presi-
dent's interest to have the advice from
the two intelligence committees, even
though approval is not required. I would
like to emphasize that, Mr. President.
We are not seeking and never have
sought to give these committees either a.
veto or a required approval before such
actions as might be anticipated and ini-
tiated by the executive branch. Congress,
through the committees, should share,
with the President the responsibility to
represent the public interest.
The President has sent a letter which
I will have printed in the RECORD directly
after this statement-acknowledging
that the administration and the subcom-
mittee are in substantial agreement with
this bill but that there are a few differ-
ences. One of these differences centers
around a criminal statute designed to
punish those who disclose the names of
undercover officers. Like many others,
nothing makes my blood boil more than
seeing a former CIA employee traipsing
about the world pointing fingers at peo-
ple who are risking their lives for their
country.
However, in the National Intelligence
Act, the statute is aimed at those who
have violated their trust, who have re-
ceived authorized access to this informa-
tion through their jobs. The administra-
tion would prefer to cover anyone who
discloses these names; but for reasons
relating to constitutional considerations,
thus far we have felt that should con-
centrate our efforts on those who have
abused their trust.
I am hopeful that recent world events
have given intelligence charters a major
impetus. These comprehensive charters
would actually help the intelligence agen-
cies by giving them statutory authority
for a clearly defined mission. We have
been studying what is needed for 3 years.
We are ready to get these charters be-
fore Congress and move quickly on them.
Hearings on the charter are tentatively
scheduled to begin February 21. I can
understand the desire of the CIA and
of the President to remove any unneces-
sary restrictions from. our intelligence
activities, but this should be done in the
context of comprehensive legislation as
far as possible. I know the President
agrees with this. If the impetus for char-
ter legislation is expended only on short-
term needs, this might undercut the
chances for passage of comprehensive
charter legislation containing provisions
that could very well prove more impor-
tant to the strength and effectiveness of
our intelligence system in the long-run.
Other bills have been introduced which
are intended to achieve many if not all
of the aims of the National Intelligence
Act. The Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence is to consider those bills, to-
gether with this one, and the full com-
mittee's position will become clear in
hearings and markup. On behalf of the
Intelligence Committee, I can say to you
today that legislation will be reported out
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February 8, 1980 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
of the Intelligence Committee this spring
which removes any unwarranted re-
straints on CIA and at the same time
promises proper congressional oversight.
Mr. President, I have the following
letter from the White House, signed by
the President:
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Over the past two
years, this Administration and the Senate
Select Committee on intelligence have
worked closely and diligently together in an
effort to agree on a comprehensive legisla-
tive charter for the nation's intelligence
community. Our goal has been to provide for
? a strong, effective Intelligence effort and at
the same time protect individual rights and
liberties.
As our January 30 meeting confirmed,
agreement has been reached on most of the
'important issues. I would like to commend
the members of the Committee, and espe-
cially Senator Huddleston and his Subcom-
mittee, for their outstanding contribution to
this effort. I am especially pleased that we
have reached virtually complete agreement
on the organization of the intelligence com-
munity and on the authorizations and re-
strictions pertaining to intelligence collec-
tion and special activities.
Although a few issues remain to be re-
solved, I urge that we move ahead on this
important legislative endeavor. The substan-
tial agreement we have already achieved
should facilitate resolution of remaining dif-
ferences in a manner that will not bar or
deter necessary action in extraordinary and
difficult circumstances. In the course of our
work together, we have overcome a number
of misconceptions and misapprehensions. We
have demonstrated that the system of over-
sight works as a safeguard against abuse. For
these reasons, I am confident that we can
resolve the remaining issues so as to protect
the capacity of our government to act, while
ensuring that -our crucial intelligence serv-
ices are operating within the bounds of law
and propriety.
In closing, I wish to emphasize my sup-
port for a comprehensive intelligence charter,
and for the majority of the provisions con-
tained in your submission. Only a compre-
hensive charter will give the American intel-
ligence community the kind of endorsement
it needs and deserves from the American
people. I also want to express again my ap-
preciation for the Committee's assistance in
this effort. I trust that our disagreements
can be resolved as the legislative process con-
tinues.
Sincerely,
JIMMY CARTER.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the text of the bill and a sec-
tion-by-section analysis be printed in
the. RECORD.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the "National Intelli-
gence Act of 1980".
TITLE I-AUTHORIZATION FOR
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Part A-FINDINGS; PURPOSES; DEFINITIONS
STATEMENT OF FINDINGS
SEC. 101. The Congress hereby makes the
following findings:
(1) Intelligence activities should provide
timely, accurate, and relevant information
and analysis necessary for the conduct of the
foreign relations and the protection of the
national security of the United States.
(2) The collection and production of in-
telligence should be conducted In a manner
that avoids waste and unnecessary duplica.
tion of effort within the intelligence
community.
(3) Supervision and control are necessary
to ensure that intelligence activities are in
support of the foreign relations of the United
States and do not abridge rights protected by
the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSES
SEC. 102. It Is the purpose of this Act-
(1) to authorize the intelligence activities
necessary for the conduct of the foreign rela-
tions and the protection of the national
security of the United States;
(2) to replace the provisions of the National
Security Act of 1947 governing intelligence
activities;
(3) to ensure that the intelligence activi-
ties of the United States are conducted in a
manner consistent with United States de-
fense and foreign policy interests and are
properly and effectively directed, regulated,
coordinated, and administered;
(4) to ensure that the Government of the
United States is provided, in the most effi-
cient manner, with accurate, relevant, and
timely information and analysis so that sound
and informed decisions may be made regard-
ing the security and vital interests of the
United States and so that the United States
may be protected against foreign intelligence
activities, international terrorist activities,
and other forms of hostile action by foreign
powers, organizations, or their agents, or by
international terrorists, directed against the
United States; and
(5) to ensure that the entities of the intel-
ligence community are accountable to the
President, the Congress, and the people of
the United States and that the intelligence
activities of the United States are conducted
in a manner consistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States.
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 103. As used in this title-
(1) The term "communications security"
means the protection resulting from any
measure taken to deny unauthorized persons
information derived from the telecommuni-
cations of the United Sttaes related to the
national security, or from any measure taken
to ensure the authenticity of such telecom-
munications.
(2) The term "counterintelligence" means
information pertaining to the capabilities,
intentions, or activities of any foreign pow-
er, organization, or person in the fields of
espionage, other clandestine intelligence ac-
tivity, covert action, assassination, or sabo-
tage.
(3) The term "counterintelligence activ-
ity" means-
(A) the collection, retention, processing,
analysis, and dissemination of counterin-
telligence; end
(B) any other activity, except for person-
nel, document, physical and communica-
tions security programs, undertaken to
counter or protect against the espionage,
other clandestine intelligence activity, covert
action, assassination, or sabotage, or similar
activities of a foreign government.
(4) The term "counterterrorism intelli-
gence" means information pertaining to the
capabilities, Intentions, or activities of any
foreign power, organization or person re-
lated to international terrorist activity.
(5) The term "counterterrorism intelli-
gence activity" means-
(A) the collection, retention, processing,
analysis, or dissemination of counterterror-
ism intelligence; and
(B) any other activity undertaken by an
entity of the intelligence community to
counter or protect against international ter-
rorist activity.
(6) The term "cover" means any means by
which the true identity or relationship with
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an entity of the intelligence community of
any activity, officer, employee, or agent of
such entity, or of a related corporation or
organization, is disguised or concealed.
.(7) The terms "departments and agen-
cies" and "department or agency" mean any
department,' agency, bureau, independent
establishment, or wholly owned corporation
of the Government of the United States.
(8) The term "foreign intelligence" means
information pertaining to the capabilities,
intentions or activities of any foreign state,
government, organization, association, or
individual, or information on the foreign as-
pects of narcotics production and trafficking,
but does not include counterintelligence,
counter terrorism intelligence, or tactical In-
telligence.
(9) The term "foreign intelligence activ-
ity" means the collection, retention, process-
ing, analysis, or dissemination of foreign In-
telligence.
(10) The term "intelligence" means for-
eign intelligence, counterintelligence, coun-
terterrorism intelligence, and information
relating to or resulting from any Intelligence
activity.
(11) The term "intelligence activity"
means-
(A) any foreign intelligence activity;
(B) any counterintelligence activity;
(C) any counterterrorism intelligence ac-
tivity;
(D) any special activity.
(12 The terms "intelligence community"
and "entity of the intelligence community"
mean, -
(A) the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence;
(B) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(C) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
(D) the National Security Agency;
(E) the offices within the Department of
Defense for the collection of specialized na-
tional intelligence through reconnaissance
programs;
(F) the intelligence components of the
military services;
(G) the intelligence components of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(H) the Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search of the Department of State;
(I) the foreign intelligence components of
the Department of the Treasury;
(J) the foreign intelligence components of
the Department of Energy.
(K) the successor to any of the agencies,
offices, components, or bureaus named in
clauses (A) through (J); and
(L) such other components of the depart-
ments and agencies, to the extent deter-
mined by the President, as may be engaged
in intelligence activities.
(13) The term "international terrorist
activity" means any activity which-
(A) involves--
(1) killing, causing serious bodily harm
to, or kidnapping one or more individuals;
(ii) violent destruction of property;
(iii) an attempt or credible threat to
commit any act described in clause (1) or
(ii); and
(B) appears Intended to endanger a pro-
tectee of the Secret Service or the Depart-
ment of State, or to further political, social,
or economic goals by-
(1) intimidating or coercing a civilian
population or any segment thereof;
(ii) influencing the policy of a govern-
ment or international organization by
intimidation or coercion; or
(Iii) obtaining widespread publicity for
a group or its cause; and
(C) occurs totally outside the United
States, or transcends national boundaries
in terms of-
(i) the means by which its objective is
accomplished;
'(ii) the civilian population, government,
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February 8, 1980 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
(e) The President may delegate presiden-
tial authorities and responsibilities under
this section to the Secretary of Defense with
respect to special activities conducted by the
Armed Forces of the United States in time of
war declared by Congress or during any pe-
riod covered by a report from the President
to the Congress under the War Powers Reso-
lution, 87 Stat. 555, to the extent necessary
to carry out the activity that is the subject
of the report.
AUTHORIZATION FOR OTHER SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 124. The President shall establish pro-
cedures for the approval of sensitive foreign
intelligence, counterintelligence, or counter-
terrorism intelligence activities which may
require review or findings by the President,
the National Security Council, a committee
thereof, the Director of National Intelli-
gence, the head of an entity of the intelli-
gence community, or any other designated
official.
CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION
SEC. 125. Each special activity authorized
under section 123(a) (1) and each category
of special activities authorized under sec-
tion 123(a) (2) shall be considered signifi-
cant anticipated intelligence activities for
the purposes of the requirement of section
142 of this Act, except that such prior notice
may be limited for a period of forty-eight
hours to the chairmen and ranking minority
members of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Speaker and minority leader of the House of
Representatives, and the majority and mi-
nority leaders of the Senate if the President
determines it is essential to meet extraordi-
nary circumstances affecting vital interests
of the United States. Such committees shall
be fully informed under section 142 of this
Act upon expiration of the forty-eight hour
period.
Part D-LIMITATIONS -ON INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORITIES
PROHIBITION ON ASSASSINATION
SEC. 131. No person employed by or acting
on behalf of the United States Government
shall engage or conspire to engage in assas-
sination.
INTEGRITY OF PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES
SEC. 132. (a) The President shall establish
public guidelines for the intelligence activi-
ties of the entities of the intelligence com-
munity to protect the integrity and inde-
pendence of private institutions of the
United States in accordance with constitu-
tional principles.
(b) No entity of the intelligence commu-
nity may use, for the purpose of establish-
ing or maintaining cover for any officer of
that entity to engage in foreign intelligence
activities or special activities, any affiliation,
real or cstensible, with any United States
religious organization, United States media
organization, United States educational in-
stitution, the Peace Corps, or any United
States Government program designed to
promote education, the arts, humanities, or
cultural affairs through international ex-
changes.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to prohibit voluntary contacts or the
voluntary exchange of information between
any person and any entity of the intelligence
community.
(d) The President may waive any or all
of the provisions of this section during any
period in which the United States is en-
gaged in war declared by Act of Congress, or
during any period covered by a report from
the President to the Congress under the War
Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. 555, to the ex-
tent necessary to carry out the activity that
is the subject of the report. The President
shall notify the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate
Select Committee on intelligence in a timely
manner of such a waiver and inform those
committees of the facts and circumstances
requiring such a waiver.
RESTRICTIONS ON COVERT DOMESTIC
PUBLICATIONS
SEC. 133. No entity of the intelligence com-
munity may pay for or otherwise knowingly
cause or support distribution of any book,
magazine, article, periodical, film, or video
or audio tape, for the purpose of influencing
public opinion within the United States,
unless the involvement of the United States
Government is acknowledged.
RESTRICTIONS ON CONTRACTING
SEC. 134. Entity sponsorship of a contract
or arrangement for the provision of goods or
services with any United States organiza-
tion may be concealed from such organiza-
tion if-
(a) the contract or arrangement is a rou-
tine service contract, procurement contract,
or transaction carried out under the Econ-
omy Act, 38 Stat. 1084; or
(b) the organization is not an educa-
tional institution and it is determined, pur-
suant to procedures approved by the At-
torney General, that such concealment is
necessary for intelligence activities author-
ized by this Act.
ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN INDIRECTLY
SEC. 135. No entity of the intelligence
community and no employee of an entity
of the intelligence community may request
or otherwise knowingly encourage, directly
or indirectly, an individual, organization, or
foreign government to engage in any activity
on behalf of the United States Government
in which such entity of the intelligence com-
munity is prohibited by this Act from en-
gaging; Provided however, That this restric-
tion shall not prohibit any entity of the
intelligence community from requesting a
department or agency of the United States
Government to engage in an activity that
is within the authorized functions of the
department or agency to which the request
is made.
Part E-OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD; REPORTING ON
VIOLATIONS; DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
SEC. 141. (a) The President shall appoint a
board to be known as the Intelligence Over-
sight Board (hereinafter referred to as the
"Board") whose members shall be selected
from outside the Government.
(b) The Board is authorized to employ staff
to assist in carrying out its functions.
(c) As prescribed by the President, the
Board shall-
(1) function to provide the President inde-
pendent oversight of the intelligence com-
munity, in order to report to the President
on questions of legality and propriety;
(2) be given access to all information rele-
vant to its functions which is in the pos-
session, custody or control of any entity of
the intelligence community; and
(3) conduct such inquiries into the ac-
tivities of any entity of the intelligence com-
munity as the Board deems necessary to per-
form its functions.
(d) Each entity of the intelligence com-
munity shall have a general counsel or a
person designated to fulfill the responsibili-
ties of a general counsel who shall serve as
legal advisor to the head of that entity and
shall have the responsibility to-
(1) review activities of that entity to de-
termine whether such activities are in con-
formity with the Constitution and laws of
the United States. Executive orders, Presi-
dential directives and memoranda, and the
rules, regulations, and policies of that en-
tity;
S 1309
(2) review all rules and regulations of that
entity, including but not limited to any
rule o: regulation proposed to implement
the provisions of this Act, to ensure that such
rules and regulations are in conformity with
the Constitution and laws of the United
States, Executive orders, and Presidential
directives and memoranda;
(3) report to the Board any intelligence
matters as specified by the President; and
(4) perform such additional duties as the
head of that entity may prescribe, consistent
with the provisions of this Act.
(e) Each entity of the intelligence com-
munity shall have an inspector general or a
person designated to fulfill the responsibili-
ties of an inspector general who shall have
the responsibility to-
(1) investigate all activities of that entity
to determine in what respects authorized
functions may more effectively be performed
and to determine the facts and circumstances
of any alleged wrongdoing;
(2) advise the head of that entity and,
with respect to matters of legality, the gen-
eral counsel of that entity of findings regard-
ing activities of that entity;
(3) report to the Board any intelligence
matters as specified by the President; and
(4) perform such other investigations as
the head of that entity deems necessary, con-
sistent with the provisions of this Act.
(f) The Attorney General or a designee
shall-
(1) report, in a timely manner, to the
Board any intelligence activity that involves
a question as to whether there has been a
significant violation of law and which has
not been previously reported to the Attorney
General by the Board;
(2) report to the President in a timely
manner any intelligence activities that in-
volve serious questions of law;
(3) report to the President, the Board,
and the heads of the appropriate entities of
the intelligence community, in a timely man-
ner, decisions made or actions taken in re-
sponse to reports from such entities concern-
ing intelligence activities; and
(4) keep the Board and general counsels
of entities of the intelligence community in-
formed regarding legal opinions of the De-
partment of Justice affecting the operations
of the intelligence community.
(g) The head of each entity of the intelli-
gence community shall-
(1) ensure that the inspector general and
the general counsel of that entity have ac-
cess to any information necessary to perform
their functions under this Act;
(2) provide to the Attorney General, in
accordance with applicable law, any informa-
tion required by the Attorney General to ful-
fill the Attorney General's responsibilities
under this Act;
(3) report to the Attorney General, pursu-
ant to section 535 of title 28, United States
Code, immediately upon discovery, evidence
of possible violation of Federal criminal law
by any person employed by, assigned to, or
acting for, such entity; and
(4) report to the Attorney General evidence
of possible violations by any other person of
those Federal criminal laws specified in
guidelines adopted by the Attorney General.
(h) All officers and employees of each en-
tity of the intelligence community shall co-
operate fully with the Board, the inspector
general and general counsel of that entity,
and the Attorney General in the conduct of
their authorized functions, and in the re-
porting of any possible violation of law to
the head of the entity and the inspector
general or general counsel of that entity or
the Board. The head of each entity of the
intelligence community shall ensure such
full cooperation. No officer or employee who
so reports in good faith or so cooperates
shall be subject to adverse personnel action
solely on account of such reporting or coop-
eration.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--SENATE February 8, 1980
(i) (1) The head of each entity of the in-
telligence community shall be empowered to
take disciplinary action against any person
employed by that entity for any action or
emission that violates the provisions of this
Act or any guidelines, procedures, or regula-
tions established pursuant to this Act, in-
cluding any regulation, procedure, or obliga-
tion to provide for personnel, document,
communications, or physical security or to
protect intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure. Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, such
action may include-
(A) suspension from employment without
pay for a period not to exceed 180 days;
(B) reduction in salary or grade, or both;
(C) dismissal from employment; or
(D) a combination of (A) and (B).
(2) Before such disciplinary action is
taken under this subsection against persons
employed by or assigned to an entity of the
intelligence community, such persons shall
have the opportunity to present evidence on
their behalf.
(3) Nothing contained in this subsection
shall be construed to affect or limit the au-
thority of the head of an entity of the in-
telligence community to terminate the em-
ployment of or take disciplinary action
against any person employed by or assigned
to that entity under any provision of law
other than this subsection.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
SEC. 142. (a) Consistent with all applicable
authorities and duties, including those con-
ferred by the Constitution upon the execu-
tive and legislative branches, the head of
each entity of the intelligence community
shall-
(1) keep the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence fully and cur-
rently Informed of all Intelligence activities
which are the responsibility of, are engaged
in by, or are carried out for or on behalf
of, that entity of the intelligence community,
including any significant anticipated intelli-
gence activity; but the foregoing provision
shall not require approval of such commit-
tees as a condition precedent to the initia-
tion of any such anticipated intelligence
activity;
(2) furnish any information or material
concerning intelligence activities in the pos-
session, custody, or control of the head of
the relevant entity of the intelligence com-
munity or in the possession, custody, or
control of any person paid by such entity
whenever requested by the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence or the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence; and
(3) report in a timely fashion to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Senate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence information relating to intelligence
activities that are illegal or improper and
corrective actions that are taken or planned.
(b) The head of each entity of the in-
telligence community shall maintain a com-
plete record of all legal authorities, pub-
lished regulations, and published instruc-
tions pertaining to the intelligence activities
of that entity.
(c) The head of each entity of the in-
telligence community shall establish pro-
cedures to ensure that a record is maintained
and preserved of each authorization or ap-
proval required by law, regulation or pro-
cedures under section 212 with respect to
any intelligence activity.
(d) The Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate shall be furnished copies of
all record schedules, which the entities of
the intelligence community are required by
law to furnish to the Archivist of the United
States, including any modifications, amend-
ments or supplements, at such time as these
schedules, modifications, amendments, or
supplements are submitted to the Archivist
for approval.
(e) The President may establish such
procedures as the President determines may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this section.
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REPORTS; DISCLO-
SURE PROVISIONS
SEC. 143. (a) The House Permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence and the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence shall
report, at least annually, to their respective
Houses on the nature and extent of the in-
telligence activities of the United States.
Each committee shall promptly call to the
attention of its respective House, or to any
appropriate committee or committees of its
respective House, any matter relating to in-
telligence activities which requires or should
have the attention of such House or such
committee or committees. In making such
reports, the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence and the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence shall do so
in a manner consistent with the protection
of the national security interests of the Unit-
ed States,
(b) No information or material provided
to the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence or the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence relating to the intelligence
activities of any department or agency that
has been classified under established security
procedures or that was submitted by the
Executive Branch with the request that such
information or material be kept confidential
shall be made public by the House Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence or the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence or
any member thereof, except in accordance
with the provisions of House Resolution 658
of the Ninety-Fifth Congress in the case of
the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and its members, or in accord-
ance with the provisions of Senate Resolu-
tion 400 of the Ninety-Fourth Congress in
the case of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and its members.
(c) (1) The House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence shall, under such reg-
ulations as that committee shall prescribe,
make any information described in subsec-
tion (a) or (b) available to any other com-
mittee or any other Member of the House.
Whenever the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence makes such informa-
tion available, that committee shall keep a
written record showing which committee or
which Members of the House received such
information. No Member of the House who,
and no committee which, receives such in-
formation under this paragraph shall dis-
close such information except in accordance
with the provisions of House Resolution 658
of the Ninety-Fifth Congress.
(2) The Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence may, under such regulations as
that committee shall prescribe to protect the
confidentiality of such information, make
any information described In subsection (a)
or (b) available to any other committee or
any other Member of the Senate. Whenever
the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence makes such information available, the
committee shall keep a written record show-
ing which committee or which Members of
the Senate received such information. No
Member of the Senate who, and no commit-
tee which, receives any information under
this paragraph, shall disclose such informa-
tion except in accordance with the provisions
of Senate Resolution 400 of the Ninety-
Fourth Congress.
(d) No employee of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence or the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence, or of
any committee to which information is pro-
vided pursuant to subsection (c), or any per-
son engaged by contract or otherwise to per-
form services for or at the request of such
committee shall be riven access to any clas-
sified information by such committee unless
such employee or person has (1) agreed in
writing and under oath to be bound by the
rules of the House cr the Senate, as the case
may be, and of such committees as to the
security of such information during and af-
ter the period of his employment or con-
tractual agreement with such committees;
and (2) received an appropiopriate security
clearance as determined by such committee
in consultation wl:h the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence. The type of security
clearance to be required in the case of any
such employee or person shall, within the
determination of such committees in consul-
tation with the Director of National Intelli-
gence be commensurate with the sensitivity
of the classified information to which such
employee or person will be given access by
such committees.
(e) The provisions of subsections (a), (b),
and (c) are enacted by the Congress-
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power
of the House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate, respectively, and as such they shall be
considered as part o:' the rules of each House,
respectively, and shall supersede other rules
only to the extent that they are inconsistent
therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitu-
tional right of either House to change such
rules (as far as relating to such House) at
any time, in the same manner, and to the
same extent as in the case of any other rule
of such House.
REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO APPROPRIATIONS
FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AND COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE, AND COUNTERTERRERISM IN-
TELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 144. No funds may be appropriated
for any fiscal year beginning after Septem-
ber 30, 1980, for the purpose of carrying out
any national intelligence activity, counter-
intelligence activity, or counterterrorism in-
telligence activity by any entity of the in-
telligence community unless funds for such
activity have been previously authorized by
legislation enacted during the same fiscal
year or during one of the two immediately
preceding fiscal yeas, except that this limi-
tation shall not apply to funds appropriated
by any continuing :resolution or required by
pay raises.
AUDITS AND REVIEWS BY THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL
SEC. 145. (a) All funds appropriated to the
Office of the Director, all funds appropriated
to entities of the intelligence community,
and all intelligence activities conducted by
entities of the intelligence community, and
information and materials relating thereto,
shall be subject to financial and program
management audit and review by the Comp-
troller General of ,he United States, upon
the request of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence or the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence.
(b) Any other committee of the Congress
may request financial and program manage-
ment audits and reviews by the Comptroller
General of the United States of any intelli-
gence activity over which such committee
has legislative jurisdiction, but only through
and with the approval of the House Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence or
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
The results of any such audit or review shall r
be submitted to (1) the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, in the case
of any audit or review requested by a com-
mittee of the House of Representatives, and
shall be made available by such select com-
mittee, in accordance with and subject to
the provisions of section 143 of this Act,
to the committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives which requested such audit or
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review, and (2) the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence in the case of any audit or
review requested by a committee of the Sen-
ate, and shall be made available by such
select committee, in accordance with and
subject to the provisions of section 143 of
this Act, to the committee of the Senate
which requested such audit or review.
(c) Any audit or review of any intelli?.
genre activity authorized in subsection (a)
or (b) above shall be conducted in accord-
ance with such security standards as may
be prescribed by the Director.
(d) Notwithstanding the foregoing provi-
sions of this subsection, the Director may
exempt from any such audit and review any
? funds expended for a particular intelligence
activity, and the activity for which such
funds are expended, if the Director (1) de-
termines such exemption to be essential to
protect the security of the United States,
' and (2) notifies the House Permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence and the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence of such
exemption.
TITLE II-STANDARDS FOR INTELLI-
GGENCE ACTIVITIES
PART A-PURPOSES AND DEFINITIONS
STATEMENT OF PURPOSES
Sec. 201. It is the purpose of this title-
(a) to provide statutory authorization for
activities of entities of the intelligence com-
munity that concern United States persons
and that are necessary for the conduct of
the foreign relations or the protection of
the national security of the United States;
(b) to establish statutory standards for
such activities and effective means to ensure
that such activities are conducted in ac-
cordance with those standards: and
(c) to delineate responsibilities of gov-
ernment officials for ensuring that such ac-
tivities are conducted in accordance with
the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
DI FTNTIIONS
SEC. 202. (a) The definitions in title I of
this Act shall apply to this title. References
to law within this title are to the laws of
the United States.
b) As used in this title-
(1) "Collecting agency" means, with re-
spect to information, the department or
agency that collects the information.
(2) "Covert technique" means any ex-
traordinary technique and any other cate-
gory or type of collection activity that is
designated by the President for the purpose
of protecting privacy and constitutional
rights from significant intrusion.
(3) "Directed collection" means obtaining
information that concerns a United States
person by requesting or directing any per-
son to acquire such information through
exploiting or developing a relationship with
a United States person without disclosing
that the information will be conveyed to
an intelligence entity, This term does not
include placing of employees under section
214(b).
(4) "Employee" means a person employed
by, assigned to, or acting for an entity of the
intelligence community.
(5) "Extraordinary techniques" means for-
eign electronic surveillance and foreign
physical search and any other technique
directed against a United States person for
which a warrant would be required if under-
taken for law enforcement purposes in the
United States, but does not include elec-
tronic surveillance or physical search under
the Foreign Intelligence Search and Surveil-
lance Act, 92 Stat, 1783, as amended.
(6) "Foreign electronic surveillance"
means the acquisition by an electronic,
mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire, oral, or radio com-
munication of a particular, known United
States person who is outside the United
States, if the contents are acquired by in-
tentionally targeting that United States per-
son, or the use of an electronic, mechanical,
or other surveillance device to monitor the
activities of a particular, known United
States person who is outside the United
States, in circumstances in which a court
order would be required under the Foreign
Intelligence Search and Surveillance Act, 92
Stat. 1783, as amended, if undertaken within
the United States, but does not include elec-
tronic surveillance as defined in that Act.
(7) "Foreign physical search" means any
search directed against a United States per-
son who is outside the United States or the
property of a United States person that is
located outside the United States and any
opening of mail outside the United States
and outside United States postal channels of
a known United States person under circum-
stances in which a court order under the
Foreign Intelligence Search and Surveil-
lance Act, 92 Stat. 1783, as amended, would
be required in the United States.
(8) "Foreign. power" means-
(A) a foreign government or any com-
ponent thereof, whether or not recognized
by the United States;
(B) a faction of a foreign nation or na-
tions not substantially composed of United
States persons;
(C) an entity that is known to be directed
and controlled by a foreign government or
governments;
(D) a group engaged in international ter-
rorist activity or activities in preparation
therefor;
(E) a foreign-based political organization,
not substantially composed of United States
persons.
(9) "Mail cover" means systematic and
deliberate inspection and recording of in-
formation appearing on the exterior of en-
velopes in the mails.
(10) "Minimization procedures", with re-
spect to extraordinary techniques, means
specific procedures which shall be adopted
by the Attorney General in consultation
with the head of an entity of the intelli-
gence community and the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence-
(A) that are reasonably designed in light
of the purpose of a particular technique to
minimize the acquisition and retention and
to prohibit the dissemination of nonpublicly
available information concerning uncon-
senting United States persons, consistent
with the need of the United States to obtain,
produce and disseminate intelligence; and
(B) under which foreign intelligence that
is not publicly available may be dissemi-
nated in a manner that identifies a United
States person, without such person's con-
sent, only if such person's identity is neces-
sary to understand that foreign intelligence
or to assess its importance, provided that
information that is evidence of a crime may
be disseminated for law enforcement pur-
poses.
(11) "Physical surveillance" means an un-
consented, systematic and deliberate obser-
vation of a person by any means on a contin-
uing basis, or unconsented acquisition of a
nonpublic communication by a person not a
party thereto or visibly present thereat,
through any means not involving electronic
surveillance.
PART B-AUTHORITY AND STANDARDS FOR ACTIV-
ITIES THAT CONCERN UNITED STATES PERSONS
AUTHORITY FOR ACTIVITIES THAT CONCERN
UNITED STATES PERSONS
SEC. 211. (a) An entity of the intelligence
community may engage in the following ac-
tivities only in accordance with this title
and only to fulfill a lawful function of that
entity:
(1) collection, retention, or dissemination
of intelligence concerning United States
persons;
(2) any other intelligence activities di-
rected against United States persons;
S 1311
(3) collection, retention, or dissemination
of information concerning United States per-
sons who are targets of clandestine intelli-
gence gathering activities of a foreign gov-
ernment;
(4) collection, retention, or dissemination
of information concerning United States per-
sons to determine the suitability or credibil-
ity of potential sources of intelligence or op-
erational assistance;
(5) collection, retention, or dissemination
of information concerning United States per-
sons to provide )personnel, document, com-
munications or physical security for intelli-
gence activities.
(b) Information concerning any United
States person may be collected, retained and
disseminated, and intelligence activities may
be directed against any United States person,,
by an entity of the intelligence community
using any technique with the consent of that
person.
(c) Publicly available information con-
cerning any United States person may be
collected by an entity of the intelligence
community when such information is rele-
vant to a lawful function of that entity, and
may be retained and disseminated for lawful
governmental purposes.
(d) Information concerning any United
States person may be retained and dissemi-
nated by an entity of the intelligence com-
munity if the information does not identify
that person.
(e) Information concerning a United
States person collected by a means or in a
manner prohibited by this Act shall be
destroyed as soon as feasible after recog-
nition and may not be disseminated unless
the head of the collecting agency or a desig-
nee determines that the information-
(1) should be retained for purposes of
oversight, accountability or redress;
(2) evidences danger to the physical safety
of any person, provided that dissemination
is limited to that deemed necessary to pro-
tect against such danger and the Attorney
General or a designee is notified in a timely
manner: or
(3) is required by law to be retained or
disseminated for any administrative, civil or
criminal proceeding of which the collecting
agency has prior notice, provided that dis-
semination is limited to that necessary for
such proceeding.
(f) Nothing in this Act shall affect the
use by an entity of the intelligence commu-
nity of security guards, access controls, re-
quirements for identification credentials, or
inspection of material carried by persons
entering or leaving its installations as meas-
ures to protect the security of its personnel,
installations, activities, equipment or classi-
fied information.
(g) Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to prohibit voluntary provision of informa-
tion to an entity of the intelligence com-
munity by any person not employed by or
assigned to that entity.
(h) Nothing in this Part shall prohibit,
limit, or otherwise affect activities of any
department or agency other than activities
described in subsection (a).
PROCEDURES
SEC. 212. (a) Except as authorized by sub-
sections 211(b) through (d) of this title, ac-
tivities described in subsection 211(a) may
not be conducted by an entity of the intel-
ligence community unless permitted by pro-
cedures established by the head of that
entity and approved by the Attorney Gen-
eral. Those procedures shall-
(1) protect constitutional rights and
privacy;
(2) designate officials authorized to initiate
or approve particular activities, provide for
periodic review of activities at timely inter-
vals by designated officials, and ensure that
records are maintained of all approvals re-
quired by such procedures and this title for
particular activities;
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--SENATE February 8, .7980
(3) be reasonably designed in light of the
purpose of a particular technique to mini-
mize the acquisition and retention and to
prohibit the dissemination of information
concerning United States -persons, consistent
with the need of the United States to obtain,
produce and disseminate information for
lawful governmental purposes;
(4) prohibit dissemination of foreign in-
telligence in a manner that identifies a
United States person unless such person's
identity is necessary to understand that in-
telligence or assess its importance, provided
that information that is evidence of a crime
may be disseminated for law enforcement
purposes;
(5) prescribe reasonable requirements for
the scope, intensity and duration of partic-
ular types of activities taking into account
the nature and quality of information on
which the activity is based and the im-
portance of the intended United States
objective;
(6) ensure that activities to collect infor-
mation that are directed against any United
States person are conducted with minimal
intrusion consistent with the need to ac-
quire information of the nature, reliability
and timeliness that is required;
(7) implement the determinations by the
President regarding covert techniques under
section 202(b)(2); and
(8) govern the conduct of employees
under cover engaged in activities within the
United States or directed against United
States persons abroad.
(b) The head of the entity shall make
such procedures and any changes thereto
available to the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence a reason-
able time prior to their effective date, unless
the Attorney General determines immediate
action is required and notifies the commit-
tees immediately of such procedures and the
reason for their becoming effective imme-
diately.
COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SEc. 213. (a) Collection of foreign intel-
ligence by means of covert techniques shall
not be directed against United States per-
sons, except in the course of collection of
counterintelligence or counterterrorism in-
telligence, or in extraordinary cases when
authorized in accordance with this section.
(b) (1) Except as provided in subsection
(c), approval for any collection of foreign
intelligence by means of covert techniques
directed against a United Sttaes person shall
be based on a finding by the President that
extraordinary circumstances require such
collection to acquire foreign intelligence that
is essential to the national security of the
United States and that cannot reasonably
be acquired by other means.
(2) Approval. for any such collection shall
be preceded by a review by the National Se-
curity Council or a committee thereof des-
ignated by the President for that purpose. No
recommendation to the President relating to
any such collection may be made unless the
following officers, or if unavailable their rep-
resentatives, were present: the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney
General, and the Director of National Intel-
ligence.
(3) Any collection under this subsection
which lasts more than a year or which is sub-
stantially changed in purpose must be reaf-
firmed by the President under paragraph (1)
and reviewed by the National Security Coun-
cil or a committee thereof under paragraph
(2).
(c) (1) Approval for collection of foreign
intelligence involving covert techniques di-
rected against a United States person may he
based on a finding by an official designated
by the President that the target is a senior
official of a foreign power, an unincorporated
association substantially composed of United
States citizens or permanent resident aliens
directed and controlled by a foreign govern-
ment or governers, or any other entity di-
rected and controlled by a foreign power and
that unusual circumstances require such
collection to acquire foreign intelligence that
is important to the national securty of the
United States anti that cannot reasonably be
acquired by other means.
(2) The Attorney General shall be advised
of any collection conducted under this sub-
section, and the National Security Council or
the committee thereof designated by the
President under subsection (b) shall review
periodically any collection conducted under
this subsection.
(d) Foreign intelligence may be collected
within the United States by clandestine
means directed against unconsenting United
States persons who are within the United
States only by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, with notice to the Attorney General
or a designee by components of the military
services when directed against persons sub-
ject to the Uniform Code of Mlil:trxy Justice,
10 U.S.C. 803, Art. 2, (1) through (10); by the
National Security Agency when directed at
foreign electromagnetic communications, as
defined in section 602(b) (5); or, when col-
lection is authorized under subsection (c)
and approved by the Attorney General, by
the Central Inteligence Agency through es-
tablished sources and pretext interviews.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERROR-
ISM INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 214. (a) Counterintelligence and
counterterrorism intelligence activities may
be directed against United States persons
without the consent of the United States
person concerned only on the basis of facts
or circumstances which reasonably indicate
that the person is or may be engaged in
clandestine intelligence activities on behalf
of a foreign power or international terrorist
activity.
(b) Counterintelligence and counterter-
rorism intelligence may be collected by plac-
ing employees in an organization in the
United States or substantially composed of
United States persons, only if--
(1) a designated senior official of the en-
tity makes a written finding that Such
participation is necessary to achieve signifi-
cant intelligence objectives and meets the
requirements of the procedures established
under section 212; and
(2) independent means are created in the
procedures established under section 212 for
audit and inspection of such participation.
(c) Counterintelligence and counterter-
rorism intelligence may be collected through
the use against a United States person of
mail covers, physical surveillance for pur-
poses other than identification, recruitment
of persons to engage in directed collection,
or access to the records of a financial insti-
tution, as defined in section 1101 of the
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1278, only
if an official designated pursuant to the pro-
cedures established under section 212 makes
a written finding that the use of such tech-
nique or techniques is necessary to achieve
authorized intelligence objectives and meets
the requirements of the procedures estab-
lished pursuant to section 212.
(d) The Attorney General or a designee
shall be notified. of findings under subsec-
tions (b) and (c) with respect to counterin-
telligence or counterrorism intelligence ae-
tivities which the entity, based on guidelines
established by the Attorney General, con-
cludes may involve significant collection of
information concerning political. or religious
activity.
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING TAR-
GETS OF CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE GATHER-
ING ACTIVITY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
SEc. 215. Information concerning United
States persons may be collected without the
consent of the Un',ed States person con-
cerned if an official designated pursuant to
the procedures established under section 212
makes a written finding with notice to the
Attorney General or it designee that the per-
son is the target of clandestine intelligence
gathering activity of a foreign government
and such collection is necessary for counter-
intelligence purposes and meets the require-
ments of the procedures established pursu-
ant to section 212. Covert techniques and
mail covers may not be directed against un-
consenting United States persons for collec-
tion under this section.
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING PO-
TENTIAL SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE OR OPERA-
TIONAL ASSISTANCE
SEC. 216. Information concerning persons
who are under consideration as potential
sources of intelligence or operational assist-
ance may be collected, without the consent
of a United States person against whom such
collection is directed, only in accordance with
procedures established under section 212
which shall limit the scope, intensity and
duration of such collection to that necessary
to determine in a timely manner the suita-
bility or credibility of the potential source.
Such collection shall be limited to inter-
views, physical surveillance for purposes of
identification, checks or Federal, State or lo-
cal government records, and other techniques
approved by the head. of the collecting agency
or a designee with notice to the Attorney
General or a designee, except that covert
techniques and mail covers may not be di-
rected against unconsenting United States
persons for such collection.
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION FOR SECURITY
PURPOSES
SEC. 217. (a) Information may be col-
lected to provide personnel. document, com-
munication, or physical security for intel-
ligence activities, without the consent of a
United States person against whom such col-
lection is directed, only in accordance with
procedures established under section 212
which shall govern the categories of persons
who may be subjects of such collection by
particular agencies, and which shall limit the
scope, intensity, duration, and targets of
such collection to that required-
(1) to determine the suitability or trust-
worthiness of employees, contractors and
contractor employees who will perform work
in connection with an agency contract, ap-
plicants for contractor status, persons
employed by proprietaries, or applicants for
employment or for access to classified infor-
mation or facilities, consultants, or persons
detailed or assigned to an entity, when re-
questing the consent of the person against
whom the collection is directed would ieop-
ardize the security of an intelligence activity;
(2) to protect against breaches of secu-
rity regulations or contractual obligations
applicable to persons described in paragraph
(1), except that such collection shall be li rn.
ited to that necessary to refer the matter to
the Department of Justice;
(3) to protect against a direct or immi-
nent threat that may be posed by the activ-
ities of that person to the physical safety of
personnel, installations, property, documents
or other materials related to intelligence
activities, except that such collection within
the United States shall be limited to that
necessary to refer the matter to an appro-
priate law enforcement agency; and
(4) to determine whether proposed intel-
ligence activity sites meet apppropriate phys-
ical security requirements.
(b) Covert techniques and mail covers
may not be directed against unconsenting
United States persons for collection under
this section. Information may be collected
under this section by clandestine means di-
rected against unconsenting United States
persons only if an official designated pur-
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February 8, 1980 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
suant to the procedures established under
section 212 makes a written finding that the
use of such means is necessary for authorized
security purposes and meets the require-
ments of the procedures established pursuant
to section 212.
REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES
SEC. 218. Activities directed against par-
ticular United States persons that are au-
thorized pursuant to sections 213 through
217 of this part for longer than one year shall
be reviewed at least annually by the head of
the entity or a designee. Except for collection
of information under section 217 concerning
employees of an entity, a report of such re-
view shall be submitted to the Attorney Gen-
eral or a designee or, for activities by compo-
nents of the military services directed against
persons subject to the Uniform Code of
Mili- tary Justice, 10 U.S.C. 803, Art. 2 (1) through
(10), to the appropriate Service Secretary or
a designee.
PART C-STANDARDS FOR EXTRAORDINARY
TECHNIQUES
USE OF EXTRAORDINARY TECHNIQUES OUTSIDE
THE UNITED STATES
SEC. 221. (a) Extraordinary techniques may
not be directed against a United States per-
son outside the United States for the pur-
poses of collecting intelligence, except pur-
suant to court order.
(b) Applications for an order from the
court established pursuant to the Foreign
Intelligence Search and Surveillance Act, 92
Stat. 1783, as amended, are authorized and,
notwithstanding any other law, a judge to
whom an application is made pursuant to
this section may grant an order approving
the use of an extraordinary technique di-
rected against a United States person out-
side the United States to collect intelligence.
(c) An order approving the use of an ex-
traordinary technique pursuant to this sec-
tion to collect foreign intelligence shall be
granted if the court finds that-
(1) the Attorney General has certified In
writing that the proposed use of an extraor-
dinary technique against the United States
person has been approved in accordance with
section 213 of this title to collect foreign
intelligence;
(2) the information sought is foreign
intelligence;
(3) there is probable cause to believe that
the United States person against whom the
extraordinary technique is to be directed is
in possession of, or, in addition with respect
to foreign electronic surveillance, is about to
receive. the information sought;
(4) less intrusive means cannot reason-
ably be expected to acquire intelligence of
the nature, reliability and timeliness that
is required; and
(5) the proposed minimization procedures
meet the definition of minimization pro-
cedures under section 202(b)(l0) of this
title.
(d) An order approving the use of an
extraordinary technique pursuant to this
section to collect counterintelligence or
counterterrorism intelligence shall be
granted if the court finds that-
(1) significant counterintelligence or
counterterrorism intelligence is likely to be
obtained from the proposed use of an ex-
traordinary technique against the United
States person;
(2) there is probable cause to believe
that the United States person against whom
the extraordinary technique is to be directed
engages or is about to engage in clandestine
intelligence activities on behalf of a for-
eign power, international terrorist activity,
or activities in furtherance thereof;
(3) less intrusive means cannot reason-
ably be expected to acquire intelligence of
the nature, reliability and timeliness that
is required; and
S 1313
(4) the proposed minimization procedures tected by this section, the Attorney General
meet the definition of such procedures under may submit a certification of facts to the
section 202(b) (10) of this title. court based on a determination by the Attor-
(e) The order of the court approving such ney General that the information reliably
use of an extraordinary technique shall he supports such certification of facts and is
in writing and shall- protected from disclosure by this section.
(1) specify the identity, if known, or a The court may require disclosure of any In-
description of the United States person formation relating to a finding of probable
against whom the extraordinary technique is cause under section 221 (c) (3) or (d) (2)
to be directed; which does not disclose information pro-
(2) specify the nature and location of the tected by this section. In any case In which
property, communications or activity to be the Attorney General has submitted such a
the subject of the use of the extraordinary certification of facts, the court shall base its
technique and state whether physical entry finding of probable cause under section
may be involved; 221(c)(3) or (d) (2) on such certification of
ceed 90 days, during which the use of an
extraordinary technique is authorized, pro-
vided that no order shall authorize more
than one unconsented entry into real prop-
erty except for entries to install, repair, or
remove surveillance devices; and
(4) direct that minimization procedures
be followed.
(f) Extensions of an order issued under
this section may be granted on the same
basis as an original order upon an applica-
tion for an extension and new findings made
in the same manner as required for an
initial order.
(g) The procedural, administrative, and
security provisions established under the
Foreign Intelligence Search and Surveillance
Act, 92 Stat. 1783, as amended, shall be ob-
served by the court considering applications
for use of extraordinary techniques under
this section. The provisions of that Act with
respect to use of information, wartime au-
thority, and congressional oversight shall
apply to the use of extraordinary techniques
under this section.
(h) The court of review established pur-
suant to section 103(b) of the Foreign In-
telligence Search and Surveillance Act, 92
Stat. 1783, shall have jurisdiction to hear ap-
peals from decisions with respect to appli-
cations for use of extraordinary techniques
under this section. Decisions of the court of
review shall be subject to review by the Su-
preme Court of the United States as provided
in that Act.
(i) Use of extraordinary techniques by
military components directed against United
States persons outside the United States who
are subject to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. 802, Art. 2, (1) through
(10), may be authorized pursuant to an order
issued in conformance with subsections (c)
through (f) of this section by a military
judge appointed under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and designated by the Sec-
facts and on any other information relating
to the finding which is not protected by this
section. The court shall not refuse to make
a finding of probable cause under section
221(c) (3) or (d) (2) because information
protected by this section has been withheld.
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
SEC. 223. Activities that require approval
under section 213 or a court order under sec-
tion 221 of this title may be conducted with-
out such approval or court order for a period
not longer than 72 hours, provided that-
(a) The head of the entity of the intelli-
gence community, or the senior agency of-
ficial, or the senior military officer author-
ized to act in such cases, in the country in
which the activity is to be conducted, ap-
proves the activity and determines that-
(1) an emergency situation exists such
that the activity is required before such ap-
proval or court order could be obtained with
due diligence; and
(2) the factual basis for such approval or
court order exists.
(b) An application for such approval or
court order shall be made within 72 hours
of the initiation of the activity.
(c) The activity shall be terminated when
the information sought is obtained; when
the application for such approval or court
order is denied; or upon the expiration of
the 72-hour period without such approval or
issuance of a court order, whichever occurs
first; and
(d) Information concerning a United
States person obtained through the activity
before an application for such approval or
court order is granted or denied shall be
treated in accordance with minimization
procedures and shall be treated in accord-
ance with section 211(e) of this title if the
application is denied.
Part D-REMEDIES AND SANCTIONS;
OTHER PROVISIONS
retary of Defense. The Attorney General shall CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
be informed in a timely manner of all appli- SEC. 231. (a) Any employee of the United
cations and orders under this subsection. States who intentionally-
The procedural, administrative, and security
provisions established under the Foreign In-
telligence Search and Surveillance Act, 92
Stat. 1783, as amended, shall be observed by
a military judge considering applications for
use of extraordinary techniques under this
section, except that security measures may
be established by the Secretary of Defense.
(1) engages in foreign electronic- surveil-
lance or foreign physical search under color
of law except as authorized by statute; or
(2) discloses or uses information ob-
tained under color of law by foreign elec-
tronic surveillance or foreign physical search
knowing or having reason to know the in-
formation was obtained through forei
n
g
COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS electronic surveillance or foreign physical
SEC. 222. (a) Notwithstanding the provi- search engaged in by any employee of the
sions of this title, no agency, federal officer United States and not authorized by statute,
or employee may be required in connection shall be guilty of an offense under this Act.
with any proceeding under section 221 to dis-
close to a court information concerning any
cooperative or liaison relationship that any
agency of the United States Government may
have with any foreign government or com-
ponent thereof, provided that the Director of
National Intelligence has determined that
such disclosure would jeopardize such rela-
tionship.
(b) In any case in which a determination
U law
of facts related to a finding of probable enforcement officer engaged in the cou
rse
cause under section 221(c) (3) or (d) (2) of official duties and there was no statute
would require disclosure of information pro- or established judicial procedure governing JI
(b) It is a defense to a prosecution under
subsection (a) that the defendant was an
employee of the United States engaged in
the course of official duties and the foreign
electronic surveillance or foreign physical
search was authorized by and conducted pur-
suant to a court order or search warrant Is-
sued by a court of competent jurisdiction. It
is also a defense to prosecution that, at the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 1315
(e) The Director shall be responsible for
the production of national intelligence, in-
cluding national intelligence estimates and
other intelligence community-coordinated
analyses, and shall-
(1) ensure that in the production of na-
tional intelligence estimates or other intelli-
gence community-coordinated analysis any
diverse points of view are presented fully and
considered carefully, and that differences of
judgment within the intelligence community
are expressed clearly for policymakers; and
(2) have authority to levy analytic tasks
on departmental intelligence production or-
ganizations, In consultation with those
organizations.
(f) The Director shall be responsible for
the dissemination, under appropriate secu-
rity procedures, of national intelligence, and
shall-
(1) ensure that departments and agencies
and appropriate operational commanders of
the armed forces of the United States are
furnished such national intelligence as is
relevant to their respective duties and
responsibilities;
(2) establish dissemination procedures to
increase the usefulness for departments and
agencies (including departments and agen-
cies not within the intelligence community)
of information collected, processed, and
analyzed through national intelligence ac-
tivities; and
(3) ensure access of each entity of the in-
telligence community to national intelli-
gence relevant to that entity's authorized ac-
tivities which has been collected or produced
by any other entity of the intelligence
community.
(g) The Director shall ensure the appro-
priate implementation of special activities
and sensitive foreign intelligence, counterin-
telligence, and counterterrorism intelligence
activities outside the United States desig-
nated under section 124 of this Act.
(h) The Director shall-
(1) formulate policies with respect to in-
telligence arrangements with foreign govern-
ments, in consultation with the Secretary of
of State; and
(2) coordinate intelligence relationships
between the various entities of the intelli-
gence community and the foreign intelli-
gence or internal security services of foreign
governments.
(I) The Director shall promote the devel-
opment and maintenance of services of com-
mon concern by designated foreign intelli-
gence organizations on behalf of the intelli-
gence community.
(j) The Director shall be responsible for
the protection from unauthorized disclosure
of intelligence sources and methods and shah
establish for departments and agencies mini-
mum security standards for the management
and handling of information and material
relating to intelligence sources and methods.
(k) No provision of law shall be construed
to require the Director or any other officer or
employee of the United States to disclose the
organization, function, name, official title,
salary, or affiliation with the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence of any per-
son employed by the Office, or the numbers of
persons employed by the Office.
(1) The Director may appoint and sepa-
rate such civilian personnel or contract for
such personal services as the Director deems
advisable to perform the functions of the
Office of the Director, without regard to
the provisions of any other law, including,
but not limited to, provisions which place
limitations on types of persons to be em-
ployed, and fix the compensation of such
personnel without regard to chapter 51 and
subchapter III and IV of chapter 53 of title
V, United States Code, relating to classifica-
tion and General Schedule pay rates, but at
such rates not in excess of the maximum
rate authorized under other provisions of
law.
(m) Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the Director may terminate the em-
ployment of any officer or employee of the
Office of the Director or, with the concur-
rence of the head of the department or agen-
cy concerned, the security clearance of any
contractor of any entity of the intelligence
community whenever the Director considers
such termination necessary or advisable in
-the interests of the United States.
(n) Any officer or employee of the Office
of the Director including those separated
under subsection (1) or whose employment
has been terminated under subsection (m)
may seek or accept employment in any other
department or agency of the Government;
if declared eligible for such employment by
the Office of Personnel Management; and
that Office shall consider such officer or em-
ployee for positions in the competitive civil
service in the same manner as if transferring
between two positions in the competitive
service, but only if such officer or employee
has served with the Office of the Director or
any other entity of the intelligence commu-
nity for a total of at least one year con-
tinuously immediately preceding separation
or termination.
(o) In order to carry out the Director's
duties under this title, the Director is au-
thorized to conduct program and perform-
ance audits and evaluations of the national
intelligence activities of the entities of the
intelligence community and to obtain from
any department or agency such information
as the Director deems necessary to perform
such duties; and each department and agen-
cy shall furnish, upon request and in accord-
ance with applicable law, such information
to the Director.
(p) In order to carry out the Director's
duties under this title, the Director is au-
thorized to review all research and devel-
opment activities which support the intelli-
gence activities of the Government and
may review all the intelligence activities of
the Government.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR; GENERAL COUNSEL;
COMMITTEES AND BOARDS
SEc. 305. (a) The President is authorized
to appoint up to five Assistant Directors of
National Intelligence to assist the Director
in carrying out the responsibilities of the
Director under this Act. At no time shall
more than two of the positions of Assistant
Director of National Intelligence be ocdu-
pied by commissioned officers of the armed
forces, whether in active or retired status.
If a commissioned officer of the armed forces
serves as an Assistant Director of National
Intelligence, the provisions of section 303
(d)-(f) shall apply to such officer.
(b) The Director, with respect to the Office
of the Director, the Attorney General with
respect to the Attorney General's duties and
responsibilities under this Act, and the head
of each entity of the intelligence community
with respect to that entity, is authorized to
establish such committees or boards, com-
posed of officers and employees of the United
States, as may be necessary to carry out ef-
fectively the provisions of this Act.
(c) The President is authorized to appoint,
by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, a General Counsel who shall dis-
charge the responsibilities of general counsel
under this Act for the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence and for the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(d) (1) The Director, with respect to the
Office of the Director, the Attorney General
with respect to the Attorney General's du-
ties and responsibilities under this Act, and
the head of each entity of the intelligence
community with respect to that entity, are
authorized to establish such advisory com-
mittees as may be necessary to provide ex-
pert advice regarding the administration of
this Act.
(2) The provisions of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (86 Stat. 770; 5 U.S.C. App.
I, 1-15) shall apply with respect to any ad-
visory committee established under author-
ity Of this subsection except that the Di-
rector, Attorney General, or the head of any
entity of the intelligence community, as the
case may be, may waive the application of
any or all of the provisions of that Act when
such official deems such action necessary
to the successful performance of the duties
of the Director, the Attorney General, or
any entity of the intelligence community,
as the case may be, or to protect the secu-
rity of the activities of the intelligence
community.
DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPORTING
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SEC. 306. It shall be the responsibility of
the heads of departments and agencies to
ensure that all national intelligence ob-
tained by such departments and agencies
is promptly furnished to the Director or
to the entity of the intelligence community
designated by the Director to receive such
intelligence.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
SEC. 307. The Director shall make avail-
able to the public an unclassified annual re-
port on the national intelligence, counter-
intelligence, and counterterrorism activities
conducted by entities of the intelligence
community. Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed as requiring the public dis-
closure, in any such report made available
to the public, of the names of individuals
engaged in such activities for the United
States or the divulging of classified informa-
tion which requires protection from dis-
closure by law.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND BUDGET'
AUTHORITY; INFORMATION
SEC. 308. The Director shall, to the extent
consistent with applicable law, have full
and exclusive authority for approval of the
national intelligence budget submitted to
the President. Pursuant to this authority-
(a) The Director shall provide guidance for
program and budget development to pro-
gram managers and heads of component ac-
tivities and to department and agency
heads;
(b) The heads of departments and agen-
cies involved in the national intelligence
budget shall ensure timely development and
submission to the Director of proposed na-
tional programs and budgets, in the format
designated by the Director, by the program
managers and heads of component activities,
and shall also ensure that the Director Is
provided, in a timely and responsive manner,
all information necessary to perform the
Director's program and budget respon-
sibilities;
(c) The Director shall review and evaluate
the national program and budget submis-
sions and, with the advice of the depart-
ments and agencies concerned, develop the
national intelligence budget and present it
to the President through the Office of Man-
agement and Budget;
(d) The Director shall present and justify
the national intelligence budget to the Con-
gress;
(e) The Director shall have full and ex-
clusive authority for reprogramming national
intelligence budget funds. in accordance
with guidelines established by the Office of
Management and Budget and after con-
sultation with the head of the department
or agency affected. The implementation of
the overall budget by the departments and
agencies that include entities of the Intel.
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the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget for the purpose of carrying out au-
thorized functions, and sums so transferred
to or froMthe Agency may be expended with-
out regard to any limitation on appropl4a-
tions from which transferred;
(2) reimburse or be reimbursed by other
departments and agencies in connection with
the detail or assignment of personnel to or
from the Agency;
(3) rent any premises within or outside
the United States as appropriate to carry
out any authorized function of the Agency;
lease property, supplies, services, equipment,
buildings or facilities; acquire, construct, or
alter buildings and facilities, or contract for
such purposes; repair, operate, and maintain
buildings, utilities, facilities, and appur-
tenances; and exercise exclusive jurisdiction,
control, and custody over all facilities and
properties owned or utilized by the Agency;
(4) maintain and operate full-scale print-
ing facilities for the production of intelli-
gence and intelligence-related materials and
lease or purchase and operate computer and
communications equipment as appropriate
to carry out authorized functions;
(5) conduct background investigations in
accordance with section 217 of this Act to
determine the suitability and trustworthi-
ness of employees, contractors and contrac-
tor employees who will perform work in
connection with an Agency contract, appli-
cants for contractor status, persons em-
ployed by Agency proprietaries, or applicants
for employment or for access to facilities or
classified Agency information, consultants,
persons detailed or assigned to the Agency,
and persons similarly associated with the
Office of the Director of National In-
telligence;
(6) acquire, establish, maintain, and op-
erate secure communications systems in sup-
port of Agency operations and in support
of the Office of the Director of National In-
telligence, and when authorized by the Di-
rector of the Agency, in support of any other
department or agency:
(7) in addition to the authority provided
under 31 U.S.C. 686, provide to any depart-
ment or agency such services, supplies, or
equipment as the Agency may be in a posi-
tion to render, supply, or obtain by con-
tract, and place orders with departments or
agencies that may be In a position to render,
supply, or obtain services, sunolies, or
equipment by contract or otherwise.
(8) protect Agency, personnel, installations,
equipment and information by lawful se-
curity procedures, including, but not limited
to, inspections of persons and items entering
or leaving facilities and grounds owned or
utilized by the Agency;
(9) provide transportation, in accordance
with regulations approved by the Director of
the Agency, for officers, employees and con-
tractors of the Agency and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, or their
dependents, when other means of transporta-
tion are unsafe or inadequate;
(10) settle and pay claims of civilian and
military personnel, as prescribed in Agency
regulations consistent with the terms and
conditions by which claims are settled and
paid under the Military Personnel and Civil-
ian Employees' Claims Act of 1964, as
amended (31 U.S.C. 240-243);
(11) pay, in accordance with regulations
approved by the Director, expenses of travel
in connection with, and expenses incident
to membership in, or attendance at meetings
of professional, technical, scientific, and
other similar organizations and professional
associations when such attendance or mem-
bership would be of benefit in the conduct
of the work of the Agency;
(12) provide or pay expenses of training
to support authorized Agency functions, and,
as appropriate, provide training for person-
nel of other departments and agencies;
(13) perform inspection, audit. public af-
fair), legal, legislative, and other administra-
tive functions; and
(14) perform such additional functions as
are otherwise authorized by this Act to be
performed by each entity of the intelligence
community.
(b) Any department or agency may trans-
fer to or receive from the Agency any sum
of money in accordance with subsection
(a) (1)-(2) of this section.
(c) Any department or agency is author-
ized to assign or detail to the Agency any
officer or employee of such department or
agency to assist the Agency in carrying out
any authorized function and the Agency may
similarly assign or detail personnel to any
other department or agency.
(d) No provision of law shall be con-
strued to require the Director of the Agency
or any other officer or employee of the United
States to disclose information concerning
the organization or functions of the Agen-
cy, including the name, official title, salary,
or affiliation with the Agency of any per-
son employed by, or otherwise associated
with the Agency, or the number of persons
employed by the Agency. In addition, the
Agency shall also be exempted from the pro-
visions of any law which require the pub-
lication or disclosure, or the search or re-
view in connection therewith, of informa-
tion in files specifically designated to be
concerned with: The design, function, de-
ployment, exploitation or utilization of
scientific or technical systems for the collec-
tion of intelligence; special activities and
intelligence operations; investigations con-
ducted to determine the suitability of po-
tential intelligence sources; intelligence and
security liaison arrangements or information
exchanges with foreign governments or their
intelligence or security services; except that
requests by United States citizens and per-
manent resident aliens for information con-
cerning themselves, made pursuant to Sec-
tions 552 and 552a of title b, shall be proc-
essed in accordance with those sections.
(e) The Agency is authorized to establish,
administer, and maintain methods to con-
ceal and protect the relationship between the
Agency and any of its officers, employees,
sources, and activities, and for personnel and
activities of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, and for defectors from
foreign countries.
(f) The Agency may continue to use and
may modify with the approval of the Presi-
dent the seal of office used by the Central
Intelligence Agency prior to the effective date
of this title and judicial notice shall be taken
of such seal,
(g) The Director of the Agency may em-
ploy or contract for security officers to police
and protect the security of Agency personnel,
installations and grounds owned or utilized
by the Agency or the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, and such security
officers shall have the same powers as sheriffs
and constables for the protection of persons
and property, to prevent breaches of the
peace, to suppress affrays or unlawful as-
semblies, and to enforce any rule or regula-
tion the Director of the Agency may promul-
gate for the protection of such installations
and grounds. The jurisdiction and police
powers of such security officers shall not,
however, extend to the service of civil
process.
(h) Under such regulations as the Director
of the Agency shall prescribe, Agency per-
sonnel may carry and use firearms while in
the discharge of their official duties: Pro-
vided, That within the United States, such
'Official duties shall Include only the protec-
tion of (1) information concerning intelli-
gence sources and methods and classified
documents and material; (2) facilities, prop-
erty, monies and other valuable assets owned
or utilized by the Agency or the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence; (3) per-
S 1317
sonnel of the Agency or the Office of the Di-
rector of National Intelligence as may be
designated by the Director of the Agency;
and (4) defectors and foreign persons visit-
ing the United States under Agency auspices;
And provided further, that such duties shall
include the transportation and utilization
of firearms for authorized training.
(1) (1) The Agency may employ, manage
and separate personnel or contract for such
personal services as it deems advisable, and
the Agency may expend such sums as it
deems advisable for the compensation and
management of persons employed by or oth-
erwise associated with the Agency;
(2) The Director of the Agency may, in the
discretion of the Director of the Agency,
terminate the employment of any officer or
employee of the Central Intelligence Agency,
or the access of any individual, including
contractors of the Agency or any employee
of any such contractor, to information re-
lting to Intelligence activities whenever the
Director of the Agency considers such ter-
mination necessary or advisable.
(3) Any Agency officer or employee, includ-
ing any officer or employee who has been
separated under paragraph (1), or whose
employment has been terminated under par-
agraph (2), may seek or accept employment
in the competitive service of the Government
if declared eligible for such employment by
the Office of Personnel Management; and
that Office shall consider such officer or em-
ployee for positions in the competitive civil
service in the same manner as if transfer-
ring between two positions in the competi-
tive service, but only if such Agency officer or
employee has served with the Agency or the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
for a total of at least one year continuously
immediately preceding separation or termi-
nation.
(j) The Director of the Agency is author-
ized to accept, hold, administer, and utilize
gifts and bequests of property, both real and
personal, for artistic or general employee or
dependent welfare, educational, recreational
or like purpose, whenever the Director of
the Agency determines that it would be In
the interests of the Agency to do so. Gifts
and bequests of money and the proceeds
from sales of other property received as gifts
or bequests shall be deposited in the Treas-
ury in a separate fund and shall be disbursed
upon order of the Director of the Agency.
Property accepted pursuant to this pro-
vision, and the proceeds thereof, shall be
used as nearly as possible in accordance with
the terms of the gift or bequest. For pur-
poses of federal, income, estate, or gift taxes,
gifts or property accepted under this sub-
section shall be accepted as a gift, devise, or
bequest to the United States.
(k) Except as otherwise provided in this
Act, the authorities contained in subsections
(a) through (e) and (I) of this section may
be exercised notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law.
(I) The Agency shall have no police, sub-
poena, or law enforcement' powers, nor per-
form any internal security or criminal in-
vestigation functions, except to the extent
expressly authorized by this Act.
PROCUREMENT
SEC. 422. (a) Except as otherwise provided
in this Act, the Agency is authorized to pro-
cure, use, and dispose of such real and per-
sonal property, supplies, services, equipment
and facilities without regard to any other
provision of law, whenever deemed necessary
to carry out authorized functions.
(b) The provisions of chapter 137, relat-
ing to the procurement of property and
services, and chapter 139, relating to the
procurement of research and development
services, of title 10, United States Code, as
amended, shall apply to the procurement of
property and research and development
services by the Agency under this title in
the same manner and to the same extent
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE February 8, 1980
such chapters apply to the procurement of Agency, the services of expert personnel, to in connection with any authorized intelli-
property, services, and research and develop- or from any other federal agency or foreign gence activity if-
ment services by the agencies named in sec- government, and, when not readily available (1) the withdrawal of funds from the Re-
tion 2303(a) of chapter 137 of title 10, from another federal agency, to or from serve Fund has been approved by the Office of
except that the Director of the Agency may state or local governments; Management and Budget;
specify by regulation when any or all of the (4) to provide and receive technical infor- (2) the Committee on Appropriations of
provisions of chapters 137 and 139 of title 10 oration or assistance to or from the Passport the House of Representatives, the Commit-
may be waived for the effective performance Office of the Department of State and the tee on Appropriations of the Senate, the
of authorized functions. Immigration and Naturalizationz Service of House Permanent Select Committee on In,
(c) In accordance with regulations pro- the Department of Justice to assist in carry- telligence, and the Senate Select committee
mulgated by the Director of the Agency, the ing out authorized functions; and on Intelligence have been notified of the
Agency is authorized to enter into contracts (5) when the internal Revenue Service is purpose of such withdrawal at least 72 hours
and amendments of contracts, and to make performing an audit of an .agency proprie- in. advance of the withdrawal; except that in
advance payments on contracts, without re- tary or any other organization or Individual
gard to any other provision of law, whenever whose relationship with the Agency is con-
deemed necessary for the effective perform- cealed or protected, to notify the internal
ance of authorized functions. Revenue Service of such relationship in
(d) Except as otherwise provided in this order that it not be disclosed publicly in
Act, the Agency is authorized to dispose of connection with the audit.
property and use the proceeds therefrom ADMISSION OF ESSENTIAL 6,LIENS
to purchase new property without regard to
any other provision of law, in accordance Agency, , the the Attorney ()eWhenever the
General, and tinDirectore of Nornm the
-
with regulations approved by the Director missioner of Immigration and Naturaliza-
of the Agency, whenever such action is tion determine that the entry of particular
found necessary for the effective perform- aliens into the United States for permanent
ance of authorized functions in accordance residence is in the interest of national secur-
with regulations established by the Direc- ity or essential to intelligence activities, such
tor of the Agency. aliens and their immediate families shall be
PROPRIETARIES 1 n e t int th Unit d $t t f
ve n r
o e
SEC. 423. (a) The Agency is authorized to
establish and operate proprietaries in sup-
port of Agency operations and, with the ap-
proval of the Director of National Intelli-
gence, in support of other entities of the
intelligence community. In addition, any
such proprietaries may be operated on a
commercial basis to the extent necessary to
provide effective cover.
(b) Appropriated funds and funds gen-
erated by an Agency proprietary or other-
wise received may be deposited in banks or
other financial institutions and expended
as necessary to accomplish the same or
closely related operational purposes except
that funds in excess of amounts necessary
for such purposes shall be deposited Into
miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury.
(c) Proceeds from the liquidation, sale, or
other disposition of any Agency proprietary
may be expended to establish and operate
other proprietaries in furtherance of the
same or closely related operational purposes.
Any such proceeds not so expended shall be
deposited into miscellaneous receipts of the
Treasury, except for amounts deemed neces-
sary or required by law to be retained for
the purpose of satisfying claims or obliga-
tions.
(d) Whenever any Agency proprietary, or
operationally related group of proprietaries,
whose net value exceeds $150,000 is to be
liquidated, sold, or otherwise disposed of, the
Agency shall, as much in advance of the
liquidation, sale, or other disposition as
practicable, report the circumstances of the
intended liquidation, sale, or other disposi-
tion to the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
(e) The authority contained in this sec- the interest of the national security, the (2) travel, transportation, medical, sub-
tion shall, except as otherwise provided in expenditure of funds appropriated to or sistence, and other allowances and benefits
this Act, be available to the Agency notwith- otherwise received by the Agency shall be ac- in a manner and under circumstances com-
standing any other provision of law. counted for solely on the certificate of the parable to those provided under title IX of
SEC. 424. In addition to those activities of timcate snail oe aeemea a culnclene voucher =~il~-lave;
de-
the Agency that relate to other departments forthe amount certified therein. (3) educational travel benefits for de-
(c) There is established and. the Director pendents in the same manner and under
and agencies and that are authorized in of the Agency is authorized to establish and the same circumstances as such benefits are
other provisions of this Act, the Agency is maintain a fund to be known. as the Con- provided under 6 U.S.C. 5924(4) (A) and
further authorized- tingency Reserve Fund (hereinafter in this (B) for dependents of employees of the De-
(1) to request other entities of the Intel- section referred to as the "Reserve Fund") partment of State; and
ligence community to undertake authorized and to credit to the Reserve Fund monies (4) (A) a gratuity to the surviving de-
intelligence activities; specifically appropriated to the Central In- pendents of officers or employees who die .
(2) to receive assistance from federal, telligence Agency for such fund and unused as a result of injuries (excluding disease)
state and local law enforcement agencies in balances of funds previously withdrawn from sustained outside the United States, in an
the conduct of authorized functions, the Reserve Fund. amount ecual to one year's salary at the
(3) to provide and receive technical guid- (d) The Director of the Agency is au- time of death. Such payment shall be made
ance, training, and equipment, and, under thorized to expend monies from the Reserve only noon determination of the Director of
regulations established by the Director of the Fund for the payment of expenses incurred the Agency or his designee that the death.
y
g
e a as Or per-
manent residence withous regard to their
inadmissibility under, or the:x failure to
comply with, any immigration law of the
United States or any other law or regulation,
but in no case may the number of aliens
and members of their immediate families
who enter the United States under the au-
thority of this section exceed one hundred in
any one fiscal year. The Agency is authorized
to process, debrief, and provide relocation as-
sistance to such individuals, as necessary and
appropriate under regulations established by
the Director of the Agency.
(b) When extraordinary circumstances in-
dicate that a foreign person associated with
the Agency should enter or leave the United
States under other than that person's true
identity, the Agency is authorized to notify
the Immigration and Naturalization Service
of these circumstances and request a waiver
of otherwise applicable rules and procedures.
AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS AND
EXPENDITURFs
SEc. 428. (a) Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, sums available to the
Agency by appropriation or otherwise re-
ceived may be expended to carry out the au-
thorized functions of the Agency. No funds
may be appropriated for any fiscal year be-
ginning after September 30, 1980, for the
purpose of carrying out any activity of the
Agency unless funds for such activity have
been previously authorized by legislation en-
acted during the same fiscal year or during
one of the two immediately preceding fiscal
years, except that this limitation shall not
apply to funds appropriated by any con-
tinuing resolution or required by pay raises.
(b) Whenever the Director of the Agency
determines such action to be necessary in
the Agency may authorize the withdrawal of
funds from the Reserve Fund without prior
notification to the appropriate committees of
the Congress if the Director of the Agency
notifies such committees within 48 hours
after initiation of the withdrawal, describes
the activity for which such funds have been`
or are to be expended, certifies to such com-
mittees that prior notification would have
resulted in a delay which would have been.
harmful to the United States, and discloses
to such committees the reasons why the de-
lay would have been harmful. The foregoing
shall not be construed as requiring the ap-
proval of any committee of the Congress
prior to the initiation of any such activity;
(3) the monies from the Reserve Fund are
used solely for the purpose of meeting needs
that were not anticipated at he time the
President's budget was submitted to the
Congress for the fiscal year in which the
withdrawal is authorized, and the activities
to be funded recuire protection from unau-
thorized disclosure; and
(4) any activity funded from the Reserve
Fund that continues after the end of the
fiscal year in which it was funded by monies
from the Reserve Fund shall be funded there-
after through the regular budgetary process
at the earliest practicable date.
(e) Monies from the Reserve Fund may be
expended only for the purpose for which the
withdrawal was approved under this sub-
section and any amount approved for ex-
penditure but not actually expended or to be
expended for the purpose for which ap-
proved shall be returned to the Reserve Fund.
PART D-TRAVEL AND OTHER ALLOWANCES: RE-
LATED EXPENSES; RETIREMENT SYSTEM; AND
DEATH GRATVrrms
SEC. 431. (a) As used in this section "em--
plovee" means an "employee" as defined in
6 U.S.C. 2105, but does not include, unless
otherwise specifically provided In accord-
ance with regulations issued by the Director
of the Agency, any person working for the
Agency under a contract or any person who,
when initially employed, is a resident in or a
citizen of the foreign country in which
such person is to be assigned to duty.
(b) Under regulations issued by the Di-
rector of the Agency the Agency may pay--
(I) travel, transportation, and subsist-
ence expenses as provided for in chapters 67
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S 1320
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 8, 1980
information the Attorney General may re- to counterintelligence or counterterrorism General or a designee fully and currently in-
quest concerning such activiites; intelligence activities of the military services formed of all intelligence collection within
(5) advise the Attorney General and the directed against persons subject to the Uni- the United States by officers or .-M.. of
f
rit
C
il
th
b
~cu
y
ounc
rega u===s
e o
-
orm Code of Military Justice, l0 United foreign governments in which information or
jectives priorities; direction, conduct, and States Code 802, Art. 2, (1) through (10), assistance is furnished by the Bureau.
effectiveness of counterintelligence and except for activities conducted by clandes- (c) The authority provided in subsection
counterterrorism intelligence activities tine means outside military installations. (a) of this section is subject to the proce-
within the United States; FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS dures, prohibitions, and restrictions con-
(6) assist the Attorney General and the tamed in title II of this Act.
National Security Council in the assessment SEC. 505. (a) The Bureau may, in accord-
of .the threat to United States interests from ante with procedures approved by the At- GENERAL AND SPECIAL AUTHORITIES
intelligence activities within the United torney General- SEC. 507. (a) In carrying out its functions
States of, foreign powers and from interna- (1) collect foreign intelligence within the under this title, the Bureau is authorized
tional terrorist activities within the United United States in the course of authorized to-
States; and collection of counterintelligence or counter- (1) procure or lease such property, sup-
(7) perform with respect to the Bureau terrorism intelligence; plies, services, equipment, buildings, and
the duties assigned elsewhere in this Act to (2) conduct activities within the United facilities, and construct or alter such -build-
the head of each entity of the intelligence States in support of the foreign intelligence ings and facilities, as may be necessary to
community. collection programs of any other entity of carry out its authorized intelligence func-
(b) The Attorney General shall provide the intelligence community; and - tions;
by regulation which officials of the Bu- (3) produce, analyze, and disseminate (2) establish, furnish, and maintain se--
reau shall perform the duties of the Director foreign intelligence in coordination with cure cover for Bureau officers, employees,
under this Act during the absence or disa- the Director of National Intelligence. and sources when necessary to carry out its
bility of the Director or during any tem- (b) Any Bureau collection of foreign in- authorized intelligence functions, in ac-
porary vacancy in the Office of the Director. telligence upon the request of another entity cordance with procedures approved by the
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM of the intelligence community, or any Bureau Attorney General;
INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS activity in support of the foreign intelligence (3) establish and operate proprietaries
collection programs of another entity of the when necessary to support Bureau intelli-
SEC. 504. (a) The Bureau shall, in accord- intelligence community, shall be conducted gence activities, in accordance with pro-
ance with procedures approved by the At- n?l~ ?- +.ha ro.,,-+ a.. ..- - neAnrac ---A 1.., +l.n A++..-,,..,,
torney General-
(1) collect, produce, analyze, publish, and
disseminate counterintelligence and counter-
terrorism intelligence;
(2) conduct such other counterntelligence
and counterterrorism intelligence activities
as are necessary for lawful purposes; and
(3) conduct, in coordination with the Di-
rector of National Intelligence, liaison for
counterintelligence or counterterrorism in-
telligence purposes with foreign govern.
ments.
(b) All Bureau counterintelligence and
counterterrorism intelligence activities out-
side the United States shall be conducted in
coordination with the Central Intelligence
Agency and with the approval of a properly
designated official of such agency. All re-
quests for such approval shall be made or
confined in writing. Any such activities that
are not related directly to the responsibilities
of the Bureau for the conduct of counter-
intelligence or counterterrorism Intelligence
activities within the United States shall be
conducted, only with the approval of the
Attorney General or a designee, made or con-
firmed in writing.
(c) (1) The Bureau shall be responsible
for the coordination of all counterintelli-
gence and counterterrorism intelligence
activities conducted within the United States
by any other entity of the intelligence
community.
(2) Such activities shall be conducted by
clandestine means only with the approval
of the Director or a designee, made or con-
firmed in writing, and only if the request for
such approval-
(A) is made or confirmed in writing by
a properly designated senior official of the
requesting entity;
(B) describes the activity to be con-
ducted; and
(C) sets forth the reasons why the request-
ing entity wishes to conduct such activity
(4) deposit public moneys in banks or
other financial institutions when necessary
to carry out its authorized intelligence func-
tions;
(5) conduct or contract for research, de-
velopment, and procurement of technical
systems and devices relating to its author-
ized intelligence functions;
(6) protect from unauthorized disclosure,
in accordance with standards established by
the Director of National Intelligence under
section 114, intelligence sources and meth-
ods; and -
(7) perform such additional functions as
are otherwise authorized by this Act to be
performed by each entity of the intelligence
community.
(b) (1) Any proprietary established and
operated by the Bureau may be operated on
a commercial basis to the extent necessary
to provide effective cover. Any funds gen-
erated by any such proprietary in excess of
the amount necessary for its operational
requirements shall be deposited by the Di-
rector into miscellaneous receipts of the
Treasury.
(2) Whenever any Bureau proprietary
whose net value exceeds $150,000 is to be
liquidated, sold, or otherwise disposed of,
the Bureau shall, as much in advance of the
liquidation, sale, or other disposition of the
proprietary as practicable report the cir-
cumstances of the intended liquidation, sale,
or other disposition to the Attorney General
and to the House Permanent Select Commit-
tee on Inelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. Any proceeds
from any liquidation, sale, or other disposi-
tion of any Bureau proprietary, in whatever
amount, after all obligations of the proprie-
tary have been met, shall be deposited by
the Director into miscellaneous receipts of
the Treasury.
(c) The Bureau is authorized, in accord-
ance with procedures approved by the Attor-
ney General, to procure or lease property,
oods
or se
i
f
g
reques
,
rv
ces
specifies
or its own use in such a
General or a designee in a timely manner the purposes for which the intelligence or manner that the role of the Bureau is not
with copies of all requests made to the assistance is sought and- apparent or publicly acknowledged when
Bureau under this subsection and shall (1) the Bureau would be authorized under public knowledge could inhibit or interfere
notify the Attorney General or a designee this Act to collect the intelligence or provide with the secure conduct of an authorized in-
In a timely manner of any action taken by the assistance in the absence of any such telligence function of the Bureau.
the ,Bureau with respect thereto. request; or (d) The
th
it
t
au
or
y con
ained in clauses
(4) Any entity of the intelligence com- (2) the collection of the intelligence or the (1), (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (a) shall,- t
munity conducting any counterintelligence provision of assistance pertains to foreign except as otherwise provided in this Act, be
or counterterrorism intelligence activity persons and is approved by the Attorney Gen- available to the Bureau notwithstanding
within the United States shall keep the eral or a designee after a written finding that, any other provision of law and shall not be
Bureau fully and currently informed regard- as a matter of comity, such collection or modified, limited, suspended, or superseded
Ing that activity. assistance is In the interests of the United by any provision of law enacted after the
(5) The requirements of paragraphs (2) States. effective datg of this title unless such pro-
through (4) of this subsection shall not apply (b) The Bureau shall keep the Attorney vision expressly cites the specific provision
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In writing, of an official of an entity of the
intelligence community who has been
designated by the President to make such
requests. The Bureau may not comply with
any such request unless such request-
(1) describes the information sought or
the support activity requested;
. (2) certifies that the information sought
or the support activity requested Is relevant
to the authorized functions and duties of the
requesting entity; and
(3) sets forth the reasons why the Bureau
is being requested to collect the information
or conduct the support activity.
The Bureau shall provide the Attorney Gen-
eral or a designee in a timely manner with
copies of all such requests, and shall conduct
such support activity only with -the approval
of the Director.
(c) The Bureau shall be responsible, in
accordance with procedures agreed upon by
the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence, for the coordination of
all collection of foreign intelligence by
clandestine means within the United States
by any other entity of the intelligence
Community.
(d) Within the United States foreign intel-
ligence may be collected by clandestine
means directed against unconsenting United
States persons only by the Bureau, with no-
tice to the Attorney General or a designee,
except as otherwise permitted by section (d)
of this Act.
COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
SEC. 506. (a) The Bureau may, in accord-
ance with procedures approved by the Attor-
ney General, collect counterintelligence and
counterterrorism intelligence within the
United States upon the written request of
any law enforcement, Intelligence, or security
agency of a foreign government, and provide
assistance to any officer of such agency who
Is collecting intelligence within the United
States. The Bureau may not comply with any
such request unless such
t
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gene and communications security needs
of the United States;
(3) to establish by law the National
Security Agency, to provide for the appoint-
ment of a director of that Agency, to deline-
ate the responsibilities of such director, and
to confer upon such director the authorities
necessary to fulfill those responsibilities;
(4) to ensure that the National Security
Agency is accountable to the President, the
Congress, and the people of the United
States and that the signals intelligence
activities and communications security
activities of the United States are conducted
in a manner consistent with the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States.
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 602. (a) Except as otherwise provided
in this section, the definitions in title I
shall apply to this title.
(b) As used in this title-
(1) The term "communications intelli-
information derived from foreign electro-
magnetic communications by other than the
intended recipients.
(2) The term "cryptographic system" in-
cludes any code, cipher, and any manual,
mechanical or electrical device or method
used for the purpose of disguising, conceal-
ing, or authenticating the contests, signifi-
cance, or meanings of communications.
(3) The term "cryptology" encompasses
both signals intelligence and communica-
tions security.
(4j The term "electronics intelligence"
means technical and intelligence informa-
tion derived from foreign electromagnetic
radiations emanating from other than com-
munications, nuclear detonations, or radio-
active sources.
that has at least one communicant outside
of the United States or that is entirely among
foreign powers or between a.foreign power
and officials of a foreign power (but not in-
cluding communications intercepted by elec-
tronic surveillance directed at premises used
(6) The term "foreign instrumentation
signals intelligence" means technical and in-
telligence information derived from the col-
lection and processing of foreign telemetry,
beaconry, and associated signals.
(7) The term I "signals intelligence" in-
cludes, either individually or in combination,
communications intelligence, electronics in-
intelligence, and information derived from
the collection and processing of non-imagery
infrared and coherent light signals, but does
not include electronic surveillance activities
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gationon its own behalf.
(8) The term "unauthorized person"
means a person not authorized access to
signals intelligence or communications secu-
rity information by the President or by the
head of any department or agency that has
been designated expressly by the President to
engage in cryptologic activities for the
United States.
_ ebruary -8, 1980 CONGUSSL.y ` _ ~ + - Y
; i r,.those signals illte1lig'_ Muni tivftTes;- (") those e)ei is of any other or, or Dep ilPiti~ spe .
protection of the national security of, the cnrtty- Council to`perform signals l fir`
_OC
United States; genie activities-during ~= So
=or1 b Yietlt; incid'ent~ Ito or
a out of any such status, office, rank,
or grade. A -commissioned officer shall, while
serving in the office of Director or Deputy
Director, continue to hold rank and grade
not lower than that in which "that officer
was serving at the time of that officer's ap-
pointment as Director or Deputy Director.
(3) The rank or grade of any such com-
missioned officer shall, during any period
such officer occupies the office of Director
or Deputy Director, be in addition.:to the
numbers and percentages authorized for the
military department of which such officer
is a member.
(e) The Director and Deputy Director,
whether civilian or military, shall be. com
pensated while serving as Director or Deputy
Director only from funds appropriated : to
the Department of Defense.
(f) If a commissioned officer of the armed
forces is serving as Director or Deputy Di-
rector, that officer shall be entitled, while
so serving, to the difference, if any, between
the regular military compensation (as de- -
fined in section 101(25) of title 37, United
States Code) to which that officer is 'en
titled and the compensation provided. for
that office under subchapter It f chapter
(g) The Deputy Director shall actin the
place of the Director during ile` abselfce`.t?
disability of the Director or during -aaf2+
temporary vacancy in the office of tr)i$ Di-,:
rector. The Director shall provide by tegula-
tion which officials of- the Agicy "shall,
whenever there is no Deputy Direetor,-act
in the place of the DireCtor during the ab-
sence or disability of the Director or during-
any temporary vacandy in the office of the
Director.
(h) In computing et*tfli
tion prescribed in subseOtion (b)' .ef bjs-
Section, any service by a person as lrr -
or Deputy Director of the National SCctirfty
Agency as such agency existed on the iay -.
before the effective date of this title shall
ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY; FUNCTION
SEC. 611. (a) There is established within
the Department of Defense an agency to be
known as the National Security Agency
(hereinafter in this title referred to as the
"Agency").
(b) It shall be the function of the Agency
to conduct signals intelligence activities and
communications security activities for
the United States Government and to serve
as the principal agency of the United States
signals intelligence system.
(c) (1) The functions of the Agency shall
be carried out under the direct supervision
and control of the Secretary of Defense and
shall be accomplished under the provisions
of this Act and in conformity with the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States.
(2) In exercising supervision and control
over the Agency, the Secretary of Defense
shall comply with intelligence policies, needs,
and priorities established by the National Se-
curity Council and with intelligence objec-
tives and requirements established by the
Director of National Intelligence.
(3) In exercising supervision and control
over the Agency, the Secretary of Defense
shall comply with communications security
policy established by the National Security
Council which shall include the Secretary of
Commerce for this purpose.
DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR
SEC. 612. (a) There shall be a Director of
the National Security Agency -(hereinafter
in this title referred to as the "Director").
There shall also be a Deputy Director of the
National Security Agency (hereinafter in
this title referred to as the "Deputy Direc-
tor") to assist the Director in carrying out
the Director's functions under this Act.
(b) The Director and the Deputy Director
shall be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The Director and Deputy Director shall each
serve at the pleasure of the President. Either
the Director or Deputy Director shall be a
person with cryptologic experience. No per-
son may serve as Director or Deputy Director
for a period of more than six years unless
such person is reappointed to that same
office by the President, by and with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate. No person
who has served as Director or Deputy Direc-
tor for a period of less than six years and
is subsequently appointed or reappointed to
that same office may serve in that office un-
der such appointment or reappointment for
a term of more than six years. In no event
may any person serve in either qr both offices
for more than a total of 12 years.
(c) At no time shall the two offices of
Director and Deputy Director be occupied
simultaneously by commissioned officers of
the armed forces whether in an active or
retired status.
(d) (1) If a commissioned officer of the
armed forces is appointed as Director or
Deputy Director, then-
(A) in the performance of the duties of
Director or Deputy Director, as the case may
be. the officer shall be subject to no super-
vision, control, restriction, or prohibition of
not be included.
activities of the United States. Goverljnent
are conducted in accordance with the pro-
 Approved For Release 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010012-7
S 1326 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE February 8, 1980
a foreign power, as defined in section (24) Section 104(a) (6) is amended by in- inserting "physical search or" before "elec-
101(a)(1), (2),or (3); serting "or the Items of property or mail to tronicsurveillance".
"(C) there is no substantial likelihood be subjected to the search" after (40) Section 105(b) (1) is amended by
that the search will involve the property or "surveillance". adding at the end thereof the following pro-
mail 104(a) (7) (B) is amended by vision:
lanc of a United States person s the surveil- (25) lance will acquire the he conteizts of any tom- inserting "search or" before "surveillance". "(G) whenever more than one search of
munication to which a United States person (26) Section 104(a) (8) is amended by in- property or the opening of more than one
is a party; and serting "search or" before both appearances item of mail is to be conducted under the
"(D) the proposed minimization proce- of "surveillance". order, the authorized scope of the searches
dures with respect to such search or surveil- (27) Section 104(a) (9) is amended by in- or opening of mail; and".
lance meet the definition of minimization serting "property," after "persons,". (41) Section 105(b) (2) is amended by
procedures under section 101'(h); and (28) Section 104 (a) (10) is amended to read inserting "physical search or" before both
as follows: appearances of "electronic surveillance" and
if the Attorney General reports such mini- "(10) a statement of the period of time by inserting "search or" before "surveillance
mization procedures and any changes thereto which the physical search will encompass or or the aid".
to the House Permanent Select Committee on for which the electronic surveillance is re- (42) Section 105(c) is amended to read
Intelligence and the Senate Select Commit- quired to be maintained, and if the nature as follows:
tee on Intelligence at least thirty days prior of the intelligence gathering is such that the "(c) Whenever the target of the physical
to their effective date, unless the Attorney approval of the use of physical search or elec- search or electronic surveillance Is a foreign
General determines immediate action is tronic surveillance under this title should power, as defined in section 101(a) (1). (2),
required and notifies the committees not automatically terminate when the de- or (3) and each of the facilities, places or
immediately of such minimization proce- scribed type of information has first been ob- items of property at which the search or
dures land the reason for their becoming tained, a description of facts supporting the surveillance is directed is owned, leased, ex-
effective immediately." belief that additional information of the clusively used or openly and exclusively con-
(12) Section 102(a) (2) is amended by same type will be obtained thereafter; and". trolled by that foreign power, the order need
striking "An electronic surveillance" and in- (29) Section 104(b) is amended to read as not contain the information required by sub-
serting in lieu thereof "A physical search or follows: paragraphs (C), (D), and (F) of subsection
electronic surveillance". "(b) Whenever the target of the physical (b) (1), but shall generally describe the in-
(13) Section 102(a) (3) (B) is amended by search or electronic suveillance is a foreign formation sought and the communications,
Inserting "search or" before "surveillance". - power, as defined in section 101(a) (1), (2), activities or property to be subjected to the
(14) Section 102(a) (4) is amended by In- or (3), and each of the facilities, places or search or surveillance and for surveillances
serting "physical search or" after "With re- items of property at which the search or sur- the type of electronic surveillance involved,
spect to". - veillance is directed is owned, leased, exclu- including whether physical entry is required
(15) Section 102(a) (4) (A) is amended by sively used, or openly and exclusively con- for the search or surveillance."
inserting "physical search or" before "elec- trolled by that foreign power, the application (43) Section 105(b) (1) is amended by in-
tronic surveillance". need not contain the information required serting "physical search or" before the first
(16) Section 102(a) (4) (B) is amended by by paragraphs (6), (7) (E), (8), and (11) of appearance of "electronic".
inserting "search or" before "surveillance". subsection (a), but shall state whether pay- (44) Section 105(d) (3) is amended by in-
(17) Section 102(a) is amended by adding sical entry is required to effect the search or serting "physical search or" before "elec-
a new subsection as follows: surveillance and shall contain such informa- tronic surveillance".
"(5) The Attorney General may authorize tion about the search or surveillance tech- (45) Section 105(e) (1) Is amended to read
physical entry of property or premises under niques and communications or other in- as follows:
the open and exclusive- control of a foreign formation concerning United States persons " (1) an emergency situation exists with
power, as defined in section 101(a) (1), (2). likely to be obtained as may be necessary to respect to the use of physical search or elec-
or (3), for the purpose of installing, repair- assess the proposed minimization tronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelli-
ing, or removing any electronic, mechanical, procedures." gence information before an order authoriz-
or other surveillance device used in conjunc- (30) Section 105(a) is amended by strik- ing such search or surveillance can with due
tion with an electronic surveillance author- tag "approving the electronic surveillance" diligence be obtained; and".
ized by this subsection." and inserting in lieu thereof "approving the is amended by in-
(18) Section 102(b) is amended- to read physical search or electronic surveillance". (46) serting S"ecctiotion n 10or" 505(e) before (2) all appearances o-
as follows: (31) Section 105(a) (1) is amended by in- "surveillance" and by inserting "physical
"(b) Applications for a court order under serting "physical search or" before "elec. search or" before all appearances of "elec-
this title are authorized if the President has, tronic surveillance". tronic surveillance".
b
by written authorization, empowered the At- (32) Section 105(a) (3) (A) is amended
y (47) Section 106(a) is amended by insert
torney General to approve applications to the inserting "physical search or" before "elec- search or" before both appear-
court having jurisdiction under section 103, tronic surveillance". ing "physical
and a judge to whom an application Is made (38) Section 105(a) (3) (B) Is amended to antes of "electronic".
may, notwithstanding any other law, grant read as follows: (48) Section 106(c) is amended by insert-
an-order In conformity with section 105, ap- "(B) each of the facilities, places, or items ing , or physical search or the property or
'proving physical search or electronic sur- of property or mail at which the physical mail of,", after "electronic surveillance of".
veillance of a foreign power or an agent of search or electronic surveillance is directed (49) Section 106(d) is amended by insert-
a foreign power for the purpose of obtaining is the property or mail of, is being used by, ing ", or physical search of the property or
foreign intelligence information, except that or is about to be used by, a foreign power or mail of," after "electronic surveillance of".
the court shall not have jurisdiction to grant an agent of a foreign power;". (50) Section 106(e) through (g) are
amended by inserting 'physical search or-
any order approving physical search or elec- (34) Section 105(b) is amended by insert- f
tronic surveillance directed solely as de- ing "physical search or" after "approving". before all appearances o "electronic surveil-
scribed in subsection (a) unless such physi- (35) Section 105(b) (1) (A) is amended by lance" and by inserting "search or" before
cal search or surveillance may involve the inserting "physical search or" before "elec- all appearances of "surveillance".
(51) Section 106(h) is amended by insert
property or acquisition of communications tronic surveillance". -
of any United States person." (36) Section 105(b) (1) (B) is amended by ing "a physical search or an" before "elec-
(19) Section 103(a) is amended by insert- striking "at which the" and inserting in lieu tronic surveillance" and by inserting
ing "physical search or" before all appear- thereof "or items of property or mail at (52) "search Seectction n before
106(j) s is amended d
insert-
ances of "electronic surveillance". which the physical search or". by -
(20) Section 104(a) Is amended by insert- (37) Section 105(b) (1) (C) is amended to ing "physical search or" amend" before both appear-
(20) "physical search or" after "approving" read as follows: antes of "electronic surveillance" and by
in the first sentence. "(C) the type of information sought to be inserting "search or" before "surveillance".
(21) Section 104(a) (3) is amended by in- acquired and the type of communications, (53) Section 107 is amended by inserting
serting "or the property or mail subject to activities or property to be subjected to the "physical search or" before "electronic sur-
to the physical search" after "surveillance". search or surveillance;". veillance%
(54) Section 108(a) Is amended by insert-
(22) Section 104(a) (4) (A) is amended by (38) Section 105(b) (1) (D) is amended to
inserting "physical search or" before "elec- read as follows: ing "physical searches and" before "elec-
tronic surveillance". "(D) the means by which the physical tronic surveillance".
(23) Section 104(a) (4) (B) is amended to search or electronic surveillance will be (55) Section 109 is amended by inserting
read as follows: effected and whether physical entry will be "physical search or" before all appearances
"(B) each of the facilities, places, or items used to effect the search or surveillance: of "electronic surveillance".
of property or mail at which the physical Provided, That no order shall authorize more (56) Section 110 is amended by striking
search or electronic surveillance is directed is than one unconsented physical entry into "or about whom information obtained by
the property or mail of, or Is being used by, real property except for entries to install, electronic surveillance of such person" and
or is about to be used by, a foreign power or repair or remove surveillance devices; ". inserting in lieu thereof "or whose property
an agent of a foreign powel;" (39) Section 105(b) (1) (E) is amended by or mail has been the subject of a physical
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--SENATE February 8, 1980
are consistent with the alms, values, and
policies of the United States; and when the
anticipated benefits of such activities justify
the foreseeable risks and likely consequences.
Sec. 122. Conduct of Special Activities.
'Special activities may be conducted only by
the CIA, by the Defense Department in a
period of war or to the extent necessary for
hostilities under the War Power Resolution,
or by any agency when the President deter-
mines that the intended objective is more
likely to be achieved. Any agency may pro-
vide support for special activities involving
substantial resources, risks, or consequences
If the President determines that such sup-
port is necessary. Any agency may provide
support for other special activities if the
NSO or a committee thereof determines that
such support is necessary.
Sec. 123. Authorization for Special Activi-
ties. Special activities shall be authorized by
the President. Authorization for any special
activity that involves substantial resources,
risks, or consequences shall require a Presi-
dential finding that each such activity is im-
portant to the national securty and con-
sistent with the purposes of this Part. Au-
thorization for any other special activities
may be by category and shall require a Presi-
dential finding that such category of activi-
ties Is important to the national security and
consistent with this Part. The NSC or a com-
mittee thereof shall be responsible for the
supervision of each activity in the category
and shall ensure that It is consistent with
the Presidential finding.
Presidential authorization shall be pre-
ceded by a review by the NSC or a committee
thereof, including an assessment and recom-
mendation as to whether the activity or cate-
gory of activities is consistent with the pur-
poses of this Part. Such recommendation
shall include any dissenting views. No deci-
sion or recommendation to the President may
be made unless the following officers, or if
unavailable their representatives, were pres-
ent: the Secretaries of State and Defense, the
Attorney General, and the DNI. Any special
activity which lasts more than a year or
substantially changes in form or purpose
must be reauthorized by the President and
reviewed by the NSC or a committee thereof.
The President may delegate presidential
responsibilities under this section to the
Secretary of Defense with respect to special
activities conducted by the military in time
of war or to the extent necessary for hostil-
ities under the War Powers Resolution.
Sec. 124. Other Sensitive Intelligence Ac.
tivities. The President shall establish pro-
cedures for the approval of sensitive foreign
intelligence, counterintelligence, or counter-
terrorism intelligence activities which may
require review or findings by the President,
the NSC, a committee thereof, the DNI, the
head of an intelligence entity, or any other
designated official.
Sec. 125. Congressional Notification, Each
special activitiy involving substantial re-
sources, risks, or consequences, and each
category of other special activities, shall be
considered "significant anticipated activi-
ties" for the purpose of fully and currently
informing the House and Senate Intelli-
gence Committees under sec. 152. When
essential to meet extraordinary circum-
stances affecting vital United States inter-
ests, the President may. limit prior notice for
forty eight hours to the chairman and rank-
ing minority members of the intelligence
committees, the Speaker and minority leader
of the House, and the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate.
Part D-Limitation on intelligence
authorities
Sec. 131. Assassination. No person employed
by or acting on behalf of the United States
Government shall engage or conspire to en-
gage in assassination.
Sec. 132. Integrity of Private Institutions
of the U.S. The President is to establish pub-
lic guidelines for intelligence activities de-
signed to protect the integrity and inde-
pendence of U.S. private institutions. Intelli-
gence entities may not use the following for
cover to engage in foreign intelligence ac-
tivities or special activities: U.S. religious
organizations; U.S. media organizations; U.S.
educational institutions; the Peace Corps;
or U.S. Government cultural exchange pro-
grams.
These restrictions do not bar voluntary
contacts or voluntary exchange of informa-
tion between these persons and intelligence
entities. The President may waive these re-
strictions in wartime or to the extent nec-
essary for hostilities under the War Powers
Resolution, if the House and Senate Intelli-
gence Committees are notified.
Sec. 133. Covert Domestic Publication. In-
telligence entities may not pay for or other-
wise knowingly cause or support distribution
of any book, magazine, article, periodical,
film, or video or audio tape, for the purpose
of influencing public opinion within the
United States, unless the involvement of the
U.S. Government is acknowledged.
Sec. 134. Contracting. Intelligence entity
sponsorship of contracts or arrangements for
goods or services with U.S. organizations may
be concealed for routine service contracts,
procurement contracts, or transactions under
the Economy Act. Unless the organization is
an educational institution, entity sponsor-
ship may also be concealed pursuant to pro-
cedures approved by the Attorney General,
If concealment is necessary for authorized
intelligence activities.
Sec. 135. Indirect Activities. Inetlligence
entities and their employees may not request
or encourage anyone, directly or indirectly,
to engage in any activity on behalf of the
U.S. Government in which that entity is pro-
hibited by this Act from engaging. This re-
striction does not bar an intelligence en-
tity from requesting another U.S. Govern-
ment agency to engage in an activity that is
within the authorized functions of that
agency.
Part E-Oversight and accountability
Sec. 141. IOB, Reports on Violations, Disci-
plinary Procedures. An Intelligence Over-
sight Board is to be appointed by the Presi-
dent. As prescribed by the President, the IOB
is to report to the President on questions
of legality and propriety, have access to in-
formation in the custody of any intelligence
entity, and conduct inquiries into the ac-
tivities of intelligence entities. Each entity
is to have a general counsel to review the
legality of its activities, rules and regula-
tions; and an inspector general to investigate
its activiites to determine whether they may
be performed more effectively and to deter-
mine the facts and circumstances of any al-
leged wrongdoing. The general counsel and
inspector general are to report to the IOB
any intelligence matters as specified by the
President.
The Attorney General is to report to the
IOB any intelligence activity that involves
a question as to whether there has been a
significant law violation, and report to the
President any intelligence activities that in-
volve serious questions of law. The Presi-
dent, the IOB, and the appropriate entity
head are to be informed by the Attorney
General of decisions or actions taken in re-
sponse to reports on intelligence activities.
The Attorney General is also to keep the
IOB and the entity general counsels informed
of Justice Department legal opions affecting
intelligence community operations.
Entity heads must ensure that the general
counsel and inspector general have access to
necessary information; provide information
required to fulfill the Attorney General's
duties under this Act: report to the Attor-
ney General evidence of possible federal
criminal violations by entity employees or
agents; and report to the Attorney General
evidence of possible violations by other per-
sons of federal criminal laws specified in
guidelines adopted by the Attorney General.
All entity employees are to cooperate fully
with the IOB, the general counsel and in-
spector general, and the Attorney General;
and are to report possible law violations to
the entity head and inspector general or gen-
eral counsel or to the IOB. Entity heads are
to ensure such full cooperation. No employee
who so reports in good faith or so cooperates
may be subject to adverse personnel action
solely on that account.
Entity heads are empowered to take dis-
ciplinary action against employees who vi-
olate this Act or the procedures or regula-
tions established under this Act, including
any regulation, procedure, or obligation to
provide for personnel, document, communi-
cations, or physical security to protect in-
telligence sources and methods from unau-
thorized disclosure. Sanctions include sus-
pension without pay for up to 180 -days, re-
duction in salary or grade, and dismissal.
Employees have a right to present evidence
on their behalf. Existing legal authority of
entity heads to terminate employment or
take other disciplinary action is not affected.
Sec. 142. Congressional Oversight. Consist-
ent with all applicable authorities and
duties, including those conferred by the
Constitution upon the executive and legis-
lative branches, the head of each intelligence
entity shall keep the House and Senate In-
telligence Committees fully and currently
informed of all intelligence activties which
are the responsibilty of, are engaged in by, or
are carried out for or on behalf of, that
entity, including any significant anticipated
intelligence activity; but Committee ap-
proval is not a condition precedent to the
initiation of any such anticipated activity.
Similarly, each entity head shall furnish any
information or material concerning intelli-
gence activities in the possession, custody, or
control of the entity or its employees when-
ever requested by the House or Senate In-
telligence Commitee, and report in a timely
fashion to the intelligence Committees in-
formation relating to intelligence activties
that are illegal or improper and corrective
actions that are taken or planned.
Entity heads shall maintain a complete
record of all legal authorities, published
regulations, and published instructions per-
taining to the intelligence activities of that
entity, and shall establish procedures to
ensure that a record is maintained of each
authorization or approval required by law,
regulation or procedures approved by the
Attorney General under sec. 204 with re-
spect to any intelligence activity. The In-
telligence Committees shall be furnished all
record schedules which intelligence entities
are required by law to furnish to the Arch-
ivist of the United States, including any
modifications.
The President may establish such proce-
dures as the President determines may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this
section.
Sec. 143. Disclosure Provisions. The House
and Senate Intelligence Committees are to
report annually to their respective Houses
on U.S. intelligence activities and call to the
attention of each House, or the appropriate
committee, any intelligence matter which
should have its attention. Such reports are
to be made in a manner consistent with na-
tional security interests and are to be made
public to the extent possible under H.Res.
658 or S.Res. 400 disclosure provisions. No
information provided to the Intelligence
Committees that has been classified or that
the Executive Branch has requested be kept
confidential may be made public, except un-
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81330 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
foreign intelligence within the United States
by any clandestine means directed against
unconsenting U.S. persons who are in the
United States. Such collection may be con-
ducted only (1) by the FBI, with notice to
the Attorney General or a designee; (2) by
the military services when directed against
military personnel; (3) by NSA when di-
rected at foreign electromagnetic communi-
cations, as defined in Title VI; and (4) with
Attorney General approval by CIA through
established sources ono pretext interviews
when the U.S. person is a senior foreign of3i-
clal or an entity directed and controlled by a
foreign power or a foreign government under
the second exception. All the procedural re-
quirements of sec, 212 apply to such collec-
tion.
See. 214. Counterintelligence and Counter-
terrorism Intelligence Activities. These ac-
ing U.S. persons only on the basis of facts
and circumstances which reasonably Indicate
of a foreign power or international terrorist
activity. Placing employees (including in-
in domestic organizations requires a finding
by a senior official that such participation is
necessary to achieve significant intelligence
objectives and meets the requirements of the
procedures under sec. 212. Those procedures
must establish independent means for audit
and . Inspection of such participation. Use
against a U.S. person of mail covers, physical
directed collection (such as informants and
undercover agents), or access to financial
records requires a finding that such tech-
niques are necessary to achieve authorized
dural requirements. The Attorney General or
a designee is to be notified of these findings
based on guidelines established by the Attor-
ney General, concludes may involve signifi-
gence Gathering Activity. Information about
unconsenting U.S. persons may be collected
if a designated official makes a finding, with
notice to the Attorney General or a designee,
that the person is the target of clandestine
intelligence gathering activity of a foreign
. See., 216. Potential Sources. Information
about persons :under consideration as po-
tential sources of intelligence or operational
assistance may be collected, without the
consent of a U.S. person against whom such
with procedures which limit the scope, inten-
sity, and duration to that necessary to de-
for identification purposes, checks of govern-
ment records, and other techniques approved
the Attorney General . or a designee. Covert
techniques and mail covers are prohibited.
Sec. 217. Collection for Security Purposes.
Information may be collected to provide per-
whom such collection is directed, only in
accordance- with procedures which govern
the categories of persons who may be sub-
jects of collection by particular agencies,
and which -limit the scope, intensity and du-
contractors or applicants for contractor
status, employees of contractors or proprie-
taries, applicants for employment or for ac-
cess to information or facilities, consultants,
or persons detailed or assigned to an entity,
when requesting the person's consent would
jeopardize the security of an intelligence ac-
tivity; (2) to protect against breaches of se-
curity regulations or contractual obligations
applicable to such persons, except that col-
lection to protect against breaches of con-
tractual obligations is limited to that neces-
sary to refer the matter to the Justice De-
partment; (3) to protect against a direct or
imminent threat that may be posed by the
person's activities to the physical safety of
personnel, installations, property, docu-
ments or other materials related to intelli-
gence activity, except that such collection in
such means are necessary for authorized pur-
poses and meet the procedural requirements.
through 217 for longer than a year must be
reviewed at least annually by the entity head
or a designee. Except for collection under
sec. 217 concerning entity employees, a re-
directed against a U.S. person abroad to col-
lect Intelligence, except pursuant to a court
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Orders
are issued by the seven federal district judges
designated under that Act. There are four
significant differences between the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act and the require-
ments for search or surveillance of U.S. per-
sons abroad. Two are contained in this sec-
tion, and the others are in sec. 222 on co-
operative arrangements and sec. 223 on emer-
gency procedures. (Title VIII deals separately
with physical searches within the United
States.)
The first difference is that the standards do
not require evidence of criminal law viola-
tion. In exceptional cases when the use of
covert techniques has been approved under
sec. 213 to collect foreign intelligence, an
order may be issued if the court finds that
the information sought is foreign intelligence
and there is probable cause to believe that
the U.S. person possesses the information
sought. A court order may also be is-
sued if the court finds that significant
counterintelligence or counterterrorism in-
telligence is likely to be obtained and there is
probable cause to believe that the U.S. person
engages or is about to engage in clandestine
intelligence activites on behalf of a foreign
power, international terrorist activity, or
activities in furtherance thereof. In all cases
the court must find that less intrusive means
cannot reasonably be expected to acquire in-
telligence of the nature, reliability, and time-
liness that is required, and the court must
approve the minimization procedures.
The second difference is that military
judges designated by the Secretary of Defense
may issue orders under these standards for
extraordinary techniques directed against
military personnel abroad. The Attorney Gen-
February 8, 1980
must be informed of all such applications
and orders.
The requirements to identify the target,
to state. Whether physical entry may be in-
volved, to specify duration (up to 90 days),
and to grant extensions are substantially the
same as under the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act, although the court receives less
information about the technique to be used.
No order may authorize more than one un-
consented entry into real property except for
entries to install, repair, or remove surveil-
lance devices. The court is to observe the
procedural, administrative, and security pro-
visions established under the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act; and that Act's pro-
visions on use of information, wartime au-
thority. and congressional oversight apply to
extraordinary techniques under this section.
The court of review established by that Act
has jurisdiction to hear appeals; and its deci-
sions are subject to review by the Supreme
Court.
Sec. 222. Cooperative Arrangements. The
third difference from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act is the provision that dis-
closure to the court of information concern-
ing cooperative or liaison relationships be-
tween U.S. Government agencies and foreign
governments is not required, if the DNI
determines such disclosure would jeopardize
that relationship. If a determination of facts
relating to a probable cause finding would
require disclosure of such* Information, the
Attorney General may substitute a certifica-
tion of facts based on a determination that
such information reliably supports the certi-
fication of facts. The court is to base its prob-
able cause finding on the Attorney General's
certification and any other available infor-
mation, and the court may not refuse to make
a finding of probable cause solely because
protected liaison information is withheld.
Sec. 223. Emergency Procedures. The fourth
difference from the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act is the three-day emergency pro-
vision. Extraordinary techniques that would
meet the standard for a court order may be
approved in emergency situations by the
senior agency official in the country where
the technique is to be used. This same pro-
cedure applies to the use of Other "Covert
techniques" that would otherwise require
Presidential approval under see. 213. (By con-
trast, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act limits emergency surveillance in the
United States to 24 hours and requires the
Attorney General's approval.)
Part D-Remedies and sanctions; other
provisions
Sec. 231. Criminal Sanctions. The criminal
penalties in the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act are applied to employees of the
United States who intentionally engage in
foreign electronic surveillance or foreign
physical search directed against U.S. persons,
except as authorized by statute. It is a de-
fense that the surveillance or search was
authorized by a court order or search war-
rant. It is also a defense that the defendant
was a law enforcement officer engaged in offi-
cial duties and there was no statute or estab-
lished judicial procedure concerning author-
izations for the type of surveillance or search
involved.
Sec. 232. Civil Liability and Jurisdiction.
The civil liability provisions of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act are applied
when sec. 231 is violated. Except for this pro-
vision, nothing in this title or in any guide-
lines or procedures established pursuant to
this title creates a civil cause of actions for
equitable relief against-the United States or
a civil cause of action against any officer,
agent, or employee or former officer, agent or
employee of the U.S. Government, not other-
wise available under the Constitution or laws
of the United States: Except as provided re-
garding extraordinary techniques, nothing in
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S 1332
conduct liaison with and provide assistance
to foreign governmental agencies and act as
the DNI's agent in the coordination of such
relationships by other intelligence agencies,
and (3) to conduct service of common con-
cern on behalf of the intelligence community
as directed by the DNI.
Ancillary CIA functions are: (1) to con-
duct or contract for research, development,
and procurement of systems and devices re-
lated to its other functions, (2) to perform
inspection, audit, public affairs, legal, legis-
lative, and other administrative functions
to support its activities, and provide such
support to the DNI's Office as directed by the
DNI, and (3) to perform functions otherwise
authorized by this Act to be performed by
each intelligence agency.
Within the U.S., CIA may collect foreign
intelligence by clandestine means only inco-
ordination with the FBI, under standards
agreed upon by the Attorney General and
the DNI, and may direct such collection
against uneonsenting U.S. persons only as
permitted by sec. 913(d). Within the U.S.,
CIA may conduct counterintelligence and
counterterrorism intelligence activities by
clandestine means only with the approval of
the FBI Director or a designee, and must
keep the FBI fully and currently informed,
in accordance with sec. 504(d).
Part C-Authorities of CIA: Authorization
for appropriations
See. 421. General Authorities. To carry out
its functions, the CIA has three types of
general authorities: security functions, per-
sonnel functions and ancillary functions.
Under the heading of security functions,
the CIA is authorized to: conduct back-
ground investigations; to maintain its own
printing plant; to operate secure com-
munications systems; to protect Agency
personnel, installations, and equipment; to
maintain cover; to conceal and protect the
relationship between the Agency and any of
its officers, employees, sources, or activities;
to hire security officers; to allow employees
to carry firearms when necessary to protect
information, persons or property of the CIA;
provide transportation when normal means
of transportation are unsafe: to carry fire-
arms in the discharge of their official duties
in limited circumstances. In addition, no
provision of law is to require the Director of
the Agency to disclose the name, official title,
salary or affiliation of any person employed
by or associated with the Agency. The
Agency is also largely exempted from any
law (e.g., FOIA) which requires disclosure
of its operations or technical systems, except
Insofar as they deal with finished foreign in-
telligence analysis or with information re-
quested by Americans on themselves.
?n dealing with personnel matters, the
Agency is authorized to be reimbursed by
other agencies in connection with the de-
tailed personnel tour from the Agency; set-
tle pay claims for civilian and military per-
sonnel; pay for expenses in connection with
membership in national societies; provide or
pay expenses of training; have assigned or
detailed to the Agency employees of other
departments; have a person who has been
separated receive a position in Civil Service.
Various housekeeping authorizations are
also granted to the CIA including authori-
zation to exchange funds; rent premises;
construct buildings; perform inspections,
audit, public affairs, legal, legislative, and
other administrative- functions; receive sums
of money, and use a seal. In addition the
Agency is permitted to carry out any other
duties granted to all entities of the com-
munity under title I.
Sec. 422. Procurement, The Agency is au-
thorized to procure property and services,
enter into contracts, and dispose of property
when necessary to perform its authorized
functions, without regard to the provisions
of other laws.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE February 8, 1980
Sec. 423. Proprietaries. The Agency is au-
thorized to establish and operate proprie-
taries in furtherance of its responsibilities.
Excess profits and funds generated by the
liquidation of a proprietary shall be returned
to the miscellaneous receipts of the U.S.
Treasury. Major transactions involving
Agency proprietaries shall be reported to the
Intelligence Committees.
Sec. 424. Relationships with Other Govern-
ment Agencies. The Agency Is authorized to
receive assistance from state and federal law
enforcement agencies in conducting back-
ground investigation on prospective em-
ployees. It is authorized to cooperate with
and receive technical assistance from the
State Department Passport Office, the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service and
other federal, state, or local agencies.
Sec. 425. Admission of Essential Aliens. The
Agency is authorized to instruct the Immi-
gration and Naturalization service to grant
up to one hundred essential aliens perma-
nent resident alien status In the United
States in any one fiscal year. The Agency is
to provide necessary processing and reloca-
tion assistance to these persons as required.
See. 426. Authorizations for Appropriations
and Expenditures.
In fulfilling It lawful responsibilities, the
Agency may expend the funds authorized
and appropriated to it. It may only expend
such funds as are authorized by legislation
enacted in the same or the two preceding
fiscal years. A Contingency Fund is estab-
lished for any lawful intelligence needs not
anticipated at the time the Agency's budget
was submitted. The withclftwal of funds
from the Contingency Fund is to be approved
by the Office of Management and Budget and
reported to the Congressional Intelligence
Committee, either 72 hours before the trans-
action or In extraordinary circumstances
within 48 hours of the withdrawal.
Part D-Travel and other allowances; retire-
ment system; death gratuities
Sec. 431. Travel, Related Expenses and
Death Gratuities for Certain Agency Per-
sonnel.In accordance with procedures estab-
lished by the Director of the Agency in co-
operation with the Director of National in-
telligence, employees of the Agency stationed
overseas are to receive the same benefits,
travel allowances and death gratuities as
Foreign Service officers receive under exist-
ing statutes.
Sec. 432. Retirement System. In general,
employees of the Agency fall under the Fed-
eral civil service retirement system. However,
certain employees of the Agency who either
hade highly specialized skills or hazardous
duties in support of Agency activities over-
seas shall be eligible for special benefits
under the provisions of the 1964 Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement Act for Cer-
tain Employees.
Part? E-Transfer of personnel, property
and functions; statutes repealed; effect of
subsequent law
Sec. 441. Transfer of Personnel, Property
and. Functions.
All personnel, contractual obligations,
rules, regulations licenses, pending lawsuits,
and functions of the Agency effective the day
before enactment of this act shall be trans-
ferred to the Agency as described under this
legislation.
Sec. 442. Statutes Repealed; Effect of Sub-
sequent Law.
Certain sections of this bill are not to be
superseded or amended unless specifically
mentioned. In addition, superseded sections
of the National Security Act of 1947 and the
Central Intelligence Agency of 1949 are
hereby repealed.
Part F-Criminal penalty
Sec. 443. Criminal Penalty. Under Title IV,
anyone using the initials CIA, the name Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, or the seal of the
Agency to convey the false Impression that
a document or production Is endorsed or
authorized by the Agency shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year or both.
TrrLE V-FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Sec. 501. Purposes. The purposes are to
authorize the FBI, subject to Attorney Gen-
eral supervision and control, to perform cer-
tain Intelligence activities; to delineate re-
sponsibilities and authorities of the FBI
Director; and to ensure that FBI intelligence
activities are properly and effectively man-
aged, accountable, and consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
Sec. 502. Supervision and Control. All FBI
intelligence authorities are to be exercised in
accordance with this Act and under the
Attorney General's supervision and control.
The Attorney General is to be guided by NSC
policies and priorities and responsive to for-
eign intelligence requirements set by the
DNI. The Attorney General and the Director
are to review ? FBI intelligence activities an-
nually and publicly designate officials to dis-
charge general counsel and inspector general
functions under this Act.
See, 503. Duties of the Director. The FBI
Director is the principal officer of the Gov-
ernment for the conduct and coordination of
counterintelligence and counterterrorism
intelligence activities within the United
States. He is to ensure conformity with the
law and efficient management, to keep the
Attorney General informed, and advise the
Attorney General and the NSC on counter-
intelligence and counterterrorism intelli-
gence matters. The Attorney General is to
provide by regulation for an Acting Director.
Sec. 504. Counterintelligence and Coun-
terterrorism Intelligence Functions. The FBI
is to collect and disseminate counterintelli-
gence and counterterrorism intelligence. Any
other counterintelligence or counterterror-
ism intelligence activities must be necessary
for lawful purposes. FBI liaison with foreign
governments is to be in coordination with
the DNI. FBI activities abroad are to be in
coordination with the CIA and, if unrelated
to activities within the United States, re-
quire Attorney General or a designee's
approval.
The FBI coordinates counterintelligence
and counterterrorism activities in the
United States by other intelligence entities.
Except for activities by the military serv-
ices against military personnel on military
installations, another entity may conduct
clandestine activities in the United States
only with written FBI approval and notice
to the Attorney General or a designee.
Sec. 505. Foreign Intelligence functions.
The FBI may collect foreign intelligence
within the United States in the course of au-
thorized collection of counterintelligence
and counterterrorism intelligence. The FBI
may also conduct activities in the United
States in support of foreign intelligence col-
lection programs of other intelligence en-
tities, and may produce foreign intelligence
in coordination with the DNI.
FBI foreign Intelligence activities for other
entities must be based on a written request
by an official designated by the President,
with notice to the Attorney General or a
designee. The Director must approve each
support activity. Clandestine activities di-
rected against U.S. persons require notice
to the Attorney General or a designee, as
under section 213 (d).
Sec. 506. Cooperation with Foreign Gov-
ernments. The FBI may collect counterin-
telligence or counterterrorism intelligence
on the written request of a foreign govern-
ment, and assist foreign government of-
ficials collecting intelligence in the United
States, under two conditions. First, if the
FBI would be authorized under this Act to
do so in the absence of such a request.
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search of property or the opening of more
than one item of mail is to be conducted
under an order, the court must specify the
authorized scope of the searches or opening
of mail. All other provisions of the Act
concerning electronic surveillance, including
criminal penalties and civil liability, are ex-
tended to physical search. Numerous tech-
nical amendments are necessary for this
purpose.
Sec. 802. Amendments to Chapter 119 of
Title, 18 United States Code. These are tech-
nical conforming amendments to changes
made by the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act.
TITLE IX-MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS AND
EFFECTIVE DATE
Sec. 901. Amendments to Title 5, United
States Code. Title 5 is amended to modify
the appropriate official designations.
Sec. 902. Repeal of Section 2422, Title 22,
United States Code. The Hughes-Ryan
Amendment is repealed.
Sec. 903. Amendment to the Federal Ad-
visory Committee Act. The CIA exemption
to the Federal Advisory Committee Act is
eliminated in view of the authority pro-
vided in section 305 of this Act.
Sec. 904. Effective Date. The Act becomes
effective on the first day of the third calen-
dar month following the month in which
it is enacted.
Mr. HU15DLESTON. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that -the state-
ments by Senator BAYH and Senator
MATHIAS be printed in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The statements are as follows:
STATEMENT BY SENATOR BATH
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT OF 1980
I join today with Senator Huddleston of
Kentucky, who Is Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence Subcom-
mittee on Charters and Guidelines, and with
Senator Charles MCC. Mathias of Maryland,
who serves as Vice Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee, and my Vice Chairman, Senator
Goldwater, in Introducing the National In-
telligence Act of 1980. This bill represents 3
years of joint effort with the Executive
Branch and particularly the intelligence
community to arrive at a comprehensive
statute to govern the intelligence activities
of the United States. Senator Huddleston
and Senator Mathias deserve the gratitude of
the Senate for the great efforts that they and
other Members of the Subcommittee, Sena-
tors Biden, Moynihan, Leahy, Garn, and
Lugar, have made over the present and past
Congress to work out a legislative charter
which would provide the authorities neces-
sary to strengthen the best intelligence sys-
tem in the world, but to -do so in a way that
protects and enhances the cherished liber-
ties of all of our citizens. This has not been
an easy task. Balancing the practical needs
of an intelligence service against the guar-
antees provided by our Constitution and laws
in a world of constant danger of shifting in-
tensities has resulted, in agreements which
required considerable give and take and ma-
ture understanding of constitutional re-
quirements and the necessities created by
world events.
It would be helpful to set forth some basic
premises that underlie this effort to enact a
comprehensive legislative charter for intel-
ligence activities.
The first premise is that today's interna-
tional situation and the military, political,
and economic threats that we now face and
can foresee, require the permanent existence
of a strong and extensive intelligence system.
The second premise is that the difficult
task of countering the efforts of potentially
hostile nations can, if not carefully directed,
adversely affect the liberties of law-abiding
citizens. In order to conduct necessary-intel-
ligence activities and to protect the rights of
citizens, clear authorities must be given to
our intelligence agencies and their activities
have to be supported by both the Executive
and Legislative Branches. Strong oversight is
the necessary companion to the authority
for a powerful, effective, far-reaching intel-
ligence system:
The third premise is that a reasonable
balance can be struck between providing
necessary flexibility for our intelligence agen-
cies to conduct intelligence activities in the
interests of the country, and do so in a way
that protects the rights of American citizens.
The task is all the more difficult because
the basic legal framework of the Constitu-
tion did not contemplate the permanent
existence of a large, primarily secret, na-
tional security system. In an important
sense we have been grappling with funda-
mental issues that require the most careful
consideration. The National Intelligence Act
of 1980 is a large and complex proposal.
There are provisions which I do not agree
with and I am sure that all of my colleagues
in the Senate will find aspects that they
would prefer be resolved in some other way.
But in my view, this bill represents a reason-
able compromise and on balance would pro-
vide an effective means for governing the
intelligence activities of the United States in
a way that gives the United States the ca-
pabilities it needs and protects the rights of
our citizens. The proposed bill is a good
starting point for Committee consideration
and a focal point for the hearings. The hear-
ings will, of course, . consider at the same
time other proposals already introduced that
are concerned with intelligence authorities.
For those who favor my concern about
strengthening our nation's intelligence ca-
pability-an objective to which I have de-
voted my energies as chairman of the In-
telligence Committee-I hope that the pres-
ent length and detail of this bill are not
misleading. The grants of authority to the
intelligence community and the agencies
require detail, and the agencies themselves
have insisted upon their need for specific
statutory authority. The overall result of this
proposed legislation is to lift restrictions
within a basic framework of accountability
and oversight. I believe that the legislation
will provide an effective statutory basis for
intelligence activities which has been lack-
ing for many years.
The Committee expects to begin hearings
after returning from its brief recess by call-
ing upon the chief policy officials of the
Executive Branch and the principal heads of
the intelligence agencies, as well as outside
witnesses-experts on various aspects of the
governance of intelligence activities.
The Committee has met with the Presi-
dent on five occasions over the past three
years and we have been able to exchange our
views directly with him in reasoned and
fruitful sessions. Vice President Mondale was
assigned the task by the President of working
with the Committee, and under his direction
Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown and Ad-
miral Turner, the NSC, and of course, the
intelligence community, In working with the
Committee to develop the bill which we have
introduced today. Senator Huddleston and
Senator Mathias have described the details
of the main provisions of the bill. I would
only add that the hearing process will ob-
viously assist in strengthening some points.
There will certainly be additions and dele-
tions as is usual in the process of Committee
consideration and as the Senate works its
will.
I would like to comment on one major
point of disagreement between the Commit-
tee and the Executive Branch. I fully sup-
port a modification of the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment reducing the access to notifica-
tion of covert action to the oversight com-
mittees in the Senate and in the House. But
in so doing, the necessity for the remaining
oversight committee to be fully informed,
including prior notice of any anticipated
significant action, is all. the more Important.
Without full, complete and timely informa-
tion an oversight committee cannot do its
work.
The experience of the Committee over
the past four years has convinced us that
there are many categories of intelligence ac-
tivities that the Committee requires informa-
tion about prior to their implementation in
order to decide whether funds should be
provided or whether they are consistent with
declared policies or in the judgment of the
Committee would serve the interests of the
nation. The Committee, on occasion, has
asked for and received the most detailed
kinds of information from the most sensitive
kinds of sources. The Committee generally
does not ask for detail unless it is necessary,
but I want to emphasize that on the basis
of my experience as chairman, the Commit-
tee must have the right in statute to be
able to ask for any information concerned
with any intelligence activity of the United
States. Of course, the Committee has to ex-
ercise discretion and balance about what it
asks for to meet its needs, and I think we
have done so over the past four years. But
we also have to recognize that abuse situa-
tions may very well occur in the future as
they have in the past and that there will be
a requirement to pursue inquiries into some
areas of intelligence activities in depth in
order to perform our Constitutional duties.
There is some concern that widening the
circle of awareness of certain activities poses
risks. I recognize that, but our Constitutional
government also requires shared responsibil-
ity and we cannot assume responsibility
without knowledge. Surely the leaders of
both houses and the Chairman and Vice
Chairman of the oversight committee can
be entrusted with any sensitive information.
They are no less trustworthy than the Presi-
dent's chief advisors and have, in addition,
Constitutional. responsibilities. It Is for this
reason that I urge the Senate to support, the
Committee's language which would give it
the authorities it needs to carry out its over-
sight duties. The language of the bill is as
follows :
CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION
SEC. 125. Each special activity authorized
under section 123(a) (1) and each category of
special activities authorized under section
123(a) (2) shall be considered significant
anticipated intelligence activities for the
purposes of the requirement of section 1,42
of this Act, except that such prior notice may
be limited for a period of forty-eight hours
to the chairman and ranking minority mem-
ber of the House Permanent Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, The Speaker and
minority leader of the House of Representa-
tives, and the majority and minority leaders
of the Senate If the President determines it
Is essential to meet extraordinary circum-
stances affecting vital interests of the United
States. Such committees shall be fully in-
formed under Section 142 of this Act upon
expiration of the forty-eight hour period.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
SEC. 142. (a) Consistent with all appli-
cable authorities and duties, including those
conferred by the Constitution upon the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches, the head of
each entity of the intelligence community
shall-
(1) keep the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence fully and
currently informed of all intelligence ac-
tivities which are the responsibility of, are
engaged in by, or are carried out for on be-
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February 8, 1980 CORGRESSIONAL. IT-C
concerning intelligence activities in the pos-
session, custody, or control of the head of
the relevant entity of the intelligence com-
munity or in the possession, custody, or, con-
trol of any person paid by such entity
whenever requested by the House Select
Committee on Intelligence; and
(3) report in a timely fashion to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligences
information relating to intelligence adtivi-,
ties that are illegal or improper and cor-
rective actions that are taken or planged.
The charter provisions affecting the
rights of Americans have also been matters.
of deep concern to me. Our nation needs a
strong intelligence community to protect
against threats from abroad, but safeguards
are essential to ensure that these powers are
of our own citizens. The charter language
has been the subject of long and careful de-
liberations with each intelligence agency and
the Department of Justice.
In 1978 the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act became law, and electronic sur-
veillance within the United States for in
court order requirement. During consider-
ation of that bill, I urged the Administra-
tion to give the most serious study to
whether the court order procedure could be
used to protect the rights of Americans over-
seas as well as at home.
I am greatly pleased that the decision has
been made to adopt this approach. Substan-
tial credit is due to former Attorney General
Griffin Bell, who played a key role in that
decision last year. Attorney General Bell and
his successor, Attorney General Civiletti, have
worked for nearly, a year under the court
Surveillance Act. The Justice Department,
the. FBI, and the National Security Agency
have "advised the Intelligence Committee
that those procedures have posed no threat
to the security of sensitive surveillance ac-
tivities.,
Through the Intelligence Committee's
oversight of surveillance under the 1978 Act,
- we have also found that its provisions have
resulted in careful scrutiny of surveillance
applications. The existence of the-court or-
der procedure has enhanced the Committee's
ability to conduct oversight, because of the
care taken by the Justice Department and
the agencies in preparing their applications
to the court. This close attention to detail
and full justification for the court makes it
easier for the Committee to assess surveil-
lance activities through its subsequent semi-
annual oversight reviews.
procedure to, electronic surveillance and
physical search directed at Americans abroad
ment techniques must be used against an
American abroad to obtain essential foreign
issues. But perhaps the best way to, bring
overseas surveillance and ., search powers
tutional system of checks and .baifces';~,fs
through this Act. We must carefully con-
sider these issues in the weeks to come.
The same is true for the provisions that
bring.,physical search" in the United States
within the framework of the Foreign Intelli-
genee Surveillance Act of 1978. Current
.gestrictions on physical search under the
Executive order procedures are very strin-
"gent. Thus, the charter could result in the
lifting of certain limitations. However,
without the requirement in law to obtain a
court order under a criminal standard for
searches of Americans in this country, a
future administration could abandon the
Executive order procedures and assert
"inherent power" to search the homes and
offices of citizens without effective checks.
Apart from Fourth Amendment search
and surveillance techniques, the charter
establishes basic standards for investigations
of " Americans by the FBI and CIA. The
detailed investigative procedures are not pus
into the law. Instead the Attorney General
is required o approve such procedures in
the light of certain basic principles of
accountability, minimization, and review.
These standards and procedures meet the
needs of the FBI and CIA for foreign intelli-
gence and counterintelligence information.
At the same time they emphasize respect for
individual privacy and the need to minimize
intrusions and unnecessary collection, stor-
age, or dissemination of information about
Americans in intelligence files.
In some respects the standards permit
wider investigations of Americans than are
allowed under the Executive order. This
would be especially true if the President did
not designate certain investigative measures
as "covert techniques," subject to special
limitations. Nevertheless, the choice may be
between having a legal framework of ac-
countability and oversight and having no
law at all.
In conclusion, Mr. President, it has been a
great honor and privilege for me to be the
Chairman of the Committee to continue the
work begun by Senator Inouye, Senator Hud-
dleston and Senator Mathias, and to work
with the Vice Chairman, Senator Goldwater,
to reach this stage of the Senate's effort to
bring necessary intelligence- activities under
Constitutional governance.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR MATHIAS
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT OF 1980
I am happy to join my colleague from
Kentucky, Senator Huddleston, and the
to meet the threats from hostile powers, the
need for timely and accurate information
directed through a carefully constructed con-
stitutional process. This constitutional proc
ess requires a', balancing between. 'the needs"
of the intelligence agencies to perform thief
necessary missions "effectively, "and .the re '-'w
to. protect' and enhance our
cherished and' constitutionally granted free
Much of this legislative charter details the
authorities, duties and missions of the in-.
the proposed charter concern the procedures'
by which the power granted-td-the intellf~
gence agencies can be monitore&:'and
governed. The basic premise is that the gov=,`
ernance of secret intelligence activities isat
responsibility that the Executive must share
"with the Legislative branch. The. two
branches must be responsible on behalf of,
quality and effectiveness of the agencies,;the. -
nsucoess. _or ; failure of their activities, and,
for assuring that their activities are `diY'eeted''
in such a way that our Liberties are`
protected and . enhanced and ' not un-
necessarily abridged. We must be cautious
that the institutions we fashion to protect
our national security do not diminish the-',
liberties that we all cherish.
The process by which we have come to
the bill that we have before the Senate.
todaylas been a joint effort. Two Presidents
and. their chief advisors have Worked with
,,.
tire`-Select Committee on Intelligence and
the intelligence comImialty. to fashion4hls. :
'comprehensive authority for intelligence ae-.
tivities. We have worked jointly to frame. -
the Executive Orders that now govern tlie''
activities of the intelligence ageneles?Tlii_
intelligence agencies should be governed.,-;
I am sure that the hearing process and' :
the consideration of the bill by the Commit.
cations of this proposed charter.B.ut I- am.,
that, what we have. presented here,
today is a fair agenda of the Issues tAia
must be considered, and at a minimwi pxQ