FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1979 HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION CONGRESS ON S. 1450 A BILL TO PROMOTE THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES BY STRENGTHENING AND IMPRO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 470
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 19, 1979
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1979
HEARINGS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1450
A BILL TO PROMOTE THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES BY STRENGTHENING AND IMPROVING THE FOREIGN
SERVICES OF THE UNITED STATES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
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HEARINGS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1450
A BILL TO PROMOTE THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES BY STRENGTHENING AND IMPROVING THE FOREIGN
SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
60-236 0 WASHINGTON : 1980
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GEORGE McGOVERN, South Dakota
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD STONE, Florida
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
S. I. HAYAKAWA, California
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
WILLIAM B. BADER, Staff Director
ALBERT A. LAKELAND, Jr., Minority Staff Director
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CONTENTS
Hearing days :
Page
July 27, 1979-----------------------------------------------------
1
December 14, 1979------------------------------------------------
211
December 19,1979------------------------------------------------
385
Statement of :
Blaylock, Kenneth T., national president, American Federation of Gov-
ernment Employees--------------------------------------------
277
Campbell, Hon. Alan K., Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Man-
agement ----------------------- -
192
Dorman, Lesley, president, Association of American
Women Foreign Service
--------------------------------------- - -------
328
Herz, Hon. Martin F., former Ambassador to Bulgaria--------------
212
Nooter, Hon. Robert H., Acting Administrator, Agency for Interna-
tional Development --------------------------------------------
206
Read, Hon. Ben H., Under Secretary for Management, Department of
State ---------------------------------------------------------
385
Reinhardt, Hon. John E., Director, U.S. International Communication
Agency -------------------------------------------------------
200
Stern, Robert H., American Foreign Service Association------------
250
Simpson, Smith, retired Foreign Service officer, Annandale, Va------
360
Thomas, Mrs. Cynthia A., Foreign Service Reserve Officer, political
analyst -------------------------------------------------------
376
Uyehara, Cecil H., Foreign Affairs Chapter, Asian and Pacific Amer-
ican Federal Employees Council--------------------------------
353
Vance, Hon. Cyrus R., Secretary of State--------------------------
179
Vance, Hon. Sheldon B., former Ambassador to Chad and Zaire_-----
230
Veale, William C., American Foreign Service Association------------
261
Insertions for the record :
Text of S. 1450 ---------------------------------------------------
2
Prepared statement of Hon. John E. Reinhardt--------------------
201
Prepared statement of Hon. Robert H. Nooter----------------------
206
Biography of Ambassador Martin F. Herz-------------------------
212
Letter to Senator Church from Ambassador Herz, dated October 24,
1979, concerning the Foreign Service Act of 1979------------------
212
Prepared statement of Ambassador Martin F. Herz----------------
220
Biography of Ambassador Sheldon B. Vance------------------------
229
Report of the task force to study the Senior Service, submitted by
Ambassador Vance---------------------------------------------
233
Prepared statement of Hon. Sheldon B. Vance----------------------
245
Prepared statement of Robert H. Stern -----------------------------
255
Letter to Senator Pell from Kenneth W. Bleakley, president, American
Foreign Service Association, dated December 18, 1979, regarding
performance pay-----------------------------------------------
264
Section-by-section analysis of S. 1450, the Foreign Service Act of
1979 ----------------------------------------------------------
265
Prepared statement of Kenneth T. Blaylock------------------------
281
Prepared statement of Lesley Dorman-----------------------------
331
Report on dependent employment, submitted by the Association of
American Foreign Service Women-------------------------------
333
Report on the Foreign Service Act and annuities, submitted by the
Association of American Foreign Service Women-----------------
336
What role for spouses?, submitted by the Association of American
Foreign Service Women----------------------------------------
342
Biographical sketch of Cecil H. Uyehara---------------------------
352
Prepared statement of Cecil H. Uyehara---------------------------
355
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Insertions for the record-Continued
Letter to Senator Pell from Elliott K. Chan, chapter president, Asian
and Pacific American Federal Employee Council, dated January 11, Page
1980, regarding the Foreign Service Act__________________________ 359
One day in the life of Simas Kudirka and the State Department, sub-
mitted by Mr. Simpson ------ ----------------------------------- 364
Biography of Mrs. Cynthia A. Thomas_____________________________ 375
Prepared statement of Mrs. Cynthia A. Thomas____________________ 379
Prepared statement of Dr. Richard I. Block, Esq., Chairman of the
Foreign Service Grievance Board, Department of State ------------ 390
Letter to Hon. Ben H. Read, Under Secretary for Management, Depart-
ment of State, from David D. Newsom, Chairman, Board of Foreign
Service, dated December 18, 1979, regarding performance pay ------ 400
Support for AFGE amendment, submitted by the Department of
State --------------------------------------------------------- 409
Support for second AFGE amendment to grant retirement benefits to
former Binational Center Grantees, submitted by the Department of
State --------------------------------------------------------- 410
The need for continuation of mandatory retirement in the Foreign
,Service of the United States, submitted by the Department of State- 412
Hon. Ben Read's responses to additional questions submitted by Sena-
tor Pell-------------------------------------------------------- 414
Appendix:
Letter to Senator Pell from the Government Accountability Project,
dated January 4, 1980, regarding the Foreign Service Act of 1979_- 427
Letter to Senator Pell from Moncrieff J. Spear, dated January 12, 1980,
concerning proposed restructuring of the Foreign Service ---------- 433
Letter to Senator Church from John J. Harter, dated January 15, 1980,
supporting State Department's amendments to the Foreign Service
Act ----------------------------------------------------------- 434
Letter to Senator Pell from the Women's Action Organization, dated
December 18, 1979, regarding equal opportunity in employment_-__ 435
Letter to Senator Pell from the Foreign Affairs Employees Council,
dated December 17, 1979, regarding the Foreign Service Act -------- 453
Letter to Senator Pell from the Diplomatic and Consular Officers, re-
tired, Inc., dated February 11, 1980, concerning an amendment to
the proposed Foreign Service Act-------------------------------- 465
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FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1979
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room 4221,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell presiding.
Present : Senators Pell and Lugar.
Senator PELL. The Committee on. Foreign Relations will come to
order.
Today we will hear testimony from the executive branch on the
proposed Foreign Service Act of 1979. This legislation is a compre-
hensive revision of the Federal law governing the Foreign Service
personnel system. It is intended to be a companion measure to the
Civil Service Reform Act, designed to increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of the foreign policy arm of Government.
[Text of S. 1450 follows:]
(1)
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96TH CONGRESS S91450
I9T SESSION
,
To promote the foreign policy of the United States by strengthening and
improving the Foreign Service of the United States, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JULY 9 (legislative day, JUNE 21), 1979
Mr. CHURCH (by request) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
A BILL
To promote the foreign policy of the United States by strength-
ening and improving the Foreign Service of the United
States, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That title I of this Act may be cited as the "Foreign Service
4 Act of 1979".
5 TITLE I-THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1979
6 CHAPTER 1-GENERAL PROVISIONS
7 SEC. 101. FINDINGS AND OBJECTIVES.-(a) The Con-
8 gress finds-
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1 (1) that a career Foreign Service, characterized
2 by excellence and discipline, is essential in the national
3 interest to assist, the President and the Secretary of
4 State in conducting the foreign affairs of the United
5 States;
6 (2) that the Foreign Service of the United States,
7 established under the Foreign Service Acts of 1924
8 and 1946, must be preserved, strengthened, and im-
9 proved in order to carry out its mission effectively in
10 response to the complex challenges of modern diploma-
11 cy and international relations; and
12 (3) that the Foreign Service should be representa-
13 tive of the American people, aware of the principles
14 and history of the United States and informed of cur-
15 rent concerns and trends in American life, knowledge-
16 able of other nations' affairs, cultures, and languages,
17 available to serve in assignments throughout the world,
18 and operated on the basis of merit principles.
19 (b) The objectives of this Act, in order to strengthen and
20 improve the Foreign Service of the United States, are-
21 (1) to assure, in accordance with merit principles,
22 admission through impartial and rigorous examination,
23 acquisition of career status only by those who have
24 demonstrated their fitness through successful comple-
25 tion of probationary assignments, effective career de-
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1 velopment, advancement, and retention of the ablest,
2 and separation of those who do not meet the requisite
3 standards of performance;
4 (2) to foster the development of policies and pro-
5 cedures which will facilitate and encourage entry into
6 and advancement in, the Foreign Service by persons
7 from all segments of American society, and equal op-
8 portunity and fair and equitable treatment for all with-
9 out regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion,
10 national origin, sex, marital status, age, or handicap-
11 ping condition;
12 (3) to provide for more efficient, economical, and
13 equitable personnel administration through a simplified
14 structure of Foreign Service personnel categories and
15 salaries;
16 (4) to establish a statutory basis for participation
17 by the members of the Foreign Service, through their
18 elected representatives, in the formulation of personnel
19 policies and procedures which affect their conditions of
20 employment, and to maintain a fair and effective
21 system for the resolution of individual grievances;
22 (5) to minimize the impact of the hardships, dis-
23 ruptions, and other unusual conditions of overseas
24 service upon the members of the Foreign Service, and
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1 to mitigate the special impact of such conditions upon
2 their families;
3 (6) to provide salaries, allowances, and benefits
4 that will permit the Foreign Service to attract and
5 retain qualified personnel and to provide a system of
6 incentive payments and awards to encourage and
7 reward outstanding performance;
8 (7) to establish a Senior Foreign Service charac-
9 terized by strong policy formulation capabilities, out-
10 standing executive leadership qualities, and/or highly
11 developed functional and area expertise;
12 (8) to improve Foreign Service managerial flexi-
13 bility and effectiveness;
14 (9) to increase efficiency and economy by promot-
15 ing maximum compatibility among the agencies author-
16 ized to utilize the Foreign Service personnel system, as
17 well as compatibility between the Foreign Service and
18 the Civil Service; and
19 (10) otherwise to enable the Foreign Service to
20 serve effectively the interests of the United States and
21 to provide the highest caliber of representation in the
22 - conduct of foreign affairs.
23 SEc. 102. DEFINITIONS.-When used in this Act, the
24 term-
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(1) "abroad" means all areas not included within
the United States;
(2) "agency" means
an agency of the United
States Government as defined in section 551 of title 5,
United States Code;
(3) "chief of mission" means a principal officer in
charge of a diplomatic mission of the United States or
of a United States office abroad which is designated by
the Secretary as diplomatic in nature (including any
person assigned under this Act to be temporarily in
charge of such a mission or office);
(4) "Department" means the Department of
State;
(5) "function" includes any duty, obligation,
power, authority, responsibility, right, privilege, discre-
tion, or activity;
(6) "Government" means the Government of the
United States of America;
(7) "merit principles" means the principles set out
in section 2301 of title 5, United States Code;
(8) "principal officer" means the officer in charge
of a diplomatic mission, consular mission (other than a
consular agency), or other Foreign Service post of the
United States;
(9) "Secretary" means the Secretary of State;
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1 (10) "Service" means the Foreign Service of the
2 United States;
3 (11) "United States", when used in a geographic
4 sense, means the fifty States and the District of
? 5 Columbia.
6 SEC. 103. PERSONNEL OF THE SERVICE.-The per-
7 sonnel of the Service shall consist of the following:
8 (1) chiefs of mission, appointed under section
9 302(a)(1) or assigned under section 511(c);
10 (2) ambassadors at large, appointed under section
11 302(a)(1);
12 (3) the Senior Foreign Service, appointed under
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
section 302(a)(1) or 303, who shall provide the corps of
leaders and experts for the management of the Service
and the performance of its mission;
(4) Foreign Service officers, appointed under sec-
tion 302(a)(1), who shall have general responsibility for
carrying out the functions of the Service;
(5) Foreign Service personnel, appointed under
section 303, who are citizens of the United States and
who provide skills and services required for effective
performance by the Service;
(6) foreign national employees, appointed under
section 303, who provide clerical, administrative, tech-
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1 nical, fiscal, and other support at Foreign Service posts
2 abroad; and
3 (7) consular agents, appointed under section 303,
4 who provide consular and related services as author-
5 ized by the Secretary at specified locations abroad ?
6 where no Foreign Service posts are situated.
7 SEC. 104. FUNCTIONS.-Members of the Service shall,
8 under the direction of the Secretary-
9 (1) represent the interests of the United States in
10 relation to foreign nations and international organiza-
11 tions, and perform the functions relevant to their ap-
12 pointments and assignments, including (as appropriate)
13 functions under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
14 Relations, the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
15 tions, other international agreements to which the
16 United States is a party, the laws of the United States
17 and orders, regulations, and directives issued pursuant
18 to law;
19 (2) provide guidance for the conduct of programs
20 and activities of the Department and other agencies
21 which relate to the foreign relations of the United
22 States; and
23 (3) perform functions on behalf of any agency or
24 other Government establishment (including any in the
25 legislative or judicial branch) requiring their services.
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1 CHAPTER 2-MANAGEMENT OF THE SERVICE
2 SEC. 201. THE SECRETARY OF STATE.-Under the di-
3 rection of the President, the Secretary shall administer and
4 direct the Service, and shall coordinate its activities with the
5 needs of the Department and other agencies. The Secretary
6 is authorized to prescribe such regulations as the Secretary
7 may deem appropriate to carry out functions under This Act,
8 and may delegate such functions which are vested in the Sec-
9 retary to any employee of the Department or member of the
10 Service.
11 SEC. 202. OTHER AGENCIES EMPLOYING FOREIGN
12 SERVICE PERSONNEL.-(a) The Director of the Internation-
13 al Communication Agency, the Director of the International
14 Development Cooperation Agency, and the head of any other
15 agency authorized by law to utilize the Foreign Service per-
16 sonnel system shall exercise the functions vested in the Sec-
17 retary by this Act, with respect to personnel of the Service in
18 their respective agencies, subject to the provisions of chapter
19 12 and other applicable laws.
20 (b) Except as otherwise provided, references in this Act
21 to the "Department" and to the "Secretary" shall be
22 deemed, with respect to the personnel and functions of the
23 International Communication Agency, the International De-
24 velopment Cooperation Agency, and other agencies author-
25 ized by law to utilize the Foreign Service personnel system,
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to be references to such agencies and to the heads of those
agencies, subject to the provisions of chapter 12 and other
applicable laws. References in this Act (or other law) to
"Foreign Service officers" shall, with respect to the Interna-
tional Communication Agency, be deemed to include refer-
ences to Foreign Service information officers.
(c) Chapters 10 and 11 of this Act shall apply only- to
the Department, the International Communication Agency,
and the International Development Cooperation Agency.
(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as diminishing
the authority of the Director of the International Communi-
cation Agency or the Director of the International Develop-
ment Cooperation Agency.
SEC. 203. THE CHIEF OF MISSION.-(a) Under the di-
rection of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign
country-
(1) shall have full responsibility for the direction,
coordination, and supervision of all Government offi-
cers and employees in that country, except for person-
nel under the command of a United States area mili-
tary commander; and
(2) shall keep fully and currently informed with
respect to all activities and operations of the Govern-
ment within that country, and shall ' insure that all.
Government officers and employees in. that country,
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1 except for personnel under the command of a United
2 States area military commander, comply fully with all
3 applicable directives of the chief of mission.
4 (b) Any agency having officers or employees in a foreign
? 5 country shall keep the chief of mission to that country fully
6 and currently informed with respect to all activities and oper-
7 ations of its officers and employees in that country, and shall
8 insure that all of its officers and employees in that country,
9 except for personnel under the command of a United States
10 area military commander, comply fully with all applicable
11 directives of the chief of mission.
12 SEC. 204. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL.-There shall be
13 a Director General of the Foreign Service, who shall be ap-
14 pointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent
15 of the Senate, from among the career members of the Senior
16 Foreign Service. The Director General shall assist the Secre-
17 tary in the management of the Service and shall perform
18 such functions, including functions under chapter 12, as the
19 Secretary may prescribe.
20 SEC. 205. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.-(a) There shall
21 be an Inspector General of the Foreign Service, who shall be
22 appointed by the President, by and with the advice and con-
23 sent of the Senate, from among the career members of the
24 Senior Foreign Service. Under the direction of the Secretary,
25 the Inspector General shall inspect the work of each Foreign
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1 Service post at least every three years, shall inspect periodi-
2 cally the bureaus and offices of the Department of State, and
3 shall perform such functions as the Secretary may prescribe.
4 (b) Under the direction of the Secretary, the Inspector
5 General may review the conduct of the Government's pro-
6 grams and activities performed under the direction, coordina-
7 tion, and supervision of chiefs of mission for the purpose of
8 ascertaining their consonance with the foreign policy of the
9 United States and their consistency with the responsibilities
10 of the Secretary and the chief of mission.
11 (c) Whenever the Secretary has reason to believe that it
12 is necessary in the public interest, the Secretary may author-
13 ize any Foreign Service inspector acting on behalf of the In-
14 spector General to suspend from duty any member of the
15 Service other than a chief of mission. If the member so sus-
16 pended is a principal officer, the Secretary may authorize a
17 Foreign Service inspector to serve in the place of the sus-
18 pended officer for a period not to exceed ninety days.
19 SEC. 206. THE BOARD OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE.-
20 The President shall establish a Board of the Foreign Service
21 to advise the Secretary on matters relating to the Foreign
22 Service, including furtherance of the objectives of maximum
23 compatibility among agencies authorized by law to utilize the
24 Foreign Service personnel system and compatibility between
25 the Foreign Service and the Civil Service. The Board of the
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1 Foreign Service shall be chaired by a career member of the
2 Senior Foreign Service designated by the Secretary and shall
3 include senior representatives of the Department, the Inter-
4 national Communication Agency, the International Develop-
5 ment Cooperation Agency, the Office of Personnel Manage-
6 ment, the Office of Management and Budget, and such other
7 agencies as the President may designate.
8 CHAPTER 3-APPOINTMENTS
9 SEC. 301. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR APPOINT-
10 MENT.-(a) Only citizens of the United States may be ap-
11 pointed to the Service, other than for service abroad as a
12 consular agent or as a foreign national employee.
13 (b) The Secretary shall prescribe appropriate written,
14 oral, physical, and other examinations for appointment to the
15 Service (other than as a chief of mission) in accordance with
16 merit principles.
17 (c) The fact that an applicant for appointment as a For-
18 eign Service officer candidate is a veteran or a disabled vet-
19 eran as defined in sections 2108 (1) or (2) of title 5, United
20 States Code, shall be considered an affirmative factor in
21 making appointments to the Service.
22 SEC. 302. PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS.-(a)(1) Ap-
23 pointment in the Service as a chief of mission, as an ambas-
24 sador at large, as a career member of the Senior Foreign
5(1-2' fi 0 - e0 - 2
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1 Service, or as Foreign Service officer, shall be made by the
2 President, by and with the advice''and consent of the Senate.
3 (2) The President may, by and with the advice and con-
4 sent of the Senate, confer the personal rank of career ambas-
5 sador upon a career member of the Senior Foreign Service,
6 in recognition of especially distinguished service over a sus-
7 tained period. Such personal rank shall be in addition to the
8 member's salary class, and no additional compensation shall
9 be paid to a career ambassador solely by virtue of such
10 personal rank.
11 (3) The personal rank of ambassador may be conferred
12 by the President in connection with a special mission for the
13 President not exceeding six months in duration if the Presi-
14 dent, before conferring such rank, "transmits a written report
15 of his intent to confer such personal rank to the Committee
16 on Foreign Relations of the Senate and transmits with that
17 report all relevant materials concerning any potential con-
18 flicts of interest by the proposed recipient of such personal
19 rank.
20 (4) Except as provided in this section, appointment to
21 any position having the title or rank of ambassador or minis-
22 ter shall be made by the President, by and with the advice
23 and consent of the Senate.
24 (b) If a member of the Service is appointed to any posi-
25 tion by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
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1 the Senate or by the President alone, the period of the mem-
2 ber's service in that position shall be regarded as an assign-
3 ment under chapter 5, and the member shall not, by virtue of
4 the acceptance of such assignment, lose his or her status as a
5 member of the Service. A member of the Senior Foreign
6 Service who accepts such an assignment may elect to contin-
7 ue to receive the salary of his or her class and remain eligible
8 for performance pay under chapter 4 in lieu of receiving the
9 salary of the position to which the member is appointed by
10 the President.
11 SEC. 303. SECRETARIAL APPOINTMENTS.-The Sec-
12 retary is authorized to appoint the members of the Service,
13 other than the categories described in section 302(a), in ac-
14 cordance with the provisions of this Act and such regulations
15 as the Secretary may prescribe.
16 SEC. 311. APPOINTMENT OF CHIEFS OF MISSION.-
17 (a)(1) The position of chief of mission to a foreign country
18 should be accorded to persons possessing clearly demonstrat-
19 ed competence to perform the duties of a chief of mission,
20 including, to the maximum practicable extent, a useful
21 knowledge of the principal language or dialect of the country
22, in which they are to serve, and knowledge and understanding
23 of the history, the culture, the economic and political institu-
24 tions, and the interests of such country and its people.
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1 (2) No person should be accorded the position of chief of
2 mission to a foreign country primarily because of contribu-
3 tions to political campaigns.
4 (3) To the extent practicable, career personnel of the
5 Service should be given consideration for appointment to
6 chief of mission positions.
7 (b)(1) The Secretary shall from time to time furnish the
8 President with the names of career members of the Service
9 qualified for appointment or assignment as chiefs of mission,
10 together with pertinent information about such members, in
11 order to assist the President in selecting qualified candidates
12 for appointment or assignment as chiefs of mission.
13 (2) Each person appointed by the President as ambassa-
14 dor or minister shall, at the time of nomination, file with the
15 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
16 Speaker of the House of Representatives a report of contri-
17 butions made by such person and by members of his or her
18 immediate family during the period beginning on the first day
19 of the fourth calendar year preceding the calendar year of the
20 nomination and ending on the date of the nomination. The
21 report shall be verified by the oath or affirmation of the nomi-
22 nee, taken before any officer authorized to adminster oaths.
23 The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
24 Senate shall have printed in the Congressional Record each
25 such report. As used in this paragraph, the term "contribu-
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16
1 tion" has the same meaning given such term by section
2 301(e) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2
?' 3 U.S.C. 431(e)), and the term "immediate family" means a
4 person's spouse, and any child, parent, grandparent, brother,
5 or sister of such person and the spouses of any of them.
6 SEC. 321. APPOINTMENT TO THE SENIOR FOREIGN
7 SERVICE.-Appointment to the Senior Foreign Service shall
8 be to a salary class established under section 411, and not to
9 a position. The total number of noncareer members of the
10 Senior Foreign Service shall not exceed 5 per centum of the
11 members of the Senior Foreign Service.
12 SEC. 322. CAREER APPOINTMENTS.-(a) Each candi-
13 date for a career appointment in the Service shall first serve
14 under a limited appointment as a career candidate for a trial
15 period of service prescribed by the Secretary. During a candi-
16 date's trial period of service, the Secretary shall decide
17 whether or not-
18 (1) to offer a career appointment to the candidate,
19 or
20 (2) to recommend to the President that the candi-
21 date be given a career appointment.
22 (b) Decisions by the Secretary under this section shall
23 be based upon the recommendations of boards composed en-
24 tirely or primarily of career members of the Service who shall
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17
1 evaluate the fitness and aptitude of candidates for the work of
2 the Service.
3 SEC. 323. ENTRY LEVELS FOR FOREIGN SERVICE OF-
4 FICER CANDIDATES.-A Foreign Service officer candidate
5 shall not be initially assigned under section 431 to a salary
6 class higher than class 4 in the Foreign Service Schedule
7 established under section 421 unless-
8 (1) the Secretary determines in an individual case
9 that assignment to a higher class is necessary because
10 of the qualifications and experience of the candidate
11 and the needs of the Service; or
12 (2) the candidate is currently serving under a
13 career appointment in the Service at a salary rate
14 equal to or higher than class 4 of such Schedule.
15 SEC. 324. RECALL AND REEMPLOYMENT OF CAREER
16 PERSONNEL.-(a) Whenever the Secretary determines that
17 the needs of the Service so require, the Secretary may recall
18 for active duty any retired member of the Service who served
19 under a career appointment. A retired member may be re-
20 called under this section to any appropriate class, except that
21 a retired member may not be recalled to the Senior Foreign
22 Service in a class higher than the member held at the time of
23 retirement unless appointed to such higher class by the Presi-
24 dent by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
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18
1 (b) Former career personnel of the Service may be reap-
2 pointed under section 302(a)(1) or 303, without regard to
3 section 322, in a salary class which the Secretary considers
4 appropriate in light of the qualifications and experience of
5 each such candidate for reappointment.
6 SEC. 331. LIMITED AND TEMPORARY APPOINT-
7 MENTS.-Noncareer and other limited appointments in the
8 Service (other than as a chief of mission), including appoint-
9 ment of a person who is an employee of an agency, shall in
10 no event exceed five years in duration and, except as pro-
11 vided in section 333, may not be extended or renewed. A
12 time-limited appointment in the Service for not to exceed one
13 year shall be a temporary appointment.
14 SEC. 332. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS FOLLOWING LIM-
15 ITED APPOINTMENT.-Any employee of an agency who ac-
16 cepts a limited appointment in the Service with the consent
17 of the head of the agency in which the employee is regularly
18 employed shall be entitled, upon the termination of such lim-
19 ited appointment, to be reemployed in the same position the
20 employee occupied at the time of appointment to the Service,
21 or in a corresponding or higher position. Such reemployment
22 shall include receipt of any within-grade salary advancements
23 the employee would have received in accordance with law or
24 regulation had the employee remained in the position in
25 which regularly employed.
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19
1 SEC. 333. FAMILY MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT EM-
2 PLOYEES.-(a) The Secretary, when employing persons
3 abroad in positions to which career Foreign Service person-
4 nel are not customarily assigned (including vacant positions
5 normally filled by foreign national employees when continuity
6 over a long term is not a significant consideration), shall give
7 equal consideration to employing available qualified family
8 members of Foreign Service and other Government personnel
9 assigned abroad. Family members so employed shall serve
10 under renewable limited appointments and be paid either in
11 accordance with the Foreign Service Schedule established
12 under section 421 or a local compensation plan established
13 under section 451, as appropriate.
14 (b) Employment of family members in accordance with
15 this section must be consistent with the needs of the Service
16 for positions for career personnel.
17 (c) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations for the
18 guidance of all agencies regarding the employment at posts
19 abroad of family members of Government personnel.
20 SEC. 341. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR COMMIS-
21 SIONS.-(a) The Secretary may recommend to the President
22 that a member of the Service who is a citizen of the United
23 States be commissioned as a diplomatic or consular officer or
24 both. The President may, by and with the advice and consent
25 of the Senate, commission such member of the Service as a
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20
1 diplomatic or consular officer or both. The Secretary may
2 commission as a vice consul a member of the Service who is
3 a citizen of the United States. All official functions performed
by a diplomatic or consular officer, including a vice consul,
shall be performed under such a commission.
(b) Members of the Service commissioned under this sec-
tion may perform under their commissions any function
which any category of diplomatic officer (other than a chief of
mission) or consular officer is authorized by law to perform.
(c) The Secretary shall define the limits of consular
districts.
CHAPTER 4-COMPENSATION
SEC. 401. SALARIES OF CHIEFS OF MISSION.-(a)
Each chief of mission shall receive a salary as determined by
the President, at one of the annual rates provided by law for
levels II through V of the Federal Executive Salary Sched-
17 ule (5 U.S.C. 5313-5316), except as provided in section
18 302(b).
19 (b) The salary of a chief of mission shall commence upon
20 the effective date of appointment to that office. The official
21 services of a chief of mission shall not be deemed terminated
22 by the appointment of a successor, but shall continue for such
23 additional period, not to exceed fifty days after relinquishing
24 charge of the mission, as the Secretary may determine.
25 During that period, the Secretary may require the chief of
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21
1 mission to perform such functions as the Secretary may deem
2 necessary in the interest of the Government.
3 SEC. 411. SALARIES OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERV-
4 ICE.-The President shall prescribe salary classes for the
5 Senior Foreign Service and shall prescribe an appropriate
6 title for each class. Salary rates for the Senior Foreign Serv-
7 ice shall not exceed the maximum rate or be less than the
8 minimum rate of basic pay established for the Senior Execu-
9 tive Service under section 5382 of title 5, United States
10 Code, and shall be adjusted at the same time and in the same
11 manner as rates of basic pay are adjusted for the Senior Ex-
12 ecutive Service.
13 SEC. 421. THE FOREIGN SERVICE SCHEDULE.-The
14 President shall prescribe nine classes of salary rates for mem-
15 bers of the Service who are citizens of the United States and
16 for whom other salary rates are not provided by this chapter.
17 The basic salary of the highest class established under this
18 section, which shall be designated class 1, shall not exceed
19 the highest rate of basic pay established for grade 15 of the
20 General Schedule described in section 5104 of title 5, United
21 States Code. Salary rates for the Foreign Service under this
22 section shall be established in accordance with subchapter I
23 of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, and shall be
24 adjusted at the same time and in the same manner as rates of
25 basic pay are adjusted for the General Schedule.
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1 SEC. 431. ASSIGNMENT TO A SALARY CLASs.-(a)
2 The Secretary shall assign to an appropriate salary class es-
3 tablished under this chapter each person appointed to the
4 Service, other than a chief of mission or member of the
5 Senior Foreign Service whose salary is determined by the
6 terms of his or her appointment.
7 (b) The salary class to which a member of the Service is
8 assigned under this section shall not be affected by the mem-
9 ber's assignment to any position or post under chapter 5.
10 Except as authorized by chapter 35 of title 5, United States
11 Code, changes in the salary class of a member of the Senior
12 Foreign Service or a member receiving a salary under the
13 Foreign Service Schedule shall be made only in accordance
14 with chapter 6.
15 SEC. 441. PERFORMANCE PAY.-(a) Members of the
16 Senior Foreign Service who are serving-
17 (1) under career or career candidate appointments,
18 or
19 (2) under limited appointments with reemployment
20 rights under section 332 to the Senior Executive Serv-
21 ice,
22 shall be eligible to compete for performance pay in accord-
23 ance with this section. Performance pay shall be paid in a
24 lump sum and shall be in addition to the basic salary as pre-
25 scribed under section 411 and any other award. The fact that
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1 a member of the Senior Foreign Service competing for per-
2 formance pay would receive compensation thereby exceeding
3 the compensation of any other member of the Service shall
4 not be taken into account in consideration for the award or its
5 payment.
6 (b) Awards of performance pay shall take into account
7 the criteria established by the Office of Personnel Manage-
8 ment for performance awards under section 5384 of title 5,
9 United States Code, and rank awards under section 4507 of
10 title 5, United States Code. Such awards shall be subject to
11 the following limitations:
12 (1) not more than 50 per centum of the members
13 of the Senior Foreign Service may receive performance
14 pay in any one year;
15 (2) performance pay for a member of the Senior
16 Foreign Service may not exceed 20 per centum of the
17 member's annual rate of basic salary except as pro-
18 vided in paragraph (3);
19 (3) not more than 6 per centum of the members of
20 the Senior Foreign Service may receive performance
21 pay in any year in amounts which exceed the per-
22 centage limitation specified in paragraph (2). Payments
23 under this paragraph to a member of the Senior For-
24 eign Service may not exceed $10,000 in any year,
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24
1 except that payments of up to $20,000 may be made
2 to up to 1 per centum of such members; and
3 (4) the total amount of basic salary plus perform-
4 ance pay received by any member of the Senior For-
5 eign Service may not exceed in any fiscal year the
6 salary provided by law for level I of the Federal Ex-
7 ecutive Salary Schedule (5 U.S.C. 5312).
8 (c) The Secretary shall determine the amount of per-
9 formance pay as described in subsectii n (b)(2) available each
10 year for distribution among the several classes of members of
11 the Senior Foreign Service, and shall make distribution to
12 particular individuals on the basis of recommendations by se-
13 lection boards established under section 603.
14 (d) The President may grant awards of performance pay
15 as described in subsection (b)(3) on the basis of annual recom-
16 mendations by the Secretary of members of the Senior For-
17 eign Service who are nominated by their agencies as having
18 performed especially meritorious or distinguished service.
19 Recommendations by the Secretary under this subsection
20 shall be made on the basis of recommendations by special
21 interagency selection boards established by the Secretary for
22 the purpose of reviewing and evaluating the nominations of
23 agencies.
24 SEC. 442. WITHIN-CLASS SALARY INCREASES.-(a)
25 Any member of the Service receiving a salary under the For-
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25
1 eign Service Schedule shall receive an increase in salary at
2 periodic intervals to the next higher rate for the class in
3 which such member is serving unless the member's perform-
4 ance during any such interval is found in a review by a selec-
5 tion board established under section 603 to fall below the
6 standards of performance for his or her class.
7 (b) Without regard to any other law, the Secretary is
8 authorized to grant to any member of the Service to whom
9 subsection (a) applies additional increases in salary within the
10 salary range established for the class in which the member is
11 serving, based upon especially meritorious service.
12 SEC. 451. LOCAL COMPENSATION PLANS.-(a)(1) The
13 Secretary shall establish compensation plans for foreign na-
14 tional employees of the Service, and for United States citi-
15 zens employed in the Service abroad who are family mem-
16 bers of Government personnel described in section 333. Such
17 compensation plans shall be based upon prevailing wage
18 rates and compensation practices for corresponding types of
19 positions in the locality (including participation in local social
20 security plans) to the extent consistent with the public inter-
21 est. Compensation plans established under this section may
22 include provision for leave of absence with pay for foreign
23 national employees in accordance with prevailing law and
24 employment practices in the locality of employment without
25 regard to section 6310 of title 5, United States Code.
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1 (2) The Secretary may make supplemental payments to
2 any civil service annuitant who is a former foreign national
employee of the Service (or is a survivor of a former foreign
national employee of the Service) in order to offset exchange
rate losses, if the annuity being paid such annuitant is based
6 on-
7 (A) a salary that was fixed in a foreign currency
8 that has appreciated in value in terms of the United
9 States dollar; and
10 (B) service in a country in which (as determined
11 by the Secretary) the average retirement benefits being
12 received by those who have retired from competitive
13 local organizations are superior to the local currency
14 value of civil service annuities plus any other retire-
15 ment benefits payable to foreign national employees
16 who have retired during similar time periods and after
17 comparable careers with the Government.
18 (b) For the purpose of performing functions abroad, any
19 agency or other Government establishment (including any in
20 the legislative or judicial branch) is authorized to administer
21 employment programs for its employees who are foreign na-
22 tionals or family members of Government personnel serving
23 abroad, in accordance with the applicable provisions of this
24 Act.
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1 (c) The Secretary may prescribe regulations governing
2 the establishment and administration of local compensation
3 plans under this section for the guidance of all agencies and
4 Government establishments.
5 SEC. 452. SALARIES OF CONSULAR AGENTS.-The
6 Secretary is authorized to establish the salary rate for each
7 consular agent, after taking into account the workload of the
8 consular agency and the prevailing wage rates in the locality
9 where it is located.
10 SEC. 453. COMPENSATION FOR IMPRISONED FOREIGN
11 NATIONAL EMPLOYEES.-(a) The head of any agency or
12 other Government establishment (including any in the legisla-
13 tive or judicial branch) may compensate any current or
14 former foreign national employee, including a foreign national
15 employee who worked under a personal services contract,
16 who is or has been imprisoned by a foreign government if the
17 Secretary (or, in the case of an employee of the Central In-
18 telligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence) de-
19 termines that such imprisonment is the result of the foreign
20 national's employment by the United States. Such compensa-
2.1 tion,,may.not exceed an amount. that the agency. head deter
22 mines approximates the salary and other benefits to which
23 the employee or former employee would have been entitled
24 had he or she remained employed during the period of such
25 imprisonment, and may be paid under such terms and condi-
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tions as the Secretary deems appropriate. For the purposes of
this I section, the agency head shall have the same powers
with respect to imprisoned foreign national employees and
former employees as those of an agency head under sub-
chapter VII of chapter 55 of title 5, United States Code, to
the extent that such powers are consistent with this section.
(b) Any period . of imprisonment of a foreign national
which is compensable under this section shall be considered
for purposes of any other employee benefit to be a period of
employment by the Government, except that a period of
imprisonment shall not be creditable-
(1) for purposes of subchapter III of chapter 83 of
title 5, United States Code, unless the individual
either-
(A) was subject to section 8334(a) of such
title during the period of his or her Government
employment last preceding the imprisonment; or
(B) qualified for annuity benefits under such
subchapter III by reason of other service; or
(2) for purposes of subchapter I of chapter 81 of
title 5, United States Code, unless the individual was
employed by the Government at the time of his or her
imprisonment.
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1 (c) No compensation or other benefit shall be awarded
2 under this section unless a claim therefor is filed within three
3 years after-
4 (1) the termination of the period of imprisonment
5 giving rise to the claim, or
6 (2) the date of the claimant's first opportunity
7 thereafter to file such a claim, as determined by the
8 appropriate agency head.
9 (d) The Secretary may prescribe regulations governing
10 payments under this section for the guidance of all agencies
11 and Government establishments.
12 SEC. 461. TEMPORARY SERVICE AS PRINCIPAL OFFI-
13 cER.-For such time as any member of the Service is tempo-
14 rarily in charge of a post during the absence or incapacity of
15 the principal officer he or she shall receive, in addition to the
16 basic salary for his or her class, an amount equal to that
17 portion which the Secretary may determine to be appropriate
18 of the difference between such salary and the basic salary
19 provided for the principal officer, or, if there be none, of the
20 former principal officer.
21 SEC. 462. SPECIAL ALLOWANCES.-The Secretary
22 may pay special allowances, in addition to compensation oth-
23 erwise authorized, to Foreign Service officers who are re-
24 quired because of the nature of their assignments to perform
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1 additional work on a regular basis in substantial excess of
2 normal requirements.
3 CHAPTER 5-CLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS AND
ASSIGNMENTS
16
17
18
19
21
22.
23
24
5 SEC. 501. CLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS.-The Sec-
6 retary shall designate and classify all positions to be occupied
7 by members of the Service (other than chiefs of mission), in-
8 cluding positions at posts abroad and in the Department. Po-
9 sition classifications under this section shall be established,
10 without regard to chapter 51 of title 5, United States Code,
11 in relation to the salary classes established under chapter 4.
12 SEC. 511. ASSIGNMENTS TO FOREIGN SERVICE POSI-
TIONS.-(a) The Secretary may assign a member of the
Service, in accordance with merit principles, to any position
classified under section 501 in which he or she is eligible to
serve (other than as chief of mission), and may transfer a
member from position to position as the needs of the Service
may require.
(b) Positions classified as Foreign Service positions nor-
mally shall be filled by the assignment of members of the
Foreign Service to those positions. Subject to that limita-
tion-
(1) Foreign Service positions may be filled by per-
sonnel of the Department and, under interagency
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1 agreements, personnel of other agencies (including
2 military personnel); and
3 (2) Senior Foreign Service positions may also be
4 filled by other members of the Service.
5 (c) The President may assign a member of the Service
6 serving under a career appointment to serve as charge d'af-
7 faires or otherwise as the head of a mission for such period as
8 the public interest may require.
9 SEC. 521. ASSIGNMENTS TO AGENCIES, INTERNA-
10 TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND OTHER BODIES.-(a) The
11 Secretary may assign a member of the Service for duty-
12 (1) in a non-Foreign Service (including Senior Ex-
13 ecutive Service) position in the Department or another
14 agency, or in an international organization, internation-
15 al commission, or other international body;
16 (2) with domestic or international trade, labor, ag-
17 ricultural, scientific, or other conferences, congresses,
18 or gatherings;
19 (3) for special instruction, training, or orientation
20 at or with public or private nonprofit institutions, or
21 commercial firms; and
22 (4) in the United States, or in any territory or
23 possession thereof, or the Commonwealth of Puerto
24 Rico, with a State or local government, public school,
25 community college, or other public or private nonprofit
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1 organization, including assignment to a Member or
2 office of the Congress so long as assignments under
3 this paragraph emphasize service outside Washington,
4 District of Columbia.
5 (b)(1) The salary of a member of the Service assigned
6 under this section shall. be the salary of the member's class,
7 irrespective of the salary of the position to which assigned,
8 and shall be paid from appropriations made available for the
9 payment of salaries and expenses of the Service. Such appro-
10 priations may be reimbursed for all or any part of the salaries
11 of members assigned under this section.
12 (2) A member of the Service assigned under subsection
13 (a)(4) to a Member or office of the Congress shall be deemed
14 to be an employee of the House of Representatives or the
15 Senate, as the case may be, for purposes of payment of travel
16 and other expenses.
17 (c) Assignments under this section shall not exceed four
18 years of continuous service for any member of the Service,
19 unless the Secretary approves an extension of such period in
20 special circumstances.
21 SEC. 531. SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
22 ABROAD.-(a) Career personnel of the Service shall be obli-
23 gated to serve abroad, and shall be expected to serve abroad
24 for substantial portions of their careers. The Secretary shall
25 establish by regulation limitations upon assignments of mem-
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1 hers of the Service within the United States. No member of
2 the Service may be assigned to duty within the United States
3 for any period of continuous service exceeding eight years
4 unless the Secretary approves an extension of such period in
5 special circumstances.
6 (b) Consistent with the needs of the Service, the Secre-
7 tary shall seek to assign career members of the Service who
8 are citizens of the United States to duty within the United
9 States at least once during each period of fifteen years in the
10 Service.
11 (c) The Secretary may grant a sabbatical to a career
12 member of the Senior Foreign Service for not to exceed
13 eleven months in order to permit the member to engage in
14 study or uncompensated work experience which will contrib-
15 ute to the member's development and effectiveness. A sab-
16 batical may be granted under this subsection under conditions
17 specified by the Secretary in light of the provisions of section
18 3396(c) of title 5, United States Code, which apply to sabba-
19 ticals granted to members of the Senior Executive Service.
20 SEC. 541. TEMPORARY DETAILS.-A period of duty of
21 not more than six months in duration by a member of the
22 Service shall be considered a temporary detail. Such a detail,
23 whether at the commencement during the course of, or at the
24 close of an assignment, shall not be considered an assignment
25 within the meaning of this chapter.
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1 CHAPTER 6-PROMOTION AND RETENTION
2 SEC. 601. PROMOTIONS. BASED ON MERIT.-(a) Pro-
3 motions in the Service shall be based upon merit principles.
4 (b) Promotions of-
5 (1) members of the Senior Foreign Service, and
6 (2) members receiving salaries under the Foreign
7 Service Schedule (including promotions of such mem-
8 bers into the Senior Foreign Service),
9 shall be based upon the recommendations and rankings of
10 selection boards established under section 603, except that
11 the Secretary may by regulation specify categories of career
12 personnel receiving salaries under the Foreign Service
13 Schedule who may receive promotions on the basis of satis-
14 factory performance.
15 SEC. 602. PROMOTION INTO AND RETENTION IN THE
16 SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE.-(a) Promotions into the Senior
17 Foreign Service shall be recommended by selection boards
18 only from among those members of the Service who are serv-
19 ing under career appointments at class 1 of the Foreign Serv-
20 ice Schedule and who request that they be considered for
21 promotion into the Senior Foreign Service. The Secretary
22 shall prescribe the period (within any applicable time in class
23 limitation specified under section 641(a)) during which such
24 members may be considered for entry into the Senior Foreign
25 Service by selection boards.
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1 (b) Decisions by the Secretary on promotions into and
2 retention in the Senior Foreign Service shall take into ac-
3 count the needs of the Service to plan for the continuing
4 admission of new members and for effective career develop-
5 ment and reliable promotional opportunities.
6 (c) The affidavit requirements of sections 3332 and
7 3333(a) of title 5, United States Code, shall not apply-with
8 respect to a member of the Service who has previously com-
9 plied with those requirements and who subsequently is pro-
10 moted by appointment to any class in the Senior Foreign
11 Service without a break in service.
12 SEC. 603. SELECTION BOARDS.-The Secretary shall
13 establish selection boards to evaluate the performance of
14 members of the Senior Foreign Service and members receiv-
15 ing salaries under the Foreign Service Schedule. Selection
16 boards shall, in accordance with precepts prescribed by the
17 Secretary, rank the members of a class on the basis of rela-
18 tive performance and may make recommendations for-
19 (1) promotions under section 601(b);
20 (2) awards of performance pay under section
21 441(c);
22 (3) offer or renewal of limited career extensions as
23 described in section 641(b); and
24 (4) such other actions as the Secretary may pre-
25 scribe by regulation.
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1 SEC. 612. BASIS FOR SELECTION BOARD REVIEW.-
2 (a) Recommendations and rankings by selection boards shall
3 be based upon records of the character, ability, conduct, qual-
4 ity of work, industry, experience, dependability, and general
5 performance of members of the Service, including reports of
6 Foreign Service inspectors, performance evaluation reports of
7 supervisors, records of commendations, awards, reprimands,
8 and other disciplinary actions, and (with respect to the Senior
9 Foreign Service) records of current and prospective
10 assignments.
11 (b) Precepts for selection boards shall include a descrip-
12 tion of the needs of the Service for performance require-
13 ments, skills, and qualities to be considered in recommenda-
14 tions for promotion. The precepts for selection boards respon-
15 sible for recommending promotion into and within the Senior
16 Foreign Service shall emphasize performance which demon-
17 strates the strong policy formulation capabilities, executive
18 leadership qualities, and/or highly developed functional and
19 area expertise required for the Senior Foreign Service.
20 SEC. 613. CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS.-The rec-
21 ords described in section 612(a) shall be maintained in ac-
22 cordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
23 Except to the extent that they pertain to the receipt, dis-
24 bursement, and accounting for public funds, such records
25 shall be confidential and subject to inspection only by the
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1 President, the Secretary, such officers and employees of the
2 Government as may be authorized by law or assigned by the
3 Secretary to work on such records, the legislative and appro-
4 priations committees of the Congress charged with consider-
5 ing legislation and appropriations for the Service, and repre-
6 sentatives duly authorized by such committees. Access to
7 such records relating to a member of the Service shall be
8 granted to such member, upon written request. .
9 SEC. 621. IMPLEMENTATION OF SELECTION BOARD
10 RECOMMENDATIONS.-Recommendations for promotion
11 made by selection boards shall be submitted to the Secretary
12 in rank order by class or in rank order by specialization
13 within a class. The Secretary shall make promotions and,
14
15
16
with respect to the career Senior Foreign Service, shall make
recommendations to the President for promotions, in accord-
ance with the rankings of .the selection boards. However, in
17 special circumstances set forth by regulation, the Secretary
18 may remove an individual name from the rank order list sub-
19 mitted by a selection board or delay the promotion of an indi-
20 vidual named in such a list.
21 SEC. 631.. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROMO-
22 TION.-(a) The Secretary may, pursuant to a recommenda-
23 tion of the Foreign Service Grievance Board, an equal em-
24 ployment opportunity appeals examiner, or the Special Coun-
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1 sel of the Merit Systems Protection Board, or pursuant to a
2 decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board-
3 (1) recommend to the President a promotion of a
4 member of the Service;
5 (2) promote a member of the Service; or
6 (3) grant to a member of the Service performance
7 pay or a within-class salary increase.
8 (b) In special circumstances set forth by regulation, the
9 Secretary may make retroactive promotions and grants of
10 performance pay and within-class salary increases, and may
11 recommend retroactive promotions by the President, under
12 section 621 and subsection (a) of this section.
13 SEC. 641. RETIREMENT FOR EXPIRATION OF TIME IN
14 CLASS.-(a) The Secretary shall, by regulation, specify the
15 maximum time during which-
16 (1) career members of the Senior Foreign Service,
17 (2) Foreign Service officers, and
18 (3) career members in such other Foreign Service
19 personnel categories as may be designated by the Sec-
20 retary who are paid salaries comparable to the salaries
21 of Foreign Service officers,
22 may remain in class (or a combination of classes) without a
23 promotion. The Secretary may, by regulation, increase or de-
24 crease such maximum time for a class (or a combination of
25 classes) as the needs of the Service may require.
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1 (b) Members of the Service whose maximum time in
2 class under subsection (a) expires-
3 (1) after they have attained the highest class for
4 their respective personnel categories, or
5 (2) while they are serving as members of the
6 Senior Foreign Service in classes designated by the
7 Secretary,
8 may'continue to serve only under limited extensions of their
9 career appointments. Such limited extensions shall not
10 exceed five years in duration and may be granted and re-
11 newed by the Secretary in light of the recommendations of
12 selection boards established under section 602 and the needs
13 of the Service. Personnel serving under such limited career
14 extensions shall continue to be considered career members of
15 the Service.
16 (c) Any member of the Service who does not receive a
17 promotion within an applicable time in class limitation speci-
18 fied under subsection (a), or whose limited career extension
19 under subsection (b) is terminated or not renewed, shall be
20 retired from the Service and receive benefits in accordance
21 with section 643.
22 SEc. 642. RETIREMENT BASED ON RELATIVE PER-
23 FORMANCE.-(a) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations
24 concerning the standards of performance to be met by career
25 members of the Service who are citizens of the United
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1 States. Whenever a selection board review indicates that the
2 performance of such a career member of the Service may not
3 meet the standards of performance for his or her class, the
4 Secretary shall provide for administrative review of the mem-
5 ber's performance. The review shall include an opportunity
6 for the member to be heard.
7 (b) In any case where the administrative review con-
8 ducted under subsection (a) substantiates that a member of
9 the Service has failed to meet the standards of performance
10 for his or her class, the member shall be retired from the
11 Service and receive benefits in accordance with section 643.
12 SEC. 643. RETIREMENT BENEFITS.-(a) A member of
13 the Service-
14 (1) whose limited extension of a career appoint-
15 ment under section 641(b) is terminated or not re-
16 newed; or
17 (2) who is otherwise retired under section 641 or
18 642-
19 (A) after becoming eligible for voluntary re-
20 tirement under section 835, or
21 (B) from the Senior Foreign Service or from
22 class 1 of the Foreign Service Schedule,
23 shall receive retirement benefits in accordance with section
24 821.
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1 (b) Any other member of the Service who is retired
2 under section 641 or 642 shall receive-
3 (1) one-twelfth of a year's salary at his or her
4 then current salary rate for each year of service and
5 proportionately for a fraction of a year, but not exceed-
6 ing a total of one year's salary at his or her then cur-
7 rent salary rate, payable without interest from the For-
8 eign Service Retirement and Disability Fund, in three
9 equal installments on the first day of January following
10 the member's retirement and on the two anniversaries
11 of this date immediately following: Provided, That in
12 special cases, the Secretary may accelerate or combine
13 the installments; and
14 (2) a refund of the contributions made to the For-
15 eign Service Retirement and Disability Fund as pro-
16 vided in section 841, except that in lieu of such refund
17 a member who has at least five years of service credit
18 toward retirement under the Foreign Service Retire-
19 ment and Disability System (excluding military or
20 naval service) may elect to receive retirement benefits
21 on reaching age sixty in accordance with section 821.
22 In the event that a member has elected to receive re-
23 tirement benefits and dies before reaching the age of
24 sixty his or her death shall be considered a death in
25 service within the meaning of section 832.
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1 (c) Notwithstanding section 3477 of the Revised Stat-
2 utes (31 U.S.C. 203) or any other law, a member of the
? 3 Service who is retired under section 641 or 642 shall have
4 the right to assign to any person or corporation the whole or
5 any part of the benefits receivable by him or her under sub-
6 section (b)(1). Any such assignment shall be on a form ap-
7 proved by the Secretary of the Treasury and a copy thereof
8 shall be deposited with the Secretary of the Treasury by the
9 person executing the assignment.
10 SEC. 651. SEPARATION FOR CAUSE.-(a) The Secre-
11 tary may separate any member from the Service for such
12 cause as will promote the efficiency of the Service. No
13 member serving under a career appointment and paid a
14 salary specified for the Senior Foreign Service or in the For-
15 eign Service Schedule shall be so separated until he or she
16 has been granted a hearing before the Foreign Service
17 Grievance Board and the cause for separation established at
18 such hearing, unless the member waives in writing the right
19 to a hearing. This section shall also apply to any such
20 member of the Service who is in a probationary status or
21 whose appointment is.limited or temporary, when separation
22 is by reason of misconduct. The hearing provided under this
23 subsection shall be in lieu of any other administrative proce-
24 dure authorized or required by this or any other law.
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1 (b) Any participant in the Foreign Service Retirement
2 and Disability System separated under subsection (a) shall be
3 entitled to receive a refund of the contributions made by the
4 participant to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability
5 Fund as provided in section 841. Except in cases where the
6 Secretary determines that separation was based in whole or
7 in part on the ground of disloyalty to the United States, a
8 participant who has at least five years of service credit
9 toward retirement under this System (excluding military or
10 naval service) may elect, in lieu of such refund, to receive
11 retirement benefits on reaching age sixty in accordance with
12 section 821.
13 (c) Any member of the Service separated under subsec-
14 tion (a) who is not a participant in the Foreign Service Re-
15 tirement and Disability System shall be entitled only to such
16 benefit as shall accrue to him or her under the retirement
17 system in which the member is- a participant.
18 SEC. 661. TERMINATION OF LIMITED AND TEMPO-
19 RARY APPOINTMENTS.-(a) Except as provided in subsec-
20 tion (b), and notwithstanding' any other law, the Secretary
21 may terminate at any time the services of any member of the
22 Service who is paid a salary specified for the Senior Foreign
23 Service or in the Foreign Service Schedule or is a family
24 member serving under a local compensation plan, and who is
25 serving under a limited or temporary appointment.
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1 (b) The termination of a limited appointment described
2 in subsection (a) because of misconduct shall be subject to the
3 provisions of section 651.
4 SEC. 671. TERMINATION OF CONSULAR AGENTS AND
5 FOREIGN NATIONAL PERSONNEL.-Notwithstanding any
6 other law, the Secretary may terminate at any time the serv-
7 ices of any consular agent or foreign national employee after
8 giving due consideration to the criteria and procedures nor-
mally followed in the locality in similar circumstances.
CHAPTER 7-FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE, CAREER
DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, AND ORIENTATION
SEC. 701. FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE.-(a) The
Secretary shall maintain and operate the Foreign Service In-
14 stitute (hereinafter the "Institute") originally established
15 under section 701 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (60
16 Stat. 1018), in order to promote career development within
17 the Service and to provide necessary training and instruction
18 in the field of foreign- relations to personnel of the Service,
19 and of the Department and other agencies. The Institute
20 shall be headed by a Director, who shall be appointed by the
21 Secretary.
22 (b) The Secretary may, in addition, provide to members
23 of the families of such personnel in anticipation of their as-
24 signment abroad or while abroad-
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(1) appropriate orientation and language training;
2 and
3 (2) functional training for anticipated prospective
4 employment under section 333.
5 (c) To the extent practicable, the Secretary shall provide
6 training under this chapter which meets the needs of all
7 agencies, and other agencies shall :avoid duplicating the facili-
8 ties and training provided by the Secretary through the Insti-
9 tute and otherwise.
10 SEC. 702. FOREIGN LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS.-
11 The Secretary shall establish foreign language proficiency re-
12 quirements for members of the Service who are to be as-
13 signed abroad in order that posts abroad will be staffed by
14 personnel having a useful knowledge of the language or
15 dialect common to the country where the post is located. The
16 Secretary shall arrange for appropriate language training of
17 members of the Service at the Institute or elsewhere in order
18 to assist in meeting such requirements.
19 SEC. 703. TRAINING AUTHORITIES.-In the exercise
20 of functions under this chapter, the Secretary may-
21 (1) provide for the general nature of the training
22 and instruction to be furnished in the Institute, includ-
23 ing functional and geographic area specializations;
24 (2) correlate training and instruction with courses
25 given at other Government institutions and at private
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1 institutions which furnish training and instruction
2 useful in the field of foreign affairs;
3 (3) encourage and foster programs complementary
4 to those in the Institute, including through grants and
5 other gratuitous assistance to nonprofit institutions co-
6 operating in any of the programs under this chapter;
7 (4) pay the tuition and other expenses of person-
8 nel assigned or detailed in accordance with law for
9 special instruction or training, including orientation,
10 language, and career development training;
11 (5) employ personnel in accordance with the civil
12 service laws and regulations and chapter 51 and sub-
13 chapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States
14 Code, except that, when deemed necessary by the Sec-
15 retary for the effective administration of this chapter,
16 personnel may be employed without regard to the civil
17 service laws and regulations and chapter 51 and sub-
18 chapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States
19 Code, at any of the rates specified in the General
20 Schedule described in section 5104 of title 5, United
21 States Code (including in the absence of suitably quali-
22 fied United States citizens persons who are not citizens
23 of the United States), by appointment on a full-time,
24 part-time, or intermittent basis or by contract for
25 services in the United States or abroad;
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1 (6) provide special monetary or other incentives to
2 encourage Foreign Service personnel to acquire or
3 retain proficiency in esoteric foreign .languages or
4. special abilities needed in the Service; and
5 (7) acquire such real and personnel property and
6 equipment as may be necessary for the establishment,
7 maintenance, and operation of the facilities necessary
8 to carry out the provisions of this chapter without
9 regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (41
10 U.S.C. 5) and section 302 of the Federal Property and
11 Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 252).
12 SEC. 704. TRAINING AND ORIENTATION GRANTS.-(a)
13 To facilitate orientation' and language training provided to
14 members of families of Government personnel under this
15 chapter, the Secretary may make grants to family members
16 attending approved orientation and language programs of
17 study. No such grant may exceed the amount actually ex-
18 pended for necessary costs incurred in conjunction with such
19 attendance and in no event may any such grant exceed $300
20 per month per individual. No individual may receive such a
21 grant for more than six months in connection with any one
22 assignment.
23 . (b) If a member of the family, of a member of the Service
24 who is assigned abroad is unable to participate in language
25 training provided by the Department at the Institute or else-
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1 where, the Secretary may compensate that family member
2 for all or part of the costs of the language training, related to
3 the assignment abroad, which is undertaken at a public or
4 private institution.
5 SEC. 705. CAREER COUNSELING.-(a) In order to
6 facilitate their transition from the Service, the Secretary may
7 provide professional career counseling, advice, and placement
8 assistance, by contract or otherwise, to members and former
9 members of the Service other than those separated for cause.
10 (b) The Secretary may facilitate the employment of
11 spouses of Foreign Service personnel by-
12 (1) providing regular career counseling for such
13 spouses;
14 (2) maintaining a centralized system for cataloging
15 their skills and the various governmental and nongov-
16 ernmental overseas employment opportunities available
17 to them; and
18 (3) otherwise assisting them in obtaining overseas
19 employment.
20 CHAPTER 8-FOREIGN SERVICE RETIREMENT AND
21 DISABILITY SYSTEM
22 SEC. 801. ADMINISTRATION AND MAINTENANCE OF
23 THE SYSTEM.-(a) In accordance with such regulations as
24 the President may prescribe, the Secretary shall administer
25 the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System (here-
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49
1 inafter the "System"), originally established by section 18 of
2 the Act of May 24, 1924 (43 Stat. 144).
3 (b) The Secretary of the Treasury shall maintain the
4 special fund, known as the Foreign Service Retirement and
Disability Fund (hereinafter the "Fund"), originally consti-
tuted by section 18 of the Act of May 24, 1924 (43 Stat.
144).
SEC. 803. PARTICIPANTS.-(a) The following persons
(hereinafter "participants") shall be entitled to the benefits of
the System:
(1) every person serving under a career appoint-
ment-
(A) in the Senior Foreign Service, or
(B) under the Foreign Service Schedule; and
(2) every chief of mission, not otherwise entitled
to be a participant, who-
(A) has served as chief of mission for an
aggregate period of twenty years or more, and
(B) has paid into the Fund a special contri-
bution for each year of such service in accordance
with section 811.
(b) Any otherwise eligible person who is appointed to a
position by the President, by and with the advice and consent
24 of the Senate or by the President alone, shall not by virtue of
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1 the acceptance of such appointment cease to be eligible to
2 participate in the System.
3 SEC. 804. DEFINITIONS.-When used in this chapter,
4 unless otherwise specified, the term-
5 (1) "annuitant" means any person, including a
former participant or survivor, who meets all require-
ments for an annuity from the Fund under this or any
other Act and who has filed a claim therefor;
(2) "child" means-
(A) an unmarried child of a participant under
the age of eighteen years (or an unmarried child
regardless of age who because of physical or
mental disability incurred before age eighteen is
incapable of self-support) who is-
(i) an offspring, or adopted child of the
participant,
(ii) a stepchild or recognized natural
child, who received more than one-half sup-
port from the participant, or
(iii) a child who lived with and for
whom a petition of adoption was filed by a
participant, and who is adopted by the sur-
viving spouse of the participant after the
latter's death; and
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1 (B) an unmarried student below age twenty-
2 two (for this purpose a child whose twenty-second
3 birthday occurs before July 1 or after August 31
4 of a calendar year, and while a student is deemed
5 to have become twenty-two years of age on the
6 first day of July after that birthday);
7 (3) "Foreign Service normal cost" means the
8 level percentage of payroll required to be deposited in
9 the Fund to meet the cost of benefits payable under
10 the System (computed in accordance with generally ac-
11 cepted actuarial practice on an entry-age basis) less the
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
value of retirement benefits earned under another re-
tirement system for Government employees and less
the cost of credit allowed for military service;
(4) "Fund balance" means the sum of-
(A) the investments of the Fund calculated at
par value, plus
(B) the cash balance of the Fund on the
books of the Treasury;
(5) "lump-sum credit" means the compulsory and
special contributions to a participant's or former par-
ticipant's credit in the Fund plus interest thereon at 4
per centum a year compounded annually to December
31, 1976, and after such date for a participant who
separates from the Service after completing at least
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one year of civilian service and before completing five
years of such service, at the rate of 3 per centum per
year to the date of separation. Interest shall not be
paid for a fractional part of a month in the total serv-
ice on or compulsory and special contributions from an
annuitant for recall service or other service performed
after the date of separation which forms the basis for
(6) "military and naval service" means honorable
annuity;
i Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or pred-
(B) in the Regular or Reserve Corps of the
Public Health Service after June 30, 1960, or
(C) as a commissioned officer of the National
active service-
(A) in the
States,
J
une 30, 1961,
ecessor organization after
I 1, r'~F
but does not include service in the National Guard
except when ordered to active duty in the service of
the United States;
(7) "student" means a child regularly pursuing a
full-time course of study or training in residence in a
high school, trade) school, technical or vocational insti-
tute, junior college, college, university or comparable
recognized educational institution (a child who is a stu-
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dent shall not be deemed to have ceased to be a stu-
dent during any period between school years, semes-
ters or terms if the period of nonattendance does not
exceed five calendar months and if the child shows to
the satisfaction of the Secretary that he or she has a
bona fide intention of continuing to pursue his or her
course of study during, the school year, semester, or
term immediately following such period);
(8) "surviving spouse" means the surviving wife
or husband of a participant or annuitant who, in the
case of a death in Service or marriage after, retirement,
was married to the participant or annuitant for at least
one year immediately preceding his or her death or is
the parent of a child born of the marriage;
(9) "unfunded liability" means the estimated
excess of the present value of all benefits payable from
the Fund over the sum of-
(A) the present value of deductions to be
withheld from the future basic ' salary of partici-
pants and of future agency contributions to be
made in their behalf, plus
(B) the present value of Government pay-
ments to the Fund under section 865, plus
(C) the Fund balance as of the date the un-
funded liability is determined.
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1 SEC. 811. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FUND.-(a) Seven
2 per centum of the basic salary received by each participant
3 shall be contributed to the Fund for the payment of annuities,
4 cash benefits, refunds, and allowances. An equal sum shall
5 also be contributed from the respective appropriation or fund
6 which is used for payment of the participant's salary. The
7 amounts deducted and withheld from basic salary together
8 with the amounts so contributed from the appropriation or
9 fund shall be deposited by the Department in the Fund.
10 (b) Each participant shall be deemed to consent and
11 agree to such deductions from basic salary. Payment less
12 such deductions shall be a full and complete discharge and
13 acquittance of all claims and demands whatsoever for all reg-
14 ular services during the period covered by such payment,
15 except the right to the benefits to which the participant shall
16 be entitled under this Act, notwithstanding any law, rule, or
17 regulation affecting the individual's salary.
18 (c)(1) If a member of the Service under another retire-
19 ment system for Government employees becomes a partici-
20 pant in the System by direct transfer, such member's total.
21 contributions and deposits that would otherwise be refundable
22 on separation (except voluntary contributions), including in-
23 terest thereon, shall be transferred to the Fund effective as of
24 the date such member becomes a participant in the System.
25 Each such member shall be deemed to consent to the transfer
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1 of such funds and such transfer shall be a complete discharge
2 and acquittance of all claims and demands against the other
3 Government retirement fund on account of service rendered
4 prior to becoming a participant in the System.
5 (2) No member of the Service whose contributions are
6 transferred to the Fund under paragraph (1) shall be required
7 to make additional contributions for periods of service for
8 which required contributions were made to the other Govern-
9 ment retirement fund; nor shall any refund be made to any
10 such member on account of contributions made during any
11 period to the other Government retirement fund at a higher
12 rate than that fixed by subsection (d).
13 (d) Any participant. credited. with civilian service after
14 July 1, 1924-
15 (1) for which no retirement contributions, deduc-
16 tions, or deposits have been made, or
17 (2) for which a refund of such contributions, de-
18 ductions, or deposits has been made which has not
19 been redeposited,
20 may make a special contribution to the Fund equal to the
21 following percentages of basic salary received for such
22 service:
Per centum of
Service basic salary
July 1, 1924, through October 15, 1960, inclusive ......................... 5
October 16, 1960, through December 31, 1969, inclusive .............. 61/2
On and after January 1, 1970 ........................................................ 7
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1 Notwithstanding the foregoing, a special contribution for
2 prior nondeposit service as a National Guard technician
3 which would be creditable toward retirement under sub-
4 chapter III of chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code, and
5 for which a special contribution has not been made, shall be
6 equal to the special contribution for such service computed in
7 accordance with the above schedule multiplied by the per-
8 centage of such service that is creditable under section 851.
9 Special contributions shall include interest computed from the
10 midpoint of each service period included in the computation,
11 or from the date refund was paid to the date of payment of
12 the special contribution or commencing date of annuity,
whichever is earlier. Interest shall be compounded at the
annual rate of 4 per centuni\to December 31, 1976, and at 3
per centum thereafter. No interest shall be charged on special
contributions for any period) of separation from Government
service which began before October 1, 1956. Special contri-
butions may be paid in installments (including by allotment of
pay) when authorized by the Secretary.
(e) No contributions shall be required for any period of
military or naval service, or for any period for which credit is
allowed to persons of Japanese ancestry under section 851
for periods of internment during World War II.
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1 (f) A participant or survivor may make a special contri-
2 bution at any time before receipt of annuity and may author-
3 ize payment by offset against initial annuity accruals.
4 SEC. 821. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES.-(a) The an-
5 nuity of a participant shall be equal to 2 per centum of his or
6 her average basic salary for the highest three consecutive
7 years of service multiplied by the number of years, not ex-
8 ceeding thirty-five, of service credit obtained in accordance
9 with sections 851 and 853. However, the highest three years
10 of service shall be used in computing the annuity of any par-
11 ticipant who serves as chief of mission and whose continuity
12 of service as such is interrupted prior to retirement by ap-
13 pointment or assignment to any other position determined by
14 the Secretary to be of comparable importance. In determin-
15 ing the aggregate period of service upon which the annuity is
16 to be based, the fractional part of a month, if any, shall not
17 be counted. The annuity shall be reduced by 10 per centum
18 of any special contribution described in section 811(d) due for
19 service for which no contributions were made and remaining
20 unpaid unless the participant elects to eliminate the service
21 involved for purposes of annuity computation.
22 (b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any married
23 participant who retires shall receive a reduced annuity and
24 provide a maximum survivor annuity for his or her spouse.
25 Such a participant's annuity or any portion thereof designat-
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1 ed in writing by the participant as the base for the survivor
2 benefit shall be reduced by 21/2 per centum of the first
3 $3,600 plus 10 per centum of any amount over $3,600. If an
4 annuitant entitled to receive a reduced annuity under this
5 subsection dies and is survived by a spouse, a survivor annu-
6 ity shall be paid to the surviving spouse equal to 55 per
7 centum of the full amount of the participant's annuity com-
8 puted under subsection (a), or by 55 per centum of any lesser
9 amount the annuitant designated under paragraph (2) at the
10 time of retirement as the base for the survivor benefit.
11 (2) A married participant may elect in writing at the
12 time of retirement to waive or reduce the maximum survivor
13 annuity for his or her spouse described in paragraph (1). In
14 recognition of the special sacrifices made by spouses of For-
15 eign Service personnel, whose opportunities to achieve eco-
16 nomic independence and self-sufficiency are severely
17 curtailed by the disruptions of frequent reassignment and by
18 the inherent limitations of service abroad on employment and
19 career development, such an election may be made only with
20 the written concurrence of the participant's spouse if the
21 spouse has resided with the participant on assignments in the
22 Service, including assignments abroad, for an aggregate
23 period of ten years or more.
24 (3) An annuity payable from the Fund to a surviving
25 spouse shall commence on the day after the annuitant dies
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11
12
13
14
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1 and shall terminate on the last day of the month before the
2 survivor's remarriage prior to attaining age sixty, or death. If
3 a survivor annuity is so terminated because of remarriage, it
4 shall be restored at the same rate commencing on the date
5 such remarriage is terminated if any lump sum paid upon
6 termination of the annuity is returned to the Fund.
7 (c)(1) If an annuitant dies and is survived by a spouse
8 and by a child or children, in addition to the annuity payable
9 to the surviving spouse, there shall be paid to or on behalf of
15 an annuity equal to the smaller of-
16 (A) $1,080, or
17 (B) $3,240 divided by the number of children.
18 (3) The amounts specified in this subsection are subject
19 to-
20 (A) cost-of-living adjustments as specified under
21 section 882(c)(3), and
22 (B) the minimum specified in subsection (1) of this
23 section.
24 (d) If a surviving spouse dies or the annuity of a child is
25 terminated, the annuities of any remaining children shall be
each child an annuity equal to the smaller of-
(A) $900, or
(B) $2,700 divided by the number of children.
(2) If an annuitant dies and is not survived by a spouse
but by a child or children, each surviving child shall be paid
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1 recomputed and paid as though such spouse or child had not
2 survived the participant. If the annuity to a surviving child is
3 initiated or resumed, the annuities of any other children shall
4 be recomputed and paid from that date as though the annu-
5 ities to all currently eligible children in the family were then
6 being initiated.
7 (e) The annuity payable to a child under subsection (c)
8 or (d) shall begin on the day after the participant dies, or if
9 the child is not then qualified, on the first day of the month in
10 which the child becomes eligible. A child's annuity shall ter-
11 minate on the last day of the month which precedes the
12 month in which eligibility ceases.
13 (f) At the time of retirement an unmarried participant
14 may elect to receive a reduced annuity and to provide for an
15 annuity equal to 55 per centum of the reduced annuity pay-
16 able after his or her death to a beneficiary whose name shall
17 be designated in writing to the Secretary. The annuity pay-
18 able to a participant making such election shall be reduced by
19 10 per centum of an annuity computed as provided in subsec-
20 tion (a), and by 5 per centum of an annuity so computed for
21 each full five years the person designated is younger than the
22 retiring participant, but such total reduction shall not exceed
23 40 per centum. No such election of a reduced annuity pay-
24 able to a beneficiary shall be valid until the participant shall
25 have satisfactorily passed a physical examination as pre-
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.1 scribed by the Secretary. The annuity payable to a benefici-
2 ary under. this subsection shall begin on the day after the
3 annuitant dies and shall terminate on the last day of the
4 month preceding the survivor's death. An annuity which is
5 reduced under this subsection or any similar prior provision
6 of law shall, effective the first day of the month following the
7 death of the individual named under this subsection, be re-
8 computed and paid as if the annuity had not been so reduced.
9 (g) An annuitant who was unmarried at retirement and
10 who later marries may, within one year after such marriage,
11 irrevocably elect in writing a reduced annuity with benefit to
12 any surviving spouse who qualifies under section 804(8). Re-
13 ceipt by the Secretary of notice of an election under this sub-
14 section voids prospectively any election previously made
15 under subsection (f). The reduction in annuity required by an
16 election under this subsection shall be computed and the
17 amount of the survivor annuity shall be determined as if the
18 election were made under subsection (b)(1). The annuity re-
19 duction or recomputation shall be effective the first day of the
20 month beginning one year after the date of marriage.
21 (h) A surviving spouse shall' not. become entitled to a
22 survivor annuity or to the restoration of a survivor annuity
23 payable from the Fund unless the survivor elects to receive it
24 instead of any other survivor annuity to which he or she may
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1 be entitled under this or any other retirement system for
2 Government employees.
3 (i) Any married annuitant who reverts to retired status
4 with entitlement to a supplemental annuity under section 871
5 shall, unless the annuitant elects in writing to the contrary at
6 that time (subject to the same conditions as are specified in
7 subsection (b)(2) of this section), have the supplemental annu-
8 ity reduced by 10 per centum to provide a supplemental
9 survivor annuity for his or her spouse. Such supplemental
10 survivor annuity shall be equal to 55 per centum of the annu-
11 itant's supplemental annuity and shall be payable to a surviv-
12 ing spouse to whom the annuitant was married at the time of
13 reversion to retired status or to whom the annuitant had been
14 married for at least one year at the time of death or who is
15 the parent of a child born of the marriage.
16 (j) An annuity which is reduced under this section or
17 any similar prior provision of law to provide a survivor bene-
18 fit for a spouse shall, for each full month during which an
19 annuitant is not married (or is remarried if there is no elec-
20 tion in effect under the following sentence), be recomputed
21 and paid as if the annuity had not been so reduced. Upon
22 remarriage the retired participant may irrevocably elect
23 during such marriage, in a signed writing received by the
24 Secretary within one year after such remarriage, a reduction
25 in annuity for the purpose of allowing an annuity for the
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1 annuitant's spouse in the event such spouse survives the an-
2 nuitant. Such reduction shall be equal to the reduction in
3 effect immediately before the dissolution of the previous mar-
riage, and shall be effective the first day of the first month
4
5 beginning one year after the date of remarriage. A survivor
6 annuity elected under this subsection shall be treated in all
7 respects as a survivor annuity elected under subsection (b)(1).
8 (k) The Secretary shall, on an annual basis, inform each
9 participant of his or her right of election under subsections (g)
10 and (j).
11 (1)(1) The monthly rate of an annuity payable under this
12 chapter to an annuitant, or to a survivor annuitant other than
13 a child, shall not be less than the smallest primary insurance
14 amount, including any cost-of-living increase added to that
15 amount, authorized to be paid from time to time under title II
16 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 401 et seq.).
17 (2) The monthly rate of an annuity payable under this
18 chapter to a surviving child shall not be less than the small-
19 est primary insurance amount, including any cost-of-living in-
20 crease added to that amount, authorized to be paid from time
21 to time under title II of the Social. Security Act (42 U.S.C.
22 401 et seq.) or three times such primary insurance amount
23 divided by the number of surviving children entitled to an
24 annuity, whichever is the lesser.
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1 (3) This subsection shall not apply to an annuitant or to
2 a survivor who is or becomes entitled to receive from the
3 United States an annuity or retired pay under any other civil-
4 ian or military retirement system, benefits under title II of
5 the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), a pension,
6 veterans' compensation, or any other periodic payment of a
7 similar nature, when the monthly rate thereof is equal to or
8 greater than the smallest primary insurance amount, includ-
9 ing any cost-of-living increase added to that amount, author-
10 ized to be paid from time to time under title II of the Social
11 Security Act (42 U.S.C. 401 et seq.).
12 SEC. 822. PAYMENT OF ANNUITY.-(a) Except as
13 otherwise provided, the annuity of a former participant who
14 has met the eligibility requirements for annuity shall com-
15 mence on the day after separation from the Service or on the
16 day after pay ceases. The annuity of a former participant
17 who is entitled to a deferred annuity under this Act shall
18 become effective on the day he or she reaches age sixty.
19 (b) The annuity to a survivor shall become effective as
20 otherwise specified but shall not be paid until the survivor
21 submits an application therefor supported by such proof of
22 eligibility as the Secretary may require. If such application or
23 proof of eligibility is not submitted during an otherwise eligi-
24 ble person's lifetime, no annuity shall be due or payable to
25 his or her estate.
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1 (c) An individual entitled to annuity from the Fund may
2 decline to accept all or any part of the annuity by submitting
3 a. signed waiver to the Secretary. The waiver may be re-
4 voked in writing. at any time. Payment of the annuity waived
5 may not be made for the period during which the waiver was
6 in effect.
7 (d) Recovery.of overpayments under this chapter may
8 not be made from an individual when, in the judgment of the
9 Secretary, the individual is without fault and recovery would
10 be against equity and good conscience or administratively
11 infeasible.
12 SEC. 831. RETIREMENT FOR DISABILITY OR INCA-
13 PACITY.-(a) Any participant who has five years of service
14 credit toward retirement under the System, excluding mili-
15 tary or naval service, and who becomes totally disabled or
16 incapacitated for useful and efficient service by reason of dis-
17 ease, illness, or injury (not due to the participant's vicious
18 habits, intemperance, or willful conduct), shall, upon his or
19 her own application or upon order of the Secretary, be retired
20 on an annuity computed as prescribed in section 821. If the
21 disabled or incapacitated participant has less than twenty
22 years of service credit toward retirement under the System at
23 the time of retirement, his or her annuity shall be computed
24 on the assumption that the participant has had twenty years
25 of service, but the additional service credit that may accrue
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1 to a participant under this subsection shall in no case exceed
2 the difference between his or her age at the time of retire-
3 ment and age sixty.
4 (b) In each case, the participant shall be given a physi-
5 cal examination by one or more duly qualified physicians or
6 surgeons designated by the Secretary to conduct examina-
7 tions. Disability shall be determined by the Secretary on the
8 basis of the advice of such physicians or surgeons. Unless the
9 disability is permanent, like examinations shall be made an-
10 nually until the annuitant has reached age sixty. If the Secre-
11 tary determines on the basis of the advice of one or more
12 duly qualified physicians or surgeons conducting such exami-
13 nations that an annuitant has recovered to the extent that he
14 or she can return to duty, the annuitant may apply for rein-
15 statement or reappointment in the Service within one year
16 from the date recovery is determined. Upon application the
17 Secretary shall reinstate such recovered disability annuitant
18 in the class in which the annuitant was serving at time of
19 retirement, or the Secretary may, taking into consideration
20 the age, qualifications, and experience of such annuitant, and
21 the present class of his or her contemporaries in the Service,
22 appoint or recommend that the President appoint the annu-
23 itant to a higher class. Payment of the annuity shall continue
24 until a date six months after the date of the examination
25 showing recovery or until the date of reinstatement or reap-
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1 pointment in the Service, whichever is earlier. Fees for ex-
2 aminations under this section together with reasonable trav-
3 eling and other expenses incurred in order to submit to exam-
4 ination, shall be paid out of the Fund. If the annuitant fails to
5 submit to examination as required under this subsection, pay-
6 ment of the annuity shall be suspended until continuance of
7 the disability is satisfactorily established.
8 (c) If a recovered disability annuitant whose annuity is
9 discontinued is for any reason not reinstated or reappointed
10 in the Service, he or she shall be considered to have been
11 separated within the meaning of section 834 as of the date of
12 retirement for disability and shall, after the discontinuance of
13 the disability annuity, be entitled to the benefit of that section
14 or of section 841 except that he or she may elect voluntary
15 retirement if eligible under section 835.
16 (d) No participant shall be entitled to receive an annuity
17 under this Act and compensation for injury or disability to
18 himself or herself under subchapter I of chapter 81 of title 5,
19 United States Code, covering the same period of time, except
20 that, a participant may simultaneously receive both an annu-
21 ity under this section and scheduled disability payments
22 under section 8107 of title 5, United States Code. This sub-
23 section shall not bar the right of any claimant to the greater
24 benefit conferred by either this Act or such subchapter for
25 any part of the same period of time. Neither this subsection
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1 nor any provision of such subchapter shall be so construed as
2 to deny the right of any participant to receive an annuity
3 under this Act and to receive concurrently any payment
4 under such subchapter by reason of the death of any other
5 person.
6 (e) Notwithstanding any other law, the right of any
7 person entitled to an annuity under this Act shall not be af-
8 fected because such person has received an award of compen-
9 sation in a lump sum under section 8135 of title 5, United
10 States Code, except that where such annuity is payable on
11 account of the same disability for which compensation under
12 such section has been paid, so much of such compensation as
13 has been paid for any period extended beyond the date such
14
15
16
annuity becomes effective, as determined by the Secretary of
Labor, shall be refunded to the Department of Labor, to be
paid into the Federal Employees' Compensation Fund.
17 Before such person shall receive such annuity he or she
18 shall-
19 (1) refund to the Department of Labor the amount
20 representing such commuted payments for such
21 extended period, or
22 (2) authorize the deduction of such amount from
23 the annuity payable under this Act, which amount
24 shall be transmitted to the Department of Labor for re-
25 imbursement to such Fund. (Deductions from such
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1 annuity may be made from accrued and accruing
2 payments, or may be prorated against and paid from
3 accruing payments in such manner as the Secretary of
4 Labor shall determine, whenever he or she finds that
5 the financial circumstances of the annuitant are such as
6 to warrant deferred refunding.)
7 (f) A claim may be allowed under this section only if the
8 application if filed with the Secretary before the participant is
9 separated from the Service or within one year thereafter.
10 This time limitation may be waived by the Secretary for a
11 participant who at the date of separation from the Service or
12 within one year thereafter is mentally incompetent, if the ap-
13 plication is filed with the Secretary within one year from the
14 date of restoration of the participant to competency or the
15 appointment of a fiduciary, whichever is earlier.
16 SEC. 832. DEATH IN SERVICE.-(a) If a participant
17 dies and no claim for annuity is payable under this Act, the
18 lump-sum credit shall be paid in accordance with section 841.
19 (b). If a participant who has at least eighteen months of
20 civilian service credit toward retirement under the System
21 dies before separation or retirement from the Service and is
22 survived by a spouse, such surviving spouse shall be entitled
23 to an annuity equal to 55 per centum of the annuity comput-
24 ed in accordance with subsection (e) of this section and sec-
25 tion 821(a). If the participant had less than three years
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1 creditable civilian service at the time of death, the survivor
2 annuity shall be computed on the basis of the average salary
? 3 for the entire period of such service.
4 (c) If a participant who has at least eighteen months of
? 5 civilian service credit toward retirement under the System
6 dies before separation or retirement from the Service and is
7 survived by a spouse and a child or children, each surviving
8 child shall be entitled to an annuity computed in accordance
9 with subsections (c)(1) and (d) of section 821.
10 (d) If a participant who has at least eighteen months of
11 civilian service credit toward retirement under the System
12 dies before separation or retirement from the Service and is
13 not survived by a spouse, but by a child or children, each
14 surviving child shall be entitled to an annuity computed in
15 accordance with subsections (c)(2) and (d) of section 821.
16 (e) If, at the time of his or her death, the participant had
17 less than twenty years of service credit toward retirement
18 under the System, the annuity payable in accordance with
19 subsection (b) shall be computed in accordance with section
20 821 on the assumption he or she has had twenty years of
21 service, but the additional service credit that may accrue to a
22 deceased participant under this subsection shall in no case
23 exceed the difference between his or her age on the date of
24 death and age sixty. In all cases arising under subsection (b),
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1 (c), (d), or (e), it shall be assumed that the deceased partici-
2 pant was qualified for retirement on the date of death.
3 (f) If an annuitant who elected, a reduced annuity dies in
4 service after being recalled under section 324 and is survived
5 by a spouse entitled to a survivor annuity based on such an
6 election, such survivor annuity shall be computed as if the
7 recall service had otherwise terminated on the day of death
8 and the deceased's annuity had been resumed in accordance
9 with section 871. If such death occurs after the annuitant
10 had completed sufficient recall service to attain eligibility for
11 a supplemental annuity, a surviving spouse, shall be entitled
12 to elect, in addition to any other benefits and in lieu of a
13 refund of retirement contributions made during the recall
14 service, a supplemental survivor annuity computed and paid
15 under section 821(i) as if the recall service had otherwise
16 terminated. If the annuitant had completed sufficient recall
17 service to attain eligibility to have his or her annuity deter-
18 mined anew, a surviving spouse may elect, in lieu of any
19 other survivor benefit under this chapter, to have the annu-
20 itant's rights redetermined and to receive a survivor annuity
21 computed under subsection (b) on the basis of the annuitant's
22 total service.
23 (g) Annuities that become payable under this section
24 shall commence, terminate, and be resumed in accordance
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1 with subsection (b)(2), (e), or (h) of section 821, as appropri-
2 ate.
3 SEC. 834. DISCONTINUED SERVICE RETIREMENT.-
4 Any participant who voluntarily separates from the Service
5 after obtaining at least five years of service credit toward
6 retirement under the System, excluding military or naval
7 service, may upon separation from the Service or at any time
8 prior to becoming eligible for an annuity elect to have his or
9 her contributions to the Fund returned in accordance with
10 section 841, or to leave his or her contributions in the Fund
11 and receive an annuity, computed as prescribed in section
12 821, commencing at age sixty.
13 SEC. 835. VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT.-Any partici-
14 pant who is at least fifty years of age and has rendered
15 twenty years of creditable service, including service within
16 the meaning of section 853, may on his or her own applica-
17 tion and with the consent of the Secretary be retired from the
18 Service and receive retirement benefits in accordance with
19 section 821.
20 SEC. 836. MANDATORY RETIREMENT.-(a) Except as
21 provided in subsection (b), any participant shall be retired
22 from the Service at the end of the month in which the partici-
23 pant reaches age sixty, and shall receive retirement benefits
24 in accordance with section 821.
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1 (b) Any participant who reaches age sixty while occupy-
2 ing a position to which he or she was appointed by the Presi-
3 dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, may ?
4 continue to serve until that appointment is terminated. In
5 addition, whenever the Secretary shall determine it to be in
6 the public interest, any participant who has reached age sixty
7 may be retained on active service for a period not to exceed
8 five years. Any participant who completes a period of service
9 after reaching age sixty as authorized by this subsection shall
10 be retired at the end of the month in which such authorized
11 service is completed.
12 SEC. 837. RETIREMENT OF FORMER PRESIDENTIAL
13 APPOINTEES.-If a member of the Service who is a partici-
14 pant in the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability
15 System completes an assignment under section 302(b) in a
16 position to which he or she was appointed by the President,
17 and if within three months of the termination of such assign-
18 ment (plus any period of authorized leave) has not been reas-
19 signed, the member shall be retired from the Service and
20 receive retirement benefits in accordance with section 821.
21 SEC. 841. LUMP-SUM PAYMENTS.-(a) Whenever a
22 participant becomes separated from the Service without be-
23 coming eligible for an annuity or a deferred annuity under
24 this chapter, a lump-sum credit shall be paid to the partici-
25 pant.
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1 (b) Whenever an annuitant becomes separated from the
2 Service following a period of recall service without becoming
3 eligible for a supplemental or recomputed annuity under sec-
4 tion 871, the annuitant's compulsory contributions to the
5 Fund for such service, together with any special contribu-
6 tions the annuitant may have made for other service per-
7 formed after the date of separation from the Service which
8 forms the basis for annuity, shall be returned.
9 (c) If all annuity rights under this chapter based on the
10 service of a deceased participant or annuitant terminate
11 before the total annuity paid equals the lump-sum credit, the
12 difference shall be paid in the order of precedence shown in
13 subsection (f).
14 (d) If a participant or former participant dies and is not
15 survived by a person eligible for an annuity under this chap-
16 ter or by such a person or persons all of whose annuity rights
17 terminate before a claim for survivor annuity is filed, the
18 lump-sum credit shall be paid in accordance with sub-
19 section (f).
20 (e) If an annuitant who was a former participant dies,
21 annuity accrued and unpaid shall be paid in accordance with
22 subsection (f).
23 (f) Payments authorized in subsections (c) through (e)
24 shall be paid in the following order of precedence to such
25 person or persons surviving the participant and alive on the
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1 date entitlement to the payment arises, upon the establish-
2 ment of a valid claim therefor, and such payment shall be a
3 bar to recovery by any other person-
4 (1) to the beneficiary or beneficiaries last desig-
5 nated by the participant before or after retirement in a
6 signed and witnessed writing received by the Secretary
7 prior to the participant's death, for which purpose a
8 designation, change, or cancellation of beneficiary in a
9 will or other document not so executed and filed shall
10 have no force or effect;
11 (2) if there be no such beneficiary, to the surviv-
12 ing wife or husband of such participant;
13 (3) if none of the above, to the child (without
14 regard to the definition in section 804(2)) or children of
15 such participant (including adopted and natural children
16 but not stepchildren) and descendants of deceased chil-
17 dren by representation;
18 (4) if none of the above,' to the parents of such
19 participant or the survivor of them;
20 (5) if none of the above, to the duly appointed ex-
21 ecutor or administrator of the estate of such participant
22 or the survivor of them;
23 (6) if none of the above, to other next of kin of
24 such participant as may be determined in the judgment
25 of the Secretary to be legally entitled thereto, except
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1 that no payment shall be made under this paragraph
2 until after the expiration of thirty days from the death
3 of the participant or annuitant.
4 (g) Annuity accrued and unpaid on the death of a survi-
5 vor annuitant shall be paid in the following order of prece-
6 dence, and the payment bars recovery by any other person:
7 first, to the duly appointed executor or administrator of the
8 estate of the survivor annuitant; second, if there is no such
9 executor or administrator, to such person as may be deter-
10 mined by the Secretary (after the expiration of thirty days
11 from the date of death of such survivor annuitant) to be enti-
12 tled under the laws of the survivor annuitant's domicile at the
13 time of death.
14 (h) Amounts deducted and withheld from basic salary of
15 a participant under section'811 from the beginning of the first
16 pay period after the participant has completed thirty-five
17 years of service computed under section 851, but excluding
18 service credit for unused sick leave under section 851(b), to-
19 gether with interest on the amounts at the rate of 3 per
20 centum a year compounded annually from the date of the '
21 deduction to the date of retirement or death, shall be applied
22 toward any special contribution due under section 811(d), and
23 any balance not so required shall be refunded in a lump sum
24 to the participant after separation or, in the event of a death
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1 in service, to a beneficiary in the order of precedence speci-
2 fied in subsection (f).
3 SEC. 851. CREDITABLE SERVICE.-(a) Except as oth-
4 erwise specified by law, all periods of civilian and military
5 and naval service and all other periods through the date of a
6 participant's final separation from the Service that the Secre-
7 tary determines would be creditable. toward retirement under
8 the Civil Service Retirement and Disability System (5 U.S.C.
9 8322), shall be creditable for purposes of this chapter. Con-
10 versely, any such service performed after December 31,
11 1976, that would not be creditable under specified conditions
12 under section 8332 of title 5, United States Code, shall be
13 excluded under this chapter under the same conditions.
14 (b) In computing any annuity under this chapter, the
15 total service of a participant who retires on an immediate
16 annuity or who dies leaving a survivor or survivors entitled
17 to annuity includes, without regard to the thirty-five-year
18 limitation imposed by section 821(a), the days of unused sick
19 leave to the participant's credit, except that these days will
20 not be counted in determining average basic salary or annuity
21 eligibility under this chapter. A contribution to the Fund shall
22 not be required from a participant for this service credit.
23 (c)(1) A participant who enters,on approved leave with-
24 out pay to serve as a full-time officer or employee of an orga-
25 nization composed primarily of Government employees may,
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1 within sixty days after entering on that leave without pay,
2 file with the employing agency an election to receive full
+ 3 retirement credit for such periods of leave without pay and
4 arrange to pay concurrently into the Fund through the em-
.0 5 ploying agency, amounts equal to the retirement deductions
6 and agency contributions on the Foreign Service salary rate
7 that would be applicable if the participant were in a pay
8 status. If the election and all payments provided by this sub-
9 section are not made for the 'periods of such leave without
10 pay occurring after November 7, 1976, the participant may
11 not receive any credit for such periods of leave without pay
12 occurring after such date.
13 (2) A participant may make a special contribution for
14 any period or periods of approved leave without pay while
15 serving, before November 7, 1976, as a full-time officer or
16 employee of an organization composed primarily of Govern-
17 ment employees. Any such contribution shall be based upon
18 the suspended Foreign Service salary rate, and shall be com-
19 puted in accordance with section 811. 'A participant who
20 makes such contributions shall be allowed full retirement
21 credit for the period or periods of leave without pay. If this
22 contribution is not made, up to six-months' retirement credit
? 23 shall be allowed for such periods of leave without pay each
24 calendar year.
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1 (d) A participant who has received a refund of retire-
2 ment contributions (which has not been repaid) under this or
3 any other retirement system for. Government employees cov-
4 eying service which may be creditable may make a special
5 contribution for such service under section 811. Credit may
6 not be allowed for service covered by the refund unless the
7 special contribution is made.
8 (e) No credit in annuity computation shall be allowed for
9 any period of civilian service for which a participant made
10 retirement contributions to another retirement system for
11 Government employees unless-
12 (1) the right to any annuity under the other
13 system which is based on such service is waived, and
14 (2) a special contribution is made under section
15 811 covering such service.
16 (f) A participant who during a period of war, or national
17 emergency proclaimed by the President or declared by the
18 Congress, leaves the Service to enter the military service is
19 deemed, for the purpose of this chapter, as not separated
20 from the Service unless the participant applies for and re-
21 ceives a lump-sum payment under section 841. However, the
22 participant is deemed to be separated from the Service after
23 the expiration of five years of such military service.
24 (g)(1) An annuity or survivor annuity based on the serv-
25 ice of a participant of Japanese ancestry who would be eligi-
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1 ble under section 8332(1) of title 5, United States Code, for
2 credit for civilian service for periods of internment during
3 World War II shall, upon application to the Secretary, be
4 recomputed to give credit for that service. Any such recom-
5 putation of an annuity shall apply with respect to months
6 beginning more than thirty days after the date on which ap-
7 plication for such recomputation is received by the Secretary.
8 (2) The Secretary shall take such action as may be nec-
9 essary and appropriate to inform individuals entitled to have
10 any service credited or annuity recomputed under this sub-
11 section, of their entitlement to such credit or recomputation.
12 (3) The Secretary shall, on request, assist any individual
13 referred to in paragraph (1) in obtaining from any agency or
14 other instrumentality of the United States information neces-
15 sary to verify the entitlement of the individual to have any
16 service credited or any annuity recomputed under this sub-
17 section.
18 (4) Any agency or other instrumentality of the United
19 States shall, upon request, furnish to the Secretary any infor-
20 mation it possesses with respect to the internment or other
21 detention, as described in section 8332(1) of title 5, United
22 States Code, of any participant.
23 (h) A participant who,. while on approved leave without
24 pay, serves as a full-time paid employee of a Member or
25 office of the Congress of the United States shall continue to
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1 make contributions to the Fund based upon the Foreign
2 Service salary rate that would be in effect if the participant
3 were in a pay status. The participant's employing office in
4 the Congress shall make a matching contribution (from the
5 appropriation or fund which is used for payment of the par-
6 ticipant's salary) to the Treasury of the United States to the
7 credit of the Fund. All periods of service for which full contri-
8 butions to the Fund are made pursuant to this subsection
9 shall be counted as creditable service for purposes of this
10 chapter and shall not, unless all retirement credit is trans-
11 ferred, be counted as-creditable service under any other Fed-
12 eral staff retirement system.
13 SEC. 853. EXTRA CREDIT FOR SERVICE AT UN-
14 HEALTHFUL POSTS.-The Secretary may from time to time
15 establish a list of places which by reason of climatic or other
16 extreme conditions are to be classed as unhealthful posts.
17 Each year of duty at such posts, inclusive of regular leaves of
18 absence, shall be counted as one year and a half in computing
19 the length of a participant's service for the purpose of retire-
20 ment, fractional months being considered as full months in
21 computing such service. No such extra credit for service at
22 such unhealthful posts shall be credited to any participant
23 who shall have been paid a differential under section 5925 of
24 title 5, United States Code, for such service.
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2 . NEEDED.-The Secretary of the Treasury shall prepare the
3 estimates of the annual appropriations required to be made to
4 the Fund, and shall make actuarial valuations of such funds
5 at intervals of not more than five years. The Secretary of
6 State may expend from money to the credit of the Fund an
7 amount not exceeding $5,000 per year for the incidental ex-
8 penses necessary in administering the provisions of this chap-
9 ter, including actuarial advice.
10 SEC. 863. INVESTMENT OF FUND.-The Secretary of
11 the Treasury shall invest from time to time in interest-bear-
12 ing securities of the United States such portions of the Fund
13 as in his or her judgment may not be immediately required
14 for the payment of annuities, cash benefits, refunds, and
15 allowances. The income derived from such investments shall
16 constitute a part of the Fund.
17 SEC. 864. ATTACHMENT.OF MONEYS.-(a) An individ-
18 ual entitled to an annuity from the Fund may make allot-
19 ments or assignments of amounts from such annuity for such
20- purposes as the Secretary in his or her sole discretion consid-
21 ers appropriate.
22 - (b)(1) Payments under this chapter which would other-
23 wise be made to a participant or annuitant based upon his' or
24 her service shall be paid (in whole or in part) by the Secre-
25 tart' to another person to the extent expressly provided for in
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the terms of any court decree of divorce, annulment, or.legal
separation, or the terms of any court order or court-approved
property settlement agreement incident to any court decree
of divorce, annulment, or legal separation. Any payment
under this paragraph to a person bars recovery by any other
person.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall apply only to payments made
under this chapter after the date of receipt by the Secretary
of written notice of such decree, order, or agreement, and
such additional information and documentation as the Secre-
tary may require.
(3) As used in this subsection "court" means any court
of any State or the District of Columbia.
(c) None of the moneys mentioned in this chapter shall
be assignable either in law or equity, except under subsection
(a) or (b) of this section or under section 643(c), or subject to
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal
process, except as otherwise may be provided by Federal
law.
SEC. 865. PAYMENTS FOR FUTURE BENEFITS.-(a)
Any statute which authorizes-
(1) new or liberalized benefits payable from the
Fund, including annuity increases other than under
section 882;
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1 (2) extension of the benefits of the System to new
2 groups of employees; or
3 (3) increases in salary on which benefits are com-
4 puted;
5 is deemed to authorize appropriations to the Fund to finance
6 the unfunded liability created by that statute, in thirty equal
7 annual installments with interest computed at the rate used
8 in the then most recent valuation of the System and with the
9 first payment thereof due as of the end of the fiscal year in
10 which each new or liberalized benefit, extension of benefits or
11 increase in salary is effective.
12 (b) There is authorized to be appropriated to the Fund
13 for each fiscal year an amount equal to the amount of the
14 Foreign Service normal cost for that year which is not met
15 by contributions to the Fund under section 811(a).
16 SEC. 866. UNFUNDED LIABILITY OBLIGATIONS.-(a)
17 At the end of each fiscal year, the Secretary shall notify the
18 Secretary of the Treasury of the amount equivalent to-
19 (1) interest on the unfunded liability computed for
20 that year at the interest rate used in the then most
21 recent valuation of the System, and
22 (2) that portion of disbursement for annuities for
23 that year which the Secretary estimates is attributable
24 to credit allowed for military service.
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1 (b) Before closing the accounts for each fiscal year, the
2 Secretary of the Treasury shall credit such amounts to the
3 Fund, as a Government contribution, out of any money in the
4 Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated.
5 (c) Requests for appropriations to the Fund under sec-
6 tion 865(b) shall include reports to the Congress on the sums
7 credited to the Fund under this section.
8 SEC. 871. ANNUITY ADJUSTMENT FOR RECALL SERV-
9. IcE.-(a) Any annuitant recalled to duty in the Service under
10 section 324 shall, while so serving, be entitled in lieu of an-
11 nuity to the full salary of the class in which serving. During
12 such service the recalled annuitant shall make contributions
13 to the Fund in accordance with section 811. On the day fol-
14 lowing -termination of the recall service, the former annuity
15 shall be resumed, adjusted by any cost-of-living increases
16 under section 882 that became effective during the recall
17 period.
18 (b) If the recall service lasts less than one year, the
19 annuitant's contributions to the Fund during recall service
20 shall be refunded in accordance with section 841. If the recall
21 service lasts more than one year, the annuitant may, in lieu
22 of such refund, elect a supplemental annuity computed under
23 section 821 on the basis of service credit and average salary
24 earned during the recall period irrespective of the number of
25 years of service credit previously earned. If the recall service
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1 continues for at least five years, the annuitant may elect to
2 have his or her annuity determined anew under section 821
3 in lieu of any other benefits under this section. Any annuitant
4 who is recalled under section 324 may upon written applica-
5 tion count as recall service any prior service that is creditable
6 under section 851 that was performed after the separation
7 upon which his or her annuity is based.
8 SEC. 872. REEMPLOYMENT.-(a) Notwithstanding any
9 other law, any member of the Service who has retired and is
10 receiving an annuity under this chapter, and who is reem-
11 ployed in the Government service in any part-time or full-
12 time appointive position, shall be entitled to receive the
13 salary of the position in which he or she is serving plus so
14 much of the annuity payable under this chapter which when
15 combined with such salary does not exceed during any calen-
16 dar year the basic.salary the member was entitled to receive
17 under this Act on the date of retirement from the Service.
18 Any such reemployed member of the Service who receives
19 salary during any calendar year in excess of the maximum
20 amount which he or she may be entitled to receive under this
21 subsection shall be entitled to such salary in lieu of benefits
22 under this chapter.
23 (b) When any such retired member of the Service is
24 reemployed, the employer shall send a notice to the Depart-
25 ment of such reemployment, together with all pertinent infor-
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1 mation relating thereto, and shall pay directly to such
2 member the salary of the position in which he or she is
3 serving.
4 (c) In the event of any overpayment under this section,
5 such overpayment shall be recovered by withholding the
6 amount involved from the salary payable to such reemployed
7 member of the Service or from any other moneys, including
annuity payments, payable under this chapter.
SEC. 881. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.-(a) The vol-
untary contribution account shall be the sum of unrefunded
amounts heretofore voluntarily contributed by any participant
or former participant under any prior law authorizing such
contributions to the Fund, plus interest compounded at the
rate of 3 per centum per year to date of separation from the
Service or in case of a participant or former participant sepa-
rated with entitlement to a deferred annuity to the date the
voluntary contribution account in claimed, or to the com-
mencing date fixed for the deferred annuity or to the date of
death, whichever is earlier. Effective on the date the partici-
pant becomes eligible for an annuity or a deferred annuity
21 and at the participant's election, his or her account shall
22 be-
23 (1) returned in a lump sum; or
24 (2) used to purchase an additional life annuity; or
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1 (3) used to purchase an additional life annuity for
2 the participant and to provide for a cash payment on
3 his or her death to a beneficiary whose name shall be
4 notified in writing to the Secretary by the participant;
5 or
6 (4) used to purchase an additional life annuity for
7 the participant and a life annuity commencing on his or
8 her death payable to a beneficiary whose name shall be
'9 notified in writing to the Secretary by the participant
i10 with a guaranteed return to the beneficiary or his or
11 her legal representative of an amount equal to the cash
12 payment referred to in paragraph (3).
13 (b) The benefits provided by subsection (a) (2), (3), or (4)
14 shall be actuarially equivalent in value to the payment pro-
15 vided for by subsection (a)(1) and shall be calculated upon
16 such tables of mortality as may be from time to time
17 prescribed for this purpose by the Secretary of the Treasury.
18 (c) A voluntary contribution account shall be paid in a
19 lump sum following receipt of an application therefor from a
20 present or former participant if application is filed prior to
21 payment of any additional annuity. If not sooner paid, the
22 account shall be paid at such time as the participant sepa-
23 rates from the Service for any reason without entitlement to
24 an annuity or a deferred annuity, or at such time as a former
25 participant dies or withdraws complusory contributions to the
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1 Fund. In case of death, the account shall be paid in the order
2 of precedence specified in section 841(g).
3 SEC. 882. COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS OF ANNU-
4 ITIES.-(a) A cost-of-living annuity increase shall become
5 effective under this section on the effective date of each such
6 increase under section 8340(b) of title 5, United States Code.
7 Each such increase shall be applied to each annuity payable
8 from the Fund which has a commencing date not later than
9 the effective date of the increase.
10 (b) Each annuity increase under this section shall be
11 identical to the corresponding percentage increase under
12 section 8340(b) of title 5, United States Code.
13 (c) Eligibility for an annuity increase under this section
14 shall be governed by the commencing date of each annuity
15 payable from the Fund as of the effective date of an increase
16 except as follows:
17 (1) An annuity (except a deferred annuity) payable
18 from the Fund to a participant who retires and re-
19 ceives an immediate annuity, or to a surviving spouse
20 of a deceased participant who dies in Service or who
21 dies after being separated with benefits under section
22 643(b)(2), which has a commencing date after the
23 effective date of the then last preceding general annu-
24 ity increase under this section shall not be less than
25 the annuity which would have been payable if the com-
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1 mencing date of such annuity had been the effective
.2 date of such last preceding increase. In the administra-
3 tion of this paragraph, the number of days of unused
4 sick leave to a participant's or deceased participant's
5 credit on the effective date of the then last preceding
6 general annuity increase under this section shall be
7 deemed to be equal to the number of days of unused
8 sick leave to his or her credit on the day of separation
9 from the Service.
10 (2) Effective from its commencing date, an annu-
11 ity payable from the Fund to an annuitant's survivor,
12 except a child entitled under section 821(c) or 832 (c)
13 or (d), shall be increased by the total percentage in-
14 crease the annuitant was receiving under this section
15 at death.
16 (3) For purposes of computing or recomputing an
17 annuity to a child under section 821 (c) or (d) or 832
18 (c) or (d), the items $900, $1,080, $2,700, and $3,240
19 appearing in section 821(c) shall be increased by the
20 total percentage increases by which corresponding
21 amounts are being increased under section 8340 of title
22 5, United States Code, on the date the child's annuity
23 becomes effective.
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10
11
12
1 (d) No increase in annuity provided by this section shall
2 be computed on any additional annuity purchased at retire-
3 ment by voluntary contributions. "
4 (e) The monthly installment of annuity after adjustment
5 under this section shall be fixed at the nearest dollar, except
6 such installment shall after adjustment reflect an increase of
7 at least $1.
8 (f) Effective from its commencing date, there shall be an
9 increase of 10 per centum in the annuity of each surviving
spouse whose entitlement to annuity resulted from the death
13 annuity.
14 CHAPTER 9-TRAVEL, LEAVE, AND OTHER BENEFITS
15 SEC. 901. TRAVEL AND RELATED EXPENSES.-The
16 Secretary may pay the travel and related expenses of mem-
17 bers of the Service and their families, including costs or ex-
18 penses incurred for-
19 (1) proceeding to and returning from assigned
20 posts of duty;
21 (2) authorized home leave;
22 (3) family members to accompany, precede, or
23 follow a member of the Service to a place of temporary
24 duty while a member or family member is en route to
25 or from a post of assignment;
of an annuitant who, prior to October 1, 1976, elected a
reduced annuity in order to provide a spouse's survivor
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1 (4) representational travel within a member's
2 country of assignment or, when not more than one
3 family member participates, outside the country of
4 assignment;
5 (5) obtaining necessary medical care for an illness,
6 injury, or medical condition while abroad in a locality
7 where there is no suitable person or facility to provide
8 such care, without regard to those laws and regula-
9 tions limiting or restricting the furnishing or payment
10 of transportation and traveling expenses, including
11 expenses for-
12 (A) an attendant or attendants for a member
13 or family member who is too ill to travel unat-
14 tended or is a family member too young to travel
15 alone, and
16 (B) a family member incapable of caring for
17 himself or herself if he or she remained at post;
18 (6) rest and recuperation travel of United States
19 citizen members of the Service, and members of their
20 families, while serving at posts specifically designated
21 by the Secretary for purposes of this paragraph, to-
22 (A) other locations abroad having different
23 social, climatic, or other environmental conditions
24 than those at the post at which such personnel
25 are serving, or
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1 (B) to locations in the United States:
2 Provided, That unless the Secretary otherwise specifies
3 in extraordinary circumstances such travel expenses
4 shall be limited to the cost for a member of the Service
5 and the member's family of one round trip during any
6 continuous two-year tour unbroken by home leave, and
7 two round trips during any continuous three-year tour
8 unbroken by home leave;
9 (7) removal of the members of the family of a
10 member of the Service, and the member's furniture and
11 household and personal effects (including automobiles),
12 from a post where there is imminent danger because of
13 the prevalence of disturbed conditions, and the return
14 of such persons, furniture, and effects to such post
15 upon the cessation of such conditions, or to such other
16 post as may in the meantime have become the post to
17 which the member of the Service has been reassigned;
18 (8) up to two round trips each year by members
19 of the Service for purposes of family visitation in situa-
20 tions where the member's family is prevented by offi-
21 cial order from accompanying the member to, or has
22 been ordered from, the member's assigned post because
23 of imminent danger due to the prevalence of disturbed
24 conditions, except that, with respect to any such
25 member whose family is located abroad, the Secretary
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the place where the member will reside;
(12) packing and unpacking, transporting
may authorize such additional trips, as deemed appro-
priate, not to exceed the equivalent, cost of two round
trips of less than first class to the District of Columbia;
(9) round-trip travel from a post abroad for pur-
poses of family visitation in emergency situations in-
volving personal hardship;
(10) preparing and transporting to their designat-
ed homes in the United States or to a place not more
distant, the remains of members of the Service and of
the members of their families who may die abroad or
while in travel status;
(11) transporting the furniture and household and
personal effects of a member of the Service to succes-
sive posts of duty and, on the termination of service, to
from a place of storage, and storing the.furniture and
household and personal effects of a member of the
Service-
(A) when absent from post of assignment
under orders, or when,assigned to a post to which
the member cannot take or at which the member
is unable to use such furniture and household and
personal effects, or when it is in the public inter-
est or more economical to authorize storage;
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1 (B) in connection with assignment or transfer
2 to a new post, from the date of departure from his
3 or her last post or from the date of departure
from the member's place of residence in the case
of a new member and for not to exceed three
months after arrival at the new post, or until the
(C) in connection with separation of a
member of the Service, the cost of packing and
unpacking, transporting to and from a place of
storage, and storing for a period not to exceed
three months of the member's furniture and
household and personal effects;
(13) transporting, notwithstanding any other law,
for or on behalf of a member of the Service, a privately
owned. motor vehicle in any case in which the Secre-
tary determines that water, rail, or air transportation
of the motor vehicle is necessary or expedient for all or
any part of the distance between points of origin and
destination: Provided, That not more than one motor
establishment of residence
shall be shorter; and
vehicle of any such member may be transported under
authority of this paragraph during any four-year
period, while the member is continuously serving
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1 abroad, except as a replacement for such motor
2 vehicle-
3 (A) determined, in advance, by the Secretary
4 to be necessary for reasons beyond the control of
5 the member and in the interest of the Govern-
6 ment, or
7 (B) incident to a transfer when the cost of
8 transporting the replacement motor vehicle does
9 not exceed the cost of transporting the motor
10 vehicle that is replaced;
11 (14) the travel and relocation of members of the
12 Service, and members of their families, assigned within
13 the United States, including assignments under sec-
14 tions 3371-3376 of title 5, United States Code (not-
15 withstanding section 3375(a) of title 5, United States
16 Code), if an agreement similar to that required by sec-
17 tion 3375(b) of title 5, United States Code, is executed
18 by the member of the Service.
19 SEC. 902. LOAN OF HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS.-The Sec-
20 retary may, as a means of eliminating transportation costs,
21 provide members of the Service with basic household furnish-
22 ing and equipment for use on a loan basis in personally
23 owned or leased residences.
24 SEC. 911. REQUIRED LEAVE IN THE UNITED
25 STATES.-(a) The Secretary may order to the United States
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1 on statutory leave of absence any member of the Service who
2 is a citizen of the United States upon completion of eighteen
3 months' continuous service abroad and shall so order as soon
4 as possible after completion of three years of such service.
5 (b) While in the United States for leave of absence, the
6 service of any member shall be available for such work or
7 duties in the Department or elsewhere as the Secretary may
8 prescribe, but the time of such work or duties will not be
9 counted as leave.
10 SEC. 921. HEALTH CARE.-(a) The Secretary may
11 establish a health care program to promote and maintain the
12' physical and mental health of members of the Service, and
13 (when incident to overseas service) designated eligible per-
14 sonnel of the Department and other agencies, and members
15 of their families.
16 (b) Any such health care program may include medical
17 examinations for applicants for employment and for personnel
18 of the Department or the Service who are citizens of the.
19 United States, and for members of their families; examina-
20 tions necessary to establish disability or incapacity of partici-
21 pants in the Foreign Service 'Retirement and Disability
22 System; and inoculations or vaccinations for such personnel
23 and the members of their families.
24 (c) The Secretary may establish health care facilities
25 and provide for the services of physicians, nurses, or other
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1 health care personnel at posts abroad at which, in the opinion
2 of the Secretary, sufficient personnel are employed to
3 warrant such facilities or services.
4 (d) In the event any person eligible for health care under
5 this section incurs an illness, injury, or medical condition
6 while abroad which requires hospitalization or similar treat-
7 ment, the Secretary may pay all or part of the cost of such
8 treatment. Limitations on such payments established by reg-
9 ulation may be waived whenever the Secretary determines
10 that the illness, injury, or-medical condition clearly was
11 caused or materially aggravated by the fact that the person
12 concerned is or has been located abroad.
13 (e) The Secretary is authorized to provide health care
14 under this section beyond the date of separation of any eligi-
15 ble personnel, and to their families beyond the date of death
16 of such personnel or dissolution of marriage.
17 (f) The Secretary shall review on a continuing basis the
18 health care program provided for in,this section. Whenever
19 the Secretary determines that all or any part of such program
20 can be provided for as well and as cheaply in other ways, the
21 Secretary is authorized for such persons, locations, and con-
22 ditions as may be deemed appropriate, to contract for health
23 care pursuant to such arrangements as may be deemed
24 appropriate.
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1 SEC. 931. REPRESENTATION.-Notwithstanding the
2 provisions of section 5536 of title 5, United States Code, the
3 Secretary is authorized to provide for official receptions and
4 entertainment and representational expenses to enable the
5 Department and the Service to provide for the proper repre-
6 sentation of the United States and its interests.
7 CHAPTER 10-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
8 SEC. 1001. LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICY.-The Con-
9 gress finds-
10 (1) that experience in both private and public em-
11. ployment indicates that the statutory protection of the
12 right of employees to organize, bargain collectively,
13 and participate through labor organizations of their
14 own choosing in decisions which affect them-
15 (A) safeguards the public interest,
16 (B) contributes to the effective conduct of
17 public business, and
18 (C) facilitates and encourages the amicable
19 settlement of disputes between employees and
20 their employers involving conditions of employ-
21
ment;
22 (2) that the public interest demands the highest
23 standards of performance by members of the Service
24 and the continuous development and implementation of
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ter, the term-
(1) "Board"
modern and progressive work practices to facilitate
their improved performance and efficiency; and
(3) that the unique conditions of Foreign Service
employment require a distinct framework for the devel-
opment and implementation of modern, constructive,
and cooperative relationships between management of-
ficials and organizations representing members of the
Service. Therefore, labor organizations and collective
bargaining in the Service are in the public interest and
are consistent with the requirement of an effective and
efficient Government. The provisions of this chapter
shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the re-
quirement of an effective and efficient Government.
SEc. 1002. DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this chap-
means the Foreign Service Labor
Relations Board, established by section 1011;
(2) "collective bargaining" means the performance
of the mutual obligation of the management repre-
sentative of the Department and of the exclusive repre-
sentatives of employees to meet at reasonable times
and to consult and bargain in a good-faith effort to
reach agreement with respect to the conditions of em-
ployment affecting employees, and to execute, if
requested by either party,. a written document incorpo-
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rating any collective-bargaining agreement reached,
but this obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or to make a concession;
(3) "collective-bargaining agreement" means a
signed agreement (which may be of a comprehensive
and long-term nature) entered into as a result of collec-
tive bargaining under this chapter;
(4) "conditions of employment" means personnel
policies, practices, and matters within the discretion of
the Secretary affecting working conditions (established
by rule, regulation, or otherwise), except that such
term does not include policies, practices, or matters-
(A) relating to the designation or classifica-
tion of any position,
(B) relating to prohibited political activities,
(C) specifically provided for by Federal
statute,
(D)
relating to Government-wide or multi-
agency responsibilities of the Secretary affecting
agencies other than those to which this chapter
applies;
(5) "confidential employee" means an individual
who assists, or otherwise acts in a confidential capacity
to, a management official (except an individual who as-
sists in a purely clerical capacity a management official
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sentative of employees;
(9) "labor organization" means an
who is not engaged in the administration of this chap-
ter or in the formulation of the personnel policies and
programs of the Department);
(6) "dues" means dues, fees, and assessments;
(7) "employee" means- .
(A) a member of the Service who is a citizen
of the United States, wherever serving, other
than a management official, a confidential em-
ployee, a consular agent or any person who par-
ticipates in a strike in violation of section 7311 of
title 5, United States Code; or
(B) a former member of the Service as de-
scribed in subparagraph (A) whose employment
has ceased because of an unfair labor practice
under section 1031 and who has not obtained any
other regular and substantially equivalent employ-
ment, as determined under regulations prescribed
by the Board;
(8) "exclusive representative" means any labor
organization which is certified as the exclusive repre-
organization
composed in whole or in part of employees, in which
employees participate and pay dues, and which has as
a primary purpose dealing with the Department con-
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conditions;
(B) an organization which advocates
cerning grievances and conditions, of employment, but
does not include-
(A) an organization which by its constitution,
bylaws, or tacit agreement among its members, or
otherwise, denies membership because of race,
color, creed, national orgin, sex, age, political af-
filiation, marital status, or handicapping
overthrow of the constitutional form of govern-
ment of the United States;
(C) an organization sponsored by the Depart-
ment or composed solely of management officials;
(D) an organization which participates in the
conduct of a strike, work stoppage, or slowdown,
or which imposes a duty or obligation to conduct,
assist, or participate in such an action;
(10) "management official" means an individual
who-
(A) is a chief of mission or principal officer;
(B) is serving in a position to which appoint-
ed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, or by the President alone;
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1 (C) occupies a position which in the sole
2 judgment of the Secretary is of comparable impor-
3 tance to the offices mentioned in paragraph (A) or
4 (B), above;
5 (D) is serving as a deputy to any of the
6 above;
7 (E) is assigned as a Foreign Service
8 inspector; or
9 (F) is engaged in the administration of this
10 chapter or in the formulation of the personnel
11 policies and programs of the Department;
12 (11) "Panel" means the Foreign Service Impasse
13 Disputes Panel, established by section 1014;
14 (12) "person" means an. individual, a labor orga-
15 nization, or an agency.
16 SEC. 1003. APPLICATION.-(a) The President may by
17 Executive order exclude any subdivision of the Department
18 from coverage under this chapter if the President determines
19 that-
20 (1) the subdivision has as a primary function intel-
21 ligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national
22 security work, and
23 (2) the provisions of this chapter cannot be ap-
24 plied to that subdivision in a manner consistent with
25 national security requirements and considerations.
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1 (b) The Secretary may suspend temporarily any provi-
2 sion of this chapter with respect to any post, bureau, office,
3 or activity, in the United States or abroad, when the Secre-
4 tary determines in writing in emergency situations that such
5 a temporary suspension is necessary in the national interest.
6 SEC. 1004. EMPLOYEE RIGHTS.-(a) Every employee
7 has the right to form, join, or assist any labor organization,
8 or to refrain from any such activity, freely and without fear of
9 penalty or reprisal. Each employee shall be protected in the
10 exercise of such right.
11 (b) Except as otherwise provided under this chapter,
12 such right includes the right-
13 (1) to act for a labor organization in the capacity
14 of a representative and, in that capacity, to represent
15 the views of the labor organization to the Secretary
16 and other officials of the Government, including the
17 Congress, or other appropriate authorities; and
18 (2) to engage in collective bargaining with respect
19 to conditions of employment through representatives
20 chosen by members of the Service under this chapter.
21 SEC. 1005. MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.-(a) Nothing in
22 this chapter shall affect the authority of the Department, in
23 accordance with applicable law and'regulations-
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1 (1) to determine the mission, budget, organization,
2 and number of types and classes of employees and in-
3 ternal security practices of the Department;
4 (2) to hire, promote, assign, direct, lay off and
5 retain employees, or to suspend or remove, or to take
6 other disciplinary action against such employees;
7 (3) to assign work, to make determinations with
8 respect to contracting out, and to determine the per-
9 sonnel by which the Department's operations shall be
10 conducted;
11 (4) to fill positions from any appropriate source;
12 (5) to determine the need for uniform personnel
13 policies and procedures between or among the agencies
14 to which this chapter applies;
15 (6) to take whatever actions may be necessary to
16 carry out the Department's mission during emergen-
17 cies.
18 (b) Subsection (a) shall not preclude the Department and
19 the exclusive representative from negotiating-
20 (1) at the election of the Department, on the num-
21 bers, types, and classes of employees or positions as-
22 signed to any organizational subdivision, work project,
23 or tour of duty, or on the technology, methods, and
24 means of performing work;
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1 (2) procedures which management officials of the
2 Department will observe in exercising their functions;
4 (3) appropriate arrangements for employees ad-
5 versely affected by the exercise of any function under
6 this section.
7 SEC. 1011. FOREIGN SERVICE LABOR RELATIONS
8 BOARD.-(a) There is established the Foreign Service Labor
9 Relations Board. The Board shall be composed of three
10 members, one of whom shall be the Chairman of the Federal
11 Labor Relations Authority, who shall chair. The remaining
12 two members shall be appointed by the Secretary from nomi-
13 nees approved in writing by the agencies to which this chap-
14 ter applies, and the exclusive representative (if any) of
15 employees in each such agency. In the event of inability to
16 obtain agreement on a nominee, each agency and each exclu-
17 sive representative whose agreement is required shall select
18 two nominees and each such agency and exclusive repre-
19 sentative, in an order determined by lot, shall in turn strike a
20 name from a list of such nominees 'until only one remains.
21 (b) The Chairperson shall serve on the Board while
22 serving as Chairman of the Federal Labor Relations Authori-
23 ty. One of the two original members of the Board other than
24 the Chairperson shall be appointed for a two-year term, and
25 one for a three-year term. Thereafter, each member other
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1 than the Chairperson shall be appointed for a period of three
2 years. An individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appoint-
3 ed for the unexpired term of the member replaced.
4 (c) A vacancy on the Board shall not impair the right of
5 the remaining members to exercise the full powers of the
6 Board. The Chairperson may at any time designate an alter-
7 pate Chairperson from among the members of the Federal
8 Labor Relations Authority.
9 (d) The members, other than the Chairperson, may not
10 be employees of the Government, and shall receive compen-
11 sation at the daily rate paid an individual at level V of the
12 Federal Executive Salary Schedule (5 U.S.C. 5316) for each
13 day they are performing their duties (including traveltime).
14 (e) The Secretary may remove a Board member, other
15 than the Chairperson, upon written notice, for corruption, ne-
16 glect of duty, malfeasance, or demonstrated incapacity to
17 perform his or her functions, established at a hearing, except
18 where the right to a hearing is waived in writing.
19 (f) The Board may obtain facilities, services, and sup-
20 plies through the general administrative services of the De-
21 partment. All expenses of the Board, including travel and
22 travel-related expenses, shall be paid out of funds appropri-
23 ated to the Department for obligation and expenditure by the
24 Board. At the request of the Board, officers and employees of
25 the Department and members of the Service may be assigned
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1 as staff employees for the Board. Within the limits of appro-
2 priated funds, the Board may appoint and fix the compensa-
3 tion of such other employees as the Board considers neces-
4 sary to carry out its functions.
5 SEC. 1012. FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD.-(a) The
6 Board shall-
7 (1) supervise or conduct elections and determine
8 whether a labor organization has been selected as the
9 exclusive representative by a majority of employees
10 who cast valid ballots and administer the provisions of
11 this chapter relating to the according of exclusive rec-
12 ognition to a labor organization;
13 (2) resolve complaints of alleged unfair labor
14 practices;
15 (3) resolve issues relating to the obligation to
16 bargain in good faith; and
17 (4) take any action -considered necessary to
18 administer effectively the provisions of this chapter.
19 (b) In the exercise of its responsibilities, the Board shall
20 give such consideration as it deems appropriate to the deci-
21 sions of the Federal Labor Relations Authority under section
22 7105 of title 5, United States Code.
23 (c) In order to carry out its functions under this chapter,
24 the Board may-
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1 (1) adopt regulations concerning its organization,
2 procedures, and functions under this chapter;
0 3 (2) conduct appropriate inquiries wherever persons
4 subject to this chapter are located;
5 (3) hold hearings;
6 (4) administer oaths, take the testimony or deposi-
7 tion of any person under oath, and issue subpenas; and
8 (5) require the Department or a labor organization
to cease and desist from violations of this chapter and
require it to take any remedial action it considers ap-
propriate to carry out this chapter.
(d) Except as provided in section 518 of title 28, United
States Code, attorneys designated by the Board may appear
14 for the Board and represent the Board in connection with any
.15 function carried out by the Board under this chapter or as
16 otherwise authorized by law.
17 (e) The Board shall maintain a file on its proceedings
18 and copies of all available agreements, and shall publish the
19 texts of its decisions and the actions taken by the Panel
20 under section 1014.
21 SEC. 1013. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF
22 BOARD ACTIONS.-(a) Except as provided in section
23 1024(d), any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board
24 may, during the sixty-day period beginning on the date on
25 which the order was issued, institute an action for judicial
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1 review of the Board's order in the United States Court of
2 Appeals for the District of Columbia, which shall conduct its
3 review on the same basis as an appeal from a decision of a r
4 district court.
5 (b) The Board may petition the United States Court of
6 Appeals for the District of Columbia for the enforcement of
7 any order of the Board and for appropriate temporary relief
8 or restraining order.
9 (c) Subsection (c) of section 7123 of title 5, United
10 States Code, shall apply to judicial review and enforcement
11 of actions by the Board in the same manner that it applies to
12 such review and enforcement of actions by the Federal Labor
13 Relations Authority.
14 SEC. 1014. FOREIGN SERVICE IMPASSE DISPUTES
15 PANEL.-(a) The Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel
16 shall assist in resolving negotiating impasses arising in the
17 course of collective bargaining under this chapter. The Chair-
18 person of the Board shall designate the members of the
19 Panel, who shall include two members of the Foreign Service
20 (neither of whom shall be a management official, a confiden-
21
tial employee, or a labor organization official); one repre-
22 sentative of the Department of Labor; one member of the
23 Federal Service Impasse Panel; and one public member who
24 is not an employee of the Government. The Chairperson of
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1 the Board shall set the terms of office for Panel members and
2 determine who shall chair the Panel.
3 (b) Panel members who are not employees of the Gov-
4 ernment shall receive compensation for each day they are
5 performing their duties (including traveltime) at the daily rate
6 paid an individual at grade 18 of the General Schedule
7 described in section 5104 of title 5, United States Code.
8 (c) Upon the request of either the Department or an
9 exclusive representative, the Panel shall promptly consider a
10 negotiation impasse, and shall assist the parties in resolving
11 the impasse through mediation.
12 (d) If the parties do not arrive at an agreement after
13 assistance by the Panel under subsection (c), the Panel
14 may-
15 (1) hold hearings (in the course of which it may
16 administer oaths, and take the testimony or deposition
17 of any person under oath); and
18 (2) take whatever action is necessary to resolve
19 the impasse.
20 (e) Notice of any. final action of the Panel under this
21 section shall be served promptly upon the parties, and shall
22 be binding during the term of the agreement, unless the par-
23 ties agree otherwise, or the Secretary finds that the Panel's
24 action is contrary to the best interests of the Service.
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1 SEC. 1021. EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION.-(a) The De-
2 partment shall accord exclusive recognition to a labor organi-
3 zation if the organization has been selected in a secret ballot
4 election by a majority of the employees who cast valid
5 ballots.
6 (b) If a petition is filed with the Board by a person-
7 (1) alleging (with the support of 30 per centum of
8 the employees in the unit)-
9 (A) that the employees are not represented
10 and wish to be represented for the purpose of col-
11 lective bargaining by an exclusive representative,
12 or
13 (B) that the exclusive representative is no
14 longer the representative desired by the majority
15 of the employees; or
16 (2) seeking clarification of,, or an amendment to, a
17 certification then in effect or a matter relating to
18 representation;
19 then the Board shall review the petition, and if there is rea-
20 sonable cause to believe that a question of representation
21 exists, the Board shall provide an opportunity for a hearing
22 after reasonable notice. If the Board finds that a question of
23 representation exists, the Board shall supervise an election
24 on the question by secret ballot and shall certify the results
25 thereof. An election under this subsection shall not be con-
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1 ducted if, in the preceding twelve calendar months, a valid
2 election has been held.
3 .(c) A labor organization which-
4 (1) has been designated by at least 10 per centum
5 of the employees; or
6 (2) is the exclusive representative of. the
7 employees involved;
8 may intervene with respect to a petition filed under subsec-
9 tion (b) and shall be placed on the ballot of any election under
10 subsection (b) with respect to the petition.
11 (d)(1) The Board shall determine who is eligible to vote
12 in any election under this section and shall establish rules
13 governing such election, which shall include rules allowing
14 employees who are eligible to vote the opportunity to
15 choose-
16 (A) from any labor organizations on the ballot,
17 that labor organization which the employees wish to
18 represent them; or
19 (B) not to be represented by a labor organization.
20 (2) In any election in which more than two choices are
21 on the ballot, the Board's rules shall provide for preferential
22 voting. If no choice receives a majority of first preferences,
23 the Board shall distribute to the two choices having the most
24 first preferences the preferences as between those two of the
25 other valid ballots cast. The choice receiving a majority of
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1 preferences shall be declared the winner. A labor organiza-
2 tion which is declared the winner of the election shall be
3 certified by the Board as the exclusive representative.
4 (e) A labor organization seeking exclusive recognition
5 shall submit to the Board and to the Department a roster of
6. its officers and representatives, a copy of its constitution and
7 bylaws and a statement of its objectives.
8 (f) Exclusive recognition shall not be accorded to a labor
9 organization-
10 (1) if the Board determines that the labor organi-
11 zation is subject to corrupt influence or influences
12 opposed to democratic principles;
13 (2) in the case of a petition filed under subsection
14 (b)(1)(A), if there is not credible evidence that at least
15 30 per centum of the employees wish to be represented
16 for the purpose of collective bargaining by the labor
17 organization seeking exclusive recognition; or
18 (3) if a petition is filed within two years of the
19 date a labor organization has been certified as the ex-
20 elusive representative.
21 (g) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the waiver of
22 hearings by stipulation for the purpose of a consent election
23 in conformity with regulations or decisions of the Board.
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1 SEC. 1022. EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED.-The De-
2 partment shall constitute a single and separate worldwide
3 bargaining unit, from which there shall be excluded-
4 (1) management officials and confidential em-
5 ployees;
6 (2) employees engaged in personnel work in other
7 than a purely clerical capacity; and
8 (3) employees engaged in criminal or national se-
9 curity investigations or who audit the work of individ-
10 uals to. insure that their functions are discharged
11 honestly and with integrity.
12 SEC. 1023. REPRESENTATION RIGHTS. AND
13 DUTIES.-(a) A labor organization which has been accorded
14 exclusive recognition is the exclusive representative of, and is
15 entitled to act for, and negotiate collective-bargaining agree-
16 ments covering, all employees in the unit described in section
17 1022. An exclusive representative is responsible for repre-
18 senting the interests of all employees in that unit without
19 discrimination and without regard to labor organization mem-
20 bership.
21 (b)(1) An exclusive representative shall be given the
22 opportunity to be represented at-
23 (A) any formal discussion between one or more
24 representatives of the Department and one or more
25 employees in the unit (or their representatives), con-
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1 cerning general conditions of employment, including
2 general personnel policies and practices, unless, the
3 specific application of those conditions to the particular
4 employees is the sole issue;
5 (B) any examination of an employee by a Depart-
6 ment representative for purposes of an investigation
7 if-
8 (i) the employee reasonably believes that the
9 examination may result ,in. disciplinary action
10 against the employee, and
11 (ii) the employee requests such representa-
12 tion.
13 (2) The Department shall annually inform employees of
14 their rights under paragraph (1)(B).
15 (c) The rights of an exclusive representative under this
16 section shall not preclude an employee from-
17 (1) being represented by an attorney or other rep-
18 resentative of the employee's own choosing, other than
19 the exclusive representative, in any separation for
20 cause or appeal proceeding; or
21 (2) exercising grievance or appeal rights estab-
22 lished by law, rule, or regulation.
23 (d) The duty of the Department and the exclusive repre-
24 sentative to negotiate in good faith shall include the
25 obligation-
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1 (1) to approach the negotiations with a sincere
2 resolve to reach a collective-bargaining agreement;
3 (2) to be represented at the negotiations by duly
4 authorized representatives prepared to discuss and
5 negotiate on appropriate conditions of employment;
6 - (3) to meet at reasonable times and convenient
7 places as frequently as may be necessary and to avoid
8 unnecessary delays;
9 (4) for the Department to furnish the exclusive
10 representative, upon request, and to the extent not
11 prohibited by law, data (other than information which
12 constitutes guidance, advice, counsel, or training pro-
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
vided for management officials or confidential
employees)-
(A) which is normally maintained by the De-
partment in the regular course of business, and
(B) which is reasonably available and neces-
sary for full and proper discussion, understanding,
and negotiation. of subjects within' the scope of
bargaining;
(5) to negotiate jointly with respect to conditions
of employment applicable to employees in more than
one of the agencies to which this chapter applies, as
determined by such agencies; and
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1 (6) if agreement is reached, to execute, upon the
2 request of either party to the negotiation, a written
3 document embodying the agreed terms, and to take the
4 steps necessary to implement the agreement.
5 (e)(1) An agreement between the Department and the
6 exclusive representative shall be subject to approval by the
7 Secretary.
8 (2) The Secretary shall approve the agreement within
9 thirty days after it is executed unless the Secretary finds that
10 the agreement is inconsistent with an applicable, law, order,
11 or regulation, or the requirements of national security or for-
12 eign policy.
13 (3) Unless the Secretary disapproves the agreement by
14 making a finding under paragraph (2), the agreement shall
15 take effect after thirty days from its execution and shall be
16 binding on the Department and the exclusive representative
17 subject to all applicable laws, orders, and regulations.
18 (f) The Department shall consult with the exclusive rep-
19 resentative with respect to multiagency or interagency mat-
20 ters affecting the rights, benefits, or obligations of employees
21 which are not subject to collective bargaining solely because
22 of section 1002(4)(D).
23 SEC. 1024. RESOLUTION OF.. IMPLEMENTATION Dis-
24 PUTES.-(a) Any dispute between the Department and the
25 exclusive representative concerning the effect, interpretation,
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1 or a claim of breach of a collective-bargaining agreement
2 shall be resolved through procedures negotiated by the De-
3 partment and the exclusive representative. Any procedures
4 negotiated under this section shall-
5 (1) be fair and simple,
6 (2) provide for expeditious processing, and
7 . (3) include provision for appeal to the Foreign
8 Service Grievance Board by either party of any dispute
9 not satisfactorily settled.
10 (b) Either party to an appeal under subsection (a)(3)
11 may file with the Board an exception to the action of the
12 Foreign Service Grievance Board to resolve the implementa-
13 tion dispute. If, upon review, the Board finds that the action
14 is deficient-
15' (1) because it is contrary to any law, rule, or reg-
16 ulation; or
17 (2) on other grounds similar to those applied by
18 the Federal Labor Relations Authority under section
19 7122 of title 5, United States Code;
20 the Board may take such action and make such recommenda-
21 tions concerning the Grievance Board action as it considers
22 necessary, consistent with applicable laws, rules, and regula-
23 tions.
24 (c) If no exception to a Grievance Board action is filed
25 under subsection (b) within thirty days after such action is
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1 communicated to the parties, such action shall become final
2 and binding and shall be implemented by the parties.
3 (d) ,Resolutions of disputes under this section shall not
4 be subject to judicial review.
5 SEC. 1031. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES.-(a) It shall
6 be an unfair labor practice for the Department-
7 . (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any em-
8 ployee in the exercise by. the employee of any right
9 under this chapter;
10 (2) to encourage or discourage membership in any
11 labor organization by discrimination in connection with
12. hiring, tenure, promotion, or other conditions of em-
13 ployment;
14 (3) to sponsor, control, or otherwise assist any
15 labor organization, other than to furnish upon request
16 customary and routine services and facilities on an im-
17 partial basis to labor organizations having equivalent
18 status;
19 (4) to discipline or otherwise discriminate against
20 an employee because the employee has filed a
21 complaint or petition, or has given any information,
22 affidavit, or testimony under this chapter;
23 (5) to refuse to consult or negotiate in good faith
24 with a labor organization, as required under this
25 chapter;
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1 (6) to fail or refuse to cooperate in impasse proce-
2 dures and impasse decisions, as required under this
3 chapter;
4 (7) to enforce any rule or regulation which is in
an employee;
(4) to discriminate against
conflict with an applicable collective-bargaining agree-
ment if the agreement was in effect before the date the
rule or regulation was prescribed; or
(8) to fail or refuse otherwise to comply with any
provision of this chapter.
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any em-
ployee in the exercise by the employee of any right
under this chapter;
(2) to cause or attempt to cause, the Department
to discriminate against any employee in the exercise by
the employee of any right under this chapter;
(3) to coerce, discipline, fine, or attempt to coerce
a member of the labor organization as punishment or
reprisal, or for the purpose of hindering or impeding
the member's work performance or productivity as an
employee or the discharge of the member's functions as
an employee with
regard to the terms and conditions of membership in
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the labor organization on the basis of race, color,
creed, national origin, sex, age, preferential or Service
status, political affiliation, marital status, or handicap-
ping condition;
(5) to refuse to consult or negotiate in good faith
with the Department, as required under this chapter;
(6) to fail or refuse to cooperate in impasse proce-
dures and impasse decisions, as required under this
chapter;
(7)(A) to call, or participate in, a strike, work
stoppage, or slowdown, or to picket the Department's
operations, but informational picketing in the United
States which does not interfere with such operations
shall not be considered an unfair labor practice;
(B) to condone any activity described in subpara-
graph (A) by failing to take action to prevent or stop
such activity;
(8) to deny membership to any employee in the
unit represented by the exclusive representative
except-
(A) for failure to tender dues uniformly re-
quired as a condition of acquiring and retaining
membership, or
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1 (B) in the exercise of disciplinary procedures
2 consistent with the organization's constitution or
3 bylaws and this chapter; or
4 (9) to fail or refuse otherwise to comply with any
5 provision of this chapter.
6 (c) The expression of any personal view, argument, or
7 opinion, or the making of any statement, which-
8 (1) publicizes the fact of a representational elec-
9 tion and encourages employees to exercise their right
10 to vote in such an election;
11 (2) corrects the record with respect to any false or
12 misleading statement made by any person; or
13 (3) informs employees of the Government's policy
14 relating to labor-management relations and repre-
15 sentation,
16 if the expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
17 promise of benefit and was not made under coercive condi-
18 tions shall not-
19 (A) constitute an unfair labor practice under this
20 chapter, or
21 (B) constitute grounds for the setting aside of any
22 election conducted under this chapter.
23 (d) Issues which can properly be raised under an appeals
24 procedure may not be raised as unfair labor practices prohib-
25 ited under this section. Except for matters wherein, under
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1 section 1131(b), an employee has an option of using the
2 grievance procedure under chapter 11 or an appeals proce-
3 dare, issues which can be raised under section 1024 or chap-
4 ter 11 may, in the discretion of the aggrieved party, be raised
5 either under such section or chapter or else raised as an
6 unfair labor practice under this section, but may not be raised
7 both under this section and under section 1024 or chapter 11.
8 SEC. 1041. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR LABOR OR-
9 GANIZATIONS.-(a) The Department shall accord recognition
10 only to a labor organization that,is free from corrupt influ-
11 ences and influences opposed to basic democratic principles.
12 Except as provided in subsection (b), an organization is not
13 required to prove that it is free from such influences if it is
14 subject to a governing requirement adopted by the organiza-
15 tion or by a national or international labor organization or
16 federation of labor organizations with which it is affiliated, or
17 in which it participates, containing explicit and detailed pro-
18 visions to which it subscribes calling for-
19 (1) the maintenance of democratic procedures and
20 practices, including-
21 (A) provisions for periodic elections to be
22 conducted subject to recognized safeguards, and
23 (B) provisions defining and securing the right.
24 of individual members to participate in the affairs
25 of the organization, to receive fair and equal
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treatment under the governing rules of the organi-
zation, and to receive fair process in disciplinary
proceedings;
(2) the exclusion from office in the organization of
persons affiliated with Communist or other totalitarian
movements. and persons identified with corrupt
influences;
(3) the prohibition of business or financial interests
on the part of organization officers and agents which
conflict with their duty to the organization and its
members; and
(4) the maintenance of fiscal integrity in the con-
duct of the affairs of the organization, including provi-
sions for accounting and financial controls and regular
financial reports or summaries to be made available to
members.
(b) A labor organization may be required to furnish evi-
dence of its freedom from corrupt influences opposed to basic
democratic principles if there is reasonable cause to believe
that-
(1) the organization has been suspended or ex-
pelled from, or is subject to other sanction by, a parent
labor organization, or federation of organizations with
which it has been affiliated, because it has. demonstrat-
ed an unwillingness or inability to comply with govern-
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1 ing requirements comparable in purpose to those
2 required by subsection (a); or
3 (2) the organization is in fact subject to influences
4 that would preclude recognition under this chapter.
5 (c) A labor organization which has or seeks recognition
6 as a representative of employees under this chapter shall file
7 financial and other reports with the Assistant Secretary of
8 Labor for Labor Management Relations, provide for bonding
9 of officials and employees of the organization, and comply
10 with trusteeship and election standards.
11 (d) The Assistant Secretary of Labor shall prescribe
12 such regulations as are necessary to carry out this section.
13 Such regulations shall conform generally to the principles ap-
14 plied to labor organizations in the private sector. Complaints
15 of violations of this section shall be filed with the Assistant
16 Secretary. In any matter arising under this section, the As-
17 sistant Secretary may require a labor organization to cease
18 and desist from violations of this section and require it to take
19 such actions as the Assistant Secretary considers appropriate
20 to carry out the policies of this section.
21 (e) This chapter does not authorize participation in the
22 management of a labor organization or acting as a repre-
23 sentative of a labor organization by a management official, a
24 confidential employee, or any other employee if the participa-
25 tion or activity would result in a conflict or apparent conflict
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1 of interest or would otherwise be incompatible with law or
2 with the official functions of the management official or confi-
3 dential employee.
4 (f) If the Board finds that any labor organization has
5 wilfully and intentionally violated section 1031(b)(7)(A) by
6 omission or commission with regard to any strike, work stop-
7 page, prohibited picketing or slowdown, the Board may-
8 (1) revoke the exclusive recognition status of the
9 labor organization, which shall then immediately cease
10 to be legally entitled and obligated to represent em-
11 ployees in the unit; or
12 (2) take any other appropriate disciplinary action
13 in addition to or in lieu of such revocation.
14 SEC. 1051. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.-(a) If the
15 Department has received from any person a written assign-
16 ment which authorizes the Department to deduct from the
17 salary of that person amounts for the payment of regular and
18 periodic dues of the exclusive representative, the Department
19 shall honor the assignment. Any such assignment shall be
20 made at no cost to the exclusive representative or the indi-
21 vidual. Except as provided in subsection (b), any such assign-
22 ment may not be revoked for a period of one year from its
23 execution.
24 (b) An assignment for deduction of dues shall terminate
25 when- '
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1 (1) the dues-withholding agreement between the
2 Department and the exclusive representative is termi-
3 nated or ceases to be applicable to the individual; or
4 (2) the employee is suspended or expelled from
5 membership in the exclusive representative.
6 (c) During any period when no labor organization is cer-
7 tified as the exclusive representative of employees in the De-
8 partment, the Department shall have the duty to negotiate
9 with a labor organization which has filed a petition under
10 section 1021(b)(1)(A) if the Board has determined that the
11 petition is valid. Negotiations under this subsection shall be
12 concerned solely with the deduction of dues of the labor orga-
13 nization from the pay of the employees who are members of
14 the labor organization and who make a voluntary allotment
15 for that purpose. Any agreement between the Department
16 and a labor organization under this subsection shall terminate
17 upon the certification of an exclusive representative of any
18 employees to whom the agreement applies.
19 (d) The following provisions shall apply to the use of
20 official time:
21 (1) Any employee representing an exclusive repre-
22 sentative in the negotiation, of a collective-bargaining
23 agreement under this chapter shall be authorized offi-
24 cial time for such purposes, including attendance at im-
25 passe proceedings, during the time the eriiployee other-
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wise would be in a duty status. The number of employ-
ees for whom official time is authorized under this
paragraph shall not exceed the number of individuals
designated as representing the Department for such
purposes.
(2) Any activities performed by any employee re-
lating to the internal business of the labor organization,
including the solicitation of membership, elections of
labor organization officials, and collection of dues, shall
be performed during the time the employee is in a non-
duty status.
(3) The Board shall determine whether any em-
ployee participating for, or on behalf of, a labor organi-
zation in any phase of proceedings before the Board
shall be authorized official time for such purpose during
the time the employee would otherwise be in a duty
status.
(4) Except as provided in paragraphs (1), (2), and
(3), any employee representing an exclusive repre-
sentative, or engaged in any other matter covered by
this chapter, shall be granted official time in any
amount the Department and the exclusive representa-
tive agree to be reasonable, necessary, and in the
public interest.
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1 CHAPTER 11-GRIEVANCES
2 SEC. 1101. DEFINITION OF GRIEVANCE.-(a) Except
3 as provided in subsection (b), for purposes of this chapter, the
4 term "grievance" means any act or condition subject to the
5 control of the Department which is alleged to deprive a
6 member of the Service who is a citizen of the United States
7 of a right or benefit authorized by law or regulation or which
8 is otherwise a source of concern or dissatisfaction to the
member, including but not limited to the following:
(1) involuntary separation of a member allegedly
contrary to law or regulation, or predicated upon al-
leged inaccuracy, omission, error, or falsely prejudicial
information in any part of the member's official person-
nel record;
(2) other alleged violation, misinterpretation, or
misapplication of applicable law, regulation, or pub-
lished policy affecting the terms and conditions of the
member's employment or career status;
'(3) allegedly wrongful disciplinary action against
the member;
(4) dissatisfaction with respect to the member's
physical working environment;
(5) alleged inaccuracy, error, omission, or falsely
prejudicial information in the member's official person-
25 nel file which is or could be prejudicial to the member;
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1 ' (6) action alleged to be in the nature of reprisal or
2 other interference with freedom of action in connection
3 with the member's participation in procedures under
4 this chapter;
5 (7) alleged denial of an allowance, premium pay,
6 or other financial benefit to which the member claims
7 entitlement under applicable law or regulation.
8 (b) A grievance may not be filed under this chapter with
9 respect to any of the following:
10 (1) an individual assignment or transfer of a
11 member ordered in accordance with law and regula-
12 tion;
13 (2) the judgment of a selection board established
14 under section 603, a tenure board established under
15 section 322,(b), or any other equivalent body estab-
16 lished by law or regulation which similarly evaluates
17 the performance of members of the Service on a com-
18 parative basis;
19 (3) expiration of a limited or temporary appoint-
20 ment or termination of a limited or temporary appoint-
21 ment under section 661; or
22 (4). any complaint or appeal where a specific stat-
23 utory hearing procedure exists, except as provided in
24 section 1131(b).
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1 (c) The scope of grievances described in this section may
2 be modified by written agreement between the Department
3 and the labor organization accorded recognition as the exclu-
4 sive representative of members of the Service under chapter
5 10 (hereinafter "the exclusive representative").
6 SEC. 1102. GRIEVANCES CONCERNING FORMER MEM-
7 BERS.-Within the time limitations specified in section 1104,
8 a former member of the Service or the surviving spouse (or, if
9 none, another member of the family) of a deceased member or
10 former member of the Service may present a grievance with
11 respect to allegations described in paragraph (7) of section
12 1101(a).
13 SEC. 1103. FREEDOM OF ACTION.-(a) Any person
14 presenting or filing a grievance (hereinafter the "grievant"),
15 and any witness or other person involved in a grievance pro-
16 ceeding, shall be free from any restraint, interference, coer-
17 cion, harassment, discrimination, or reprisal in those proceed-
18 ings or by virtue of them.
19 (b) A grievant who is a member of the bargaining unit
20 represented by an exclusive representative shall be
21 represented at every stage of the proceedings only if repre-
22 sented by that exclusive representative (which may approve
23 the participation in the proceedings by an additional person
24 on the grievant's behalf). Such a grievant has the right to
25 present a grievance on his or her own behalf; however, the
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1 exclusive representative shall have the right to be present
2 during the grievance proceedings. Any grievant who is not a
3 member of such a bargaining unit has the right at every stage
4 of the proceedings to representation of the grievant's own
5 choosing. The grievant and any representative who is a
6 member of the Service or an officer or employee of the De-
7 partment shall be granted reasonable periods of administra-
8 tive leave to prepare and present the grievance, and to attend
9 proceedings under this chapter.
10 (c) Any witness who is a member of the Service or an
11 officer or employee of the Department shall be granted rea-
12 sonable periods of administrative leave to appear and testify
13 at any such proceedings.
14 (d) The Foreign Service Grievance Board is authorized
15 to assure that no record of-
16 (1) a determination by the Secretary to reject a
17 Grievance Board recommendation,
18 (2) a finding by the Grievance Board against the
19 grievant, or
20 (3) the fact that a proceeding is pending or has
21 been held,
22 shall be entered in the personnel records of the grievant
23 (except by order of the Grievance Board as a remedy for the
24 grievance) or those of any other person connected with the
25 grievance. The Department shall maintain records pertaining
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1 to grievances under appropriate safeguards to preserve confi-
2 dentiality.
3 (e) The Department will use its best endeavors to expe-
4 dite security clearance procedures whenever necessary to
5 insure a fair and prompt resolution of a grievance.
6 SEC. 1104. TIME LIMITATIONS.-(a) A grievance is
7 forever barred, unless it is presented within a period of three
8 years after the occurrence or occurrences giving rise to the
9 grievance or such shorter period as may be agreed to by the
10 Department and the exclusive representative.
11 (b) There shall be excluded from the computation of the
12 three-year period specified in subsection (a) any time during
13 which, as determined by the Foreign Service Grievance
14 Board, the grievant was unaware of the grounds for the
15 grievance and could not have discovered such grounds
16 through reasonable diligence.
17 (c) If a grievance is not resolved under Department pro-
18 cedures (which have been negotiated with the exclusive rep-
19 resentative, if any) within ninety days of written presenta-
20 tion, the exclusive representative (on behalf of a grievant
21 who is a member of the bargaining unit) or a grievant who is
22 not a member-of such bargaining unit shall be entitled to file
23 a grievance with the Foreign Service Grievance Board for its
24 consideration and resolution.
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1 SEC. 1111. THE FOREIGN SERVICE GRIEVANCE
2 BOARD.-(a) There is established the Foreign Service Griev-
3 ance Board (hereinafter the "Board"). The Board shall con-
4 sist of not fewer than five members, all of whom shall be
5 independent, distinguished citizens of the United States, well
6 known for their integrity, who are not presently serving as
7 officers, employees, or consultants of the Department or as
8 members of the Service.
9 (b) The chairperson and other members of the Board
10 shall be appointed by the Secretary, from nominees approved
11 in writing by the agencies to which this chapter applies and
12 the exclusive representative (if any) of employees in each
13 such agency. Each member of the Board shall be appointed
14 for a term of two years, subject to renewal with the same
15 written approvals required for initial appointment. In the
16 event of a vacancy on the Board, an appointment for the
17 unexpired term may be made by the Secretary in accordance
18 with the procedures specified in this section. In the event of
19 inability to obtain agreement on a nominee, each agency and
20 each exclusive representative whose agreement is required
21 shall select two nominees and each such agency and exclu-
22 sive representative in an order determined by lot, shall in
23 turn strike a name from a list of such nominees until only one
24 remains.
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1 (c) Members of the Board who are not employees of the
2 Government shall receive compensation for each day they are
3 performing their duties (including travetime) at the daily rate
4 paid an individual at grade 18 of the General Schedule de-
5 scribed in section 5104 of title 5, United States Code.
6 (d) The Secretary may remove a Board member,upon
7 written notice for corruption, neglect of duty, malfeasance or
8 demonstrated incapacity to perform his or her functions, es-
9 tablished at a hearing, except where the right to a hearing is
10 waived in writing.
11 (e) The Board may obtain facilities, services and sup-
12 plies through.the general administrative services of the De-
13 partment. All expenses of the Board, including necessary
14 costs of a grievant's travel and travel-related expenses, shall
15 be paid out of funds appropriated to the Department for obli-
16 gation and expenditure by the Board. At the request of the
17 Board, officers and employees of the Department and mem-
18 bers of the Service may be assigned as staff employees for
19 the Board. Within the limits of appropriated funds, the Board
20 may appoint and fix the compensation of such other employ-
21 ees as the Board considers necessary to carry out its func-
22 tions. The members, officers, and employees so appointed or
23 assigned shall be responsible solely to the Board, and the
24 Board shall prepare the performance evaluation reports for
25 such members, officers, and employees. The records of the
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1 Board shall be maintained by the Board and shall be separate
2 from all other records of the Department.
3 SEc. 1112. BOARD PROCEDURES.-The Board may
4 adopt regulations concerning its organization and procedures.
5 Such regulations shall include provision for the following:
6 (1) The Board shall conduct a hearing at the
7 request of a grievant in any case which involves-
8 (A) disciplinary action or a grievant's retire-
9 ment from the Service under section 641 or 642,
10 or
11 (B) issues which, in the judgment of the
12 Board, can best be resolved by a hearing or
13 presentation of oral argument.
14 (2) The grievant, the grievant's representatives,
15 and the Department's representatives are entitled to be
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
present at the hearing. The Board may, after consider-
ing the views of the parties and any other individuals
connected with the grievance, decide that a hearing
should be open to others. Testimony at a hearing shall
be given by oath or affirmation which any Board
member or person designated by the Board shall have
authority to administer.
(3) Each party shall be entitled to examine and
cross-examine witnesses at the hearing or by deposi-
tion, and to serve interrogatories upon another party
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and have such interrogatories answered by the other
party unless the Board finds such interrogatory irrele-
vant, immaterial or unduly repetitive. Upon request of
the Board, or upon a request of the grievant deemed
relevant and material by the Board, an agency shall
promptly make available, at the hearing or by deposi-
tion any witness under its control, supervision, or re-
sponsibility, except that if the Board determines that
the presence of such witness at the hearing is required
for just resolution of the grievance, then the witness
shall be made available at the hearing, with necessary
costs and travel expenses provided by the Department.
(4) During any hearing held by' the Board, any
oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the
Board shall exclude any irrelevant, immaterial or
unduly repetitious evidence as determined under sec-
tion 556 of title 5, United States Code.
(5) A verbatim transcript shall be made of any
hearing and shall be part of the record of proceedings.
(6) In those grievances in which the Board holds
no hearing, the Board shall offer to each party the op-
portunity to review and to supplement, by written sub-
missions, the record of proceedings prior to its decision.
The Board decision shall be based exclusively on the
record of proceedings.
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(7) The Board may act by or through panels or
individual members designated by the Chairperson,
except that hearings within the continental United
States shall be held by panels of at least three mem-
bers unless the parties agree otherwise. References in
this chapter to the Board shall be considered to be
references to a panel or member of the Board where
(8) If the Board determines that the Department
is considering the involuntary separation of the griev-
ant, disciplinary action against the grievant, or recov-
ery from the grievant of alleged overpayment of salary,
expenses, or allowances, which is related to a griev-
ance pending before the Board, and that such action
should be suspended, the Department shall suspend
such action until the Board has ruled upon the griev-
ance. Notwithstanding such suspension of action, the
head of the agency concerned or a chief of mission or
principal officer may exclude the grievant from official
appropriate. All members of the Board shall act
impartial individuals in considering grievances.
premises or from the performance of specified functions
when such exclusion is determined in writing to be es-
sential to the functioning of the post or office to which
the grievant is assigned.
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1 (9) A grievant whose grievance is found not to be
2 meritorious by the Board may obtain reconsideration
3 by the Board only upon presenting newly discovered or
4 previously unavailable material evidence not previously
5 considered by the Board, and then only upon approval
6 of the Board.
7 SEC. 1113. BOARD DECISIONS.-(a) Upon completion
8 of its proceedings, the 'Board shall expeditiously decide the
9 grievance on the basis of the record of proceedings, and in
10 light of previous adjudications of similar issues under this
11 chapter and under section 1024. In each case the decision of
12 the Board shall be in writing, and shall include findings of
13 fact and a statement of the reasons for the Board's decision.
14 (b) If the Board finds that the grievance is meritorious,
15 the Board shall have the authority, within the limitations of
16
17
.18
19
20
21
22
23
24
the Secretary's authority, to direct the Department-
(1) to correct any official personnel record relating
to the grievant which the Board finds to be inaccurate,
erroneous, or falsely prejudicial;
(2) to reverse an administrative decision denying
the grievant compensation or any other perquisite of
employment authorized by law or regulation when the
Board finds that such denial was arbitrary, capricious,
or contrary to law or regulation;
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1 (3) to retain in the Service a member whose sepa-
2 ration would be in consequence of the matter by which
3 the member is aggrieved; .
4 (4) to reinstate the grievant with back pay, under
5 applicable law and regulations, where it is clearly es-
6 tablished that the grievant's separation or suspension
7 without pay was unjustified or unwarranted; and
8 (5) to take such other remedial action as may be
9 appropriate in procedures agreed to by the Department
10 and the exclusive representative.
11 (c) Orders of the Board under this chapter shall be final,
12 subject only to judicial review as provided in section 1141,
13 except as provided in subsection (d).
14 (d) If the Board finds that the grievance is meritorious
15 and that remedial action should be taken that relates directly
16 to promotion or assignment of the grievant or to other reme-
17 dial action not otherwise provided in this section, or if the
18 Board finds that the evidence before it warrants disciplinary
19 action against any officer or employee of the Department or
20 member of the Service, it shall make an appropriate recom-
21 mendation to the Secretary. The Secretary shall make a
22 written decision on the Board's recommendation. A recom-
23 mendation of the Board may be rejected in whole or in part if
24 the recommendation would be contrary to law, would ad-
25 versely affect the foreign policy or security of the United
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1 States, or would substantially impair the efficiency of the De-
2 partment or the Service. If the Secretary rejects the recom-
3 mendation in whole or in part, the decision shall specify the
4 reasons for such action. Pending the Secretary's decision,
5 there shall be no ex parte communication concerning the
6 grievance between the Secretary and any person involved in
7 the Board's proceedings. The Secretary shall, however, have
8 access to the entire record of the Board's proceedings.
9 SEC. 1121. ACCESS TO RECORDS.-(a) In considering
10 the validity of a grievance, the Board shall have access, to
11 the extent permitted by law, to any agency record considered
12 by the Board to be relevant to the grievant and the subject
13 matter of the grievance.
14 (b) The Department shall, subject to applicable law,
15 promptly furnish the grievant any Department record which
16 the grievant requests to substantiate the grievance and which
17 the Board determines is relevant and material to the proceed-
18, ings. When deemed appropriate by the Board, a grievant
19 may be supplied with only a summary or extract of classified
20 material. If a request by a grievant for a document is denied
21 prior to or during the Department's consideration of a griev-
22 ance, such denial may be raised by the grievant as an
23 integral part of the grievance before the Board.
24 (c) This chapter does not require disclosure of any
25 agency record to the Board or a grievant where the head of
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1 agency or deputy determines in writing that such disclosure
2 would adversely affect the foreign policy or national security
3 of the United States.
4 (d) The grievant in any case decided by the Board shall
5 have access to the Board's record of proceedings and
6 decision.
7 SEC. 1131. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER REMEDIES.-
8 (a) A grievant may not file a grievance with the Board if the
9 grievant has formally requested, prior to filing a grievance,
10 that the matter or matters which are the basis of the griev-
11 ance be considered or resolved and relief be provided, under
12 another provision of law, regulation, or Executive order, and
13 the matter has been carried to final decision thereunder on its
14 merits or is still under consideration.
15 (b) If a grievant is not prohibited from filing a grievance
16 under subsection (a), the grievant may file with the Board a
17 grievance which is also eligible for consideration, resolution,
18 and relief under chapter 12 of title 5, United States Code, or
19 a regulation or Executive order other than under this chap-
20 ter. Such an election of remedies shall be final upon the ac-
21 ceptance of jurisdiction by the Board.
22 SEC. 1141. JUDICIAL REVIEW.-Any aggrieved party
23 may obtain judicial review of regulations prescribed by the
24 Secretary under this chapter and final action of the Secretary
25 or the Board on any grievance in the district courts of the
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1 United States in accordance with the standards set forth in
2 chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code. Section 706 of title
3 5, United States Code, shall apply without limitation or
4 exception.
5 CHAPTER 12-COMPATIBILITY OF PERSONNEL SYSTEMS
6 - SEC. 1201. COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE FOREIGN
7 SERVICE AND OTHER GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SYS-
8 TEMS.-The Service shall be administered to the extent
9 practicable in conformity with general policies and regula-
10 tions of the Government. The Secretary shall consult with
11 the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, the Di-
12 rector of the Office of Management and Budget, and the
13 heads of other agencies as the President shall determine,
14 through appropriate mechanisms, in order to assure compati-
15 bility of the Service to the extent practicable with other Gov-
16 ernment personnel systems.
17 SEC. 1202. COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN CIVIL SERVICE
18 AND FOREIGN SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS.-(a) In
19 order to maintain existing conformity between the Civil Serv-
20 ice Retirement and Disability System (subchapter III of
21 chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code) and the Foreign
22 Service Retirement and Disability System. (chapter 8 of this
23 Act), whenever a law of general applicability is enacted
24 which-
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1 (1) affects current or former participants, annu-
2 itants or survivors under the Civil Service Retirement
3 and Disability System; and
4 (2) alters substantially identical treatment existing
5 immediately prior to the enactment of such law, under
6 a corresponding provision of law affecting participants,
7 former participants, annuitants or survivors under the
8 Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System;
9 such provision of law shall be deemed to extend to the latter
10 System so that it applies in like manner with respect to For-
11 eign Service Retirement and Disability System participants,
12 former participants, annuitants or survivors.
13 ? (b) The President is authorized by Executive order to
14 prescribe regulations to implement this section and to make
15 such extension retroactive to a date no earlier than the effec-
16 tive date of such provision for the Civil Service Retirement
17 and Disability System. Any provisions of an Executive order
18 issued under the authority of this section shall modify, super-
19 sede, or render inapplicable, as the case may be, to the
20 extent inconsistent therewith-
21 (1) all provisions of law enacted prior to the effec-
22 tive date of the provision of such Executive order, and
23 (2) any prior provision of an Executive order
24 issued under authority of this section.
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20
21
22
23
SEC. 1203. COMPATIBILITY AMONG AGENCIES EM-
PLOYING FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL.-The Service
shall be administered to the extent practicable in a manner
that will assure maximum compatibility among agencies au-
thorized by law to utilize the Foreign Service personnel
system. To this end, the heads of such agencies shall consult
regularly with the Secretary.
SEC. 1204. CONSOLIDATED AND UNIFORM ADMINIS-
TRATION.-The Secretary shall on a continuing basis con-
sider the need for uniformity of personnel policies and proce-
dures and (in accordance with section 23 of the Act of
August 1, 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2695)), consolidation of personnel
functions among agencies utilizing the Foreign Service per-
sonnel system. Where feasible, the Secretary shall encourage
the development of uniform policies and procedures and con-
solidated personnel functions in consultation with such
agencies.
SEC. 1205. EXCLUSIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE SECRE-
TARY.-The Secretary alone among agency heads shall per-
form the following functions, on behalf of all concerned agen-
cies as appropriate:
(1) designation of offices abroad as diplomatic in
nature under section 102(3);
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1 (2) supervision and direction of the Director Gen-
2 eral under section 204 and the Inspector General
3 under section 205;
4 (3) functions under section 206 regarding the
5 Board of the Foreign Service;
6 (4) issuance of regulations under section 333(b)
7 regarding employment of family members of Govern-
8 ment personnel;
9 (5) recommendations to the President under sec-
10 tion 341 that personnel of the Service serve under
11 diplomatic or consular commissions;
12 (6) recommendations to the President under sec-
13 tion 441(d) that members of the Senior Foreign Service
14 be awarded grants of performance pay for especially
15 meritorious or distinguished service;
16 (7) issuance of regulations under section 451(c)
17 regarding local compensation plans;
18 (8) determinations under section 453(a) and issu-
19 ance of regulations under section 453(d) regarding
20 compensation for imprisoned foreign nationals;
21 (9) operation of the Foreign Service Institute
22 under chapter 7;
23 (10) administration of the Foreign Service Retire-
24 ment and Disability System under chapter 8;
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1 (11) administration of health care programs under
2 section 921;
3 (12) appointment and removal of members of the
4 Foreign Service Labor Relations Board and provision
5 of facilities to such Board under section 1011; and
6 (13) appointment and removal of members of the
7 Foreign Service Grievance Board and provision of
8 facilities to such Board under section 1111.
9 TITLE II-TRANSITION, AMENDMENTS TO OTHER
10 LAWS, REPEALS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PRO-
11 VISIONS
12 CHAPTER 1-TRANSITION
13 SEC. 2101. CONVERSION TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE
14 SCHEDULE.-(a) The Secretary of State (hereinafter "the
15 Secretary") shall convert to the appropriate class in the For-
16 eign Service Schedule established under section 421 of the
17 Foreign Service Act of 1979 those members of the Foreign
18 Service-
19 (1) who on the effective date of this Act are serv-
20 ing under appointments at or below class 3 of the
21 schedule established under section 412 or 414 of the
22 Foreign Service Act of 1946 or at any class in the
23 schedule established under section 415 of such Act
24 as-
25 (A) Foreign Service officers,
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1 (B) Foreign Service Reserve officers with
2 limited or unlimited tenure, or
3 (C) Foreign Service Staff officers or
4 employees; and
5 (2) who (with respect to Reserve and Staff officers
6 and employees) the Secretary determines are available
7 for worldwide assignment.
8 (b) Those Reserve and Staff officers and employees who
9 the Secretary determines are not available for worldwide
10 availability shall also be converted to the appropriate class
11 under such section 421 if-
12 (1) the Secretary certifies that there is a need for
13 their services in the Foreign Service; and
14 (2) they affirm in writing their obligation to accept
.15 worldwide availability for assignment as a condition of
16 employment.
17 SEC. 2102. CONVERSION TO THE SENIOR FOREIGN
18 SERVICE.-(a) Foreign Service officers and Foreign Service
19 Reserve officers with limited and unlimited tenure who are
20 serving under appointments at class 2 or a higher class of the
21 schedule established under section 412 or 414 of the Foreign
22 Service Act of 1946 on the effective date of this Act may at
23 any time within one hundred and twenty days after such date
24 elect in a written instrument submitted to the Secretary to
25 request appointment to the Senior Foreign Service.
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1 (b) Except as provided in subsection (d), if a request
2 under subsection (a) is submitted by a Foreign Service Re-
3 serve officer with limited tenure, the Secretary shall grant a
4 limited appointment of such officer to the appropriate class
5 established under section 411 of the Foreign Service Act of
6 1979.
7 (c) Except as provided in subsection (d), if a request
8 under subsection (a) is submitted by a Foreign Service officer
9 or a Foreign Service Reserve officer with unlimited tenure,
10 the Secretary shall recommend to the President a career ap-
11 pointment of such officer, by and with the advice and consent
12 of the Senate, to the appropriate class established under
13 section 411 of the Foreign Service Act of 1979.
14 (d) If the Secretary determines that a Reserve officer
15 with limited or unlimited tenure who submits a request under
16 subsection (a) is not available for worldwide assignment, an
17 appointment under subsection (b) or a recommendation for
18 appointment under subsection (c) shall be made only if-
19
20
21
22
23
24
(1) the Secretary certifies that there is a need for
the services of such officer in the Senior Foreign Serv-
ice; and
(2) such officer affirms in writing his or her obli-
gation to accept worldwide availability for assignment
as a condition of employment.
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1 (e) If a request for appointment to the Senior Foreign
2 Service as described in subsection (a) is submitted to the Sec-
3 retary, but more than one hundred and twenty days after the
4 effective date of this Act, the Secretary (in the case of a
5 Foreign Service Reserve officer with limited tenure) may
6 grant a limited appointment or (in the case of a Foreign Serv-
7 ice officer or Foreign Service Reserve officer with unlimited
8 tenure) may recommended to the President a career appoint-
9 ment of the requesting officer to the appropriate class estab-
10 lished under section 411 of the Foreign Service Act of 1979,
11 subject to the conditions specified in subsection (d) and such
12 other conditions as the Secretary may prescribe in light of
13 the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1979 relating to
14 promotion into the Senior Foreign Service.
15 (f) Any officer of the Foreign Service who is eligible to
16 submit a request under subsection (a) and-
17 (1) who does not submit such a request within one
18 hundred and twenty days after the effective date of this
19 Act, or
20 (2) who submits such a request more than one
21 hundred and twenty days after the effective date of this
22 Act and is not appointed to the Senior Foreign Service
23 for any reason other than failure to meet the conditions
24 specified in subsection (d),
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1 may remain in the Foreign Service for not more than three
2 years after the effective date of this Act. During such period,
3 the officer shall be subject to the provisions of the Foreign
4 Service Act of 1979 regarding members of the Senior For-
5 eign Service, except that such officer shall not be eligible to
6 compete for performance pay under section 441 of such Act,
7 and shall not be eligible for a limited career extension as
8 described in section 641(b) of such Act. Upon separation, any
9 such officer who is a participant in the Foreign Service Re-
10 tirement and Disability System shall be entitled to retirement
11 benefits determined in accordance with chapter 8 of the
12 Foreign Service Act of 1979.
13 SEC. 2103. CONVERSION TO THE CIVIL SERVICE. '(a)
14 Members of the Foreign Service who are serving on the ef-
15 fective date of the Act in a personnel category described in
16 section 2101(a)(1) or 2102(a) and who are not converted into
17 an appropriate class in the Foreign Service Schedule under
18 section 2101 or in the Senior Foreign Service under section
19 2102 because they do not meet the conditions specified in
20 section 2101(b) or 2102(d) shall, not later than three years
21 after the effective date of this Act, be converted to the appro-
22 priate grade in the General Schedule described in section
23 5104 of title 5, United States Code, notwithstanding any
24 other law, except that such members who meet the eligibility
25 requirements for the Senior Executive Service and who elect
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1 to join that Service shall be converted to the Senior Execu-
2 tive Service in the appropriate rate of basic pay established
3 under section 5382 of title 5, United States Code.
4 (b)(1) This section shall not apply prior to July 1, 1981,
5 to personnel of. the International Communication Agency
6 who are covered by an existing agreement with the exclusive
7 representative of those personnel. Prior to that date, mem-
8 bers of the Service exempted from conversion by this subsec-
9 tion may elect to remain in the Foreign Service and, notwith-
10 standing any other provision of law, the status, promotion,
11 class, and tenure of such personnel shall continue to be gov-
12 erned by the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and Public Law
13 90-494 (as those Acts were in effect immediately prior to the
14 effective date of this Act). The Foreign Servite Act of 1979
15 (except sections 411, 421, 431, 441, and 531) shall also
16 apply to such members of the Service, and such personnel
17 shall be considered personnel of the Service for purposes of
18 sections 103, 442, 511, 521, 651, and 803 of this Act. ?
19 (2) The President shall prescribe salary rates for the
20 personnel who are temporarily excepted from conversion
21 under this subsection in accordance with the salary classes
22 established under sections 414 and 415 of the Foreign Serv-
23 ice Act of 1946. Salary rates for such personnel shall be
24 adjusted at the same time as rates of basic pay are adjusted
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1 for the General Schedule and in such manner as to preserve
2 without prejudice the comparable rates of pay for each class.
3 SEC. 2104. PRESERVATION OF STATUS AND BENE-
-
FITS.-(a)(1) Every member of the Foreign Service who is
4
5 converted to a different personnel system or category under
6 this chapter shall be converted, notwithstanding any other
7 law, to the class or grade and salary rate that most closely
8 corresponds to the class and step at which the member was
9 serving prior to conversion, except that no conversion shall
10 cause any individual to incur areduction in his or her class,
11 grade, or basic rate of salary: Provided, That until such con-
12 versions are made the affected personnel shall receive basic
13 salary and allowances as if they had been converted under
14 section 2101 or 2102, as appropriate, on the effective date of
15 this Act.
16 (2) Conversions of members of the Foreign Service to
17 new salary schedules under sections 2101 and 2102 shall in
18 each case be to a class and step determined, in accordance
19 with regulations prescribed under section 2105 to correspond
20 to the class and step under which the member was serving
21 immediately prior to conversion. Such regulations shall
22 assure that no such conversion shall cause any individual to
23 incur a reduction in salary.
24 (b) Any participant in the Foreign Service Retirement
25 and Disability System who would normally participate in the
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1 Civil Service Retirement and Disability System by virtue of
2 the enactment of this Act or conversion under this chapter
3 shall remain a participant in the Foreign Service Retirement
4 and Disability System for one hundred and twenty days after
5 participation in such system would otherwise cease. During
6 such one hundred and twenty-day period, the individual may
7 elect in writing to continue to participate in the Foreign
8 Service Retirement and Disability System instead of the Civil
9 Service Retirement and Disability System. If 'such an elec-
10 tion is not made, the individual will then be transferred to the
11 Civil Service Retirement and Disability System and contribu-
12 tions made by the participant to the Foreign Service Retire-
13 ment and Disability Fund will be transferred to the Civil
14 Service Retirement and Disability Fund.
15 (c) Members of the Foreign Service who are converted
16 under this chapter shall be converted to the type of appoint-
17 ment which corresponds most closely in tenure to the type of
18 appointment under which they were serving immediately
19 prior to such conversion: Provided, That no conversion shall
20 operate to extend the duration of any limited appointment or
21 previously applicable time in class. Any member of the Serv-
22 ice who is converted to the Civil Service under this chapter
23 shall be deemed to be an employee for purposes of subchapter
24 II of chapter 75 of title 5, United States Code.
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1 (d) Any person who on the effective date of this Act is
2 serving- 9
3 (1) under an appointment in the Foreign Service,
4 or
5 (2) in any other office or position continued by
6 this Act,
7 may continue to serve under such appointment, subject to the
8 provisions of this Act, and need not be reappointed by virtue
9 of the enactment of this Act.
10 (e) Section 642 of the Foreign Service Act of 1979 shall
11 become applicable effective five years after the effective date
12 of this Act to members of the Foreign Service-
13 (1) who are serving under career appointments on
14 the date of enactment of this Act, and .
15 (2) who were not subject to section. 633(a)(2) of
16 the Foreign Service Act of 1946 immediately prior to
17 the effective date of this Act.
18 SEc. 2105. REGULATIONS.-Under the direction, of the
19 President, the Secretary is authorized to prescribe regula-
20 tions for the implementation of this chapter.
21 SEC. 2106. AUTHORITY OF OTHER AGENCIES.-The
22 heads of agencies other than the Department of State which
23 employs Foreign Service personnel are authorized to perform
24 any of the functions vested in the Secretary by this chapter
25 with respect to personnel of the Service in their respective
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1 agencies. Such agency heads shall consult with the Secretary
2 in the exercise of such functions. 7
3 CHAPTER 2-AMENDMENTS TO OTHER LAWS
4 SEc. 2201. BASIC AUTHORITY.-(a) The Act entitled
5 "An Act to provide certain basic authority for the Depart-
6 ment of State", approved August 1, 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2684
7 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
8 new sections:
9 "SEc. 24. GIFTS.-(a) The Secretary of State may
10 accept on behalf of the United States gifts made uncondition-
11 ally by will or otherwise for the benefit of the Department of
12 State including the Foreign Service or for the carrying out of
13 any of its functions. Conditional gifts may be so accepted at
14 the discretion of the Secretary, and the principal of and
15 income from any such conditional gift shall be held, invested,
16 reinvested, and used in accordance with its conditions, but no
17 gift shall be accepted which is conditioned upon any income
18 thereof unless such expenditure has been approved by Act of
19 Congress.
20 "(b) Any unconditional gift of money accepted pursuant
21 to the authority granted in subsection (a), the net proceeds
22 from the liquidation pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) of any
23 other property so accepted, and the proceeds. of insurance on
24 any such gift property not used for its restoration, shall be
25 deposited in the Treasury of the United States and are
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1 hereby appropriated and shall be held in trust by the Secre-
2 tary of the Treasury for the benefit of the Department of
3 State including the Foreign Service, and the Secretary of the
4 Treasury may invest and reinvest such funds in interest-bear-
5 ing obligations of the United States or in obligations guaran-
6 teed as to both principal and interest by the United States.
7 Such gifts and the income from such investments shall be
8 available for expenditure in the operation of the Department
9 of State including the Foreign Service and the performance
10 of its functions, subject to the same examination and audit as
is provided for appropriations made for the Foreign Service
by Congress.
"(c) The evidences of any unconditional gift of intangi-
ble personal property, other than money, accepted pursuant
to subsection (a), shall be deposited with the Secretary of the
Treasury, who may hold or liquidate them, except that they
17 shall be liquidated upon the request of the Secretary of State
18 whenever necessary to meet payments required in the oper-
19 ation of the Department including the Service or the perform-
20 ance of its functions. The proceeds and income from any such
21 property held by the Secretary of the Treasury shall be avail-
22 able for expenditures as provided in subsection (b).
23 "(d) The Secretary of State shall hold any real property
24 or any tangible personal property accepted unconditionally
25 pursuant to subsection (a), and shall permit such property to
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1 be used for the operation of the Department including the
2 Service and the performance of its functions, or may lease or
3 hire such property, and may insure such property, and de-
4 posit the income thereof with the Secretary of the Treasury
5 to be available for expenditure as provided in subsection (b).
6 The income from any such real property or tangible personal
7 property shall be available for expenditure at the discretion of
8 the Secretary of State for the maintenance, preservation, or
9 repair and insurance of such property and any proceeds from
10 insurance may be used to restore the property insured. Any
11 such property when not required for the operation of the De-
12 partment including the Service or the performance of its
13 functions may be liquidated by the Secretary; and the pro-
14 ceeds thereof deposited with the Secretary of the Treasury
15 whenever in the Secretary's judgment the purposes of the
16 gift will be served thereby.
17 "(e) For the purpose of Federal income, estate, and gift
18 taxes, any gift, devise, or bequest accepted by the Secretary
.19 under this section shall be deemed to be a gift, devise, or
20 bequest to and for the use of the United States.
21 "SEC. 25. AUTHORIZATION To RETAIN ATTOR-
22 NE.Ys.-The Secretary of State may, without regard to sec-
23 tion 3106 of title 5, United States Code, authorize a principal
24 officer of the Foreign Service to procure legal services when-
25 ever such services are required for the protection of the inter-
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1 ests of the Government or to enable a member of the Service
2 to carry on the member's work efficiently.
3 "SEC. 26. EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR
4 FAMILY MEMBERS.-(a) In order to expand employment op-
5 portunities for family members of United States Government
6 personnel assigned abroad, the Secretary of State shall seek
7 to conclude such bilateral and multilateral agreements as will
8 facilitate the employment of such family members in foreign
9 economies.
10 "(b) Any member of a family of Foreign Service person-
11 nel may accept gainful employment in a foreign country
12 unless such employment-
13 "(1) would violate any law of such country or of
14 the United States; or
15 "(2) could, as certified in writing by the Chief of
16 the United States Diplomatic Mission in such country,
17 damage the interests of the United States.
18 "SEC. 27. USE OF VEHICLES.-Notwithstanding the
19 provisions of section 5 of the Act of July 16, 1914 (31
20 U.S.C. 638a), the Secretary of State may authorize any prin-
21 cipal officer to approve the use of Government-owned or
22 leased vehicles located at the principal officer's post for
23 transportation of United States Government employees and
24 their families when public transportation is unsafe or not
25 available.
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8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
"SEC. 28. EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES.-whenever the
Secretary of State determines that educational facilities are
not available, or that existing educational facilities are inad-
equate, to meet the needs of children of American citizens
stationed outside the United States engaged in carrying out
Government activities, he is authorized, in such manner as he
deems appropriate and under such regulations as he may pre-
scribe, to establish, operate, and maintain primary schools,
and school dormitories and related educational facilities for
primary and secondary schools, outside the United States, or
to make grants of funds for such purposes, or otherwise pro-
vide for such educational facilities. The provisions of the For-
eign Service Buildings Act, 1926, as amended, and of para-
graphs (h) and (i) of section 3 of this Act, may be utilized by
the Secretary in providing assistance for educational facili-
ties. Assistance may include, but shall not be limited to,
17 hiring, transporting, and payment of teachers and other nec-
18 essary personnel.
19 "SEC. 29. MALPRACTICE PROTECTION.-(a) The
20 remedy-
21 "(1) against the United States provided by sec-
22 tions 1346(b) and 2672 of title 28 of the United States
23 Code, or
24 "(2) through proceedings for compensation or
25 other benefits from the United States as provided by
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1 any other law, where the availability of such benefits
2 precludes a remedy under such sections,
3 for damages for personal injury, including death, allegedly
4 arising from malpractice or negligence of a physician, dentist,
5 nurse, pharmacist, or paramedical (including medical and
6 dental assistants and technicians, nursing assistants, and
7 therapists) or other supporting personnel of the Department
8 of State in furnishing medical care or related services, includ-
9 ing the conducting of clinical studies or investigations, while
10 in the exercise of his or her duties in or for the Department of
11 State or any other Federal department, agency, or instru-
12 mentality shall be exclusive of any other civil action or pro-
13 ceeding by reason of the same subject matter against such
14 physician, dentist, nurse, pharmacist, or paramedical or other
15 supporting personnel (or his or her estate) whose act or omis-
16 sion gave rise to such claim.
17 "(b) The United States Government shall defend any
18 civil action or proceeding brought in any court against any
19 person referred to in subsection (a) of this section (or his or
20 her estate) for any such damage or injury. Any such person
21 against whom such civil action or proceeding is brought shall
22 deliver, within such time after date of service or knowledge
23 of service as determined by the Attorney General, all process
24 served upon him or her or an attested true copy thereof to
25 whomever was designated by the Secretary to receive such
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1 papers and such person shall promptly furnish copies of the
2 pleading and process therein to the United States attorney
3 for the district embracing the place wherein the proceeding is
4 brought, to the Attorney General, and to the Secretary.
5 "(c) Upon a certification by the Attorney General that
6 the defendant was acting within the scope of his or her em-
7 ployment in or for the Department of State or any other Fed-
8 eral department, agency, or instrumentality at the time of the
9 incident out of which the suit arose, any such civil action or
10 proceeding commenced in a State court shall be removed
11 without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney Gener-
12 al to the district court of the United States of the district and
13 division embracing the place wherein it is pending and the
14 proceeding deemed a tort action brought against the United
15 States under the provisions of title 28 of the United States
16 Code and all references thereto. Should a United States dis-
17 trict court determine on a hearing on a motion to remand
18 held before a trial on the merits that the case so removed is
19 one in which a remedy by suit within the meaning of subsec-
20 tion (a) of this section is not available against the United
21 States, the case shall be remanded to the State court except
22 that where such remedy is precluded because, of the availabil-
23 ity of a remedy through proceedings for compensation or
24 other benefits from the United States as provided by any
25 other law, the case shall be dismissed, but in that event, the
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1 running of any limitation of time for commencing, or filing an
2 application or claim in, such proceedings for compensation or
3 other benefits shall be deemed to have been suspended during
4 the pendency of the civil action or proceeding under this
5 section.
6 "(d) The Attorney General may compromise or settle
7 any claim asserted in such civil action or proceeding in the
8 manner provided in section 2677 of title 28 of the United
9 States Code and with the same effect.
10 "(e) For purposes of this section, the provisions of sec-
11 tion 2680(h) of title 28 of the United States Code shall not
12 apply to any tort enumerated therein arising out of negli-
13 gence in the furnishing of medical care or related services,
14 including the conducting of clinical studies or investigations.
15 "(f) The Secretary may, to the extent he deems appro-
16 priate, hold harmless or provide liability insurance for any
17 person to whom the immunity provisions of subsection (a) of
18 this section apply, for damages for personal injury, including
19 death, negligently caused by any such person while acting
20 within the scope of his or her office or employment and as a
21 result of the furnishing of medical care or related services,
22 including the conducting of clinical studies or investigations,
23 if such person is assigned to a foreign area or detailed for
24 service with other than a Federal agency or institution, or if
25. the circumstances are such as are likely to preclude the rem-
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1 edies of third persons against the United States provided by
2 sections 1346(b) and 2672 of title 28 of the United States
3 Code, for such damage or injury.
4 "(g) For purposes of this section, any medical care or
5 related service covered by this section and performed abroad
6 by a covered person at the direction or with the approval of
7 the United States Ambassador or other principal representa-
8 tive of the United States in the area shall be deemed to be
9 within the scope of employment of the individual performing
10 the service.
11 "SEC. 30. POST EMPLOYEE SERVICES.-(a) The Sec-
12 retary of State may authorize and assist in the establishment,
13 maintenance, and operation by civilian officers and employees
14 of the Government of non-Government-operated services and
15 facilities at posts abroad, including the furnishing of space,
16 utilities, and properties owned or leased by the Government
17 for. use by its diplomatic, consular, and other missions and
18 posts abroad. The provisions of the Foreign Service Buildings
19 Act of 1926 (22 U.S.C. 292-300) and section 13 of this Act
20 may be utilized by the Secretary in providing such assistance.
21 "(b) The Secretary may establish and maintain emer-
22 gency commissary or mess services in places abroad where in
23 the Secretary's judgment, such services are necessary tempo-
24 rarily to insure the effective and efficient performance of offi-
25 cial duties and responsibilities. Reimbursements incident to
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1 the maintenance and operation of commissary or mess service
2 under this subsection shall be at not less than cost as deter-
3 mined by the Secretary and shall be used as working funds:
4 Provided, That an amount equal to the amount expended for
5 such services shall be covered into the Treasury as miscella-
6 neous receipts.
7 "(c) Services and facilities established under this section
8 shall be made available, insofar as practicable, to officers and
9 employees of all agencies and their dependents who are sta-
10 tioned in the locality abroad. Such services and facilities shall
11 not be established in localities where another agency oper-
12 ates similar services or facilities unless the Secretary deter-
13 mines that additional services or facilities are necessary.
14 Other agencies shall to the extent practicable avoid duplicat-
15 ing the facilities and services provided or assisted by the Sec-
16 retary under this section.
17 "(d) Charges at any post abroad for a service or facility
18 provided, authorized, or assisted under this section shall be at
19 the same rate for all civilian personnel of the Government
20 serviced thereby, and all charges for' supplies furnished to
21 such a service or facility abroad by any agency shall be at the
22 same rate as that charged by the furnishing agency to its
23 comparable civilian services and facilities.".
24 (b) The authorities conferred upon the Secretary of
25 State by sections 24 and 25 of such Act shall continue to be
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1 available to the Director of the International Communication
2 Agency and the Director of the International Development
3 Cooperation Agency.
4 SEC. 2202. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.-(a) The
5 Peace Corps Act (22 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.) is amended as
6 follows:
7 (1) in section 5(f)(1)(A), strike out "section
8 852(a)(1) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as
9 amended (22 U.S.C. 1092(a)(1))" and insert in lieu
10 thereof "section 851(a) of the Foreign Service Act of
11 1979";
12 (2) in section 5(h)-
13 (A) strike out "section 1091 of the Foreign
14 Service Act of 1946" and insert in lieu thereof
15 "section 31 of the Act entitled `An Act to provide
16 certain basic authority for the Department of
17 State', approved August 1, 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2684
18 et seq.)"; and
19 (B) strike out "Director of Action" and
20 insert in lieu thereof "President";
21 (3) in section 7(a)(1)-
22 (A) strike out "the Foreign Service Reserve
23 and Staff under the Foreign Service Act of 1946,
24 as amended (22 U.S.C. 801 et seq.)" and insert
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1 in lieu thereof "the Foreign Service under the
2 Foreign Service Act of 1979";
3 (B) strike out "section 528" and insert in
4 lieu thereof "section 332";
5 (C) strike out the word "Reserve" the last
6 place it appears and all that follows and insert in
7 lieu thereof a period;
8 (4) section 7(a)(2) is amended to read as follows:
9 "(2) The President may utilize such authority contained
10 in the Foreign Service Act of 1979 relating to members of
11 the Foreign Service and other United States Government of-
12 ficers and employees as the President deems necessary to
13 carry out functions under this Act, except that-
14. "(A) no Foreign Service appointment or assign-
15 ment under this paragraph shall be for a period of
16 more than five years unless the Director of the Peace
17 Corps, under special circumstances, personally ap-
18 proves an extension of not more than one year on an
19 individual basis; and
20 "(B) no person whose Foreign Service appoint-
21 ment or assignment under this paragraph has been ter-
22 minated shall be reappointed or reassigned under this
23 paragraph before the expiration of a period of time
24 equal to that person's preceding tour of duty.
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1 Such provisions of that Act as the President deems appropri-
2 ate shall apply to persons appointed or assigned under this
3 paragraph, including in all cases, the provisions of section
4 332 of that Act: Provided, however, That the President may
5 by regulation make exceptions to the application of section
6 332 in cases in which the period of the appointment or as-
7 signment exceeds thirty months: Provided further, That
8 members of the Foreign Service appointed or assigned pursu-
9 ant to this paragraph shall receive within-class salary in-
10 creases in accordance with such regulations as the President
11 may prescribe: Provided further, That under such regulations
12 as the President may prescribe persons who are to perform
13 duties of a more routine nature than are generally performed
14 by members of the Foreign Service at the lowest class may
15 be appointed to an unenumerated class ranking below the
16 lowest class of the Foreign Service Schedule and be paid
17 basic compensation at rates lower than those of the lowest
18 class.";
19 (5) in section 14(b), strike out "section 901 of the
20 Foreign Service Act of 1946 (22 U.S.C. 1131)" and
21 insert in lieu thereof "section 931 of the Foreign Serv-
22 ice Act of 1979".
23 (b) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
24 2151 et seq.) is amended as follows:
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1 (1) section 625(d)(1) (22 U.S.C. 2385(d)) is
2 amended to read as follows:
3 "(1) employ or assign persons, or authorize the
4 employment or assignment of officers or employees by
5 agencies of the United States Government, who shall
6 receive compensation at any of the rates provided for
7 under section 411 or section 421 of the Foreign Serv-
8 ice Act of 1979, together with allowances and benefits
9 under that Act; and persons so employed or assigned
10 shall be entitled, except to the extent that the Presi-
11 dent may specify otherwise in cases in which the
12 period of employment or assignment exceeds thirty
13 months, to the same benefits as are provided by section
14 332 of that Act for persons appointed to the Foreign
15 Service.";
16 (2) section 631(b) (22 U.S.C. 2391) is amended
17 by striking out the second sentence and inserting in
18 lieu thereof "Such chief shall be entitled to receive
19 such compensation and allowances as provided for in
20 the Foreign Service Act of 1979, not to exceed those
21 authorized for a chief of mission (within the meaning of
22 that Act), as the President shall determine to be appro-
23 priate.";
24 (3) section 631(c) is amended by striking out the
25 second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "Such
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1 person may receive such compensation and allowances
2 as are authorized by the Foreign Service Act, not to
3 exceed those authorized for a chief of mission (within
4 the meaning of that Act), as the President shall deter-
5 mine to be appropriate.".
6 (c) Section 42 of the Arms Control and Disarmament
7 Act (22 U.S.C. 2582) is amended to read as follows:
8 "FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL
9 "SEC. 42. (a) The Secretary of State may authorize the
10 Director to exercise, with respect to :embers of the Foreign
11 Service appointed or employed for the Agency the following
authority:
(1) the authority available to the Secretary of
State under the Foreign Service Act of 1979, and
(2) the authority available to the Secretary under
any other provisions of law pertaining specifically or
generally applicable to such members.
"(b) Limited appointments of Foreign Service personnel
19 for the Agency may be extended or renewed, notwithstanding
20 section 331 of the Foreign Service Act of 1979, so long as
21 the service of the individual under such appointment does not
22 exceed ten consecutive years without a break in service of at
23 least one year.".
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1 SEC. 2203. SALARY FOR AMBASSADORS AT LARGE.-
2 Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
3 adding at the end thereof:
4 "(24) Ambassadors at Large.".
5 SEC. 2204. ATTORNEYS FEES IN BACKPAY CASES.-
6 Section 5596(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-
7 (1) by amending paragraph (1)(A)(ii) by inserting
8 immediately after "chapter 71 of this title," the words
"or under chapter 11 of the Foreign Service Act of
1979,";
(2) by amending paragraph (3)-
(A) by inserting immediately after "section
7103 of this title" the, words "and (with respect
to Foreign Service personnel) in sections 1002
and 1101 of the Foreign Service Act of 1979";
(B) by inserting immediately after "section
7116 of this title" the' words "and (with respect
to Foreign Service personnel) in section 1031 of
the Foreign Service Act of 1979".
21 SEC. 2205. LEAVE FOR SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE.-
22 Section 6304 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-
23 (1) in subsection (a) by striking out "and (f)" and
24 inserting in lieu thereof "(f), and (g)"; and
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1 (2) by adding at the end thereof the following new
2 subsection:
3 "(g) Annual leave accrued by a member of the Senior
4 Foreign Service shall not be subject to the limitation on accu-
5 mulation otherwise imposed by this section.".
6 CHAPTER 3-REPEALS
7 SEC. 2301. REPEALED PROVISIONS.-There are re-
8 pealed-
9 (1) the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (22 U.S.C.
10 801-817, 821, 822, 826, 827, 841-843, 846, 861,
11 866-873, 876, 877, 881, 882, 886, 889, 890, 896,
12 900-902, 906-915, 921-924, 926-932, 936-939,
13 946, 947, 951, 961-966, 968, 981, 986, 987,
14 991-996, 1001-1009, 1016, 1017, 1021, 1022,
15 1026-1028, 1031, 1036, 1037-1037c, 1041-1048,
16 1061-1065, 1071, 1076-1079s, 1081, 1082, 1084,
17 1086, 1091, 1093, 1095, 1101, 1103, 1106, 1111,
18 1112, 1116, 1121, 1131, 1136-1138a, 1139,
19 1148-1151, and 1156-1160);
20 (2) sections 401 and 413 of the Foreign Relations
21 Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979 (92 Stat. 981,
22 986);
23 (3) section 413 of the Foreign Relations Authori-
24 zation Act, Fiscal Year 1978 (91 Stat. 857);
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1 (4) sections 117, 120, and 522 of the Foreign Re-
2 lations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1977 (90 Stat.
3 827, 829, 846);
4 (5) section 6 of the Department of State Appro-
5 priations Authorization Act of 1973 (87 Stat. 452);
6 (6) the Act entitled "An Act to promote the for-
7 eign policy of the United States by strengthening and
8 improving the Foreign Service personnel system of the
9 International Communication Agency through estab-
10 lishment of a Foreign Service Information Officer
Corps, approved August 20, 1968 (22 U.S.C.
929-932, 1221-1232);
(7) paragraph (2) of subsection (d) and subsections
(e), (g), (j), and (k) of section 625 of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2385 (d)(2), (e), (g),
(j), and (k)), except that the effective date of the repeal
of subsection (k) shall be January 1, 1982;
(8) section 7(b) of the Peace Corps Act (22
U.S.C. 2506(b)); and
(9) section 124(a)(2) of the International Develop-
ment and Food Assistance Act of 1977 (91 Stat. 542).
CHAPTER 4-SEVERABILITY, SAVING PROVISION,
REPORTS, AND EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 2401. SEVERABILITY.-If any provision of this
Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance
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1 is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application
2 of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall
10 3 not be affected thereby.
4 SEC. 2402. SAVING PROVISION.-All determinations,
5 authorizations, regulations, orders, agreements, exclusive
6 recognition of an organization or other actions made, issued,
7 undertaken, entered into or taken under the authority of the
8 Foreign Service Act of 1946 or any other law repealed,
9 modified, or affected by this Act shall continue in full force
10 and effect until modified, revoked, or superseded by appropri-
11 ate authority. Any grievances, claims, or appeals which were
12 filed or made under any such law and are pending resolution
13 on the effective date of this Act shall continue to be governed
14 by the "provisions repealed, modified, or affected by this Act.
15 References in law to provisions of the Foreign Service Act of
16 1946 or other law superseded by this Act shall be deemed to
17 include reference to the corresponding provisions of this Act.
18 SEC. 2403. REPORTS.-Not later than eighteen months
19 after the effective date of this Act, the Secretary of State
10 20 shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
21 and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
22 report describing the steps taken in furtherance of this Act's
23 objective (as set out in sections 101(b)(9) and 1203 of the
24 Foreign Service Act of 1979) of achieving maximum com-
25 patibility among the agencies utilizing the Foreign Service
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1 personnel system and including such recommendations as the
2 Secretary believes will assist in achieving that objective. The
3 Secretary shall keep the Congress informed on a continuing
4 basis on progress made in pursuit of the goal of maximum
5 compatibility.
6 SEC. 2404. EFFECTIVE DATE.-This Act shall take
7 effect on January 1, 1980.
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Senator PEIL. The witnesses today will highlight the major features
of this bill, and there will be further hearings to examine more fully
all facets of this legislation and to allow the various employee unions
an opportunity to comment on its provisions.
In this regard, I recall this work being started in the previous ad-
ministration by Larry Eagleberger and Carol Laise. I think the broad
outlines set forth then are being fine-tuned and improved, and will be
the first overall change of this sort that has been made since the Foreign
Service Act of 1946, of which we all had great hopes but which was
never really fully implemented.
We are very honored that our first witness today is the Secretary of
State, Cyrus Vance, who is accompanied by the Deputy Under Secre-
tary of State, Ben Read.
STATEMENT OF HON. CYRUS R. VANCE, SECRETARY OF STATE;
ACCOMPANIED BY BEN H. READ, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT
Secretary VANCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, may I say how much I appreciate your early scheduling of
these hearings on the proposed new Foreign Service Act to which we,
and I personally, attach great importance.
Senator PELL. I must apologize; it was my amendment that changed
your title from Deputy Under Secretary to Under Secretary. Excuse
me, Mr. Vance.
Secretary VANCE. Not at all.
No one has a more profound appreciation of the necessity for a vital
Foreign Service, and no one has a deeper personal obligation than I to
maintain its vitality. From my tenure as Secretary of State and earlier
Government experience, I know the country and its leaders depend
upon a strong and a vigorous Foreign Service. And I believe a strong
Foreign Service needs this act.
ROGERS ACT OF 1924, FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 194.6
The Rogers Act of 1924 which created the modern Foreign Service,
and the Foreign Service Act of 1946, to which the chairman just re-
ferred, which established its present form, were landmarks in their
present time. They served us well. The 1946 Act created the personnel
system which now supplies three-fourths of our ambassadors. This ad- .
ministration, as have all administrations since World War II, de-
pends on it for the people who represent our international interests-
from the most sensitive missions down to the simplest, yet essential,
day-to-day tasks.
But times have changed since 1946. We must be sensitive to the
shifts which have taken place in the environment that affect the For-
eign Service career, and we must look ahead to the challenges of our
Foreign Service, the challenges they will face in the future.
Diplomacy has always been a risky trade. From the days of Ben-
jamin Franklin and the Committees of Correspondence, our diplomats
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have quite literally risked their lives in the service of their country. At
no time since 1946 has service been more difficult than it is in so many
posts today, or as dangerous-as the senseless deaths of able officers in
the last few tragically demonstrate.
The 1946 Act gave us a Foreign Service that answered the demands of
the day. But today's circumstances are significantly changed. The num-
ber of independent governments has more than doubled during that
period, and the range of multilateral institutions and efforts in which
we are engaged has grown enormously. Our international commerce
has vastly expanded and the international dimension of economic
issues has become increasingly central. Major new areas of concern,
such as nuclear nonproliferation, narcotics control, environmental pro-
tection, and science and technology have emerged. And new emphasis
has been given to traditional concerns of American foreign policy, such
consular services.
The Foreign Service has had to respond to these increasing demands
with roughly the same number of people as it had 20 years ago.
At the same time, personnel management is influenced now in ways
that were hardly foreseen in 1946. Formal employee-management rela-
tionships only emerged in the State Department within the last 10
years. A change has also taken place in the perceived advantages of
overseas service. The quality of life in many foreign capitals has de-
teriorated while the threat to personal safety has increased. The de-
clining value of the dollar and high inflation in many nations have
made our task more difficult. Moreover, with a growing number of
families in which both spouses are pursuing professional careers, there
is understandable increasing family reluctance to leave the United
States for foreign posts.
All of these foreign developments underscore the obvious fact that
the Foreign Service is confronted by dramatically different circum-
stances than prevailed a third of a century ago. The Service must
adapt to these new conditions if it is to meet new responsibilities, now
and in the years ahead. And yet, the structure of the Service has not
kept pace. Obsolete, cumbersome, and frequently anomalous organiza-
tional arrangements and personnel distinctions have tended to sap its
traditional strength and hinder its performance.
We need a personnel system which takes account of new realities.
We need the discipline and the incentives that will preserve,
strengthen, and prepare our Foreign Service for the complex chal-
lenges ahead.
The Civil Service Reform Act passed by the Congress last year
strengthens and modernizes the conditions of employment as well as
the management efficiency of the Civil Service in all departments and
agencies, including the Department of State and the foreign affairs
agencies. In recognition of the fundamentally different mission and
conditions of the Foreign Service, however, it was exempted from
many of the basic provisions of that act.
This has given us a rare opportunity to draw from the features of
the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act where they are adaptable to the
unique requirements of the Foreign Service.
as the advancement of human rights. Americans are traveling abroad
in record numbers, with a commensurate increase in the demands for
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COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IMPROVE, SIMPLIFY PERSONNEL ARRANGEMENTS
The bill we are proposing for your consideration today is directly
responsive to a 1976 congressional request initiated by you, Mr. Chair-
man, calling on the Department to submit a "comprehensive plan"
to improve and simplify our personnel arrangements. The proposal
represents 3 years of studies, suspended only during congressional
consideration of the Civil Service legislation last year, but resumed
and intensified during the last 7 months. It represents extensive con-
sultation within the executive branch and with interested members
and staff on the Hill. I have devoted many hours to this process and
am confident that we are submitting a bill which will substantially
strengthen the Foreign Service.
Let me summarize the major features of the bill.
First and foremost, it links the granting of career tenure, promo-
tions, compensation and performance pay, as well as retention in the
Service more closely to the quality of performance.
The bill would require all persons seeking career status to pass a
rigorous testing process before being awarded such status.
It restores an effective "up or out" policy essential to attracting and
keeping the most qualified people and assuring them the opportunity
to move through the ranks at a.-rate which reflects their ability.
Some procedures, such as selection out for substandard performance,
would be applicable for the first time to all Foreign Service person-
nel, from the highest to the lowest ranks.
Other procedures, such as limited career extensions for persons at
the highest ranks of their occupational categories, are new. They would
be administered on the recommendations of annual selection boards
and would provide greater flexibility in assuring that the Service re-
tains the ablest people and the essential skills it needs.
Present voluntary and mandatory retirement features, both essential
for an effective Service, are retained without change.
The bill would create a new Senior Foreign Service, with rigorous
new entry criteria for the highest three ranks. Membership in the
Senior Foreign Service would involve greater benefits and risks based
on performance. With adaptations, the incentive provisions are
modeled on the Senior Executive Service provisions of the 1978 law.
Second, the bill recognizes the clear distinction between the Foreign
Service and the Civil Service. It clearly limits Foreign Service career
status only to those people who accept the discipline of service
overseas.
Today, there are several hunderd members of the Foreign Service in
the Department alone who have entered the Service without any real
expectation that they would have to serve abroad, and who have not
served abroad. The bill would convert these persons to Civil Service or
Senior Executive Service status, with pay and benefits preserved.
Third, it improves the management and efficiency of the Service by
reducing the number of personnel categories from more than a dozen
to two. There would be a single pay scale for both. In general, our per-
sonnel laws would be consolidated, rationalized, and codified to meet
current demand.
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Fourth, it places employee-management relations on a firmer and
a more equitable statutory basis, establishing a new Foreign Service
Labor Relations Board and a Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel.
Fifth, it would underscore our commitment to mitigating the
special hardships and strains on Foreign Service families, and ad-
vancing equal employment opportunity and fair and equitable treat-
ment for all without regard to race, national origin, sex, handicap, or
other such considerations.
Sixth, it would improve the economy and efficiency of government
by promoting maximum compatibility and interchange among the
agencies authorized to use Foreign Service personnel. It would also
foster greater compatibility between the Foreign Service and the
Civil Service.
There are many other features of this bill, Mr. Chairman, which will
be described in more detail by others who follow me, including USICA
[International Communication Agency] Director Reinhardt, Acting
AID [Agency for International Development] Director Nooter, and
Director of OPM [Office of Personnel Management], Scotty Campbell.
The Mission of the Foreign Service, in the years ahead will be
complex and difficult. It will face great demands, both physical and
emotional. But freed by this new proposed charter from the organiza-
tional obstacles to which I have alluded, I am confident that it will be
able to do its essential work for the Nation with distinction, for the vast
majority of its members at all levels are people of uncommon profes-
sional ability, experience, and dedication.
I know you share my view that the country needs a strong Foreign
Service. I believe that when you have completed your examination of
this proposed legislation you will share my view that a strong Foreign
Service needs this act.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your state-
ment. Also, I recognize and have high regard for the interest you have
taken in this project yourself. It is not a very "sexy" issue, as shown
by the fact that usui.;ly the press corps are quite multitudinous when
you appear before a congressional committee, and we have exactly one
occupant at the press table here.
But it is a highly significant piece of legislation, and I think that it
can have a very real effect on the conduct of our diplomacy and the
status of our country in the world in the years to come.
Secretary VANCE. Mr. Chairman, could I just make a point on that?
Senator PELL. Please.
Secretary VANCE. I wholeheartedly share what you have just said.
This is a matter of, I think, great importance to the Foreign Service
and to its effectiveness in the years that lie ahead. I think it is also a
matter of great urgency. I think it is a matter that needs attention at
this time and prompt action by the Congress.
So, I repeat as I did at the outset of my statement, my thanks for
the willingness of this committee to schedule this early hearing so that
we can get on with the business of reviewing this bill and enacting it
into law.
Senator PELL. Thank you. Speaking personally, it is of particular
interest because my father passed the old diplomatic exam and I was
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in the Foreign Service myself some years back. So, I am really per-
sonally very interested in this project as well, and as you pointed out,
it is in the national interest.
I thought you touched on one very important point, and that is that
careers in the Foreign Service involve danger. I think it is a fact that
is lost sight of except in time of war when the military or the civilian
population suffers; but in time of peace there is no more dangerous
situation than the Foreign Service. You and I have both discussed in
the past the fact that four of our chiefs of mission in a certain part of
the world were killed, and this continues to go on. So, they need cer-
tain incentives, rewards, and a different spirit-with all respect to Mr.
Campbell who will be following you-from the Civil Service. The
Civil Service is, I think, more of a "nine-to-five" approach except
in its higher regions when they are, Lord knows, exceptionally
conscientious.
FOREIGN SERVICE, CIVIL SERVICE COMPARABILITY
When you talk about greater comparability to civil service, I think
that is perhaps the wrong line, it ought to have a greater comparability
with the military service where you have promotion and selection out;
where you have the element of danger; where you have the discipline
and the free assignments. I would have thought your thinking would
be more in that direction rather than making it more comparable with
the civil service.
Secretary VANCE. I think it is clearly comparable in many ways to
the military because of the overseas service; because of the risks and
hardships that are incurred by our personnel serving overseas and
their families, including wives and children, I wholeheartedly agree
with you on that. However, I think that there are many who during
their tours of duty obviously are going to be serving at home in the
United States, and where there can be comparability, then we should
have comparable treatment and we should have comparable pay.
That is one of the reasons I believe we should have performance
pay in connection with the Senior Foreign Service, which I know is
a subject you will want to discuss with me.
Senator PELL. You are right,, that is one point of difference in view,
very much the same view that made me feel that young officers should
not have differences in pay. Just like in the military service, you do
not pay extra to the watch officer when he cons the ship at night; nor
do I think that you would pay more for Senior Foreign Service offi-
cers. That is like saying that a brigadier general, or major general, gets
more money when he does a good job, less if he does 'a bad job, rather
than keeping the incentives of "motion up," retention, or selection out,
which really are adequate stimuli, I would have thought.
Why is it that you feel those stimuli are not adequate?
Secretary VANCE. As all of us know, last year the Congress over-
whelmingly decided during its consideration of the Civil Service Re-
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form Act that it was appropriate for senior career officials of the
Government to have the opportunity to earn pay which was more like
that of individuals in the private sector, with comparable responsi-
bilities. This additional compensation, it was decided, should not be
automatic; it should be awarded only to those performing at the higher
level. Now, these two principles were applied and the principle of per-
formance pay has been enacted into law for the Senior Executive
Service.
I believe that it is right and appropriate that the people in the Senior
Foreign Service should have similar treatment and similar compensa-
tion. I think it is correct when there is outstanding performance that
people should be compensated for outstanding performance as they are
in private life. I think it is also important from the standpoint of the
Foreign Service. They should not find themselves in a category where
they are being compensated at a rate less than their colleagues in the
civil service who are working at home.
Senator PELL. Have you ever discussed that thought with Secretary
of Defense Brown that under exactly the same analogy perhaps the
four-star general who has a responsibility that is really tremendous
from a managerial viewpoint, or a two-star general, doing his job well,
should get more money than one who does it badly? I do not see the
difference.
Secretary VANCE. I think that the principle is a sound principle. I
think the principle of rewarding people for good performance is a
sound one. I do not see any reason why that should not apply to the
military as well as this case.
Senator PELL. But do you not think that the incentives I mentioned,
the possibility of a command, or a job, retention in the service or selec-
.tion out, that those are pretty strong stimuli right there?
Secretary VANCE. They are stimuli, I would not disagree on that.
However, I think in the modern world with the costs which are en-
tailed in raising a family-whether it be in the United States or over-
seas-that it is important that the principle of compensation for per-
formance should apply, as well as the other stimuli which we already
know exist.
Senator PELL. I do not want to overburden this dialog, but I think
there is another difference here. There is no promotion, really, in the
civil service because you get to higher rank only by changing a job,
which is just the opposite from the military and the Foreign Service
concept where the rank goes with the individual. Therefore, for ex-
ample, a GS-16 ought to get performance pay if he really does an extra
good job since he cannot get to a GS-17 slot except by changing jobs.
I think there is a very real difference in this regard.
What would be your reaction to that thought?
Secretary VANCE. I look at this thing in a very practical way. My
judgement is, unless you provide performance pay, you are going to
find that the Senior Foreign Service will not be compensated at the
same level as those in the civil service. Therefore, I feel that it is es-
sential that we put this in law on a comparable basis so that we can as-
sure that the people in the Foreign Service are going to receive the
same kind of compensation in terms of amounts, which is possible
under the civil service.
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FOREIGN SERVICE/CIVIL SERVICE COMPARABILITY
Senator PELL. I guess our point of difference is, you come back to
the idea that there should be comparability with the civil service, and
I think the less comparability'the better, it should be comparable with
the military service.
Secretary VANCE. It is required by law.
Senator PELL. In what way, sir?
Secretary VANCE. The Pay Act of 1962.
Senator PELL. That would apply to military service, too, then; would
it not?
Secretary VANCE. I do not know whether it applies to the military or
not.
Senator PELL. If it applies to the Foreign Service, I would imagine
it applies to the military service as well.
Secretary VANCE. I do not know. Scotty could perhaps answer that.
Senator PELL. What is the answer?
Mr. CAMPBELL. There is a simple tie between the military and civil
service pay under which the former are adjusted by the same overall
percent as the latter.
Senator PELL. Under the same theory, then, should we have major
generals get different pays, depending on how well they do their jobs?
Mr. CAMPBELL. As far as I am concerned, the use of bonus pay for
performance could well apply in the military. I do not know Sec-
retary Brown's views, but Secretary Brown very strongly supported
the Civil Service Reform Act and the use of performance pay.
Senator PELL. I do not want to take too much of the Secretary's
time on this point. I think except for this one feature, much of the
rest of the bill is altogether excellent.
PROMOTION/SELECTION OUT PROCESS
Another question that came up the other day is that if you have
what I might call the noncommissioned officers, the support staff, the
secretary who has been in for 10 years and is not being promoted up
within the time frame, would she be compelled to retire, or is there a
grandfather clause in the bill to take care of situations such as this?
Secretary VANCE. With respect only to selection-out for relative
performance, after 5 years they will be treated in a similar fashion
to others. My recollection is, as* a result of our consultations on this,
we have found that the majority would agree that this is something
they could support.
Senator PELL. But for 5 years the grandfather clause would apply?,
Secretary VANCE. Yes.
Senator PELL. I have come across secretaries who spoke vigorously
on this subject.
What will be the long-term cost of the bill to the Government, com-
paratively speaking?
Secretary VANCE. There will be very slight no additional cost di-
rectly resulting from the passage of the bill. However, if we move to
performance pay-which I hope very strongly we will-at that time
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there obviously would, in my judgment, be additional costs. I cannot
give you an estimate at this time as to what they would be, this would
have to be taken care of in connection with the annual budgetary
process. Therefore, it would be only a guess on my part. I might point
out that the passage of the bill will not result in any automatic
promotions or deirnotions, and that the pay comparability study
which was mandated by the Congress, and which has been just com-
pleted and submitted to you, I believe, on June 20, will be imple-
mented separately. Its cost will be part of the regular authorization
and appropriation process.
On that t might just mention that you have the results of the
study by Hay Associates which, again, I think, came about as a result
of a request that you made, Mr. Chairman. It is a very interesting
study. It is also being reviewed within the executive branch at this
time by a group consisting of the interested agencies and elements
within the Government. We hope to complete our review of that
study by the end of August, and hope by that time to have an
administration position which we would submit to you, reflecting the
views of the administration, based upon that study and its inter-
relationship to pay scales.
Senator PELL. As you know, I believe very strongly that our For-
eign Service officers should be compensated at as high a rate as pos-
sible, and that would not worry me at all. I particularly believe the
junior ones should, with the responsibilities they have.
I guess where we part company is whether you would have the
incentive pay in addition to the possibilities of promotion.
Secretary VANCE. Let me say on that, I took a look during the
process of my study and review of the bill as it developed on whether
or not we should seek to have incentive or merit pay at the lower
levels as well. I concluded that would be a mistake because it would
be very hard to administer at that level. Indeed, I think it might
end up with a sort of negative effect because if the Congress saw at
that level that there was incentive or merit pay available, they might
not give the necessary authorizations for cost-of-living increases, and
employees might end up, on balance, worse off than otherwise.
I do not think the same thing applies at the three senior grades
which would be contained in the Senior Foreign Service.
Senator PELL. I think it was Napoleon who once said that a man
will give up his life for a piece of little red ribbon. I thought that
incentives were along those lines, the awards and medals that you
give. 1 do not think that a really dedicated Foreign Service officer
is going to do a better job or a worse job if he gets more money for
it. I think it is almost demeaning to him in that position. That is
where we differ.
Secretary VANCE. We really do part. I really do not think it is
demeaning, Mr. Chairman. I think that it is important to reward
superior performance, outstanding achievement by the medals and
awards that are made. But I do not think that precludes giving ade-
quate compensation to our people, which is comparable to what oth-
ers, who are doing similar or even less demanding jobs, are getting.
Senator PELL. I cannot imagine a more conscientious, hard-working
and able Secretary of State than you are.. Yet, I question whether you
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would do a better job if you got a little more pay than one of your
colleagues in the Cabinet.
Secretary VANCE. I am not suggesting it for Cabinet officers.
Senator PELL. All right. Senator Lugar?
Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I would add my appreciation to that which the chair-
man has already expressed for your appearance here this morning. I
think this is a tremendously important bill and it highlights an im-
portant role for a Secretary of State. Most of your appearances here
and elsewhere are about major issues involving our international rela-
tions, and that is the essence of your job in many ways; but from my
limited visits to embassies abroad and visits with the Foreign Service
personnel I know how important it is to each one of them-not only
our Ambassadors but the rank and file-to know of your personnel in-
terest in their careers. It is tremendously important to them. On the
trip I took with Secretary Blumenthal to the Middle East last year
we had occasion to visit some relatively embattled positions with the
people who are, if not risking their lives-and they certainly were in
Iran when we were there in November-are at least located in some-
what remote places where families have very great difficulty in com-
ing and going. They are, I think, good examples of some of the people
you described in your testimony today. This Service is interesting and
exciting, but it is sacrificial in many ways.
On those frontiers we ought to be* well represented. We need to have
quality people who are genuinely excited about Foreign Service, as
opposed to persons-whether they are in the Navy or in the Foreign
Service-who really would prefer "shore duty" permanently.
From conversation with the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] the
other evening, I learned that in the Navy the problems of recruitment
are clearly the two you pointed to today, compensation and the prob-
lem of "shore duty" as opposed to sea duty. American life has evolved
in ways in which a higher material standard of living is desired. I do
not want to denigrate the motives of Foreign Service officers, but
failure to take heed of this, it seems to me, is courting disaster.
PERFORMANCE PAY IMPLEMENTATION
I agree enthusiastically with your idea of performance pay, particu-
larly for those who have considerable responsibility. I think it is a
courageous thing to implement. Clearly, in the whole realm of public
life, whether it be schoolteachers or fire or police service or the Foreign
Service, the trend has been down for a long time. They have been sort
of lost in the herd.
Now, it seems to me, this legislation offers a?chance for a break-
through. The Foreign Service is made up of first-class personnel at-
tained through both recruitment and the screening out process. They
deserve to be paid better. t think they ought to be paid very well. If
the right people are there, they will make money and good will for
our country many times over. This is an aggressive posture that I think
is exciting.
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FOREIGN SERVICE VIEWS CONCERNING LEGISLATION
What I ask you-and you have touched upon this briefly-is what
is the general feeling in the Foreign Service when members take a
look at this legislation? Is this going to have a boost for morale for
those that are presently there, quite apart from the ones that will be
coming along? What sort of comment can you make about that?
Secretary VANCE. Thank you very much, Senator. I would welcome
the opportunity to respond to that question.
First, let me say that there is a broad consensus in favor of many of
the principles that are contained in the bill. First is the affirmation of the essential role of the Foreign Service.
Second, the provisions which provide for conversion to civil service
status of Foreign Service personnel obligated and needed only for
domestic service.
Third, the principles which are involved in the statutory employee-
management relation which are contained in this bill.
Fourth, the single Foreign Service pay scale.
Fifth, the consolidation of multiple Foreign Service personnel cate
gories and subcategories from the many that exist now, into two.
Sixth, the new procedures to assure "up or out" principles which
make attrition and promotion more predictable and reliable, and link
promotion and retention more closely to performance.
On all of those there is a broad consensus. There are differences with
respect to other aspects of the bill. I am pleased that as people learn
more about the bill, as we are able to discuss the-bill now that we have
it completed and out on the table with the people in the Foreign Serv-
ice, both at home and abroad, there is an increasing enthusiasm for the
bill. That is not saying that everybody agrees with all the provisions of
the bill because they do not. You will hear from some of those who will
be coming before you of provisions that they would like to see changed.
I think it is important to note that the Board of Foreign Service
has endorsed the bill. On the 20th of June it adopted a statement as-
serting, "The Board believes that the bill represents a well-considered
effort to meet existing anomalies in the present Foreign Service person-
nel structure and should be supported." That is a broadly based group.
I think that their support and endorsement is important.
As to the other elements of the Foreign Service community, I think
they really. should speak for themselves. You will hear from John
Reinhardt and Bob Nooter who will be following on after me; they
can tell you the views of themselves and their agencies with respect to
the bill. I think it is fair to say that they generally endorse the bill, but,
they have spoken and will speak for themselves.
SAFEGUARDS FOR "RISK TAKERS"
Senator LUGAR. Mr. Secretary, in making these evaluations-and I
suppose this is always one of the difficulties of a merit pay system, even
in the best of all worlds-the people who make these evaluations must
be fair-minded and make the right sort of choice. What sort of "fall-
back position" is there to protect and to promote people who are con-
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spicuous in their work in various countries? These people might be
called in the business world "risk takers," people who are self-starters
and who have a great deal of initiative. I do not mean by this that they
are busy taking policy into their own hands or that they are serving
as alternate Secretaries of State or preempting the Congress, but that
they are really "live-wire" people who make a big difference in how
this country's mission is accomplished.
Such people frequently engender opposition. Such is the nature of
this kind of person. In fact, they may become controversial and at
the very time we are attempting to get a merit pay system in the For-
eign Service, they become known as people who rock the boat and cause
trouble.
What sorts of safeguards are there for the system so that these sorts
of people in fact are rewarded? Is there some type of review by the
Secretary, or if not by you, by someone in the system who says, "Now,
let us take a look at this, Mr. X or Mrs. X in that situation really is
somebody who is doing a good job. I appreciate all the rumbles and
the ripples that are coming along here, but at the same time, let us take
another look at it."
Can you make any broad comments to this sort of general question?
Secretary VANCE. Let me say first of all, I believe it is very im-
portant that we have people who are, as you described them, risk tak-
ers : people who are willing to come forward and put their neck out on
the line by making suggestions which are innovative and which may
contain elements of risk, but should be surfaced and should be consid-
ered by those at higher levels, as well as those on the ground where
these people are actually working.
I think it is important that it be known that is encouraged. I think
that performance pay is something which can be used to give a signal
that this is the kind of thing we are looking for, that capable people
who are willing to take risks will be rewarded.
Second, getting down to the more nitty-gritty level of this there are
dissent channels which people can use if they feel that they are being
stifled in their efforts to come forward with ideas which are being
blocked. Certainly, as far as the Selection Boards are concerned, we
make very clear to them that this kind of initiative is not to be penal-
ized, it is to be looked at which favor rather than in a negative way.
I certainly try to make it clear in my dealings with my colleagues
in the Department that this is the kind of thing I welcome and en-
courage. I hope, to an increasing extent, this will be understood and
become known throughout the Department.
Ben, do you want to add anything?
Mr. READ. No. The essential protection is the selection boards, Sena-
tor Lugar, and they are completely independent of management. The
precepts which they' follow are very carefully structured, and are based
,on dialog between management and the labor representatives. The
precepts instruct the Selection Boards to reward initiative; reward
leadership ; reward the qualities that you have well defined. We have
no sense that the Boards do otherwise in practice.
Secretary VANCE. I might go back. I faced the same question when
I was working in the Defense Department, when I was Secretary of
the Army. I remember the best way that I could get at it was to make
this clear in the precept to the selection boards. I would often bring
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in the selection boards and talk to them, and convey to them my strong
feelings that this kind of initiative was something to be welcomed,
rather than be frowned upon. I found that it worked-not always,
but it did have a beneficial effect.
ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS
Senator LUGAR. Let me ask you this question, Mr. Secretary. Clearly,
the problems of the Foreign Service officer grow, as they do for each
person in public service, whether in the executive or legislative branch,
in terms of subject matter areas for which we are responsible, even
though this may not be our area of talent.
One of the problems that I have noted as a member of the Agricul-
ture Committee, for example, is that there have been considerable prob-
lems at various levels in our Embassies in understanding, agriculture
problems, both from the standpoint of marketing our products and
opening up new channels in which production occurs in various coun-
tries. In the past this may have been consigned to something that agri-
culture people do, as opposed to'real politics and the problems of state
that other people do. I think now we all see that these things are closely
intertwined : food and nutrition issues, population issues and a whole
realm of technical and scientific issues are important for statecraft.
How can the entry situation be structured in such a way that there
are not impossible requirements to qualify, but that it very clearly is
inculcated that Foreign Service officers need to be broad gaged and
sensitive to implementing the foreign agricultural acts that we have
been passing in recent years.
Secretary VANCE. I would like to ask Ben Read to answer that ini-
tially, and then I might want to add a word.
Mr. READ. The economic and commercial officers in the Foreign
Service, Senator Lugar, are sensitized to the agricultural opportuni-
ties in a variety of ways in their training, in the directives they receive
from the Department, and by the fact that, in the major" embassies,
they work with foreign agricultural service specialists from the De-
partment of Agriculture who are very much part of the country
mission, country team.
As you know, this last year the Congress passed the Agricultural
Trade Act, and in year one of that act we are in the process
of setting up six agricultural trade offices which will be integrated
with our missions abroad and which I hope will lead to an even
stronger enipliasis of integration of effort along the lines you
suggested.
Senator LUGAR. Did you have something to add,. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary VANCE. No.
INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL INTEGRATION INTO OVERSEAS PROGRAMS
Senator LUGAR. Finally, I have one more question, and it relates to
my view that we must -do better with regard to intelligence personnel
and their integration into our overseas programs.
Now, this will not be solved this morning or even in this act, but
there are very real problems. I know from visits to Embassies-I have
tried to be interested in several sorts of issues at one time-how
strained and how difficult the intelligence role can become, and how
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vulnerable on occasion, I think, our intelligence. people may be due to
lack of sensitivity or simply because the'rules do not allow sensitivity.
While we are taking a look at setting up new ways of classification,
Fesprit de corps, and all this, I would think it a shame if we reinforced
this longstanding problem because we assumed it was insoluble. For
our national. interest we really need to do so a great deal better.
I wonder if you have any comment on that.
Secretary VANCE. Yes ; I do have some comment. I have from the
outset been working with my colleagues in other branches of the
Government on how to integrate better the intelligence functions and
their relationship to the work of the Ambassador as the mission head
in a given country. I have worked very closely with Stan Turner to
try and improve the relationships between the Department of State
and others involved on intelligence matters. I think we are, making
some progress. I watched this very closely over the last year and a
half or so, and I think if you would ask them,-you would get the same
answer that I have given.
Second,.I think it is very important that we continue to strive to
increase.the quality of our political reporting which is of vital im-
portance'to us back here in making judgments as to actions to take
in connection with the activities that are reported to us from the field.
We have embarked on a number of actions to strengthen the political
reporting, including adding additional persons in certain missions
where it is 'important to strengthen that organization in that
particular post; where the task becomes too difficult, to bring in addi-
tional people; to send in people to work with them and help in develop-
ing better quality in the reporting from a particular post.
As a result of it, again; I think I see progress in the product that
is beginning to come out. We have to keep working at it. It is a con-
tinuing task that we all have, but I think it is one which we clearly
recognize and give high'attention to.
Senator LuGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
SUPPORT FOR` S. 1450
Mr. Chairman..I appreciate this. chance of dialog with the Secre-
tary and your calling this hearing; and likewise-although I will not
be able to stay for his testimony-seeing Scottie Campbell here who
has, I think, accomplished so much in the whole civil service reform.
I just would want to be associated with you and with others, I am
certain, on the committee, who will advocate this legislation and try
to push it along.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much indeed, Senator.
Going back for a second to this question of pay. I want the record
to show clearly that I support and recognize the fact that pay is a
? very strong incentive, but where we part company is that I think the
incentive should be promotion, and that now you reach a situation
where a class II officer may be receiving just about the same amount
of money as a class I officer. I think that is wrong. I will do anything
I can to try to change that.
Where we differ is to say that within the class itself one should pick
and choose. I think when you are in a very highly responsible job, you
are at the top of the Foreign Service, top of the heap, then the incen-
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tive is to be promoted which you still can be, and leave your name in
history.
This is a subject we can talk about later. Except for this, I am in
general support of this legislation. I congratulate you and thank you
for all the hard work you have put into this, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary VANCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator FELL. Thank you.
Our next witness will be Mr. Campbell, Director of the Office of
Personnel Management.
Mr. Campbell, we welcome you here, and I join in saying what an
excellent job you have done and are doing in your tough assignment.
We look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN B. CAMPBELL, DIRECTOR, U.S. OFFICE
OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I do have a brief formal statement that I would like to make, and
then I will be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.
OPM INTEREST, ACTIVITIES RELATING TO FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL
SYSTEM
The Office of Personnel Management's interest and activities in rela-
tion to the Foreign Service personnel system are substantial. Through
Executive Order 11434, we have significant responsibilities for advis-
ing the Secretary of State and the Director of the ICA. In addition,
we are represented on the Board of the Foreign Service and the Board
of Examiners for the Foreign Service. These contacts have meant that
the staff of the Civil Service Commission, now the Office of Personnel
Management [OPM], participated in'the earliest formative stages of
the plan to reorganize the State Department's personnel system. OPM
has been consulted frequently in the final stages of development. We
have provided comments and assistance to those working on the plan,
and we believe the proposed legislation before you represents not only
significant change but a major step forward for the Foreign Service.
FOREIGN SERVICE/CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT COMPARABILITY
'The Foreign Service Act of 1979, in many respects-and we believe
appropriately-parallels the Civil Service Reform Act. Certainly the
impact on the Service will be comparable to the impact that the Civil
Service Reform Act is having and will have on the civil service.
Those who have preceded me today, the Secretary of State, and those
who will follow, have and will provide some details. I will concen-
trate, therefore, on those features that we are particularly pleased to
see in this proposal and on those about which we have some questions.
NEED FOR CONTINUING, STABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMPONENT
First, the Department of State, AID, and ICA have recognized the
need for a continuing and stable civil service component. The eventual
savings, which will be brought about by clearly distinguishing between
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employees whose duties do not include overseas service and those whose
duties do require it, will be significant.
The Foreign Service personnel system is designed to give flexibili-
ties and benefits to a worldwide Service requiring mobility and hard-
ship assignments and, as such, has a unique and important place in the
array of Federal personnel systems. The attempt to adapt that system
to jobs that did not carry the same requirements produced both diffi-
culties and inequities.
The proposed legislation requires conversion of employees who do
not serve overseas and allows a painless transition by providing for
no loss in pay or benefits as a result of conversion. We give our full
support to the Department in its wish to make a clean start and support
the Department in seeking authority to allow retention of Foreign
Service benefits for those converted to the civil service.
SECTION 2104 (b) CLARIFICATION
We believe an addition should be made to section 2104(b) to clarify
that the retention of coverage under the Foreign Service retirement
system shall not extend to employees after transfer to another agency.
We recognize that this was open to interpretation after the bill cleared
the executive branch. However, without this limitation, those converted
would be advantaged over those who had not converted by being able
to transfer to a nonforeign affairs agency while staying in the Foreign
Service retirement system.
The Foreign Service was specifically excluded from the Senior Ex-
ecutive Service in the Civil Service Reform Act. We therefore warmly
endorse the Department's proposal to establish a Senior Foreign Serv-
ice which has many features that parallel those of the Senior Execu-
tive Service. We particularly note that the Senior Foreign Service
proposal will hold members accountable for their performance, and
reward those whose performance is outstanding.
We recognize that there are special conditions that affect personnel
who have to serve overseas, and that therefore it may not be practical
to establish a Senior Foreign Service fully comparable to the Senior
Executive Service which, incidentally, became operational on July 13.
We see the two systems as complementary, however, and as being able
to work together.
There is a strong emphasis in the bill on the improvement of inter-
agency coordination, as for example through greater consultation
among the foreign affairs agencies. We have long recognized a need
for closer ties between the personnel regulations of the foreign affairs
agencies. We have noted differences in the approaches between agen-
cies that are both justified and unjustified. We therefore view it as a
major goal to bring the personnel policies of the various foreign serv-
ice agencies into closer conformity so that neither management nor
the members of the Service will be disadvantaged by the existence of
unwarranted differences.
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Bringing compatibility to the personnel systems of the three foreign
aff airs agencies is one of the most important advisory roles of the
Board of the Foreign Service, which will be established in statute with
representation by the Office of Personnel Management. The Board of
Foreign Service has worked toward this end on many occasions in the
past. The Board allows executive line management to influence per-
sonnel policy and, thus, is in step with the objectives of civil service
reform.
Having touched on these points where we are in complete agree-
ment, I should note that we have had some concern about the inclusion
of supervisors in the collective bargaining unit. In this sense title X
differs from title. VII of the Civil Service Reform Act, which states
that a unit does not appropriately include-with a few exceptions-
any management officials or supervisors. We have generally thought it
inappropriate to have any managers or supervisors within the bar-
gaining unit. I recognize, however, that there are historical differences
in the Foreign Service situation that the Congress may wish to take
into account. I simply would not want, action in this field to be re-
garded as indicative of the Congress views on other Federal personnel
systems where the exclusion of managers from bargaining units its
a well-established policy.
EMPLOYMENT OF FAMILY MEMBERS ABROAD
Another problem that we have had with the proposal relates to the
employment of family members abroad. The authority of the Sec-
retary in section 333(c), to "prescribe regulations for the guidance of
all agencies regarding the employment at posts aboard of family
members of Government personnel" goes beyond the Foreign Service.
We believe OPM should retain regulatory authority in this area for
employment in agencies such as DOD [Department of Defense]. We
realize that the sectional analysis states that these regulations shall be
advisory and designed to set forth uniform standards and criteria.
However, the draft language does not make clear that the regulations
are "advisory," nor does it recognize the legitimate role of the Office
of Personnel Management in regulating employment outside of the
Foreign Service.
At the July X17 hearing on the House side, Chairman Fascell of the
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations explained that this provision had
been drafted by the subcommittee and it was not its intention to have
the Department regulating other agencies. We have been assured that
this language will be corrected in the House subcommittee.
Section 701 (b) of the draft bill provides authority for functional
training to family members in anticipation of their assignment abroad
or while abroad. We read this authority as extending to family mem-
bers of employees of non-Foreign Service agencies. We therefore en-
dorse the provision with the understanding that family members of
employees of all Federal agencies operating overseas will have access
to available functional training in order to avoid favoring family
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members of one agency over those of others. I have been assured by the
State Department that they share my interpretation of this provision.
OPM SUPPORT FOR LEGISLATION
I do wish to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that this legislation has
my strong support. I think it will contribute materially to the conduct
of foreign affairs while according proper consideration to the needs of
employees. Its following of some of the basic principles of the Civil
Service Reform Act is, of course, a matter of considerable satisfac-
tion to those of us who worked on that.
That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, and I stand
.ready to answer any questions you may have.
Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Campbell.
SECTION 2104(b) CLARIFICATION
In connection with your testimony I want to be sure I understand
one point where you say, "We believe an addition should be made to
section 2104(b) to clarify that the retention of coverage under the
Foreign Service retirement system shall not extend to employees after
transfer to another agency." Does that mean to another agency of the
Government?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes.
Senator PELL. In other words, to the Commerce Department.
Mr. CAMPBELL. To non-foreign affairs agencies.
Senator PELL. Not in the State Department.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Not in the State Department, right.
Senator PELL. Then, moving on, the provision in the paragraph you
are talking about, the top of that page, should there not be one boss,
even if people are working under another agency, under Agriculture
or Interior? Should there not be one boss, the Ambassador, to set the
rules?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I do not have any problem with that if the person is
assigned to work in the Embassy. Our concern here is about employees
of the Defense Department, for example, who are serving overseas. We
simply think it inappropriate that the State Department would make
rules and regulations related to employees of other departments and
agencies. This is a responsibility that the central personnel agency of
the Federal Government has always had.
Senator PELL. If for political reasons the Ambassador to, let us say,
Hungary, did decide that he really did not want to see the wives of the
Defense attaches getting a job in the local economy for one reason or
another, or did not want them to be schoolteachers, something of that
sort because of political reasons. In his judgment it would not be wise
for the interest of the United States. Should he not have the right to
tell the Defense attache, "I really would prefer it if your wife did not
work in the local economy" ?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, if the attache is responsible to the Ambassador
then, indeed, the Ambassador would have that kind of control.
Your example raises some difficulties in relation to affirmative action
and equal employment opportunity, and the like. But, leaving that
aside,, I am not talking about people who work in the Embassy, I am
talking about people who work in other U.S. activities abroad.
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. Senator PELL. That is exactly what I am talking about. I am talking
about a Defense attache's wife.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes; but the Defense attache is in the Embassy and
thereby works for the Ambassador.
Senator PELL. All right, what about a Treasury Department
employee?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I think if you had a Treasury Department employee
who was not working in the Embassy, who had some other assignment
overseas, that the general rules and regulations for people serving
overseas should apply to that person, rather than rules and regulations
made by the State Department for State Department employees.
Senator PELL. Would you give me an example of one or two cate-
gories of employees you are thinking about?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, the largest group and probably over 90 per-
cent of those are civilians working for the Defense Department.
Senator PELL. Do you not think that; for example, our Ambassador
to Germany should be able to set the rules? That in a period of ten-
sion he might decide that he does not want wives of Defense Depart-
ment personnel working in the local economy?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I would think that should be done only after con-
sultation with the Secretary of Defense.
Senator PELL. I see your point. I am. not sure I agree with you. I
wanted to be sure I understood it.
SHOULD THERE BE "PARACHUTE CLAUSE"?
Now, do you think that there should be a so-called parachute clause
similar to that contained in the Civil Service Reform Act for a person
who fails to come up to the required standard in the Senior Executives
Service, that he should be permitted to fall back?
Mr. CAMPBELL. The Foreign Service system is a different one because
of the "up or out" provisions.
Senator PELL. Right.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Therefore, it seems to me that the parachute system
is less relevant to that kind of personnel system than it is to the regular
civil service system.
Senator PELL. So it should not have a parachute system?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I do not want to answer that in a final way because
there may be some situations where that did make sense, and quite
frankly, I am not certain how the legislation deals with that.
FOREIGN SERVICE, CIVIL SERVICE PAY COMPARABILITY
Senator PELL. Do you think that Foreign Service officers in general
are paid about on a comparable basis now with civil service?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, there are points of tie between the General
Schedule pay and the Foreign Service pay. The effort has been to try
to make those ties at points of approximately equal responsibility and
equal obligation. Whether those are correct at this time is a matter that
is being considered in the task force the Secretary of State mentioned
in terms of the study that has been done: of the pay levels of the For-
eign Service. Until that group has reviewed that study and, as the
Secretary of State said, until the administration has had an opportu-
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nity to reach a position on that, I am not prepared to say whether there
ought to be some changes.
I would point out that the Office of Personnel Management is very
much involved with that task force, is a part of it, and we are trying
very hard to make the system as fair and equitable as we can on both
sides. We. do believe these needs to- continue to be a tie between the
two pay systems.
Senator PELL. You speak of obligations. How do you crank into your
judgment the physical danger of assassination that does not affect the
civil service?
.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, I would; say only that, first, it does affect some
members of the civil service, whether they are people involved in the
protective services or the like. So, it is not a matter that is exclusively
related to the Foreign :Service. I would, in addition, say that that
factor obviously is taken.into account by those in the decision as to
whether to join the Service or not. Obviously, you cannot put a.price
on it.
Senator PELL. For example, do not the Treasury Department, Secret
Service, 'or FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] get a slightly
higher salary because of the risk element in their job?
Mr. CAMPBELL. They get privileges in relation to early retirement.
But, in relationship to the risk involved, it is not a matter of special
pay for that, except to the degree to which that matter is taken into
very broad account in doing a position analysis. But, basically, for
those protective services, .it is the -early retirement which is the
privilege.
. Senator PELL. In' connection with the upper level Foreign Service
officers, if 'the performance pay was removed but you kept the rest -of
the concept as fairly as you could there, what would be the impact of
the legislation? What, in your view, would be the effect?
Mr. CAMPBELL. If I understand the question, I think that it would
considerably undermine one of the important elements in the legisla-
tion in its emphasis throughout on performance; on performance as it
relates to promotion, retention, and, in the case of the upper level, to
the opportunity of earning bonuses. As you know, this matter was very
carefully considered in the Civil Service Reform Act. I would point
out in relation to the questions and comments you made in your dialog
you had with the Secretary of State, that in fact the Senior Executive
Service is not a position-based system now, but is a rank-in-person
system and in that sense is like the Foreign Service and the military,
rather than being like the old civil service system.
It is our judgment that the opportunity of earning bonuses-and I
would point out that they can be substantial, up to 20 percent of base
salary, and there are in addition Presidential awards to which 5 per-
cent may receive in any given year $10,000; 1 percent, $20,000. So, we
are talking about what we believe to be appropriate awards for out-
standing performance. Quite frankly, I do think that is more helpful
to those in those top senior positions than receiving plaques or other
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kinds of awards of that kind, which has been traditional practice in
the public service.
Senator PELL. Recalling our dialog on that same subject, you say
you would advocate this for the military, too.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I would have absolutely no problem: with it being
used in the military. Obviously, I would want to go through the process
of considering that and talking to the military people.to determine
their views on it. But I see nothing inconsistent with military service
and the opportunity of earning bonuses for outstanding performance.
Senator PELL. If . this is the philosophy and the viewpoint of the
administration, then it ought to be carried to its logical conclusion,
which would be the Cabinet.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, it does seem to me that you reach a point at
the top of the system where the service itself and the distinction that
goes with that service provides a nonmaterial reward. On the other
hand, I would personally have no problem with a Presidential per-
formance appraisal system that would indeed make judgments about
quality of performance of those in the Cabinet. I must say that I think
the alternative to bad performance should not be no bonus, but perhaps
should be relief from responsibility.
Senator PELL. Do you not think when you go to the top three pro-
posed grades in the Foreign Service, that is the top of the system; too.
You are an Ambassador, you are a career Minister-what is the third
grade?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Counselor.
Senator PELL. That does not make sense because you have many
people who are consuls who are class IV now.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I am going to have to ask.
FOREIGN SERVICE TERMINOLOGY
Senator PELL. So, a man could be a consul at class IV, but would
not be a consul under the present terminology, the in-house consul
until he has reached class I.
Out of curiosity, why do we use the phrase "consul" when so many
people become consul at a much lower rank; why not use the phrase
"Minister, Minister-Consul, and Ambassador"? I can see confusion in
people's minds. "Oh, Joe Jones has just made consul and is still class
IV,' calling a man a general when he is still a major. That would be
a little confusing.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I defer to the State Department on the terminology
question.
PERFORMANCE PAY, SELECTION OUT QUESTIONS
If I may add, Mr. Chairman, just one word in relation to the per-
formance pay issue, and following up on the comments you just made.
I think performance pay does serve the purpose of promoting out-
standing performance, but equally I see it as an appropriate reward;
in other words, it is an opportunity for people in the top levels of the
Government to receive bonuses in real money as a way of appropri-
ately rewarding them for outstanding service. I believe that the pub-
lic sector should have that kind of reward system. I think the fact
we do not have it is one of the reasons we have some of the bureau-
cratic characteristics the system does have.
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Senator PELL. In the 9-to-5 syndrome?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes.
Senator PELL. I am wondering now if the selection out for "time
in class" can sometimes result in the Foreign Service losing its most
highly qualified members first since they get to the highest grade the
quickest. In other words, a young man will rise like a meteor and
then out because he has risen so quickly and still cannot meet the
competition at that top grade.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I again would defer to people from the State
Department who are more expert on the system than I am. I would
only suggest that with that kind of rise, it seems to me, that the possi-
bility of being selected out would be relatively small.
Mr. READ. Could I add something, Mr. Chairman?
Senator PELL. Please, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. READ. One of the new features of the bill is a renewable limited
career extension, that would take care of it.
Senator PELL. Does this bill look into the question at all of pay for
Foreign Service wives? I happen not to agree with their proposal, but
I know it is of great interest in the service. Is there anything in the
bill that speaks to that question?
Mr. CAMPBELL. No.
Senator PELL. And how will the bill affect Affirmative Action
efforts, and how does the affirmative action provision compare with
the civil service's?
Mr. CAMPBELL. The affirmative action provisions are very similar
to the civil service side. In addition to that, the State Department
has developed a route into the system that attempts to emphasize
the affirmative action character of the appointments. What the legis-
lation does is to strongly reaffirm the Department's commitment to
and obligation in the affirmative action area.
Senator PELL. What is your own view with regard to the desir-
ability of a separate Foreign Service?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I do not have any attachment to uniformity. I be-
lieve that the character of the obligations, the fact of overseas service,
and the very fact of the history of the Service_ argues very strongly
in favor of a separate. Foreign Service.
FOREIGN SERVICE KINSHIP TO MILITARY SERVICE
Senator PELL. Do you see what I keep driving at, that there is a
greater kinship of the Foreign Service to the military service than
civil service? If you had a scale, do you feel it leans more in the direc-
tion of civil service or the military?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I think that one has to talk about that in relation
to different aspects of the system. We tended in the dialog here this
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morning to emphasize heavily the top part of ` the system. I would
say in relation to the Senior Foreign Service and the top military
officers, and the Senior Executive Service [SES], that what we are
seeing first in the Civil Service Reform Act, and now in the Foreign
Service Act of 1979, is a. coming together in which in many ways the
SES moves in the direction of the Foreign Service rather than the
Foreign Service in this instance moving in the direction of the civil
service.
What we: try to do is.to capture some of that esprit of the top man-
agers of the.system through the Senior Executive Service. So, in that
sense, I would argue that we have moved at the top of the system in the
direction of the. Foreign Service and ?the .top military officers in the
armed services.
Senator PELL. But very often in the Foreign Service you get a young
man who will be assigned to be in charge of a small Embassy or as-
signed to a consulate where he will be on his own because the consul
general has not come, with very real responsibilities and very real crises
turning up. It seems to me that those would be more akin to what a
young captain or major might face, than, what a GS-8 would prob-
ably,face'in his. life.
What would be your view?
Mr. CAMPBELL. It depends a little bit on the level of the rank.
Senator PELL. I may have gotten my'numbers wrong; a 35-year-old,
let me put it that way.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Certainly, within the career service there are 35-
year-olds in grades 13, 14, and 15, particularly those who serve outside
of Washington,: where 85. percent of the career service is, who have
very heavy responsibilities and carry very significant assignments ;
and can indeed end up in crisis situations. One need only point to Three
Mile Island as an example.
Therefore, I would not-perhaps because of where I sit-draw the
sharp distinction that you have been drawing today between the two
career services, the Foreign Service and the civil service.
Senator FELL. I must.say, I applaud you for the dedication and
enthusiasm, and the strength you have brought to the civil service. I
like your idea of rather than bringing the Foreign Service to the
civil service, bring the civil service toward the Foreign Service. I
applaud you in that regard.
Thank you very much for being with us this morning.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator PELL. Our next witness is John Reinhardt, Director of the
International Communication Agency.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. REINHARDT, DIRECTOR, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY r
Mr. REINHARDT. Mr. Chairman, if it is agreeable with you, we will
simply put the whole statement in the record.
For the record, I support the general principles of the legislation
that has been submitted to the Congress. The statement makes this
clear in some detail. I am prepared to respond to your questions.
Senator PELL. I had an opportunity to go over this statement, and it
will be entered in full in the record.
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[Mr. Reinhardt's prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. REINHARDT
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you
today to discuss an issue of great importance and interest : The proposed Foreign
Service Act of 1979.
Proposals for changing personnel policies deserve the closest scrutiny and
the most careful consideration because they go to the very heart of the morale,
efficiency, and effectiveness of any career service. Experience has made us fully
aware of this fact in the Foreign Service, and it has weighed on our minds at
every step of our deliberations about the proposed bill. We have consulted with
representatives of our union, Local 1812 of the American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees, who have had considerable influence on the development of the
Agency's position. We have consulted members of the Service, both at home
and abroad, who have studied the various proposals and have shared their
concerns.
We have worked closely with the Department of State in drafting the proposed
legislation and have been encouraged by the cooperation we have received. We
have met with Secretary Vance, Under Secretary Read, Director General Barnes
and other officials of the Department. Our lawyers and. personnel staffs have
been in regular contact with their counterparts at State as the bill was drafted.
The proposed Act reaffirms the need for a professional Foreign Service with
its own personnel system. The purposes of the bill, have already been described
in the testimony and supplementary material presented by the Department of
State. I associate myself fully with those purposes and urge the Committe to
report favorably on the bill as rapidly as may be possible.
There are a few major provisions which would have a significant impact on
USICA and which I would like to address.
(1) the bill creates a Senior Foreign Service comparable to the Senior Execu-
tive Service in the Civil Service. I support the proposed Senior Foreign Service.
I see it as a positive personnel management proposal, well adapted to promote the
best opportunities and incentives for our ablest senior officers. I believe the
Senior Foreign Service system will contribute to enhanced productivity in the
public service. At the present time, Foreign Service Officers do not enjoy many
of the incentives which will be available to their counterparts in the Senior Exec-
utive Service. The Senior Foreign Service proposal would put the two career serv-
ices on a par and make available to senior Foreign Service Officers the incentives
and rewards which are now available only to senior Civil Service employees. In
return, it is reasonable to set the highest,. most stringent standards of per-
formance, as this bill does.
(2) The bill provides a single Foreign Service salary schedule for American
personnel. The new schedule will supersede the two overlapping schedules that
now exist for officers and staff employees. This will enable us to achieve the long
sought objective of having a uniform pay scale for all Foreign Service personnel,
including Foreign Service Information Officers, Foreign Service staff employees,
and Foreign Service Reserve Officers who are available for worldwide Reserve
Officers who are available for worldwide assignment.
(3) The bill will provide a useful statutory basis for labor-management rela-
tions, which has been lacking heretofore.
(4) Consistent with Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977, which established
USICA, the bill provides the Director with all authority necessary to manage
USICA's personnel systems. While seeking the maximum compatibility in per-
sonnel policies and practices among the foreign affairs agencies, it allows for
differences necessary for the accomplishment of separate Agency missions.
(5) Finally, under the proposed bill, the Foreign Service "domestic specialist"
personnel category is eliminated by the provision that all such personnel shall
be converted mandatorily to the Civil Service not later than three years after
the effective date of the Act.
We concur with the need to consolidate the personnel systems which have
evolved over the years, clearly sorting them into two systems-foreign and
domestic. Only in that way will all employees know clearly where they stand
in terms of work requirements, pay scales and assignment obligations.
1CA has taken a.number of steps toward this end in recent years. We have
stopped the practice of appointing officers to positions in USICA under any For-
eign Service personnel system unless they are available for assignment overseas.
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I+urther, we have implemented a regulation which severely limits the length
of domestic tours for our Foreign Service Information Officers.
Nevertheless, we have over 900 Agency employees classified as Foreign Service
"domestic specialists" (known as FAS employees). They work as VOA techni-
cians and broadcasters, magazine editors, exhibit designers, and in many of the
positions essential to the support of our missions overseas. Experience has shown
that the features of the Civil Service personnel system are more suitable for this
class of employees than are the procedures of the Foreign Service system. For
example, promotions for a domestic complement can be made more equitably
under the rank-in-job system than under the rank-in-man system. For these rea-
sons, we have moved in recent years toward the use of Civil Service procedures
for domestic personnel, regardless of whether they are categorized as Foreign
Service or Civil Service.
In 1977 we entered into an agreement with Local 1812 of the American Fed-
-eration of Government Employees, the exclusive bargaining representative of our
Foreign Service personnel. That agreement provides that USICA's Foreign Serv-
-ice "domestic specialists" would not be subject to mandatory conversion to Civil
Service, though they have the option, through June 30, 1981, of converting vol-
untarily. Under the agreement, those who do not exercise this option would
remain in the Foreign Service. A corollary provision states that no new domestic
specialists would be brought into USICA's Foreign Service.
The ultimate objective of a clear distinction between Foreign Service and Civil
Service within USICA would be achieved in time, through attrition and the appli-
cation of new hiring policies. However, while the present arrangements go far
toward meeting management needs and safeguarding employee benefits, they
fall short of the clear-cut distinction between Foreign Service and Civil Service
systems that is made in the proposed new Foreign Service Act of 1979. Under
the proposed Act, domestic employees will be converted to the Civil Service so
that all operational features of that system can be employed in day-to-day man-
ngement. This will facilitate the administration of domestic personnel and will
treat in the same fashion all employees who serve only in the United States.
At the same time we were and are convinced that employees who were granted
Foreign Service retirement benefits when they were appointed in the Foreign
Service system should retain those benefits. These benefits, which were conferred
upon employees who earlier were encouraged by management to join the Foreign
Service, will be preserved.
Because of USICA's agreement with AFGE, special provision is made in the
proposed Act (Sec. 2103(b)) for the temporary exemption of USICA "domestic
specialist" employees from mandatory conversion until July 1, 1981, the period
allowed for voluntary conversion under the contract. Thus, the proposed legisla-
tion endeavors to preserve the essential thrust of the agreement with AFGE,
while providing better personnel management and following the policy and pro-
cedures proposed for other foreign affairs agencies.
However, I must be candid in stating that in the discussions regarding the
preparation of this bill, and in view of the agreement with AFGE, I have op-
posed`the application of this provision to our employees. Many of the affected
employees have expressed objection to mandatory conversion. I am sure you will
hear the testimony of their representatives.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, I reiterate our full support for a revised, updated
and consolidated Foreign Service personnel system. The revised Act can serve to
clarify many aspects of our present patchwork personnel system, to correct in-
equities which have evolved over the years, to consolidate the many branches of
the Foreign Service into a single career service, to obtain greater comparability
of pay between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service, and to convey to all
members of the Service our appreciation for the changing requirements and
challenges they face.
I shall be happy to respond to questions.
FSI07 FSO AMALGAMATION
Senator. PELL. I am particularly concerned with how ICA would
fare under the proposed bill. There* would be certain changes. I would
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like to get to a fundamental question of the FSIO's [Foreign Service
information officers] that, as you know, came out proposed by Con-
gressman Hays and myself some years ago to create the separate serv-
ice. My thought at that time was that it was a very good idea to create a
separate information service and also to use it as. a device quite hon-
estly, to get rid of-through the promotion, selection out, features,
that was part of the concept at the time-of some of the people who
had perhaps been in who were not performing as they should.
As the years have gone by I have come to the conclusion that I may
have made an error. Perhaps we would be better off with Foreign
Service officers in "fifth cone" structure. I recognize that the Foreign
Service no longer has that structure of economical, political, and con-
sular, and my thought would be to add information to it. We theoreti-
cally got rid of the cone structure, but in fact it still continues to exist.
What is your view with regard to a complete amalgamation of the
FSIO Corps with the FSO Corps.
Mr. REINHARDT. The last time, Mr. Chairman, that I had the privi-
lege of appearing before your subcommittee you raised the same ques-
tion. I have thought about it a great deal since that time and have
concluded that what we are talking about is not a separate Foreign
Service. What you are calling the FSIO cone is not a separate Foreign
Service, and this bill would not make it a separate Foreign Service. If
the bill is passed, there would be a great measure of compatibility be-
tween the personnel service of the Department of State and the per-
sonnel service of USICA, and the personnel service of AID. That is,
the general rules, or the general regulations for recruiting; for promo-
tion; for selection out; for assignment, would be compatible.
At the same time, each of these three Foreign Service agencies would
administer its own personnel system. It seems to me that since these
systems are different. Since the functions are different; since the re-
cruitment process, for example, is entirely different; since the exami-
Iiation process is different.
The personnel systems should be administered in a different way, but
in accordance with general compatible principles of personnel
administration.
FSIO7 FSO ADMISSION PROCESS
Senator PELL. I think the difficulty of admission into the FSIO
Corps is just as tough as into the FSO Corps; is that correct?
Mr. REINHARDT. They follow the same general procedures, a written
examination and an oral examination. But it is a different examina-
tion, sir.
Senator PELL. This, I understand.
What, in essence, would be its impact of this proposed bill on your
agency, if it was passed?
Mr. REINHARDT. It would make even more rigid the compatibility
of regulations, rules, and legislation governing the personnel system.
Senator PELL. It would make what even more rigid ?
Mr. REINHARDT. The compatibility. That is, each system would
recruit, would promote, would assign, would dismiss or select out in
accordance with a compatible system.
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Senator PELL. What is the impact of this bill on your service specifi-
cally, does it change any of your present procedures?
Mr.. REINHARDT.. The Senior Foreign Service provisions of the bill
would be applicable to our service, for example. This would be quite
different from our present practices.
Senator PELL. How would you handle the problem of the conversion
of. some of your employees who, I think, are covered by an existing
union agreement? Would that not provide a complication here?
Mr. REINHARDT. I made that clear in the prepared statement, and I
will be happy to discuss it briefly for you, sir..
We have a category of personnel in our system, so does the Depart-
ment of State, for that matter,, called FAS, a category that was estab-
lished some years ago. It never worked as it was envisioned.. In 1977,
within this so-called FAS we had personnel
Senator PELL. Excuse me, what is FAS?
Mr. REINIARDT. Foreign affairs specialist is the exact designation.
This is a category. of personnel who receive the general benefits of
the Foreign Service, the retirement provisions, for example. But these
people have not by and large served overseas; and by and large have
no intention of serving overseas. Nevertheless, they were brought to-
gether in this single category.
In 1977 in USICA we, with the agreement of our union, moved to
abolish the FAS service over it period of time. From 1977 until 1981,
persons in that category called FAS could choose between the civil
service or the Foreign Service. There are approximately 900 persons
in this category. Some of them have already exercised the option either
to enter the civil service or to remain in the Foreign Service ; some
have not exercised this option yet.
The legislation now before the Congress ,deals with this category
called FAS in the Department of State and in USICA. We endorse
the principle of two separate personnel categories, one for the civil
service and one for the Foreign Service, as this bill is intended to do.
Nevertheless, it gives us a problem within our own agency because of
this prior agreement with the union.
Senator PELL. I think generally I recognize the problem at the
higher levels. Now, I think, both the State Department and the ICA
have top-heavy senior levels. Are not the present legislative author-
ities, administrative practices, really sufficient to deal with this prob-
lem, or do you need new legislation?
Mr. REINHARDT. It is less of a problem in USICA than I under-
stand it is in the Department of State. In the category of class I officers,
for example, we have approximately 44 officers now. This is approxi-
mately what we need at that level. We have a few more than we
actually need at the class 2 level. Thus, the impact of this problem on
us is not nearly as severe as it is in the Department of State. We are
a smaller agency. The Department of State has far more people-than
we do, far more Foreign Service officers than we do, and naturally
would have a greater problem at their upper levels.
In short, under existing legislation we have been able to deal with
this problem of seniority in our own agency.
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COMPARABILITY WITH OTHER NATIONS' FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCIES
Senator PELL. In devising this legislation-I direct this question also
to Secretary Read-have you drawn at all on the experiences of other
nations, the French, Italian, British, and German Foreign Services
because it seems to me it goes a different line than other services; that
? is not necessarily meaning that it is better or worse, but I would like
to get first Mr. Read's reaction and also Mr. Reinhardt's for his specific
agency.
Mr. READ. We had rather detailed discussions, Senator Pell, with our
- counterparts in Canada and the United Kingdom, and at different
l
y m cer ain very
times with the Federal Republic of Germany, but on
discrete aspects have we found applicability and transferability of
ideas.
Senator PELL. Mr. Reinhardt?
Mr. REINHARDT. At the time of the reorganization of our agency 2
years ago we looked into this question to a great extent. We studied the
information, cultural and educational activities of foreign affairs
agencies of several major governments-all governments that had
one-and we drew from their experience. We looked upon our own ex-
periences over the last 30 years and believe that we dealt responsibly
with this question at the time of reorganization. We have not studied
it in connection with the proposed legislation.
Senator PELL. Without saying what services you think are poor but
thinking of those services which are good, would you agree Mr. Read,
that probably the French, Italian, and British Foreign Services, with
their wealth of experience are really very, very effective in promoting
their countries' interests? Just as our own service is very effective. Ana
yet, they start from a very different premise. They start from a highly
competitive, even more competitive, entrance than Ave have. Then, once
in, without pay incentives or anything else, they are reasonably sure,
just because of the incentive and interest of the job, the desire for
promotion, to stay in.
Why is that not a good idea?
Mr. READ. That creates an accurate picture as I understand it, and I
agree with the characterization.
I do think the other systems, as I know them, are much more self-
contained than our system. I believe here we have a certain number
of infusion of political appointments with new administrations. In-
and-out movement among agencies of government is a healthy thing,
and I think it works very well.
LIMITATION ON POLITICAL APPOINTEES
Senator PELL. I guess one of. the greatest factors for morale in the
Foreign Service, competition in improvement of performance, would
be if we had a limitation of 5 percent on political appointees. Was this
discussed at all in drawing up this legislation? I think I had a pro-
posal a couple years ago for 15 percent.
Mr. READ. Yes, and on the senior positions there is precisely a 5-
percent noncareer provision which would be for the first time a limita-
tion on politization.
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Senator PELL. Could you carry that thought one step further and
say nobody would be an Ambassador unless he is a member of the
Senior Foreign Service?
Mr. READ. No; I think that would inhibit the constitutional powers
of the President. There is now, in fact, a 3-to-1 ratio.
Senator PELL. I know in the years that I have been in the Senate,
under six Presidents, that ratio has always stayed about the same,
.somewhere around 30 percent. What is it, now?
Mr. READ. Seventy-five to twenty-five. We are very conscientious in
keeping it at that ratio. That is a considerably higher career percentage
than in years prior.
RETENTION OF FSIO CORPS
Senator PELL. Mr. Reinhardt, do you believe that the FSIO Corps
should be retained, then?
Mr. REINHARDT. I dot sir.
Senator PELL. All right. Thank you very much. I have enjoyed
reading your testimony, I appreciate it very much.
Mr. REINHARDT. Thank you, sir.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
Mr. Nooter, the Acting Administrator for the Agency of Interna-
tional Development.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT H. NOOTER, ACTING ADMINISTRA-
TOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. NooTER. Mr. Chairman, with your permission I will submit my
statement for the record and move right into any questions you might
have. We do think the proposal has desirable features for our agency.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much, indeed. Your testimony will be
put in full into the record. I had a chance to go through it last night.
[Mr. Nooter's prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED, STATEMENT, OF HON. ROBERT H. NOOTER
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee : I am pleased to appear before
you to testify in favor of the legislation proposed by the President, the Foreign
Service Act of 1979.
We at A.I.D. regard this proposed bill as a long overdue effort to update the
Foreign Service Act of 1946. The Secretary of State is to be commended for his
leadership in guiding this bill, in all its complexities, through the Executive
Branch and to the Congress for your consideration because it is a well-written,
well-organized document that updates and revises the old law, and adds several
new provisions that are consistent with the Administration's reform of the per-
sonnel laws governing domestic U.S. Government employees.
The proposed new Foreign Service Act is designed to provide the basic per-
sonnel authority for the employees who serve abroad for each of the foreign
affairs agencies. These agencies include the Department of State, the United
States International Communication Agency (USICA), the proposed new In-
ternational Development Cooperation Agency , (IDCA), and, to a more limited
extent, the Peace Corps and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
We support the concept of a single, comprehensive statute as the basic set of
authorities for the personnel systems of all foreign affairs agencies. At present,
A.I.D. utilizes the Foreign Service Act as the basic legislation governing its
Foreign Service personnel. As one of the component agencies of IDCA, A.I.D.
would be included within the coverage of the new law.
We believe that the basic concepts of the Foreign Service as enunciated in the
proposed new statute are entirely appropriate for A.I.D. These include the basic
rank-in-person concept that is essential to a mobile Foreign Service; the com-
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anitment of Foreign Service employees to worldwide -availability ; the use of panels
.and boards for selection, evaluation, and assignment ; and the strongly held prin-
-ciple that merit and performance, fairly evaluated, are the basis for selection,
.advancement and tenure in the Service.
A shared set of legal authorities will help A.I.D., the State Department, and
ICA to collaborate-and to achieve the efficiencies that result from uniformity-
in a number of areas in which, despite the diversity in the work of our several
? agencies, our needs and interests are similar. We now have joint regulations
in a number of areas. We would expect that, operating under a new umbrella
statute, this collaboration will continue.
We would expect, for example, to continue to have joint regulations covering
travel, overseas allowances and benefits, and the transportation of people and
their effects to posts abroad. We expect that language training and area spe-
cialty training will continue to be offered by the Foreign Service Institute for
personnel of all foreign affairs agencies, and that State will continue to man-
age the Foreign Service retirement system for participants from all foreign
.affairs agencies. There will continue to be a single Foreign Service Grievance
Board to act on the grievances from employees of all foreign service agencies.
We are also pleased with the provisions in the bill for a single, simplified
pay schedule for all Foreign Service personnel. This change will, in the first
place, simplify and rationalize the pay system by bringing Foreign Service staff
employees within the same pay schedule as other Foreign Service employees and
,eliminating the artificial distinction that now exists between Foreign Service
staff employees and other Foreign Service employees.
It is particularly important for A.I.D. that there be a maximum compatibility
in the rules governing its Foreign Service and Civil Service employees. These
-two groups of employees are, in fact, interrelated and function-or should func-
tion-as a single unit. It is the Agency's intention to encourage unified manage-
ment of the Agency's personnel.
The proposed new Foreign Service Act would not conflict with the "Obey
Amendment" (Section 401 of last year's A.I.D. authorization act), or the regu-
lations that the President submitted to the Congress on May 1 of this year to
implement Section 401. Pursuant to the directive of the amendment that A.I.D.
adopt a "unified" personnel system, the regulations call for the designation of
certain positions in A.I.D. for incumbency by Foreign Service personnel, and
-encourages Civil Service employees who meet the standards for entry into the
Foreign Service to convert to the Foreign Service. This bill does not alter
.A.I.D.'s commitment to the policy underlying Section 401. A.I.D. will follow
the regulations promulgated under Section 401. in filling positions.
In conclusion, A.I.D. supports the bill and believes it to -be an excellent set of
-authorities to enable us to employ our Foreign Service personnel in ways which
can best achieve the objectives of our administration of the Foreign Assistance
.Act.
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator PELL. As you know, your agency has been "buffeted" an
awful lot in these last few veers. I do not mean to burden you with my
'own views, you are probably familiar with my resolution which would
"dismantle it completely-not with regard to any individuals in it, but
from the viewpoint of the execution of the mission for the United
'States. Those functions-just so the record is clear-would still be
carried on, but they would be carried on by private voluntary agencies,
international agencies, or where necessary by the Bureau within the
t State Department for political reasons.
I recognize that is not a very popular view and in all likelihood
will not prevail. "
S. 1450 IMPACT ON AID
Now, in order to help you do your job as best you can, would you tell
me how this bill impacts on your agency?
Mr. NooTEa. Yes. There will be three ways in which it will have
an effect on us. One will be the establishment of the Senior Foreign
:Service.
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Senator PELL. Will that affect your Agency? Will your top men.
overseas, your AID chiefs, be members of that Senior Foreign Service
Corps?
Mr. NoOTER. That is correct. The same rules would apply to our serv-
ice in the senior ranks.
Senator PELL. Would those chiefs be drawn from the State Depart-
ment, or ICA, or would they be drawn from your own agency?
Mr. NooTER. They would be drawn from our own career service,
except to the extent that the 5 percent noncareer provision might be
applied. But we would essentially have people coming up through our
system in the same way, on a career basis, to fill the Senior Foreign
Service, as would be true of the other two services.
SKIPPING FROM AGENCY TO AGENCY
Senator PELL. Is there an opportunity and this question I would
direct to Secretary Read-for people to skip back and forth a bit so,
a man who might be interested in USIA.work or AID work could
spend 5 years of his career in one of those agencies, and then come
back.
Mr. READ. We hope that will be facilitated.
Mr. NooTER. We do now, and Mr. Read and I have had conversations
about how to expand the amount which goes on. One of the ways this is
done is simply by detailing a person from one agency to another while
not changing his personnel status. He is on loan to the other agency,
but he retains his rights and his standing in his own organization. On
other occasions a person may actually transfer on a permanent basis,
as has happened from time to time over the years one way or the other..
BENEFITS FOR FOREIGN SERVICE PEOPLE
If I could add to the dialog that took place before about the Senior
Foreign Service, I think one of the important aspects is that our For-
eign Service people-be able to qualify for benefits comparable to those-
of the civil service. I know your views on this, but I would say while
our employees are extraordinarily dedicated, particularly our technical
people, the temptation to transfer to an agency that has more potential
for pay would be very great. We would risk, in that case, losing what
might usually be our better people who would be tempted to make the
transfer to a civil service job if they had the chance for a performance
bonus there where they did not have it in our system.
I therefore think there is a defensive aspect that is very important in
the creation of the Senior Foreign Service, as well as the more positive,
aspect of creating incentives.
The other impact on our system would be the elimination of the
FSS category which we think is desirable. That category may have
been useful in the past, but now it is an obstacle to upward mobility for
women, particularly secretaries, and its elimination would eliminate an
artificial barrier to* job progression.
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209
REVISED PAY SCALE
Third, the bill will provide the basis for a revised pay scale. Our
interest here is in a pay scale which is more compatible with that of
the civil service. I think for us, perhaps even more than the other
agencies, some transferability between the civil service and the For-
eign Service for our personnel is very important-hopefully with more
transfers into the Foreign Service where we have a need for midcareer
officers in the technical ranks to meet our needs.
Those are the three ways, I think, that would affect us the most. We
do not have the conversion problems of some of the other agencies
because we now give Foreign Service limited appointments only to
people with Foreign Service availability. The other possible impact
would be the applicability of some of the new rules upon our system,
such as time in class and selection out; but that would depend on how
decisions were made and on how the rules would be implemented.
BILL IMPACT ON EXISTING STATE-Am RELATIONSHIP.
Senator PELL. Would there be any change in the existing State-AID
relationship caused by the enactment of this bill, or would it be the
same?
Mr. NooTER. Only in the sense that our rules would be more closely
aliiied with each other, but the intention of the bill as drafted is that
each of the three agencies would then carry out those rules in ways
that are consistent with their own individual needs. Nevertheless, some
of the differences that exist in personnel categories would be eliminated,
so that our systems would be more compatible than they are now.
Senator PELL. It is our understanding that in some of the bureaus
in AID, such as policy planning, approximately 70 percent of the slots
will be designated as GS instead of as Foreign Service. Why would
that be?
Mr. NooTER. Well, we have another exercise going on within AID
that is not applicable to the other two agencies, but in fact really is,
moving us in the direction which State now uses. The provisions of
section 401 call fora "unified personnel system" within AID. We have
submitted regulations to the Congress, and if they are put into effect on
October 1, they will result in a larger number of Foreign Service
y people administering our programs and policies in Washington. The
exact number of those positions to be designated only for Foreign
Service appointments is not fully decided. Some parts of the Con-
gress have expressed the view that it should be a larger instead of
smaller number, and we are heeding that invocation.
Senator PELL. Thank you very, very much indeed, Mr. Nooter. If
there are any further questions we will submit them. We wanted to get-
this hearing out of the way prior to the recess period so that the legis-
lation can be discussed, and we all hopefully will have more crystallized
views on its merits when we come back in the fall.
I recognize full well the tremendous amount of work that Secretary
Read has put into this for 'a long time. Obviously, legislation is the
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passage of the possible and there will have to be compromises. I woulcf
hope that those who are interested will not dig their feet in too much-
whether it is the Foreign Service Association or other different groups..
In general, I think, the legislation is good.
Except some of the concerns which I expressed today, about which
I feel strongly, I see no other wrinkles in it. But I, too, want to have,
a chance to go through it in greater detail, and will do so in the coming L
weeks.
I want to congratulate the Department for finally coming forwards
with this very real opus which has been; under way for a long time.
The real credit for it goes to Secretary Read, who pursued this vigor-
ously right from the very beginning.
I ani very 'conscious -of the irnpontance'; the administration attaches
to ' it; with 'Secretary' Vaance's wi'lliiigness to come up today and take
the leading role in putting it forward.
Thank you, Mr. Nooter for being with us. The meeting is adjourned.,
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call
of the Chair.]
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FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1979
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1979
UNITED STATES SENATE,
.SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, OCEANS,
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT,
OF THE CoiIMITPF.E ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present : Senators Pell and Javits.
The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will continue its hearings on S.
1450, the Foreign :Service At of 1979. This legislation, which runs
parallel with'tlie 1978 Civil Service Reform Act, is designed to revise,
simplify, and consolidate in one place all the legislation concerning
the administration of the Foreign Services.
I would adhere my own view that the Department of State should
not be too intent on having the Foreign Service and the civil service
run in parallel lines. They are different services and they should em-
phasize their differences and not try to secure the greatest similarity
possible between them.
Today's witnesses consist of retired career ministers, ambassadors,
Foreign Service officers, as well as representatives of various employee
unions and minority groups.
I am looking forward to hearing their views on this bill very much
indeed.
Next Wednesday, I will be holding another hearing to provide the
administration with an opportunity to respond to any criticisms or
points brought out in today's testimony.
The first witness today is Martin Herz, former Ambassador to Bul-
garia, a very old friend of the chairman. We entered the Foreign Serv-
ice practically the same day, if my recollection is correct, and served
in the same part of the world at different times.
So, welcome, Ambassador. We are delighted you are here. As you,
know, I am familiar with some of your ideas and look forward to
hearing them articulated here.
I would like to add that we have quitea large number of witnesses;
so I would hope that the witnesses would hold themselves to a maxi-
mum of 10 minutes. Full statements will appear in each case in full in,
the record. And, if they can do it in less than 10 minutes, in 5 minutes,.
even better, giving more opportunity for questions and comments.
Ambassador Herz.
[Ambassador Herz's biography follows:]
(211)
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212
BIOGRAPHY OF AMBASSADOR MARTIN F. HERZ
Born 1917 in New York; educated in Vienna, Austria; Oxford; and in New
York (Columbia University). Active in business before entering federal service.
Drafted in 1941, rose from private to major in World War II, specializing in
psychological warfare (combat propaganda) addressed to German troops. Spe-
cialist in surrender, capture, and desertion.
Entered the Foreign Service by examination at the bottom grade (unclassified-
C) in 1946. Political officer, Vienna, Austria (1946-48) ; in charge of Austrian
information and cultural affairs, Department of State (1948-50) ; political
officer, Paris, France (1950-54) ; political officer, Phnom Penh, Cambodia (1955-
57) ; political officer, Tokyo, Japan (1957-59)..
Department of State, African affairs (1960-62) ; Senior Seminar in Foreign
Policy (1962-63) ; counselor for political affairs, Tehran, Iran (1963-67) ;
director for Laos/Cambodian affairs, Department of State (1967-68) ; minister-
counselor for political affairs, Saigon, Vietnam (1968-70) ; Senior Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Department of
State (1970-74) ; ambassador to People's Republic of Bulgaria (1974-77) ;
assigned to Georgetown University (1977-79) ; retired from federal service
1979.
Presently Director of Studies of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., also adjunct professor of diplomacy
and senior research fellow of the university's Ethics and Public Policy Center.
Author of the following books: The Golden Ladle (1944) ; A Short History of
Cambodia (1958) ; Beginnings of the Cold War (1966) ; How the Cold War Is
Taught (1978) ; Decline of the West? George Kerman and His Critics (1978).
Awards and decorations: Purple Heart (1944), Bronze Star (1945), Com-
mendable Service Award, Department of State (1960), Superior Honor Award,
Department of State (1970), Medal of Honor with Silver Star, Austria (1973) ;
Horseman of Madara,.Bulgaria (1977).
:STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN F. HERZ, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO
BULGARIA
Ambassador HERZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permis-
'sion, I would like to request that the annexes to my statement be in-
? corporated in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your entire statement, includ-
ing annexes will be included after your oral statement.
Ambassador HERZ. I will abbreviate my statement in the interest of
saving time.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Ambassador HERZ. I also would appreciate it if my letter to Sen-
-ator Church dated October 24, which also summarizes some points of
my position, could be incorporated in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Hon. FRANK CuuRCH,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
MARTIN F. HERZ,
Washington, D.C., October 24, 1979.
-U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR : I am writing with respect to H.R. 4674, the "Foreign Service
Act of 1979" on which I have testified before the House Subcommittee on Septem-
'her 7. I am sorry that I was notified too late about the dates of hearings by your
Committee, but hope that the following observations in writing may be circulated
to the Senators who are studying the bill.
My comments are based on experience of over 32 years in the Foreign Service,
-which culminated in the position of American Ambassador to Bulgaria-prob-
ably the least important position that I held during my career, in'terms of the
`influence I had on American policy, but indicating that I am commenting as some-
one who started at the bottom and made it to the top of the profession. I am now
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retired, and there is no possible personal interest that I can have in seeing my
recommendations adopted, I make them strictly as a citizen interested in seeing
that our country has the best possible people in its first line of defense.
I see serious deficiencies in the proposed bill, in the power that it would give
a future Secretary of State to make arbitrary dismissals of Senior Foreign Serv-
ice officers because they do not inspire him with confidence that they will execute
his policies with the enthusiasms he seeks in his subordinates. Unfortunately
? such enthusiasm also entails one-sidedness, and I believe a healthy diversity of
views in the Foreign Service, especially among its top officers, is a national asset.
As I testified before the House, I have perhaps a longer memory than my
younger colleagues in the Foreign Service, and perhaps even than some of the
members of the Committee. There is no merit in this, for it is entirely a function
'- of age. But I lived through a period in our history when an Administration tried
to purge the Foreign Service of officers,. especially senior officers, who had "lost
China" or did not display enough "positive loyalty" to the Administration then
in office. I do not predict that such a period will come again-but I strongly urge
that your Committee modify the bill to make certain that if such a period comes
again, the new Foreign Service Act cannot be used to "decapitate" the Foreign
Service. As now written, a future Secretary of State could do so very easily.
Take, for instance, the phrasing of Section 612(a) which says that recom-
mendations and rankings by selection boards shall be based on records of char-
acter, ability, conduct, quality of work, industry, experience, etc. * * * and
records of current and prospective assignments." How can there be a "record,
of a prospective assignment" except in the sense that the file could contain a.
notation to the effect that "no assignment is in prospect" for the officer in ques-
tion? At the time of Senator McCarthy, when his friend Scott McLeod was in
charge of the administration of the State Department, if it had been possible
to make wholesale changes in the top ranks of the Foreign Service by simply
noting in their personnel records that no "prospective assignments" were avail-
able for them-you may be sure that the then administration would have taken,
ample advantage of such a provision.
The provision is unnecessary, subject to abuse, and should be dropped.
Or take Section 641(b) which says that Members of the Service whose maxi-
mum time in class * * * expires * * * may continue under limited extensions
[which] may be granted and renewed by the Secretary in light of the recom-
mendations of selection boards * * * and the needs of the Service." What does-
this imply? It implies that renewal of a member of the Senior Foreign Service
will not be in accordance with the rank-ordering established by selection boards-
but by the way any Secretary of State construes "the needs of the Service"
not just in terms of numbers but also in terms of people. At least, such a con-
struction is possible under this provision as it is now drafted.
. The phrase "and the needs of the Service" should be dropped, or else provisions;
written into the law so that retention of members of the Senior Foreign Service
will not be at the caprice of a Secretary of State but in accordance with merit
as determined by the selection boards.
I hope it is understood that I am not accusing or suspecting the present Admin-
istration of any capricious or underhanded approach toward the Senior Foreign
Service. I am sure there is no intention to politicize it by weeding out non-
conformists or people lacking enthusiasm for certain policies. But a future Ad-
61 ministration could do just that, and could do it with great ease if provisions of-
this kind are retained in the bill.
I understand that former Secretary Kissinger has testified favorably about
the provisions for the Senior Foreign Service on the basis of his experience that
bright, vigorous senior FSO's enthusiastic for what he was trying to accomplish,
A weren't always available. An Administration embarked single-mindedly on a
certain policy will always wish to surround itself with career officers who are
devoted with equal single-mindedness to such policies. Such an Administration-
and one doesn't have to go back to the dim past to see this-will always complain
that senior FSO's are too conservative or too liberal or too cautious or too-
much encumbered by the past. But what they see as a liability I believe to be a
national asset that we should be careful to preserve.
Virtually every new Administration comes into office with an intense suspicion
of the Foreign Service, and especially of the senior officers who have served the-
previous Administration, and wishing to make sure that their "own people", or-
people full of enthusiasm for the new policies, are put as high as possible into.
the Service. Very often they realize that this has been a mistake, that senior
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FSO's who hold somewhat different opinions, who represent an institutional
memory, who know how and why similar attempts in the past come to grief, are
really great assets to have around ; and even if they did not realize this, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee should make sure that such senior officers
cannot be simply discarded from the system. Their asking of inconvenient ques-
tions, their bringing up things from their experience which may not be otherwise
known or understood, all this is something very precious for the policy formu-
lation process and we should be very careful not to deprive ourselves of it.
Even the provisions of Section 602(b), that Decisions of the Secretary on
promotions into and retention in the Senior Foreign Service shall take into
account "the needs of the Service to plan for the continuing admission of new
members and for effective career development and reliable promotional opportu-
nities" could be abused. I am not saying, again, that this particular Adminis-
tration has any such plans. But chucking, out. older and more experienced officers
to make room at the top for younger ones entails a price. Certainly it should take
place in a reasonable and orderly way. But there are no safeguards, in the bill
as it is present written, that it will be in a reasonable and orderly way-such
language could be used to get rid of very. large numbers of senior officers because
they are, or are believed to be, inconvenient to have around, perhaps lacking in
the "positive loyalty" that John Foster.Dulles sought in his subordinates, to the
lasting impoverishment of the, policy formulation process during those years.
My citing of examples from among conservatives is incidental, I can visualize
the same bias, or even fanaticism, coming from the other side. My point is that
we should be careful not to politicize the Senior Foreign Service by calling for
the limited appointments. Tenure at the top should be precarious, that is fine, but
it should not be politically precarious, in the sense that a new Administration
could come in and bring about a Gleichschaltung of the top ranks of our Foreign
'Service. [Gleichschaltung=assuring conformity by eliminating people who do
not conform, term used in connection with the Nazi-fication of post-Anschluss
Austria.]
I know that there are some members of both Houses who will welcome the
idea of allowing a new Administration to assure conformity through the pro-
visions of the new Foreign Service Act. But I do not think that thoughtful
members of your Committee will wish to accommodate such inclinations if they
exist, for we need diversity at the top of our professional Foreign Service.
Senator Church, I have been a member of the American Foreign Service As-
sociation for as long as I can remember. I was an officer twice, and at one time
'was Vice Chairman of its Board. I am devoted to its principal purpose, which
is the enhancement and protection of professionalism in foreign affairs. But
I do not believe that AFSA can validly speak to the matter that I am raising,
because it represents a lot more junior and middle-grade officers than senior
officers. Many senior members of AFSA share my views, but those views were
not reflected in the testimony that AFSA has given to the House. I am not
blaming. AFSA for this, they naturally have to respond to the needs of the
largest numbers of their members. But I warn against taking their views as
representative of those of senior officers.
During my testimony before the House sub-committee. I was asked if I didn't
agree that a certain precariousness of the position of a Senior officer, having
'him put the predictable part of his career behind him and accept the risks that
go with higher responsibility, is desirable. 'At that time I had not, perhaps,
given that question sufficient thought so that my response to its was inadequate.
If I were asked the same question now, I would answer as follows-and I believe
the Committee itself should answer the same way :
Applying more stringent criteria of performance and stature and ability to
people at the. top of the Foreign Service pyramid is a healthy and constructive
-idea. There is nothing wrong with it if what one is seeking is ever-higher
standards of professionalism. But is that really what we are seeking? Or are
some of the proponents of that aspect of the reform not perhaps secretly seek-
ing to give every Administration an opportunity to surround. Itself with top
Foreign Service officers who are politically congenial to it? If we try to make
this possible, we gain something-greater homogeneity near the top-hut we
also lose something, namely the unpolitical nature of our Foreign Service.
We should be very careful before we opt, consciously, for such a Senior Foreign
'Service, for that means wholesale changes at the top every four or eight years,
with a tremendous loss and waste of experience-and or moral courage near the
top, where it is especially necessary. When the top career rewards go to those
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who make themselves most agreeable to a new Administration, when the penalties
fall wholesale on those who are or are suspected of not being imbued with the
desired enthusiasm, then you have politicized the Senior Foreign Service. At the
price of greater homogeneity you will have sacrificed a reservoir of experience,
willingness to dissent, to ask the inconvenient question at a time of crisis, that
represent a very important asset to our Nation.
I am not against the idea of a Senior Foreign Service. Such a service is not
necessary, but properly administered it might perhaps do some good. But I warn
against a political Senior Foreign Service. I recommend changes in the bill which
will make merit, and not politics, the criteria for retention in the Senior Foreign
Service.
illy full testimony before the House subcommittee should be available in a cou-
ple of weeks or so. I hope that members who read this letter will supplement it
with a reading of that testimony. Again-I have nothing to gain by writing this
letter or testifying. My career is behind me. I am not in any way bitter. I have
had a good career. But because I have seen how the Service can be well or ill used,
with good or disastrous consequences for our foreign policies and our national
security, I warn against politicizing the Senior Foreign Service, however uninten-
MARTIN F. HERZ.
Ambassador HERZ. In expressing my appreciation to your com-
inittee for allowing me to testify about one aspPot of the proposed
Foreign Service Act of 1979, I wish to stress that f speak for no one
but myself. I do not represent an organization. But, the ideas that I
shall submit to you coincide with those of a number of senior officers
of the Foreign Service who are still on active duty. I myself retired
this. year after 37 years of Government service, 5 of them in the
Armed Forces and over 32 in the Foreign Service.
I entered the Foreign Service at the bottom, in 1946, by the exami-
nation route, and advanced step by step to class 1, which I reached
after 21 years. The most important position I attained was that of
Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. The most prestigious
was that of Ambassador to Bulgaria. The most unpleasant, though
not unrewarding to the inner man, was that of Minister-Counselor
at the American Embassy in Saigon, after the Tet offensive' in 1968.
I was not, incidentally, the first choice for that unpleasant position.
I was offered it, and accepted, after one or two others had turned it
down. I was amazed then, and am even more amazed now, that it
should be possible in a disciplined career service to turn down a
responsible position just because it is extremely difficult or unpleasant.
Mr. Chairman, I have perhaps a longer memory than my younger
colleagues in the Foreign Service, and perhaps, even than some of
the members of this committee. There is no merit in this, for it is
entirely a function of age. I happen to have lived through a period in
our history when there was a sort of open season against Senior For-
eign Service officers.
I am concerned that the proposed legislation will not only not
guard against a repetition of those dangerous. days-dangerous not
just to the Foreign Service, but to the country-but, that it will make
it easier for a future Secretary of State to "decapitate" the Foreign
Service through mass retirements of its most experienced and most
valuable members.
This is not a fantasy of mine. I have been there. I have seen it going
on all around me. I have seen friends and colleagues hounded out of
the service. I have seen loyal Foreign Service officers, who had been
cleared again and again and again by the most rigorous security pro-
tionally it might be.
Sincerely yours,
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cedures, dismissed from the service because the Secretary of State,
and those whom he had brought into the Department with him, did
not share their views and their outlook, and because those politically
appointed officials were subservient to others who would make the
Foreign Service a scapegoat for our misfortunes and failures abroad.
The CHAIRMAN. I cannot help but interpolate. I was a Foreign
Service agent at that time. I remember being a security officer in the
EE security office or whatever it was called at the time. And nobody
thinks that John Foster Dulles or President Eisenhower were evil
men, yet very evil things happened with the best of intentions at the
time. And, the same thing could very easily happen again.
I appreciate the remarks that you are making.
Ambassador HERZ.. Thank you, sir. It may be said that McCarthy
was an isolated phenomenon that is not likely to be repeated. To this,
I would reply that it is a misreading of history to associate McCarthy-
ism with only one man. There were a number* of Senators and Repre-
sentatives who shared his attitudes and who outlived him and who
continued to do damage to the service and whose views were given
very much weight in'the executive branch:
It is, thus, not fanciful for me to look at the proposed legislation
from the point of view whether a future Secretary of State would be
more, or less, able to root out of the service people whom he might not
like, whose political views, real or imagined, he might not share, or
whose presence in the service might be an embarrassment to him in
his relations with powerful Members of the Congress.
I find that there is serious'ground for concern because the provision
for limited appointments to the Senior Foreign Service is tailormade
for unscrupulous use against senior officers suspected of holding views
divergent from those of an incoming new adrriinistration.
It should be understood that I am not attributing to this adminis-
tration, certainly not to' the present Secretary of State, also not to the
excellent career officers who have -worked on this legislation, any in-
tention-to open the way to some future inquisition or bloodbath of the
Senior Foreign' Service. .
These are all honorable men, inspired by the highest motives. What
I question is the wisdom of enacting legislation which could be abused
in a way that the framers of the legislation had not intended or en-
visaged. This involves a question of public policy-whether it is Wise,
even if some benefits would flow from a certain measure, to open the
doors to possible abuse of those measures.
I an! proceeding in my testimony from the assumption that the
wise course of action is to forgo some minor advantages if there is a
major danger that the purposes of the legislation could be perverted
some time in the future under circumstances that we cannot, at present,
foretell.:
At this point, I would like to make a short digression-it is only a
seeming digression. You who have devoted so much time to the Foreign
Service and its problems and to this pending legislation, are, of course,
aware of the weaknesses of a career diplomatic service in our political
environment. Even when there are no accusations of disloyalty, or even
'treason, as occurred in the late forties and early fifties, it is fair to say,
I think, that the Foreign Service does not enjoy a good press, that
there are people, perhaps also in this House, who feel that there is
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something wrong with it, and that somehow the service is "unrepre-
sentative" of the United States.
From this attitude, which I submit is quite widespread or at least.
in our society, it is not a very long way to distrusting the Foreign
Service and associating it with policies that one does not like. It is
no secret, I think that both the Kennedy and Nixon administrations
came into office with a determination to place "their own men" at the
top of the Department and into key positions abroad, because they dis-
trusted the views and attitudes and orientation of the professionals.
What one Secretary of State called "positive loyalty," which he de-
manded from the Foreign Service, others would call conformity. And,
I.submit, conformity in the Foreign Service is a very dangerous thing
because it is from the Foreign Service that the questions come that
need. to be asked, that the collective memory of our diplomacy can as-
sert itself, that the inconvenient counterargument needs to originate.
We need, in other words, a free play of ideas in the Department of
State and the Foreign Service. Thank God we have it now. We have
not always had it, and there is no reason to believe that it is fore-
ordained that we shall always have it. We may lose it if we aren't
'easeful. We have lost it before. The proposed legislation does not pro-
tect it, on the contrary, it endangers that free flow of ideas, which,
of course, includes ideas of a contrary nature that another administra-
tion might not cherish.
I believe that section 602, which makes retention in the Senior For-
eign Service a matter of the Secretary's appreciation of the "needs
of the service to plan for the continuing admission of new members"
and section 641, which allows the Secretary, by regulation, "to in-
crease or decrease such maximum time for a class * * * at` the needs
of the service may require" opens the way to mass dismissals of Senior
Foreign Service officers by some, new administration that might be
convinced that they all "lost China" or "lost Africa" or were "pinks"
or "fascists" or otherwise uncongenial.
What would Mr. Scott McLeod, whom Mr. Dulles brought into the
State Department as his head of administration and security, and who
was a friend and confidant of Senator McCarthy, have made of such
n wide latitude given to a Secretary of State? He would have reveled
in it. He would have exploited it to the utmost to get rid. of Foreign
'Service officers who were suspected.not of being Communists, but of
being left-leaning, excessively liberal, wooly-minded, do-gooders who
didn't understand the reality of the threat. _
What might be the future policy in whose name another open sea,
son might be declared? Perhaps it might be on the opposite end of
the political spectrum. But, whatever end of the spectrum it might
come from, it would be bad news for the country, for the freedom to
express unpopular ideas, and for the principle that a professional
career service is, in any case, the servant and not the master of foreign
policy.
Let me make clear what I meant by the last remark. I.believe that
it is, and was, profoundly mistaken to believe that Foreign Service
officers represent political parties or political tendencies. The paranoid
attitude, for instance, of Mr. Ehrlichman, who saw the Nixon admin-
istration's foreign policy sapped by disloyal career public servants, was
not justified.
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218
. The Foreign Service loyally implemented Mr. Nixon's policies just
as it had implemented those of his predecessor and his successors. It
is a non-political service. But, that is precisely what makes it so sus-
pect in the eyes of some of the political chieftains in the White
House.
"Positive loyalty" is not, after all, so very far removed from the,
performance checks that have recently been ordered in the White
House and which require loyalty, once more, to be checked out. It is
only a relatively small step from getting. someone's loyalty to evaluat-
ing his usefulness according to how much he or she agrees, or en-
thusiastically supports, certain policies.
In other words, the danger is always present. It is only a matter
of degree. So, it is not so far-fetched to imagine that some future
administration might want, to make a clean sweep of the Senior
Foreign Service because it is associated, or the minds of the new, in-
coming administration, with failures and idiocies or total benighted-
ness, or worse-sympathy with our enemies, or inveterate blindness
toward something that is particularly important to such an
administration.
With your permission, I will skip the section of my testimony deal-
ing with George Kennan, which,.I think, is wise and pertinent, but can
be read in the written record.
It will not have escaped you that the desirable characteristics that
Kennan saw in a Foreign Service officer, come from "long pursuit"
of the career. In other words, I am not at all sure that they are fully
developed in the younger and more vigorous and less skeptical and
more ambitious officers who so often strike the political leaders as
more with, it, as sharing their own. ideas more visibly and articulately,
as being, in other words, in step with the times.
This is precisely what I am warning against, and I think it is not
an excessive extrapolation from the remarks of Kennan that I have
just cited to say that he, too, sees merit in experience, in the acquisition
of that skeptical detachment which does not come readily to younger
people.
Section 612 of, the proposed legislation would make one of the criteria
for promotion or retention in the Senior Foreign Service not only the
usual performance evaluation reports, commendations, awards, rep-
rimands, and so forth, but also records of current and prospective as-
signments. What a strange expression-records of prospective assign-
ments. How can there be a record of prospective assignments, except a
notation that Mr. or Ms. X is in line for a new job, and that Mr. or
Ms. Y does not have a job in prospect? .
What could not Mr. Scott McLeod, the agent of Senator Joe Mc-
Carthy in the State Department, have made with such a provision as
it applied to, say, Mr. John Stewart Service or Mr. John Paton Davies
who were accused. of having lost China.
Lest you believe that no such cases occurred in more recent years.
I may recall-that there was, also a man in the early sixties who was
suspected or accused of having lost Cuba and- for whom the American
Foreign Service, Associations-of which I was a member of the board
of directors-unsuccessfully intervened because the administration did
not want to'give him any prominent assignment for fear of flak from
hostile Senators'and Congressmen.
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It could have been easily certified for such a man that there was no
prospective assignment for him-and out he would go. He, and others
in his category, would be on an escalator to the guillotine, but it would
not be his value to his country that would decide whether the blade
would fall, but a political judgment whether he was controversial or
an embarrassment.
That, I submit, is coming very close to politicizing the senior ranks
of the Foreign Service. Fearlessness at the bottom of the career
pyramid is easy. Fearlessness at the top is sometimes also easy, par-
ticularly when you approach retirement.
But, fearlessness near the top, seeing how the heads roll of those
who do not know how to make themselves agreeable to a. new adminis-
tration, could be a very dangerous thing to a diplomatic career and
is likely to give way to conformity.
We need, and always need, a variety of iSenior Foreign Service
officers, with widely divergent viewpoints. We need people who ask
the inconvenient questions, who recall the things that others have
forgotten or cannot remember because they haven't experienced them
as a senior diplomat has.
Mr. Chairman, at this point, I would ask to put in a comment that
comes to mind from testimony before a House committee by former
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, a man for whom I have high
respect. He endorsed the provision for the Senior Foreign Service.
He endorsed wholeheartedly the idea that people would be on proba-
tion at the top. And, I have no doubt that he did so because he felt that
he was surrounded occasionally, when he was in the White House and
on other occasions when he was in the State Department, by senior
officers of the Foreign Service who did not share his enthusiasm for a
particular policy, experienced officers, who did ask the inconvenient
question, people who were the repository of things that had gone
wrong in the past and brought these up as counter-arguments.
Now, I do not say that a Secretary of State needs to surround him-
self. with people uncongenial to him. Neither, however, should he be in
a position to penalize such officers for views that they express.
And, I think there is a natural tendency of a Secretary of State,
of an, administration, of a President embarked on some major enter-
prise-let us say, the war in Vietnam-a major enterprise that is very
controversial, there is a natural tendency for these policy officers to
surround themselves with people who are congenial to him, who are
with it, who are young, who are enthusiastic, who really understand,
and who don't ask those inconvenient questions.
That is why I say, and I also perhaps put this more strongly in my
letter to Senator Church, that such senior officers are a national asset
which could be too easily discarded if the bill were enacted as it' is
presently written.
I now come to the final portion of my testimony.
Theoretically, by shortening the time in grade at the top and certify-
ing to the non-availability of onward assignments, by letting terms of
able senior officers expire simply because they aren't showing enough
positive loyalty, it would not take much time for some future Secretary
of State, perhaps one who might be well-intentioned, but only weak
and inclined to yield to pressure from Capitol Hill or the press or the
White House, to decimate, indeed to decapitate the Senior Foreign
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220
Service. This is an abuse that should not be allowed, that should be
carefully guarded against in the legislation.
Perhaps I may be permitted to add one final observation. I am, my-
self, a member of the American Foreign Service Association. As
already remarked, I was a member of its board of directors. At one
time, I was even its vice chairman.
I write frequently for the Foreign Service Association's organ, the
Foreign Service Journal. I am in full sympathy with its principal
goal, the protection and enhancement of professionalism in our di-
plomacy. But, I do not regard it presently as fully representative of the
Foreign Service, if only for demographic reasons : It has more young
members than old ones. This is not a criticism, it is a statement of fact.
Older officers, who now almost seem to be ashamed of being older
and more experienced, are an endangered species in today's Foreign
Service. Their percentage is constantly going down. But, it is a fact
of life that to the younger officers, there are always too many older ones
holding positions of responsibility.
I felt the same way when I was young. I am not criticizing it. All I
am saying is that the virtues of having a corps, a good proportion, of
seasoned older officers. available and on hand to make their input into
the policy-formulation process and its. execution-the virtues of that
are not normally perceived by younger people or not perceived to the
same extent by older people, I should say.
That, I think, is why I have been encouraged by a number of older
officers to come forward and make these observations about the pro-
posed legislation which, coming from them, would seem self-serving.
My career in the Foreign Service is behind me. It has been a good
career. I think today's Service is excellent and should be protected
against some' future ravages by irresponsible politicians.
If my testimony has sensitized you. to that.danger, if I have been
able to point out that the danger is not fanciful, then I have, perhaps,
rendered a service not only to your committee, but also the Foreign
Service that I love, including the younger officers who may be inclined
to worry about testimony such as mine because it turns out to be in
favor of lengthening the escalator to the guillotine.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Ambassador Herz's prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN F. HERZ
In expressing my appreciation to your committee for allowing me to testify
about one aspect of the proposed Foreign Service Act of 1979, I wish to stress
that I speak for no one but myself. I do not represent an organization. But the -4
ideas that I shall submit to you coincide with those of a number of senior
officers of the Foreign Service who are still on active duty. I myself retired this
year after 37 years of government service, five of them in the armed forces and
over 32 in the Foreign Service.
I entered the Foreign Service at the bottom, in 1946, by the examination route,
and advanced step by step to Class 1, which I reached after 21 years. The most
important position I attained was that of senior deputy assistant secretary of
state. The most prestigious was that of ambassador to Bulgaria. The most un-
pleasant, though not unrewarding to the inner man, was that of Minister-Coun-
selor at the American embassy in Saigon, after the Tet offensive in 19168. I was
not, incidentally, the first choice for that unpleasant position. I was offered it,
and accepted, after one or two others had turned it down. I was amazed then,
and am even more amazed now, that it should be possible in a disciplined
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career service to turn down a responsible position just because it is extremely
difficult or unpleasant.
Mr. Chairman, I have perhaps a longer memory than my younger colleagues
in the Foreign Service, and perhaps even than some of the members of this
committee. There is no merit in this, for it is entirely a function of age. I happen
to have lived through a period in our history when there was a sort of open
season against senior Foreign Service officers. I am concerned that the proposed
legislation will not only guard against a repetition of those dangerous days-
dangerous not just to the Foreign Service but to the country-but that it will
make it easier for a future Secretary of State to "decapitate" the Foreign Service
through mass retirements of its most experienced and most valuable members.
This is not a fantasy of mine. I have been there. I have seen it going on all
around. I have seen friends and colleagues hounded out of the Service. I have
seen loyal Foreign Service officers, who had been cleared again and again and
again by the most rigorous security procedures, dismissed from the Service be-
cause the Secretary of State, and those whom he had brought into the Department
with him, did not share their views and their outlook, and because those po-
litically appointed officials were subservient to others who would make the For-
eign Service a scapegoat for our misfortunes and failures abroad.
You may say that McCarthy was an isolated phenomenon that is not likely to
be repeated. To this I would reply that it is a misreading of history to associate
McCarthyism with only one man. There were a number of senators and repre-
sentatives who shared his attitudes and who outlived him and who continued to
do damage to the Service and whose views were given very much weight in the
Executive Branch. It is thus not fanciful for me to look at the proposed legisla-
tion from the point of view whether a future Secretary of State would be more,
or less, able to root out of the Service people whom he might not like, whose po-
litical views (real or imagined) he might not share, or whose presence in the
Service might be an embarrassment to him in his relations with powerful mem-
bers of the Congress.
I find that there is serious ground for concern because the provision for limited
appointments to the Senior Foreign Service is tailor-made for unscrupulous use
against senior officers suspected of holding views divergent from those of an
incoming new administration.
It should be understood that I am not attributing to this Administration, cer-
tainly not to the present Secretary of State, also not to the excellent career of-
ficers who have worked on this legislation, any intention to open the way to some
future inquisition or bloodbath of the senior Foreign Service. These are all honor-
able men, inspired by the highest motives. What I question is the wisdom of enact-
ing legislation which could be abused in a way that the framers of the legislation
had not intended or envisaged. This involves a question of public policy-whether
it is wise, even if some benefits would flow from a certain measure, to open the
doors to possible abuse of those measures. I am proceeding in my testimony from
the assumption that the wise course of action is to forego some minor advantages
if there is a major danger that the purposes of the legislation could be perverted
some time in the future under circumstances that we cannot at present foretell.
At this point I would like to make a short digression-it is only a seeming
digression. You who have devoted so much time to the Foreign Service and its
problems and to this pending legislation, are of course aware of the weaknesses
of a career diplomatic service in our political environment. Even when there are
no accusations of disloyalty, or even treason, as occurred in the late forties and
early fifties, it is fair to say, I think, that the Foreign Service does not enjoy a
good press, that there are people, perhaps also in this House, who feel that there
is something wrong with it, and that somehow the Service is "unrepresentative"
of the United States.
From this attitude, which I submit is quite widespread or at least latent in our
society, it is not a very long way to distrusting the Foreign Service and associat-
ing it with policies that one does not like. It is no secret, I think, that both the
Kennedy and Nixon administrations came into office with a determination to place
"their own men" at the top of the Department and into key positions abroad,
because they distrusted the views and attitudes and orientation of the profession-
als. What our Secretary of State called "positive loyalty", which he demanded
from the Foreign Service, others would call conformity. And, I submit, conformity
in the Foreign Service is a very dangerous thing because it is from the Foreign
Service that the questions come that need to be asked, that the collective memory
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222
of our diplomacy can assert itself, that the inconvenient counter-argument needs
to originate.
We need, in other words, a free play of ideas in the Department of State and
the Foreign iService. Thank God we have it now. We have not always had it, and
there is no reason to believe that it is foreordained that we shall always have it.
We may lose it if we aren't careful. We have lost it before. The proposed legisla-
tion does not protect it, on the contrary it endangers that free flow of ideas,
which of course includes ideas of a contrary nature that another administration
might not cherish. ?
I believe that Section 602, which makes retention in the Senior Foreign
Service a matter of the Secretary's appreciation of the "needs of the Service to
plan for the continuing admission of new members" and Section 641, which
allows the Secretary, by regulation, "to increase or decrease such maximum
time for a class ... as the needs of the Service may require" opens the way to
mass dismissals of Senior Foreign Service officers by some new administration
that might be convinced that they all "lost China" or "lost Africa" or were
"pinks" or "fascists" or otherwise uncongenial.
What would Mr. Scott McLeod, whom Mr. Dulles brought into the State
Department as his head of administration and security, and who was a friend
and confidant of Senator McCarthy, have made of such a wide latitude given to a
Secretary of State ! He would have reveled in it. He would have exploited it to
the utmost to get rid of Foreign Service officers who were suspected not of
being Communists but of being left-leaning, excessively liberal, wooly-minded
do-gooders who didn't understand the reality of the threat. What might be the
future policy in whose name another open season might be declared? Perhaps
it might be on the opposite end of the political spectrum. But whatever end of
the spectrum it might come from, it would be bad news for the country, for the
freedom to express unpopular ideas, and for the principle that a professional
career service is in any case the servant and not the master of foreign policy.
Let me make clear what I meant by the last remark. I believe that it is, and
was, profoundly mistaken to believe that Foreign Service officers represent
political parties or political tendencies. The paranoid attitude, for instance of
Mr. Ehrlichman, who saw the Nixon administration's foreign policy sapped by
disloyal career public servants, was not justified. The Foreign Service loyally
implemented Mr. Nixon's policies just as it had implemented those of his prede-
cessor and his successors. It is a non-political service. But that is precisely
what makes it so suspect in the eyes of some of the political chieftains in the
White House. "Positive loyalty" is not, after all, so very far removed from the
performance checks that have recently been ordered in the White House and
which require loyalty, once more, to be checked out. It is only a relatively
small step from getting someone's loyalty to evaluating his usefulness according
to how much he or she agrees, or enthusiastically supports, certain policies. In
other words, the danger is always present. It is only a matter of degree. So it
is not so far-fetched to imagine that some future administration might want to
make a clean sweep of the Senior Foreign Service because it is associated, in
the minds of that new, incoming administration, with failures and idiocies or
total benightedness, or worse-sympathy with our enemies, or inveterate blind-
ness toward something that is particularly important to such an administration.
George F. Kennan, in remarks that I request permission to include in the
printed version of my testimony, stated the problem of the diplomat in a demo-
cratic society in terms that are both insightful and graphic. He noted that "this
diplomat has to recognize that he is himself something of an anomaly within
the traditional structure of American government-something for which there
is not, and could not be, any fully natural and accepted place. He is not politi-
cally appointed-a circumstance which is sometimes a source of irritation, one
suspects, for politicians, who see him. as preempting positions and salaries that
might otherwise be used to reward political supporters."
Moreover, as Kennan points out, the very qualities that make a diplomat
effective in a foreign environment involve features of his appearance and
manners and even thinking processes which are perceived as alien by his own
society. "To many people in journalistic and political life," wrote Kennan, "this
habitude du monde is particularly disturbing, because it seems to imply on the
part of the professional diplomat a certain deliberate self-distancing from those
great currents of mass reaction and emotion to which American society is
uniquely vulnerable and by which journalists and politicians, above all others,
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are carried, of which they are the spokesmen, and in the reflection of which they
find their inner security."
In an earlier interview, of which I would also ask your permission to insert
longer excerpts into the record, Kennan observed that journalists and legis-
lators frequently "expect the FSO to be a sort of foreign exhibit of American
virtues and mannerisms, as they themselves conceive them. They expect him to
cultivate popularity and to use this popularity for the `selling' of American out-
looks (rather than policies) to other peoples. They do not realize that his
main tasks normally have to do with other governments rather than with
peoples ; that his function is really that of an effective and unobtrusive inter-
mediary, assuring the accuracy and usefulness of communication among govern-
ments ; that he needs sometimes to take on something of the personal coloration,
not just linguistically but in manners and way of thinking, of those with whom
he has to communicate; that a strident and expansive Americanism is often an
impediment in this respect ; and that in his quality as an effective intermediary
he is bound, if he is to be useful, to acquire a certain inner detachment towards
both sides, which does not imply any disloyalty to his own. I would submit that no
one can long pursue the Foreign Service profession without acquiring a certain
critical detachment towards the behavior and policies of all governments-
including his own-a detachment which respects the prejudices and limitations
of vision by which that behavior and those policies are often inspired, but does
not necessarily share them."
"Congress and the American public must ultimately choose," Kennan says in
this passage of the interview, "either they want effective intermediaries, effec-
tive executors of American policies abroad, and effective observers as well, in
which case they have to tolerate a certain amount of cosmopolitanism in the
personal make-up of these people, or they must be prepared to forego the
advantages of a highly effective diplomatic arm."
It will not have escaped you that the desirable characteristics that Kennan
saw in a Foreign Service officer, come from "long pursuit" of the career. In
other words, I am not at all sure that they are fully developed in the younger
and more vigorous and less skeptical and more ambitious officers who so often
strike the political leaders as more "with it," as sharing their own ideas more
visibly and articulately, as being, in other words, "in step with the times." This
is precisely what I am warning against, and I think it is not an excessive
extrapolation from the remarks of Kennan that I have just read to you to say
that he, too, sees merit in experience, in the acquisition of that skeptical detach-
ment which does not come readily to younger people.
Section 612 of the proposed legislation would make one of the criteria for
promotion or retention in the Senior Foreign Service not only the usual per-
formance evaluation reports, commendations, awards, reprimands, etc., but
also "records of current and prospective assignments." What a strange ex-
pression-records of prospective assignments. How can there be a record of a
prospective assignment, except a notation that Mr. or Ms. X is in line for a new
job, and that Mr. or Ms. Y does not have a job in prospect.
What could not Mr. Scott McLeod, the agent of Senator Joe McCarthy in
the State Department, have made with such a provision as it applied to, say,
Mr. John Stewart Service or Mr. John Paton Davies who were accused of having
"lost China." Lest you believe that no such cases occurred in more recent years,
I may recall that there was also a man in the early sixties who was suspected
or accused of having "lost Cuba" and for whom the American Foreign Service
Association (of which I was then a member of the board of directors) unsuccess-
fully intervened because the Administration did not want to give him any
prominent assignment for fear of flak from hostile Senators and Congressmen;
It could have been easily certified for such a man that there was no prospective
assignment for him-and out he would go. He, and others in his category, would
be on an escalator to the guillotine, but it would not be his value to his country
that would decide whether the blade would fall, but a political judgment whether
he was "controversial" or an embarrassment.
That, I submit, is coming very close to politicizing the senior ranks of the
Foreign Service. Fearlessness at the bottom of the career pyramid is easy. Fear-
lessness at the top is sometimes also easy, particularly when you approach
retirement. But fearlessness near the top, seeing how the heads roll of those
who do not know how to make themselves agreeable to a new administration,
could be a very dangerous thing to a diplomatic career and is likely to give way
to conformity. We need, and will always need, a variety of senior Foreign
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Service officers, with widely divergent viewpoints. We need people who ask the
inconvenient questions, who recall the things that others have forgotten or
cannot remember because they haven't experienced them as a senior diplomat has.
Thoretically, by shortening the time in grade at the top and certifying to the
non-availability of onward assignments, by letting terms of able senior officers
expire simply because they aren't showing enough "positive loyalty", it would
not take much time for some future Secretary of State, perhaps one who might
be well-intentioned but only weak and inclined to yield to pressure from Capitol
Hill or the press or the White House, to decimate, indeed to decapitate the
Foreign Service. This is an abuse that should not be allowed, that should be
carefully guarded against in the legislation.
Perhaps I may be permitted to add one final observation. I am myself a
member of the American Foreign Service Association. As already remarked, I
was a member of its Board of Directors. At one time I was even its Vice Chair-
man. I write frequently for the Foreign Service Association's organ, the Foreign
Service Journal. I am in full sympathy with its principal goal, the protection
and enhancement of professionalism in our diplomacy. But I do not regard it
presently as fully representative of the Foreign Service, if only for demographic
reasons : It has more young members than old ones. This is not a criticism, it is
a statement of fact.
Older officers, who now almost seem to be ashamed of being older and more
experienced, are an endangered species in today's Foreign Service. Their percent-
age is constantly going down. But it is a fact of life that to the younger offi-
cers, there are always too many older ones holding positions of responsibility.
I felt the same way when I was young. I am not criticizing it. All I am saying
is that the virtues of having a corps, a goodly proportion, of seasoned older
officers available and on hand to make their input into the policy-formulation
process and its execution-the virtues of that are not normally perceived by
younger people.
That, I think, is why I have been encouraged by a number of older officers
to come forward and make these observations about the proposed legislation
which, coming from them, would seem self-serving. My career in the Foreign
Service is behind me. It has been a good career. I think today's service is ex-
cellent and should be protected against some future ravages by irresponsible
politicians. If my testimony has sentitized you to that danger, if I have been
able to point out that the danger is not fanciful, then I have, perhaps, rendered
a service not only to your committee but also the Foreign Service that I love,
including the younger officers who may be inclined to worry about testimony
such as mine because it tends to be in favor of lengthening the escalator to the
guillotine.
EXCERPT FROM "FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT" BY GEORGE F.
KENNAN, IN THE WILSON QUARTERLY, WINTER 1977
[Secondly], this diplomat has to recognize that he is himself something of
an anomaly within the traditional structure of American government-some-
thing for which there is not, and could not be, any fully natural and accepted
place. He is not politically appointed-a circumstance which is sometimes a
source of irritation, one suspects, for politicians, who see him as preempting
positions and salaries that might otherwise be used to reward political sup-
porters. But he is also not, or at least should not be, a member of that great
body of lower-level serving personnel known as the civil service, which con-
stitutes the overwhelming majority of those, other than the political appointees,
who serve the government. But between these two categories of people who work
for the government-the political appointees and the domestic civil servants-
there is no third category, familiar to American politicians and to public opin-
ion generally, to which the Foreign Service could be assigned.
With minor exceptions the United States has no tradition at all of a self-
administered career service within the civilian (as distinct from the military)
sector of government. To the extent, therefore, that the American Foreign Serv-
ice remains a career service, immune to political appointment and resistant
to control by the domestic civil service, it tends to become an object of bewil-
derment and suspicion in the eyes of Congress, of the political parties, and of
much of the press. And yet the legislators and the party politicians, in particu-
lar, are precisely the people on whom the Foreign Service is of course depend-
ent for its appropriations, its salaries, and the physical premises and facilities
with which it has to work.
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Underlying this organizational isolation, and in part explaining and reinforcing
it, is an even more widespread and serious Foreign Service burden-namely, a
deeply ingrained prejudice against people who give their lives professionally to
diplomatic work. This prejudice operates within the political establishment in
the first instance but also with much of the press and portions of the public.
The late French ambassador, Jules Cambon, in the celebrated series of lec-
tures he once delivered before the French Academie (published in 1926 under
the title of Le Diplomate), observed that "democracies will always have am-
bassadors and ministers; it remains to be seen whether they will have diplo-
mats * * * [Diplomacy] is a profession that requires of those who practice it
some cultivation and a certain habitude du monde [roughly : sophisticated view
of the world]." But, he went on, to find people with these qualities, and to bring
then together in a professional service, requires a certain process of selection ;
and this, he thought, would always be disagreeable to democratic tastes because
"democracies have a difficult time tolerating anything that resembles selection."
However true these words might be with respect to other countries, they could
not be more true of the United States, particularly at this time. We live, as we
all know, in an age when egalitarianism is the prevailing passion, at least in
many intellectual and political circles. We seem to stand in the face of a wide-
spread belief that there is no function of public life that could not best be per-
formed by a random assemblage of gray mediocrity. For people of selecting peo-
ple for any governmental function on the basis of their natural suitability for
that sort of work must be rejected; because to admit that some people might
be more suitable than others would be an elitist thought-hense inadmissible.
And not only is selection per se distasteful to many Americans, but the par-
ticular qualities that would have to underlie any proper selection for profes-
sional diplomacy are especially odious. The very idea of this habitude du monde
of which Cambon spoke is repugnant to many because the experience essential
to its acquisition is one that cannot be obtained within our society ; it can be
obtained only by residence and work outside it.
To many people in journalistic and political life this habitude du monde is
particularly disturbing, because it seems to imply on the part of the professional
diplomat a certain deliberate self-distancing from those great currents of mass
reaction and emotion to which American society is uniquely vulnerable and by
which journalists and politicians, above all others, are carried, of which they
are the spokesmen, and in the reflection of which they find their inner security.
To them, the outlook of the diplomatic professional is a challenge-all the more
provoking because it is one they cannot meet on its own ground. And the result
of this is that the diplomat comes only too easily to be viewed as a species of
snobbish and conceited elitist, depays6, estranged from its own country and
countrymen, giving himself airs, looking down upon his fellow citizens, fancying
himself superior to them by virtue of his claim to an esoteric knowledge and
expertise and which by the very fact of its foreign origin challenges the sound-
ness and adequacy of their world of thought.
And in this way there emerges, and finds partial acceptance, the familiar
stereotype of the American diplomat as a somewhat effeminate, rather Anglicized
figure (the British are usually made victims of our inferiority complexes), as
a person addicted to the false attractions of an elegent European social life,
usually to be found at parties, attired in striped pants, balancing a teacup, and
nursing feelings of superiority towards his own country as he attempts to in-
gratiate himself with the hostesses and the officials of another one. The fact
that there is no substance for this stereotype-the fact that what little sub-
stance it might once have had passed out of our lives decades ago, the fact that
this particular professional dedication involves today a great deal of hard work,
much discomfort, much loneliness, a dedication to the service of the nation far
beyond what most people at home are ever asked to manifest, and, last but not
least, in many instances no small amount of danger-all this is of no avail. The
stereotype exists. It persists. It is gratifying to many egos. It will not soon
be eradicated.
The multiplicity of critics and detractors of the American Foreign Service
would not be so serious, perhaps, if it were balanced by any considerable body
of defenders ; but this, unhappily, is not the case. The Department of State,
which theoretically controls the Service and ought properly to defend it, has
neither the ability nor the will to act very effectively in this direction. The
ability is lacking because, of all the departments and agencies of the United
States, the Department of State is perhaps the only one that has no domestic
constituency-no sizable body of the citizenry, that is, which understands its
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functions and is concerned for it, no special interest groups who stand to profit
by its activity and are ready to bring pressure to bear on Congress on its be-
half. Lacking these things, it has little domestic influence. And the State De-
partment's own will to defend the Service is also often lacking, because the
Department is normally headed and administered by people without foreign-
service experience-sometimes even by people who share the very prejudices and
failures of understanding just referred to.
EXCERPT FROM "AN INTERVIEW WITH GEORGE F. KENNAN" BY JOHN F. CAMPBELL, IN
FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, AUGUST, 1970.
Question. When men like the late 'Senator Joseph McCarthy attack the Foreign
Service for "disloyalty", isn't their main objection really that the 'Service is or
something of an intellectual elite and its members pick up eccentric and "un-
American" habits from spending most of their lives mixing with foreigners and
living abroad? Isn't this the real reason many congressmen can't stand the State
Department?
KENNAN. YeS, I think there is, most unfortunately, a conflict between the
qualities of character and personality that are most effective in the Foreign
Service and those that most commend themselves to some people in Congress and,
in general, to the American press.
In part, this arises from a suspicion on the part of congressmen and journalists
that people so subtly different from themselves cannot fully respect them and
must in some way be looking down on them. But there is also the fact that very
few people in our domestic life-almost none, in fact, even among the most ex-
perienced journalists and legislators-have any proper understanding of the real
function and 'requirements of the Foreign Service. They expect the FSO to be a
sort of foreign exhibit of the American virtues and mannerisms, as they them-
selves conceive them. They expect him to cultivate popularity and to use this
popularity for the "selling" of American outlooks (rather than policies) to other
peoples. They do not realize that his main tasks normally have to do with other
governments rather than with peoples ; that his function is really that of an ef-
fective and unobtrusive intermediary, assuring the accuracy and usefulness of
communication among governments ; that he needs sometimes to take on some-
thing of the personal coloration, not just linguistically but in manners and way
of thinking, of those with whom he has to communicate ; that a strident and
expansive Americanism is often an impediment in this respect ; and that in his
quality of an intermediary he is bound, if he is to be useful, to acquire a certain
inner detachment towards both sides, which does not imply any disloyalty to
his own. I would submit that no one can long pursue the Foreign Service profes-
sion without acquiring a certain critical detachment towards the behavior and
policies of all governments-including his own-a detachment which respects
the prejudices and limitations of vision by which that behavior and those policies
are often inspired, but does not necessarily share them. Congress and the Amer-
ican public must ultimately choose, either they want effective intermediaries,
effective executors of American policies abroad, and effective observers as well,
in 'which case they have to tolerate a certain amount of cosmopolitanism in the
personal make-up of these people, or they must be prepared to forgo the advan-
tages of a highly effective diplomatic arm. s
It is a great pity that this touch of cosmopolitanism (it is generally very
slight) is so often taken for effeminacy or lack of affection for one's own coun-
try. It is a poor sort of manliness that has:to document itself by expansive and
boisterous behavior ; this latter, in fact, is usually the mark of inner insecurity
and uncertainty. And the variety of patriotism which has never known ex- 4
posure to the challenge of different ways of thought and behavior is not neces-
sarily the strongest form of patriotism. One thinks, here, of Milton's words
(from the Areopagitica) :
"I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed,
that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out 'of the race where
that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat."
I am afraid that before many Americans can hope to have a really effective
Foreign 'Service, they will have to overcome certain forms of narrowness and
provincialism in their own attitude towards the tasks and requirements of For-
eign Service work.
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Qucstion. Franklin Roosevelt seemed to have very little use for the Foreign
Service. American diplomats were not consulted about most of the major wartime
decisions, and Roosevelt traveled to Casablanca and Yalta without senior State
Department advisers. He once wrote in a memorandum that the successful di?plo-
prat is "a man who is loyal to the Service, who does not offend people and who
does not get intoxicated at public functions." Was it Roosevelt's personal tem-
perament that made him avoid diplomatic advice, or was it the feeling that a
President can never be sure of receiving from professional diplomats the kind of
intense loyalty he gets from his political supporters?
IiENNAN. I am not sure of that answer to this question. 'Sometimes the reluc-
tance to recognize any virtue in the Foreign Service officer's expertise conceals
a painful awareness of one's own lack of it. In FDR's case, I think there was
something personal, as well. He disliked social prominence and pretension ; and
he probably associated these things with the Foreign Service. He had little or
no understanding for a disciplined, hierarchical organization. He had a highly
personal view of diplomacy, imported from 'his domestic political triumphs, and
great confidence in his personal ability to wheedle anybody into anything. His
approach to problems of foreign policy was basically histrionic, with the Amer-
ican political public as his audience. Foreign Service officers were of little use to
him in this respect. His taste was for the dilettante, and he liked boldness in
the people around him. He disliked cautious, experienced men ; and it is true
that a Foreign 'Service officer, since he is a professional, has the same kind of
caution bred of experience that a good doctor or lawyer has.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed, for very intelligent
testimony and for very intelligent points. I think one has to have
actually experienced the days of McCarthyism to be able to recall it
with the vividness that one should. And, I believe and I trust that the
Department of State has representatives here who, as they are looking
through section 612, will keep your testimony in mind.
I must say it would seem to me that a selection board, if one wanted
to cozy up to the Secretary of State, could really raise havoc with
Foreign Service officers who had views counters to those of the ad-
ministration.
I also remember being at the environmental conference in Stock-
holm, Sweden, a few years ago, and the chilling effect the presence
of Mr. Erlichman had on the free expression of views of people in that
delegation when they met and expressed the thought that we were en-
gaged in environmental warfare in Vietnam. That was absolutely con-
sidered disloyal to say and, yet, it was a fact and we have recognized
that fact since then. And, we are now in the process of ratifying a
treaty that will prevent environmental modifications as a means of
warfare.
And, as times change, I think the people in the career service should
be given protection for their own views as long as they are loyal serv-
ants to the Government.
In connection with performance pay where some Foreign Service
officers will get higher pay than others, which will necessitate a new
burden for selection boards to figure out which ones will get it-some-
what like paying one major general extra pay as opposed to another
major general or as opposed to the present system which is very much
the same in the Foreign Service as in the military where the carrot is
the prospect of better assignment and promotion and where the stick
is the thought of not being promoted and passed over, which, I think,
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seems to work fairly effectively-I was wondering what your views
were on that, Ambassadore Herz.
Ambassador Huxz. Mr. Chairman, I believe the intention of those
who support performance pay is simply to make sure that Foreign
Service officers would be adequately compensated.
The CHAIRMAN. Forgive me, I don't think that is the reason. I think
the reason is to encourage their performance. But, the adequate
compensation is provided for by the salary and living allowances
theoretically.
Ambassador Hnnz. Thank you, sir. I completely agree that this
should be the main concern. Adaquate pay, I think is-I just wish to
say what my comments on performance pay should not by any means
be interpreted as directed against adequate compensation for Senior
Foreign Service officers.
I don't believe they are adequatly compensated now. I think means
should be found to compensate them adequately. Whether the allow-
ance is due, that is another question.. At any rate, I don't think that
should be the main consideration when one is considering the concept
of performance pay.
Using your parallel, Senator, of generals, and not wishing to use
examples of recent wars, I would say that Hanibal would probably
have gotten performance pay for crossing the Alps, but as for Fabius
Maximus cunctator-the Roman Senate would surely have withheld
performance pay from him because he would have been regarded as a
timid general who was not using properly agressive tactics against
the enemy.
Fabius Maximus defeated Hannibal, but defeated him after a long
campaign in which his feints, his retreats, his failure to have an
immediate showdown with him, were the essence of his strategy.
I don't see how, using the Foreign Services as a realistic case. the
"general" in the Foreign Service who avoids the showdown will be as
easily rewarded or as easily recognized as deserving reward as the one
who has it out, who creates the crisis and "solves the crisis," because
he will be regarded as the activist, as a man who has really worked
hard. Whereas, in fact, the other man may have worked harder, more
intelligently and in the long run with better effect.
Using another parallel from the field of my wife, who is a doctor,
I imagine if performance pay were given to doctors in a hospital, the
doctor who successfully performs a triple bypass heart operation
would be entitled to performance pay, but the internist who so manages
the patient that he does not need a triple bypass operation, would
probably not get performance pay.
What I am pointing out is that it is very difficult to see how this
provision can be equitably enforced.
And, I would again wish to close my remarks on the subject by
saying ways should be found so that responsible representatives in the
Foreign Service who are representing the United States abroad or who
are in important policymaking positions in Washington, should be
adequately compensated. These are people who carry enormous loads
and who certainly deserve to be put in a position not inferior to people
in the civil service who get substantial compensation.
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229
CONCERN FOR NEEDED MANPOWER
The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. I think all the salaries should be in-
creased, but does the thought of even the paperwork involved in set-
ting up the selection boards, however they would do it, to reward
people with these added little pay bonuses, that in itself would use up
a good deal of manpower. Does that concern you at all?
Ambassador HERZ. I am worried by that, but am more worried by
the unseemliness of the kind of competition you would get for per-
formance pay. It is even today, at least when I was still in the service,
difficult sometimes when you read a telegram from a chief of mission
in the field, perhaps in some trouble spot, to know whether it was
written because he wishes to make a record or whether it was written
because he thought that what he was saying made the most sense.
This is a human frailty which is normal, I think, in most profes-
sions. But, we should be careful not to exacerbate that human frailty
when it is coupled with the desire for increased material recognition.
The CHAIRMAN. Going back to your analogy of doctors, I sometimes
get worried under the present system whether a doctor, if he suddenly
finds he needs a new garage or something of that sort, would have a
tendency perhaps to perform a hysterectomy whereas you go into the
Kaiser plan where the doctor gets no more, then you find the number
of hysterectomies, and so forth, vastly reduced.
I am thinking here of a Foreign Service officer who needs a new
garage. He might not want to antagonize his boss with a specific rec-
ommendation if he thought that nice pay bonus is going to go down the
drain. I think this also can enter into it alit.
Ambassador HERZ. I think, Senator, you are going too far in that
respect. I am not sure that the monetary incentive would, in practice,
turn out to be the important thing because it is monetary. But what you
are doing, if you approve the provision for incentive pay, is starting
an entirely new round of competition among Service officers.
Now, if this were for a particularly attractive medal publicly dis-
played, I am not sure that this would not be equally bad, quite aside
from the question of whether it is money. But you are creating a new
set of hierarchies. This ambassador has gotten $10,000 more because
of the way he handled a crisis in Groustark, now what can I do to be
his equal, how to surpass him?
The CHAIRMAN. First, create a crisis in Groustark and then resolve
it.
Ambassador HERZ. I am more worried about that than the garage
that needs to be fixed or replaced.
The CHAIRMAN. I think you have an excellent point. I would love
to go on all morning with you, old friend, but I think it assists and
move on to our next witness, the honorable Sheldon B. Vance, former
Ambassador to Chad and Zaire.
I notice you have a very long statement, which will appear in full
in the record. If you can digest it, it would be appreciated.
[Ambassador Vance's biography follows:]
BIOGRAPHY OF AMBASSADOR SHELDON B. VANCE
Sheldon B. Vance has been practicing law in Washington, D.C., in the firm of
Vance & Joyce, since his retirement, February 28, 1977, from the Foreign Service.
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His 34 years in the American Foreign Service included almost seven years as
Ambassador, three in a position comparable to Assistant Secretary, and four
and a half as a Deputy Chief of Mission. He retired with the personal rank of
Career Minister.
His posts included embassies in Brazil, Ethiopia, Chad and Zaire, in the latter
two as Chief of Mission. He also served at two consulates in France and had
four tours of duty at home in the Department of State. The latter included as-
signments as the desk officer for Belgium and Switzerland, Chief Personnel
Placement Officer for Africa, Director of the Office of Central African Affairs, a
Senior Inspector, and the Executive Secretary of the President's Cabinet Com-
mittee on International Narcotics Control. In the latter position, he was also
Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator of Foreign Narcotics
Control.
He had a nine month academic assignment to the Department of State's
Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy and served as the African Affairs Advisor to
our U.N. General Assembly delegation in 1968. He served twice on Department of
State Selection Boards, once as Chairman.
Born in Minnesota on January 18, 1917, he obtained his BA from Carleton
College and his J.D. from Harvard Law School. He is married.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON B. VANCE, FORMER AMBASSADOR
TO CHAD AND ZAIRE
Ambassador VANCE. I intend to attempt orally to summarize my
prepared statement, briefly.
Mr. Chairman, I would first of all like to express my appreciation
for the privilege of addressing this committee this morning on a
subject of great interest and concern to me, based upon the 34 years I
spent in the Foreign Service until I voluntarily retired about 3 years
ago.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you enter the service, what year?
Ambassador VANCE. 1942. During that period, I was Ambassador
to two different countries. I later held a position equivalent to an
Assistant Secretary of State. I was promoted to the personal rank of
Career Minister before retiring. And, I have held just about every
type of assignment that is available in the Foreign Service, including
personnel management and assignment to the inspection corps.
The importance of the Foreign Service to the Republic need not I
think be emphasized in this body. I see it as playing two 'basic roles.
One, as giving foreign policy advice with all appropriate candor to
the President and the Secretary of State and once foreign policy is
decided, assisting them in implementing it. Two dangers threatened
by the proposed Foreign Service Act of 1979 concern me.
The first has been addressed very eloquently by my friend and
former colleague, Ambassador Martin Herz, which is to assure that
the Foreign Service in the future gives its advice to its seniors with all
appropriate candor. The second, which was also addressed by Ambas-
sador Herz, is that the accumulated experience and wisdom of the
Foreign Service be protected. However I wish to emphasize that this
protection should be afforded in reasonable balance with the equally
essential up or out principle that has governed the Foreign Service
since the Foreign Service Act of 1946.
I would like to talk to these two points in that order. One, I think
that candor is threatened by several provisions in the present act. The
provision that concerns me the most is.the creation of performance
pay for the proposed Senior Foreign Service, which mirrors or paral-
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lels or copies the Civil Service Reform Act of last year and the Senior
Executive Service.
And, as you, Mr. Chairman, have yourself suggested, there is a
world of difference between the two services. And what is applicable
to the one is not necessarily applicable to the other.
The CHAIRMAN. Along that line would you think that the Foreign
Service should be allied more with the Civil Service or with the mili-
tary service?
Ambassador V ANCR. I would like to develop that thought a little
further, if I may, Mr. Chairman.
Amongst the factors that should be clearly understood, I think, in
the proposal of performance pay is that competition for that cash
bonus would be open even to ambassadors of career service and to
assistant secretaries, even to the Under Secretary of State if he hap-
pens to be a career officer and wishes to participate.
Also, the old rule that no officer at a given post may be paid more
than the chief of mission would be breached by this performance pay
idea.
We are told by management that performance pay will be awarded
by the selection boards and management suggests that selection boards
can assure that these rewards will be made equitably. However, I
would like to say the following, speaking from the experience of a
number of assignments to selection boards and a considerable knowl-
edge of how they function.
I believe that the Foreign Service evaluation system is the best that
has been developed thus far in our Government. However, it cannot,
in my opinion, be finely tuned sufficiently to be able to make an annual
decision of a cash bonus in an equitable fashion.
The great temptation for our officers will be to reduce candor in
order to encourage the most favorable possible recommendations from
one's immediate boss each year. These awards are not like promotions,
which, once attained, continue to be enjoyed. These are annual awards.
I want to underline also for this committee, Mr. Chairman, that this
new idea has not yet even been tried in the Civil Service. I have seen
press reports stating that personnel managers in the Civil Service have
expressed dismay as to how they are going to be able to administer this
strange new notion.
The Civil Service is, as the committee knows, a rank-in job serv-
ice. And, one cannot get promoted no matter how well one does unless
you get another kind of job that has a higher rank. This, as the chair-
man well knows, is not true of the Foreign Service nor of the military
where rank is in person and good performance can be rewarded and
is rewarded by promotion.
As the chairman has suggested, if such cash awards for performance
are appropriate for the Foreign Service, why not for our military
services? 'I understand that our Air Force tried something like per-
formance pay and abandoned it. Quite simply, it is not appropriate to
seek a cash bonus for doing one's duty.
I cannot speak for the Civil Service, but I can assure the committee
from my experience that the Foreign Service does not need a cash
encouragement to do its best.
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The position on performance pay of the American Foreign Serv-
ice Association is, if I understand it correctly, the following: 'as the
professional or trade union representative of the Foreign Service
as a whole, it cannot appropriately try to block the opportunity of
members to earn more money.
I agree that the Foreign Service, at all classes, should receive more
compensation, but the idea of the proposed performance pay is cer- W
tainly not, in my opinion, the way to go about it.
The chairman mentioned that a ,Senior Foreign 'Service officer might
want a new garage and he would set out to do everything possible
to gain a performance pay award in order to pay for it. That unhappy `
supposition could occur. But, it would not be something on which
that officer could base the family budget or decide to send junior
to that school instead of this one, because the bonus would be good
only for 1 year. This is not an answer to the need of the Foreign Serv-
ice for more remuneration.
It has been suggested, I believe, by management witnesses that the
Foreign Service generally supports performance pay. I would like to
make the following statement. Although I am today speaking solely
for myself, being a retired officer, when this bill was first proposed,
I volunteered my services to the Foreign Service Association, of
which I have long been a member. For my pains-perhaps another
example of the old saw that one should never volunteer-I
wound up the chairman of one of the task forces established by the
Foreign Service Association to examine the impact of this new legis-
lative proposal on the Foreign Service. The task force I chaired was
the one that looked at the bills impact on the senior ranks.
Our task force included 11 members. We consulted hundreds of For-
eign Service officers of all ranks in the active service. We also studied
the airgrams and telegrams that came in from the field from virtually
every one of our posts commenting on the various aspects of this pro-
posed new legislation.
My reading of these, and my conclusions from these studies, from
this total exposure, is that the idea of performance pay is not one that
is welcomed by the service as a whole. I think most Foreign Service
officers of all ranks are uncomfortable with it. A larger number would
swallow it for reasons of the possibility of additional money. But,
it would still, in my judgment, be a minority.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a copy of that report?
Ambassador VANCE. Of the task force?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Ambassador VANCE. Yes; I do.
The CHAIRMAN. That will be incorporated into the record without
objection.
Ambassador VANCE. I would like to add that there have been a
number of changes made in the draft legislation since we wrote that
report. So, its pertinence is perhaps not as wide as it might be. But,
it certainly supports what I said with regard to performance pay.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows :1
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., April 6, 1979.
KENNETH N. ROGERS, Esquire,
Chairman, State Standing Committee, American Foreign Service Association,
c/o Department of State, Washington, D.C.
DEAR KEN : I have the honor to submit the report of our task force on "The
Senior Service", for your transmittal to Management as part of the Associa-
tion's overall response to Management's proposals on Foreign Service personnel
reform.
The members of the task force included the following officers other than
myself :
Marshall P. Adair, FSO-5;
Michael H. B. Adler, FSR-1 (AID)
M. Lyall Breckon, FSO-2;
Peter S. Bridges, FSO-1;
Richard Hecklinger, FSO-4;
Ivan Izenberg, FSIO-2 (ICA) ;
Edward W. Lollis, FSO-3;
Wade Matthews, FSO-2;
James R. Ruchti, FSO-1;
Moncrieff J. Spear, FSO-1.
Our task was made far easier by the remarkable degree of agreement we have
found among Foreign Service officers on basic Service problems.
Respectfully submitted,
SHELDON B. VANCE,
Chairman, Career Minister, Retired.
This task force, and AFSA through its consultations with officers in Washing-
ton and in the field, have found deep concern among members of the Foreign
Service that recent years have seen a serious erosion of the basic "up or out"
principle underlying the Foreign Service Act of 1946-but an overwhelming
belief among members of the Service that a massive revision of this Act, as pro-
visionally proposed by Management, is not the way to proceed. Vigorous imple-
mentation of the "up or out" principle is vital to the overall effectiveness of the
corps of 3400 Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) who have formed the heart of
the American Foreign Service since the Foreign Service was first created as
our career diplomatic and consular service by the Rogers Act of 1924. (Much of
what is set forth in this paper is applicable also to the Foreign Service In-
formation Officers of ICA, and to senior levels of State Department Foreign
Service Reserve and Staff Officers, whose future structure is also discussed in
a separate report.)
The basic legislation under which the FSO corps operates today is the For-
eign Service Act of 1946. This Act, which as emphasized in the 1946 House of
Representatives report "was written by departmental and Foreign Service of&-
cers working together", has with relatively few amendments provided a flexible
system which has maintained strict intake and promotion standards, permitting
successive postwar Administrations to name from the FSO corps two-thirds or
more of our Ambassadors, as well as a varying number of Presidential appoint-
ments in the Department. The FSO corps also fills most of the other officer-level
positions in our Embassies, Missions and Consultates abroad and, since the re-
form authored by the Wriston Commission two decades ago. FSOs have filled
most officer-level positions in the Department in Washington. Beyond this, a
number of FSOs are assigned temporarily to other Federal agencies, to staff
positions in the Congress, to State and local governments, and to universities
and non-profit organizations, in accordance with Sections 571 and 576 of the Act.
Thus a Service destined primarily to represent this country's foreign interests
also enjoys a unique assignment flexibility at home, which benefits both the
Federal service and individual officers' career development.
1. Management's analysis.-The Department's management has stated, in its
proposals of February 13, 1979 entitled "Proposed Foreign Service Act", that
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major change is necessary to correct defects in the present Foreign Service sys-
tem, and that "The most important defect in the existing FS system is the
seriously impacted situation at senior personnel levels which has caused severe
restrictions and distortions at all levels affecting intake, promotion, and assign-
ments with consequent career frustrations, uncertainties, and morale prob-
lems." In suggesting possible remedies for the situation it describes, Management
has emphasized the basic difference between the Civil Service and the highly
mobile, rank-in-person Foreign Service which is called on to accept assignment
anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, Management insists that the greater the
comparability between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service, the greater
the benefits to the Department and its employees ; it believes that innovative
features of the recent Civil Service Reform Act "should, therefore, be drawn on
or paralleled where that would be advantageous to the FS." Furthermore, Man-
agement has argued for a major piece of new legislation, warning that "a piece-
meal approach limited to a few changes in the Act of 1.946 will not enable us to
achieve this important reaffirmation of the unique and essential role of the
Foreign Service."
2. AFSA's analysis.-Our analysis, as well as the critique and proposed alter-
natives which follow, reflects views widely held within the Service insofar as we
have been gble to determine them through a careful process of consultation. The
members of the task force have reviewed a' large number of cables and letters
received from AFSA chapters and individual officers abroad; they have listened
to the views expressed at open meetings which AFSA has held in Washington ;
they have sought the private views of officers assigned in Washington, including
a number of widely respected senior officers holding senior positions. Senior
officers of AID and ICA served on the task force and contributed valuable in-
sights gained in part from interviews with officers in their agencies.
We have not found perfect unanimity among the officers of the Service, but we
found an impressive similarity of views.
Basically, we agree with Management that there is a "seriously impacted
situation at senior personnel levels". Unfortunately Management has not supplied
any analysis of this situation. The root causes of this situation in our view are
the following :
(1) The decision of the,Department Management in 1976 to lengthen time-in-
class maximums for senior officers, which has significantly slowed attrition at the
top and, because of the "cascade" effect, thereby preyented promotion of perhaps
seventy officers through the ranks in 1978;
(2) The very low recent rates for selection-out for sub-standard performance,
after the Department was required by a 1975 court decision to provide a greater
element of due process-rates which may admittedly be difficult to raise ;
(3) The low recent voluntary retirement rate for senior officers, due to the
early-1977 pay raise which has led individuals to delay retirement until they
can cclculate pensions on a higher 3-year average;
(4) The recent temporary halt to mandatory retirement at 60, after a lower
court decision which the Supreme Court has now overturned 8-1 in Vance v.
Bradley-a halt which is however sought anew in a bill introduced by Congress-
man Pepper ;
(5) Non-use of Section 519 of the Act, which calls for mandatory retirement of
an FSO who has not been reassigned after serving as chief of mission ;
(6) Over-use of "stretch" assignments of mid-grade officers to senior positions,
which in moderation is a useful management tool ;
(7) Finally, the decision of the current Administration to increase the number
of political, non-career appointments to senior positions in the Department of
State. This flies in the face of Jimmy Carter's praise of the Foreign Service in
Why Not the Best and his indication that he would end non-merit diplomatic
appointments. It is true that about three-quarters of American Ambassadors are
now drawn from the career service, a slightly higher percentage than in previous
Administrations, but no other major country makes more than a tiny handful of
ambassadorial appointments from non-career rank ; most major countries make
none. Furthermore, about 55 percent of ranking positions in the State Depart-
ment (deputy assistant secretary and above) are now filled by political ap-
pointees ; and political appointees have been named to office-director positions
which had been filled by career officers in previous Administrations. In the last
Administration there was only one political appointee and 13 career officers among
Assistant Secretaries of State (including the heads of CA, INR and PM) ; now
these positions are filled by 8 political appointees and only 7 career officers ! Who
can dispute that this affects the "impacted situation at senior personnel levels"
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which even the Department's management calls "the most important defect in the
existing FS system"?
Aside from "impaction", we believe that the Service faces other serious prob-
lems not addressed in Management's proposals. Among these are :
(a) A decreasing substantive role for the Foreign Service. As the roles of the
NSC staff, other Departments and agencies, and non-career personnel in the
Department in formulating and executing foreign policy have expanded, partici-
pation by the career Service has declined proportionately. As successive Ad-
ministrations have tended more and more to send delegations (often interagency
ones) overseas for important discussions, rather than rely on communication
through Embassies, the sense of serving ceremonial and facilitative, rather than
substantive, functions has increased in Foreign Service posts. This effect varies
by functional sector and "cone." But declining job satisfaction is widespread,
and the trend has been downward for some time.
(b) The decrease in the Service's materials compensation, due to the drastic
decline in the dollar vis-a-vis many currencies as well as inflation (which we
share with other citizens, but which is better compensated for in private
business).
(c) Family stress in the Foreign Service, which has increased, in part as a
result of change in American society which can have a particular effect on the
Service. For example, spouses are offered expanding opportunities for satisfying
employment in the US, and are often understandably loath to leave a good job
An Washington to assume household and ornamental functions, overseas. Foreign
Service parents are understandably concerned about the need to send teen-aged
children away to boarding schools, a need which has expanded with the opening
of posts in cities where no English-language. secondary schools exist.
(d) The decade-old division of FSOs into political, economic/commercial, con-
sular, and administrative "cones" which was made without adequate consulta-
tion or sufficient analysis of Service needs. The cone system turned most officers
to increased specialization ; it has brought benefits, and undoubtedly our Service
does have need of specialization ; but in the view of the task force the present
system is too crude and inflexible, and has not only unnecessarily divided the
Service but has impeded the development of officers who, if they are to reach
the top of the Service, are supposed to have mastered all areas of foreign-affairs
work.
B. MANAGEMENT'S PROPOSED REMEDIES
Management proposes to improve the senior levels of the Foreign Service by
instituting a "senior threshold" selection process and creating a "Senior Foreign
Service" inspired by the new Senior Executive Service created by the Civil
Service Reform Act. The top rank of the Senior Foreign Service, called "Minis-
ter" and equivalent to the present class of Career Minister, would serve on a
three-year appointment renewable on a basis of the Department's overall needs
and Selection Boards' recommendations on individuals. (Renewable contracts
would also be instituted for senior specialist officers, presumably non-FSOs. )
The next two ranks, designated "Minister-Counselors"' and "Counselors" and
equivalent to present FSO-1 and FSO-2, would have "shorter than current
time-in-class limits".
The three SFS ranks (and possibly lower ranks, in time) would be eligible
for special performance pay, modeled on similar provisions for the Senior Execu-
tive Service, to be awarded on the recommendation of Selection Boards. Al-
though Management's proposals of February 13 state that performance pay
could be awarded to up to half of the "Senior Foreign Service", the Department
Notice of March 27 (sent to the field as State telegram 76373) on the Staff
Corps-but presumably applicable in this regard to FSOs-states that "The
money for performance pay for each Selection Board category * * * would be
the same as currently available for merit step increases, but rather than being
distributed to everyone, it would be awarded on the basis of performance."
This necessarily indicates that performance pay awards must be very limited
in either numbers or amounts.
In addition, Management proposes to bring about a radical change in promo-
tion procedures at both senior and lower levels by furnishing to Selection
Boards, which currently work only on a basis of officers' performance files,
Management's recommendations on individuals' suitability for promotion.
Management also states that it would continue the "valuable career develop-
ment practice" of assigning outstanding mid-career officers to senior jobs, and
that the exchange of senior officers with other agencies "would be encouraged".
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These are in each case simply reaffirmations of existing practices and not new
proposals.
O. AFSA CRITIQUE OF MANAGEMENT REMEDIES
With exceedingly few exceptions, members of the Foreign Service have as
individuals and through AFSA chapters expressed their strong opposition to any
comprehensive legislative re-design of the FSO corps. They have strongly ex-
pressed the need for caution, and for thorough consultation with the Service,
before attempting to replace the 1946 Act of which has proven an excellent,
flexible tool for the management of the Service. They have pointed out that
management has not used the tools available to it to confront the "impacted
situation" ; they have expressed their doubts that this situation is in any sense a
structural defect requiring new legislation. Among cables received from many
posts, officers of a major Embassy in Europe have suggested that the manage-
ment proposals are intended as a substitute for "the responsibility and self-
discipline which management has failed to exercise." The officers of an Embassy
in Central America have noted that the management proposals are argued
largely on the basis of the Civil Service Reform Act, which is the first such
intended reform of that Service in 60 years while the Foreign Service's basic
legislation is postwar and its reforms since then numerous ; they say that the
Foreign Service should not "suffer the indignity of yet another major overhaul
for the sake of change alone, unless real benefits, which are not apparent, are to
be found." A number of officers have contrasted Management's present proposals,
drafted without consultation with the Service, with the coordinated, cooperative
venture which resulted in the 1946 Act.
An additional reason to avoid structural change intended to ease the "impacted
situation" is that data available to the task force indicate that this situation
may ease appreciably within the next year even if Management fails to take any
action, structural or otherwise. For instance, we understand that in February
1980, three years after top salaries were raised to $47,500, a total of 429 senior
FSOs, or roughly two-thirds of the total, will be eligible to retire on this new
"high-3" basis.
All in all, the basic Service criticism of Management's proposal for a "Senior
Foreign Service" is that it seems to lack justification other than a desire to create
a structure outwardly similar to the Senior Executive Service. Such a structure
is totally unnecessary in order to carry out needed reforms. A number of officers
have also questioned why Management has chosen the rank-in-job Civil Service
for a model, while failing to look for possible inspiration at the other main rank-
in-person services ; the military services which, as the Supreme Court has re-
minded us in Vance v. Bradley, were with good reason closely studied and drawn
on by the framers of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Many have also questioned
whether it makes sense to imitate a recent innovation in the Civil Service which
may conceivably not live up to expectations, and which in any case is intended
to create for the Civil Service the kind of broadly-experienced, broadly-assignable
senior executives which the Foreign Service already possesses. As noted above,
Sections 571 and 576 of the 1946 Act as amended already provide authority under
which FSOs can be assigned to a wide range of agencies and institutions. The
system works ; for example, in the present Administration FSOs have held senior
positions in a range of other agencies including CIA, Commerce, Defense, Energy,
and Treasury.
Further Service criticism is directed at Management's intention to provide Se-
lection Boards with recommendations as to which officers should be promoted.
The task force shares the view that this is a most unwise proposal, subject to
political manipulation, and believes that the Foreign Service 'Selection Board
system provides what is probably the fairest and most equitable system of merit
promotion in the Federal service. Since officers are promoted on the basis of
boards' rankings, Management cannot always raise up by direct action those
officers which it believes best ; but it does so indirectly by assigning them above
their rank to key jobs which, if they do well, will surely win them high board
ranking ; meanwhile, the impartial board review helps ensure that the officer in
Madras or in Wichita gets as fair a deal as an Under Secretary's favorite. The
idea of feeding to selection boards Management's ideas as to who should be pro-
moted not only flies in the face of our merit principles but is inherently foolish,
since an independent selection board might deliberately low-rank an officer urged
on it by management. Furthermore, although Management would make its Board
recommendations available to the individual officer, the result would undoubtedly
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be a high rate of grievance actions to remove these assessments from files, and
increased distrust of the promotion system. This is not to say that the present
evaluation system could not be improved ; it could ; see Section D below.
Many officers have criticized the still vague proposal for performance pay. The
task force has given this question close attention; the senior ranks (and not only
the senior ranks) of the Foreign Service are under-paid, and any proposal to allow
at least a few FSOs to raise their pay from $47,500 to $66,000 obviously deserves a
good look. Several considerations apply.
The Foreign Service, unlike the Civil Service, has a considerable percentage
of senior officers in Presidential appointments, to which separate non-career
salaries apply. Would an FSO serving in a Presidential appointment be eligible
for performance pay? If so, would it not be better management for the President
to award the premium pay, rather than a Department selection board? If not,
would it be good management for an office director to be able to earn more than
the Ambassador to France?
The vast majority of officers would strongly oppose the use of money from
regular step increases for performance pay. We would emphasize that the legis-
lative basis for step increases in the Foreign Service is quite different from that
of the Civil Service. Section 625 of the Foreign Service Act presently provides an
annual step increase for any officer whose services meet Service standards, and
possible additional increases for especially meritorious service.
Some officers have expressed concern that the intended performance-pay sys-
tem runs entirely against the valid concept of the senior FSO corps as a uniquely
valuable group of public servants, most (though admittedly not all) of whom
render extraordinary service. If management should intend to make performance
pay available for a high percentage of senior officers, this concern would be
allayed ; but a system awarding performance pay to as low a percentage as is
intended for the SES would be a negative judgment on the worth of the Foreign
Service. As noted above in Section B, available information indicates that the
percentage receiving extra pay would in fact be very small.
It must also be emphasized that if a performance pay system should be judged
advisable for the Foreign Service, it need not be conditioned in any way on
introduction of a "Senior Foreign Service" proposal. The performance-pay idea
cannot "sell" the rest of the SFS idea to members of the Service.
Finally, the task force notes that a large number of officers have expressed
their overall objection to the notion of performance pay, simply on grounds that
the concept is alien and demeaning to the Foreign Service. Performance pay may
be a valuable tool to elicit outstanding performance from a Civil Service officer
for whom a salary increase is impossible unless his or her job is upgraded. That
situation does not apply in the rank-in-person Foreign Service, whose officers
are not locked into a job with a particular salary. The task force agrees that
premium pay will not necessarily produce better performance by a Service which
is highly motivated and hard-working. The question is rather whether Manage-
ment (and the Congress) can do a better job of supplying better overall com-
pensation to a Service which, as noted in Section A above, has suffered a loss in
both psychic and material income. As the House Report on the 1946 Act put it,
"Compensation should be sufficient to attract able men [and women] regardless
of the possession of private means".
In sum, the task force believes that the Service is not wholly opposed to the
idea of performance pay ; but it believes that Management owes the Service a
frank discussion of the problems outlined above, before any further step is
taken. It believes that the question of performance pay should not disguise the
basic problem of overall compensation. And it notes, incidentally, that another
rank-in-person service, the Air Force, has recently abandoned incentive or
performance pay as unworkable.
Aside from performance pay, the key element in the "SFS" proposal is that
for three-year renewable contracts at the top SFS level, which would equate
the Career Ministers who presently have no time-in-class maximum. It is not
clear how many officers would be retired earlier under such a proposal; there
are never more than a few dozen Career Ministers, and a number of them hold
Presidential appointments at any given time (23 out of 38, at present) and
would not be immediately affected by retirement from the career service. More-
over, the option of involuntary retirement through Section 519 is available.
The task force's basic criticism of this contract proposal is that the reason
for putting it forward is quite unclear. Is it principally intended to deal with
the "impacted situation"? It will, as noted, affect relatively few senior officers;
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at the same time Management has until now made no report to the Service on
how it views the possibility of early action on the factors listed in Section A.2
above which are the real cause of the "impacted situation". True, Management
also proposes to reduce time-in-class maximums for other "SFS" officers ; but
one does not need to create an "SFS" to reduce maximums which Management
itself lengthened only three years ago. All in all, the task force is led to the
conclusion that the main reason for the contract proposal, as for the "SFS"
proposal as a whole, is simply to emulate a Civil Service innovation yet to ?
prove itself.
D. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
There is no denying the fact that the Service needs improvement at senior
levels. One basic need is to improve the performance evaluation system in such
a way as to make possible the "senior threshold" process mentioned but not laid
out in Management's proposals.
Since our promotion process in effect substitutes a Selection Board for the
judgment of one or two supervisors, it is vitally important that a board have
at its disposal the most accurate information possible on the performance of
the individual being reviewed. The improvements made in the efficiency report
system over the past decade have introduced more equity, and at the same time
have increased the difficulty of writing frank reports. This difficulty is further
increased when promotion rates go down ; in such a situation, the supervisor
tends to think that his or her subordinate will suffer in competition if not
described in superlatives. This is another example of the fact that the personnel
system must be managed as a coordinated whole, since problems in.one part of
the system inevitably affect other parts.
The best way to improve the evaluation system so as to make possible a real
senior threshold would seem to be to introduce some additional. means of objec-
tive assessment. The Board of Examiners has recently begun using, with candi-
dates for entry into the FSO corps, individual and group assessment techniques
of the sort used successfully by many private firms and pioneered in the Federal
service over a decade ago by the IRS.
The task force suggests that a possible solution to the evaluation problem,
which is most critical for officers at senior ranks whose files tend to become
increasingly laudatory, would be to institute an assessment process for all
officers after their promotion to Class 3. Officers in the field would presumably
be assessed on their next return to Washington on transfer or consultation. This
would not be a substitute for efficiency reports, but rather an additional exami-
nation of an officer's abilities and potential to serve at senior levels, obtained
in a one- to two-day assessment carried out in Washington. Such assessment
would be required for eligibility for promotion to Class 2. The task force under-
stands that assessment techniques are available which evaluate not only skills
developed in past service but the potential to assume the management responsi-
bilities which are required for most senior positions. This, coupled with the
higher senior attrition rates which Management can bring about without re-
course to legislation, could do much to ensure that officers who reach and remain
in the senior ranks are of a very high standard. Needless to say, the modalities
for such a threshold assessment-and the precepts instructing Selection Boards
what weight to give to assessment records-would need to be worked out care-
fully between AFSA and Management. None of this, it may be noted, would
reouire new legislation.
The task force also noted that Management's decision several years ago to
cease requiring Foreign Service Inspectors to do reports on each officer in a
post or bureau, has reduced the amount of objective information available
to Selection Boards. While we appreciate the amount of effort required to pro-
duce inspection reports on each officer, we believe that the need for better
performance evaluation argues for reconsideration of Management's decision.
As to the "impacted situation", the task force is firmly of the opinion that
Management possesses sufficient authority to resolve the problems, in the first
instance by reducing senior time-in-class maximums. The task force believes
that Management should take such action without further delay. The vast ma-
jority of officers unquestionably agree that promotion rates and attrition rates
are too low for a Service designed, according to the House Report of 1946, to
"* * * insure the rapid advancement of men of ability to positions of responsi-
bility and the elimination of men who have reached their ceilings of perform-
ance."
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It should be clear that the task force believes the proposal for a "Senior
Foreign Service" unjustified. Aside from the reasons cited above, we see no
reason to create a separate structure marking a division between our senior
officers and the rest of the Service-although we do agree on the need for
better evaluation of candidates for senior ranks and have suggested above
how this might be done. The fact is that we already possess an excellent "senior
service", a sizeable number of whose members have been called on to fill
Presidential appointments by each Administration since the creation of the
Foreign Service.
As to the question of short-term contracts for one or more of the senior grades,
the task force believes that it would be useful for Management and AFSA to
begin discussions, to see whether agreement could be reached on a proposed
partial amendment of the Act of 1946 which might enjoy broad Service sup-
port. A number of preliminary observations may be useful in this regard :
(1) It would seem preferable to use the term "commission" rather than
"contract".
(2) A three-year term for a renewable senior commission seems too short,
in the opinion of a number of officers who have expressed their views. To lessen
suspicion that political pressure might somehow be exerted by a particular
Administration, to reduce senior officers' desire to seek assignment in Wash-
ington rather than abroad in order to be more "visible", and to permit a more
objective basis for a renewal/termination decision than evaluation of an officer
in a single job, a five-year commission might be preferable.
(3) A group of senior FSOs in the Department has suggested that a system
of renewable commissions might be introduced not only at the Career Minister
level but for FSO-1s and FSO-2s. The task force has serious reservations regard-
ing the possible effects of this proposal on the Service, but believes that the
underlying idea deserves further study.
(4) Consideration should be given to substituting some sort of limited-com-
mission proposal for the present Section 519 of the Act, so seldom used.
(5) Some consideration should be given to names. The rank of Career Am-
bassador is meaningful for the general public, but there are no Career Ambas-
sadors on active service and the task force is unaware of any plans to pro-
mote any officers to that class. The rank of Career Minister is not meaningful
for the general public, given the demise of legations. Perhaps the present class
of Career Ministers should be re-named Career Ambassadors, but with a provision
for future promotion to that class only of officers who had already served as
Ambassadors abroad.
(6) In considering the problem of retaining only high-quality senior officers,
Management and AFSA might examine proposed legislation 'submitted by the
Defense Department for the armed services, which inter alma provides that a
brigadier general may serve a total of 30 years or spend 5 years in grade, which-
ever is longer ; corresponding figures for major general are 35 and 5.
(7) Regardless of what changes may be agreed for the Foreign Service, a
number of domestic-service positions will be reserved for the Senior Executive
Service in the State Department. The task force understands that these posi-
tions number about 100, and assumes that none of these are FSO positions or
positions traditionally filled by FSOs. The task force believes that while it is
important to set the Civil Service in the Department on a new and better basis,
it is equally important to protect the "home base" for FSOs in the Department
provided by the Wriston reforms two decades ago.
In conclusion, the task force emphasizes that it has found in its investigation
strong support among Foreign Service officers of all ranks for restoring condi-
tions, in an already competitive Service, which while fully maintaining the
principles of merit and equity, would reward outstanding officers with more
rapid promotion through renewed, more effective implementation of the "up or
out" principle. The officers of the Service will also strongly support measures
to provide more responsible jobs, in the context of increased responsibilities for
the Service as a whole. The Foreign Service has been much studied and criti-
cized ; but as the President has made clear in Why Not the Best?, it is an unparal-
leled reservoir of talent which deserves the fullest use.
The officers of the Service will fully support measures to improve the Serv-
ice further. They will however insist-and principles of good management would
dictate-that they be consulted closely in the elaboration of such measures.
Ambassador VANCE. I will now talk about the repugnance with
which I read the language quoted by Ambassador Herz in section
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612 (a) which authorizes management for, the first time in the history
of the Foreign Service to introduce into the evaluation records that
go before selection boards some uncontrolled and uncontrollable state-
ments of management's views about the future assignability of officers
to be evaluated.
I would like to close this statement at this position of my remarks
by urging the elimination of all reference to performance pay and of
this objectional language from section 612.
My second and last point is the need, as I see it and as Ambassador
Herz sees it, to protect, to assure that the tenure of the Senior Foreign
Service shall not be diluted dangerously. However, I think it equally
imperative to the well-being of the Foreign Service and the national
interest in a sound Foreign Service that promotion up and selection
out, and particularly selection out, be maintained, that upward move-
ment be assured.
There must,. therefore, be a reasonable balance between these two
objectives, which are mutually inconsistent to some extent.
The Foreign Service has basically four methods of thinning out the
Foreign Service. The first is obligatory retirement at age 60, which I
fervently hope continues to be applicable notwithstanding Congress-
man Pepper's, in my view, misguided efforts to apply to the Foreign
Service his proposed legislation removing this age cap.
Second, voluntary early retirement. As the chairman knows, after
20 years of service and after age 50, Foreign Service officers may
voluntarily retire. The administration has spoken in its testimony of
the surplus on glut of Senior Foreign Service Officers that has devel-
oped in the last couple of years.
I would like to go very briefly into why this glut has developed. Our
retirement pensions are determined by a formula which looks to the
average salary of the highest paid 3 years.
I would point out that, at the end of February 1977, there was a
very large pay increase for the Foreign' Service as well as for all
Government employees.
Therefore, there is a very large number of Senior Foreign Service
officers who have been awaiting the attainment of 3 years at this new
salary level before retiring. There will be very little financial reason
for many of them to remain in service after that period. And, we are
already beginning to see, I understand, a large number of voluntary
retirements of this age group as we approach February of 1980.
The third method of thinning out is selection out. In our selection
boards each year we look not only for the officers who are recommended
for promotion, but also identify the lowest percentile of officers who,
even though they are still performing satisfactorily, are recommended
for selection out because of relatively less productive performance.
Now, I think this is an excellent principle and it is one that was
borrowed, again, from the military by the 1946 Foreign Service Act.
Management has pointed out that thinning out from this procedure
has dropped in numbers very appreciably in the last few years.
I agree with management that this is regrettable. I would point
out, however, that increased openness, the creation of grievance pro-
cedures and the like, which I think are quite appropriate in a de-
mocracy, have resulted in cumbersomeness being increased not only in
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the Foreign Service, but in other quasi-judicial and judicial pro-
cedures throughout our Government.
How this can be corrected is a very difficult problem, but it should
be corrected only with the greatest of care.
The fourth and last method of thinning out of the Service is time
in class, which means very simply that if an officer is not promoted to
the next higher class after an administratively fixed number of years
in class, he is automatically retired.
The CHAIRMAN. We are very fortunate that does not happen in the
Senate.
Ambassador VANCE. The administration, in connection with this
new legislation, has stated that it proposes administratively to reduce
time in class. One wonders why it awaits the new legislation in order
to reduce time in class, because it can be done administratively.
It also, by legislation, introduces a new tool of personnel manage-
ment called the renewable commission. This means that, after ad-
ministratively reduced time in class, the selection board can have an
option additional to the options that existed before.
The options that existed before are : promotion up, selection out,
or leave the officer there and, if time in class tolls, he is out.
The proposal would permit the board to recommend that he be
given a renewable commission, even though the officer had reached
the end of time in class. The length of a renewable commission would
be administratively determined.
The administration has indicated that in order to eliminate this glut
of senior officers, it will greatly reduce time in class for the senior
ranks and establish, perhaps, a 3-year renewable commission.
The administration points out, quite accurately, that a glut in the
numbers of senior officers limits the openings for promotion and
blocks the upward flow from the bottom to the top, which is essential
to the health of the Foreign Service. Such a blockage results under-
standably in low morale and the departure from the Foreign Service
of some younger good officers we should not be losing.
However, I would like to point out low morale and departure of good
officers are caused by more than periods of slow promotion or a percep-
tion that pay is inadequate. I would like to emphasize the psychic pay
which used to exist when Foreign Service officers believed they were
contributing participants in. a venture in American world leadership
designed to make this planet a better and safer place on which to live.
The Vietnam syndrome has largely destroyed this psychic pay, al-
though Khomeini and his ilk may be correcting this sickness.
Another contribution to low morale arises from the following.
Experienced Foreign Service officers know from hard-won experience
that effective foreign policy implementation requires coordination.
Yet, these same officers have seen AID and what is now called ICA
moved very recently by statute even further away from effective State
Department coordination.
The same Foreign Service officers have also very recently seen com-
mercial positions taken away from the Department of State and given
to another department, copying the earlier ill-advised experiment
which saw our agricultural officers taken away from State and given
to another department. I saw, personally, the harm done by this latter
move.
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The last contribution to low morale I want to mention is noncareer
appointments to Foreign Service positions, a problem with which this
committee has had more than ample experience.
We have today perhaps as many chiefs of mission who are career as
in other recent administrations. However, my count in the most recent
Department of State telephone book as to the number of career and
noncareer officers now filling the positions of Assistant Secretary or
the equivalent and above, counting ambassadors at large (but not the
Secretary of State), totals 24 noncareer and 11 career officers.
In the last administration there was only one noncareer Assistant
Secretary.
The CHAIRMAN. Along that line, as you may know, I have long
fought for the idea there should be a higher percentage of career chiefs
of mission. But, it is interesting in the last 30 or 40 years, the percent-
ages remain somewhat the same, hovering around 70 percent or 65
percent of career and the balance noncareer for chiefs of mission.
And, it seems to be staying there now. When you get to the Assistant
Secretaries of State, I am wondering if those should probably not be,
and this is a. question of concept, political, because those are really
political positions. And in that situation the deputies should be career.
It is a matter of where the political line is drawn. You could say
that a Foreign Service officer would make a much better Secretary of
State because he would be more familiar with the world, but still, I
think, we all agree that that level should be political. Where do you
then stop this process? I agree with you, I think, that most ambassa-
dors should be career because the ambassadors, particularly in this age
of instant. communications, are merely, soldiers carrying out the po-
litical orders given from Washington. But at what level do you think
it should stop? Do you think it should stop at the Under Secretary
level? Or, do you think it should include the Assistant Secretary level ?
In other Government agencies, as you know, as a general rule, the
new administration brings its own people down to the Assistant Sec-
retary level. In Great Britain, however, they stop at the cabinet or
immediate subcabinet level.
Ambassador VANcn. I certainly believe that the Secretary and his
immediate deputy, the Under Secretary, should be political. Tradi-
tionally, the third position in the Department of State has been career,
as it is today.
I agree that the President and the Secretary of State have got to
have freedom to appoint Assistant Secretaries from among persons of
their political persuasion. However, I think a better balance could be
achieved by the present administration. Recent administrations of
both parties did better.
I think the present administration has leaned somewhat out of
balance in the direction of political appointments. I would add that
one level to which political appointments should not reach and which,
for the first time in the history of the Foreign Service the present
administration has reached, is the level of office director.
The CHAIRMAN. I would completely agree with you.
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Ambassador VANCE. You spoke of other departments. Other de-
partments other than the military do not have a career service that is
available for them to draw upon.
I do not think that any administration has had any reasonable basis
to complain about the lack of loyalty of the Foreign Service in the
implementation of foreign policy once that policy is decided upon.
So, the fear of a new administration, coming in following one of
another political persuasion is, I think, ill-founded.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. In connection with your statement,
which will appear in full in the record, I am very, very appreciative.
Your view, as I understand, your thought is that the pay should be
increased because of the responsibility of the work.
And, I would agree there with you. But, do you think the Foreign
Service would welcome equally the idea of an increase in pay being
divided up amongst the whole group as having the individual bonuses
to be decided by the selection board?
Ambassador VANCE. I would think that they would prefer the avail-
able moneys to be divided equitably between all members. And, to that
end may I add a remark or two about pay comparability, which I
think is directly pertinent to the Chairman's question?
I am told that OMB [Office of Management and Budget], has very
recently decided to refuse in the Department of State's upcoming
budget some $24 million which the Department of State requested in
order to bring about pay comparability at the middle and lower ranks
of the Foreign Service with the civil service.
The Chairman will recall that in last year's appropriation bill, the
Department of State was directed to conduct a study of pay com-
parability between the Foreign Service and the civil service. The
State Department engaged Hay Associates, which is a very well-
known firm used by many major corporations, for this type of study.
And, Hay Associates determined
The CHAIRMAN. That was my amendment. My memory is jogged
that that was my amendment that provided the means to do that.
Ambassador VANCE. Yes. Hay Associates found that Foreign Serv-
ice officers in the middle and lower ranks are being paid less for com-
parable work than the civil service. There was, therefore, a decision
by the Department of State to seek approximately $24 million in this
year's budget in order to correct this to the extent recommended by
Hay Associates.
OMB, I am told, has decided to give $4 million spread over 4 years
to make some slight, but totally inadequate corrections. I think this
is very regrettable. And, I think this is another argument why per-
formance pay should be eliminated.
I suggest it is totally inappropriate to make performance pay avail-
able to the Senior Foreign Service, cash in addition to base salary,
when at the same time we are not paying our middle and lower ranks
at the same level as the civil service.
While on the subject of the budget, I also have been informed that
very serious cuts are being made by OMB in moneys the Department
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of State is requesting this year for language and area training. I would
suggest to the chairman this is not the time to reduce language and
area training, with the crises we are facing around the world.
And, if it is going to be cut for officers, I fear such training will be
eliminated totally for our spouses. And, the Department of State just
recently won authorization to give them this kind of training. Our
spouses have always been anxious to further their country's foreign
policy goals and should certainly be given all the training possible to
put them in a position to do so more effectively.
The CHAIRMAN. I would agree on that. The Hay study did not just
compare the Foreign Service salaries with the Civil Service, but also
with the military and industry. And, as I understand, in every case,
the Foreign Service came out at the low end of the totem pole, includ-
ing the military.
You have another factor emphasized and that is, in a world at peace,
the danger, the possibility. of death, illness, maiming is far greater in
the Foreign Service than it is in the military service. And, the fact that
we have had five chiefs of mission killed or assassinated in the last 10
years is a fact of life that I don't think is.thought enough about and
is another reason why a comparison with the military is more relevant
than with the civil service is warranted because not too many civil
servants are assassinated or maimed or held
Ambassador VANCE. As hostages.
The CHAIRMAN. Or held as hostages at this time. And, it is a factor
that I think should be kept in mind.
Thank you very much, indeed.
Ambassador VANCE. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief comment
in response to what you just said? There are two ways that are readily
available by administrative action for the Department of State now,
without further legislation, to give more remuneration to Foreign
Service officers.
One relates to differential pay. As the chairman knows, our hard-
ship posts around the world, usually in the developing countries, are
rated as 10, 15 or 25 percent differential and all persons assigned to
those posts, except chiefs of mission, receive this percent of base pay
as "differential" pay. This decision to deprive chiefs of mission is an
administrative decision which can be reversed administratively.
This would not only be an immediate benefit to chiefs of mission, to
career officers assigned to hardship posts but it would encourage offi-
cers to seek these assignments, which are not always the most desir-
able in that they include such places as Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan,
and so forth. Moreover, the present rule that prohibits any officer at
post receiving more pay than his chief of mission results in a number
of officers at these posts not receiving as much money as they would
otherwise get.
When I was Ambassador in Kinshasa, Zaire, which was a 25 percent
post, I did not receive this differential and that meant that some five
or six of my senior associates were receiving less than they would have
if chiefs of mission were given differential pay.
Another suggestion relates to the charge d'affaires pay. As the chair-
man knows, if a chief of mission is absent temporarily, his No. 2 be-
comes charge d'affaires. What made me think of this suggestion was
the chairman's reference to the dangers our officers are experiencing.
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I was thinking of my friend and fellow Minnesotan, Bruce Laingen,
who is charge d'affaires in Iran.
A charge d'affaires has to wait 28 days, before he gets any difference
in pay and then he gets only 50 percent of the difference between his
pay and that of his absent chief. And, he has to wait considerably
longer (90 days) to get 75 percent. These are all administrative deci-
sions and I see no reason why a charge d'affaires should not get the
full difference if he is performing that difficult a position for any
appreciable period of time.
The CHAIRMTAN. I think you are correct. As you know, the charge
pay also applies to consulates as well. I think that is a very good
suggestion.
I thank you very much, indeed, Ambassador Vance, for being with
us. I look forward to reading your testimony in detail myself, too.
Ambassador VANCE. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce also in the
record a two-page document which indicates that, perhaps, the glut
in the Senior Foreign Service is virtually ended now and we may
even be facing a shortage next year.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be inserted in the rec-
ord following your prepared statement.
[Ambassador Vance's prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON B. VANCE
I greatly appreciate the privilege of testifying before this Committee on the
proposed bill to restructure the Foreign Service, replacing the Foreign Service
Act of 1946.
The Foreign Service constitutes an unequaled national resource of experts for
advising our Government on foreign policy and for implementing that policy
once it is adopted. We should all be concerned at assuring that :
(1) The Foreign Service performs its advisory functions with maximum can-
dor ; and
-(2) Its accumulated experience and wisdom is protected in reasonable balance
with the opportunity for younger officers to be promoted to the top.
These are the two issues I will discuss, in that order.
I fear that some of the proposals in this bill which relate to the Senior Foreign
Service will seriously dilute the candor with which the Foreign Service advises
the President and the Secretary of State. I refer to the proposal of performance
pay for the Senior Foreign Service, itself to be created under this bill.
I am distressed by the context in which these proposals were put forward, as
well as by their substance. As to context, the creation of a "Senior Foreign Serv-
ice" copies last year's Civil Service Reform Act and its creation of the Senior
Executive Service. We all recall that the Civil Service Reform Act was pressed
by the Administration because it wanted to strengthen management's control
of the Civil Service work force. If the same motivation led to the legislation pro-
posed for the Foreign Service, we should be concerned about its impact on candor.
We have been assured by the honorable men who currently head the State De-
partment that they value candor and favor "risk takers", or officers willing to
advance presently unpopular positions. However, this may not always be the at-
titude of Departmental leadership. Therefore, let us be sure that the legislation
protects appropriate candor.
"Performance pay" proposes that members of the new Senior Foreign Service
may compete for annual cash performance bonuses. Even career chiefs of mis-
sion and assistant secretaries may join in this competition ! Awards are to be
based upon recommendations from the annual selection boards. However, even
though the selection board system of the Foreign- Service is the most equitable
evaluation system yet devised by our Government, my considerable experience
with it persuades me that it cannot be finely enough tuned to make annual per-
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formance pay awards equitable. Temptation will be great on the part of the com-
petitors to assure a highly favorable recommendation from supervisors, to the
serious dilution of candor.
Even in the Civil Service, it has yet to be proven that performance pay is de-
sirable. Press reports speak of the dismay of Office of Personnel Management
experts at the difficulties they anticipate in administering performance pay in
the Civil Service.
Anyhow, the Civil Service is a "rank in job" service and the only way one can
be promoted is to be assigned to another, higher ranking position. The Foreign
Service is a "rank in person" system and there is annual competition for promo-
tion. Incidentally, management can exert influence by the assignment process,
assigning a favored officer to a position where he may more easily show his quali-
fications (or the reverse).
Finally, many, including myself, oppose performance pay because it is simply
inappropriate to reward someone for doing his job, especially when he can earn
promotion by following such a course. If performance pay is appropriate for the
Foreign Service, why not for the military services with which our Foreign
Service has so much in common? Moreover, the military services are also "rank
in person" and do not seek cash bonuses for doing their duty. Our Air Force ex-
perimented with performance pay and gave it up.
The American Foreign Service Association's Board is uncomfortable with per-
formance pay, but does not believe it would be proper for the Board as the trade,
union organization of the Foreign Service to block the opportunity for any mem-
ber to earn substantially more money. I share the belief of the Association that
the Foreign Service, as a whole, and not just its senior officers, is underpaid. But
the possibility of an annual grant of performance pay would not be a reliable
factor upon which family budget planning could be based. In sum, performance
pay would detract from meaningful compensation, would be impossible of equit-
able implementation and hence lead to toadyism, and it would be, quite simply,
inappropriate.
Under last year's American Foreign Service Association's Board, I had the
honor to lead one of its task forces to consider the earlier drafts of this legisla-
tion. This was the task force on the legislation's impact on senior officers. We
consulted with several hundred Foreign Service Officers of all ranks and read the
reports of reactions from most of our officers in the field. We found that very few
favored performance pay. More, but still a minority, would swallow it only
.because of the feeling that the Foreign Service should be better remunerated.
Virtually all were uncomfortable with the method proposed.
You could ask what appropriate suggestions could be advanced to provide more
remuneration for the Senior Foreign Service other than performance pay. Al-
though I am sure other means might be found, the following two come to mind :
(1) Personnel assigned to hardship posts in the Foreign Service are given
differential allowances ranging from 10 to 15 to 25% of base pay. However, by
administrative, not legislative, action chiefs of mission are not given any dif-
ferential pay. This not only penalizes them but also the other senior officers at
the post because of the quite appropriate rule that no one should be paid more
than the chief of mission (please note that performance pay ignores this rule).
(2) If the second officer at a post becomes in charge because of the absence of
the chief of mission, his charge pay is, by administrative decision, not payable
until he has been in charge 28 days and, even then, he receives only half the
difference between his pay and that of his absent chief. (After 90 days of chargd
ship the percentage goes to 75.) It should be made immediately effective, and for
the full difference.
I have just learned that OMB is denying the budget request of the Department
of State for $24 million which State believes would be required to bring about
pay comparability between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service in the lower
and middle grades. You will recall that the Congress directed that a study of pay
comparability be made in the Department of State. The Department engaged Hay
Associates to prepare such a study. This firm is probably the best known in its
field and is widely used by major corporations. After careful study, Hay Asso-
ciates concluded that the Foreign Service is being paid less for the same work
than the Civil Service in the middle and lower grades. To correct this state of
affairs, they proposed to change certain linkage points between Foreign and Civil
Service ranks and pay scales. OMB is recommending much less than needed to
correct the incompatibilities found by Hay Associates, apparently for budgetary
reasons.
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If monies are not available to assure equal pay for equal work, a principle
mandated by law, one can reasonably wonder whether the new funds which would
be required to implement performance pay over and above those required for the
continuation of regular salaries would be made available, especially in this day
of budget stringencies. Moreover, it would not be appropriate to give the Senior
Foreign Service money above salary, in order to give these officers treatment
equal to that given the Senior Executive Service, while at the same time depriving
the middle and lower grades equality with Civil Service base pay.
(Incidental to this point, but important : I have learned that OMB is seriously
cutting the Department of State budget requests in the area of language and
area training. It would appear that this is a classic case of penny wisdom and
,dollar foolishness. Today's foreign policy crises surely call for increased, not
decreased, training for our Foreign Service. Also, if language and area training
for officers is to be decreased, the newly won programs for such training for
Foreign Service spouses risks cancellation. Our spouses want to further our
foreign policy goals, and it would be shortsighted to deprive them of the train-
ing which would render their efforts more effective.)
II
My second major concern with this proposed legislation is that tenure in the
senior ranks of the Foreign Service will be diluted dangerously.
I believe that a number of factors have resulted, in recent years, in too much
protection of tenure, an imbalance damaging to the "promotion up or selection
out" principle which must continue to be the basic personnel policy for our
Foreign Service. But, let us not over-correct.
Management complains that there has been a serious falling-off in the number
of senior officers "selected out" in the "promotion-up or selection-out" system,
which was borrowed by the 1946 Foreign Service Act from our military services.
This is regrettable because, in order to maintain the high quality of the Foreign
Service, its less productive officers must be sternly culled out, even if they are
performing satisfactorily, in order to keep upward movement functioning. How-
ever, this problem is not restricted in today's America to its Foreign Service.
Openness, grievance procedures, and the like, which a democracy must favor,
have led to increased cumbersomeness across the who'e range of our govern-
mental, and especially quasi-judicial and judicial procedures. Solutions are not
easy to find which will not so dilute senior officer tenure as to approach Russian
roulette or pressure, at the expense of candor, to cater to the boss.
The Administration proposes in this legislation to attempt to make "selection
out" easier for selection boards and management by the creation of a new
tool called the "renewable commission" for the three senior classes. As we shall
see, this and other actions proposed would importantly erode tenure.
The Foreign Service system presently provides for thinning the ranks by
four procedures:
(1) Selection-out for relatively less productive performance (to which we
have just alluded) ;
(2) "Time in class" ("Time in class" provides that officers not promoted before
the expiration of an administratively fixed time in a given class or rank are
automatically retired) ;
(3) Obligatory retirement at age 60 (which may not be retained, if Congress-
man Pepper's singularly misguided efforts to extend his proposal to the Foreign
Service succeed) ; and
(4) Voluntary early, retirement.
The Administration argues that not only are far fewer of the less productive
officers now being dropped but that a surplus of senior officers has developed,
relative to the number of positions available. This glut restrict' promotions
which contributes to low morale among middle and junior officers.
It is proposed (administratively) to reduce "time in class" sharply and pro-
vide (legislatively) for the "renewable commission." In other words, this would
provide that an officer not promoted after a much reduced "time in class" may
be given a "renewable commission" which would extend him at his present rank
for an administratively determined, but short number of years. A later (or an
initial) denial of this renewable commission is expected by management to be
less difficult for selection boards than recommending selection out for the less
productive officers. If that proves to be the case, "selection out" may resume
retiring a larger number of less effective officers. Management has said that it
has in mind reducing "time in class" for classes 1 and 2, now an excessive total
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of 22 years, to perhaps 5 years for each class, with the possibility of a "renew-
able commission" of perhaps an additional 3 years, per renewal.
I would favor this experiment, but would want to see safeguards that some
future managers do not reduce "time in class" and the length of the "renewable
commission" to derisory totals of years, thus instituting virtually no tenure or
Russian roulette. I hope the Congress will make the legislative history clear
that it will closely monitor the Department's implementation in order to be
sure that tenure in the senior ranks is reasonably protected and that decimation
of this valuable resource does not occur. Additionally, the legislation itself
should provide that the Board of the Foreign Service should certify that the
annual selection board precepts are in accordance with this intent. It is con-
ceivable that we could see a serious shortage of senior officers develop as early
as next year.
It should be noted that the surplus of senior officers has been created to a
very considerable extent by the extension of "time in class" for classes FSO
1 and 2, just mentioned, which was administratively decided in 1976. It was also
brought by the court decision which set aside compulsory retirement at age
60 for a number of months until that decision was only recently overturned
by the Supreme Court. And, finally, a large number of senior officers who would
otherwise have opted for voluntary early retirement for one reason or another
have. been waiting to retire until now because of the impact of the large pay in-
crease of February 1977 on the rule that retirement pensions are based upon
the average salary of the highest three years. Finally, it should be noted that
something like 35 percent of total senior positions are filled by non-senior officers,
in so-called "stretch assignments." Some more reasonable balance could be
attained if more promotions were assured by a return to serious, strict "up or
out" attrition.
As for the admittedly low morale in the Foreign Service, reasons other than
slow promotions and base pay can be identified. These include the serious erosion
in "psychic pay" which used to exist when Foreign Service officers believed they
were contributing participants in a venture in American world leadership de-
signed to make this planet a better and safer place on which to live. The Viet-
Nam syndrome destroyed most of this feeling. However. Khomeini and his ilk
have done much to restore recognition that the United States must lead if it is
to survive.
The Foreign Service, which has been convinced by experience that a country's
foreign policy, to be effective, must be coordinated, has seen recent laws remov-
ing still further from State Department coordinating influence two of the key
arms of foreign policy implementation, AID and USIA (to use the former titles).
Most recently, our country's efforts to help our foreign commerce have been taken
from State and lodged in another Department. This was done notwithstanding
the conviction of the Foreign Service that it had earlier been a mistake to take
away from State and lodge elsewhere our efforts abroad in the agricultural
field.
Then, there is the problem of non-career appointments to Foreign Service po-
sitions. While it is true that about three-quarters of American ambassadors are
now drawn from the career service, a slightly higher percentage than in pre-
vious administrations, no other major country makes more than a tiny handful
of ambassadorial appointments from non-career ranks. Most major countries
make none. Furthermore, about 55% of ranking positions in the State Depart-
ment (deputy assistant secretary and above) are now filled by political ap-
pointees. And political appointees have been named even to office-director
positions which had all been filled by career officers in previous administrations.
In the last administration there was only one political appointee and 13 career
officers among assistant secretaries of State (including the heads of Consular
Affairs, Intelligence Research and Politico-Military Affairs). Now there are 8
political appointees in these jobs ! Added to this, is the increasing resort to
special missions sent abroad, staffed from the NSC and other sources. A certain
amount of this is perhaps unavoidable in our political system, but it should not
be exaggerated.
* s * * * * *
I have just been informed that Section 612A of the proposed bill contains
another provision which is dangerous to candor. The early Association task
forces had objected strongly to it and I had supposed it had been dropped.
This section describes the material which may be given to selection boards.
After listing documents appropriate for this purpose, such as efficiency or evalua-
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tion reports by supervisors, reports by inspectors, official commendations or
charges of misconduct, this section adds for officers in the Senior Foreign Serv-
ice, "and records of current and prospective assignments".
This last phrase could mean either that Mr. Smith may look forward to
assignment as chief of mission, or it can state that management envisages
extreme difficulty in placing Mr. Smith anywhere.
How could the victim protect himself? Projecting the future is the classic "iffy"
question. Disproving a prQjection of the future would not be possible for the
individual.
I urge elimination of this language.
A GRIM FAIRY TALE: Do WE NEED A NEW FOREIGN SERVICE ACT TO CLEAR THE
PATH TO THE Top?
(James R. Ruchti 1)
Only occasionally do ugly ducklings turn out to be swans. But one of those
occasions may come as early as March 1, 1980. The ugly ducklings are the surplus
senior officers whose failure to retire voluntarily in previous reliable numbers
(about 90-100 a year) has clogged the personnel system. This has prevented
flow-through so that middle-grade officers are not being promoted in the numbers
of a few years ago. This situation, it is alleged, has swept the Department's
management toward a complete restructuring of the Foreign Service, although
the Congress may not share M's sense of urgency.
Let's look at senior officers in the Department over the 10-year period, 1968-
1978. There are fewer senior officers (CM, FSO-1 and 2, FSR-1 and 2, and
FSRU-1 and 2) today than ten years ago, both absolutely and relatively (1968:
1131 senior officers, or 5 percent of the total work force. 1979: 939 senior officers,
or 3.8 percent of the work force).
The old birds have been staying close to the Department feed trough, however,
waiting for clearer readings on retirement at age 60 (which is once again manda-
tory) and for three high years at the current salary maximum of $47,500 to
feather their retirement nests. The first high-3 nest egg at $47,500 will hatch by
March 1, 1980.
At that time, there will be at least 400 seniors, of which 320 are FSOs, with all
the technical qualifications to fly the coop voluntarily : they will have high-3
at $47,500, 20 years of service, and will be over 50.
When the results of all the other methods of separation are added (time-in-
class for Class 2, disability, age 60, selection-out for substandard performance,
etc.), something like another 50-75 seniors will retire.
Thus the maximum total potential departures would be just under 500. A
very high range of separation would be about 50 percent or 200-250. A low range
would be about 10 percent or 50-60. A medium range would be 100-125. These
estimates are probably conservative. By March 1, 1980, 258 senior officers will
have 30 years of service and 111 will have 35 years. Given the tax picture and
the absence of cost-of-living adjustments for seniors at $47,500, there is almost
no net financial gain to be had by remaining on the job, because retirement pay
is close to net active duty pay.
To understand the significance of these facts, we need one more set of figures.
Promotion rates over the last 15 years for FSO-2 to 1 and FSO-3 to 2 have
averaged 9 percent of the class in each case. There were 647 FSO-3 and 293
FSO-2 officers on June 30, 1979. Thus, the, expected promotion rate for both
FSO classes is 60 for 3's and 30 for 2's, for a combined total of about 90 promo-
tions in 1980. To these should be added the FSR and FSRU promotions for
Classes 3 and 2, or a combined total of 15-20 annually. The grand total for all
3's and 2's is in the range 105-110.
The conclusions are obvious. Under almost any predictable scenario, there will
be a strong swing back to normal senior separations in 1980 which will match
or, probably, exceed the expected promotion rate of Class 3 and even the com-
bined expectations for Classes 2 and 3.
There may even be a shortage of senior officers by the summer of 1980, and it
could be a severe one, lowering the proportion of seniors in the total work force
substantially below the 4 percent figure for the first time.
1 James Ruchti is presently with the President's Commission on Foreign Language.and
International Studies. Formerly he was reports coordinator in M/MO and Consul General
in Stuttgart. He is a member of the Open Forum Working Group on Professional Concerns.
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To carry the metaphor one step further, it looks like management may be in
the process of really laying a restructure egg. If its real concern is the bulge at
the top, management should let nature take its own self-correcting course.
Middle-grade officers, who are concerned about prospects for promotion to
senior ranks, should note that the historical promotion rate of 9 percent for
Classes 3 and 2 is nevertheless below that of recent years. The figure, though
disappointing, is instructive. It indicates the limitations on promotions. Only a
draconion revision of personnel rules, policies, and procedures, which raises
questions of safeguarding professionalism from political manipulation, would
have much long-term effect on average rates of advancement.
The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is.Mr. Robert Stern, American
Foreign Service Association. Thank you for being with us.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT H. STERN, AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE
ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Stern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may, sir, before we get.
to our basic remarks, I would like to comment that the Association
could not agree more with your opening statement that there are fun-
damental differences between the Civil Service and the Foreign Service_
And, we should not be slavishly looking for ways to get closer to it,
but should be looking at other models, particularly the miJiitary. We
could not agree with that more, sir.
I also think I should make a comment or two regarding the state-
ments of the previous witnesses, with whom for the most part, the
Association is quite in agreement. There is, however, I think in Am-
bassador IIerz's testimony the inference that the middle- or junior
level officers of the Department and of the Association are making
policy without regard to the interests and to the experience of our
senior colleagues.
And, I would like to note, as Ambassador Vance has himself stated,
lie was the chairman of our task force. We have actively gone out to
seek all of the people we could find who could provide us with his
kind of personal knowledge and experience. And, he was a vast help
to us.
We also have two retired ambassadors who are members of the
Board of Directors of the Foreign Service. They are the retired con-
stituency. They are regular and very active participants.
We are, by executive order, barred from seeking the participation
of many senior officers as they are deemed confidential employees.
And, therefore, we may not ask them to participate in day-to-day
activities. Nevertheless, we do canvass them.
When the administration first put forward a draft proposal of
the bill you have before you, sir, we circulated it to our membership
worldwide. We received back almost 300 messages. We held several
major meetings in Washington. We did our best to canvass everybody.
And, I think that the statement that I will offer to you today on
behalf of the Association is very reflective of that broad consensus
throughout the ranks.
We do represent and we are the exclusive representatives of the
11,000 AID and State Foreign Service employees. We believe that
we can offer proposals which will better serve the national interest
than some of the elements of the current act.
We have testified, of course, before the joint subcommittee of the
House on two occasions. We explained to them then why we could
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251
not endorse the proposal as it was presently written, and presented
a detailed analysis of the changes needed to win our endorsement.
We will, sir, submit a line-by-line analysis of the bill, but will not
take your time with that at the moment.
[The information referred to appears on p. 265.]
In our consultation with the leadership of State and AID, we are
now convinced there is a greater commonality of objectives than in
the beginning. In part, this is due to the fact we have been consulting
for a period now approaching 1 year.
The bill before you is a substantially different document than the
original draft. We are pleased we had a hand in that making. It still
does not meet all of our concerns.
Essentially, there are three elements we would like to bring to
mind. The first is the role and integrity of the Foreign Service,
which we believe must be preserved and enhanced.
Second, we believe that career employees must be assured a strong
voice in the evolution of the Foreign Service. This touches on pre-
vious testimony from previous witnesses. And, lastly, we would like
to reemphasize the comments of Ambassador Vance and your inter-
vention, sir, that the Foreign Service must be compensated on a par
with other Government employees and must receive appropriate incen-
tives for lifetime service abroad.
On the first point on the role and integrity of the Service, the loss
of the commercial function is the latest in a series of events which
highlights the need to reaffirm the role of the career service as an
institution for which there is no credible substitute within our Gov-
ernment.
And, we ask that both in the general provisions of the proposed
act and in its legislative history that the Congress support a Foreign
Service of the United States which advises and assists the President
and Secretary of State in the formulation of foreign policy and con-
ducts the full range of U.S. Government civilian affairs overseas on
behalf of the principal foreign affairs agencies and those with major
foreign affairs concerns.
We believe this will require maximum uniformity of Foreign Serv-
ice personnel management, particularly of the Senior Foreign Service
among the varying agencies.
We have modified our original proposal for Foreign Service develop-
ment officers in AID to outright endorsement that they should be
commissioned officers. There should be no artificial labels or distinc-
tions among Foreign Service officers.
On the other hand, we do recognize, given AID's recent history,
that a rush to compatability would be a disservice. Too many officers
who have been frozen in-grade for too long would be ill served.
We will have recommendations on that as well. We believe the
changing roles and aspirations of the families of our overseas em-
ployees must be an integral part of the comprehensive improvement
of the quality of Foreign Service life for all. The dangers and hard-
ships endured by Foreign Service families must be acknowledged and
addressed.
We want more training. We would like chances for employment.
And, we are looking at such benefits as vested retirement rights.
However, we are very concerned and we totally reject the fratricidal
implications of the Office of Management and Budget approach which
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would require that the resources to support the families would have to
be taken out of the hides of the career employees.
This must not be a zero sum game. In our section-by-section analysis,
we provide a number of changes which would mandate specific im-
provements for families, but that would stipulate as a matter of law
that resources and opportunities necessary may not be reprogramed
to the detriment of the professional career employee, staff corps, officer,
or whatever else.
We are concerned that the intake into the Service, the career devel-
opment, and the intake into the senior ranks as well as just, honorable,
and secure retirement must be predictable and controlled.
It is for this reason in a variety of places in our testimony and in
the line by line, we seek to make some of the new concepts in the act
subject to negotiations with the representative of the Foreign Service.
We recognize these will. be evolving processes and we are concerned
that if we put things too hard and too fast into the 1979 law, we may
well find them unacceptable in 1983.
We would prefer rather to have more permissive language which
would allow us, as we do presently, to discuss these things on a regular
basis and negotiate fully.
Ultimately, however, the preservation and enhancement of the Serv-
ice's ability to serve the national interest can only be accomplished if
the administration and the Congress provide the financial and per-
sonnel resources necessary for us to accomplish our mission.
We can no longer survive shifting resources from one important
activity to another, such as reducing political reporting to provide
administrative services. The United States cannot continue to main-
tain a strong international diplomatic position in the complex world
of the 1980's by deploying fewer people than it did in the 1950's.
Now, the association would not be so simplistic as to suggest that
the reduction of 'a few reporting positions is solely responsible for our
problems. It is, however, significant. And, in the face of the challenges
ahead, we think it irresponsible that the fiscal year 1981 budget for
State put forward by OMB proposes further cuts in reporting posi-
tions, language, and other training.
It is inconceivable to us that, at a time when the entire Nation is
aware of the importance of our relations with foreign countries, our
ability to deal with them will be further reduced.
We know, sir, that you and the Congress have called attention to the
fact that we have not had sufficient numbers of officers trained in hard
languages. Yet, we now see the Office of Budget and Management pro-
posing to reduce that number even further. We consider that grossly
unacceptable.
In the recent reorganization plan which was presented to the Con-
gress to strengthen and improve U.S. commercial function overseas,
we lost 600 positions, 162 of them officers. We now understand that a
large number of those positions will not be passed on to the Depart-
ment of. Commerce, but for .budget reasons will be retained within
OMB.
Thus, we find. that rather. than strengthening. our commercial func-
tion abroad, we will dilute it. We don't even know how many years it
will be before we come back to the current strength.
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We And that the concept of having these separate'services non-inte-
,grated, within an embassy is unacceptable. We believe they can only
be mutually reinforced if they are integrated under the ambassadors
and clearly backstopped by the department.
We ask the Senate to specify that the balkanization of the Foreign
Service end and that the integrity of the service be no further
impaired.
In terms of our need for a voice in the evolution of the service, we
recognize that the proposed act will give management broad new au-
thorities. We know where we stand under the existing executive order
and under existing legislation. We have no idea how successive admin-
istrations may choose to implement new authorities. We are concerned,
as you heard from Ambassador Herz and Ambassador Vance, of pos-
sible political abuses in the future.
Therefore, we feel it is in everybody's interest that the employee
representative be as broadly based as possible, that we have the largest
possible bargaining unit. The executive order under which we pres-
ently act is rather unique in that managers and supervisors are part of
our bargaining unit. This is a recognition of our rank in person. It is
a recognition . of our shared problems, hardships, and concerns
worldwide.
It differs, very significantly from. the Civil Service Reform Act
legislation. The best thing we can say about the current act is that it
works well. Neither management nor the employees have found any
reason to challenge this aspect of it and we urge that Title VII of the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 not be included in the Foreign Serv-
ice legislation. It would disenfranchise half of the service.
On this. particular point, title VII proposes the exclusion of a wide
variety of people who, in the civil service, would be considered super-
visors'by virtue of the rank-in-job. In our service, which is rank-in-
person, an officer may well be a supervisor on a given tour and not be a
supervisor in the next.
I might state from personal experience in my last overseas assign-
ment, I was a chief of section and supervised seven people. Since then,
I have been promoted and supervise half a secretary. This is not at
all uncommon because we move back and forth depending on our re-
sponsibilities.
It is important, sir, that subject to the necessary limitation of con-
fidential employees, which we recognize should not be involved in the
bargaining unit, we keep as broad a based unit as we can. And, in our
line-by-line, we would make specific comments on it.
We are also concerned that in the Foreign Service Act they would
water down the disputes' panel decisions. In the Civil Service Act,
disputes' panel decisions are final. We think they should be final for
the Foreign Service as well.
Lastly, sir, I would like to turn to the question of pay. If we are to
attract, develop, retain the talented people we need we have to be
able to make reasonable predictions about their futures and they
must retain tangible benefits. For the staff corps this means compen-
sation built into the salary structure for the overseas factor and a
renewed assessment of the extra responsibilities they assume abroad.
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'254
1 should mention that few of our staff corps serve in: Washington.
They,.serve;'the 'great majority of their careers overseas. .7o-try and
look: at ;them on ? a 'one-for-one basis with a civil,, service which never
goes overseas, begs the question. We 'find they do not .receive pay.an-
th'orization 'for the extraordinary hours they spend on :standby duty.
At 15 small. - osts, this often means communicators' never get a day -off.
They live by the telephone 7 days a week.
This -is the functional equivalent of house' arrest.. Something has to
be done for them.
For 'the service, we would like to see an end to the exclusion from
-hardship pay for ambassadors. As has been brought out by Ambassador
Vance,: by administrative fiat, ambassadors may not receive these
allowances. All of their senior officers below them are, therefore, denied
it as well.
We'have'had five ambassadors assassinated in the past decade. That
is more than-all of the U.S. generals killed by hostile fire in Vietnam.
Ambassadors deserve the same rights and same allowances as anybody
else.
We are split on the question of performance pay. We have attempted
to reach all of the senior officers who might be affected by it and
those officers who could reasonably be expected to join the Senior
Foreign-.Service over the next few years. And, we get a mixed reaction.
We have chosen not to oppose it because at the moment it is the only
tangible thing we have seen that would offer additional compensation
for our senior people.
On basic pay comparability, we note that almost 10 years ago the
Congress enacted 5 U.S.C. 501 which explicitly called for equal pay for
equal work. In 1978, the Congress directed and authorized funds to the
Hay study that was mentioned earlier. I should add that when the
Civil Service' Commission was being changed into the Office of Person-
nel Management, they hired Hay Associates as their consultants. It
was this which led us to make the same choice.
The State Department, the Agency for International Development,
and the International Communications Agencies have all accepted
Hay's findings and have recommended to OMB adoption of proper
linkages.
OMB has chosen to ignore the intent of the Congress, the evidence
of the, study, and the advice of the agencies and instead. seeks to
substitute the findings of the study done more than 5 years a o by the
Civil Service Commission. We ask the Senate to insist that the intent
of the Congress to rectify this longstanding injustice be rectified im-
mediately, setting into law the pay parity between the Civil Service
and Foreign Service at the Hay recommended linkages.
We could not support this act unless necessary provisions for pay
comparability have been elaborated either beforehand or within this
legislation. There is no reason, however, why pay comparability must
of necessity be deferred until such time as this bill is enacted. In light
of the Federal budget cycle we would strongly support a decision by
the Congress to proceed on this question immediately.
Lastly, sir, I would like to conclude my statement by addressing the
question of equal employment opportunity in the Foreign Service. 'It
is very clear to us that the Foreign Service has not yet succeeded in
attracting sufficient numbers of women and minorities. We would like
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255
to go. on record, today as stating that, they Association, is committed to
actively supporting the goal of equal: opportunity 'for. a11.:But we rec,og-
nize that legislation alone cannot bring about'the`changes required to
produce a,Fully, representative service Implementation, however; of
Service more monetarily and professionally attractive for all, woi.Ad
take away the disadvantages we presently suffer in competing with
other Government services and with the private', sector for the out-
standing people we need.
The foreign affairs agencies must produce career'development pro-
grams that will assure the growth of all personnel to achieve a more
open and balanced service in the years ahead. ,
[Mr. Stern's prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT H. STERN
Mr. Chairman : We are pleased to appear before you today 'to indicate our
desire, as the exclusive representative of the 11,000 AID and State Foreign
Service employees, to support a new and improved Foreign Service' Act=and
to outline our comprehensive proposals for achieving this goal. Incorporation of
our proposals would result, we believe, in' an Act which, will" also better serve
the national interest than some elements of the present text. Our Association
explained to the Joint house Sub-Committee on July 9 and again on September 27
why we could not endorse the proposal as it then stood and presented a detailed
analysis of it. Today I wish to review briefly events since that time and describe
the essential elements, as we see them, of the proposed bill. W e will ' be giving
you a refined, line-by-line analysis which takes into account 'recent develop-
ments, our further talks with State's leadership, and testimony' by others before
this committee.
Our consultations with the leadership of State and AID, ' as well as with
our constituency, convince us there is a greater commonality of objectives than
may have been immediately apparent. Secretary Vance concurs fully in the
basic principles which I am about to present to you. He has expressed his con-
fidence that we can reach agreement or substantially narrow our differences on
specific points at issue. We share that confidence and are prepared to give sup-
port to a bill which secures these principles.
There are three elements which are essential to be a new Foreign' Service Act.
The role and integrity of the Foreign Service must be preserved and enhanced.
Career employees must be assured a strong voice in the evolution of the Foreign
Service. Foreign Service employees must be compensated on 'a par with. their
Civil Service colleagues and must receive appropriate incentives for 'a lifetime
of service abroad. I will concentrate only on those specific points under each' of
these elements which are not adequately addressed under the Administration's
proposal, with particular attention to areas where consensus has not yet been
reached.
First, the role and integrity of the Foreign Service nwst be preserved 'and en-
lianced. The stripping of the commercial function is but,the latest in a series of
events which highlight the need to reaffirm the role of the career Foreign Service
as an institution for which there is no credible substitute within our government.
Both in the General Provisions of the proposed Act and in its legislative his-
tory, we ask the Congress to support a Foreign Service of the United States
which : (1) advises and assists the President and Secretary of State in the
formulation of foreign policy ; and (2) conducts the full range of U.S. Govern-
ment civilian affairs overseas on behalf of the principal foreign affairs agencies
and those with major foreign affairs concerns.
This will require maximum uniformity of Foreign Service personnel manage-
ment, particularly of the Senior Foreign Service, among the individual agencies
operating abroad. We have modified our original proposal for Foreign Service
Development officers in AID to outright endorsement of the concept of Foreign
Serv ice, Officers serving each of the agencies utilizing the authorities of this Act,
without artificial labels implying that officers of some agencies are more equal
than others. . ' '
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On the other hand. AID's recent history would make too'rapid a movement
toward compatibility in some areas unwise.'The decline in AID'S. Foreign Service
workforce from some 5,500 a decade ago to less than 2,000 today has virtually
frozen promotions during that period,, leaving many outstanding officers with
many years in class. The sudden application of time-in-class limits would remove
these people, from the Service. By the same token', it would make no sense to
apply the senior threshold window concept in Sec. 602(a) unless and until there
is an established and reasonable time-in-class limit at that level and reasonable ?
prospects for promotion above it.
The history of AID personnel management clearly indicates that, the applica-
tion of such concepts as retirement for excessive 'time-in-class (Sec. 641) or
substandard performance (Sec. 642) will have to be gradual, with the full con-
sent of the Foreign Service expressed through its exclusive representative. To
make clear that AFSA is the` exclusive representative of the affected ? Foreign
Service people now that AID has been subsumed by IDCA, we have proposed an
amendment at Sec. 2402.
The changing roles and aspirations of families of our overseas employees must
be an integral part of a comprehensive improvement of the quality of foreign
service life for all.
The dangers and hardships endured by the foreign service families who ac-
company the employee to the far ends of the earth must be acknowledged and
addressed with increased opportunities for employment, training and other bene-
fits such as vested retirement rights. However, we totally reject the fratricidal
implications of the OMB approach which requires that resources for such long
overdue reforms be taken out of the hides of our employees. This zero sum game
path to rendering justice is unacceptable. In our section-by-section analysis, we
provide a number of changes which mandate specific improvements for families,
but stipulate as a matter of law that resources and opportunities necessary to
realize them may not be reprogrammed to the detriment of the staff corps.
-The intake into the Service, career development through the middle grades,
and intake into the senior ranks, as well "as just, honorable and secure retirement
must be predictable and controlled. Only in this manner can we end the vagaries
of successive managers, commissions and boards.
The bill provides a number of generally desirable new mechanisms to con-
sciously regulate the overall flow through the personnel system. With a few
specific changes, many of which management regards as improvements, we
strongly support these new mechanisms. However, it is essential that the ap-
plication of these authorities be broadly subject to negotiation with the employee
representative to prevent any possible abuse.
Ultimately, however, the preservation and enhancement of the Service's ability
to serve the national interest can only be accomplished if the Administration and
Congress provide the financial and personnel resources necessary for us to ac-
complish our mission. We can no longer, survive shifting resources from one
important activity to another, such as reducing political reporting to provide
administrative services. The United States cannot continue to maintain a strong
international diplomatic position in the complex world of the '80s by deploying
fewer people than it did in the '50s.
In all candor, we must admit that some of the failures that have been laid at
the doorstep of other agencies can be 'attributed to the Department of State,
which should properly be this nation's first and internationally accepted means
of assessing political and economic trends in areas where our vital national in-
terests are engaged.
The Association would not be so simplistic as to suggest that the reduction of
substantive reporting positions abroad is solely responsible for the failure in
the world arena which are all to familiar. Nevertheless, it is a significant factor.
In the face of the challenges ahead, we think it irresponsible that the FY 1981
budget for the State Department put forward by the Office of Management and
Budget proposes further cuts in reporting positions, language and other training.
It is inconceivable to us that at a time when the entire nation is aware of the
importance of our relations with foreign countries our ability to deal with them
will be further reduced. We know that you in the Congress have called attention
to the fact that we have not had sufficient numbers of officers trained in such
languages as Fars!, and you are right. Yet what we see is the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget proposing to reduce that number even further.
In this context, the Foreign Service is appalled by the ill-conceived Reorgani-
zation Plan No. 3 which was recently presented to the Congress in the name of
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"strengthening and improving" the U.S. commercial promotion overseas. This
"reform", which has stripped the State Department of about 600 positions (in-
eluding 162 American positions) at the most important commercial posts for
transfer to Commerce may, in fact, mask an actual reduction in the resources
committed to this function. We understand that OMB is purposefully procras-
tinating on releasing many of the new positions to Commerce in the name of
budget stringencies. It may be a number of years before on-line U.S. commercial
promotion strength in these posts recovers from this reorganization. Even then,
we fear that the "separate commercial promotion function" will atrophy rather
than prosper.,The various U.S. interests within a given country can, however, be
made mutually reinforcing if integrated under the Ambassador and backstopped
by the Department of State.
While hoping that this "reorganization" plan can be reversed, the Association
urges the Senate, to clearly specify that the "balkanization" of the Foreign
Service stops here. The integrity of, the Foreign Service must not be further
impaired. .
Second, career employees must be assured a strong voice in the evolution of
the Foreign Service. The proposed Act will give foreign affairs management
broad new,authorities for administering the Foreign Service. While we know
where we stand under existing legislation and Executive Orders, we do not
know how .successive administrations will attempt to implement these authori-
ties. We also need to guard against possible political abuses in the future. There-
fore, the safeguards of an effective employee organization are essential if there is
to be a new Foreign Service Act.
In order to play a creative, responsible influential role, our employee organiza-
tion must be,as broadly based as possible.
Since its inception, Executive Order 1.1636 has served the Foreign Service well.
We see no need for exclusions from the bargaining unit beyond management
officials and confidential employees as defined in this Executive Order. Additional
exclusions, as proposed in the bill, must be minimized in legislative history and
in practice. Exclusion of "supervisors" along the lines of Title VII of the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 would be intolerable, because it would disenfranchise
more than half of the Foreign Service, whose need to participate in collective
bargaining is in-no way diminished when they are assigned as supervisors under
our rank-lu-Person system.
Our scope of bargaining must be as broad as that accorded the Civil Service.
For example, Disputes Panel decisions, like Civil Service arbitration awards,
must be final. .Indeed our unique and essential rank-in-person system, and the
special demands-of career service abroad, require the broadest possible negotiat-
ing mandate. We must be able to negotiate in advance the implementation of
such provisions of the Bill as: (1) precepts for tenure, promotion and selection
out; (2) changes of time in class; (3) definition of concepts such as "worldwide
availability" and "the needs of the Service" ; and (4) ranges of promotion and
attrition rates. This concept is essential to a new Foreign Service Act. We would
adamantly oppose an Act which granted management major new authorities with-
out providing those whose careers they affect a handle to prevent the abuse of
these authorities.
We could only accept the imposed monopoly on grievance representation if its
inclusion would not then be used to further reduce the size of the bargaining unit
in the name of preventing conflict of interest. This would be a heavy burden on
our resources since we have dedicated professional staff precisely to provide
independent representation to grievants.
Indeed, we would prefer that the monopoly on access to the grievance board
not be imposed. Rather, we would ask for a stipulation in law that employees
retain free access to the grievance board, but that no finding by the board may
operate to impair a duly concluded labor-management agreement. In cases of
dispute, the Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel would be charged with
determining, whether such an infringement exists. We will provide specific
language in our line-by-line recommendations to accommodate this change. Aside
from the above and some particular word changes, we are favorably impressed
with the grievance proposals in Chapter XI.
Finally, the Foreign Service must be compensated on a par with the Civil
Service and must receive appropriate incentives for a lifetime of service abroad.
If we are to attract. develop and retain the talented people we need from all
segments of our society, they must be able to make reasonable predictions about
their futures in the Service. They must also receive tangible benefits for pur-
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suing a career which, takes them away. from home for much of their'lives; exposes.
them to hardships 'and dangers and frequently thrusts incredible responsibilities
on them. . ,
For the Staff Corps this means : (1) compensation' built into the salary struc-
'ture for the "overseas factor" and a renewed assessment, of the extra responsi-
bilities, they assume abroad; (2) pay authorisation for the long hours they are
aegillarly on .standby duty-the functional 'equivalent of house arrest. ;
FOi, the Senior. Service it 'means an end to exclusion from hfiid hi pay, for
Ambassadors. With five Ambassadors assassinated in the past decade,,more than
all ITS. generals killed by hostile fire, in Vietnam, Ambassadors do not deserve
this exclusion. This exclusion also acts as a cap on the hardship pay for senior
officers under them. In addition, senior personnel are entitled to compensation
ranges on a.level with the Senior'Executive Service.
The Service is divided on the question of "performance pay." Since it is the
only means now ''available for'providing equitable compensation for our senior
ranks, we will not oppose its enactment. It is essential there be guarantees of its.
protection from political' abuse and of impartial distribution through the Selec-
tiOa Boards. We must emphasize, however, that it is not financial incentives but
the standard of excellence which has provided our real motivation for superior
service.
For the first time, senior AID Foreign Service personnel would become, as
members of the Senior Foreign Service, presidential appointees, with an oppor-
tiinity to be promoted to the highest rank, now called Career Minister. Political
abuse of the system should be reduced by deletion from the Foreign. Assistance
Act' of the anachronistic Administratively-determined as well as the 631 B per-
sonnel appointment authorities. Together, these sections allow the Agency to
appoint some 185 officers from outside the career service-over 100 of whom may
be given supergrade status, thereby negatively impacting on 'both AID's profes-
sionalism and its employees' opportunities for advancement. Moreover, we have
urged that the legislative history of Sec. 311(a) (3) and (b) (1) explicitly include
AID and. USICA 'members of the Senate for appointment as Chiefs of Mission.
We would include IDCA also, if it becomes part of the Foreign Service Com-
munity, which it clearly should. Organizations such as IDCA which deal exclu-
sively in the foreign affairs area should not be staffed exclusively by civil serv-
ants who do not serve overseas and therefore cannot fully understand the impact
of the policies they establish.
Almost ten years ago the Congress enacted 5 USC 5301 et seq.1 which explicity
called for equal pay for equal work for the Civil Service and the Foreign Service.
In 1978 the Congress directed and authorized funds for the State Department to
conduct a study of pay comparability between the Foreign Service and the Civil
Service. The Department, with "OMB concurrence, hired Hay Associates, the
leading American firm in the field of pay comparability analysis to conduct the
study. The Hay findings conclusively prove that existing Foreign Service-Civil
Service pay linkages are inequitable. Continuation of these inequities is unlaw-
ful. The State Department, the Agency for International Development and the
International Communications Agency have accepted Hay's findings and have
recommended to the Office of Management and Budget adoption of proper.linkages
as recommended by Hay. OMB has chosen ,to ignore the intent of the- Congress,
the evidence of the study and the advice of the agencies and instead seeks to
substitute the findings of a study done more than five years ago by the then Civil
Service Commission. We note in this connection that in the transformation of the ?
Civil Service Commission into the Office of Personnel Management, Hay Associ-
ates was selected by OPM as an expert and impartial consultant.
We ask the Senate to insist that the intent of the Congress to rectify this long-
standing injustice be realized unequivocally, setting into law pay parity between
the Foreign Service and the Civil Service at the Hay recommended linkages. We
could not support this Act unless necessary provisions for pay comparability
have been elaborated, either beforehand or within this legislation. There: is no
reason, however, why pay comparability must of necessity be deferred until such
time as this bill is enacted. In light of the federal budget cycle, we would strongly
support a decision by the Congress to proceed on this question immediately.
In sum, the Foreign Service Act should contain these three essential elements :
Enhancement of the role and integrity of the Service ;
A strong voice for the career Service determining conditions of employment ;
Full pay parity with the Civil Service.
'If these three essential questions are adequately addressed, we will actively
support the Act. The Association is prepared to work with the Congress and the
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Administration to develop the'kind of bill which will be a new and welcome''bezlch-
mark.in the-history of. the Foreign Service.
I wish to conclude, my statement by addressing the question of Equal_, mploy-
ment Opporturiity in the Foreign Service.
It is clear that the Foreign' Service has not yet succeeded in attracting stif elent
numbers of women and minorities. I want to go on record today as:stating that
the -American'.Foreign Service Association is committed to actively supporting
the, goal of equal opportunity for all. We are in complete agreement with the
explicit application of the principles contained in 5 USC 2301(b) (~') and (2) to
the Foreign Service.
Legislation alone, however, cannot bring about the changes required to produce
a fully representative service. Unless, by implementing the three principles I
have outlined, the Foreign Service is made more monetarily and. professionally
attractive for all and unless flow is restored to the personnel system, we .will
continue to be disadvantaged in competing with the Civil Service and the private
sector for the outstanding;people we need. Foreign Affairs agencies. must produce
career development programs that will assure the growth of all . their Foreign
Service personnel to. achieve a more open and balanced Service in the years ahead.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
There are a couple of specific questions here if I could..
In connection, with the point you made of the standby pay, do you
favor standby pay of this sort for those who have to just call in oc-
casionally or answer a beeper but are otherwise free to travel ,as long
as they are within a convenient distance from the Embassy; or-would
you recommend it only for those few employees who must remain on
standby right within practically walking range, a 10-minute driving
range of the Embassy?
Mr. STERN.. That will be a very difficult line to draw, sir, .and I,must
admit we haven't attempted to shave it quite that finely. Our main feel-
ing is to those posts where we know that people don't have.the. freedom
of movement, where we recognize that telephonic communications are
grossly inadequate, if they don't. stay at their home literally they,may
not be reached. We'realize that many of these people are. on standby
not only on the weekend but all through the night as well. because. we
don't have adequate staffs, particularly such groups as communicators.
We need to find ways of properly compensating these people., Hope-
fully, we can do?it.by looking at the base pay. It is certainly our pref-
erence to see, the overseas dimension incorporated into . the base pay
rate rather than an allowance which may or may not apply ,.at a,given
time or another. But we would certainly, want. to look at some of the places where, the
hardships are more evident than others. ? .; ,
The CHAIRMAN. Why do you believe that there should be thj.s wide-
ranging representation? Don't you think communicators. and. ,~ecre-
taries have rather different interests from Foreign Service,officers?.
Mr. STERN. Not necessarily, sir, because we all serve overseas. We are
all concerned about ,whether or not we are going to have a: baggage
allowance. We. are all concerned by the same uniform regulations,which
are handed down by the foreign affairs agencies and apply to the, lowest'
ranking staff person or the, most senior Ambassador m.. t$e. service.
This is the unique quality. There are not separate regulations, based- on
rank but rather a uniform set of regulations that apply to. any person
that is. Foreign Service. We recognize certainly that not, teyer,ybody
within the Service has identical interests.
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And for this reason we have established task forces so that we can
have the expertise. With me at the table today, for example, we have a
representative of the staff, we have a specialist on pay, we have a
specialist on personnel flowthrough so as to be able to address the
totality of the interests of the Service. But I don't believe the staff corps
would advocate a separate organization for themselves. And I don't
feel that, speaking as one officer, I would want to see them split away.
We have too close a relationship.
Mr. MCBRIDE. Senator, if I might add fora moment, having been
205
involved intimately in the Foreign Service since I came back on the
last night of evacuation from Saigon, having been involved intimately ?~
in the Foreign Service Association, I think there are a number of re-
forms that we need to accomplish. I can tell you personally that if
the broad and extensive unit that we have to bargain with is broken
up, we would suffer from a balkanization, a setting off of one interest
against the other, which would only totally vitiate in my view any
effective representation of employee interest.
And in the process we would find that the new manager who harkens
only to his immediate political boss and has no concept of the Foreign
Service tradition of service going back now for over one century, we
would find the employee attachment and devotion would be destroyed.
We would lose our ability to effectively represent our people.
The CIIAmMAN. You may be right. I have always felt that the
Foreign Service per se is very much in the nearest analogy to the
military service, similar to the Marine Corps. They are dedicated. I
tell young Foreign Service people when they come up to the Hill,
that in civilian life the profession may be more akin to that of the
clergy. You go into it for a life of service, not to become a bishop.
And the Foreign Service should have that idea even more. The Am-
bassador's brief case is not in every man's luggage, the life of service is,
the same way as the general's stars are not necessarily in every military
man's baggage, wlien he goes to an academy. But this point of service
is very important. ?
And I think it is one that should be kept in mind.
Mr..McBRIDE. Sir, I can only tell you now that the Foreign Service
Association maintains the plaque on which the navies of 46 of our
colleagues have been recorded since 1965. I personally went and counted
those names. I knew a number of them. The Foreign Service Associa-
tion speaks to the interest of the staff corps who were frying, along
with our officers, in Islamabad, and to the interests of the staff corps,
the communicators, and the secretary who was one of the 13 released
from Teheran.and stayed until the last night with me in Saigon.
All bean say is there is a commonality in the Foreign Service of this
commitment from the top and bottom, staff and officer alike, of this
spirit of commitment to service. This spirit must be maintained.
The CHAIRMAN. I think it is a point, too, the American Foreign
Service Association and the other groups that represent you should
emphasize a great deal more. And I think ou would do better rather
than scratching around for comparability to* the Civil Service. It ought
to be comparability to the Marine Corps. I think you would find the
response would be better. I don't think you emphasize that good point
enough. One of the things about the bonus pay is that it goes in just
the opposite direction. I don't imagine a Marine, Corps general or
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261
coloiiel; gets le'is'katioiip'r'oposing a bonus pay. for a colbnel!;who does
a good job; I don't imagine that would get very far.
A colonel who does a good job is more likely to become a general very
quickly. That is the difference. I would say the same thing for the
Senior Foreign Service officer; if he does a good. job, he may. not get
the money for the garage that year but is more.'likely to: move, on to
aiiother'.assignm'ent' which will either give him a garage door or in-
creased" interest.'
Mr. Seth. Sir,' we, couldn't agree more. We are a' Service. We be-
lieve in service. But at the same time we recognize that just as a
corporation seeking to attract the finest people from the universities
will sometimes 'up the bidding ,a little bit, we have to recognize there
is' some of this competition beginning at the bottom. With our con-
cept of up or out we are in a sense encouraging everybody .to think
that they have' that marshall's baton in their knapsack. We are a
very small service.
If I may, I would like to introduce Bill Veale, who is our expert on
pay, who can address this comment, particularly tol the military an-
alogy. Bill is a former military officer as well.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. VEALE, AMERICAN FOREIGN
SERVICE ASSOCIATION
Mr. VF.er.E. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to start out by pointing out the Foreign Service is an
institution which has similarities to both the military.and the' Civil
Service but is compensated less favorably than either. I am a' major in
the Reserves, that is a rank equivolent to my FSO-5 rank. When I
go on active duty for 12 days I bring home-not on per diem-$150
more on that paycheck, partly because of the quarter's allowance the
military enjoys any time they are not occupying Government quarters.
I cite this just as one example.
We have long believed the Foreign Service deserved full' pay, parity
with the Civil Service. This is in fact because the law calls for equal
pay with the Civil Service, and a linkage with the Civil. Service. We
appreciate the support the Congress has given that led to the Hay
study. We do not see common salaries with the Civil Service as.threat-
ening the independence of the Foreign Service. The independence of
the Foreign Service we believe must stand on stronger grounds.
We generally support the Hay findings which made clear the need
for upward adjustments of junior and mid-level salary levels and
defended the salaries of the staff corps. However, we 'are dismayed
that the Hay recommendations are reflected only in the first two of
the four pay options developed by an OMB-chaired interagency task
force.
These four options are first, an option that advocates 10 classes. The
second option calls for nine classes. Both of these have the same kind
of linkages with the Civil Service that Hay recommended and paral-
leled the recomendations of Hay. The other two options are 'also
nine class options which have much less favorable linkages with the
Civil Service scales.
While our Association would prefer the' 10-class solution proposed
by Hay, we have made clear our willingness to settle for immediate
implementation of Hay's 9-class recommendation, that is, the task
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force's second option. In doing so we joined a consensus for option 2
supported by all the foreign affairs agencies and the Board of Foreign
Service.
We understand the Secretary of State is also personally committed
to option 2 and intends to give the pay issue first priority in the
Department's budget.
Opposed to this position, however, are OMB and OPM supporting
the fourth option, the lowest, based on an out-of-date 1974 position
survey by the Civil Service Commission that even failed to take ac-
count of the overseas dimension of foreign service work, one aspect of
which we are all reading in the papers now.
We"are particularly chagrined that ,01M has tried to structure
the options paper to favor a compromise on the third option, slightly
better than option 4 but still not consistent with the Hay findings. And
we are appalled that on an issue where so much is at stake, for the
future of the Foreign Service the selection of the final pay option is to
be made on budgetary grounds-because OMB views State's budget as
a "controllable" expense.
But what kind of price tags are we really talking about? For im-
mediate implementation in all foreign affairs agencies option 1 would
cost $33.8 million; option 2, for which we would settle, would cost
$30.5 million; option 3 would cost $21.7 million; and option 4 would
cost $15.2 million. We are talking then about a spread of $20 million.
Mr. Chairman, in our view this is peanuts, not much more than the
cost of one F-14 Tomcat ; a fighter aircraft of the type now rotting on
airfields in Iran.
The CnAIRMAN. Normally I would agree but don't forget that that
is a dime for every man, woman, and child in America. You have to
ask every man, woman, and child do they really want to pay this
much more.
Mr.'VEAr.E. It is a question of the long-term objective, of what it does
for the Foreign Service.
To conclude, I would say that the Foreign Service is well aware
of Hay's findings. We have come to look on the pay issue as a symbol
that in these trying times somebody cares about the Foreign Service.
Any solution to the pay problem short of immediate implementation
of option 2 will create a real crisis of morale.
In the face of the uncertainties of a restructured Foreign Service
there 'will undoubtedly be resignations of well-qualified people, as
there already have been. Especially in the middle ranks the caliber
of entrants will sag. In the end, we feel the American people will
be ill: served by a Foreign Service that is less qualified and less
representative.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
REMOVAL OF PAY INCENTIVE FEATURE
In essence then, you support the legislation but with some changes
and you would not be adverse to the removal of the pay incentive
feature. Would that be a correct statement.?
Mr. STERN. That would be, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
From, the viewpoint of the staff corps. I have heard some questions,
I have'had some secretaries come up to me and say they were unhappy
about it. What is your reaction, madam?
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Ms. AUSTIN; With regard. to the act!
The CHAIRMAN. Yes..
Ms. AUSTIN. Basically I don't think that secretaries per se have any
problems with it. It is more in line with the communicators who have
had some problems with the idea of selection out of time in class. While
the staff corps supports the idea of selection out and time in class as a
means of getting our ranks, but we make sure we have only the best in
the Foreign Service
The CHAIRMAN. I must say I have had some members of the staff
corps very vigorously say they do not support the concept.
Ms. AUSTIN. We are divided on. the issue. There is no doubt about
that. But I think we would definitely settle for the idea that we could
accept time in class for selection out if it were grandfathered for the
people currently in the Foreign Service and implemented for those
who would be newly coming into the Foreign Service and who would
be coming in with the understanding that time in class and selection
out is the procedure.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the legislation grandfather them in now?
Mr. McBRIDE. Sir, the provisions are being made in the legislation
and in amendments we have worked out with management based upon
these kinds of concerns to grandfather. The grandfather is presently
for 5 years I believe. And we would expand that to 10 years. I: would
have to doublecheck it.
The CHAIRMAN. In the bill as presently written it is not.
Ms. AUSTIN. No, sir, it is not.
Mr. STERN. It is on our line by line.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. McBRmE. No, but management would agree with.us.
The CHAIRMAN. On the Foreign Service and the pay incentive busi-
ness, if that is dropped out completely what will be the reaction of the
American Foreign Service Association?
Mr. STERN:ou are referring now strictly to the performance pay
aspect?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, that one specific point.
Mr. STERN. If that were struck out-and as I said, we have chosen
not to oppose,it rather than say we support it-we could. live with it.
The CHAIRMAN. Right. Thank you very much. Are there any other
points?
Mr. McBRIDE. Could I make one briefly and speaking to what Am-
bassador Herz talked about, which is the danger of the Senior Service
becoming terrorized by political manipulation, we are very concerned
about that ::kind of problem. And we have proposed a number of
changes which we would propose to work over with your staff in great
detail to make sure -that does not happen. One of those specific changes
turns to section.612 which the Ambassador cited in which as presently
drafted the law would permit inclusion of all sorts of material, in-
cluding perspective assignability in decisions, in material being put
before selection boards for retention or selection out if you would.
We would, delete that. material totally from the law so that anything
and everything that is to be, put before a selection board must be
subject to negotiation. with the exclusive bargaining .agent to protect
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,our individual officers and staff from any return to a McCarthy ap-
proach of approaching the Senior Foreign Service..
The second thing is we offer a number of suggestions, some of which
'management will accept, which will address again the.'board issue of
the negotiability of the application of the various attrition mechanisms
they will now be able to employ under this concept. We think that
very important, sir. We think that we can start with a. service which
will. permit a regular and a balanced flowthrough but which will not
lead to either political abuse or will not lead to senior officers having
to constantly look over their shoulders and say the junior officers have
gotten to the Secretary and they are going to ax me, because that is
not what we .want.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
One final question. Obviously when it comes to assignments, certain
personnel factors enter into it. If a Foreign Service officer has a spouse,
be that spouse a male or a female, who is an alcoholic, for example, that
could have an effect on the assignment of where the person goes. As I
understand the present rules, you are not supposed to- have in your
personnel jacket that fact; is that correct?
Mr. STERN. I believe the way it read, sir, is that you may only have
in the jacket that which is germane to the performance of the work.
So if we had a person illustratively that is an alcoholic but presently
under treatment
The CHAIRMAN. Or the spouse.
Mr. STERN. Or the spouse
The CHAIRMAN. If he is an alcoholic he shouldn't be in the service
in my view.
Mr. -STERN. Well, we would not necessarily of course know whether
a spouse was or was not an alcoholic but for the sake of the assumption,
if it was not deemed that this would detract from the ability of the
person. to perform the job, then it should not be indicated. If in fact
it was something where the spouse had abused privileges' o'r position,
this would have to be a matter of record because it directly impacts
on the ability to perform.
But we are dealing with some very fine lines in social legislation
which have come through fairly recently. And I am not an attorney
myself. I feel I am about to get into very deep water.' I might ask for
our attorney to comment on it.
The CHAIRMAN. I won't go further on it, but I would just state in-
stances I have known in the past year where the spouse ofd the Foreign
Service officer can be a tremendous help to that Foreign Service officer
or can absolutely ruin him. And I think this is a factor that should be
taken into account. At any rate, I thank you very much indeed, gentle-
men, for being with us.
[The following information was subsequently supplied for the
record.] '
AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE AssoCIATION,
Washington, D.C., December 18, 1979.
Senator CI.aiBORNE PELT,
Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENAToB PELL: The American Foreign Service Association appreciated
the opportunity to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee December
14 on the proposed new Foreign Service Act. I regret that illness' prevented my
appearing personally. In view of the specific questions you raised regarding
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"performance pay" for the Senior Foreign Service, the Board of Directors of
our association believes the following supplemental information' on our position
might be useful to you.
We are proud of our traditions of excellence and willingess to walk in harms
way in the service, of our nation. Financial incentives have never been the prime
motivation of the Foreign Service but they are of course important to our
employees and their families and they should be compatible with those of our
colleagues elsewhere in the Federal Government. The Congress chose in the
Foreign Service .Act of 1946 to establish points of linkage between the Foreign
Service and Civil Service pay scales. In 1978 it mandated the -review of those
link points. It also passed the Civil Service Reform Act which inter alia estab-
lished.Performance Pay for the Civil Service which could exceed the Federal
Pay Ceiling. Subsequently, the mandated study on pay linkage established that
certain categories of foreign service personnel were indeed substantially under-
paid when.comparing the content of their jobs to those of the Civil Service. At
the same time, the Administration chose to include "performance pay" for the
Senior Foreign Service in its proposals for a new Foreign Service Act.
The American Foreign Service Association has taken the position that any
new legislation must include provisions for full pay parity with our colleagues
elsewhere in the Government for all categories of personnel. In the case of
linkage of pay scales all that is required is an immediate change in link points
as proposed in the Hay Associates Study.
"Performance pay" presents a more complicated picture because it implies
that our senior officers might perform better if competing among themselves
for additional pay and because it would require new administrative mechanisms
which might be subject to abuse. These are valid concerns. The Association
would prefer some other means for assuring adequate compensation for the
Senior Foreign Service but believes that these concerns can be overcome through
adequate language in the law. However, no alternative has been proposed either
by the Congress or the Administration. We have been told that alternatives
such as a 15% overseas allowance are politically infeasible. We would support
an alternative to "performance pay" which provided compensation levels for
the foreign service as high as those elsewhere in government service. In the
absence of such an alternative, however, the Association could .not support a
new Foreign Service Act which established pay ceilings for the Senior Foreign
Service below the Senior Civil Service. It is for this reason that we cannot
oppose "performance pay" for the Senior Foreign Service, the only means now
available to assure pay parity.
We would appreciate your making this supplemental material part of the
record on the Foreign Service Act hearings.
Sincerely,
KENNETH W. BLEAKLEY, President.
UPDATED SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE BILL To PROMOTE THE FOREIGN
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES BY STRENGTHENING AND IMPROVING THE FOREIGN
SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
[Submitted by: American Foreign Service Association]
CHAPTER 1--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 101 (a) (1) (p. 2), insert after Foreign Service "of the United States,"
Comment : Emphasis on the national, interdepartmental character of the
Service.
Sec. 101 (a) (3) (p. 2), add in first line "that the members of the Foreign
Service . . ." Insert after "languages, and."
Comment : Each member of the Service should strive to be representative of
the American people and to remain truly American rather than becoming too
foreign or cosmopolitan.
Sec. 101 (a) (1F) (p. 2), add new subsection (4) "that the Foreign Service
should be operated on the basis of merit principles ; and
Comment : It is desirable to reaffirm that the merit principles of the Civil
Service Reform Act apply to the Foreign Service as indeed they do by the terms
of 5 U.S.C. 2301 (b) (1).
NOTE : A d next to a section number indicates a change in our line-by-line since our
October 17, 1979 submission.
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. Sec. 101 (a). (5) (p. 2), add new subsection (5) "that the growing scope and
complexity of the nation's foreign affairs has heightened the need for a profes-
sional Foreign Service that will serve the foreign affairs interests of the United
States in an integrated fashion and that can provide a resource of qualified per-
sonnel for the President, the Secretary of State and the agencies concerned with
foreign .affairs.
Comment: This addition explicitly acknowledges that the need for a Foreign
Service of the United States is increasing due to world events.
Section-by-Section Analysis : Add new paragraph under Findings and Objec-
tives, following paragraph ending "merit principles :"
"Finally, this section finds that our growing and increasingly complex foreign
affairs has heightened the need for a professional Foreign Service to serve the
President, the Secretary of State, and the various agencies concerned with
foreign affairs."
Comment : This emphasizes the broad scope of responsibilities envisioned for
the Foreign Service.
See.,101 (b) (6) (p. 4), insert new phrase "to provide compensation, including
salaries . "
Comment : This wording clarifies the concept that it is "compensation" in its
broadest sense and not merely certain elements of it which encourages and re-
wards outstanding performance.
Section-by-Section Analysis: Revise para on Section 101 (b) (6) to read:
"Section 101 (b) (6), drawn from section 111 (7) of the 1946 Act, 'states that
the Act will provide salaries, allowances and benefits compensation that will at-
tract and retain qualified personnel, and .,as well as incentive payments and
awards to encourage and reward outstanding performance. Compensation for the
Foreign Service must take into account the conditions of overseas service re-
ferred to in Section 101 (b) (5)."
Comments : The additions make clear the intent to minimize the impact of the
hardships, 'disruptions and other unusual conditions of overseas service upon
the members of the Foreign Service and to mitigate the special impact of such
conditions upon their families.
Sec. 101 (b) (9) (p. 4), revises subsection to read: "(9) to increase efficiency
and economy by promoting maximum compatibility uniformity of personnel man-
agement among the agencies authorized to utilize the Foreign Service personnel
system particularly in the Senior Foreign Service as well as compatibility between
the Foreign Service and the Civil Service ; and"
Comment : Just as there is a single Civil Service system flexible enough to
serve the interests of the individual domestic U.S. agencies, there should be a
Foreign Service with a Senior Foreign Service component paralleling the Senior
Executive Service which serves U.S. national interests abroad.
Sec. IOu (2) (p. 7), insert as follows: "provide guidance for the formulation
and conduct of United States foreign policy and programs ... "
Comment : This establishes that the Foreign Service advises the President and
Secretary on foreign policy in addition to executing it.
Section-by-Section Analysis, para 3 (p. 7), insert as follows: "Section 104(2)
states that members of the Foreign Service shall provide guidance for the
formulation and conduct of United States foreign policy and for the formulation
and conduct of Government . . "
Comment : See comment on 104 (2) above.
CHAPTER 2-MANAGEMENT OF THE SERVICE
Sec. 202 (a) Section-by-Section (p. 9), add: "It is expected that these agencies
will use all the appointment authorities in the Act. For example, the Inter-
national Development Cooperation Agency will establish a Foreign Service 0 ffjcer
corps."
Comment : In order to enhance compatibility among the Foreign affairs agen-
cies and the status of the international development function, the law should
strongly encourage the establishment of a Foreign Service Officer corps in IDCA,
parallel with FSO's in State and FSIO's in USICA. The categories of personnel
who would be so appointed would be worked out subsequently by regulation.
Sec. 206 (p. 13)
Comment : We strongly support the re-establishment in law of the Board of
the Foreign Service. We agree with the composition and functions of the Board
described in Sec. 206 and its analysis. We welcome the proviso that a career
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member of the Senior Foreign Service chair the Board, and we believe that a
majority of Board Members should likewise be career Members of the Senior
Foreign Service. Only those domestic agencies with government-wide respon-
sibilities (OPM and OMB) or which use the Foreign Service overseas but have
none of their own (Commerce and Labor) should be represented. To insure
that the Board can function as an independent and useful source of advice
to the Secretary and other foreign affairs agency heads, it should have a staff,
like that of the FSLRB In Chapter 10 or the FSGB in Chapter 11, independent
of agency management and responsible only to it. Its career Foreign Service
members should be neither officials of the exclusive employee representative
:nor management officials as defined in Sec. 1002(10) (F). It should not only
respond to requests from agency heads for advice on issues arising under the
Foreign Service Act on the Secretary's government-wide authority, but also
initiate such advice. In forming its judgments, it should feel free to hear rep-
resentatives of both agency management and the exclusive representative.
Sec. 311 (a) (1) (p. 17), add:
"The President shall provide the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate, with each nomination for a chief of mission position, a report on that
nominee's demonstrated competence to perform the duties of chief of mission
.in the country in which he or she is to serve."
Section-by-Section, add: Additionally, it requires a report from the President
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the competence of his. or her
.nominees, measured against these criteria."
Comment : This provision will improve the Senate's ability to judge the quali-
fications of a nominee, and deter the nominations of inadequately qualified
,persons.
Sec. 311(a) (3) (p. 18), and Section-by-Section change to read "(3) for to the
.maximum extent practicable . .
Comment: This change parallels, the language of Sec. 311 (a) (1) with respect
to the qualifications of a chief o? mission and reflects the previously expressed
sense of Congress (Sec. 120, P.L. 94-350 (90 Stat. 829) that "a greater number
of positions of ambassador should be occupied by career personnel of the Foreign
Service."
. Sec. 311(b) (1) (p. 18), Section-by-Section, add: "It is expected that Foreign
Service personnel from the foreign affairs agencies other than the Department
of State will receive fair consideration for Chief of Mission nominations."
Comment: IDCA and USICA Foreign Service personnel should receive fair
cosideration for Chief of Mission positions.
Sec. 321. (p. 19), Section-by-Section, add : "As noted in the analysis of. sec-
tion 511(b), the number of non-Foreign Service personnel serving in Foreign
Service positions (which includes those serving under limited appointments in
the Service) is not expected to exceed the number of Foreign Service personnel
assigned to non-Foreign Service positions."
. Comment : This reflects the expectation that the present balance of exchange
in senior assignments between the Foreign Service and the rest of the,Govern-
-?ment will be maintained lest Foreign Service promotion and assignment oppor-
tunities be reduced.
Sec. 322. (p. 19), Section-by-Section, line 10, insert after "....be for four
years" : Career members of the Senior Foreign Service will normally be ap-
pointed by the promotion (cf Sec. 602) of career personnel who will have
established records of performance in the Foreign Service. Career candidates at
.the SFS level will be appointed from outside the career Service only in extraor-
dinary cases where the needs of the Service cannot otherwise efficiently be met.
Accordingly, such candidates will serve not less than four years in proba-
fiionary status so that their qualifications for career status can be thoroughly
.evaluated.
Comment: This section provides clear safeguards that the new mechanism for
accepting career candidates directly into the Senior Foreign Service will be con-
-trolled. This will ensure that candidates' demonstrated competence for top level
management have been carefully evaluated and confirmed before career status is
conferred. The aggregate number of such outside appointments should not un-
dermine the predominance of appointments from within the career service which
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is necessary to maintain healthy flow rates throughout the Service in recognition
of meritorious performance.
Sec. 322 (.p. 19) .Section-by-Section. Add the following a.s..the new final sentence
in the first paragraph: Appointments;to the highest rank of the Senior Foreign
Service shall be from the ranks of those who have already achieved career
status.
? Comment: This parallels the provision of the existing law that all,?appoint-
ments to the.highest rank of career minister must come from the ranks of career
Class 1 officers.
Sec. 323 (p. 20)
Comment : Reference to "class higher than class 4" should be reviewed to
bring it into conformity with determination of classes under Section 421 once
that provision has been established.
Amend Sec: 333 (b) to read as follows :
V 333(b.)..Employment of family. members in accordance w-iththis section may
not be used to avoid fulfilling the need for full-time career positions.
Sec. 833(b) Section-by-Section, insert "full-time" before "positions."
Comment: This change is consistent with existing law (Sec. 413, P.L. 95-
426, 92 Stat 963) which makes it clear that full-time American career positions
should-not be abolished in order to create those positions, sometimes part-time,
temporary, or ? Intermittent (PIT) , for family members. Such action -.of creat-
ing PIT positions reduces promotion and assignment opportunities for current
career members of the Foreign Service. Our" proposed change is not intended
to impede increases in job opportunities for family: members, or innovations
concerning job-sharing overseas.
CHAPTER 4-COMPENSATION
See. 462 (p. 36), Section-by-Section, and Table of Contents-Change "Allow-
ances" to "Differential."
Comment : The special allowance, unlike other allowances available to gov-
ernment employees overseas, but like the post differential, is taxable, and estab-
lished as a percentage of basic salary. Also unlike overseas allowances, it can be
paid for positions in Washington. Calling it a differential would be more logical.
V Sec. 462, Section-by-Section, change to read :
"Section 462 authorizes the Secretary to pay special differentials in addition
to other compensation to all Foreign Service officers who are required to per-
form additional work on a regular basis in substantial excess of normal re-
quirements. It is contemplated that o7}1cers who must work an average of at
least 50 hours per week, receive special differentials at the rate of not less than
25 percent of basic salary. This section is identical in substance to section
451 of the 1946 Act, and is in lieu of overtime or other premium pay under sub-
chapter V of Chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code. The Department shall
not take advantage of the ineligibility of FS0's for premium pay by requiring
them to work when work is not really essential, or avoiding the need to ask for
more personnel whenever necessary to perform the Department's mission."
Comment: As indicated below (Sec. 2301 (3) ), AFSA seeks the repeal of the
premium pay ban on FSOs. If this is not possible, we seek at least to mitigate
the injustices with which the special allowances have been administered. The
Department, adding insult to injury, claims that the legislative history of the
provision excludes FSO-3's (new FS-1s) and special assistants to Presidential
appointees of Executive Level 3 and above ; limits the total eligible to approxi-
mately 100 In State ; defines "substantially in excess of normal requirements" as
55 hours per week ; and provides as a special allowance only 12 to 18 percent
over basic salary. The premium pay ban and special allowance limits also en-
courage the Department to overwork FSOs rather than adjust its workload to
seek additional resources. The new sectional analysis would correct these
problems.
Sec. 462 (p. 36), after "authorized" Insert "(a)" and line 25, add: "or (b) to
Foreign Service personnel who are required by the nature of their assignments
overseas to remain on call on a regular basis for substantial periods of time out-
side normal duty hours."
Section-by-Section, add: "Subsection (b) would apply the concept of the
special differential to Foreign Service personnel required by the nature of their
assignments overseas to remain on call on a regular basis for substantial periods
of time outside normal duty hours."
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Comment ; B any Foreign Service. personnel,: especially secretaries and com-
municators at small posts overseas,. are required to remain on "stand-by duty"
or, on.call :for extremely long periods of time, but are. not compensated except and
to the extent that they are required during such periods to come in to work. The,
concept of the special allowance, of a certain percentage of basic salary, is an
appropriate way to compensate personnel for such a substantial loss of free
time.
CnAPTER 5-CLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS
Sec. 511(b) (1) (p. 38, line 1) Insert after "filled by" "the assignment for speci.-
Jicd tours of duty :.."
Section-by-Section Analysis, first paragraph, add : "The number of such. per-
sonnel.is not expected to exceed the number of Foreign Service personnel as-
signed to non-Foreign Service positions."
Comment : All Foreign Service personnel assignments are for specific tours of
duty, normally for two or three years. Similarly, an assignment of a non-Foreign
Service employee to a Foreign Service position should be for a specific period of
time after which the assignment could be renewed or another person assigned
to the. position: The purpose of revising the legislative history is to reflect the
expectation that Foreign Service assignment and promotion opportunities will
not be adversely affected by reversing the present balance in assignments be-
tween the Foreign Service and the Civil Service.
Sec. 521(a) (4) (p. 39). Section-by-Section analysis, add following at end of
paragraph : "A substantial number of Foreign Service personnel should be given
assignments under this paragraph."
Comment : This restores the original concept of the "Pearson Amendment"
(Sec. 572 of the Act of 1946 as amended). The legislative history should reflect
the sense of. Congress that such assignments are important to a comprehensive
career development program.
See. 521(b) (1) (p. 39), first sentence. Insert "the higher of" before "the
salary" ; and in the following line delete irrespective and insert "or". Also, revise
the accompanying legislative history by amending all of paragraph four before
the last sentence to read as follows: 521(b) (1) preserves the rule established by
571 (c) of the 1946 Act that a member of the Service assigned under this section
will receive the salary of his or her Foreign Service class. or, when assigned to a
non-Foreign Service position, the salary of the position to which the member is
assigned if. it is higher than the salary of the member's class." [Continue with
existing last sentence.]
Comment: . This is consistent with the existing law and with the concept of
equal pay for equal work which is part of merit system principles. ..
V Sec. 531(a) (p. 41). Amend last sentence to read : No .member of the Service
may be assigned.to duty within the United States upon initial appointment, for a
period to exceed three years, or for any period of continuous service exceeding
eight years unless the Secretary approves an extension of such period in special
circumstances.
V Sec. 531. Section-by-Section : Delete last sentence of first paragraph and
insert :
"The limitation of three years initial service carries forward the policy of sec.
625(d) (2) of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. 2385(d) (2). The limitation
of eight years continuous service carries forward the policy of section 571 (a)
of the 1946 Act."
Sec. 531(a). (p. 41). Section-by-Section analysis, add the following to the end
of the first paragraph: "It is expected that regulations limiting, assignments in.
the United States and procedures for exceptions of the eight-year rule would be
negotiated with the exclusive representative for each agency."
Comment: We applaud Sec. 531(a) as a reaffirmation of the principle of world-
wide assignment in the Service. However, it is essential that the regulations and
procedures under which these aspects of service discipline are applied be co-
determined by'the exclusive representative to ensure equitable application and
prevent arbitrary, abuse.
See. 531(b) (p. 41). Revise Section-by-Section Analysis by adding the follow-
ing at the end of the second paragraph : "The implementation of this subsection
implies that?a reasonable number of Foreign Service positions will be maintained
in the United States in all categories so as to permit the assignment of those
who desire assignment in the United States after extended duty abroad."
Comment: We approve of paragraph (b). However, there are some specialties,
e.g., secretaries and communicators, in which there are not enough positions in
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Washington to meet this objective because not enough positions are classified
Foreign Service. This revision 'envisions steps to ensure that enough slots are
made available for all Foreign Service personnel categories to permit reasonable
domestic rotations after extended duty abroad.
CHAPTER 6-PROMOTION AND RETENTION
Sec. 602 (a) (p. 43), Section-by-Section Analysis, add following as a new para-
graph : It is contemplated that the exclusive representative will be able to nego-
tiate the time-in-class (TIC) for new FS-1, as well as the number of years in the
threshold window during which one may be considered for promotion. In AID'/
IDCA, where retirement for excessive TIC has not been used, the establishment
of a threshold window would have to await the establishment of a TIC at that
level-both on the basis of negotiation with the exclusive representative;
Comment: Our approval of the senior threshold "window" and the extension
of TIC to AID is conditioned by the requirement that the application of these
authorities be negotiable as a safeguard for employees.
See. 602 (b) (p. 43), substitute the following :
"(b) Decisions by the Secretary on the numbers of those to be promoted into
and retained in the Senior Foreign Service shall be based upon a systematic
long-term projection of personnel flows and needs designed to provide-
(1) a regular, predictable flow of recruitment at the junior levels of the
Foreign Service ;
'(2) effective career development patterns to meet the needs of the Service;
and
(3) regular, predictable flow of talent upward through the ranks and'into
the Senior Foreign Service."
Section-by-Section Analysis, revise as follows : First sentence, delete "in mak-
ing" and insert in lieu thereof "to base," and insert "upon" after "SFS" and
delete "to. take into account". Insert as new second sentence the following : "This
subsection, calls for the establishment- of long-term promotion ranges in the rele-
vant competition groupings, together with' the associated ranges of combined
voluntary and involuntary attrition necessary to achieve overall balance in the
flow pattern."
Comment: These changes are-necessary to'lend greater specificity to the Con-
gressionalrequirement that the personnel system of the Service be managed as
an integrated whole in which the overall entry, departure and promotion rates
are consciously kept in balance.
Sec: 602'(b) (p. 43), . Section-by-Section Analysis, add following - as another
paragraph.:, ,
It.is contemplated that these long term target promotion ranges in the relevant
competition groupings would be subject to negotiations which' would: also identify
the range' of permissible forced attrition necessary to achieve overall balance in
the Row pattern: Anticipated failure to stay within the agreed` target promotion
ranges would trigger renegotiation of either the long term promotion and/or
attrition target ranges.
Comment : The, fundamental long-term trade-offs between advancement and
security must be negotiable if the exclusive representative is to properly safe-
guard the 'interests of employees. By negotiating overall ranges with a long-
term character management would be free to make the necessary. adjustments to
fine tune the system from year to year, but employees would be empowered to
negotiate if, exogenous factors force a fundamental shift in the balance between
job security and promotion opportunities.
Sec. 603 (p. 44) Section-by-Section Analysis, add following sentence at end of
second, paragraph : "It is expressly understood that the composition of selection
boards, and the precepts under which they function, should continue to be subject
to negotiation and agreement with the exclusive representative."
Sec. 612 (a) (p. 44). After "Dependability" insert "usefulness", and lines 2-7
delete everything after "Service."
Comment : "Usefulness" is from the 1946 Act ; to us it carries an implication of
assignability. However, we would eliminate all the examples of reports in the
performance file in order to leave these for negotiation between management and
the exclusive representative. Many of our Members are concerned that records of
prospective assignments for SFS members might be subject to abuse.
Sec. 641(a) (p. 47), Section-by-Section Analysis, add the following to the last
sentence of the first paragraph : "and/or among classes, but all individuals in a
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given occupation and within the same class, competing for the same'assignnaents
and promotions will be covered in an identical fashion."
Comment : This section is meant to. protect specialist categories, particularly
communicators, to ensure that those competing for the same jobs:and assign-
ments at a given level will be treated identically with regard to TIC regardless
of the different rules which applied before to those formerly holding FSS versus
FSR/U designations. Equitable application of this provision requires that it be
negotiable between Management and the Exclusive Representative.
Sec. 641(a), Section-by-Section Analysis, add the following to the second para-
graph :
"The establishment and adjustment of regulations specifying time-in-class (or
combinations thereof) and the duration of limited' ex=tensions of career appoint-
ments shall be negotiable with the exclusive employee representative to ensure
that these authorities are exercised in a manner consistent with equity and stable
career planning."
Comment: Adjustment in time-in-class or the duration of limited extensions
of career appointments are extremely blunt instruments for managing the com-
position of the work force. These regulations must be negotiable to. maintain con-
fidence in the Service that this authority will not be abused because of external
political influences or internal cronyism. In AID, -different historical circum-
stances require that TIC must be established very carefully and gradually as
safeguarded by mandatory negotiations with the exclusive representative.
Sec. 642 (p. 48), delete "relative" and substitute "failure to meet standards of"
in heading of bill, section-by-section heading, and table of contents.
Comment : We support the concept of selection out for substandard perform-
ance, including its extension to what is now the Foreign Service Staff Corps, and
to AID, where the authority has not been used recently. We oppose, however, a
section title which. suggests that selection out could occur to'a career member
of the Service who is performing adequately, albeit not as ,well as his/her peers
and if retired, would not receive an immediate annuity. Either immediate annui-
ties should be extended below age 50 or new FS class one, or the, legislation should
not be written so`as to prejudice the negotiations on performance standards pre-
cepts. On the other hand, we would have no problem with rettrement,for relative
performance for personnel who are eligible for immediate annuities and whose
retirement would increase promotion opportunities for outstanding mid-level
and junior members.
V Sec. 60 (a) (p. 48). Section-by-Section: Insert after first sentence 6f-second
paragraph:
"All individuals in a given occupation and within the :same class competing
far, the, same assignments and promotions will be covered: in, an identical
fashion.
Comment : This provision is intended to protect specialist categories, particu-
larly 'communicators, to ensure ~ that those competing for the same jobs .and
assignments at a given level will be treated identically with, regard to standards
of performance.
Sec. 642 .(p..48), Section-by-Section `Analysis, .revise, last sentence of first
paragraph as follows
"However, section 2104 (e) of'this bill exempts those members currently on
the rolls to whom section 633.(a).. (2) of,the 1946 Act does not now apply from
application of this section for a period of five ten years or eligibility of the
individual before that time for voluntary retirement with .immediate annuity."
CHAPTER 7-FOREIGN SERVICE 'INSTITUTE, CAREER DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, AND
ORIENTATION
Sec. 701 (b), Section-by-Section, first line (p..53), after "that" insert "in
addition to training for employees."
Comment: Parallels text of Sec. 701 (b).
Sec. 703, Section-by-Section, line 11 (p. 54), insert new sentence: "This pro-
vision,. derived from sections 702 and 703 of the 1946 Act, is intended to en-
courage a variety of activities to foster broadened emperiences for members of
the Service, including activities involving ..:'
Sec. 703 (b) (p. 55), delete "esoteric."
Comment : The Service may require proficiency in languages which are not
esoteric.
Sec. 704 (a), lines 2 and 5, (p. 56), delete "orientation and language."
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V Sec:..744 (a) ; line 2. Amend to read: ".:. . to emlloyees and members of
families ...
'line 3. Amend to read: ".:. to employees and family members ...
Comment::The Secretary should have the authority to provide grants to cover
the actual' costs.. of training for employees and family. members pursuant to-
section 7010).. :
Sec. 704-(4)1; line 7, and Section-by-Section, delete references to $300 per-
month and six months.
Comment:: The Secretary should have the authority to-provide grants to cover
the actual costs of training pursuant to Sec. 701 (b).
V Sec. 704 (b) Substitute : "If a member of the service ora member of the family-
of a member of the service..."
Sec* ,705:(by (p. 57), delete "facilitate" and insert "assistance in facilitating-
through-.a family liaison office," after "personnel", insert "including"; delete
subparagraph (3) ; section-by-section, add: "Of course, the 'Family Liaison
Office may be assigned additional functions by the Secretary. (The existhi.g-
Family, Liaison Office currently provides a wide variety, of services relating to
Foreign Service families.)"
Comment: This recognizes the role which the Family Liaison Office can play in.
facilitating the employment of Foreign Service spouses.
CHAPTER S-FOREIGN SERVICE RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM.
Sec. 821. (c) (_$), (p. 71), revise to read :
"If an, annuitant dies and is survived not by a spouse but a child or children.
an annuity equal to the maximum survivor annuity for a surviving spouse shall`
be paid to the.child or in equal parts to the children.?'.
Comment: Considering the very unique problems of orphaned minor children,
we believe the current schedule of annuities to be unrealistic. Making arrange-
ments for the further support of such child or children can be very difficult be-
cause foreign, service life weakens ties to the extended family and the only sur-
viving relative may reside in a foreign country. We recommend that the annuity
schedule for surviving orphan children be increased under the above formula.
See. 836 (b) '(p. 80). Amend to read: "... shall determine that the needs of-
the Service require any participant . "
Comment: The justification for extending the period of employment of a career
employee beyond age 60 should be tied to Service needs, which can be measured'
and determined.
V Sec,837.(p. 81). Section-by-Section Analysis, add: "This provision should be-
used systematically as one of the attrition mechanisms."
Comment: This section is an improvement over Sec. 519 in the 1946 Act in that
it extends.. coverage to all career employees with. Presidential appointments and'
not just chief of, mission appointments. Section 519 retirements have been used-
sparingly.
Sec. 872 (a) (p. 93), change to read: "not to exceed during any calendar year-
the basic, salary the member would be entitled to receive under this Act if cur-
rently employed in the Foreign Service class which the Secretary determines-
most compatible to the class the member held on the date of his or her retirement
from the Service."
Comment : Considering inflation and the significant basic federal salary in-
creases which have occurred, it is unrealistic and unfair .to use the employee's
salary at time of retirement as a ceiling for what he can receive as annuity and'
salary when re-employed. Rather, the ceiling should be no less than that salary
which the employee would be receiving if he or she had continued his or her career-
employment.
CHAPTER 9-TRAVEL, LEAVE AND OTHER BENEFITS
'Sec. 901 (1) (p. 98) Section-by-Section Analysis, last line, change to read'
"tion 911 (1), (2), and (6) of the 1946 Act."
Comment.: Management officials have testified that 901(1) includes the author-
ity of old 911 (6): . .
Sec. 901 (2); and Section-by-Section (p. 98), change to read "authorized or-
required home leave in the United States."
Comment : Parallels Sec. 911.
Sec. 901 (3) . (p. 98), delete all after "duty."
Comment : The Secretary should have the authority to determine by regula-
tion conditions.. under which travel costs of family, members may be paid in,
connection with an employee's TDY.
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CHAPTER 10-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Se6 1601 (3Last sentence (p.,106), change "shall" to.'sh.ould
Comment : Parallels CSRA See., 7101(b).
Sec. 1002(5) (p. 108), ehange to read:
"(5) `confidential employee' means an, individual who acts in-a. ,confidential
capacity. with respect to an individual who formulates or effectuates pnanage-
went'.policies in the field of labor-management relations."
Section-by-Section, first paragraph, insert "certain" before '.',management";
delete parenthetical phrase.
Comment: parallels CSRA, Sec. 7111(d) (13) as well as the definition used
in E.O. 11636.
Sec.1005. (a). (1). (p. 112) Delete "of type and classes"
Comment:.parallels CSRA, Sec. 7106 (a), and is consistent with. Sec. 1005(b)
of this bill.'
Sec. 1011 (a), last sentence (p. 113), change to read ". .. on a nominee, each
such agency and each exclusive representative whose agreement is required . . 11
Comment : To make clear that the exclusive representative for employees in
each agency has the same right as the management of that agency to .,participate
fully in this process, even though one labor organization may be exclusive rep-
resentative of more than one bargaining unit.
Sec. 1014 (c) (p. 118). Delete all after "otherwise."
Section-by-Section. delete last two lines.
Comment; Parallels OSRA, 7119(c) (5) (C).
See. 1028(b) (1) (A) last three lines (p. 122), change to read "concerning
aug grievance or any personnel policy or practice or other general, condition of
employment."
Change Section-by-Section to read "other employees."
Comment: Parallels CSRA, Sec. 7114(a) (2).
See. 1028(d) (2) (p. 1231, Change to read "... .,any condition.of employment ;"
Comment: Parallels CSRA, Sec. 7114(b) (2). .
Sec. 1011 (e) (p. 132).
Comment: This subsection, paralleling Sec. 1(b) of E.O. 11636, has prevented
and will effectively prevent any real or apparent conflict of: interest for any
employee, if not a management official or confidential employee. Thus, addi-
tional exclusions from. the bargaining unit are unnecessary.
Sec. 1041.(f ), (p. 132) Delete "prohibited picketing"
Comment : Parallels CSRA, ' Sec. ' 7120(f), , which reflects, a decision of the
Conference on the CSRA (see p. 154 of Conference Report).
Sec. 1051(c) (p. 133), Delete "under Section, 1021(b) (1) (g),7, and, insert
"alleging that ten percent of the employees in an agency have membership in
the organization". . . . . - 1
Comment: Parallels CSRA, Sec: 7115(c) (1).
CHAPTER 11-GRIEVANCES ..:.',.... .
Sec. 1101(a) (1) (p..135), insert "involuntarily before ',`separation" and
"character of before "information."
Comment: Parallels the existing grievance ,legislation; See- 692(1.) (?B) of
the Foreign Service Act of 1946 as amended.
Sec. 1101:(a). (p. 135), Section-by-Section. Amend next' to- last:?line:,'to read
. alleged wrongful or capricious denial of allowance . . "
Comment: Consistent with current law, the provision should be clear in its
coverage to include cases where an allowance or financial benefit has been denied
arbitrarily or capriciously even: if permissible under the letter of the applicable
:statute. ;. r.:.
V Sec. 1103(b) (p 138) Substitute for first two sentences A'grievant who is
:a member of the bargaining unit represented by an exclusive representative shall
be represented at every stage of. the proceedings only if represented by that
exclusive representative, or a representative approved by such exclusive repre-
sentative,.. Such a' grievant has the right to present a grievance on his or her own
behalf : however, the exclusive representative shall have all the rights` of a party
grievance proceedings.
to the
V Sec. 1103(b) Section-by-Section.: Delete last sentence and Insert: A'member
of the bargaining unit represented by an exclusive representative ma j/' bb repre-
sea,ted only ?by that exclusive representative although the excl'usive'representa-
tive can approve representation by an alternate representative.
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It is expected that. the exclusive representative ? would establish criteria for
reviewing all, potential, grievances to see which have sufficient merit. to file.
Where a grievant chooses to' 'present -a grievance "on his or her' own behalf, the
exclusive representative would concomitantly"have all, the rights of a party
to the grievance proceeding, so as to enable it to protect the collective interests
of its-constituents.
V Insert new- 1103(c) and renumber subsequent section accordingly: (c) No
finding by the Foreign Service Grievance Board may operate to impair a duly
concluded labor-management agreement.
V Sec. 1103(c) -Section-by-Section:
This'-provision is designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act to ensure the
inviolability of any duly concluded agreement between the agency and the em-
elusive, representative, and to reinforce the employees' right under section 100.E
(b) (9)' W engage in collective bargaining with' respect to conditions of employ-
ment.
See. 1103(d)` (p. 138), Amend to read "The Foreign Service Grievance Board
shall have authority to ensure that no record of-"
Comment: The above wording repeats' that contained in present legislation.
Because the present wording has presented no problems and there is prece-
dent concerning its meaning and interpretation, AFSA recommends against any
change.
See. 1111(b) (p. 140), Amend to read " ` . each' such agency and exclusive
representative shall select two nominees ..."
Comment: The revised wording clarifies and-reinforces the concept of equality
between : the 'agency and the-exclusive representative, for the `bargaining unit
in that agency:
V Sec. 1112 (p. 142) Amend subsec. (2) to read : "the grievant, the grievant's
representatives, the exclusive employee representative, and the Department's
representative are entitled to be present at the hearing."
V See. -1112 Section-by-Section: Add :
Where the grievant has chosen to represent "himself, or where the exclusive
representative approves alternate representation, the -exclusive' representative?
shall have the right to be present at the hearing Ito protect the collective interests
of its constituents.' '
V Sec. 1141, ?(i.?148) Section-by-Section. Add:
Since. under see. 1103(b); the exclusive representative would have all the rights
of a party to the grievance proceeding, the exclusive representative would conse-
quently 'have the right to appeal a?deci?sion of the Foreign Service Grievance Board
impair a -duly' concluded labor-management agreement.
CHAPTER 12-COMPATABILITY OF PERSONNEL SYSTEMS,
Sec. 1203 (p. 150) Add:
.. . in a manner that will assure maximum, uniformity of personnel man-
agement, particularly in the Senior Foreign Service, among .. .
Comment:,This fosters the concept of a Foreign Service of the kited States
and of the flexibility which could result from It if uniformly administered
by thewarl'ons participating agencies. ' : " , ` ? ' .'
'TITLE 1I=TRANSITION; AMENDMENTS TO OTHER LAWS, REPEALS AND
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
-41 CHAPTER 1--TEANSrON
Sec. 2101(b) (p. 153) Change "availability" to "assignment".
Comment.: This corrects what is apparently a typographical error. ,
See. 2101(c); (p. 154), Insert new subsection "(c)" to read : _ "(c) Any Foreign
Service officer or candidate currently serving who at the time of original appoint-
ment met the-new criteria for appointment at class 1, shall be immediately pro-
moted.,to the.appropriate step of that rank if it has not already been attained."
Comment-: This Is a necessary transitional authority to avoid disadvantaging
an employee who is already in the Service in contrast to a new recruit.
Sec. 2104(e) .(p. 160), change to read: "(e) Retirement under'Section 642 of
the Foreign -Service Act of 1979 shall not be effected until ten, years after the
effective date of this Act with respect to members of the Foreign Service.
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275
Change Section-by-Section Analysis last sentence (p. 159) to read ".., . for ten
years .
See. 2104(0) (p:160)
Add new. (3) : "(3) who are not eligible for immediate annuity upon retire-
ment under Chapter 8 of the Foreign Service Act of 1979."
Comment: We support the extension of retirement for substandard perform-
ance throughout the Foreign Service. However, we have many members of the
present Foreign Service Staff Corps who have served for many years under the
assumption that they would be able to continue to serve until eligible for retire-
ment with an immediate annuity, but who are not yet in FSSO Class I or age
50 with 20 years service. It would be harsh to apply selection out to them, par-
ticularly to secretaries who find it very difficult to start a second career after
age 40, and particularly in the context of relative performance which may be
adequate although relatively less good than that of their peers. Our amendment
would start the selection out process immediately after enactment, but would
avoid for ten years thereafter actual retirements from the Service of those not
eligible for an immediate annuity. This would apply to AID Foreign Service
Corps members as well.
Sec. 2105 (p. 160). Delete "under the direction of the President."
Comment There should be no doubt'that the Secretary (and other foreign
affairs agency heads) have the discretionary authority to prescribe implement-
ing transitional regulations-and therefore, the obligation to negotiate these
regulations with the exclusive employee representative. We would be particularly
interested in negotiations on procedures for the determination of worldwide
availability, pursuant to See. 2101 (a) (2), p. 173, lines 11-13, and Sec. 2102 (d),
p. 175, lines 3-4; and the determination of needs of the Service, pursuant to
Sec. 2101 (b) (1), p. 173, lines 19-21, and Sec. 2102 (d) (1), p. 175, lines 8-10.
VSec. 2106 (p. 161). Add at end of section: Within twelve months of the effective
date of this Act, the Director of the International Development Cooperation
Administration shall promulgate regulations implementing the provisions of
Section 802 of this Act to establish from the ranks of tenured career officers a
commissioned Foreign Service Officer Corps for the Agency for International
Development.
Comment: All foreign affairs agencies should utilize the authorities of this
Act, without artificial labels which imply that officers of some agencies are more
equal than others. See our line-by-line for Sec. 202 (a).
CHAPTER 2-AMENDMENTS TO OTHER LAWS
Sec. 2201 (a) (p. 164). Insert a new subsection "(4)" and renumber succeed-
ing subsections:
"(l.) Sec. .27-Exemption from Foreign Customs Duties and Local Duties
and Local. Taxes."
The Secretary of State shall take all appropriate steps, including the nego-
tiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements, necessary to carry out fulfil/
the provisions of the Diplomatic and Consular Conventions which extend to non-
commissioned diplomatic and consular personnel assigned abroad protection
from host government customs duties and local taxes. Pending completion of
such agreements, the Secretary is authorized to reimburse members of the
Service for those customs duties and local taxes which the member has paid
despite,the protection accorded by the appropriate conventions."
Comment: The Vienna Conventions and others extend to noncommissioned
diplomatic and consular personnel assigned abroad certain protections from
host government customs duties and local taxes. Despite these assurances
many host governments deny such exemptions at considerable extra expense to
members of the Service. Departmental efforts to persuade host government com-
pliance with the Conventions have always been time-consuming and all too often
unsuccessful,. The purpose of this new section is to reinforce the Department's
determination to force other governmental compliance and to authorize reim-
bursement of, disadvantaged employees, and to place the Department's obliga-
tion in this regard on an equal basis with its obligation to bargain for employ-
ment for family members. If other countries are not willing to accord the inter-
nationally, recognized privileges, immunities, and employment opportunities, the
Secretary should withdraw any such benefits from the country in question.
V See. 2202(b) (p. 173) Add a new "(1)" and renumber subsequent subsections.
(1) Section 625 (b) Is amended by adding at the end of this section : No persmi-
nel serving under this appointment authority may be assigned to dny position des-
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innated? as'a foreign service position pursuant to Section 101 of'the International
Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978.
Comment : The Agency for International Development has taken ? the position
that' the excepted service appointed authority of the Foreign Assistance -Act of
1961, as amended, supersedes section 401 of the International Development and
Food Assistance Act of 1978, the so-called Obey Amendment, 22 U.S.C. sec. 2385a.
This' position is directly contrary to subsection (c) of that section, which
provides:
(c) Regulations which take effect pursuant to this section shall have the force
and effect of law and shall apply with respect to the personnel of the agency
primarily responsible for administering sub-chapter I of this chapter, notwith-
standing and [sic] inconsistent provision of law unless that provision of law
specifically states that it supersedes regulations issued under this section.
The Agency's construction would allow it to circumvent the Obey Amendment
by appointing up to 110 non-career and non-Foreign Service employees to posi-
tions designated as Foreign Service positions.
This amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act would further the intent of
the Obey Amendment and would serve to protect the integrity of the Foreign
Service.
Sec. 2202(b) (2) (p. 174). Insert after "is amended" by striking out the first
sentence and replacing it with : "The chief and his or her deputy of each special
mission or staff carrying out the purposes of Part I shall be appointed by the
President from the Senior Foreign Service, and may, notwithstanding the provi-
sions of any other law, be reassigned by the President athis discretion .
Comment : The proposed Foreign Service Act provides that five percent of the
Senior Foreign Service may be non-career appointees. (sec. 321). To continue
-to allow for non=career 631(b) appointments is therefore unnecessary. Further-
more, it is inimical to the personnel system, opening it up to abuse. Allowing too
many non-career employees to enter into the Agencies' senior ranks would impair
AID professionalism and its employees' opportunities for promotion.
This amendment would also further the objectives of the proposed Foreign
Service Act to promote maximum compatibility among the Agencies authorized
to utilize the Foreign Service personnel system. (See sections 101(b)- (7) (Senior
I oreign Service) and 101(b) (9) ). - I ,
Sec. 2206 (p. 77, after line 8). Insert new Section:
Sec. 2206 Post Differential.
5 U.S.C. 5925 is amended as follows: All members of the Service shall receive
the full amount of post differential to which they are entitled, provided that the
amount of basic salary, post differential, and, if applicable, senior differential,
shall not exceed in any fiscal year the salary provided by law for Level I of the
)i'cderal Executive Salary Schedule (5 U.S.C. 5312).
Comment:' 5 U.S.C. 5925 establishes a taxable post differential often called a
"hardship allowance", of 10, 15, 20, or 25 percent of the basic salary as-a.recruit-
ment and retention incentive to staff assigned to certain designated posts. A post
differential is'established for when, and only when, the location of the post
involves extraordinarily difficult living conditions, excessive physical hardship,
including physical danger, or notably unhealthful conditions. Living costs are not
taken into account. Heretofore, pursuant to regulations, post differential has not
been paid to chiefs of mission and has been paid to subordinate personnel only
in amounts so that the employee's salary plus post differential will not exceed
$100 less than the salary of the chief of mission. These restrictions were appar-
ently adopted in the belief that chiefs of mission receive sufficient other forms of
compensation and that their authority would be threatened if their salary were
less than the salary plus post differential paid to subordinate employees.
AFSA believes these regulatory restrictions are unfair and anachronistic. The
-full amount of allowed post differential should be paid to all governmental
employees assigned to the post. This is in line with the recommendations of the
1977 report of the Inter-Agency Committee on Overseas Allowances and Benefits
for U.S. Employees. Using the base salary of the chief of mission as a ceiling on
the amount of post differential that can be paid to a subordinate employee creates
undesirable anomalies. A senior, official, including a present-day FSO-3, could
receive more in the form of.salary plus allowances if assigned to a relatively
subordinate position at a "differential post" Class I mission than when assigned
to a more challenging position, such as deputy chief of mission, at a Class III
"differential post" mission. The outstanding officer thus has an incentive to accept
the less challenging assignment.
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Chiefs of mission are subject to the same physical hardships and unhealthful
conditions as all other members of the mission.. In many cases they, are the most
likely person at the post to be selected as the target for a terrorist attack or other
acts of violence.
We believe that senior management officials of the Department are sympathetic
to this proposal. See also Sec. 441 above.
CHAPTER 8-REPEALS
Sec. 2301 (3) (p. 178, line 24). After "section" insert "412 and".
Comment : This section is the amendment which abolished premium pay for
Foreign Service officers. Since it took effect in October 1978, it has caused great
bitterness among FSO's, including those who never personally apply for overtime.
The provision for special allowances (repeated as Sec. 462 of the draft bill), has
so far only benefited some 77 FSO's who regularly work more than 55 hours a
week, and they are making much less than they would have. This provision
enables the Department, by overworking its FSO's, to cut its costs and avoid
requesting adequate staffing.
While we understand that the author of this amendment was aiming at what
he regarded as the unprofessional practice of FSO's seeking overtime pay, the
provision bans all forms of premium pay for FSO's, including extra pay for
night, Sunday, and holiday work which may be imposed on the office or activity
in which the FSO serves with other Foreign Service or non-Foreign Service
personnel who are eligible for premium pay. In principle, FSO's are not even
allowed to take compensatory time off or to participate in flexitime which the
Office of Personnel Management is now urging.
We strongly urge the repeal of this provision. See also Sec. 462 above.
CHAPTER 4-SEVERABILITY, SAVING PROVISION, REPORTS AND EFFECTIVE DATE
Sec. 2402 (p. 203). After line 9 insert: "(including recognition of any orga-
nization of Foreign Service Officers and employees in the Agency for Interna-
tional Development as the exclusive representative of employees in the Inter-
national Development Cooperation Agency)."
Comment: IDCA is being touted as not just a "successor agency" to AID,
within the meaning of E.O. 11636, but a superagency of which AID is only one
element. We want to make sure that the status of the current exclusive repre-
sentative of AID Foreign Service people, and thus its ability to protect the
interests of the AID Foreign Service in the coming transition, is not adversely
affected either by the IDCA reorganization plan or this bill.
See. 2404 (p. 181). Change "January" to "October" add "Provided, that ac-
tions may be taken after that date on the basis of any the current Foreign
Service evaluation cycle as if this Act had been in effect at the beginning of
that cycle."
Section-by-Section, change "January" to "October" and add: "permits im-
plementation to be retroactive to the beginning of any current personnel evalua-
tion cycle."
Comment : The January 1980 date is not realistic. October would correspond
more closely to legislative reality, including the budget cycle The additional
words would take account of the various promotion cycles.
The CHAIRMAN. We now move on to Mr. Kenneth Blaylock, national
president of the American Federation of Government Employees.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH T. BLAYLOCK, NATIONAL PRESIDENT,
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, WASH-
INGTON, D.C.; ACCOMPANIED BY STEPHEN KOCZAK, CHARLES
.MEDD, AND MARY JACKSTEIT
Mr. BIAYLocK. I am not in the Foreign Service. I am the national
president of the American Federation of Government Employees. I
appreciate the opportunity to express our views on this
The CHAIRMAN. Let me just for my edification ask what is your own
personal job. Are you in the Foreign Service?
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Mr. 'BLAYLOCK I I am not in the Foreign Service. I am`the national
president:ofthe American Federation of Government: Employees. I
have with me, Mr. Stephen Koczak, who is my special assistant, special-
izing in Foreign Service affairs and a 15-year employee of the Foreign
Service. I have also with me this morning' Mary Jacksteit 'our legisla-
tive counsel who also has experience in the Foreign Service, and
Charles Medd, who is presently with the Voice of America and has
long experience
The CHAIRMAN. You have a rather long statement so
A Mr. BLAYLOCK. I have a summary statement. I would request that
the full statement be entered after my oral statement.
These are a couple of comments I would like to make, Mr. Chair-
man.. As you know, my organization ' played a key role and worked
very intimately with the administration and with the Congress as we
developed Civil Service reform. And I think there seems -to be an
assumption, really I guess proposed 'by the administration as they'
proposed this legislation, that it is very much in line with Civil.Serv-
ice reform, however, there are some major differences` in the Civil
Service Reform Act and some of the proposals in this particular piece
of legislation. .
We supported the Reform Act itself and I had no serious opposition
to the Senior Executive Service conditioned on certain protections.'
For instance in the Civil Service Reform Act the members of the
Senior Executive Service still have the protections of the title I of
that act; which are the merit principles which are policed and pro-
tected by the Merit System Protection Board. This legislation pro-
posing the Senior Foreign Service does not provide that kind of
independent statutory statutory protection.
We also have built into the Senior Executive Service in the Civil
Service Reform Act a parachute clause that allows career employees
who go into the Senior Executive Service from the career. service to
parachute back into the career service provided they do not make it in
the Senior Executive Service system, The design there was to avoid
loss of competent, dedicated employees who. may not make it in the
Senior Foreign Service.
I would like to basically go over the summary of our prepared state-
iiient, which I already stated is comprehensive and does deal specifi-
cally with each element of the legislation.
When I discussed some 6 months ago the administration's proposed
reform, S. 1450, with members of our AFGE locals 1534 and 1812,
the consensus we reached was that our foreign service has been seri-
ously .neglected and that apparently not even the Secretary of. State
appreciated fully the grave dangers this neglect entailed for our na-
tional security. We felt that the progressive depreciation:of the foreign
affairs agencies, the Department of State, the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, and the International Communication Agency,
had to be reversed and the needs of the United States and. of the per-
sonnel in these three agencies had to be perceived in the larger context
in which they have to discharge their missions.
Our estimate has been unhappily confirmed by the events which have
transpired since then. Today, nearly 50, members of the Foreign Serv-
ice are hostages while our Nation prays and demonstrates for their
safety.'Some' are military personnel; most are civilians' some have
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been in Iran working in such offices as Bi-National Centers. dome have
performed diplomatic functions, others consular tasks;! still others
administrative and clerical duties. All now share a common fate, irre-
spective of grade or rank-the fate of hostages, captives despite every
pledge of security and immunity with which they had gone forth,
not only by the U.S. Government as their employer, but also by the
U.N. and by the World Court on the basis of the Geneva Convention
of 1961 defining diplomatic and consular immunity and privilege.
How are we to succor, let alone compensate, these Foreign Service
personnel? Can we honestly say that the present law, or the proposed
administration's Foreign Service reform legislation, reflects the con-
ditions of their employment and the commitment of loyalty and sacri-
fice which they have given?
My comments anc' proposals for solving these problems take full
cognizance of the stark realities of the foreseeable future.'
First, I have sought to identify the degree to which the Foreign
Service is unique, that is incomparable with other civil service sys-
tems. In that light, I have sought a method to compensate this unique-
ness by a special tax exempt allowance and by providing retirement
at rates at least equal to such other hazardous professions as the FBI
and firefighters.
Second, we have sought to define those areas when the Foreign
Service is comparable to the Civil Service. In those areas, such as base
pay, premium pay, labor management relations, grievance procedures,
we have sought to assure that Foreign Service personnel do not receive
less than their Civil Service counterparts.
Third, we have drawn attention to injustices, some of recent origin,
others the residues of the past. These ,affect several 'hundred em-
ployees at the Agency for International Development and nearly 50
employees at the Voice'of America who were formerly with Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
These are the broad outlines of my concerns. I shall now summarize
my proposals specifically to accommodate the time limitations affect-
ing us this morning, with the understanding my entire statement will
be entered into the record of these. hearings.
The CHAt 'MAN. Without objection.
Mr. BLAYLoCK. It has been our position since this legislation began
to take form, that the measure fails to respond to the needs for ade-
quate compensation for Foreign Service employees, for a personnel
structure that will enhance the ability of Foreign Service` employees
to carry out 'their vital work, and for the need to preserve to. each
foreign affairs agency the ability to carry out the mission assigned to
it. We have also insisted that 'in every case of rectification of past
errors in management of the foreign affairs agencies, there must be
due respect'for the rights of the employees to be.affected.
We do not believe that the personnel system envisaged -by the admin-
istration bill is inadequate to the times, will attract new talent to
the Foreign Service, or will reward achievement or: compensate
employees and their.families for the dangers and traumas which the
new international climate contains.
First, the bill seeks to bring an end to the era of attempted unified
personnel systems in the foreign affairs agencies. As our 'statement
describes in detail, AFGE never advocated theunified :system- policy
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and fought it in every way possible. We succeed in reaching an agree-
ment with the International Communication Agency several years
a go which in effect ended the program in that Agency, but provided
that those in the Foreign Service as- foreign affairs specialists would
be permitted to retain the status which the Agency assigned to them
under these previous personnel policies, if they so desired.
The program undertaken by AFGE and ICA in this regard is an
earnest one and represents the best judgment of both employees and
their representatives, and the agency, as to the fairest and wisest way
to end an unfortunate personnel experiment. We oppose the adminis-
tration provision to cancel this agreement and legislate a resolution
to this problem, thereby ignoring the legitimate rights of employees
and their representative, and placing into jeopardy their compensa-
tion and benefits.
Second, we reject the efforts in this legislation to compromise the
independence of the USICA and AID by altering their fundamental
relationship with the Department of State by conferring on the De-
partment the authority to enforce "maximum conformity" in matters
of personnel policy. We want to strenuously repeat our support for
the separate career Foreign Service Information Officer Corps and en-
dorse the comments made by Director John Reinhardt to this commit-
tee last'summer on this subject.. We oppose any first step in eliminating
the separate FSIO corps such as transforming the Senior Foreign
Service, proposed in the bill, into a unified, interagency management
corps.
Third, we urge the committee to examine the proposals we have
made for a 15-percent allowance for Foreign Service employees who
serve 'abroad, and for improved retirement benefits. Our evaluation
of the: exercise going on within the executive branch at this time, to
establish a new pay scale for the Foreign Service, is that it will fail
miserably to bring real equity to the Foreign Service compensation
system, and will completely fail in its attempt to reward Foreign
Service employees for the unique burdens they bear from a career
served :abroad. The allowance approach is more equitable and more
effective.
Fourth, we find unacceptable the labor-management provisions of
the bill-which would establish a separate and inferior labor-manage-
ment system for the Foreign Service. We firmly believe that the rights
and interests of Foreign Service employees can only be served by giv-
ing them access to the new labor relations structure created by Con-
gress last year. The unique characteristics of the Foreign Service can
be fully accommodated within that structure by special provisions
with regard to membership and scope of bargaining units.
We also believe it essential that the bill and legislative history
clearly establish the right of the emplee- representatives to
negotiate with the foreign affairs agencies on' the implementation of
the provisions of this bill which accord extraordinary powers to-mail-
agement. in the areas of career tenure, time in class, and performance
pay. It' will be the employee representatives alone who will be able to
insure that this grant of authority is not misused and abused.
Finally, expanded management authorities referred to above raise
the specter of politicization of the Foreign 'Service-they will in-
crease dramatically the ability of the agencies to enforce conformity
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among a group of employees within which creative intelligence and
courageous thinking is essential. We are not convinced that this di-
rection represents "reform," let alone progress. In our statement we
have made a number of recommendations for modification of these
proposals.
I thank you again for the opportunity to appear here this morning.
If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them.
[Mr. Blaylock's prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH T. BLAYLOCE
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this Senate Subcommittee, I ap-
pear before you fully cognizant of the somber circumstances which surround
the lives and the liberties of foreign service personnel today. The events at the
American 'Embassy in Tehran are but the latest, potentially the most tragic
confrontation in the recent annals of our. foreign service. Yet. the fact is that
the fabric of diplomatic and consular immunity has been torn often before, if
not so flagrantly. The assassinations, undue verbal: harrassment and attacks
on sovereign soil which the United States foreign service has experienced re-
cently and the murders and. kidnappings to which the diplomatic and consular
representatives of other states are being subjected are only precursors, in our
-view, of even more grave events.
When I discussed some six months ago the Administration's proposed reform,
S. 1450, with members of our AFGE Locals 1534 and 1S12, the consensus we
reached was that our foreign service has been seriously neglected and that ap-
parently.noteven 'the Secretary of State appreciated fully the grave dangers
this neglect, entailed for our national security. We felt that,the progressive
depreciation of the foreign affairs agencies, the Department of State, the Agency
for International Development, and 'the International Communication Agency,
had to be reversed and the needs of the United States and of the personnel in
these three agencies had to be perceived in the larger context in which they
have to discharge their missions.
Our estimate has been unhappily confirmed by the' events which have trans-
pired since theu.? Today, nearly. 50 members of the foreign service are hostages
while our nation, prays and demonstrates for their safety. Some are military
personnel; most are civilians; some have been in Iran working in such offices
as Bi-National _Centers. Some have performed diplomatic functions, others con-
sular tasks, still others administrative and clerical duties. All' now share a
common fate, irrespective of grade or 'rank-the fate of hostages, captives
despite every pledge of the security, and 'immunity with which they had gone
forth,, not. only by the U. S. Government as their empl'oyer,,but.also by the U.N.
and by the World Court on the basis of the Geneva Convention of 1961 defining
diplomatic and consular immunity and privilege.
How are we to succor, let alone compensate, these foreign service per-
sonnel? Can we honestly say that the present law, or the proposed administra-
tion foreign -service reform legislation, reflects the conditions of their employ-
ment and the commitment of loyalty and sacrifice which they have given?
I do not believe,that they do and our members and their families, whether in
the foreign service or the civil service, do not believe that the employees of the
foreign affairs agencies have been properly honored and properly compensated.
I am sure that you know that in saying these words I speak with knowledge
and deliberation because our union represents approximately 25,000 Federal
employees whose missions are involved with U.S. foreign policy or U.S. physical
presence overseas. We are the exclusive representative of all employees, civil
service and foreign service, in the International Communication Agency. We
represent all the civil service employees in the Agency for International De-
velopment and some civil service employees in the Department of State. We
have a separate Council of Foreign Affairs Employees to coordinate our rep-
resentation at these so-called Foreign Affairs agencies. In addition, we have
an entire District, the Fifteenth, within whose jurisdiction are those em-
ployees overseas of all the U.S. Federal Departments, including employees
in the Panama Canal area, Germany, Italy, and other foreign countries for
whom we have won exclusive representation. Thus, our membership is fully
cognizant of the importance and wide ramification of foreign affairs in our
national life.
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282
I. have-reviewed= our involvement in foreign affairs. so .extensively. primarily
because I.sh'all be commenting on the proposed draft for the Foreign Service
Act of 1979 from that very broad perspective.
See..froth this perspective'' the Administration's proposals are disappointing,
and reactionary. They' incorporate. time-worn procedures -for promoting, select-
ing and managing employees with concepts to ill-advised and destructive that
we do. not wonder that,the legislation introduced with such haste has been
pursued only tfully. For our part, we'have consistently' argued, that the Ad-
ministration's' bill is inadequate to the times, unable to attract new talent,
reward achievement, and compensate empolyees and their families for the
dangers and traumas which the new international climate contains.
I earnestly beseech you, with the wisdom you have available and the lessons
which the last half year have brought to world-wide attention to use this oppor-
tunity-"to' draft Foreign Service legislation fitted to our times. The Foreign
Service-Act has not been re-written since 1946 and whatever is put in law now is
likely to' be with us another decade. We do not believe that the bill submitted
by the Department is sufficient even for the immediate future, based on recent
developments in international affairs.
THE DECLINE OF THE "FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCIES"
One;fact.which reveals the disintegration of our foreign policy structures is the
ratio of career foreign service personnel at our missions abroad. Generally
speaking, the Department of State asserts that only 1, in 4 persons. are subject
to the jurisdiction of its own foreign service; adding ICA and AID, the ratio is
no more than 1 in 3. This issue is not in any way addressed by the bill.
Some of this problem, but increasingly of less importance at this juncture, is
the role of the Central Intelligence Agency both in Washington, D.C. and in
the diplomatic and consular missions abroad. Of far greater threat are the pres-
ent ambitions of such other Federal agencies as the Department of Commerce
and the Department of Agriculture, which. wish to operate abroad without direct
personnel involvement or cooperation of members of the traditional-foreign serv-
ice of the, United States. These ambitions have been gratified recently by the
Administration under Reorganization Plan Number 3 of 1979, transferring ap-
proximately..100 positions from the Department of State to the Department of
Commerce..
With this extraordinary fragmentation of authority in Washington and in
the missions abroad, the energies of our Ambassadors have been dissipated so
deeply that it is hardly surprising that they have not been able to respond in a
timely manner to anticipate such crises as the Iranian debacle, the disasters we
have suffered in Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the current civil war in
Afghanistan. Unless this dreadful dissipation of resource is stopped, they will
not be able to respond in a timely fashion to the brewing crises in, among others,
Morocco, Yugoslavia, Albania, South Africa, the Middle East, Central America,
Cambodia, and Thailand, and the overwhelming, challenges to world order arising
from the extraordinary dislocations of trade and commerce resulting from the
civil and international wars all over the world which now are a daily occurrence.
I submit to you that this is the prospect which you should bear in mind when
drafting new legislation for the foreign service. The Department bill is lengthy
and many of its provisions deserve specific comment. In the interest of time,
we will focus our testimony on major areas that concern us. As attachments
to our testimony are our sectional commentary as Annex I and material dealing
with other major areas of concern which we would like to bring to your
attention.
It is evident that the foreign service should be placed under the provisions of
Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Unfortunately the labor-
management title in the proposed bill does not grant full collective bargaining
to members of the Foreign Service.
We believe in universality of protection for all employees. As we hope you
will perceive from our report on the origin of the Foreign Affairs Specialist
program, the only assurance that such bizarre undertakings are prevented is to
have labor-management relations governed by the same principles as those which
apply everywhere else where there are American employees of the Federal
government.. , '
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.283
As seen .with the implementing legislation for the. Panama. Canal Treaties,
where coverage of Title VII was extended to employees of the PanamaCanal
Commission 'employees who are not American citizens, it' is feasible to extend
coverage.to.,those.categories.previously not incorporated.
We.favor the, incorporation of foreign service personnel under the very fine
provisions 'of Title VII by an amendment to that act deleting the following
langilage.under exclusions: .
"(iv) an .Officer or employee in the Foreign Service' of the United States
employed in the Department of State, the Agency for International Development
or the International Communication Agency."
We believe this would be the most judicious and appropriate manner to pro-
ceed..We. oppose the provisions of the Administration proposal for labor-
management relations because it is redundant and would deprive foreign service
personnel of the, protections and the procedures established by the Federal Labor
Relations'Authority, and the Federal Service Impasses Panel.
You will hear,' with justification, of two problems which concern members of
our union and of the American Foreign Service Association with such a simple
action. One, concerns the issue of "world-wide" representation ; the other con-
cerns so-called* ."supervisors" being in the unit.
Both problems arise from the ambiguities in the "rank-in-person" and "world
wide availability" requirements of foreign service personnel. Consequently, these
need to. be perceived in their fundamental relationship to the subject of appro-
priate unit and supervisor.
Under the. "rank-in-person" system an individual is not tied to any position
in the foreign, service, but is reassigned with regularity. Even 'at the highest
rank, a position, does not involve per se any supervisory function, since even the
highest ranking officer cannot rank anybody in relation to any other officer. Only
the selection panels can do that. Nor is there an exercise of any other of the
managerial functions in hiring, assigning, and dismissing foreign service per-
sonnel. These are all handled by centralized or collegial bodies.
The problems of management, and the abuses of management, consequently
reside in the anonymities of centralized administration and collegial bodies.
These are the. real managers of the foreign service. It is against their anonymous
action. that even the most senior foreign service officers and personnel .need the
protections of the world wide unit in which all foreign service personnel are
members.
The Congress no doubt has in mind the protection of the clerical and technical
and professional personnel from the abuse of power by senior career personnel.
The question can be asked : How can a secretary or typist speak up in a meeting
of the union representing foreign service personnel if the supervisor or manager
can sit. by right in the same meeting? Does this not reduce labor-management
relations to management manipulation? We have not found this to. be. the case.
Common interests, particularly in working conditions overseas, create a col-
legiality among Foreign Service employees. Conflicts can be resolved by resort
to the Grievance Board.
We recognize and concede there are problems. It is precisely for this reason
that we wish to have the entire foreign service placed under the jurisdiction
of Subpart F,-Labor-Management and Employee Relations of Title V of the
U.S. Code, to assure. that the fullest measure of supervision over the activities
of both management and labor in the foreign service takes place by the Federal
Labor Relations Authority. We can think of no better way to assure that abuses
are avoided and that collective bargaining rights are at least equivalent, and
preferably identical, with those of other employees of the Federal government,
who are not in the Foreign Service.
Having said this, we believe that it is necessary to permit the retention of the
present world-wide units and the present membership in the units and leave all
other matters to the jurisdiction of the Federal Labor Relations Authortty.
For the reasons we have given and the weaknesses which we perceive, we oppose
totally the enactment of legislation such as that proposed by the Administration
as Chapter 10.of its draft bill, entitled Labor-Management Relations. Such a
separate Foreign Service Labor Relations system would be both administratively
redundant and, we fear, not serve the best interests of either management or
labor.
THE FOREIGN SERVICE GRIEVANCE BOARD
The push 'for ? a grievance procedure for Foreign Service employees began in
the early 1970's when the absence of due process in the system was fast becoming
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a public scandal. Senator Bayh first introduced a bill in 1971 establishing an
independent grievance board. The State Department resisted and opposed this
measure, successfully arguing to Congress that a procedure should be negotiated
under the new Executive Order 11636, providing for labor-management relations
in the Foreign Service. However, the Department failed to engage in meaningful
negotiations with the employee representative-instead it proceeded to establish
its own "interim" procedure which was seriously flawed. Agitation for an effec-
tive grievance procedure grew, spurred by the tragic suicide of Charles William
Thomas, a Foreign Service officer selected-out without due process, and the
formation of the Thomas Legal Defense Fund which began litigation that re-
sulted in the court decision in 1973 holding the selection-out procedures uncon-
stitutional. AFGE and AFSA continued to press for a bill in Congress and
Senator Bayh persistently introduced his bill in each session of Congress.
Finally, the pressure became irresistable when all public members of the interim
board resigned in 1974 after AID refused to abide by a Board decision. In 1975
Congress enacted the grievance legislation that now exists. The text is the
product of the collective efforts of the employee representatives, Congressional
staffs and foreign affairs agencies. The procedure has wide acceptability among
? members of the Service. The Foreign Service Grievance Board consists of pres-
tigious arbitrators from the labor field and retired Foreign Service officers-all
of whom are subject to selection and renewal by unanimous agreement of the
parties using the Boa.rd-AFGE, AFSA, AID, USICA, and the State Department.
Its operating regulations were negotiated with the unions, and conferral on
issues relating.to the operation of the Board occurs on a regular basis. We have
been generally satisfied with our experience-grievants have a full and fair
opportunity to be heard, the union has been able to establish a good working
relationship with Board members and staff, transcripts are available on a timely
basis without cost, and decisions are published regularly. We welcome the addi-
tion made in section 1024 to the. Board's jurisdiction of union grievances con-
cerning violations of negotiated agreements-such a mechanism has been lacking
in our labor-management system. On the other hand, we do not favor the State-
originated proposal to make the union the exclusive representative for grievants
within the bargaining unit. The Foreign Service Grievance Board is a statutory
Appeal body set up by Congress for all members of the Service. Its jurisdiction
covers many matters which a Civil Service employee would have the right to
appeal through statutory procedures. This proposal would result in bargaining
unit members having fewer rights than non-unit members who would have access
.to the, Board with any representative of their choosing. The State Department
proposal is evidently aimed. at over-taxing the resources of the unions and at
limiting the number of grievances. We ask that Congress reject this effort. After
serious consideration of this issue, we firmly believe that freedom of choice with
regard to representation is most. compatible with the nature of the Foreign
Service Grievance Board. It is therefore our request that the present language
of subsection (b) of section 11.03 be deleted and replaced with the following:
"The, grievant, has the right to a representative of his or her own choosing at
every stage of the proceedings. The grievant and his/her representative (s) who
are under the control, supervision or responsibility of the foreign affairs agencies
shall be granted reasonable periods of administrative leave to prepare, be present
and to present the grievance. Where the grievant is not represented by the ex-
clusive bargaining representative for Foreign Service employees of the agency,
.the exclusive representative shall have the right to be present during the griev-
ance proceedings."
Having expressed our endorsement of the existing procedure we would like
to point to one area where the procedure could be significantly strengthened and
made comparable to the binding arbitration that is generally used by unions
and management. The procedure currently provides that with respect to certain
matters, particularly assignment, promotion and discipline, the Board may only
recommend a remedy to the agency head who may consider whether to follow
the recommendation based upon "the needs of the Service." We have found this
provision troubling and not infrequently resorted to; refusal of the agency to
follow a recommendation leaves the grievant with only the choice of going to
court, a choice that may not be realistic in terms of cost and the issues at stake.
We therefore would propose the following amendment to chapter 11, section
1113: delete subsection (d) and add to subsection (b) a new paragraph (5)
stating, "to promote an employee who is found to have previously failed to re-
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ceive proper consideration. Promotion may be retroactive where the Board finds
that, but for the failure to be considered, the grievant would have been promoted."
This feature of the proposed legislation is clearly patterned after Title IV of
the Civil Service Reform Act establishing the Senior Executive Service. The op-
portunity to create this executive corps was obviously a major incentive for de-
veloping the bill. But there are significant areas where the SFS proposal departs
from the SES model, and in our view these departures are to the detriment of
the Foreign Service. Passage of the SFS provisions as now written would, in
,our view, have unfortunate consequences for not only the Service, but also for
the conduct of the nation's foreign policy. Among USICA Foreign Service of-
ficers there is overwhelming concern with the possibility that the SIPS as now
designed will permit wholesale politicization of the Foreign Service and dis-
courage discussion, dissent and professional development. This concern should
not be difficult to understand. The combination of variable time-in-class and the
so-called limited extension could be used to eliminate an entire class of officers
not satisfying a Director's political bent, within a period as short as two or three
years, by establishing time-in-class at one or two years and permitting no, or few,
limited' extensions. While no one accuses the drafters of the bill with such in-
tentions, there have been in the past, and there will be again, administrators
who are capable of such action. Even absent the most extreme situation, the
lack of certainty about one's status is going to foster caution, not courage. We
are not opposed to making advancement and retention more directly dependent
on performance. But the proposed SFS goes far beyond what is either necessary
or adviseable. Let me make specific reference to those aspects of the SFS' which
are without parallel in the SES and which we find objectionable.
(1) The absence of a "parachute clause" for those removed from the Senior
Foreign Service after expiration of time-in-class or non-renewal of a limited
extension. The SES system provides that a member who is removed for reasons
of performance (not misconduct or malfeasance) is entitled to placement in a
non-SES position at the GS-15 level or above. ,This safeguard is a natural com-
panion to the stringent provisions regarding retention and removal. In our view
no less should be provided in the SFS. As. in the Civil Service, an employee in
the Foreign Service may be fully capable of work at the FS-1 yet be deemed
unsuitable for the SFS, possibly for reasons not in the least reflecting on the
employee's abilities. As the bill is now written, an officer who is particularly
able could reach, enter and be dropped from the SFS before the age of fifty
while still retaining skills and knowledge important to the agency. The dis-
incentive for achievement for the employee is as obvious as the disadvantage
to the 'agency. We therefore propose that section 641 be amended to allow
,officers dropped from the SFS by expiration of time-in-class or non-renewal of
.limited extension to retreat to the FS-1 level for the time remaining, if any, in
the time-in-class period for class 1 (counting time previously served in class 1
and in the SFS). This could be achieved by adding a new subsection (c) to sec-
tion 641 as follows :
(c) Members of the Senior Foreign Service who are not granted a limited
extension. or whose limited extension is not renewed shall be entitled to return
to the FS-1 level and assigned to a non-SFS position for the period, if any, re-
maining to be served in class 1 under applicable time-in-class rules for class 1.
In determining the time remaining, periods previously served in class 1 and pe-
riods served in the Senior Foreign Service shall be subtracted from the time
in class period.
(2) The "limited extension." This concept has no equivalent in the SES. It is
a mechanism which will give enormous power to the agency head in retention
decisions for those in the SFS and discretion to exercise that power without
regard to performance factors. It is true, that decisions granting and renewing
extensions will be made upon selection board recommendations, but the agency
head will determine the number of extensions to be given and could allow none
or very few. In combination with the authority to set and change time-in-class
limits it will therefore be possible for the agency head to keep SFS members
in a constant state of uncertainty about their future. At that point, dissent and
creativity will be a luxury few will be able to afford. For a profession in which
performance is not easily quantified, and where personal integrity and courage
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are vital to the national interest, we think such measures are particularly ill-
advised. It is our view that the provision in section 641 for "limited extensions"
be deleted, that a minimum time-in-class period. be established for the SFS.
(3) Section 602(b). The Department indicates in its sectional analysis that
the objective of the SFS is to create a corps with rigorous entry, promotion and
retention standards based on performance, but provides in this section that
consideration should be given to the need for attrition. The necessity and pur-
pose of this provision are not immediately clear, but the provision appears to
conflict with the merit principles incorporated into the bill. Under merit prin-
ciples, employees are to be retained on the basis of the adequacy of their per-
formance. When agency managements determine the number of promotion oppor-
tunities and selections into the SFS, they will surely consider this factor with-
out a legislative mandate to do so. In our view, this section should be deleted.
With the modifications we suggest the Senior Foreign Service would still give
the agencies the flexibility desired but without the' sacrifice of legitimate inter-
ests of both employees and the public. The stringent measures sought in the
bill have not been justified to our satisfaction. For USICA, the Director himself
made the case, in a March 26 letter to Mr. Read in which he reported :
"Attrition and shorter promotion lists at USICA in the last two years have
brought us a long way toward removing the surplus of senior officers. . . To-
day, the number of officers at the class 1-3 levels and the number of jobs classi-
fied at those ranks are at parity and the historic imbalance has been resolved.
I'm convinced, therefore, that current legislative authority and internal admin-
istrative practices are sufficient to deal with any potential future problems of
senior officer impactment."
Without modification, the SFS proposal will result in damage to the integrity
of the Foreign Service and worsen rather than improve the personnel system.
One of the most critical problems, associated with proper classification, in the
area of personnel practices is appropriate pay. The Administration draft is silent
on its specific character and we consider this one of the many serious weak-
nesses in the bill.
Our union endorses fully the principle that Foreign Service personnel be
assured of proper classification, equivalent to those provided civil service em-
ployees. We feel that, just as civil service employees now enjoy overtime pay,
foreign service employees should be entitled to the same provisions. Conse-
quently, we request that you include in your legislation the provision that both
base and'premium pay for foreign service personnel shall be determined in the
same manner as pay for civil service employees by proper "linkage" established
by the Federal Pay Agent and Federal Employees Pay Council. The simplest way
to achieve this would be to restate that the provisions of Title V, U.S. Code,
which incorporates the authority of the Pay Agent and Pay Council, apply to
the foreign service.
However, even if this were done, foreign service employees would not have
pay comparability because civil service employees are not subject to world wide
service, to the attendant disruptions in their assignments, to the stresses in
their personal and family lives. For this reason, we propose that foreign serv-
ice personnel be paid, at all times, a tax exempt allowance to compensate them
for this aspect of their governmental service. I should like to suggest the
.following language as a model or outline for your consideration.
"The compensation of all foreign service personnel shall be the same as the
comparable grade in the General Schedule excepting that foreign service per-
sonnel shall be paid a further tax-exempt allowance of 15 percent additional
because of their availability to serve world-wide; PROVIDED THAT, IN NO
CASE SHALL THIS ALLOWANCE BE LESS THAN $2,000 AND NOT MORE
THAN $5,000. This allowance shall be in addition to any other allowance which
may be authorized."
The minimum and maximum allowances I have suggested are to assure that
clerical and other personnel in the higher grades, particularly in the Foreign
Senior Executive Service if it is established, do not benefit disproportionately
from other members of the Foreign Service.
The foregoing tax exempt allowance is to take official notice of the element of
incomparability between the foreign service and the civil service, the element
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of personal commitment to sacrifice which cannot be computed in terms of hours
at the desk or office but is written in the burdens of foreign service life where
terror and disability and strife is attendant twenty-four hours a day. In this
exposure to attack the youngest and the least in time and grade share the
trauma with the wisest, the most mature and the most senior in rank. All have
this together in the foreign service as a part of their tours abroad, outside the
office, outside official hours. Thus this allowance compensates them not primarily
for that in which they are comparable to the civil service but for that in which
they are incomparable.
I should like also to address the issue in which they are comparable-work at
the desk, at the guard house, in the pouch room.
When testifying before the joint hearing of two House committees, we had been
asked to comment on the Hay Study, which was then not available to us. In the
interval, we have received copies also of a Report of the Task Force on the
Foreign Service Salary System, dated November 20, 1979. Unfortunately, we had
not been consulted when either of these reports was being prepared. Had we been,
we would have commented that both reports ignored the function of fulcrum, or
locus of movement, in reconciling the particular problems in promotions based on
rank-in-person with a civil service system based on promotions where rank-in-job
exists. Consequently, the findings of the Task Force, as well as the Hay study,
resort to extraneous, tangential remedies, rather than intrinsic factors, and do
not recognize that movements upward in rank-in-person systems have different
institutional and chronological characteristics than those in the civil service.
As a tentative proposal, provided largely as a model, we suggest that your
Committee consider a classification and pay system, comparable in general terms
with the civil service but reflecting intrinsic foreign service structural differences.
One model, which we have developed, which seeks to meet both these criteria,
would be the following :
Old class FSO/
New class
FSIO/FS
Old FSS class
CSC equivalent
1----------------------------------------------------------------
FSO-3
FSS- 1
GS-15
2----------------------------------------------------------------
FSO-4
FSS- 2
GS-14
3----------------------------------------------------------------
FSO-5
FSS- 3
GS-13
4----------------------------------------------------------------
FSO-6
FSS- 4
GS-11
5----------------------------------------------------------------
FSO-7
FSS- 5
GS- 9
6----------------------------------------------------------------
FSO-8
FSS- 6
GS- 8
7------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FSS- 7
GS- 7
8---------------------------------------------------------------=--------------
FSS- 8
GS- 6
9------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FSS- 9
GS- 5
(10) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FSS-10
(GS- 4)
The foregoing table recognizes that there will be important career determinant
decisions before the selection boards and that, on either the 9 or 10 rank system,
certain promotion decisions will be more crucial than others. Moreover, it seeks
to motivate and reward employees seeking upward mobility by a larger increase
in pay resulting from promotions to Class 4 and to Class 3 under the new
system. On the other hand, it seeks to require greater attention and selectivity
from management in promoting employees of lesser performance while still
permitting employees to be rewarded by increases in pay through step increases.
As to the number of steps, we prefer the 10-step system as comparable with
the civil service. Moreover, we find it quixotic that the Hay report has proposed
14 steps, adding four steps at the end of each civil service grade, ostensibly to
compensate employees for service abroad, late in grade and not throughout the
employee's total foreign service. Under the Hay concept, only the less competent
would begin to be compensated at the end of a long period of ten years in
grade while the more competent would not be rewarded at all since they
would have been promoted to the next higher grades and never reached steps
11 to 14. We believe that our proposal for a Foreign Service Allowance achieves
the commendable goal sought by the Hay report without the awkwardness and
inequities its 14 step system introduces.
Our criticisms of the findings of the Task Force relate to the backward-look-
ing perspectives on which its judgments were predicated, and we have preferred
to anticipate the managerial as well as the employee motivations in a reformed,
revitalized foreign service.
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In any case, we submit our proposals as another possible alternative to the
Hay and Task Force options which are being circulated.
PERFORMANCE PAY IN THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE
Since the initiation of this legislation we have not been very happy with the
concept of "performance pay" as now proposed for the Senior Foreign Service.
Our objections are based on several considerations.
First, the evidence thus far is that the Executive Departments authorized to
utilize Senior Executive Service personnel in the Civil Service have not de-
vised any standard method for implementing performance pay. In fact, mil-
lions of dollars have been expended in consultant fees seeking to obtain some
rational methodology, and the Office of Personnel Management has no pro-
posals of its own.
Second, some reports from the private sector indicate that the concept of
"performance pay" is being abandoned by many of those private enterprise
firms which had instituted it. Instead of better management, through coopera-
tive team work, the system has produced intrigue and rivalry at managerial
levels where cooperation and mutual support are the most important. The re-
sult has been to fragment and dissipate managerial initiative.
Third, we note that the new Civil Service Senior Executive Service being a
tank-in-person system is an anomaly, from a systemic standpoint, in the
civil service. Consequently, there was some plausibility to press the anomaly in
the compensation' area. However, the entire foreign service operates under
a rank-in-person system, and we believe, it would be more prudent to continue
to pay the Senior Foreign Service according to the general practices of the
rest of the Foreign Service. We would therefore suggest that the Senior For-
eign Service have distinct steps in each class so that its members know in ad
vance the discrete amount of monetary reward they would receive in terms of
their own performance without their having to contrast their own records
with those of their colleagues for purposes of receiving compensation. One
system might be to have five steps in each class, with one step increase annually
for good performance and two or three step, increases for exceptionally meri-
torious service in grade.
Fourth. we believe that a performance pay system would be much more diffi-
cult to operate in the Foreign Service than in the Civil Service due to the wide
variation in assignment (i.e. an assignment to a private organization, or a small
and peaceful country versus an assignment to a large and influential or an
unstable but strategic country), the isolation of officers at many overseas posts,
the inducement this would provide for "cronyism" and the difficulty of adminis-
tering such a system through the selection board process.
There is a myth that "selection out" and early mandatory retirement at age
60 is a feature of the foreign service alone. It' exists in the civil service as well
for special categories, particularly the officers of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, other law enforcement groups, firefighters and air traffic controllers and
employees of the Alaska Railroad. In fact. for most of them, mandatory retire-
ment is at a lower age than 60..I request permission to include as Attachment II
hereto extracts from Title V, sections 8335 and 8336 on Mandatory Separation
and Immediate Retirement. But there are two major differences. First, these
persons can continue to stay in the civil service in other functions besides their
original specialties. Second, their annuities are computed, for the first twenty
years of service at 2.5 percent, and not the 2.0 percent offered foreign service
personnel. To qualify for this larger annuity, they contribute 7.5 percent to their
retirement annuity instead of 7.0 percent.
I should like to suggest that all foreign service personnel required to serve.
world wide be brought under provisions similar to those afforded these categories:
I mentioned.
Under my proposal these computation formulas would be portable. so that
any separated foreign service officer would be eligible for the higher 2.5 percent
rate for all their actual foreign service.
In summary, the following retirement provisions would apply to all persons
in the foreign service : First twenty years computed at 2%; remainder at 2 per-
cent, with voluntary retirement at any age after five years service abroad.
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SPECIAL PROBLEMS AT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
There are several problems at the International Communication Agency which
are the result of past errors made by the Department of State in seeking to
establish a domestic foreign service. The one most frequently mentioned in testi-
mony by Administration spokesmen concerns the so-called Foreign Affairs
Specialist category, a term of art for "domestic foreign service" personnel.
Among the other problems are such matters as employment rights at the Voice of
America, retirement credit for former Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty person-
nel and for retired Bi-National Grantees, and the employment of spouses of
ICA personnel abroad.
FAS : ITS ORIGINS AND ITS AFTERMATH
None of the Administration spokesmen have informed you that our union
was adamantly opposed to the introduction of the Foreign Affairs Specialist
program. In fact, we were so much opposed that we spent $50,000 in legal fees
bringing a suit against James Keogh, Director USIA, and Henry A. Kissinger,
Secretary of State, to declare its installation to be illegal.
We had a partial superficial victory, in as much as Judge Howard J. Corcoran
required that the only persons who could be appointed to the Foreign Affairs
Specialist catgory had first to serve three years as Foreign Service Reserve Of-
ficers or Foreign Service Reserve Unlimited Officers. However, since Judge
Corcoran did not specify that these three years had to be served overseas, we
lost the essence of our suit and the Foreign Affairs Specialist program was in-
stalled both at the State Department and at the United States Information
Agency, over our strongest objections. With your permission, I should like to
append hereto, at the very end of all the other attachments, a copy of the
court decision on the FAS programs.
Let us be frank about this program. Its main purpose was to entice civil serv-
ice personnel out of the civil service category in order to free management from
the civil service safeguards provided to all civil service employees.
Why then did our members join the Foreign Affairs Specialist program? Be-
cause concurrently with its introduction, positions in the higher grades were
withdrawn from civil service competition and restricted only to personnel who
were in the FAS or other foreign service category. Civil service category per-
sonnel had available only "dead-end" jobs. If one did not join FAS, one would
not get a promotion. If one did join, one was assured an immediate increase in
pay and greater opportunity for promotion as a reward for voluntary entry.
Why did the State Department want to use this peculiar Foreign Affairs Spe-
cialist program-why did it insist that the Attorney General oppose our-suit?
For one simple reason. It was opposed to the existence of personnel rights based
on some outside authority or statute to which its employees could appeal.
You may recall that this is the period when the State Department waged war
on its personnel. This is the period when Charles William Thomas committed
suicide because the management of the Foreign Service did not wish to admit
it had committed a grievous error in selecting him out. This is the period when
the Charles William Thomas Legal Defense Fund brought a successful suit,
also costing $50,000, to assure that the personnel records of foreign service per-
sonnel did not contain false or ex parte information. This was the period when
the Congress finally passed the grievance procedures which became self-evidently
necessary following our suits.
After our union achieved victory over a rival organization to represent for-
eign service personnel, we proceeded to attack the inequities of the system from
the inside. Ultimately we reached an agreement with a new administration in
USICA to bring the program to an end. This is the "contract" about which there
has been so much discussion. Management agreed to stop hiring FAS employees.
We agreed to eliminate selection boards for FAS employees and to permit these
personnel to exercise the right all other civil service personnel have-to bid
on jobs in the civil service category. On the other hand we obtained reaffirma-
tion of the commitment, an enticement by management, that retirement would
be under the foreign service, including mandatory retirement at 60, if a person
chose to remain under such an appointment. For those preferring otherwise, we
obtained a guarantee that they could convert to Civil Service status essentially
as a matter of right until June 30, 1981.
I want to emphasize these were concessions made to us for the manipulation
and coercion of our personnel under the FAS program.
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To our Local 1512, this agreement represents the considered judgment of both
the union and management as to the fairest way to phase out the FAS program.
Obviously the agency concluded that the existence of a residual force of do-
mestic foreign service employees was something that could be lived with. In
the case of both the union and the agency, the desire was to find the most equi-
table ending to the unhappy history of FAS. Should there be reasons why the
Congress would feel it could not continue this arrangement, we would petition
that the principal elements of the contract be preserved for the individual FAS
members after their mandatory conversion as personal perquisites. These are:
(1) Right to retire voluntarily on present foreign service computation formula
(2 percent for all years of service). They would not have the right to invoke
the 21 percent retirement formula which I have proposed for persons who
serve overseas.
(2) Right to retain permanently, their classification and pay under the FAS
rank-in-person formula in the event of downgrading of any position they may
occupy.
(3) Exemption from "selection out" except for reasons identical with dis-
missal for cause in the civil service.
(4) Full access to the protections afforded all civil service employees under
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
(5) Right to voluntarily convert to the civil,service at any time up to June 30,
1961.
THE AUTONOMY OF USICA
From the beginning of public discussion on a proposal to reform the Foreign
Service personnel system we have been concerned with the role of USICA. The
proposal was solely a State Department initiative-discussion with USICA man-
agement and employee representatives was, from our perspective, minimal at
the early stages. By the time our comments were seriously solicited and by the
time the Director submitted his comprehensive response to the Department,
the issue was not whether there would be a reform bill, but only what form spe-
cific measures would take within the general format already adopted by the De-
partment. We found, very persuasive the arguments made by Director Rein-
hardt in his March 26 letter to Under-Secretary Read, that certain problems at
which the proposal was aimed do not exist in USICA or are well on their way
to solution. But obviously the Department was beyond the point of willingness
to either reconsider its decision to move ahead with omnibus legislation, or
seriously depart from its proposals. This, the record should be clear that this
legislation was not designed with USICA in mind. Our task, and that of the
agency, in the last few months has been to try to modify the bill to a form that
at least can be lived with. That effort has only been minimally successful. We
agree that improvements have been made, particularly in the area of returning
to each agency head the authority to make specific provisions with regard to
such things as length of the SIPS threshold. And we appreciate the addition of
section 202(d) which provides that the statute shall not be constructed as to
diminish the authority of the Director of USICA. Nevertheless we are still con-
cerned with provisions in the bill that suggest a different intention, specifically
the requirement that the foreign affairs agencies achieve "maximum compati-
bility." We agree that a degree of compatibility must exist to facilitate personnel
exchanges and to allow for reasonable personnel administration abroad, but the
adjective "maximum" transforms "compatibility" into "uniformity."
Our concern on this issue can only be appreciated in the context of the his-
torical relationship between the Department and USICA. The employees of
USICA have over the years been subject to various disruptions and manipula-
tions. the FAS program. being a timely example; most of which originated with
the Department of State and were transmitted to, or imposed on. that agency.
The failure of the Department to try to bring order to the resulting chaos in
recent years is in sharp contrast to the efforts made in USICA by both man-
agement and the union. While we have agreed and still agree that personnel
reform is necessary in USICA we believe that reforms are most likely to occur
and to be constructive when the independence of USTCA in personnel matters
is assured and the agency is freed from the necessity of accommodating the
special personnel and political problems current in the Department of State.
The issue of the integrity of the news, educational and cultural programs of
USTCA was a major concern of Congressman Fascell's Subcommittee is discus-
sions on the reorganization plan which established USICA. We hope that this
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concern will manifest itself again in careful scrutiny of this legislation to insure
that neither the agency, the Director, nor the FSIO corps is compromised. To
this end we propose amending section 1203 to delete the word "maximum" modi-
fying the word "compatibility." The same deletion would be made in section
2403. We would also ask for assurances that section 204 is intended to give no
authority to the Director General over the personnel system of USICA. In addi-
tion we request amendment of section 441(d) to provide that the determination
of nominations for performance pay for meritorious or distinguished service be
made separately within each agency, not by an interagency board whose recom-
mendations will ultimately be reviewed by the Secretary. The Director of USICA
should be able to submit nominations to the President, or if considered appropri-
ate, to a third party, such as OPM, without going through the Secretary of State.
The present formulation represents, in our view, a first step toward a single,
interagency SFS, a creation we would strongly oppose since it would under-
mine not only the autonomy of the agency, but also of the separate FSIO corps.
VOICE OF AMERICA-ITS FAILURES
A. Broadcasting Mission
The Voice of America continues to be beset with certain failures, some result-
ing from its basic philosophy of international communication, others from its
treatment of personnel. In a sense, these are interrelated.
One of its principal failures in the last year is in the area of foreign language
broadcasting. During the entire period of the Iranian crisis, prior to and after
the Shah's departure from Iran, while the Soviet Union was intensifying its
broadcasts, the Voice of America was silent. Not one:word, not one minute was
broadcast in Farsi, the majority language in Iran, until April of this year, when
a half hour of service was begun. On November 6, two days after the seizure of
our embassy, broadcast time was increased to one hour.
An analogous situation appears to exist in the broadcasts to Yugoslavia-these
are in "Serbo-Croat", angering the indigenous Croatian population of more than
six million who wish to have broadcasts in "Croatian". Similarly, the few VOA
broadcasts to Haiti are in French, not Creole, the language of 95 percent of the
people. Consequently, Haitians listen to Radio Havana and Radio Moscow, not
to the Voice of America.
These unhappy situations result from a policy which many past Administra-
tions, apparently with the acquiescence of Congress, have pursued in the foreign
language. broadcast area, in the apparent belief that one can ignore those people
who are friends. Apparently, so far as the Voice of America goes, the assump-
tion is that the people we regard as friends today should listen to our broadcasts
in English, not their own language.
For this reason, it appears, there were no broadcasts to Iran, just as there
are today no broadcasts to Japan. Our union urges the Congress to review this
policy, particularly since the many crises which we confront show that even our
friends do not always understand our foreign policies. There is just as much
concern, we have learned, in Japan about our positions in Ethiopia, Somalia,
Eritrea, South Africa, Cambodia as there is in these countries which are directly
affected.
I submit to your consideration the advisability of Congress raising with the
Administration, as an oversight function, the introduction of broadcasting to our
"friends", while they are still "friends" and not merely broadcasting to arbas
where we believe we do not have "friends." In fact, such a tacit policy as we
now have suggests to many people that our primary goal is propaganda and not
communication, propaganda in competition with that of the Soviet Union rather
than a means of positive communication from our nation to all peoples of the
world.
B. Broadcasting Personnel Policies
A second failure of the Voice of America relates to its personnel practices in
foreign language broadcasting.
Last February we raised this issue with the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee while commenting on a section of the 1980-1981 USICA authorization
bill which amended the statutory authority of the Voice of America to hire
non-citizens to work in the United States and is now enacted in law.
The problem which this provision addressed was the under-classification of
alien VOA broadcasters who under previous statutory language could not receive
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a grade higher than GS-11. We pointed out that this was a factor in creating
the present situation where grade levels of American national foreign language
broadcasters, we believe, are unfairly depressed below those of the English
language broadcasters.
This situation has led to morale problems among foreign language broad-
casters-citizen and alien-who believe they are being denied the basic con-
stitutional right of equal pay for equal work. I am happy to report that since
last February, the agency, responding to initiatives from AFGE, has made seri-
ous progress with a Task Force Study aimed at rectifying unjustified classi-
fication disparities. It is our hope that the final results, both at the agency
level and within the Office of Personnel Management, will be a constructive
resolution of the issue. We would like to return and report to the Congress when
those results are known.
C. Fringe Benefits for its Employees
The Agency has not made an effort to obtain proper retirement benefits for
a certain group of its employees ; specifically those who formerly served as in-
ternational broadcasters with Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Armed
Forces Network, Europe.
This year we raised the issue again in connection with 1980-1981 USICA
authorization bill, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee decided to con-
sider it in connection with the personnel bill which is now here as the proposed
Foreign Service Act of 1979. This subject has a direct impact on the morale of
certain USICA employees. Admittedly, it is a matter of past mistakes in seek-
ing to make covert what has, since then, become overt.
The number of these RFE/RL employees who are still alive and employed in
the Federal Service cannot exceed fifty. Of these the greatest number, perhaps
thirty, are now with the Voice of America, which has benefitted greatly by hav-
ing had them available as trained RFE/RL broadcasters and not having had to
give them any training. Thus, VOA and the American taxpayer have benefitted far
more already than the costs of the additional annuities.
We estimate that the additional cost. at the very most, of these additional
annuities would reach approximately $100,000 annually, provided that the pur-
ported beneficiaries first paid into the retirement fund an amount of approxi-
mately $125,000 to purchase these benefits. Considering the interests rates now
being earned, considering that the beneficiaries would be receiving back in the
first three years of retirement only their own contributions, considering the age
of these prospective beneficiaries, our estimate is that the actual retirement cost
over the life of these employees may be not more than $500,000 at the most
and might be as little as $250,000.
All these Federal employees for whom we petition equity have in common prior
service with those radio operations established and funded by the Federal Gov-
ernment in the late 1940s and early 1950s-and still funded today by the Federal
Government under Congressional authorizations and appropriations. All for-
merly served with either the American Forces Network, Europe ; Radio Free
Europe; or Radio Liberty (one former employee or RL also served at Radio
Free Asia).
As you know, the American Forces Network is operated world-wide by the
Department of Defense. Employees of the Network in Asia were paid by the
De'bartment from Appropriated funds. They were thus Federal employees, and
were entitled to Civil Service retirement credit. Employees of the American
Forces Network. Europe, however, were paid by the Department from Non-
Appropriated Funds. In these circumstances they were not considered to be
Federal employees, and were deprived of Civil Service retirement credit. We
believe that simple justice and equity call for eliminating this discrimination
for former employees of AFN(E) who are now in the Federal Government, so
that they may obtain Civil Service retirement credit for the time served with
AFN(E).
The Free Europe organization and Radio Liberty were, of course. funded
by the Central Intelligence Agency for the first two decades of their existence.
The CIA's funding was clandestine. This arrangement sought to achieve two
things : to allow listeners to believe that the Radios were not United States
Government agencies, and to allow the United States Government to say things
Which could not then be attributed to it. In the circumstances of the day, these
were no doubt legitimate aims. It seems to us not to be legitimate, however,
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293
to perpetuate those aims today by penalizing those who served them loyally in
other circumstances in the past.
Denial of Civil Service retirement benefits to employees of RFE and RL was
part and parcel of the clandestine funding arrangements (although, curiously
enough, those benefits were not denied to CIA officers, or to U.S. Foreign Service
Officers, assigned to the Radios). Because the Radios were originally viewed
as short-term operations, undertaken in what appeared to be imminent danger
of war (broadcasters were in fact inaugurated during the Korean War), a pension
plan and retirement benefits for the Radios' employees were not even contem-
plated by the Radios' managements and clandestine funders until a whole decade
of operations had passed. Even then they were only accepted by those who
directed the Radios on the initiative of the unions involved.
Notwithstanding the absence of retirement benefits, no effort was made by
the Radios' managements to compensate employees for their disadvantaged po-
sition in comparison to others serving the Federal Government. In fact, the
union initiative which eventually led to establishment of a retirement system
began in 1957 with a concerned-and unsuccessful-effort to raise the level of
staff pay to that prevailing at the Voice of America (with no hope of achieving
levels equal to comparable private industry).
In 1957 the first union contract at Radio Free Europe, for example, set salary
scales and provided for a 15% general increase in salaries, either through those
salary scales or a general increase, whichever was greater. The new RFE salary
scales gave a Deputy Desk Chief $115 a week, a Senior Editor $100 a week.
The comparable Voice of America figures at that time (GS-12 and GS-11 or
GS-10) were $145 and $122 or $133 a week. The 1958 RFE contract brought
increases of $5 per week in Radio salaries-still below the comparable VOA pay.
The union negotiators of that time tell us that the Radio managements, in
the discussions which eventually produced a retirement plan, never once sug-
gested that introduction of such a system should involve some reduction in
pay or benefits originally given to the Radios' staffs to compensate for the lack
of retirement benefits. Indeed, in view of the facts of staff compensation, any
such claim would have been untenable.
When the Radios finally agreed in 1959 to the introduction of pension plans,
they imposed a requirement of 10 years' service as a full-scale employee for
the vesting of an employee's rights in the plans. This meant that those who left
the Radios with less than 10 years' service and entered other Federal employ-
ment lost those years so far as credit for their retirement is concerned. As for
former employees of the Radios whose service equalled or exceeded 10 years
(there are about 10 such persons in Federal employ) their Radio pensions-
available to them at age 65, or in reduced amounts at ages down to 60-would
be based on their lower earnings when much younger, and on salary scales a
fraction of today's. They would thus represent a considerable loss compared
to giving them full credit for all of their Federal service.
Depending on their category of employment, some persons now Federal em-
ployees made contributions to the United States Social Security System while
at the Radios. Others did not. (In the case of a number of former Radio em-
ployees now in Federal employ, they achieved American citizenship, and with
it the possibility of Federal employment, including VOA, while serving the
Radios abroad only thanks to an Act of Congress which specifically permitted
them to count time serving the Radios abroad towards the residence requirement
for naturalization.) Even among those who made Social Security contributions,
there are those whose contributions were below the minimum required for vest-
ing in the Social Security System. That time and their contributions are now
lost to them.
There are approximately 50 current employees of the Federal Government
who are affected by the inequities we are addressing. Some 44 are now working
at the Voice of America. The other half-dozen are employed by such other Fed-
eral agencies as the ICA, the Trust Territories of the Pacific, the Board for In-
ternational Broadcasting, the Department of Energy, the National Endowment
for the Humanities, and the General Accounting Office.
On behalf of these 50 current employees of the Federal Government we would
therefore like to solicit your support for an amendment to Title 5, United States
Code. It concerns Chapter 83-Retirement, particularly Section 8332, Creditable
service.
We are offering some suggested rewording of that Section which would specifi-
cally forbid use of prior service with the Government-funded Radios for benefits
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under any other retirement system if used for credit under the Federal retire-
ment system. This means that Federal employees who credit their service with
the Radios for Federal retirement benefits cannot also credit that same time for
benefits from the Radios' retirement plans or from the Social Security System.
But there are other concerns, besides the possibility of "double dipping,"
which need to be addressed. One is to the effect that however equitable or just
this remedy might be, it risks creating a "precedent" that would open the flood-
gates to a deluge of demands on the Federal retirement system by great num-
bers of persons formerly associated in one way or another with CIA clandt Stine
operations, and therefore these particular inequities should be continued.
We believe that the Congress of the United States, which sets no precedents
if it does not wish to do so, is not as powerless to remedy inequities as this view-
point suggests.
Beyond that, the suggestion of "precedent" merits closer examination : there
are specific features of the Government-funded Radios that make them entirely
unique-and inapplicable as "precedents."
For one, although RFE and RL were "clandestinely funded" by the CIA, they
were not "clandestine organizations." Their functions, indeed, the organizations
themselves, were openly and publicly espoused by Presidents of the United States,
and by leading members of the Legislative and Executive Branches, of both par-
ties. This cannot be said of any CIA "clandestine operations."
This unique status of the Government-funded Radios made it possible for their
clandestine funders to avoid-indeed, it precluded-the special incentives,
awards, or bonuses characteristic of CIA "clandestine operations." The employees
of the Radios were thus not only disadvantaged in comparison to those in other
regular Federal service-in terms of their employment-but, precisely because
of the unique status of the Radios, they (except for the CIA agents in their
midst) were deprived as well as any possible special benefits that might accom-
pany CIA employment.
For another, and even more importantly, the existence of RFE and RL, after
more than 20 years of clandestine funding, was openly and fully debated by the
United States Congress in 1971-72. The Congress decided, by a very large
majority, that the two Radios should be continued in the national interest, and
that they should be funded by the regular and open Congressional procedures.
There is no other case of the Congress mandating the continued existence and
assuming the funding of activities previously funded by the CIA.
These unique features of the Radios, of course, refer to the past. To a past of
ambiguities and improvisations. Our appeal to you concerns-indeed, is specific-
ally limited to-leftovers of that past. For this reason our suggested rewording
of Section 8332, Title 5, United States Code, confines the remedy we seek to those
presently affected, i.e., to persons employed by the Federal Government only as
of the date of enactment of the amendment.
We therefore, hope that this Committee, as a matter of justice and equity, will
see fit to grant the remedy sought, which it appears can be achieved most simply
by amending Section 8332 of Title 5, United States Code, as follows :
Retirement Credit for Service With Government-Funded Radios
Sec. (a) Section 8332 (b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (8) ;
(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (9) and inserting in
lieu thereof a semicolon and "and";
(3) by inserting immediately after paragraph (9) the following:
"(10) subject to sections 8334(c) and 8339(i) of this title, service (other than
service performed before July 1, 1946) ' in any full-time capacity for at least 130
working days a year, beginning after December 1, 1945, to the National Com-
mittee for a Free Europe, Free Europe Committee, Incorporated, Free Europe,
Incorporated, Radio Liberation Committee, Radio Liberty Committee, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Incorporated, RFE/RL, Incorporated, Radio Free Asia,
the Asia Foundation, the American Forces Network, Europe, or any part thereof,
if such service is not credited for benefits under any other retirement system.";
and
(4) by inserting between the second and third sentences immediately following
paragraph (1), as added by paragraph (3) of this subsection, the following:
"The Office of Personnel Management shall accept the certification of the Execu-
tive Director of the Board for International Broadcasting concerning service for
the purpose of this subchapter of the type described in paragraph (10).".
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(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall apply only with respect to an
employee, as defined in section 5311 (1) of title 5, United States Code, who is so
employed on the date of enactment of this Act.
RETIREMENT EQUITY FOR BINATIONAL CENTER EMPLOYEES
The BiNational Center Grantee problem arose in the United States Informa-
tion Agency many years ago, but it has had its solution frustrated repeatedly
and obsessively by the Secretary of State who administers the Foreign Service
Retirement Fund and has been unsympathetic to the needs of USIA (now ICA)
employees. Even though USIA management agreed that these employees were
entitled to retirement credit, the State Department, supported by the Civil
Service Commission, objected and suit was brought by our union. On May 2,
1974, Federal Judge Albert Bryant ruled in Taylor v Hampton (Civil Action
No. 1178-72) that BiNational Center grantees met all the criteria of Federal
government employment and were entitled to credit under the Federal retire-
ment system. The court order read as follows :
U.S. District Court For The District of Columbia
WAYNE W. TAYLOR,
PLAINTIFF
ROBERT HAMPTON, ET AL.,
DEFENDANT
CIVIL ACTION 1178-72
ORDER: Upon consideration of Defendant's motion for summary judgment and
Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment, and of the entire record herein,
and it appearing to the Court that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact involved in this cause, and that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment herein as
a matter of law, it is by the Court this second day of May, 1974.
ORDERED : That the Defendant's motion for summary judgment be denied and
Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment be granted.
(Signed) WILLIAM B. BRYANT, Judge.
All those persons who were still in Federal employment were automatically
able to benefit from this ruling. The Secretary of State interpreted the court
order as applying only to personnel still on the rolls of the Foreign Service
at the State Department and the United States Information Agency. For this
reason the case was again taken to the court, on September 11, 1975, at which
point the Secretary yielded to our view that the retirement credit also applied
to all those who had been already retired either under Civil Service or For-
eign Service and their annuities were adjusted retroactively.
This brought equity to almost all the persons except those who had been
hired directly as BiNational Center grantees and were not ever shown, for
that reason, as employees of the Foreign Service. Of these there are only a
few still alive and equity would suggest that they also be entitled to credit under
the foreign service retirement system. The Secretary of State, however, still
interprets the court ruling to their prejudice despite the obvious fact, now con-
ceded by ICA, that they were foreign service employees.
An example of the problem is the case of Paul Johnson of Newport, Rhode
Island. Because of an administrative USIA ruling against "cancer" employ-
ment after age 60, he was given further "limited indefinite FSS" status which
excluded him from the retirement system even though he had previously served
nearly six years as a BiNational Center grantee. Had that BiNational grantee
been recognized, he would have been considered to be in the career foreign
service and his subsequent FSS appointment computed as part of the foreign
service retirement system. Thus he was doubly denied retirement credit.
For the reasons given, I request equity for those very few persons, such as
Paul Johnson, and petition you to incorporate the following text in the legislation
you are drafting.
"Any person who was appointed as a BiNational Center Grantee and who has
completed at least five years satisfactory service in that capacity or any other
appointment under the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, shall become a
participant in the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System and shall
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make an appropriate contribution to the Foreign 'Service Retirement and Dis-
ability Fund in accordance with the provisions of Section 652 of the Foreign
Service Act of 1946, as amended.
ICA SPOUSES ABROAD
We favor the employment of spouses abroad in all non-career positions. How-
ever, complaints have been received that the spouses of -senior Foreign Service
Officers, who write the efficiency reports of more junior Foreign Service personnel
officers at post abroad, manage to get much better positions much faster than the
spouses of Foreign 'Service Information Officers. Our complaint here appears to
parallel the general complaint of many women that the spouses of influential
senior government officials somehow manage to get higher level grades in Wash-
ington than an equally competent wife of a private citizen or a lower ranking
civil servant. We would wish to have equal affirmative outreach action among
wives, especially since those married to lower, ranking males probably need the
money more than the spouses of senior officers. This complaint, by the way, is
even more true of the spouses of personnel employed by the Agency for Inter-
national Development.
The most immediate problem at the Agency for International Development
relates to the developments initiated by the so-called Obey Amendment and the
"Regulations" submitted to the Congress on May 1, 1979.
We consider the Regulations most mischievous, and rather than repeating argu-
ments which we have employed earlier, we should like your permission to attach
them as Annex III to this statement and to summarize some, expatriating only
on those issues which treat with equity, particularly for women, minorities and
all other persons now in the clerical or technical positions who are qualified
to assume professional and administrative roles when opportunities arise.
The Agency for International Development, concedes that the Regulations
will not result in a single additional position becoming available abroad. These
positions are set by ceilings imposed by the Secretary of State and unless the
Congress mandates by legislation more positions abroad, the Regulations will not
achieve the alleged legislative purpose of the so-called Obey Amendment. Con-
sequently, the Regualtions fail to achieve the very purpose for which they were
intended by Representative Obey. That in itself is mischievous behavior-
pretending to be able to achieve something which will not be possible.
The second mischief is worse. Prior to issuing the regulations, the Agency for
International Development had been spared one of the acute problems that have
plagued the Department of State and the International Communication Agency-
this is the pretense to a higher personnel status arising from an established ex-
clusive right to certain so-called "prestige" jobs in Washington. Unlike the De-
partment of 'State and the International Communication Agency, AID had for-
merly assigned foreign service personnel and civil service personnel to any and
every -position as it became available and claimed that it sought the best qualified
person to fill that position. Because foreign service experience is an important,
sometimes the most important, factor in filling certain positions, many of these
have been regularly assigned to members of the foreign service. However, in the
event some civil service person was more qualified than the available foreign
service personnel, the position could be filled immediately by that person in the
civil service. This advantage to both management and employees is now lost. Al-
ready 809 positions in Washington have been designated exclusively for oc-
cupancy by Foreign Service personnel.
The impact of the change will be unfortunate. In the past, as more and more
younger women, particularly persons of black (African) and Hispanic back-
ground, became educated in foreign policy matters, they discovered that, while
they still had to enter at the clerical and technical level they could at least aspire
to professional and administrative functions. The past system could facilitate
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such an upward mobility if applied consistently because the best qualified person,
irrespective 'of foreign or domestic service, could apply for assignment. The new
regulations frustrate this because these "prestige" professional jobs are now
designated as foreign service and thereby they are segregated, by administrative
decision. Only persons who serve abroad now are entitled to fill them. This places
a premium on, and gives an inordinate advantage to, past foreign service. Some
person, let us say a white male, who entered the AID foreign service ten years
ago and served mostly in Afghanistan or Pakistan, now knows that certain
prestige positions are in effect restricted by regulation to white males in the AID
foreign service, even in areas not related to their 'awn experience. The most
educated married black woman, in the General Schedule, who has a graduate
degree in West African affairs and who is much more qualified than anyone
else in AID, would have difficulty in obtaining an assignment, for example, on
the Ghana desk, because that position now has been "reserved" to the foreign
service. She might have to remain a typist or secretary or computer operator all
her career at the Agency.
We believe this situation leads to a caste system, institutionalized supposedly
to send more people abroad, but actually serving only as an additional barrier
to equal opportunity and affirmative action at home. For this reason we continue
to oppose these regulations as being mischievous and because we consider them
questionable and not in compliance with several Constitutional and statutory
requirements seeking to foster equal employment opportunities and genuine
competitiveness based on merit principles.
The Regulations have been in force long enough for AID employees to ex-
perience their discriminatory impact. For example, GS employees have applied
for conversion to the Foreign Service and have been denied conversion due to
the alleged non-availability of actual foreign service positions abroad. Never-
theless, individuals are being hired as new employees into the foreign service
and assigned to Washington positions newly designated for the foreign service.
This relates to the right of present AID employees of access to foreign service
positions. But even in the matter of their rights to remain in their present posi-
tions, General Schedule employees are suffering discrimination. Many of those
who encumber positions that are now being designated Foreign Service are not
permitted to retain their jobs, as the Agency assured Congress when submittting
the Regulations. Instead they are being reassigned to other General Schedule
positions.
Unless the Congress reviews the highly questionable, reactionary policies now
being carried out at the Agency for International Development, we fear that
the morale and efficiency of that Agency will further decline to the level of a
likely scandal. We most earnestly urge that the Congress review this situation
at the very earliest possible date to ascertain whether these Regulations are
compatible wtih the fundamental purpose of Foreign Service reform as per-
ceived by the Administration in its own bill or as defined by Congress in its
legislative wisdom.
In the interim, it might be reassuring to the employees of the Agency for
International Development if your Committee requested the Comptroller Gen-
eral and the General Accounting Office to prepare a report as to the proprieties
of the actions taken in the management at AID in drafting these regulations
and in implementing them in a fashion inconsistent to commitments made to
the Congress when they were issued.
. I should like to reiterate our most sincere appreciation for your invitation
to testify before this Committee and to assure you of the fullest cooperation of
our two locals and our national headquarters in your enterprise.
I would like to take the opportuniity to stress that good foreign policy de-
cisions depend not only on good personnel but on proper institutional struc-
tures. I share the view of many persons, including the members of the so-called
Murphy Commission, that these are now in disarray and that it is important
to relate the operations of the Departments of Agriculture. Commerce, Energy,
Labor and Treasury more closely to those of the recognized foreign affairs agen-
cies, AID, ICA and the State Department.
And I would like to again emphasize that it is critical at this time that due
recognition be made of the commitment and personal sacrifice of members of
the foreign service to the nation.
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ANNEX 1 TO STATEMENT OF KENNETH T. BLAYLOCK, NATIONAL PRESIDENT,
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
1. SECTION 204. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
This section gives the Director General a vague jurisdiction over the Foreign
Service employees of USICA which does not currently exist. Neither the State
Department nor the Director General has an obligation to consult with USICA
employees or their exclusive representative. Therefore, the greater the role of
the Director General in USICA personnel matters, the less meaningful is our
collective bargaining relationship with the agency. In addition, the authority of
the USICA Director is undermined. We ask for clarification that the Director
General will exercise no authority over the Foreign Service personnel of USICA
or AID.
We do not understand what function the Board is expected to fulfill now that
labor-management relations and other adjudicatory functions have been as-
signed to other authorities. For the same reasons discussed above, we cannot
accept a situation where the Board is making personnel rules and regulations.
If the Board is to be retained purely as an advisory body, it should be insured
some degree of independence by a provision that administrative services will be
,provided to it upon request of the Chairman.
We are disturbed that the Department of State apparently does not intend to
make available its pay proposals during the period that this bill is under dis-
cussion. We object to this since from the beginning, the Department has enlisted
support for its legislative effort by suggesting that it would improve Foreign
Service pay. Since the Hay Study Report is complete, the State Department and
OMB should make known its proposals for pay linkage.
Subsection (c)-We have misgivings about selection boards making recom-
mendations for performance pay. The same board will be determining pay, pro-
motion and retention. Different factors are involved in each of these determina-
tions. Selection boards already work under the pressure of time and limited
resources. Adding this function will worsen that situation. If performance pay
must be instituted, we suggest that an alternative mechanism be devised for
administering it.
Subsection (d)-As written, this section provides that recommendations for
the highest performance awards to SFS members in all three foreign affairs
agencies must be reviewed by the Secretary of State before going to the Presi-
dent. We propose amending the section to allow, the Director of USICA and AID
Administrator to'make recommendations directly to the President or to a third
party such as the Office of Personnel Management.
This provision was passed by Congress as a substitute for premium pay after
the latter was prohibited to all Foreign Service Officers and Foreign Service In-
formation Officers by the Pell Amendment (section 412, P.L. 95-105). We opposed
the Pell amendment and have sought its repeal. Junior and middle level officers
should be entitled to overtime compensation on the same basis as other govern-
ment employees. Special allowances are not an adequate substitute. Only seven
positions in USICA are currently certified as eligible.
Item (2) should be deleted, per our comments regarding section 441, perform-
ance pay.
7. SECTION 602. PROMOTION AND RETENTION IN THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE
Subsection ('b)-This section should be deleted. By making the need for attri-
tion a prominent factor, this section conflicts with the provision that promotions
will be made based upon merit principles.
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Subsection (a)-Provision should be made for a minimum time-in-class for
those in the SFS if the "limited extension" is retained, to assure to officers a
reasonable expectation of continued employment for a given period. Periods of
live and eight years have been suggested.
Subsection (b) -Deletion should be made of the "limited extension". This pro-
vision has no equivalent in the Civil Service Senior Executive Service. It places
awesome power into the hands of management to eliminate senior level officers
for any number of reasons, and to keep them in a constant state of uncertainty
and conformity. In our view this device will not enhance performance considera-
tions but will expand the area for non-performance factors.
Subsection (c)-We propose amendment of this section to provide a "para-
chute clause" similar to that in the SFS to entitle a SFS member to retreat to the
FS-1 level for the remainder of time-in-class. Addition would be made of the
following language :
"Members of the Senior Foreign Service shall, upon election, be entitled to
return to the FS-1 level and assigned to a non-SFS position for the period, if
any, remaining to be served in class 1 under applicable time-in-class regulations.
In determining the length of time remaining, periods previously served in class 1
and periods served in the SFS shall be subtracted from the time-in-class period."
Our position is that the labor management chapter of the Civil Service Reform
Act should apply to the Foreign Service except with regard to definition of unit
and unit membership. The existing units reflect the unique characteristics of
the Foreign Service although admittedly they do not conform with normal labor
relations principles. Should the present legislation go forward with a separate
labor management system for the Foreign Service, we have the following specific
objections or comments which in large part, simply point to areas in which the
proposed bill is not equivalent to the Civil Service Reform Act.
Section 1005 (a) Management Rights-In paragraph 1, deletion should be made
of. the words, "of types and classes". In paragraph 2, deletion should be made of
the word "promote". Paragraph 5 should be deleted in its entirety.
Section 1011. Foreign Service Labor Relations Board-The Board should be
made independent from the Secretary of State. Establishment of an independent
third party whose members are removable only by the President for cause was a
major objective of the labor management section of the Civil Service Reform Act.
We would point out that the Foreign 'Service Labor Relations Board does not
incilude a General Counsel to prosecute unfair labor practices.
Section 1014. Foreign Service Impasse Panel-In subsection (e) deletion
should be made of the words, "or the Secretary finds that the Panel's action is
contrary to the best interests of the Service". As written, the Panel's final orders
are not binding on the foreign affairs agencies.
Section 1103. Freedom of Action-Subsection (b) represents a departure from
current procedures which we do not favor since we believe that with regard to a
legislated appeal procedure, individual choice of a representative is most appro-
priate. The Foreign Service Grievance Board has jurisdiction over matters which
in the Civil Service system would be considered adverse actions and appealable to
the Merit Systems Protection Board. Therefore, we propose deletion of subsection
(b) and substitution of the following:
"(b) The grievant has the right to a representative of his or her own choos-
ing at every stage of the proceedings. The grievant and his/her representatives
who are under the control, supervision or responsibility of the foreign affairs
agencies shall be granted reasonable periods of administrative leave to prepare
be present and to present the grievance. Where the grievant is not represented
by the exclusive representative for Foreign Service employees of the agency,
the exclusive representative shall have the right to be present during the griev-
The Statute should abandon the distinction between those cases in which rem-
.edies may only be recommended by the Board and those cases in which rem-
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edies may be ordered. The procedure should be made equivalent to binding
arbitration. This would be achieved by making the following amendments to
section 1113:
Delete subsection (d).
Revise subsection (b) as follows: add a new paragraph (5), "to promote
an employee who is'found to have previously failed to receive proper con-
sideration. Promotion may be made retroactive where the Board finds that,
but for the failure to be properly considered, the grievant would have been
promoted."
11. SECTION 1203. COMPATIBILITY AMONG AGENCIES EMPLOYING FOREIGN SERVICE
PERSONNEL
Deletion should be made of the word "maximum" in the third line of the sec-
tion. While we agree that the personnel systems of the foreign affairs agencies
should be compatible enough to permit interchange of employees and reason-
able personnel administration at overseas posts, the word "maximum" implies
much more, and perhaps, uniformity. There are any number of reasons why each,
agency should be able to manage. its own personnel : different promotion pat-
terns and rates of attrition, special needs for specialists, varying degrees of poli-
tical sensitivity. Congress recently affirmed its belief that USICA should be an
autonomous agency. To insure that autonomy, references to "maximum" com-
patibility should be eliminated.
12. SECTION 1205. EXCLUSIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE SECRETARY
Deletion should be made of part (6) in accord with our comments on section
441 (nominations for performance awards).
Deletion should be made of part (12) in accord with our comments on section
1011 of Chapter 10 (Foreign Service Labor Relations Board).
13. SECTION 2102. CONVERSION TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE SCHEDULE
Subsection (f)-Deletion should be made in lines 16-17 of the words, "not more
than three years after the effective date of this Act", and substitution made of
the words, "the time-in-class period to be determined by the Secretary which in
no case shall' be less than five years". This provision has no equivalent in the
Civil Service Senior Executive Service where'a person not opting into the SES
may remain in grade without loss of pay or benefits and does not face termina-
tion. The section as proposed is coercive ; an 'individual not within three years
of retirement will have no choice but to enter the SFS. Entry into the SFS is
supposed to be voluntary.
14. SECTION 2103. CONVERSION INTO THE CIVIL SERVICE
Subsection (b) (1)-Deletion should be made of the words, "prior to July 1,
1981". This date does not represent the expiration date of the AFGE 1812/
USICA agreement regarding domestic Foreign Service employees.
15. SECTION 2104. PRESERVATION OF'STATUS AND BENEFITS
Under Secretary of State Read testified on June 21 that employees converted
to the Civil Service will not be subject to loss of pay or grade as long as they do
not voluntarily move to a different position. This guarantee does not appear in
the bill.
16. SECTION 2403. REPORTS
Deletion should be made of. the. word, "maximum" in lines.7-8 on page. 203 in
accord with comments made on section 1203 (Compatibility among agencies em-
ploying Foreign Service personnel).
This section assigns solely to the Secretary of State the duty of reporting to
Congress and making recommendations on the progress of achieving conformity.
The Director of USICA and Administrator of AID should be given access to the
Congress to report and recommend. Foreign Service employees in USICA fear
that this section is an invitation for a recommendation to eliminate the separate
FSIO corps, a step that we would vigorously oppose.
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8335. Mandatory separation
(a) An air traffic controller shall be separated from the service on the last day
of the month in which he becomes 56 years of age. The Secretary of Transporta-
tion, under such regulations as he may prescribe, may exempt a controller having
exceptional skills and experience as a controller from the automatic separation
provisions of this subsection until that controller becomes 61 years of age. The
Secretary of Transportation shall notify the controller in writing of the date of
separation at least 60 days before that date. Action to separate the controller
is not effective, without the consent of the controller, until the last day of the
month in which the 60-day notice expires.
(b) A law enforcement officer or a firefighter who is otherwise eligible for-
immediate retirement under section 8336(c) of this title shall be separated from
the service on the last day of the month in which he becomes 55 years of age or
completes 20 years of service if then over that age. The head of the agency, when
in his judgment the public interest so requires, may exempt such an employee
from automatic separation under this subsection until that employee becomes 60
years of age. The employing office shall notify the employee in writing of the
date of separation at least 60 days in advance thereof. Action to separate the-
employee is not effective, without the consent of the-employee, until the last day
of the month in which the 60-day notice expires.
(c) An employee of the Alaska Railroad in Alaska and an employee who is a
citizen of the United States employed on the Isthmus of Panama by the Panama
Canal Company or the Canal Zone Government, who becomes 62 years of age
and completes 15 years of service in Alaska or on the Isthmus of Panama shall
be automatically separated from the service. The separation is effective on the
last day of the month in which the employee becomes age 62 or completes 15
years of service in Alaska? or on the Isthmus of Panama if then over that age.
The employing office shall notify the employee in writing of the date of separa-
tion at least 60 days in advance thereof. Action to separate the employee is not
effective,' without the consent of the employee, until the last day of the month
in which the 60-day notice expires.
(d) The President, by Executive order, may exempt an employee from auto-
matic separation under this section when he determines the public interest so
requires.
(Pub. L. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 571, amended Pub. L. 92-297, ? 4, May 16,
1972, 86 Stat. 144; Pub. L. 93-350, ? 4, July 12, 1974, 88 Stat. 355; Pub. L. 95-256,
? 5(c) (1)-(3), Apr. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 191.)
? 8336. Immediate retirement
(a) An employee who is separated from the service after becoming 55 years
of age and completing 30 years of service is entitled to an annuity.
(b) An employee who is separated from the service after becoming 60 years
of age and completing 20 years of service is entitled to an annuity.
(c) An employee who is separated from the service after becoming-50 years
of age and completing 20 years of service as a law enforcement officer or fire-
fighter, or any combination of such service totaling at least 20 years, is entitled
to an annuity.
(d) An employee who is separated from the service-
(1) involuntarily, except by removal for cause on charges of misconduct
or delinquency ; or
(2) voluntarily, during a period when the agency in which the employee
is serving is undergoing a major reorganization, a major reduction in force,
or a major transfer of function, as determined by the Office of Personnel
Management, and the employee is serving in a geographic area designated
by the Office ;
after completing 25 years of service or after becoming 50 years of age and
completing 20 years of service is entitled to an annuity.
(e) An employee who is voluntarily or involuntarily separated from the service,
except by removal for cause on charges of misconduct or delinquency, after
completing 25 years of service as an air traffic controller or after becoming
50 years of age and completing 20 years of service as an air traffic controller, is
entitled to an annuity.
(f) An employee who is separated from the service after becoming 62 years
of age and completing 5 years of service is entitled to an annuity.
50-236-80-20
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302
(g) A Member who is separated from the service after becoming 62 years
of age and completing 5 years of civilian service or after becoming 60 years of
age and completing 10 years of Member service is entitled to an annuity. A
Member who is separated from the service after becoming 55 years of age (but
before becoming 60 years of age) and completing 30 years of service is enitled to
a reduced annuity. A Member who is separated from the service, except by resig-
nation or expulsion, after completing 25 years of service or after becoming 50
years of age and (1) completing 20 years of service or (2) serving in 9 Con-
gresses is entitled to an annuity.
(h) A member of the Senior Executive Service who is removed from the Senior,
Executive Service for less than fully successful executive performance (as deter=
mined under subchapter II of chapter 43 of this title) after completing 25 years
of service or after becoming 50 years of age and completing 20 years of service
is entitled to an annuity.
(i) An annuity or reduced annuity authorized by this section is computed
under section 8339 of this title. (Pub. L. 80-554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 571,
amended Pub. L. 90-83, ? 1(75) , Sept. 11, 1967, 81 Stat. 214; Pub. L. 92-297,
? 5, May 16, 1972, 86 Stat. 114; Pub. L. 92-382, ? 1, Aug. 14, 1972, 86 Stat. 539;
Pub. L. 93-39, June 12, 1973, 87 Stat. 73; Pub. L. 93-350, ? 5, July 12, 1974, 88
Stat. 356; Pub. L. 94-183, ? 2 (40) and (41), Dec. 31, 1975, 89 Stat. 1059; Pub.
L. 95-454, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1147, 1175.)
ANNEX III
PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH T. BLAYLOCK, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, AMERI-
CAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
The American Federation of Government Employees appreciates the oppor-
tunity to comment on the proposed regulations, "22 . C.FR Chapter II, Agency
for International Development, subchapter B-Personnel."
Because of the peculiar genesis of these regulations, the many versions in
which they have been successively cast, and the exegesis by legal authorities
and ultimately by the courts which may be placed on their complex and trou-
bled origins, I shall try to simplify the presentation of our concerns as much as
possible. For that reason, I should like to comment on the regulations under the
following headings :
1. The Date of Submission of the Regulations ;
2. The Regulations as "Law";
3. The "Best Personnel System" Using Two Personnel Authorities ;
4. Specific Comments on the Regulations as Submitted ;
5. Recommendation that the Congress Disapprove the Regulations.
THE DATE OF SUBMISSION OF THE REGULATIONS
I note that the regulations purport to have been submitted under Section 401
of Public Law 95-424, 92 Stat. 956, 22 USC, enacted on October 6, 1978. If I
am not incorrect, it appears that that law required the proposed regulations to
be submitted not later than March 15, 1979. Yet, to my knowledge, they were
submitted on, or approximately on, May 1, 1979.
It appears that, with respect to these regulations, there may be a legal de-
ficiency arising out of that fact alone. This concern appears to be shared by
the House of Representatives which has, reportedly, taken some action by
amending H.R. 3324 (the 1980-1981 Authorization Bill for the Agency for In-
ternational Development and the Peace Corps). seekinz to overcome this de-
ficiency by substituting the words "May 1, 1979" for "March 15, 1979". As to
whether this action by the House is sufficient to remove the legal handicap,
I am unable to judge because H.R. 3324 has not yet received consideration by
the Senate and, certainly, it has not been enacted.
All of us then, at this hearing, are confronted with certain exceptional legal
fictions which appear not to have been anticipated by the Founding Fathers.
the drafters of the Constitution, and the judges of the courts. A shadow of
illegitimacy falls over the very submission of these regulations even before
the Congress has had the opportunity to reflect on them as to their Constitu-
tionality or their intrinsic merits.
That this shadow may be more than an insubstantial shade of the moment is
suggested by a recent action of the Congress in passing. judgment on D.C. Act
2-10 which presented a similar problem in law.`That Act, creating a new person-
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nel system for the District of Columbia, included a series of provisions apparently
in conflict with the statute establishing Home Rule for the District of Columbia.
Among others, to which the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee took excep-
tion, was the inclusion within it of provisions similar to H.R. 10, the Hatch Act
amendments passed by the Congress but vetoed by the President. These provisions
would have entitled D.C. employees to greater rights to participate in political
activities. The legal conflict which the Senate Committee perceived arose from
the curious juxtaposition of effective dates. Although. forbidden by the Home
Rule Act to legislate in this area, the D.C. Council incorporated H.R. 10 in Act
2-10, on the stipulation that it would not become effective until the Congress
lifted the prohibition to legislate.. Even though this was clear and repeatedly re-
inforced in the legislation at many points, the Senate Committee insisted that the
D.C. Council be convoked in emergency session and repeal this provision, because
,of the failure of the D.C. Council to comply literally/ with the Home Rule Act.
The governing date was held by the Committee to be the date of approval of Act
2-1.0 and not the date on which the Congress lifted the prohibition.
In our opinion, the regulations submitted to you by the Agency are under a
cloud at least as somber as that involved in Act 2-10 of the D.C. Council. Thus,
it appears that the chronological date of the 90 days for Congressional consider-
ation is highly ambiguous. Will these 90 days be different in the House and Sen-
ate? Do the 90 days begin from the date of hearings in each House of Congress?
Or do they begin on the date on which the Senate accepts, if it does, the House
amendment in H.R. 3324, or the date on which the President signs it?
This factor might not have been so important if the provisions of Section 401
of Public Law 95-424 required both Houses to approve the regulations. How-
,ever, the opposite is true. If neither disapproves, the regulations are to have the
force of law. Can one House of Congress now deny another House the right to
deliberate action? Would that be the case if the Senate did not have the oppor-
tunity to review these regulations, or even legislate on H.R. 3324 within 90 days?
In any case, we urge that these issues be clarified so that all the interested
parties have the same understanding of fact and law. For our part, we can state
now that this very circumstance of confusion has seriously disturbed the em-
ployees of the Agency for International Development. Quite frankly, they fear
that, if this kind of ineptitude awkwardness, and inefficiency accompanies these
regulations at the outset, when one would hope for clarity, the future will prob-
::ably bring manipulation, deviousness, and policies based on ad hoc and ad per-
srnmem arrangements violating the most fundamental precepts of merit personnel
.systems. The prospects for likely appeals to the Office of Personnel Management,
to the Special Counsel of the Merit Protection Board and to the courts already
-loom large in the visions of these employees.
This certainly does not indicate a well-managed Agency with high morale
among its managers and employees.
THE REGULATIONS 'AS "LAW"
Obviously, all Regulations issued pursuant to statutes have the "force and
,effect of law," even if the Regulations do not so state. There is, however, an order
of precedence in "law," the highest being the Constitution. Next are statutes en-
acted by Congress. Lowest are Regulations, and . Executive Orders. The highest
cannot be transgressed by the lower and the Congress cannot change this order
and cannot divest itself of its own proper powers, rights, or duties nor the Exec.u-
tive arrogate Congressional rights to itself.
Statutes can be passed only by the Congress of the United States and no regu-
lation can supersede or nullify any statutes unless the Congress has previously
specifically modified or repealed those statutes which had the force of law.
Otherwise, we would confront the Constitutional issue that the Congress had
-permitted the abrogation of its own inalienable rights under the Constitution to
legislate and had invested unconstitutionally the Executive Branch with the
exercise of these rights by Executive Regulations or Orders.
The text of the Section 401 of Public Law 95-424, which is cited in these
Regulations, does not reveal such a Congressional intent to set aside the statutes
which apply to Federal employees nor does the legislative history indicate that
such a possible intent was even considered. Moreover, since the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978. Public Law 95-454 was enacted later than Public Law
95-424, it is the statutory standard by which the courts will determine Congres-
s sional intent regarding the legality of any Regulations issued at this time. Con-
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sequently, all the rights of Federal employees which have not been altered by
statute are applicable and any regulations issued pursuant to Section 401 of
Public Law 95-424 may not transgress civil service law, least of all the provisions
of Public Law 95-454.
THE BEST PERSONNEL SYSTEM USING TWO PERSONNEL AUTHORITIES
As to the best system, It is my view that all personnel who serve in the United,
States and who, in the normal course of their assignments will not be serving
abroad, should be in the General Schedule.
I am pleased to be able to cite in support of my judgment the views of thee-
Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign
Policy. I recommend that portion of its Report dealing with personnel to you and,
enclose a photocopy of pages 171-175, entitled "Improving Departmental Person-
nel Management," as an Annex to this Statement.
The model suggested by the Commission has become the standard used by all
departments and agencies dealing primarily in foreign affairs including the
Department of State and the International Communication Agency. As your.
know, our union represents both the civil service and the foreign service compo-
nents of the latter Agency and we participated actively in the recent Reorganiza-
tion Plan which restructured that Agency.
On the basis of our own involvement in seeking solutions for personnel prob-
lems in agencies having foreign affairs roles and programs, it is our view that all
clerical, technical, administrative, professional, policy, and "other" (guards,.
etc.) personnel, whose employment will be primarily or exclusively in the United
States, should be under the classified civil' service, where positions are based on
rank-in-job. These should include those professional employees (lawyers, ac-
countants, contract specialists)' whose main function is to deal with domestic
counterparts (such as domestic universities, domestic private institutions, con-
sulting firms).
On the other hand, all those personnel whose sole or primary function will be
to deal with foreign governments, more specifically to reside abroad and super-
vise programs carried out abroad, should be in the foreign service. We state this
on the premise that the exigencies of foreign 'service abroad can be better met,
in very many cases, by a rank-in-person personnel system. For the sake of sim-
plicity, and uniformity, it is logical to recognize these frequent exigencies and
assign persons regularly serving abroad to a specialized foreign service which has
readily available special authorizations and appropriations to meet these exigent
needs.
Both for rotational reasons, and to assure their proper influence on the policies.
both substantive and personnel, of the Agency, adequate positions in the United
States should be reserved for foreign service personnel.
It has been suggested by some persons that all "policy" positions should be in
the foreign service because the Agency is involved in foreign operations. Al-
though this attitude may appear to be based on self-evident principles, I should
like to point out that such.a claim,;bas?not been recognized for selecting even-the-
Secretary of State and that the recent Administrators of the Agency, the persons
in its top policy making positions, seem not to have emerged from the foreign
service of that Agency. Instead, it appears, the intention in appointing and con-
firming the A.I.D. Administrator was to assure that U.S. policies, the wills of
the Congress and of the President, were. carried out in the administration of
these aid programs.. -
As to other senior "policy" positions, I should like to inouire whether the re-
cent authorities established under Public Law.95-454, the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978, for the "rank-in-person" and "policy related" Senior Executive Serv-
ice'appear to be totally inadequate for the needs of "policy making" in the Agency
and whether there is a real need to establish a'novel and unprecedented Foreign
Senior Executive 'Service to discharge these functions.
I raise this point because it has been held by legal counsel of the Civil Service
Commission, now"the Office of Personnel Management, that every Department
head, even now, has the basic legal right to "order the transfer of any Federal
employee, whether civil service; excepted service, foreign service, or any other
service, anywhere in" the world. Of course, the"transfer must be reasonable and
must not be discriminatory or capricious or serve ulterior purposes. For the vast
majority of Federal employees. Department heads do not exercise these rights
because they can achieve their personnel missions' more easily and less ex-
pensively by other means, such as voluntary reassignments or local hire or tem-
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porary duty or detached service assignments. However, in those cases where
Departments need, in fulfillment of their missions, to transfer personnel to.other
geographic locations, including service abroad (as in the case of various auditors
or inspectors, the immigration service, the customs service), they do so under
the civil service authorities made known in the job descriptions of their em-
ployees or posted as a condition of employment. Just as in the foreign service,
civil service employees may refuse to serve, of course, in which case, if insub-
ordinate, they can be reprimanded, disciplined, or terminated. Consequently, it
is a serious misstatement that the authority to assign or transfer personnel
abroad resides only in the foreign service.
Regarding the best personnel system, I should like to reiterate that all posi-
tions, clerical, technical, administrative, professional, policy making and "other,"
when the function will be primarily to discharge duties in the United States,
should be under the authorities established in Title V of the Federal Statutes,
governing the Civil Service in its various denominations (Senior Executive Serv-
ice, Excepted Service, Classified and Competitve General Schedule and Prevailing
Wage Rate). All functions which will be discharged by regular assignments
nbroad should be in the foreign service, as they are in the Department of State
and the International Communication Agency, with positions reserved in Wash-
ington, D.C., for foreign service personnel on rotational assignment in the United
States. All policy making positions requiring explicit foreign service experience
should of course be reserved to experienced foreign service personnel, but all
senior policy positions which do not require primary foreign service experience
should be in the Senior Executive Service under Subchaper II of Title V, United
States Code, since these personnel can be required to go anywhere when needed.
SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE REGULATIONS AS SUBMITTED
Our first observation is that the Regulations do not conform to the instructions
In Section 401 of Public Law 95-424. This is simply a statement of fact, of course,
because we do not believe that that passage is legally sufficient to bring into being
its purpose.
Consequently, for the rest of this testimony, I shall set aside the legal issues
and discuss,the personnel proposals solely in terms of merit.
Earlier, in describing the "best" system I had made the point, and adduced
the views of others, to the effect that sufficient positions should he reserved to
accommodate foreign service personnel on rotation. This is a very different issue
from designating specific positions; that is, reserving them exclusively for for-
~eign service personnel. This makes for inflexibility, an inflexibility which harms
both management and employees.
First, such designation is in effect a further affirmative action criteron in
its worst form, the quota system. Second, it is an administratively determined
affirmative action criterion which takes in fact precedence over all the statutory
affirmative actions mandated by Congress, including Veterans Preference, laws
against discrimination because of sex, race, or national origin.
Thirdly, the regulations violate the most important purpose of Section 401-
to get personnel overseas. The regulations submitted by the Agency do the re-
verse. They will mandate an increase in the number of foreign service per-
sonnel in Washington, D.C. All the correspondence and comments which we
have read indicate that currently there are 470 foreign service personnel in
Washington whereas, under the Regulations, there will be eventually nearly
800, 700 in designated positions and another 100 in General Schedule positions.
I note that, for some reason, the Agency's personnel tables seek to obscure
this eventual development by limiting the identified foreign service positions
to a time span of five years. We regret this obfuscation, because a careful read-
ing reveals that 700 positions will be "designated" and another 100 positions
will, in fact, be "reserved" for foreign service personnel within the General
Schedule grades.
I have already stated that we believe it is illegal to impose conditions by reg-
ulation which violate rights granted by statute. We believe such illegal situa-
tions will be created in every case where civil service personnel will be told
they must join the foreign service or will be denied the normal promotions in
the career ladders in which they are situated. The mere fact that a position
in a higher grade has been "designated" foreign service will not, in our opinion,
he a barrier to the civil servant obtaining redress and in fact obtaining the
promotion. We are sure that the rights of Veterans, of women, of minorities,
will not be foreclosed by any such devious administrative action.
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Thus, in the end, it appears that the regulations will collapse as soon as they
are tested by the rule of statute.
We hope, that, for the sake of the interim morale and efficiency of the
Agency, the Congress will not permit such an anguished demise of proposals whose:
birth have all the characteristics not only of illegitimacy but unviability.
RECOMMENDATION THAT THE CONGRESS DISAPPROVE THE REGULATION
For all the reasons which we have cited, I recommend that Congress din
approve these regulations as inconsistent with the requirements of Section.
401, inconsistent with Constitutional criterion, violative of statutes, and un-
worthy in their conception and formulation, as measured by the standards of'
a merit personnel system.
In their place, we recommend that the Congress draft a new set of statutes.
applicable to, all Foreign Affairs Agencies, including the Department of State,
the 'International, Cominunication Agency, and -the Agency for International
Development.
Such a Congressional initiative would provide viability and legitimacy to,
the sound purpose for which Section 401 was written-to get foreign service
personnel abroad as quickly and as long as possible.
In conclusion, I should like to state once again our appreciation for the Op-
portunity to comment and to assure you that we will cooperate with the Con-
gress to the fullest extent possible in seeking new, better legislation for the,
personnel of all the foreign affairs agencies.
The FSO in our view, though now recruited as a generalist, becomes potentially
a specialist in conducting bilateral relations. In today's world, he is not a "for-
eign affairs generalist" in the sense of seeing national policies in Presidential'
and Secretarian perspectives. There are too many streams of consideration and
competences which, must be, integrated with bilateral competence to produce
foreign policy in a world where multilateral issues will increasingly predominate.
However, the FSO should have the opportunity to earn the broader designation.
by solid achievement in many subject matter areas, by reaching out to broaden
himself through assignments and training and by competing with others within
and outside the Departments.
In one area in particular the FSO must intensify his efforts and develop his
talents : the rigor and depth of foreign assessment. Some analysis and assessment
is now performed in connection with political, economic, military, and tech-
nological reporting. But studies for this Commission and others indicate that
present reporting, while voluminous, too often focuses on description of events
and conversations and too little upon the meaning and longer-term possibilities-
In Chapter 9 we have discussed in considerable length the nature of this assess-
ment role.
An increase in analysis and in the ability to explore and present bold policy
and program options does not come simply by willing it at the Secretary's level.
It can only be the product of a broad, well-conceived strategy which includes
recruiting, developing, promoting and encouraging people who are at home in
this task. If we want innovators and free systematic exploration of ideas, man-
agement must set a new framework and behave in a way which demonstrates its
commitment. The Commission recommends that :
The Foreign Service should be recruited, trained, and sized to its historic mis-
sion-that of representing U.S. interests in foreign countries. This requires people-
willing to and psychologically attuned to serve in alien and difficult situation.s-
a7nd who have strong basic competence in area studies and language.
A major change in emphasis, however, should be directed toward improvement
in rigorous short and longer term assessments of U.S. interests and analytic-
reporting.
The officers should be broadened by experience and training for the new assess-
ment emphasis, particularly in the area of economics.
Improving Departmental Personnel Management.-The problems of personnel
management, whether those of the functional bureaus or the Foreign Service,
are symptoms of a more fundamental problem. The top management of State is-
of necessity so policy and externally oriented that it has little time for sustained'
attention to internal management. All Secretaries of State have shown interest
in management and a desire to make lasting improvements in the working of the
Department. But sustained attention to internal management strategy and
implementation has been lacking since the era of Marshall and Acheson.
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Past studies have focused on the number two man in the Department, now the
Deputy Secretary. Many have felt be should play the role of "Mr. Inside," and
preeminently concern himself with Departmental management. As the alter ego
of the Secretary, however, he faces heavy policy pressures. He serves as Acting
Secretary when the Secretary is out of the country. He is on tap with the White.
House and bears a large share of the burden of Congressional testimony. He is
also absorbed in interagency problems, particularly with Defense. This problem
is frequently exacerbated by fuzzy delineation of duties between the Secretary
and his Deputy. The "one-two relationship" is always difficult, even with experi-
enced managers involved.
The greatest need is to develop a clear Secretarial view in the management of
the Department. We conclude that it is feasible and logical to use the Deputy
Under Secretary as the major vehicle for meeting this need. There should be a
clear Presidential and Secretarial charter as to what is to be done. The individual
selected for this position must have the management and foreign policy stature
and-closeness to the Secretary to do the job; there must be adequate arrange-
ments for reporting to the Secretary through the Deputy and for keeping abreast
of the evolving substance of foreign policy.
It is important to emphasize that the Secretary remains responsible for the
management of the Department and its personnel and that the Deputy Under
Secretary is acting for him. Also, personnel management should be coupled with
budget management under the Deputy Under Secretary for Management. The
combination of budget and personnel provides the necessary strength to plan
and carry out this difficult assignment.
The vacuum in consistent management direction from the top has been filled
by the Foreign Service, the continuing body which cares most. Today, it
dominates the Department through the personnel management function. The
assignment process is of course. a critical element in this control.
'The'chief'of personnel in the State' Department is the Director General of
the Foreign Service, who by law, must be a Foreign Service Officer. The rotation
in the job is high; there have been 13 Directors General in 28 years. The person
with the title of "Director of Personnel" reports to the Director General and
is also an FSO. Moreover, the four Deputy Directors of Personnel heading the-
major personnel functions are FSOs, as are most of the other major sub-
ordinate jobs in the personnel area.
This condition makes for a tendency to visualize personnel policy for the,
Department in terms of the needs and aspirations of the Foreign Service Corps.
It results in high turnover and lack of professionalism in personnel activities.
It must be changed if the Department wants to develop a professional personnel
function which meets in optimum fashion its needs for special competence and',
continuity.
The Board of the Foreign Service is advisory to the Secretary of State on
procedures and policies related to administration of the Foreign Service. It is
established by Executive Order and all functions are vested in the Secretary.
The Board is composed of four officials of State, one representative each from
AID. USIA. Commerce, Labor and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission.
OMB has observer status. The current chairman is the Deputy Secretary.
In light of the proposals herein to strengthen Departmental personnel man-
agement, the role, functions and membership of the Board of the Foreign
Service should be renewed. Its main continuity function might be to advise-
the Secretary on cross-agency aspects of overseas representation and reporting-
by the Foreign Service. Perhaps it should be given it wider role in advising on
executive development and coss-agency exchange and training.
The Commission recommends that :
Responsibility for Department-wide personnel management functions should"
be centered in the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, who should be
made Under Secretary.
A modern, professional personnel function should be established at the De-
partment level, with a Director reporting to the Under Secretary for Manage-
ment. His task would be to see that viable careers are developed within all'
personnel categories and that all systems work to the full benefit of the
Department.
The Director General of the Foreign Service should report to the Director of
Personnel and should focus upon the administration of the high mobility officer-
component (FSOs) within prescribed Departmental policy.
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The Board of the Foreign Service should be reviewed and reoriented to a new
cross-agency mission as discussed- above. The Under Secretary for Management
should lead the review and be designated Chairman of the reconstituted board.
The Under Secretary for Management should be responsible for developing,
.for the Secretary's approval, an annual Department manpower plan as a vehicle
for determining the needs for, and deployment of people and skills-over 3-5 years.
The Policy Planning Staff should play a key role in developing for the
Secretary's approval basic guidance as to the policy directions, shifts in deploy-
ment emphasis at overseas posts, and critical competences to be acquired.
Executive Department.-The Department needs a strong extensive develop-
ment program to produce the pool of career executives to fulfill its policy leader-
ship role. The program should be based upon the following key principles :
All personnel in all systems in the Department should have the opportunity
to rise to the top career jobs in Washington and overseas based upon merit
.and performance.
The GS, FSR/U, FSO, and FSS, and the major career ladders.create within
each, would be considered "feeder.systenrs" leading to a Foreign Affairs Execu-
tive Service at the top (GS-16 and FSO/R, 0-2,and above).
Jobs in the Executive Service, as designated by the Secretary, would be filled,
when vacant by a special "selection-in" process involving full review of all poten-
tial candidates and recommendations by line managers and the proposed Execu-
tive Development Staff.
Key "stepping-stone" jobs throughout the Department would be identified and
used for career development purposes for candidates from all systems.
Supervisors at home and abroad would be made responsible for identifying and
developing candidates with executive potential, and the supervisors would be
,evaluated on the performance in this score.
The responsibility for administering State's Executive Development Program
on behalf of the Secretary should be placed on the Under Secretary for Manage-
ment. Based upon the experience in industry, a professional Executive Develop-
ment Staff should be established reporting directly to the Under Secretary and
:separate from the Department's regular personnel activities. This staff, which
might number 10-12, would work with the Director of Personnel and other
Departmental officials in performing the following functions :
Knowing in depth the. best promotion candidates in all systems in the grades
just below the executive level who might be qualified for designated jobs :
Recommending to the Secretary candidates for designated executive job
,openings ;
Developing overall policy and procedures for an executive manpower system ;
Assisting units of State in defining executive jobs accurately and in developing
annual executive manpower reviews; and
Monitoring the operation of the program from the perspectives of the Secretary.
The Executive Development Staff must be highly competent, objective profes-
sionals, and perceived as such throughout the organization. They are not king-
makers. Their recommendations on filling designated executive jobs, however,
would supplement those of Department managers and would be based upon inde-
pendent and extensive investigations, including interviews with the candidates,
their subordinates, their peers, and their supervisors. This procedure would pro-
vide the Secretary with a new viewpoint in the selection of executive talent.
We further believe that the executive search, and development process in State
is so important that it should look beyond the confines of the Department.
State's Executive Development Staff should be aware of high potential candidates,
for the Executive Service from other agencies and from outside the Government.
This staff should also actively create and monitor interagency assignments and
private sector exchanges for State personnel which contribute to the broadening
of experience.
Presidential appointments to key Departmental posts including ambassadors
would continue to be made from the White House. It is assumed, however, that.
the President would build his selection process,on State's Executive Development
Program and would use the pool of career executive talent to a large extent in
making such appointments.
The Commission recommends that:
The Under Secretary for Management should establish an Executive Develop-
'snent Program administered by a professional staff reporting directly to him
(outside but related to regular Personnel functions).
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Promotions to designated executive jobs (largely FSO-2 and GS-16 and
above) should be subject to special procedures of a Foreign Affairs Executive
Service (FAES).
Candidates would be "selected in" to executive jobs in the FAES by the
Secretary on the basis of recommendations from line managers and the emecu-
tive development staff.
The purpose of the Executive Development program would be to find the
best talent from all categories within the Department based on the Secretary's.
defined needs. It should be part of a community-wide approach.
Civil No. 3141-71
(Filed, June 12, 1973, James F. Davey, Clerk)
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, ET AL., PLAINTIFFSj-
v.
WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL., DEFENDANTS
Memorandum and Order
This action is before the Court on the cross motions of the parties for summary
judgment. Hearing on the motions was held on April 27, 1973. Upon considera-
tion of the complaint and answer, the motions, the affidavits, exhibits and'
statements of material facts not in dispute filed herein as well as the memoranda
and oral argument of counsel heard in open court, and the entire record in this
cause the Court concludes that the motion of plaintiffs must be granted in part
and denied in part, and that defendants' motion must be denied. The findings
of fact and conclusions of law which led to this determination follow.
A. The Parties
Plaintiff, American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) is a na-
tional union affiliated with the AFL-CIO. It represents employees of various
agencies of the Federal government pursuant to Executive Order No. 11491,
"Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service," 34 Fed. Reg. 17605 (1969).
Plaintiff Local 1812, AFGE, has been accorded exclusive recognition under
the said Executive Order to represent "all non-supervisory domestic General'
Schedule (GS and GG) and Wage System [Civil Service]" employees in the
United States Information Agency (USIA). Plaintiff Local 1534, AFGE, has been
accorded exclusive recognition under the said Executive Order to represent
non-supervisory Civil Service employees in the Publishing and Reproduction
Division of the Department of State, as well as language instructors at the-
Foreign Service Institute, Department of State.
Intervenor plaintiffs Josephine C. Campbell, Bruce N. Gregory and Rose F.
Kobylinski are Civil Service employees of USIA. Intervenor plaintiffs William
P. O'Brien and Nancy R. Schroeder are Civil Service employees of the Depart-
ment of State."
Defendant William P. Rogers is the Secretary of State, charged with the re-
sponsibility of supervising and directing the affairs of the Department of State,.
including the supervision and direction of the activities of the personnel of the.
Department, both Civil Service and Foreign Service.
1None of the named plaintiffs represent personnel of the Foreign Service under the
provisions of Executive Order 11636. governing representation of Foreign 'Service person-
nel. Foreign Service personnel of both the Department of State and the United States
Information Agency are exclusively represented by the American Foreign Service Associa-
tion. which is not a party to this action. The standing of the plaintiffs is discussed below at
p. 9.
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Defendant James Keogh is the Director of the USIA. He is charged with re-
sponsibility for supervising and ,directing the affairs of that agency, including
the supervision and direction of the activities of the personnel of the agency,
'both Civil Service personnel and personnel of the Foreign Service.
Defendants are responsible in their respective agencies for the conduct of
Foreign Affairs Specialist Corps (FAS) programs challenged in this action.
B. The FAS Programs
On February 16, 1971, the Department of State issued a document styled
"Management Reform Bulletin" which purported to establish a new "Unified
Personnel System" in State to be known as "The Foreign Affairs Specialist
(FAS) Corps."a The bulletin stated that the Foreign Affairs Specialist Corps
was to parallel and complement the Foreign Service Officer Corps. State's em-
ployees were advised that "Its establishment grows out of the conclusions of
. Task Forces and earlier management study groups that a unified Foreign
Service personnel system would give the Department the advantage of greater
management flexibility."'
The Management Reform Bulletin stated further that, with exceptions not
here relevant, all existing Foreign Service and Civil Service officer positions in
State. whether located in the United States or overseas, had already redesignated
'"as either FSO [Foreign Service Officer] or FSRU (FAS) ' [Foreign Service
Reserve Unlimited, (Foreign Affairs Specialist)], "i.e., as positions suitable for
staffing by personnel from the Foreign Service personnel system by the provisions
of the Foreign Service Act, as amended (Title 22 U.S.C. ? 801 et seq.)
The new FSO and FSRU (FAS) system is distinct from the Civil Service sys-
tem established and maintained pursuant to the various Civil Service laws con-
tained in Title 5 of the United States Code.
Accordingly, the Department notified all of its Civil Service officer employees
and all of its Foreign Service Reserve Officers and Foreign Service Staff Officers
that "under the authority of Public Law 90-494, (22 U.S.C. Section 922-32)
State would immediately accept applications for conversion of all such employees
to the new Foreign Affairs Specialist Corps," the applicant in each case to be
removed upon approval of his or her application, from their existing employment
categories in either the Civil Service or the Foreign Service to "FSRU (FAS) or
PSO."
The Management Reform Bulletin continued :
"(i) Civil Service applicants for conversion, not previously subject to service
abroad in their Civil Service positions now resdesignated "FAS," would continue
to be exempt in most cases from service abroad after conversion to the Foreign
Service ;
"(ii) Civil Service applicants for conversion, not theretofore subject to "selec-
tion out" procedures of the Foreign Service Act (22 U.S.C. ? 1003, et seq.), would
upon conversion to the Foreign Service, be "exempted from selection-out" for
periods up to 10 years or until their first promotion after conversion ; and
"(iii) Civil Service applicants for conversion would, upon conversion to the
Foreign Service, "become eligible for earlier retirement at a slightly higher
annuity under the Foreign Service Retirement System."
The Reform Bulletin made it clear that Civil Service employees who failed to
apply for conversion or who were ineligible for conversion under the terms and
conditions of the new FAS program, would gradually find deminished-opportu-
nities-for future promotion. In this regard, the bulletin stated :
"As the plan for implementation of a Foreign Affairs Specialist Corps pro-
gresses, however, it must be expected that promotional opportunities for those
On July 1. 1971. the Director of the USIA. actin7 on the same legal authority as the
Secretary of State established a new FAS Corps in TJSIA which was patterned in all sub-
stantial aspects on the State Department program. The discussion which follows is accord-
ing1v directed at both programs. P
I It is undisputed that at numerous. times in the. past the implementation of a 'unified
personnel structure at the Department of State has been urged by various and distinguished
groups charged with the task of exploring ways to improve the efficiency of that depart-
ment. The most comprehensive and detailed of such studies were included in the reports of
the Hoover Commission of 1949. the Rowe. Ramsneck, DeCourcey Committee of 1950, the
Wriston Committee of 197i4 and the Herter Committee of 1962.
? ?FAS" (Foreign Affairs Specialist) is it creature of defendants making. It is only a
program and not a personnel des+enation found in the Foreign Service Act as are FSO
(Foreign Service Officer) and FSRTJ (Foreign Service Reserve With Unlimited Tennr).
FSRU Is the personnel category utilized by defendants to create and execute the FAS
program.
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(Civil Service employees] remaining in positions designated for FSO or FAS
staffing are bound to decrease * * *"
Those who would be ineligible for transfer to the new FAS Corps included :
(i) Applicants unable to obtain the necessary "medical clearance" from the
Department's Medical Director ;
(ii) Applicants who were not citizens of the United States "for at least 5 years"
or who did not possess "3 years of satisfactory service with the Department ;"
(iii) All applicants who were over certain specified ages and;
(iv) All applicants under 59 years of age who failed to convert by December
21, 1973."
The bulletin further indicated that FAS personnel would normally be expected
to spend some time abroad and would be "encouraged to acquire some foreign
language proficiency." Because of the likelihood of overseas duty, members of
their family would also be required to obtain "medical clearance". from the
Department's Medical Director.
In 1971 when State and USIA announced their intentions to proceed admin-
istratively a with the creation of the above described unified Foreign Affairs
personnel systems in their respective agencies, their programs, reduced to essen-
tials, consisted of three elements: viz (1) the designation of officer-level posi-
tions within the Department of State and USIA for future staffing by Foreign
Service personnel; (2) the assignment of Foreign Service personnel to such
designated positions and (3) the appointment of present Civil Service and For-
,eign Service personnel as Foreign Service Reserve officers with unlimited tenure.
To evaluate the effect of the personnel shifts inherent in the programs it must
be kept in mind that the Foreign Service personnel system is administered
exclusively by top grade State Department and USIA management officials (22
U.S.C.?? 811a, 821, 826; Executive Orders 1.0477, 10522). These officials are au-
thorized to keep "efficiency records" of all employees in the Foreign Service and
they have unfettered discretion to decide which employees should be promoted
,and which should be subject to "selection out" (22 U.S.C. ?? 991, 993) for failure
to achieve promotion within,time periods devised and enforced by their superiors.
(22 U.S.C. ? 1003)
The Foreign Service system is oriented only toward personnel classification
by grade and persons in a particular grade may be assigned to wherever the
,Secretary or Director determines they will be most effective.
'Civil Service employees on the other hand are appointed to their positions
in accordance with Examination, Selection, Appointment and Placement laws
administered by the Civil Service Commission (5 U.S.C. ? 3301 et seq.). They
hold their positions subject to the protections afforded by the Veterans' Prefer-
ence Act (5 U.S.C. ?? 3309-3313, 3363, 3501-3504, 7511-12 and 7701). the Adverse
Action statutes (5 U.S.C. ? 5115 et seq.). They are promoted under the Civil
,Service Merit System and the Performance Ratings Act (5 U.S.C. ? 4301 et
,seq.)-all of which are subject to the overall jurisdiction and administration
of the Civil Service Commission.
If the three-part program outlined above is put into, effect the comprehensive
hoped-for result will be that all "officer" positions will ultimately be either FSO's
or FAS's at State and FSIO's or FAS's at USIA. For the purposes of the For-
eign Service Act, all FAS's will be in the category of FSRU, and the positions
they fill at'State and USIA will no longer be included in the Civil Service System.
The defendants will be vested with broader discretion and greater flexibility in
-the management of personnel within the State Department and USIA by elimi-
nating virtually all Civil Service "officer" grade positions.
As a practical matter, personnel transferring from the Civil Service to the
Foreign Service will find that the statutory guarantees which adhered to the
positions they held previously have disappeared with the change. The gain by
'their superiors of considerable flexibility in discharging their executive functions
will be accompanied by diminution in the job security of the Civil Service trans-
ferees. The effect on the promotional opportunities of those remaining in the
'Civil Service has been noted above.
It is thus evident that the new FAS programs, if put into operation by defend-
ants in the manner just described will directly affect and will continue to affect
r An earlier attemnt to accomnlish essentially the same result legislatively in 1905 filed
when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee failed to renort out the so-called "Hays
Rill" after strenuous objection by such groups as the AFGE. the Government Employees
Council, the AFL-Clfi, the American Legion and the Veterans' of Foreign Wnre. The
me"sure initiated by Congressman Wayne Hays of Ohio had been approved by the House
-of Representatives on 'September 9, 1965.
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thousands of employees of State and USIA who hold Civil Service positions typical,
,of those found throughout the Executive Branch.
II. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
For the purposes of this discussion the Court accepts defendants position that
the creation of a unified personnel system will culminate in heightened morale,
and more efficient operations of State and USIA. However, we must still deter-
mine whether the specific steps they propose to take to achieve that added effi-
ciency violate the laws under which State and USIA operate.
A. Standing
Earlier in these proceedings the defendants challenged plaintiff AFGE's stand-
ing to bring this action. On February 16, 1973, the Court, by oral ruling, denied'
defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing. In the interest of formulat-
ing an adequate record, the Court deems it expedient at this time to detail its%
reasons for that order.
It is axiomatic that an organization whose members are injured may represent
those members in a proceeding for judicial review, NAACP v.' Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963). Furthermore, it is established in this circuit that a union composed
of federal employee members has standing to sue on behalf of those members
when they are injured or threatened with injury by the federal agency which
employs them, Lodge 1858, AFGE v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882 (D.C.C.A. 1970) United,
Federation of Postal Clerks v. Watson, 409 F.2d 462 (D.C.C.A. 1969). If there,
were any question that organizations in the position of plaintiff AFGE may have-
standing to sue on behalf of aggrieved members it was conclusively answered
in the affirmative by Sierra Club v. Morton, 40 U.S. 727 (1972). Because AFGE'
brings this action in its representative capacity, the Court looks only to the ques-
tion of whether the members it represents are "injured" or "aggrieved" by the-
proposed agency' action of the defendants iii instituting the new FAS program.
Association of Data Processing Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).'
On the question of the individual's standing the Court notes that since "[E]ach
case turns to the nature of the parties, the grievances and the statutory provi-
sions involved * * *," the Court must determine de nova whether individual
AFGE members employed by the Department of State and USIA have standing
,to complain that the defendants have acted illegally and have "arbitrarily
disregarded [their] statutory mandate" to administer provisions of the Foreign
Service Act. Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 125 (D.C.C.A:1969). The entire thrust
of the personnel programs under consideration is toward the concept of an or-
derly personnel system characterized by statutorily defined rights to pay, allow-
ances, retirement benefits and to a lesser extent, promotional opportunities and
job security. It follows that the institution of a pervasive personnel program-
some aspect of which may be illegal-in the two agencies may do violence to that-
concept, and since the interests of. the complainants in the maintenance of an
orderly personnel regime are arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected by the statutes in question, they have standing to bring this action. Asso-
ciation of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, supra, at 155. See also
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Court is persuaded that their interest is-
such that it ensures that the dispute they seek to adjudicate will continue to be.
presented in an.adversary context and in a form historically viewed as eapahle-
of judicial resolution. Sierra Club v. Morton, supra. "[A] person aggrieved in
fact may * * * [avail himself of] * * * a broad conception that congress is.
`hospitable' to the maintenance of complaints' against officials charged with dis-
regarding its substantive mandate." Curran v. Laird. supra, 126. Sec also,
5 U.S.C. ? 702; Pub. L. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966 80 Stat. 392.
B. Merits
There is no specific statutory authorization for the establishment of the "FAS
personnel program at either USIA or the State Department. As was noted earlier-
(note 2 supra) "FAS" is merely an acronym for a personnel program=it is not
an individual personnel designation.
The Court considers the standing-of the plaintiff union only in terms of its representa-
tive capacity and does not address the problem of whether or not the union itself has such a
stake in the outcome as to enable it to bring this action on its own behalf. Since only the-
union's representation of the individuals is pertinent to this discussion the anestion of
whether the plaintiff AFGE locals remain recognized bargaining agents for affected em-
ployees is not relevant to the Court's conclusion.
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Of course the fact that a program has not been specifically authorized by stat-
Lite does not necessarily mean that it is forbidden. There is no law against the
use of imagination by the heads of executive departments in discharging their
responsibilities. But if and when their imagination, no matter how inspired,
carries them outside the boundaries of their statutory authority, an injunction
will lie.
As was noted above at p. 6 the FAS program is to be implemented through a
three-step procedure. We examine each step in light of the statutory provisions
:bearing thereon.
(1) The designation of officer level positions within the Department of State
-and USIA for future staffing by Foreign Service Personnel.
22 U.S.C. Section 886(b) (Section 441(b) of the Foreign Service Act) reads
..as follows:
"(b) Under such regulations as he may prescribe the Secretary may, notwith-
standing the provisions of Chapter 51 and Subchapter III of Chapter 53 of Title 5,
classify positions in or under the Department which he designates as Foreign
Service Officer positions to be occupied by officers and employees of the Service,
:,a nd establish such positions in -relation to the classes established by Sections 867,
869 and 870 of this title.?
This section clearly deals with the classification of positions, not the status
of individuals. If a position is presently occupied by an individual who is part
of the Civil Service personnel system, then nothing in Section 886(b) directly
affects the incumbent's rights guaranteed under Title 5. Defendants agree with
this and specifically include in their memoranda a portion of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs Report which interpreted this section as follows :
"When a position, subject to the Classification Act of 1949 (i.e. Title 5) is
filled by a person other than an officer of the Foreign Service, it would con-
tinue to be classified in accordance with the provisions of the Classification
- Act. Classification under the provisions of this section would be inoperative
until such position is filled by,. a Foreign Service. Officer." B
Since the redesignation of positions envisaged by the defendants' programs ap-
plies only to future staffing-not to present personnel designation-there is no
limitation in Section 886(b) which precludes such action. Moreover, despite
plaintiffs' position that such redesignation may be arbitrary and capricious in
some instances (i.e. those where personnel qualified for certain positions might
gain no ? advantage from overseas assignment and inclusion in the. Foreign
Service), the administrative advantages to be gained from implementation of
a. unified Foreign Service personnel system have..been amply spread upon the
record and not effectively. rebutted. Accordingly,, the . Court finds as a matter
-of law that the redesignation of. officer level positions in the. Department of
-State and the USIA for future staffing. by. Foreign' Service and Foreign Serv-
"ice Information personnel is a reasonable exercise of the defendants' statutory
powers and expressly permitted by 22 U.S.C. 886(b) .(Sec. 441(b)).
(2) The assignment of Foreign Service Personnel to positions redesignated
-under 22 U.S.C. 886(b). .
We touch only briefly on this aspect of the. proposed FAS Program, because
it is clear from the statutory, language throughout the Foreign Service Act that
? the Secretary of State and the Director, of USIA have unusually broad powers
to assign Foreign Service Personnel throughout the. government.
As one point the statute reads :
"Any officer or employee of the Service may in the discretion of the-Secretary.
be assigned or detailed for duty in any government agency for a period of not
-more than four years * * *" B
Elsewhere it indicates that reserve officers may be
"* * * assigned to a class and not to a particular post, and such an officer
-may be assigned to posts and may be transferred from one post to another
by order of the Secretary as the interests of the Service may require." 10
Furthermore the legislative history of the 1960 Amendment to the Foreign
Service Act, Pub. L. 86-723, indicates that it was prepared in conjunction with
'These provisions are also applicable to, USIA. The statutory references to Title 5
concern the Civil Service classification law. Sections 867. 869 and 870 establish the cate-
gories of Foreign Service Officers. Foreign Service Reserve Officers and Foreign Service
Staff Officers, respectively.
B H. Rep. No. 2104, Foreign Service Act Amendments of '1960, Committee on Foreign
Affairs. 86h Cong., 2d Sess.,.pp. 16-17.
F 22 U.S.C. Sec.'961. (a).
1022 U.S:C. Sec. 923. The Court notes in passing that, "reserve" officers would make up
-the FAS program corps.
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existing broad redesignation power vested in the Secretary and Director by 22
U.S.C. 886 discussed, supra.'
Accordingly, this second step to implement the FAS Program is within the
statutory power of the defendants. Furthermore, since the Court has found the
goal of defendants to be a reasonable one, there are no grounds for enjoining
continuation of this activity.
(3) The appointment of present Civil Service and Foreign Service personnel
as Foreign Service Reserve Officers with Unlimited Tenure.
The designation Foreign Service Reserve Officer with Unlimited Tenure
(FSRU) is authorized by 22 U.S.C. Sec. 929 which reads :
(a) Any officer appointed as a Foreign Service Reserve Officer after August 20,
1968 may serve as such for no longer than five years. During such period (no
sooner than the expiration of the third year but no later than the expiration of
the fifth year) such Foreign Service Reserve Officer shall be appointed as a
Foreign Service Officer, Foreign Service Information Officer, Foreign Service
Reserve Officer with Unlimited Tenure, Foreign Service Staff Officer, or shall
be terminated as a Foreign Service Reserve Officer." Pub. L. 90-494.
The language of this provision yields only one interpretation, viz, that only
Foreign Service Reserve Officers with more than three but less than five years
in the Foreign Service Reserve can be made Foreign Service Reserve Officers
with Unlimited Tenure.
Defendants urge that the provision should be interpreted to permit them to
appoint directly to the FSRU category any and all personnel whether Civil Serv-
ice or Foreign Service with three years satisfactory service and who have been
citizens of the United States for five years. Their argument is that the Congres-
sional "purpose" behind the enactment of Section 929 would be frustrated by a
narrower interpretation ; i.e. a requirement of three years service as a Foreign
Service Reserve Officer before a person becomes eligible for FSRU appointment.
They cite the example of a hypothetical qualified regular Foreign Service officer
who for reasons of his own determines that he would rather become part of the
new FAS program, thus necessitating his change from FSO to FSRU status. It
would be senseless, they argue, to require such a person to go through the three-
year "initiation period" before according him FSRU status.
This may well be so. But the short answer, is that Section 929 was not written
to facilitate a FAS program. Section 929 was. designed simply to afford the. Sec-
retary and the Director the power to'offer some; degree of security to those who
had joined the Foreign Service Reserve."
It may well be wise to permit free transfers of personnel from FSO designa-
tion to FSRU designation; and it may also be advisable to permit Civil Service
personnel with a record of long and capable service and who otherwise meet
statutory requirements to move immediately into the FSRU category. However,
at the present time, a statutory basis for such movement does not exist. The
Court will.not.,modify statutory language by construction to achieve a goal the
Congress did not contemplate or seek to accomplish through legislation.
The Court -therefore finds as a matter of law that the defendants' appointment
of any personnel, other than those who have served as Foreign Service Reserves
for three years as Foreign Service Reserve Officers with Unlimited Tenure is
action which lies outside the authority of the defendants as defined by 22 U.S.C.
929 (a).
11 Sections 961(c) and 886(b) were part of the same statutory scheme. (Pub. L. 86-723).
The former gave the Secretary broad power to reassign his Foreign Service personnel while
the latter gave him equally broad power to redesignate positions within the Department to
conform with such reassignment. The need for sweeping redesignation power stemmed ill
part from the earlier practice of paying a "salary differential" to Foreign Service person-
nel of a relatively low paying grade who had been assigned to a Classification Act position
carrying a higher salary. The "differential" was the difference between the two amounts.
It is clear that Congress intended to vest the Secretary with broad powers to determine
how best to use his ForeignService Officer corps and that these two sections were intended
as concurrent steps giving him greater flexibility in utilizing that power.
32 Previously these personnel were permitted to remain in this status for only five
years. They could be reappointed to a term only if they were not regularly employed by the
State Department and the head of the agency regularly employing them approved, but
thereafter they could be reappointed further only after a minimum of one year in another
capacity. 22 U.S.C. 922, 927.
22 U.S.C. ? 931. also relied upon by the defendants. confers no additional power to
make FSRU appo'ntments. It permits appointment to FSRU status only of Foreign Service
Reserve officers with three years service "as such." (emphasis added)
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III. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER
The foregoing constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
and, in the light thereof, it is this 12th day of June 1973.
ORDERED that the defendants, the Secretary of State and Director of the USIA,
their officers, agents, employees and attorney be and hereby are permanently
restrained and enjoined from offering or extending appointments to the Foreign
Service Reserve with Unlimited Tenure category created by Pub. L. 90-494 (22
U.S.C. 922-32) to any but Foreign Service Reserve Officers possessed of at least
three years of continuous satisfactory service in that capacity only; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Secretary of State and the Director of the USIA their officers,
agents, employees and attorneys shall, and hereby are directed to take any and
all necessary steps to rescind in a fair and equitable manner and without undue
delay any actions heretofore taken to offer or extend Foreign Service Reserve
with Unlimited Tenure appointments under the provisions of Pub. L. 90-494
(22 U.S.C. 922-32) to any employees of the two agencies who were not, when
appointed to the FSRU category, Foreign Service Reserve Officers with at least
three years of continuous, satisfactory service in that category ; and it is
further
ORDERED that in all other respects the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
is denied, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied, and that
the preliminary injunction heretofore granted by the Court prohibiting the con-
tinued implementation of the FAS except as indicated above is dissolved.
, Judge.
Counsel:
Edward L. Merrigan, Smathers & Merrigan, Washington, D.C., attorney
for plaintiffs.
Harold H. Titus, Jr.
U.S. Attorney,
Michael A. Katz,
Assistant U.S. Attorney,
U.S. Courthouse,
Washington, D.C., attorney for defendants.
Civil Action No. -
Filed April 30, 1975
LOCAL 1812, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (AFGE), c/o U.S.
INFORMATION AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C.; LOCAL 1534, AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (AFGE), 21ST AND C STREETS, WASHINGTON, D.C.;
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (AFGE), 1325 MASSACHU-
SETTS AVENUE, NW., WASHINGTON, D.C.; BRUCE N. GREGORY, SILVER SPRING,
MD.; JOSEPHINE CAMPBELL, MT. RANIER. MD.; DOROTHY A. BODEEN, WASH-
INGTON, D.C.; GORDON M. CONNELLY, GARRETT PARK, MD.; ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS
JAMES KEOGH, DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C.; HENRY
A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C., DEFENDANTS
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, MANDAMUS, INJUNCTION AND OTHER
RELIEF
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This is a class action seeking a declaratory judgment, mandamus and in-
junctive relief for ,plaintiffs and members of the class they represent, consisting
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316
of all those past, present and future employees of the United States Information
Agency (hereinafter USIA) and the Department of State who have been, are
being, or will be denied Civil Service appointments, classifications, job security,
veterans preference, assignments, and/or promotional opportunities as the result
of management decisions and practices aimed deliberately and illegally at per-
manently replacing all GS-7 level and above Civil Service (defined as officer
level) employees in domestic staffing positions in these agencies within the terri-
torial United States through the misuse of the Foreign Service Reserve officer
-category created under the Foreign Service Act of 1946.
2. Plaintiffs contend that the USIA and the Department of State have en-
gaged in, and are engaged in, a planned, deliberate and purposeful program to
phase out all Civil Service positions from their agencies, through the use of
Foreign Service Reserve appointments for domestic staffing positions as well as
,other programs, policies and practices, in order to accomplish this objective.
Plaintiffs contend that by so doing, the defendants have violated the statutory
.and constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and of the class they represent. In seek-
ing to achieve their objective, the defendants, without any legislative authoriza-
tion, have done and continue to do the following :
a. Appointing Foreign Service Reserve officers, tinder a synthetic category
labeled Foreign Affairs Specialists, to perform essentially and traditionally do-
mestic staffing functions for which Civil Service General Schedule officer level
employees previously have been, and in many instances, are still being employed.
b. Ignoring the basic requirement that all jobs in the competitive service in the
Executive Branch must be filled in accordance with Civil Service laws and
related statutes unless specific legislation provides otherwise.
c. Ignoring and violating the limitations under which appointments of For-
eign Service Reserve officers may be made under the Foreign Service Act of
1946, namely to make available to the Foreign Service such specialized skills as
may from time to time be required.
d. Amending by Departmental and Agency declarations, the primary objective
of the Foreign Service Act "(t)o enable the Foreign Service effectively to serve
abroad the interests of the United States," in order to authorize the eventual
ouster of all Civil Service personnel from employment with the USIA and the
Department of State within the territorial limits of the United States.
e. Inducing and coercing Civil Service employees to convert to Foreign 'Service
Reserve officer status through offers of preference for promotional opportunities,
advantageous assignments, and the financial advantages inherent in "lateral con-
versions" and in eventual higher annuities under the Foreign Service Retire-
ment and Disability Act, and through the fear of potential separations by reduc-
tions in force at some future date if still in Civil Service status.
f. Restricting all new appointments to officer level positions only to those indi-
viduals, even if on Civil Service registers, who can be persuaded to accept For-
eign Service Reserve officer status for domestic staffing functions in which the
possibility of ever being sent overseas is virtually nonexistent and, in so doing,
applying limitations as to age which are prohibited under Civil Service laws and
regulations and the Fair Labor Standards Act and also depriving such employees
of any job security for a minimum of three and a possible maximum of five years.
g. Ignoring and violating the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1883. the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, the Classification Act of 1949, the Veterans Pref-
erence Act and other statutes for the protection of career Civil Service em-
ployees in domestic staffing positions, insofar as those under Foreign Service
Reserve appointments are concerned, while exposing those who obtained Foreign
Service Reserve appointments with "unlimited tenure" to the hazards of a
"selection out" for time-in-grade or low ranking as well as mandatory retire-
ment at age 60.
It. Applying a double standard as to terms and conditions of employment to
those who are appointed Foreign Service Reserve officers for Departmental or
Agency domestic staffing as contrasted to those who are appointed Foreign V
Service Reserve officers legitimately to provide specialized skills needed in the
Foreign Service to serve abroad, the interests of the United States.
3. Plaintiffs seek redress for these past and continuing violations of their stat-
utory and constitutional rights by means of a declaratory judgment as to the
rights of plaintiffs and the class they represent and for a preliminary and perma-
nent injunction restraining defendants from maintaining policies, practices, cus-
tonis or usages under which :
a. Employees are appointed or assigned as Foreign Service Reserve officers to
occupy Agency or Departmental staffing positions within the United States
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except insofar as may be required to provide occasional "home tours" as
required by statute for officers on overseas duty ; and
b. Civil Service employees are induced, coerced or pressured to convert to
Foreign Service Reserve officer status even though employed on a continuing and
permanent basis within the United States.
U. JURISDICTION
4. This action arises under the laws and Constitution of the United States and
the jurisdiction of this Court is based upon 28 U.S.C. ? 1331(a), which gives Dis-
trict Courts jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions in which the
total amount in controversy is over $10,000; upon 28 U.S.C. ? 1361 which gives
District Courts jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus ; upon the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. ?? 702-706 which provides for judicial
review of actions of federal agencies; upon 28 U.S.C. ??2201 and 2202, which
gives District Courts power to issue declaratory judgments; upon the All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. ? 1651 (a) ; and under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
A. Plaintiffs
5. The American Federation of Government Employees (hereinafter referred to
as AFGE) is a national labor organization affiliated with the AFL-CIO composed
of federal civilian employees of the United States and the District of Columbia.
The plaintiff, AFGE, in its own right and through its various local union affiliates,
holds some 1,541 exclusive recognitions throughout the Executive Branch of the
government and represents approximately 650,000 federal employees under those
recognitions. Among its purposes is the protection and strengthening of the job
rights and security of its members and all government employees under regula-
tions, statutes and the Constitution.
6. Local 1812, AFGE, has within its membership all members of the AFGE who
work for the United States Information Agency, whether Civil Service General
Schedule (GS) or Wage System (WS or WB) employees, Foreign Service Infor-
mation officers (FSIO), Foreign Service Reserve officers (FSR), or Foreign
Service Staff officers (FSS). They number 950 at present. AFGE Local 1812 has
been recognized by the United States Information Agency as the exclusive bar-
gaining agent for nearly 2,000 eligible federal Civil Service employees employed
at the USIA in such capacity is a party to a collective bargaining agreement with
the USIA. This recognition of AFGE Local 1812 as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative for employees at the USIA is pursuant to the provisions of the Execu-
tive Order 10988 (27 Fed. Reg. 511) and E.O. 11491 (34 Fed. Reg. 17605) since
July 27, 1971. All GS-7 or above Civil Service employees (defined as officer level)
at USIA are subject to having their jobs taken over, their job security, tenure,
promotions and classifications undermined and destroyed and being replaced by
Foreign Service Reserve officers.
7. Local 1534, AFGE, has within its membership all members of the AFGE who
work for the Department of State, whether Civil Service, General Schedule (GS)
employees, Foreign Service officers, Foreign Service Reserve officers, or Foreign
Service Staff officers. They number at the present time 473. In addition, Local
1534 is the exclusive bargaining agent for those Civil Service employees of the
Department of State who are employed in the Foreign Service Institute School
of Language and in the Publicity and Reproduction Division. All GS-7's or above
Civil Service employees (defined as officer level) at the Department of state are
subject to having their jobs taken over, their job security, tenure, promotions,
and classifications undermined and destroyed and being replaced by Foreign
Service Reserve officers.
8. Plaintiff Bruce N. Gregory is the President of Local 1812, AFGE, and Is a
Project Officer, GS-13, employed by the USIA in Washington, D.C. Plaintiff
Gregory has been a USIA employee since 1967 when he joined as a GS-11. He Is
presently assigned to the Foreign Policy Staff of the Information Center Service,
USIA. Plaintiff Gregory was the recipient of an outstanding performance evalua-
tion in 1973. As President of Local 1812, AFGE, he is suing in that capacity, as a
representative of the class, as well as individually.
9. Plaintiff Josephine Campbell is Vice-President of Local 1812, AFGE and is
a writer-editor, GS-13, employed at the USIA in Washington, D.C. Plaintiff
Campbell has been a USIA employee since 1956 and is presently assigned to the
Africa Branch of the Press and Publications Service, USIA. As Vice-President
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of Local 1812 she is suing, as a? representative of the class in that capacity, as
well as individually.
10. Plaintiff Dorothy Bodeen is Vice President of Local 1534, AFGE and is a
GS-9 Intelligence Assistant in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State in Washington, D.G. She has been a Department of State employee
since 1956 and has worked for the federal government for twenty-seven years.
As Vice President of Local 1534, she is suing, as a representative of the class in
that capacity, as well as individually.
11. Plaintiff Gordon M. Connelly is a shop steward of Local 1812, AFGE, and is
employed as a Foreign Service Reserve officer with limited tenure, FSRL 3/1 on
a five year appointment at USIA. He was formerly employed as a GS-13 Social
Science Analyst, Office of Research, Media Division, USIA, until his conversion
to FSRL in March, 1974. Plaintiff Connelly has worked at the USIA since 1960.
He is suing individually, as well as a representative of the class of all those
similarly situated who were formerly General Schedule Civil Service employees
who were induced or coerced to accept Foreign Service 'Reserve officer
appointments.
12. Defendant James Keogh is Director of the United States Information
Agency and is sued in his official capacity. As such, he is responsible for the
employment practices and policies of the USIA and the necessity that these
practices and policies conform to the regulations of the USIA, the Civil Service
Commission and the laws and Constitution of the United States.
13. Defendant Henry A. Kissinger is Secretary of State and Head of the
Department of State and is sued in his official capacity. As such he is responsible
for the employment practices and policies of the Department of State and the
necessity that these practices and policies conform to the regulations of the
Department, the Civil Service Commission and the laws and Constitution of the
United States.
IV. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
14. Pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b) (2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the organizational and individual plaintiffs bring this action on their behalf and
on behalf of all past, present, or future similarly situated Civil Service employees
at USIA and the Department of State. Each of them is fully entitled to the pro-
tections and benefits which are afforded to such federal employees by the Civil
Service laws, by other related statutes of the United States, by regulations of the
Civil Service Commission, by regulations of the defendants, and each of them is
directly and immediately threatened by grave and irreparable harm, damages,
and loss of Job rights and opportunities by reason of the policies, programs and
practices complained of herein.
15. In support of this claim, plaintiffs allege the following facts :
a. The Size of the Class.-The class is defined as all those Civil Service em-
ployees of the USIA and the Department of State whose jobs have been filled
in the past, are being filled and are threatened to be filled in the future by For-
eign Service Reserve officers, or who will be denied job assignments and promo-
tional opportunities as the result of the placement of Foreign Service Reserve
officers in domestic staffing positions in the United States and whose careers and
jobs as Civil Service employees have been, are being and will be adversely affected
by this practice, as well as those AFGE members in domestic staffing positions
who continue to have reemployment rights to Civil Service status, although now
under Foreign Service Reserve appointments. There are, at the present time,
1,906 Civil Service employees at the USIA and 1,083 Foreign Service Reserve
officers in domestic staffing positions. There are at the present time 3,421 Civil
Service employees at the Department of State and 2,213 Foreign Service Reserve
officers in domestic staffing positions. Plaintiffs will seek to discover through
interrogatories (i) the total number of Foreign Service Reserve officers serving
in domestic positions who were induced or coerced to convert from their General
Schedule (GS) positions; (ii) the total number of GS employees whose jobs
have been filled, are being filled and are threatened to be filled in the future by
Foreign Service Reserve officers. These persons are so numerous that joinder
of all would be impracticable. All members of the class possess common rights
and seek a common relief.
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b. Basis on which plaintiffs claim to be adequate representatives of the class,
Plaintiff American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) is a na-
tional labor organization of federal civilian employees. It, and its locals 1812
and 1534, included within their membership, Civil Service and Foreign Service
employees of the USIA and the Department of State whose employment, post-
tions, assignments, careers, and rights as federal employees have. been directly
affected or will be affected as a consequence of defendants' program for the
phasing out of Civil Service positions and filling them with Foreign Service Re-
serve officers. They include among their members individuals who have been
employed, are employed or might be employed at the USIA and at the Depart-
ment of State and have been affected, are being affected or might.be affected by
the activities.herein complained of by defendants. Plaintiffs Gregory, Campbell,
and ? Bodeen are competitive Civil Service employees whose chances for advan-
tageous assignments and promotions have been .diminished and whose careers
and rights as federal Civil Service employees have been threatened and dam-
aged by defendants' policies, programs, and practices of appointing. Foreign
Service Reserve officers to domestic, competitive Civil Service positions. In ad-
dition, plaintiff Gregory is the President of Local 1812 of AFGE, and plaintiff
Campbell is a Vice President of said local. Plaintiff Bodeen is Vice President of
Local 1534, AFG'E:.Plaintiff Connelly is a shop steward'of Local 1812 AFGE and
is a former Civil Service employee who is now employed as a Foreign Service
Reserve officer of limited tenure. In those capacities they will represent the inter-
ests of the members of their union and all other federal empolyees at USIA and
the Department of State. as well.
c. Questions .of:la'w and fact that are common to the class.-There are common
questions of law and fact protecting the rights of the members of the class which
include, but are not limited to the following :
I. Lack of legal or statutory authority for defendants to employ Foreign Service
Reserve officers to occupy domestic staffing positions within the United States.
ii. Lack of legal or statutory authority for defendants to eliminate competitive
Civil Service classifications for such domestic positions.
iii. The disadvantages suffered by federal Civil Service employees who have
been, are being affected or might be affected with respect to job opportunities,
promotions, assignments, career advancement and training as a consequence of
defendants' actions.
iv. Violations of the rights of these Civil Service employees under the Civil
Service Act of 1883, the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912, the Classification. Act of
1949 and/or the Veterans Preference Act.
v; Plaintiffs further allege that the above mentioned class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable ; that there are questions. of law and fact
common to the class ; the claims of the above named plaintiffs are typical of the
claims of .the class ; that they will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class and that the defendants and their predecessors have acted and refused
to action the grounds generally applicable to the class. Under these circumstances
.injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole is appropri-
ate, and a class action is superior to any other available method for the fair and
efficient adjudication of this controversy.
IV. FACTS
16. Congress passed the Foreign Service' Act of 1946 in which its primary ob-
jective is set forth as the following :
"The Congress hereby declares that the objectives of this Act are to develop
and.strengthen the Foreign Service of the United States so as-
1. To enable the, Foreign Service effectively to serve abroad the, interests of the
United States;
y .t s s w t +
6. To provide for the temporary appointment or assignment to the Foreign
Service of representative and outstanding citizens of the United States possess-
ing special skills and abilities ;" 22 U.S.C. ? 801.
17. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 provided that among the categories of
officers and employees of the Service were :
"Foreign Service Reserve officers, who shall be assigned to the Service on a
temporary basis from government agencies or appointed on a temporary basis
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outside the government in accordance with the provisions of Section 522, in
order to make available to the Service such specialized skills as may from time to
time be required ;" 22 U.S.C. ? 861(3).
18. Section 522 of the Foreign Service Act as' amended (now 22 U.S.C. ?922)
provides for the appointment as Foreign Service Reserve officers of individuals
with special skills from government service, as well as from the private sector,
for periods of up to five years.
19. The above statutory provisions are applicable to the USIA under Reor-
ganization Plan Number 8 of 1953 (18 Fed. Reg. 4542, 67 Stat. 642), as amended;
Exec. Order 10477 (18 Fed. Reg. 4540, August 1, 1953), as amended; P.L. 90-494
?? 5, 6, (82 Stat. 811) ; Exec. Order 11434 (33 Fed. Reg. 16485, Nov. 8, 1968).
20. Civil Service career officers and employees in the Department of State and
the USIA have always enjoyed all of the protections of the Civil Service Act
of 1883, the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, the Classification Act of 1949 and the
Veterans Preference Act against unlawful, arbitrary and capricious separations
from the federal service, demotions and reductions in rank or compensation ;
and their right to promotions and increases in compensation have been governed
by the Civil Service Classification Act and by the Federal Civil Service merit
promotion system.
21. Congress intended that there be duel personnel systems in the USIA and the
Department of State so that the permanent domestic based personnel would be
governed by rules and regulations of the Civil Service system and the personnel
involved in the foreign based activities of these agencies would be governed by
the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, 22 U.S.C. ? 801, et seq. .
22. In 1965 President Lyndon Johnson called on Congress to create "a unified
foreign affairs personnel system" in the Department of State and USIA. In his
Presidential message to Congress President Johnson said "There will be a single
Foreign Affairs Personnel System, broad enough to accommodate the personnel
needs-domestic, as well as overseas-of the Department of State, the Agency
for International Development, and the U.S. Information Agency, and to cover
appropriate personnel of other agencies engaged in foreign affairs."
23. The President urged Congress to pass the so-called Hays Bill, (introduced
by Wayne Hays, Dem. Ohio), H.R. 6277, 89th Congress, called "The Foreign
Service Act Amendments of 1965" which would, among other things :
1. Amend 22 U.S.C. ? 801 so as to broaden the "objectives" of the Foreign
Service Act to serve interests "at home" as well as "abroad."
2. Amend 22 U.S.C. ? 886 (? 441 of the Act) as follows: "Section 6 of the
Bill would amend Section 441 of the Act which now limits the Secretary's classi-
fication authority under subsection (a) to positions in the Service 'at posts
abroad.' This limitation would be repeated." [Emphasis added].
24. President Johnson further stated :
To carry out these principles, legislation is needed to do a number of things.
Among these are : * * *
(2) Provide a transitional period of three years during which Civil Service
employees of the foreign affairs agencies may decide to become participants in
the new system without screening and without loss of compensation. Those who
do not wish to participate will be assisted in obtaining suitable employment in
other government agencies. But after the transitional period, the dual Foreign
Service-Civil Service personnel systems of the foreign affairs agencies would
be ended and only the unified foreign service would apply." [Emphasis added].
25. The Hays Bill, H.R. 6277, in the face of overwhelming employee opposi-
tion failed to pass the Congress. It was tabled by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee after hearings and has never been revived.
26. In 1968 Congress passed Public Law 90-494, 22 U.S.C. ?? 922, 929-32.
27. 22 U.S.C. ? 929 provides under the heading "Limitation on Tenure":
"(a) Any officer appointed as a Foreign Service Reserve Officer after August
20, 1968, may serve as such for not more than five years. During such period
(no sooner than the expiration of the third year but no later than the expiration
of the fifth year) such Foreign Service Reserve officer shall be appointed as a
Foreign Service officer, Foreign Service Information officer, Foreign Service
Reserve officer with unlimited tenure, Foreign Service Staff officer, or shall be
terminated as a Foreign Service Reserve officer."
28. 22 U.S.C. ? 931 provides under the heading "Limited Tenure":
"Any Foreign Service Reserve officer appointed before August 20, 1.968, who has
completed at least three years of continuous and satisfactory service as such on
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such date or who will have completed at least three years of such service before
the exploration of the 3-year period beginning on August 20, 1968, may be
appointed as a Foreign Service Reserve officer with unlimited tenure."
29. On August 26, 1968 the USIA announced: "The new law does not affect
the status or rights of Civil Service employees of the Agency."
30. No claim was advanced in 1968 or 1969 by either the USIA or the Depart-
ment of State that the Foreign Service Reserve with Unlimited Tenure had any
bearing on domestic staffing. Use of the new category within USIA was strictly
restricted to certain categories of Reserve officers with overseas duty and no
use was made within the State Department where some Foreign Service officers
objected to the new category as a possible dual career corps.
31. Late in 1969 Department of State management undertook an elaborate
internal self-examination of its personnel system.
32. On February 16, 1971, and allegedly in exclusive reliance on the provisions
of Public Law 90-494 dated August 20, 1968 (82 Stat. 813, 814; 22 U.S.C.
?? 922-932), the Department of State issued a "Management Reform Bulletin"
to all of its employees entitled "A Unified Personnel System-the Foreign Affairs
Specialist Corps". The said "Reform Bulletin" announced the establishment of a
new Corps composed of Foreign Service Reserve officers with unlimited tenure,
and stated that the Department intended to seek "the conversion" to said corps,
of all eligible career Civil Service officers and that the purpose of the new
corps is the creation of a "Unified Personnel System."
33. A similar program was announced at USIA and is explained in USIA's
Manual of Operation and Administration, Part V-A/V-B-1000.
34. Charts attached to the Department of State's "Reform Bulletin" demon-
strated that 6,928 positions in the Department would be converted to the new
corps, of which 2,556 would be simply "administrative" positions and 517 would
be regular professional positions. Said charts also showed that of the adminis-
trative positions scheduled for conversion to the new corps, approximately half
of 1,234 would be "positions in the United States" as distinguished from "over-
seas positions."
35. An April 9, 1971 USIA issued an "announcement" entitled "Agency De-
cision on FAS Program" which stated:
"The Director has decided to establish a Foreign Affairs Specialist (FAS)
Corps and the Office of Personnel and Training (IPT) has been instructed to
develop the details of an FAS Program for USIA similar to that published by
the Department of State in its Management Reform Bulletin No. 8 * * *.
"The decision to establish an FAS Corps cannot be implemented until a de-
tailed plan similar to that of the Department of State is developed for publica-
tion. The formulation of the details of the plan will take several months but it
will be published as quickly as the necessary studies can be completed. * * *
"The long range goal of the Agency is to staff all officer positions at home and
abroad under Foreign Service personnel authorities. All future officer appoint-
ments will be made under authorities of the Foreign Service Act and PL 90-494.
"All officer positions will be designated for FSIO or FAS staffing. Present
career CS employees will not be required to convert to Foreign Serrtce appoint-
ments, regardless of the designation of their positions [as FAS]. The decision on
whether or not to convert to FAS will be strictly voluntary. However, the num-
ber of Civil Service (CS) officers will gradually decrease as present CS em-
ployees convert to FAS and those who do not convert leave or retire and are
replaced by appointees under Foreign Service." (Emphasis added).
30. Thereafter, on July 1, 1971 Frank Shakespeare, then Director of USIA,
allegedly acting exclusively on the basis of legal authority afforded to him by
Public Law 90-494 hereinabove referred to, actually went ahead and established
a new Foreign Affairs Specialist (FAS) Corps in USIA. USIA's Manual of Oper-
ations and Administration Part V-A/V-B Section 1000 A, issued on July 1, 1971
asserts "This plan for establishing the FAS Corps is based on the use of the
FSRU authorities provided by P.L. 90-494." The plan provided for the direct
and immediate appointment as FAS (FSRU) officers any Civil Service Officer
who applied for it, subject to minimal qualifications.
37. On July 6, 1971 the American Federation of Government Employees and
its Locals 1534 and 1812, AFGE filed suit seeking to enjoin the Foreign Affairs
Specialist Program in either the Department of State or the United States In-
formation Agency and to have it declared illegal. (Civil Action No. 3141-71,
D.D.C.).
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33. On June 12, 1973 the Honorable Howard J. Corcoran, United States District
-Judge, issued a memorandum order in which he granted the plaintiffs cross motion
for summary judgment in part and in which he held :
a. "* * * as a matter of law that the defendants' appointment of any personnel,
,other than those who have served as Foreign Service Reserve for three years as
Foreign Service Reserve Officers with Unlimited Tenure is action which lies out-
side the authority of the defendants as defined by 22 U.S.G. 929(a)." He ordered
that defendants be restrained and enjoined from offering or extending appoint-
ments to the FSRU category to any but Reserve officers with at least three years
of continuous satisfactory service in that category."
b. "There is no specific statutory authorization for the establishment of the
`FAS' personnel system at either USIA or the State Department. As was noted
earlier * * * `FAS' is merely an acronyn for a personnel program-it is not an
individual personnel designation. Of course the fact that a program has not been
specifically authorized by statute does not necessarily mean that it is forbidden.
There is no law against the use of imagination by the heads of executive depart-
ments in discharging their responsibilities, but if and when their imagination
carries them outside the boundaries of their statutory authority,. an injunction
will lie."
Judge Corcoran found statutory authorization for the redesignation of officer
level positions in the Department of State and USIA, as indeed the plaintiffs have
recognized and not challenged.
39. Judge Corcoran, in his opinion, did not decide and left open, the question
of whether it was legal under the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, to
appoint or assign Foreign Service Reserve officers with either limited or
with unlimited tenure, to permanent domestic positions in the USIA and the
Department of State.
V. CLAIMS
40, Plaintiffs assert for themselves and the, thousands of federal employees in
the USIA and the Department of State for whose benefit they sue. herein:.
. . a. That defendants have acted and are continuing to act contrary to law in
attempting, by practices, programs and policies, including but not limited to the
FAS Program, to phase out all Civil Service employees in the USIA and the
Department of State and to replace them with Foreign Service Reserve officers
in' domestic, competitive Civil Service positions.
b. That the category of Foreign Service Reserve officer, whether with limited
or unlimited tenure, was intended by Congress solely to serve the interests of the
United States abroad and that no power was granted to the Department of
State or USIA, to assign them to permanent domestic positions within the con-
tinental United States.
c. Neither the 'Department of State nor USIA have the legal authority, arhi-
trarily and unilaterally, to remove or transfer positions permanently in the com-
petitive Civil Service located in the territorial United States to the Foreign
Service Reserve system or to determine that henceforth such domestic positions,
when vacant, shall be filled on a permanent basis without reference to the Civil
Service laws or to the Veterans Preference Act and regulations which govern
selections and appointments to and promotions and retentions in such positions in
the, federal service; or .
? tl. ? Neither the USIA nor the Department of State have the legal authority,
arbitrarily, :to decree that thousands of federal. Civil Service employees who
are satisfactorily performing their duties of employment in those agencies tinder
the Civil Service laws and regulations must either "voluntarily convert" to the
Foreign Service Reserve category, herein described, or effectively to waive or
encumber their right to future promotions or advancement in the federal Civil
Service. ?
.41. Plaintiffs allege * that the defendants have arbitrarily and. capriciously
deprived plaintiffs and the class they represent, of rights under applicable
regulations, statutes and the Constitution and have continuously and per-
manently injured them in their chosen work in depriving them arbitrarily,
c,anriciously and illegally, of training opportunities, promotions, assignments and
other job opportunities by appointing Foreign Service Reserve officers to domes-
tic, competitive Civil Service positions and discriminating against General Sched-
ule employees :
a. More particularly, the creation of a second category of Foreign Service
Reserve officers for the specific purpose of filling permanently the domestic
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staffing jobs within the USIA and the Department of State, in contrast to the
statutory category of "specialists to supply skills needed in the Foreign Serv-
ice, * * *" and other policies, practices and programs of the Department of
State and USIA threaten irreparably to injure, damage and ultimately destroy
the vitality of the Civil Service system in both agencies.
b. More particularly, both these plans as well as other programs, policies
and plans constitute an illegal, calculated capricious endeavor on the part of
the individual defendants herein, and their respective personnel officials to entice,
force and compel all Civil Service employees employed in other than clerical
positions in the two agencies, mainly those employed exclusively here in the
continental United States, to abandon all of their statutory rights and pro-
tections under the Civil Service laws (Title V, United States Code) and regula-
tions, the Veterans Preference Act, (5 U.S.C. ?? 3309-3313, 3363, 3501-3504, 7511-
7512 and 7701) and regulations thereunder, the Performance Ratings Act (5
U.S.C. ?? 4301-4308) and regulations, the Classification Act (5 U.S.C. ?? 5101-
5115) and regulations, the Federal Pay Rates statutes (5 U.S.C. ?? 5301-5596),
the adverse actions provisions of Title 5 U.S.C. ?? 7501-7512, and regulations
thereunder, the Civil Service merit system for promotion, and the Civil Service
Retirement System in favor of an illegally devised personnel scheme, which was
flatly tabled and rejected by the Congress in 1966 and never again revived.
42. Unless enjoined by the Court in this action defendants and the federal
agencies they administer, will continue to assign Foreign Service Reserve of-
ficers to permanent, domestic, competitive Civil Service positions ; and that they
will continue to coerce, induce and to bring pressure to bear on Civil Service
incumbents in said positions, to force them "voluntarily" to waive all of their
existing rights, protections under the federal Civil Service and Veterans Pref-
erence Laws and regulations, mentioned above, and to convert them from long
standing Civil Service status to Foreign Service Reserve officer status ; that they
will continue unlawfully to narrow and foreclose statutory promotion and job
retention rights for those Civil Service employees in permanent domestic jobs
who fail or refuse to convert ; and that they will ultimately succeed, contrary to
the will of Congress expressed as late as 1966, in frustrating and defeating all
of the Civil Service and Veteran Preference statutes and regulations mentioned
above which were enacted and promulgated by the Congress to protect the in-
tegrity of the Civil Service system for permanent positions in the continental
United States and to insure that Civil Service employees are not arbitrarily
maneuvered or manipulated out of their positions. Finally, of course; unless
the Court grants injunctive relief herein, it is clear that the Civil Service sys-
tem will soon disappear, contrary to law, for all but clerical employees in both
the Department of State and USIA.
43. No previous application for relief has been made. Plaintiff's allege that
no adequate remedy of that law is available to prevent the severe, irreparable
injury, damage and loss they and the class of employees in the USIA and the
Department of State whom they represent, will sustain as a direct consequence
of the unlawful, capricious actions of the defendants herein above recited.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly
situated pray :
1. For a declaration that the system, policy, and program of appointing For-
eign Service Reserve officers to domestic competitive Civil Service positions is
without legal authority and in violation of the Civil Service laws, applicable
rules and regulations, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, and the
United States Constitution and that any designation of such domestic staffing
functions as Foreign Service Reserve officer positions is without basis in law
and in violation thereof.
2. For a declaration that the permanent placing of Foreign Service Reserve
officers, or only those willing to convert to Foreign Service Reserve officer status
in domestic competitive Civil Service positions is in violation of. Civil Service
employees rights under applicable rules and regulations, laws and the United
States Constitution.
3. For a declaration that plaintiff and other similarly situated have been
unlawfully deprived of career advancement opportunities by reason of the place-
ment of Foreign Service Reserve officers in domestic competitive Civil Service
positions.
4. That all members of plaintiffs' class be immediately promoted to the grades
and/or positions which they have been denied by reason of the placement of
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Foreign Service Reserve officers and of those who were willing to convert to For-
eign Service Reserve officer status in domestic competitive Civil Service
positions.
5. That all members of the class who have been persuaded or coerced to ac-
cept the patently illegal status of domestic Foreign Service Reserve officers be
restored to the GS grades and steps equivalent to their present levels in the
Foreign Service Reserve.
6. Enjoin defendants from continuing any and all programs, policies, or prac-
tices which seek to replace and displace permanently qualified Civil Service em-
ployees with Foreign Service Reserve officers in domestic competitive Civil
Service positions in the United States.
7. Order that all members of the class who have been denied appointments
under the Civil Service law for domestic staffing positions because of the de-
fendants' insistence upon recruitment of them as Foreign Service Reserve offi-
cers be given retroactive appointments under the equivalent General Schedule or
Wage Systems to positions for which they are qualified.
8. Pay to plaintiffs their costs incurred, herein, including reasonable attorney
fees.
9. Grant such other further relief to plaintiffs and the class they represent
which the Court may consider just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
LAWRENCE SPEISER,
Attorney for Plaintiffs.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA : SS
(Bruce N. Gregory, being first duly sworn in oath, deposes and says that he
is one of the plaintiffs herein ; that he has read the foregoing complaint, and that
he knows the contents thereof; that the matter and things therein stated are
true to his personal knowledge, and those stated upon information and belief
that he believes are true.
BRUCE N. GREGORY.
MARTHA W. ROBERTS,
Notary Public, D.C.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA : SS
Dorothy A. Bodeen, being first duly sworn in oath, deposes and says that she
is one of the plaintiffs herein ; that she has read the foregoing complaint, and that
she knows the contents thereof ; that the matter and things therein stated are
true to her personal knowledge, and those stated upon information and belief
that she believes to be true.
DOROTHY A. BODEEN.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of April, 1975.
MARTHA W. ROBERTS,
Notary Public, D.C.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA : SS
Gordon M. Connelly, being first duly sworn in oath, deposes and says that he
is one of the plaintiffs herein ; that he has read the foregoing complaint, and that
he knows the contents thereof ; that the matter and things therein stated are
true to his personal knowledge, and those stated upon information and belief
that he believes to be true.
GORDON'M. CONNELLY.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of April 1975.
PAUL F. FELLEMAN,
Notary Public, D.C.
My Commission expires Feb. 29, 1980.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA : SS
Josephine Campbell, being first duly sworn in oath, deposes and says that she
is one of the plaintiffs herein ; that she has read the foregoing complaint, and that
she knows the contents thereof; that the matter and things therein stated are
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true to her personal knowledge, and those stated upon information and behalf
that she believes to be true.
JOSEPHINE CAMPBELL.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of April 1975.
MARTHA W. ROBERTS,
Notary Public, D.C.
My Commission expires April 14, 1976.
The CHAIRMAN. In summation then do you oppose or support the
bill, the legislation as presently written?
Mr. BLAYLOCK. We oppose most of the provisions of the bill as
written.
The CHAIRMAN. So in other words if it was unchanged, you would
rather see it not passed than passed?
Mr. BLAYLOCK. This is true.
The CHAIRMAN. You represent the ICA, the Information Branch.
As you may know, the FSIO Corps calve out of my legislation some
years ago. I am coining to the conclusion that I may have made an
error, or maybe not an error at the time, but that we would do better
now if the FSIO Corps were part of the FSO Corps, as a separate
cone, so you would then have a cone for administrative, consular,
political, economic, and also for informational activities.
What would be your reaction to that?
Mr. BLAYLOCK. Well, basically we are opposed to it.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that a question of turf, because you might lose
the representation of a group?
Mr. BLAYLOCK. No, really not, Senator. We as an organization, and
I am sure that you are very much aware, we work through the civil
service reform and others. We do not and have not by constitution
taken postures for jurisdictional purposes. And we have a constitu-
tional provision that mandates that our organization work for effec-
tive, efficient government.
And I think we are probably one of the few unions that so exist.
The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing wrong with turf. We fight for turf
all the time in the Congress and executive branch but we own up to it.
And I think that when that is an issue it should be mentioned.
Mr. BLAYLOCK. I would point out, Senator, if I may that with regard
to the Civil Service Reform Act in which the administration developed
many of these proposals such as the Senior Executive Service, per-
formance pay, et cetera, our union's support of that piece of
legislation-and we worked for many amendments of that piece of
legislation as you may know; it did not come through the Congress
as proposed by the administration-one of the conditions was for a
strong labor/management title. Because we are convinced that when
any agency or in this case the executive branch is given broad authori-
ties by the Congress and that is transferred to an agency one of the
best protections that we have is a strong labor/management program
that gives the employees statutory rights to have a say in those per-
sonnel policies because the employees, if they are given those rights
by the Congress, are going to be able to raise objections.
Without adequate empoyee protections you are going to have con-
formity. And that word replaces many other more sinister words.
As I pointed out, in the Senior Executive Service under Civil Service
Reform and the regular civil service, Senior Executive Service mem-
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bers are protected by the title I of that law, which spells out the pro-
hibited personnel practice and the merit principles.
As a result it would be a violation of the statute under title I for the
administration to take action against a member of the Senior Execu-
tive Service solely because he belonged to one political party or the
other. It is a violation of the law. Explicit reference to prohibited
personnel practices is not included in this proposed legislation by the
administration for the Foreign Service. There are some additional
protections that have to be included in the Senior Foreign Service
there or we create a very dangerous situation.
The CHAIRMAN. Along that same line what is your reaction to the
Senior Foreign Service performance pay concept?
Mr.,BLAYLocK. We personally don't think performance pay is going
to work. We do not support the idea of performance pay. And if you
look at the private sector-and you will see in our comprehensive
statement we go directly to that issue-that the private sector itself
is moving away from the experiment of performance pay because it
is creating competition rather than cooperation. Witnesses before me
have already talked about some of the problems of competition, of
creating situations where employees are motivated to get the bonus
pay or the performance pay.
We. think that we must establish rates of pay by tenure and length
of service, and that the employee's length of service must be based
upon their performance. In addition, you have to compensate for the
hazards, for the work assignments and' for the level of responsibility.
The employees who achieve levels are then promoted into higher ranks
but they also gret the differentials that compensate for hazardous duty.
We don't think performance pay is going to work.
The CHAIRMAN. Comparability with military or civil service. Do
you think there should be a greater comparability of the Foreign
ervice-you don't represent the Foreign Service, but the Foreign
Service Information officers in the ICA, greater comparability with
the military service or with the civil service!
Mr. BI.AYLOCK. If you say either/or,,I would have to say that we
think, first, that we should have comparability-we are talking in the
area of pay I assume now. In the area of pay I would say, obviously
we need to have comparability with the civil service. That is where
an awful lot of your recruiting comes from. And presently you do not
have comparability in some areas. Now if you are talking about the
overall structure, we have mixed reactions. And we have discussed this
at our policy level. And at this point we have mixed reactions.
We see more a combination of-the two, not saying one or the other.
We see the uniqueness of the Foreign Service and the foreign affairs
agencies we represent as needing a combination of some military
structure and some civilian structure. And we pointed it out. in our
statement.
The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing wrong with the word'elite as long
as it is used correctly. And I have also thought that the Foreign Service
was basically in our overall structure somewhat like an elite civil serv-
ice. Like in the French they have, I have forgotten the name, the
Inspecteurs de Finance, who can be moved around from agency to
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327
agency. And I always thought the Foreign Service should be much
the same thing. The people you represent in ICA
Mr. BLAYLocx. We agree with that totally.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Are in that position and might well
be moved to another governmental agency doing a special job and,
coming back somewhat like Ambassador Carlucii.
Mr. BLAYLOCK. Well, even if that function is moved into another,
agency though, Senator, we feel that the responsibility and the final
authorities for the way the other agency carries out that program
should be under the control of our Foreign Service. That is where the
expertise is.
The CHAIRMAN. One of the problems with the FSIO corps now is
that it has become very separate and you are not getting the cross-
fertilization that we hoped for originally. I would like to see more of
your people in political and economic jobs and becoming chiefs of
mission. And this is not happening as things stand. And that is why
I lean in the direction of thinking that it might be better, both from
the national interest and from the interest of the people you represent,
if they had a separate cone and then could spend two-thirds of their
life in informational work and one-third of their life in other kinds
of foreign affairs related work. That is my reasoning on this.
Mr. Br.AYLocx. Well, Mr. Chairman, in every meeting that I have
had with representatives of our groups that we are discussing they
bring that problem up and have the same feeling. That presently there
are barriers in the system that don't allow the interchange that
should be.
The CHAIRMAN. Exactly. I think you and I will find the number
of your people 'who have been chiefs of mission, for example, is very
limited, I think two or three. I may be wrong. Let us get that figure
for the record and insert it.
[The information referred to follows:]
NUMBER OF FSIO's WHO HAVE BEEN CHIEFS OF MISSION
Since 1961 when the first FSIO was named chief of mission there have been
eight :FSIO chiefs of mission and four FSIO deputy chiefs, of mission.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know by any chance how many of your
people, FSIO's, have been chiefs of mission?
Mr. ME, DD. No more than two or three.
The 'CHAIRMAN. I 'think that condition will stay as long as you
have the present separation whereas if there is a fifth cone I think
there would be a greater flowing back and forth. And frankly,.I
think diplomacy moves along very well when you have information-
ally sensitized, propaganda sensitized people engaging in it.
Mr. MEDD. If I may add 'to the subject, sir, you mentioned earlier
or you questioned whether this is a matter of turf for AFGE. AFGE
is a trade union and it also represents the Foreign Service, as you
know, of ICA.
The CHAIRMAN. I emphasize as a labor supportive man, I have
nothing against trade unions; quite the contrary.
Mr. MEDD. I understand. We also speak as a union representing
the-several hundred officers of the FSIO Corps. I think we speak for
them when we are talking about maintaining the integrity of that
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328
corps as officers who work for a specialized agency and who feel they
have special skills to perform within that agency. I believe you know
there is a concern that if, they became just another cone within the
Foreign Service personnel structure that there would be a great deal
,of dilution of the positions that they now have. I would not neces-
sarily add to the number, to that two or three who have become chiefs
of mission but that there might be some wholesale raiding into that
cone from the Foreign Service officers themselves looking for ways to
advance their own careers.
The CHAIRMAN. I see that. And I appreciate your views very much
indeed. I would say your views are shared by the present director, Mr.
Rheinhardt, because he shares those and does not agree with my
thoughts. So I would say nothing is going to happen in the immediate
future. I thank you very much indeed, Mr. Blaylock and your asso-
ciates, for being with us and I wish you well.
Our next witness is Ms. Lesley Dorman, president, Association of
American Foreign Service Women. Welcome, Ms. Dorman.
STATEMENT OF LESLEY DORMAN, PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE WOMEN, WASHINGTON, D.C.; AC-
COMPANIED BY PATRICIA RYAN AND MARCIA CURRAN
Ms. DORMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do have a longer statement, Mr. Chairman, which I request be put
into the record. This is brief for everybody's benefit.
The CHAIRMAN. That will be inserted in the record after your oral
statement.
Ms. DORMAN. Mr. Chairman, the Association of American Foreign
Service Women [AAFSW] deeply appreciates the opportunity to
testify before you today. We are especially grateful to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee for their concern and understanding of
the human side of Foreign Service personnel matters demonstrated
in the past.
Our independent volunteer organization has existed since the early
sixties to meet welfare and education needs in the Foreign Service
community, raising funds for scholarships and participating in many
local community projects. Our members are women, both employees
and wives, who spend the majority of their working lives in worldwide
service representing the American people abroad.
While life in the Foreign Service is stimulating and has undeniable
rewards of personal growth, travel, and international friendship, the
darker side is spotlighted today. We experience the alienation of cul-
ture shock, the isolation of language inadequacy, the hazards of rigor-
ous climate and endemic disease, the trials of evacuations, and the
pervasive fear of terrorism.
Considerable energy has been expended by the women themselves
in finding creative responses to the hardships. The AAFSW has orga-
nized seminars and workshops, and pressed for training to prepare
individuals for life abroad, because we believe that the prepared indi-
vidual is the self-reliant individual.
In 1976, the AAFSW began to recognize that changes in American
society were creating stresses in the Foreign Service community. The
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association formed a forum committee on the concerns of Foreign
Service spouses and families which subsequently presented a report to
the Secretary of State based on responses to a mailing of 9,000 ques-
tionnaires. The forum report, which we have made available to each
member of the committee, remains the most significant document to
date on family life in the Foreign Service, and it continues to provide
the basis of an ongoing dialog with the Secretary of State. We feel
that without the sympathetic hearing accorded us by Secretary Vance,
the human costs of family participation in the Foreign Service would
have continued to go unrecognized.
Two major recommendations of the forum report which have been
implemented by the Department are the establishment of the family
liaison office and the spouses' skills/talent bank. The family liaison
office, known as FLO, represents the nonprofessional interests of the
Foreign Service community in the policymaking councils of manage-
ment. FLO provides us, at last, with a recognized channel of communi-
cation. Since the opening of the office in March 1978,.FLO has been
inundated with requests for advice and counsel on such questions as
schooling, allowances, dependent employment, divorce, medical and
mental health. In the past 2 weeks alone, they have dealt with hun-
dreds of evacuees.
FLO also operates the skills/talent bank, a computerized record
of spouse employment resumes. We are concerned that FLO might
be cut back or eliminated under a different Secretary, of State. Even
now, FLO needs additional space and staff. Therefore, we urge Con-
gress to incorporate the family liaison office in the new act to guaran-
tee the continued existence of this valuable service.
In its response to the forum report, the Department of State posed
the question of "whether the Foreign Service, with its high interna-
tional mobility and increasing demands on the time and energy of one
family member, can accommodate the modern, highly educated
American family in which both parents work and both share parent-
ing and homemaking responsibilities.
We feel that if the Foreign Service is to be truly representative of
American society today, which-is stated as one of the basic objectives
of the proposed act, then that accommodation must be made.
In the past two decades, the political, social, and economic role
of women in America has changed significantly. Increased mobility,
longevity, education, combined with economic necessity, brought
about by inflation and soaring divorce rates, have radically altered
the American woman's way of life. Census figures show that two-
thirds of married women in America are presently employed. It is
clear that the American woman needs and expects to have a broad
range of work choices and to be able to pursue a meaningful career.
The Foreign Service career spouse is concerned that long-term in-
ternational mobility, combined with structural barriers to employ-
ment will continue to exclude her from establishing her own eco-
nomic base through a career, or, at the minimum, through recent
work experience. Pressures for spouse employment will continue to
mount and must be met with imaginative programs.
No matter how earnest the desire to become economically inde-
pendent through her own paid employment, many Foreign Service
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'wives will sacrifice the earning potential of their most productive
.years in helping their families make unending cross-cultural adjust-
ments and in voluntary community responsibilities. The Foreign
Service homemaker is a vital resource abroad, enriching the overseas
communities with thousands of hours of donated service.
, For these women, divorce exacts a heavy toll. Our association is
deeply concerned about the hardships of the many divorced Foreign
Service wives who are left after long years of unpaid Government
service abroad with no employment record, no modern skills, no social
security, no shared annuity, no survivor benefits, and exorbitantly
expensive medical insurance. In order to protect these women, the
foreign affairs agencies must recognize earned rights for spouses and
former spouses to survivor benefits and shared pensions.
We have received support on this point from the Honorable Loy W.
Henderson in a letter which we would like to read into the record.
Ambassador Henderson says :
When I was Deputy Under Secretary for Administration of the Department of
State, I appeared before a subcommittee of the Senate in 1959 and defended
the- position that Foreign Service wives make a different contribution from wives
of civil servants. In referring to Foreign Service widows, I said "a surviving
widow, in a very real sense, has earned her annuity."
The following year I spoke on the same issue before a subcommittee of the
House of Representatives and told them, "It has seemed to us unfair that a
woman who, for instance, has devoted 30 years of her life working for the
American government abroad with her husband should lose her annuity, if she
should remarry after her husband dies."
' Since that time, there have been many. changes in society. Unprecedented, num-
bers of marriages which have endured for years are ending in divorce. It seems
just as unfair to deprive a former -wife of many years standing of her survivor
annuity as it seemed then to deprive a widow,of any annuity should she remarry.
They have "earned rights" to their modest recompense. .
Most Foreign Service wives have spent then lives in accordance with
:ground rules laid down by the government.. Government regulations "dis-
couraged" them from seeking employment overseas. Until 1972 they, were
graded annually' along with their husbands. Although no longer. thus graded,
the overwhelming majority of Foreign. Service wives, realizing that their
cooperation with their husband in a spirit of helpfulness adds to his effective-
ness, have continued to work with him as a partner for the American
.government. '
If, after years of joint work with her husband, the marriage of a Foreign
Service wife should end in divorce, she has at present no "earned" rights. If
the. same woman were a widow, she would be provided for ; if only a "former
wife," she is a non-person so far as the government is concerned.
These women have given up the productive years of their lives following their
husbands around the globe. -It seems to me that they have clearly "earned their
rights" and that the time has come for the government to honor such rights.
Ms. DORMAN. Moreover, we are concerned about the effects on fami-
lies of OMB's proposed cuts in the current budget. The congression-
ally mandated Hayes Study shows that the middle and lower ranks
in- the Foreign Service receive lower pay than the civil service for
equivalent work. Yet money for pay parity as well as funds for allow-
ances already authorized by Congress would be denied. These costs
will be absorbed by the family members, exacerbating family problems.
Although an employee has the option to resign if family concerns
so dictate, let us consider the costs to the system. Not only does it cost
more than $25,000 to test and train a new Foreign Service officer, but
the accelerated loss of seasoned employees with expertise, languages,
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331
and, above all, personal contacts accumulated over the years could
become a hemorrhage of irreplaceable assets.
We do not feel that it is appropriate for the AAFSW to take a
position on the proposed Foreign Service Act of 1979 as a whole. We
do feel that any new act should fully recognize the unique sacrifices
and adjustments required of Foreign Service families so as to make
clear the justification for the Secretary's authority to help families in
special ways.
I have with me today two of my colleagues, both Foreign Service
wives, Marcia Curran, chairman of the Forum Committee on Employ-
ment and Career Development, and Patricia Ryan, chairman of the
Forum Committee on Retirement, who have submitted reports on
their areas for the record. The three of us will be happy to respond to
questions.
[Ms. Dorman's prepared statement and the information referred to
PREPARED STATEMENT or LESLEY DORMAIN
Mister Chairman, Members of the Committee : The Association of American
Foreign Service Women deeply appreciates the opportunity to testify before you
today. We are especially grateful to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for
their concern and understanding of the human side of Foreign Service personnel
matters demonstrated in the past.
Our independent volunteer organization has existed since the early sixties to
meet welfare and education needs in the Foreign Service community, raising
funds for scholarships and participating in many local community projects. Our
members are women, both employees and wives, who spend the majority of
their working lives in worldwide service representing the American people
abroad. While life in the Foreign Service is stimulating and has undeniable
.rewards of personal growth, travel, and international friendship, the darker side
is spotlighted today. We experience the alienation of culture shock, the isolation
of language inadequacy, the hazards of rigorous climate and endemic disease,
the trials of evacuations, and the pervasive fear of terrorism. Considerable
energy has been expended by the women themselves in finding creative responses
to these hardships. The AAFSW has organized seminars and workshops, and
pressed for training to prepare individuals for life abroad, because we believe
that the prepared individual is the self-reliant individual.
In 1.976, the AAFSW began to recognize that changes in American society were
creating stresses in the Foreign Service community. The Association formed a
.Forum Committee on the Concerns of Foreign Service Spouses and Families
which subsequently presented a report to the. Secretary of State based on
responses to a mailing of 9,000 questionnaires. The Forum Report, which we have
made available to each member of the Committee, remains the most significant
document to date on family life in the Foreign Service, and it continues to
provide the basis of an ongoing dialogue with the Secretary of State. We feel
that without the sympathetic hearing accorded us by Secretary Vance, the human
costs of family participation in the Foreign Service would have continued to go
.unrecognized.
Two major recommendations of the.Forum Report which have been imple-
mented by the Department are the establishment of the Family Liaison Office
.and the spouses' Skills/Talent Bank. The Family Liaison Office, known as FLO,
represents the non-professional interests of the Foreign Service community in
the policy-making councils of Management. FLO provides us, at last, with a
recognized channel of communication. Since the opening of the office in March
1978, FLO has been inundated with requests for advice and counsel on such
questions as schooling, allowances, dependent employment, divorce, medical and
mental health. In the past two weeks alone, they have dealt with hundreds of
evacuees. FLO also operates the Skills/Talent Bank, a computerized record of
spouse employment resumes. We are concerned that FLO might be cut back or
eliminated under a different Secretary of State. Even now, FLO needs additional
space and staff. Therefore, we urge Congress to incorporate the Family Liaison
follows:]
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Office in the new Act to guarantee the continued existence of this valuable
service.
In its response to the Forum Report, the Department of State posed the ques-
tion of "whether the Foreign Service, with its high international mobility and
increasing demands on the time and energy of one family member, can accom-
modate the modern, highly-educated American family in which both parents work
and both share parenting and homemaking responsibilities". We feel that if
the Foreign Service is to be truly representative of American society today, which
is stated as one of the basic objectives of the proposed Act, then that accom-
modation must be made.
In the past two decades, the political, social, and economic roles of women in
America has changed significantly. Increased mobility, longevity, education, com-
bined with economic necessity, brought about by inflation and soaring divorce
rates, have radically altered the American woman's way of life. Census figures
show that two-thirds of married women in America are presently employed. It
is clear that the American woman needs and expects to have a broad range of
work choices and to be able to pursue a meaningful career. The Foreign Service
spouse is concerned that long-term international mobility, combined with struc-
tural barriers to employment will continue to exclude her from establishing
her own economic base through a career, or, at the minimum, through recent
work experience. Pressures for spouse employment will continue to mount and
must be met with imaginative programs.
No matter how earnest the desire to become economically independent through
her own paid employment, many Foreign Service wives will sacrifice the earning
potential of their most productive years in helping their families make unend-
ing cross-cultural adjustments and in voluntary community responsibilities. The
Foreign Service homemaker is a vital resource abroad, enriching the overseas
communities with thousands of hours of donated service.
For these women, divorce exacts a heavy toll. Our Association is deeply con-
cerned about the hardships of the many divorced Foreign Service wives who
are left after long years of unpaid government service abroad with no employ-
ment record, no modern skills, no Social Security, no shared annuity, no survivor
benefits, and exorbitantly expensive medical insurance. In order to protect these
women, the Foreign Affairs agencies must recognize earned rights for spouses
and former spouses to survivor benefits and shared pensions.
We have received support on this point from the Honorable Loy W. Henderson
in a letter which we would like to submit for the Record. Ambassador Hender-
son says in part:
"Most Foreign Service wives have spent their lives in accordance with ground
rules laid down by the government. Government regulations "discouraged" them
from seeking employment overseas. Until 1972 they were graded annually along
with their husbands. Although no longer thus graded, the overwhelming
majority of Foreign Service wives, realizing that their cooperation with their
husband in a spirit of helpfulness adds to his effectiveness, have continued to
work with him as a partner for the American government.
"If, after years of joint work with her husband, the marriage of a Foreign
Service wife should end in divorce, she has at present no "earned" rights. If the
same woman were a widow, she would be provided for ; if only a "former wife",
she is a nonperson so far as the government is concerned.
"These women have given up the productive years of their lives following their
husbands around the globe. It seems to me that they have clearly `earned their
rights' and that the time has come for the government to honor such rights."
Moreover, we are concerned about the effects on families of OMB's proposed
cuts in the current budget. The Congressionally-mandated Hayes Study shows
that the middle and lower ranks receives lower pay than the Civil Service for
equivalent work. Yet money for pay parity as well as funds for allowances al-
ready ?
authorized by Congress would be denied. These costs will be absorbed by
the family members, exaccerbating family problems.
Although an employee has the option to resign if family concerns so dictate,
let us consider the costs to the system. Not only does it cost more than $25,000
to test and train a new Foreign Service officer, but the accelerated loss of
seasoned employees with expertise, languages, and, above all, personal contacts
accumulated over the years could become a hemorrhage of irreplaceable assets.
We do not feel that it is appropriate for the AAFSW to take a position on
the proposed Foreign Service Act of 1979 as a whole. We do feel that any new
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Act should fully recognize the unique sacrifices land adjustments required of
Foreign Service families so as to make clear the justification for the Secretary's
authority to help families in special ways.
I have with me today two of my colleagues, both Foreign Service wives,
Marcia Curran, Chairman of the Forum Committee on Employment and Career
Development, and Patricia Ryan, Chairman of the Forum Committee on Retire-
ment who have submitted reports on their areas for the record. The three of us
will be happy to respond to questions.
REPORT BY MARCIA CURRAN, FORUM COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT
THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT AND DEPENDENT EMPLOYMENT
Many Foreign Service dependents wish to provide for their own economic
security through employment. They find it difficult to sacrifice jobs, tenure and
pension rights in the United States to face limited employment abroad. It is the
continuous geographic mobility as well as bureaucratic restrictions on employ-
ment which put the Foreign Service family member who wishes to work at a
special disadvantage.
Jobs abroad are scarce. Local work laws frequently mean that the spouse
must look to the U.S. Mission for employment opportunities ; yet, all such jobs
are temporary, low in pay, carry no promotion potential, earn to credit toward
government status and offer no adequate retirement program. It is these circum-
stances which justify more flexible and open employment programs for Foreign
Service dependents.
The Department of State, the International Communication Agency and the
Agency for International Development have begun to recognize the need for
such programs, despite the long history of discouraging married women from
working. This is evident in recent actions and in sections of the proposed Act.
Encouraged by legislative authorization the Department has expedited, through
the A-1/A-2 regulations, a program which could open up employment on local
economies for official American family members. It has held widely attended
career counseling workshops at the Foreign Service institute, and has begun
to set up a Skills/Talent Bank to assist spouses in their search for employ-
ment. As a pilot program, it has approved spouse participation on a space avail-
able basis in FSI functional training courses; ICA and AID have offered
to do the same for some of their training programs. These employment programs
are discussed more fully in our recent Report on Dependent Employment which
we wish to submit for the record.
Resistance to spouse employment
Unfortunately, there seems to be considerable attitudinal resistance to the idea
of spouse employment among some members of the Foreign Service community.
Marguerite Cooper King of the Women's Action Organization has carefully
described, in testimony before the House Committees earlier, the situation faced
by working women in the State Department and other Foreign Affairs agencies.
From her testimony it is clear that women, and most Foreign Service spouses
are women, have a very long way to go to achieve equality of opportunity even
if they are already within the career system. AAFSW is grateful to WAO for its
dedicated efforts to expand dependent employment opportunities, as it is to the
Foreign Service Secretaries' organization for working toward improvement in
the treatment of women employees.
We are saddened when we hear that Foreign Service staff, and particularly
secretaries, are worried about job security and assignment opportunity because
of spouse employment. We do not believe that spouse employment presents a
threat to job opportunity for career members of the Foreign Affairs community.
AAFSW will always be among the first to defend the rights of the Staff Corps
against any real and substantiated inequities. In this connection, we fully sup-
port the Staff Corps' request, stated in the AFSA testimony before the House,
for the opportunity to take orientation, language training, and professional train-
ing for upward mobility.
There are those in the Department of State who would discourage the trend
toward families with two Foreign Service career employees, commonly termed
the "tandem couple" because of the desire to find a pair of tandem assignments
at the same post thus permitting families to live together. Some in the Depart-
ment look upon this as a problem ; AAFSW prefers to look upon it as a solution
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to changes taking place In American society. In the United States at the present
time two out of three married women are working, and that trend is growing.
Through tandem assignments the Department and the other Foreign Affairs
agencies not only make significant savings in administrative costs, but also
provide employment to both members of a two-career family. Employment op-
portunities are thereby expanded for those who are able to qualify for the
career services. It is our conviction that such a view of tandem assignments
acknowledges the present and long-run direction of American society. To dis-
courage it, or to fail to encourage the two-career Foreign Service couple is to
misread the future, and to substitute what is perceived as one problem for
another.
On the other hand we have noted that if the spouse wants to practice a skill
which is not perceived to threaten traditional Foreign Service career categories,
there seems to be less resistance. For example, the Medical Division has re-
cently endorsed the use in Foreign Service posts of the professional skills of
spouses who are clinical social workers. A few months ago these spouses created
the Association of American Foreign Service Clinical Social Workers, and took
their cases to the Department. The resourcefulness of the spouses, combined
with the growing awareness in the Medical Division of the need for such serv-
ices abroad, resulted in this employment breakthrough.
AAFSW will continue to search for ways to expand work opportunities and
will, at the same time, search for ways to reduce resistance to, and ungrounded
fears of these job programs. Since pressures for more dependent job opportu-
nities will inevitably increase, we hope that the Foreign Affairs agencies will
actively work to create a more positive climate.
Section-by-section comment on the act
Sec. 332. We believe that this section might be the appropriate place to add
language which would protect the Foreign Service spouse or dependent who
must give up a government position in order to accompany the Foreign Service
employee abroad. Reemployment right and/or credit toward government status
should be offered in this section.
Civil Service status, a kind of reemployment right, can never be earned in
temporary jobs. It is earned only in permanent jobs and then only if the person
remains in such a position for three years or more without a break in service
of more than three days. The mobility of Foreign Service life and the fact that
all government jobs abroad are temporary (unless the person is already a mem-
ber of the career service), make earning status extremly difficult. At. present
a spouse can work for as many as five years in a temporary job and still not
earn status.
Sec. 333. The language, "renewable limited. appointments", eliminates one
inequitable aspect of the present employment situation for spouses. Under the
old system a dependent could have only five years of cumulative temporary
employment. This designation does away with that five-year time limit.
The language at the end of sec. 333(a) appears to allow flexibility in the
choice of pay scales for American family member employees. This is an improve-
ment over State's interpretation of present law authorizing American' family
member employment in certain vacant foreign national positions. In our Report
on Dependent Employment (March 12, 1979) we outlined the inequities of paying
local wages to American family members in foreign national positions : at one
end of the scale you have wages below U.S. minimum wage ; and at the other you
have wages higher than that of comparable career Foreign Service personnel. We
continue to take the position, as does WAO, that all official Americans employed
by the Foreign Affairs agencies abroad be paid according to American pay scales.
This foreign national/American family member program took a long time to
get off the ground. Now that the program has gone worldwide, fifty positions have
been designated and twenty dependents hired as AFMs. We hope that the Foreign
Affairs agencies will give it more publicity and more emphasis.
Sec. 333(a) refers to the employment of family members "abroad in positions
to which career Foreign Service personnel are not customarily assigned." It is
our understanding after discussion with Management that this language does
not preclude the possibility that dependents may, on a temporary basis, fill posi-
tions which are usually filled by Foreign Service personnel. If the Committee in-
terprets this language differently, we would want to seek changes.
Some of the more interesting jobs dependents are offered abroad are those
which usually are filled by career personnel, but are vacant for several months
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or longer, or are in less desirable posts and do not attract career personnel. It is
our understanding and hope that the language of this subsection and that of
subsection 333(b) permit the temporary hire of qualified dependents to fill such
career positions. In this way no career personnel will be displaced, the Depart-
ment's needs will be served (often at a lower cost) and dependents will be offered
needed job opportunities. This would be no threat to the job security of career
personnel.
Sec. 701 (b). "The Secretary may ... provide to members of families of such
personnel [all Foreign Affairs personnel) in anticipation of their assignment
abroad or while abroad . . . (2) functional training for anticipated prospective
employment under section 333." This is new and we wholeheartedly support it.
Dependents can fulfill vital, short-term staffing needs if they are trained to do so.
Under the present operating rules for this program some difficulties do arise:
admission of dependents on a space available basis means that up to the last
minute there is uncertainty about spaces ; it also means that very few spaces are
available for family members ; initially, only the consular and the budget and
fiscal courses, not the general services not the personnel courses were opened to
spouse participation. In the next round at FSI the general services course will
be made available. ICA and AID are also opening functional training courses to
dependents on a space available basis.
Sec. 705 (b). This section authorizes the Skills/Talent Bank. We believe that
the first line should read : "The Secretary shall facilitate the employment of
spouses of Foreign Service personnel . . ." It is our concern that under a dif-
ferent Secretary of State the Skills Bank may be phased out or starved for
resources. Even at the present time, it needs additional staff and resource
support to do its job. The Coordinator of the Skills/Bank holds only a parttime,
temporary position (a six-month appointment).
Sec. 705(b) (3) refers to assisting spouses in obtaining "overseas employ-
ment." We agree.with AFSA's testimony before the House that the word "over-
seas" should be removed if it means that Skills Bank personnel cannot counsel
the spouse for stateside employment. -It is just as essential to assist a dependent
for employment in the States as overseas. The two go hand-in-hand. If in fact the
Skills Bank operation is to serve the whole system, there can be.no logical separa-
tion between stateside and overseas jobs counseling in the case of the Foreign
Service dependent.
We are often asked if any of these programs assist male spouses. The answer is
an emphatic "yes". There is, of course,'no distinction made on the basis of sex.
It may interest you to know that-at the present time there are more than 25 male
spouses represented in the Skills/Bank. Four will have gone through functional
training courses at the Foreign Service Institute.
Additional recommendations
We would like to raise a: number of matters which are not addressed by the
Act, but which we feel must receive attention. We recommend that the Foreign
Affairs agencies give serious consideration to the following :
(1) Need for administrative or legislative action to permit Foreign Service
spouses to earn credit toward government employment status on an incremental
basis. The Department has offered to assist us through cooperation with the
Office of Personnel Management to find a solution to this issue. We think we
are slowly making progress.
(2) Need to make available on a regular basis midlevel and senior level
positions for spouse employment. The present system which offers nothing
higher than an FS-8 is an anachronism, a hangover from the days when tem-
porary jobs were always clerical. Regulations for temporary hires should he
changed to permit hiring at higher grade levels. The Foreign Service agencies
should look into the possibility of making parttime permanent GS positions
available overseas for spouses hired at post.. (We also recommend parttime
permanents here in Washington.)
(3) Need to look for ways to recognize and compensate the highly involved
U.S. Missions and community projects abroad, and without whose contributions
of time and talent the quality of our presence abroad would be vastly diminished.
(We would like to submit for the Record at this time the results of AAFSW's
Time-Use Survey.) A first step to recognize this contribution is in the works:
a senior spouse job description has been developed ; it represents a career focused,
skill oriented approach to diplomatic spouse activities. We would like to see
more steps taken in this area.
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(4) Need for adequate retirement programs for spouses working in temporary,
parttime or limited hire positions. We would like to see the renewable limited
appointments permit participation in the Civil Service retirement system.
Those who have left Civil Service jobs behind should be allowed to continue
their participation in the Civil Service -system while working abroad. Senior
spouses who volunteer their efforts full time performing diplomatic and com-
munity services abroad should be permitted to pay into Social Security.
Some of these needs could be met by administrative regulations. Others will
require legislation. For the AAFSW, spouse employment and career develop-
ment will continue to be a priority concern. So long as these issues are manifest
throughout American society, the Foreign Service community will feel their
effects and must respond one way or another.
The demonstrated interest and concern by Members of this Committee earlier
have already played an important part in. the progress that has been made. We
will continue to seek your support. We know how effective it can be.
THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT AND ANNUITIES
I want to consider the problems of the divorced Foreign Service wife, and to
begin by reminding you of .some facts.
First, the concept of no-fault divorce has swept the country. There is no longer
any defense against a unilateral decision by one partner to end a marriage.
Second, a recent study by the University of Texas projects that 38 percent
of the young women now in their late twenties or early thirties will be divorced
at some point in their lives.
Third, the divorce rate in marriages that have lasted longer than fifteen years
has doubled in the past decade.
Fourth, despite mythology to the contrary, alimony is awarded in only 14 per-
cent of divorces. To make matters worse, fewer than half the women receive
payments with any regularity after the first year. In any case, payments cease
when the husband dies, often leaving a divorced woman with desperately little
money at the exact time in her life when she most needs it. Indeed, the fastest
growing group of persons subsisting under the poverty line are older women.
Last, I draw your attention to a. statistic that currently is not known : the
divorce rate in the Foreign 'Service. For whatever reason, the State Department
has never kept any record of this information. No one suggests that whether a
particular employee has been divorced should be on the public record, but surely
these data should be kept in numerical form to show how the Foreign Service, in
comparison with other ways of life, affects marriages. The Family Liaison coun-
selors tell us that much of their time is spent dealing with divorce cases.
Keeping these. facts in mind, let us move on to the difficult problem of annuities
for divorced Foreign Service spouses. Our approach is based on a concept of
marriage as an economic partnership of co-equals. Contributions to this partner-
ship may be in earned wages or in unpaid activities such as those traditionally
delegated to the homemaker and mother. In assessing the value of these activities
a Maryland court in 1975 awarded damages of $1,500,000 to a man and his two
children for the loss of their wife and mother. The court assessed the value of
the mother's services to the two children for a period of eight or nine years at
$60,349. Society, however, generally ignores the economic contribution of the
homemaker in questions of divorce.
Our view is, further, that the Foreign Service wife has special impediments to
economic independence, resulting exclusively from the husband's employment.
Cultural, legal and linguistic barriers prevent her from working overseas. When
she can work, constant international mobility usually prevents her from vesting
in any sort of retirement plan. Earlier government policy, as you heard from
Ambassador Henderson, discouraged her from working at a paid job. It is the
existence of these unique conditions which are the grounds for granting special
relief to Foreign Service wives, not necessarily granted to members of other
government services. We do not feel that we are in any sense better than other
groups of wives, but rather that no other group shares all the ways in which
we are disadvantaged in attaining economic self-sufficiency. The United States
government has an obligation to compensate wives for this loss of opportunity
to create their own economic base. This obligation is independent of the marital
relationship.
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In addition, Foreign Service wives frequently perform hours of unpaid service
for the government. Our time-use survey shows that wives of middle- and upper-
rank officers donate from one to four weeks work per month. One ambassador's
wife logged the equivalent of two full-time jobs in activities related to her hus-
band's employment.
There is no present method for reimbursing wives for their work, because
there is no satisfactory means of rating the work.
Let us turn now to the proposed Foreign Service Act of 1979, Section 821(b) (2).
We are grateful to see this provision included which would require permission
of the affected spouse to waive his or her survivor annuity. We would, however,
like to see the protection extended to former spouses who have resided with the
participants on assignments in the Service for the requisite ten years.
Next, let me simply mention Section 864(b) which authorizes payments of
sums otherwise due to an annuitant or a participant to another person pursuant
to the terms of a court decree of divorce. These provisions are similar to those
in P.L. 95-366, enacted in 1978 for the Civil Service. This section begins to
nibble at the problem. However, the court order approach is not satisfactory
to us. I will discuss the reasons for this in a moment.
Now we turn to a section which has disappeared. An earlier draft or the bill
contained a proposal to deal with the question of a survivor annuity for a divorced
spouse, again pursuant to a court-ordered property settlement. It required that
the former spouse be married to the participant for at least ten years during
the latter's employment in the Foreign Service. OMB requested that the section
be excised and placed in a separate bill. The Administration would prefer to
consider the issue under the rubric of pensions in the Presidential Commission
on Pension Policy. While this decision may be appealing from the standpoint of
rationalizing effort, it is dismaying for divorced or divorcing Foreign service
wives because it will cause a three- to four-year delay at best. Some of these
wives have almost nothing. Some live in terror that they will not die soon
enough before rampant inflation or the death of their former husbands reduces
them to abject penury. They need relief now.
There are grave disadvantages to the court-ordered approach to these issues
adopted by the Department. There is the enormous expense of access to the
courts, especially for appeals. There is the lack of precedent for awarding parts
of pensions and survivor annuities. There are widely varying divorce laws from
state-to-state which would result in different women receiving widely differing
awards of a federal benefit for the same deprivations. There is little or no
awareness among jurists of the special problems faced by Foreign Service wives.
Furthermore, these women are frequently cut off from community roots or con-
nections, and often rely on their husbands' lawyers or on ones they recommend.
For these reasons, we greatly prefer Rep. Schroeder's bill, H.R. 2857, which
would automatically give a former spouse who was married to a participant
for at least ten years a pro rated share of the retirement and survivor's annuity.
The exact amount of the former spouse's annuity would depend on the number
of years of marriage that overlap with credited years of service toward
retirement.
The only drawback of Rep. Schroeder's bill is that it does not solve the problem
of those already divorced, especially those whose participant or annuitant spouse
has died. A possible solution may lie in the grantee approach used in P.L. 94-350
in 1.976 which gave widows of Foreign Service employees retired before 1960 a
minimum annuity.
If Rep. Schroeder's bill were made retroactive to cover existing former spouses,
present second spouses of participants or annuitants would be adversely affected
and would require some relief. Second marriages made in the future, however,
would be protected by the, knowledge of the exact entitlement of the former
spouse.
I would like to discuss one last matter, the extraordinary hardship visited on
the divorced Foreign Service wife by the withdrawal of medical insurance. At
present, if she applies within a specified period after her divorce, her former
carrier must accept her without a physical examination. However, she receives
only limited hospitalization coverage, usually excepting existing health prob-
lems, and is charged up to $1,600 per year for this inadequate coverage.
Because so many health conditions are caused by or exacerbated by inadequate
medical care overseas, this is a particular cruelty. We would like to have health
insurance renegotiated-to provide a better deal for divorced women so that the
costs of the actuarial risk are spread over the entire system.
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The expense of rectifying these inequities is negligible. On the other hand,
the continued failure to protect these older women has hidden costs: 'payments
for welfare and food stamps, the loss of tax revenues through deductions taken
by family members who may contribute support, and increased costs to the
health delivery system of the higher incidence of illness associated with poverty.
There are human costs as well. The bitter sense of betrayal by a system which
appears to exploit and discard participants is a contagion, spreading distrust
and lack of commitment that will never appear on a cost/benefit analysis or a
zero-based budget.
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE WOMEN,
Washington, D.C., March 12, 1979.
Hon. CYRUS R. VANCE,
Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY : In response to your reply of September 8, 1977, to the
Report on the Concerns of Foreign Service Spouses and Families, the Associa-
tion of American Foreign Service Women is pleased to submit'the Forum's most
recent study on the dependent employment situation.
Reports on other matters of concern to the Forum, such as mental health,
orientation, and communication between families and the Department, are being
prepared. However, because of the high priority and timeliness of the employment
issue, we wish to submit this report separately at this time. Other reports will
be sent along to you as they are readied.
Your personal interest in, and understanding of, the issues raised by the Forum
have already given impetus to significant improvements in the life of the Foreign
Service family. We greatly appreciate your support and look forward to a con-
tinuing and fruitful dialogue.
Sincerely,
LESLEY. DORMAN,
President, Association of American
Foreign Service Women.
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, A REPORT ON DEPENDENT EMPLOYMENT FROM THE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE WOMEN FORUM COMMITTEE ON THE
CONCERNS OF FOREIGN SERVICE SPOUSES AND FAMILIES
We are encouraged that the Department recognizes the serious problems facing
Foreign Service spouses, both male and female, who wish to pursue careers ap-
propriate to their interests, experience and educational. background. It is in-
creasingly clear, that inadequate employment for spouses is adversely affecting
assignments, efficiency and morale in the Foreign Service. That -men want careers
of their own has never been questioned. Many female spouses now also want the
opportunity to. have careers of their own. This is not purely a 'matter of economic
need, although that plays a strong role in times of rapid inflation. Women, now
more than ever before, want the satisfaction of an independent career and the
security a career provides them for weathering the uncertainties of middle and
later years.
We are grateful to the Department for its efforts to improve employment op-
portunities for Foreign Service dependents. The setting up of a Skills/Talent
Bank in the Family Liaison Office, the successful negotiation of new regulations
governing employment of diplomatic and consular dependents in this country
(A-1 and A-2 visa holders), the pilot implementation of Sec. 401 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act (FY 1979) which converts some foreign national
slots to American possibilities and morals at post. The Family Liaison Office
itself is, of great assistance in answering questions and providing advice on em-
ployment programs. The Career Workshops offer positive assistance for reentering
the work force. PIT (Parttime/Intermittent/Temporary) and contract jobs can
add to employment choices. Two programs recently initiated reserve support :
the stateside use of the 90-day security clearance waiver to permit hiring spouses
for emergency short-term needs of the Department, and the Service Institute so
that they might be employed to fill administrative and consular needs abroad.
This report discusses the above programs and offers suggestions for changes.
It will then. turn to other key issues which the Forum-and the AAFSW feel
must be addressed by the Foreign Affairs Agencies in order to meet the needs
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of Foreign Service dependents in today's world. These other issues include the
special employment problems of the spouses of senior diplomats, the need for
spouse participation in individual retirement benefit programs, and the need to
earn career status.
The Skills/Talent Bank.-We applaud the Department's funding of it half-
time position for six months to implement the Skills/Talent Bank and to promote
its use within the Foreign Affairs Agencies and among firms doing business
abroad. It is, however, unclear what will happen when the six-month period
ends in June 1979. We do not see how the Skills Bank can continue to func-
tion as a useful service if there is not at least one part-time employee to man-
age it. We hope the Department would agree with this point of view and fund
a permanent part-time position for the Skills Bank. The Skills Bank Coordinator
not only answers requests for names of persons with geographic availabilities
and skills, but also promotes the Bank with international firms and organiza-
tions hiring abroad. She is available to answer questions and counsel those
going abroad on work opportunities at particular posts. In addition, the current
Skills Bank Coordinator, working approximately thirty-two hours a week, has
developed a job information resource packet for mailing to all posts, coordinates
the semi-annual Career Planning Workshops at the Foreign Service Institute
(discussed separately), conducts monthly meetings to assist spouses returning
to the D.C. job market from overseas, and recruits spouses to fill PIT positions
in the Department and for the pilot training program at FSI. These efforts
must be continued to make the Skills/Talent Bank the valuable service that
it should be, both to-the Foreign Affairs Agencies and to the Foreign Service
family.
As an adjunct to the services of the Skills Bank, a repository of full-up-to-date
information on the employment situation at each post would enable every
spouse going abroad to obtain valuable information on her/his job prospects.
In some cases, the spouse/dependent might be able by using this information
to land a job even before arriving at post, thereby making a happier transition
to a new location. While we recognize that post reports and the Overseas
Briefing Center generally have some information available, it is often incom-
plete and out-of-date. We urge the Department to set up a system for gathering
this information on a frequent basis and to make it available both in the Over-
seas Briefing Center and in the Skills Bank. We recommend that posts collect
this type of information by entering into,a contract with a qualified dependent
who will also seek job openings in the private sector for official American
dependents.
A-1, A-2 visas and reciprocity.-The Department is to be congratulated on
the dispatch with which it ,accomplished changes in the regulations permitting
A-1 and A-2 visa holders in the U.S. to accept employment. We hope that the
dependents of many embassies and consulates in the U.S. will take advantage
of this new opportunity, so that our own dependents in the reciprocal countries
may easily obtain permission to work. Although we do not have much informa-
tion on the effectiveness of the new reporting requirements concerning am-
bassadorial permission for dependents wishing to. ;accept work on the local
economy, we feel that the new process should represent a change for the better.
Conversion of foreign national positions to FN/AFM.-We appreciate the
difficulties encountered by the Department in its efforts to comply with Sec.
401 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY 1979. We hope that the
Department, as it works out the final regulations will support the intent of the
law which is to expand employment opportunities for family members of U.S.
personnel assigned abroad. But for a few exceptions, the kinds of positions
which were identified at pilot posts offer low-level jobs both in the skills
demanded and the pay offered. The former may be a result of the fact that the
pilot posts had a very short time to respond to the request for this information.
There is some indication that at least in one post not all foreign affairs elements
were consulted thoroughly and, therefore, did not designate jobs which might
become available. It is possible that with more time to consult and focus on the
program at post more positions and more interesting positions might have been
selected.
Because, according to the present plan, the FN/AFM positions will remain
on the local pay scale, many positions will pay far less than even the present
U.S. minimum wage. In some cases the wage will be less than half of the poverty
level wage. In a few geographic areas, such as the Persian Gulf and Europe,
wages paid at the local rates will be higher than comparable positions in the
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U.S. It appears to us that in the interest of equity all FN/AFM positions when
held by an American dependent should follow American pay schedules. We
believe that this is what the law intends when it refers to compensation prac-
tices "consistent with the public interest." If this program mainly offers low-
level jobs at pay scales unfair to Americans, then the program will not make
a significant difference in the overall job picture and will not carry out the
main intent of the law. If the Department determines that under the present
language of the law it cannot legally pay American dependents in FN/AFM
positions on an American pay scale, then we urge the Department t(, seek appro-
priate changes in the law.
Career Workshops.-We wish to underline the contribution made by the
Career Workshops conducted at FSI by the Overseas Briefing Center and the
Family Liaison Office. These workshops have provided invaluable guidance for
those attempting to reenter the work force both here and abroad. Not only have
the courses been extremely well run and well attended, but they have also
created support groups for those trying to break into today's tight job market.
The fact that the Foreign Service dependent must continually interrupt her/his
career with each new assignment makes finding suitable employment difficult, if
not impossible, in the States as well as overseas. Furthermore, it is not uncom-
mon for a potential employer to turn down an applicant just because as a
Foreign Service dependent she/he looks like a short-timer. The Career Work-
shops offer the spouse, whether returning or departing, an essential service
in facing yet another job search. We urge the Department to continue funding
these two-day workshop programs twice yearly.
Pit and contract programs.-We look forward to learning the results of the
Director General's inquiry into the pros and cons of expanding the PIT pro-
gram and of encouraging the use of non-personal service contracts and con-
sultants drawn from the dependent community. We would welcome informa-
tion on any expansion of these programs in the past year. Given the fact that
there are spouses of U.S. employees abroad who have professional backgrounds
in economics, political science, journalism and other areas, and who could per-
form important services in those areas, we suggest that the Department give
full consideration to employing these individuals on contract or as consultants
to meet the changing needs of the Department's work abroad.
As the PIT program is now designed, it presents a number of problems
which we would like to bring to the attention of the Department : appointments
are limited.to one year, followed by a three-month break in employment before
the employee can be given the same position again ; the position can be termi-
nated at any time; grade levels with rare exceptions are limited to FSS-8 and
below ; PIT jobs offer no career potential ; and, unlike DOD hiring programs,
no preference is given to official dependents. We propose that these deficiencies
be examined. Specifically, we propose that the Department offer PIT positions
at all grade levels, that the three-month break in employment be eliminated,
that positions be offered for two-year periods, that official U.S. civilian de-
pendents be given preference in this and other hiring programs, and the PIT
employees be eligible for promotion and step increases. The question of status
will be dealt with later in this report.
Two new Department programs.-The Forum is keenly interested in two
programs recently approved by the Department : the temporary employment of
Foreign Service spouses on an emergency basis under security clearance waiver
of Executive Order 10450; and training for a pilot group of spouses in regular
Foreign Service Institute administrative and consular courses on a space avail-
able basis. We fully support the first program and look forward to being of
service in this way to the Department. The security clearance time lag works
a hardship both on the Department and the individual waiting for final clear-
ance. We urge the Department to apply the security clearance waiver to summer
hire of teenage dependents.
. As to the second program, we also strongly endorse the Department's idea
of training spouses to handle designated administrative and consular tasks.
Under this program spouses with appropriate training at post can fill staffing
gaps, thus eliminating possible TDY expenditures and providing continuity of
service. Such a program can also contribute markedly to the improvement of mo-
rale at post, not only because it will increase employment opportunities, but
because it will demonstrate a realization on the part of the Department that
the skills and experience of dependents are a valuable resource. We support the
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implementation of these programs by the Department and will urge the other
Foreign Affairs Agencies to follow suit.
OTHER KEY ISSUES
The Forum is encouraged by the steps which the Department has taken to
try to expand the employment opportunities for dependents abroad and at
home. We view these adjustments to the increasing demands of women and
male dependents for a fair chance in the job market as a very important begin-
ning. Eventually, however, the issue of career status and benefits, and of em-
ployment for spouses of senior officials will have to be met.
Retirement.-Retirement puts the Foreign Service spouse in a particularly
difficult situation. She/he is ill prepared for later years because of mobility
and the failure of many job programs abroad to offer adequate retirement bene-
fits. Even some U.S. Government jobs abroad do not provide retirement programs
(i.e., English language teaching, commissary, and other contract work). The
spouse who devotes full time to supporting the Foreign Service Officer's rep-
resentational activities receives no monetary or retirement benefits in her/his
own right. The spouse who leaves a job with paid-in retirement benefits in the
States may find a job abroad, but it will probably not permit her/him to con-
tinue to pay into the retirement program of the agency which had employed
her/him at home. The person who had been employed by a company where the
retirement benefits were fully paid by the company may lose all retirement
credit with that company. The dependent who left a retirement program at
home usually must enter a different program when working abroad, but might
not be in any program long enough to qualify for adequate benefits or any bene-
fits at all. These are intolerable situations, and ones which, in some cases, may
require new legislation in order to give the Foreign Service spouse a fair
chance at earning decent retirement benefits. One suggestion which deserves
study would be to permit the dependent spouse, even while unemployed, the
option of paying into an independent retirement account or the Social Security
system while abroad. (To offer adequate retirement income, these programs
should permit larger contributions and benefits than at present.) Those who
have a stake in another retirement system should be permitted to continue to
pay into that system if they so desire.
Two concepts are central to understanding this problem : it is essential to
recognize that the non-working person has the same retirement needs as the
working person, and that each individual needs to have retirement benefits in
her/his own right. We urge the Department to take the lead in requesting
appropriate changes in laws and- regulations to permit spouses more oppor-
tunities and greater flexibility for participation in retirement programs. We also
recommend that all jobs connected with official missions abroad and held by
official dependents offer adequate retirement benefit programs.
The Forum strongly supports the proposal to make Foreign Service spouses
who are divorced or legally separated eligible fot inclusion, along with Civil
Service spouses, under P.L. 95-366. This law permits a spouse to claim a portion
of the employee spouse's pension at retirement. The proposal meets an urgent
need for those spouses now facing this circumstance.
Employment for spouses of senior officials.-Spouses of senior diplomatic
officials face special employment problems. The officers position may make
employment both within and outside of the mission awkward. Many may feel
that under these circumstances the best use of their talents is in the representa-
tional area and that relinquishing these activities for other employment would
not be in the best interests of the United States. Appropriate steps should be
taken to recognize their efforts. Although we do not support the idea of honorary
awards, we do support the request made by wives attending the recent Chiefs
of Mission Regional Conference in Columbo (State 00317, Jan. 19, 1979) that
COM spouses be given a job description which could be used as a model for
inclusion in their resumes. There should be a form of appropriate certification, if
requested by the spouse, for her/his efforts. Naturally, no spouse should feel
compelled to fulfill the duties outlined in the job description. She/he should be
free to accept or reject the traditional role.
We feel that those spouses who accept the responsibilities of the role as out-
lined in the proposed guidelines should be compensated by receiving a salary
based on a percentage of the employee spouse's salary. Along with this should go
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the right to earn. retirement benefits, or at least to pay into an independent retire-
ment account. We realize that this idea will require serious study and changes in
the law before it can be put into effect. Nevertheless, we think it has great merit.
It would permit official recognition of the dedicated and expert services rendered
by the spouse who takes on this traditional role. It would permit monetary reward
to satisfy the spouse who objected to the two-for-one arrangement but who could
not comfortably avoid it. We hope that this proposal will receive serious Depart-
mental consideration and support.
Career issue.-The modern Foreign Service spouse who works in various U.S.
government positions abroad, be they PIT, contract, or some other form of
direct-hire, is, under present regulations, denied status regardless of how long
she/he has worked for the Government. Under the plan for the new FN/AFM
positions and PIT positions, the dependent is allowed to work for one year with
a possible one-year extension. Present regulations permit acquisition of status
even in career jobs only after three years of basically unbroken service, and
under no circumstances when working in direct-hire, FN/AFM, PIT or contract
positions. Thus. the limitations attached to such employment discriminates un-
fairly against a class of persons who have practically no other choice for
employment but to work for the U.S. government. The fact that this employment
offers no hope for career status also adversely affects the individual's employ-
ment opportunities in the U.S. Since the U.S. government, the largest employer
in the Washington area, makes status a qualification for many positions, the
Foreign Service dependent who returns without status is cut out of much of the
job market.
The AAFSW Forum plans to do all it can to have regulations adopted which
permit Foreign Service dependents to accumulate Civil Service status through
credit for each month worked for the Government, both in the States and abroad,
regardless of breaks in service. We will also request that this change be made
retroactive. We hope that the Department will actively support us in this en-
deavor. It is our belief that, in the short and long run, increases in real career
opportunities, not just work opportunities, will strengthen the. Foreign Service
by making it more attractive to all employees.
Spouse employment and career development will continue to be a priority
concern of the AAFSW Forum. So long as these concerns are manifest throughout
Americtn society as a whole, the Foreign Service community will feel their
effects, and must -respond one way or another. We are encouraged that the
Department of State has, through its statements and actions, recognized this
growing issue. We hope to continue to work with the Department to make needed
adjustments, to eliminate inequities in existing and future programs, and to
find new ways to expand dependent work and career opportunities.
[From the Association of American Foreign Service Women, Washington, D.C.,
May-June 1978 Newsletter]
Time Use Survey: Lots of Hours
(By Margaret W. Sullivan)
"I knew I worked hard, but I was surprised at how many hours it really was",
commented a wife as part of her response to a time-use survey undertaken this
year by the Association of American Foreign Service Women Newsletter. The
survey documents the hours of unremunerated work spouses contribute to the
official functioning of U.S. Missions and delineates the ways these hours are
spent. Time use-not opinions about if or how it should or should not be recom-
pensed-is all the survey studies. The results do not so much present a new
picture as fill-in, highlight and confirm areas of the commonly assumed one.
Although some respondents report no involvement at all in the official life of
a Mission, a substantial majority contribute .to it in some way. The degree of
involvement-except in activities of a. purely community-building nature-is
generally related to the employee's position. The unique demands of the specific
post and the variations of individuals personalities are also factors in the
amounts of time invested.
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.
Two findings stand out:
Being an Ambassador's wife is frequently a full-time job. An Ambassador's or
Charge's wife probably devotes an average 167 hours a month-over four 40-hour
work-weeks-to official functions. Some devote much more. The top number
reported for 328 hours 30 minutes, or almost 11 hours a day, seven days a week ;
enough for two full-time jobs.
Being the wife of an officer with representational responsibilities is frequently
equivalent to having. at Least a part-time job. The survey suggests that nearly
half the wives of officers who have such responsibilities may contribute more
put in lmorethan three
120
than 4 and less thn 120 hours a month-more 40-hour work-weeks. An additional fifth of such than
The survey was initiated in October 1977 when the questionnaire appeared in
the AAFSW Newsletter. A later story about it in the Department of State News-
letter elicited a few requests for forms. At a number of posts, the survey form
was reprinted and circulated. It is impossible to know, therefore, how many
foreign affairs agency dependent spouses saw the form or knew that the survey
was being undertaken. Nor is the total number of dependent spouses currently
abroad with the various foreign affairs agencies known. Such statistics are not
kept by the agencies involved. In 1976, the questionnaire for the AAFSW Forum
Report was sent to some 8,000 people. Using a 60/40 abroad and home ratio, this
would suggest that nearly 5,000 dependent spouses are at posts at any one time.
Educational guesses based on other Departmental statistics tend to confirm this
estimate. Clearly, more accurate statistics about spouses are needed.
One hundred sixty-nine responses to the survey were received. This number by
itself is not statistically sufficient to more than suggest the range of involvement
and hours some wives invest. The survey is important, however, as the first docu-
mentary study of the subject. Some sub-groups of the response are big enough to
be statistically significant. Twenty Ambassadors' and Charge's wives responded,
14.38 percent of such possible responses. This, and the geographical and post-class
distribution of this aub-group makes the picture of full-time involvement of wives
at the top level of Foreign Service life statistically valid. A log kept in 1957 by
an Ambassador's wife was also submitted. Very little has changed at that level.
Two posts responded in sufficient numbers that a reasonably accurate profile of
the contribution of spouse-time can be drawn for each of them. One,. with a 24
percent response, is a Class 1 Asian post. The other, with a nearly 75 percent
response, is a Class 4 post in South America. That the other responses to the
questionnaire follow in the same basic pattern of these sets gives greater weight
than otherwise might be the case of the profile suggested by the limited number
of responses.
The number of responses as a whole. is skewed toward spouses who are in-
volved.-This is hot .surprising in, a self-selected group of respondents. People
doing something are often quicker to talk about it than those who are not. The
number of respondents who list their husbands as having representational or
representational and post leadership responsibilities outnumber the responses
from those whose spouses-do not, three to one. While this may be larger than
the ratio in the foreign affairs agencies married population as a whole, it is
probably not 'substantially so. (As mentioned, however, observations about over-
all numbers must be.educated guestimates rather than statistical fact.)
The responses come from 44 posts out of 240 (18.3 percent). The Department
classifies its 139 Embassies as Class 1, 2, 3 and 4. There are-103 non-Embassy
posts. Responses were distributed among the classes of post as follows :
Class 1, 8-44.4 percent.
Class 2, 3-17.6 percent.
Class 3. 12-42.9 percent.
Class 4,12-15.8 percent.
Others, 9-8.5 percent.
The geographical distribution of responses has two major gaps: Eastern Euro-
pean countries and the London-Paris-Rome axis. The responses, therefore, could
be and were analyzed to see if class of post makes any marked difference in time
involvement for wives. A break-down by geographical area was not possible and
was not attempted.
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344
Other variables that appear to affect the time wives invest-the isolation, and
fish-bowl factors, and the political "sexiness" of certain posts-could only be
judged on the basis of common knowledge. Were a broader-based, more detailed
study to be undertaken at a later date, these aspects would need to be more care-
fully addressed.
Single responses were received from 24 posts. Multiple responses came from
20 posts. A block of 13 came from an Embassy and two of its Consulate Generals.
Two male dependent spouses participated in the survery. Responses were so-
licited from any dependent spouse at post without regard to which agency or
service the employee works for. A number of responses from military wives were
received from the two posts which sent in substantial replies. Some women
mentioned being regularly or intermittently employed themselves. Not enough
information was consistantly available about this aspect, however, to draw any
conclusions.
For this sample, percentages and average numbers of hours, are misleading.
It seems more relevant to look at clusters of times reported and to talk in terms
of 40-hour work-weeks. One hundred sixty hours constitutes a full four 40-hour
work-weeks per month. Percentages and averages are cited primarily for those
sub-groups with great enough responses to be meaningful in those terms.
Respondents were asked to keep a log for a month and from that to answer
five questions giving the number of hours per month spent : preparing for and
entertaining at home ; attending official functions hosted by other Americans and
host or third country nationals ; assisting in official activities such as updating
post reports, price surveys, escorting visitors, etc. ; other time-consumers the
respondent considers official rather than personal ; and community building/
supporting activities within the Mission. They were also asked to identify the
post and give some general information about their spouse's position in it.
THE TOTAL PICTURE
Individuals reported monthly totals of unremunerated work time contributed
to the official functioning of U.S. Missions abroad varing from 0 to 328.5 hours
a month. Including those who reported no involvement, just over a quarter of
the respondents reported under 39 hours per month total contribution-less than
one work-week. More than half reported over 40 hours and less than 120
(between one and three work-weeks). Nearly a quarter of the responses reported
over three work-weeks (120 hours) per month. Ten women reported over 200
hours for the month surveyed. A number submitted logs to substantiate their
reports. There seems to be only minor variation in the pattern of the hours
reported among the Class 1, 2, 3 and 4 posts. Constituent posts show a larger
proportion of responses in the 80-119 hour range: Whether this is because the
posts are smaller or because of the particular jobs of the husbands of those who
took time to respond, is impossible to say.
Among those women whose husbands have representational responsibilities,
nearly two-thirds reported more than one and less than three. work-weeks total
time (compared to just over half of the total sample). More than a quarter of
them reported over three work-weeks while about 10 percent reported less than
one work-week and only one person in this category reported no involvement at
all. Conversely, of women whose husbands have no representational responsi-
bilities (about a quarter of the sample) well over half reported less than one
work-week's total contribution and over 10 percent reported no involvement of
any kind
The patterns of total time distribution of each of the two posts with substan-
tial responses shows a similar picture, although at both posts the proportion of
responses under one work-week is larger (38 percent of the Class 1 post, 34.2
percent of the Class 4 post). The hour range at the Class 1 post was from 0 to
309 although the second highest reported there was 169. At the Class 4 post, the
range is from 0 to 235 hours per month. Of those whose husbands have repre-
sentational/leadership responsibilities at the Class 1 post, 59.25 percent report
between one and three work-weeks per month while 22 percent report over 120
hours for the month. At the Class 4 post, the same group reports 85 percent
between 40 and 119 hours while 13 percent report over 4 work-weeks a month.
Of those whose spouses have no representational responsibilities, at the Class 1
post, 23.1 percent show no involvement, 46.2 percent under one work-week and
30.8 percent between one and three work-weeks per month. At the Class 4 post,
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1.3.3 percent of the wives whose husbands have no representational responsi-
bilities report no involvement while 46.6 percent contribute less than 39 hours
a month and 40 percent report between 40 and 120 hours a month.
The Ambassadors' and Charges' wives, predictably, report larger number of
hours. The totals range from 54 to 338.5 hours for the month. The average is
just over 167 hours (more than four 40-hour work-weeks in one month). The
wife who reports only 54 hours for the month surveyed, however, notes special
circumstances which indicate that 130 hours per month would be more nearly
normal for her. The distribution of time these women report is 30 percent
between one and three work-weeks, 30 percent between three and four work-
weeks, and 40 percent over four work-weeks per month.
While the responses do not always indicate other specific leadership positions
beyond Principal Office and Deputy, occasionally internal evidence pinpoints an
AID Mission Director's, Defense Attache's or an ICA Director's wife. Uniformly,
these women are among those reporting the most hours. The same is true to a
lesser extent for Section Chief's and Cultural Affairs Officer's wives. However,
not enough of these were pinpointed to make statistical analysis possible. Com-
ments suggest that the time demands of posts are cyclical and seasonal. There
seems to be about as much variation in the time ranges of posts within a single
class as there is between posts of different class. This suggests that each post
has its own dynamic or that there are other dynamics that the survey did not
bring out. The length of time a person has been at post also seems to affect the
amount of time spent on official activities. A few women mentioned deliberately
restricting involvement either to spend time with children or to pursue other
careers. No one cited these as reasons for total non-involvement although it may
be the case. None of the "non-participants" gave reasons.
One woman wrote "Even though I expect to start work next month, I antici-
pate that I will still spend about 50 hours a month on representational and com-
munity activities". In looking at those responses which are well over four
40-hour work-weeks per month (235 hours, 240 hours, 260 hours, 273 hours, 294
hours, 309 hours, and 338 hours) one has to wonder if there is a point where the
demands of the post stop and the needs of the individual to be constantly work-
ing take over.
OFFICIAL ENTERTAINING
One of the major, and traditional, contributions of time wives make is in
preparing for and being hostess at representational functions in their own homes.
The range of time reported for this function varied from 0 (about one-sixth of
the response) to a monumental 205 hours per month on the part of one woman.
Over half those responding spend between one and 39 hours a month (less than
one work-week) preparing and entertaining. The hours for those whose husbands
have representational responsibilities are slightly higher although they still pri-
marily fall in the under one work-week a month range. Fifty-five percent of the
Ambassador's and Charges' wives, however, report between 40 and 79 (between
one and two work-weeks) spent entertaining and 10 percent report between 80
and 119 hours a month. The pattern for time invested in official entertaining at
the two posts with substantial responses bears out these observations. Not
unsurprisingly, those women whose husbands have no representational responsi-
bility show little or no time spent in "required" entertaining. One woman whose
husband's job is not representational reports doing a. substantial amount of
"effectively" representational entertaining because of their long-time and now
high-level connections in the country. Personal as well as official relationships
affect the number of hours spent. "It is our pleasure".
Much entertaining is done in the evening although many people also report
daytime activities. One night a week entertaining officially at home is the pattern
for about a third of the respondents. Almost as many report less-one, two or
three evenings a month. For those whose husbands have representational re-
sponsibilities, two-thirds report between three nights a month and four nights
a week. Twenty-five percent of Ambassadors' and Charges' wives entertain one
evening a week, 25 percent report two evenings a week, and 30 percent report
from three to five evenings a week. In addition, 25 percent also give one daytime
social function a week and 30 percent give more than that
The amount of time spent preparing for functions in the home varies with the
function, the ease of shopping at the post, the availability of household help and
the capabilities of that help. Women at one post report the necessity of crossing
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one of. the world's largest cities to shop for things needed for representational
entertaining. At another post, the food supply is so bad that;periodic motor trips
on difficult roads to a neighboring country are necessary to be adequately sup-
plied. Without these extreme cases, a minimum of two hours preparation time
for every hour's entertaining time seems usual.
A number of women mention that their husbands do an increasing amount of
representational, entertaining at lunch in restaurants. Conversely, several say
that at their present post the places to go out are limited and the quality poor.
Because almost a quarter of the wives at the Class 4 post which responded
en masse are employed, they organized a special questionnaire which shows that
11 out of 13 spouses with jobs outside the home continue to entertain about the
same amount when they start working. Seven of them are hiring more help for
parties, six are not. Ten of their husbands help plan and prepare for guests at
the same rate as they did before, but no idea is given as to whether or not the
husbands help. Eight of the women spend about the same amount of money while
four spend more "because the easiest dishes to prepare are the most costly".
Twelve report' that their type of entertaining has not changed. because of their
employment, although one reports that "my job is at night and this makes
entertaining difficult". Six report they do not choose to do less "representational"
and more spontaneous entertaining with friends than they used to while four
report that they do. One wife, employed outside the Mission, reports sharing
entertaining work, expenses and guest lists with her husband. She pays and
works when the guests are her contacts. He pays and does-the major work when
they are his.. If, she is not there, he entertains.
BEING OFFICIALLY ENTERTAINED
Attending functions to which one has been invited solely because of the em-
ployee's positions is another traditional occupation of Foreign Service spouses.
Two-thirds of the sample report spending between one and 39 hours (one work-
week) a month at such functions. A quarter of the sample report between 40
and 119 hours (over one and less than three work-week). One response docu-
ments 135 hours in one month at official social functions. Half the respondents
report attending functions two or three nights a week on an average. Many men-
tion more than one function on a single evening. Those whose husbands have
representational responsibilities suggest that three or four nights a week is a
frequent pattern.
"I think", writes one wife, "the cruelest aspect of a Foreign Service woman's
time is that which she must give in the evenings. I have children and house-
keeping duties which take up most of my daily time and ... any time that is for
my enjoyment suffers for long periods of time because of the - evenings. When
we don't go out,' we are so terribly exhausted we can only catch up on sleep.
Some weeks we will go out 5 and 6 times .. this is an occupational hazard and
should not be thought of as something to remedy. I wouldn't want my husband
to go to these functions without me. I think we should instead advise women
how to deal with the panic-i.e., identify it, find other times in the day for
themselves, don't expect too much from themselves, etc. Also, more important
still, how to help husbands deal with this panic of no time."
Ambassadors' and Charges' wives average 58 hours 45 minutes attending offi-
cial functions. "Not counting the time it takes to keep hair done and change
clothes." None of these women reported less than two evenings out a week.
"I tend to participate more actively as an Ambassador's wife than hitherto in
the rounds ... there is a kind of unwritten quid pro quo that propels us to each
other's National Days."
The pattern varies considerably from post to post. One wife suggests that her
present post is "'quieter" than some of the others in the area. A woman in a
Muslim country has stopped attending many functions because the local wives
do not attend. In another Muslim post, however, diplomatic wives are expected
to maintain a very active social schedule largely separate from their husbands.
"Calling on royal family wives is expected".
One of the clear pictures this survey shows, then, is a large group of women
whose evenings are not their own. They spend two or three nights or more out
officially and maybe the same or slightly less entertaining officially at home.
One wife suggests "there is one other factor to be considered, call it `minus
time' . . . the time' representational duties take away from small children. So
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many functions are `early evening' and take the mother, especially, away from
the dinner hour, bubble bath, story-time routine. Hired help is no substitute."
Spouses contribute to other areas of official functioning of Missions. They
escort Codels and other visitors, conduct price surveys, up-date post reports, edit
post and commissary newsletters, serve on commissary and school boards, respond
to the Forum Report, prepare slides for the Overseas Briefing Center, organize
the American booth for local charity bazaars and many other things. Less than
half the total. sample reported activities of this sort. This is also true of the
two posts for, which it is possible to establish profiles. Most of those who are
involved in these official activities, however, find that they consume from 1 to 39
hours of their, time (less than one work-week). Ambassadors' and Charges'
wives average 28 hours per month. Very few women whose husbands do not have
representational or leadership responsibilities report involvement in these activi-
ties ; the few who do, with one exception, report less than 4 hours a month.
The mosr, frequently mentioned activity is escorting visitors-taking them
shopping and sightseeing. Codels are often mentioned separately from other
visitors. Asked whether or not such activities are on a continuing or "one shot"
basis, one wife responds "Each is `one shot' but they keep coming". Such escort
duty can take from three to 15 hours a time. "Each visit usually takes my whole
day..We use my car and my gas, and I drive". Other chores are also mentioned
in relation to official visitors : mailing packages afterwards, checking airline
reservations and, in some posts, putting them up. Escort duty falls primarily to
the wives of the more senior officials.
Not, all posts are on the visitors circuit. "My representational responsibilities
here are negligible", reports the wife of a mid-level officer. "However, we were
the only AID representatives at our last post and there was an average of two
official visitors a week (often more) and only one hotel and restaurant in town.
Obviously, my response would have looked quite different." Political circum-
stances change quickly and a post can suddenly be inundated. "At the time of
my log, I had not been involved with escorting visitors. Since that time, I have
spent a considerable amount of time with Senators visiting. * * *, this month
and last particularly. I did not record the hours but it would have been days,
not hours."
Women at two posts report they are not asked to participate in this type of
activity without remuneration. "For official vistiors who require translators, the
Embassy hires language experts among the wives". At another post, wives are
given a training course and paid a flat fee for working a Congressional visit.
Although one wife reports that "All required surveys are paid for in * * *"
doing price surveys appears frequently on responses as official time that is
unremunerated. Usually they are reported as using only a few hours a month
(only once or twice a year) but two women report spending 40 hours (one
work-week).
Another category of official functioning which wives of senior officers, partic-
ularly Ambassadors' and Charges' wives, report involves traditional diplomatic
wives duties-calling on the wives of local officials and other members of the
Diplomatic Corps, or being called upon by them ; attending the meetings of
Diplomatic Wives and belonging to clubs of a binational nature. "The Ambas-
sador's wife is always the honorary president of * * * so I feel I must." "The
PAO's or CAO's wife is always asked to sit on the Arts Council Board."
One post which sent in five responses shows several women involved in the
President's Wife's Charity Tea. Other posts report similar functions which,
while they may occur only once a year or every other year, can take up to 60
hours of a person's time and involve many of the women at the post.
Entertaining "in-house" visitors is also mentioned by some women : "gave a
dinner for the regional psychiatrist". Women at some constituents posts list house
guests as an official time-consumer. "We are glad to do it but it is disruptive."
The fourth question on the survey asked for "other time consumers which
you consider official". There is considerable overlap in the responses to this
question and the previous one (re official activities) on the survey form. Slightly
fewer respondents list less hours than for the previous question. However, all
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348
but one, of the Ambassadors' and Charges' wives list time in this category. They
again aerage 28 hours. Other than these women, however, there is no predictable
pattern as to who is involved and who is not. The underlying connection for
women's responses to this question is tasks that they would not be undertaking
except for the fact that they, find themselves abroad as the wife of their husband.
One of the major areas involves Official Residence supervision, maintenance
and repair and the supervision of Residence staff. This applies only to the wives
of Principal Officers and their Deputies. "Inventory for Residence. 2 full days !
At home, I would not have to inventory a vast hotel kitchen with pantries, attic
full of guest glassware, 4th of July tables, etc." "I'm tired ! ! Is my time 'supervis-
ing' this official or not? I'd be in a much smaller place if it weren't for my
husband's work." (She did not list the time for running the DCM's residence
and it was not counted). "I also did not include traditional gifts (X-mas) to
staff of Residence, drivers, agents, guards and all their children * * * 80 people !
I spent days on that. If this counts, add 35 hours (not counted). This has always
been done, so I thought I should keep the practice which I'm sure these employees
were expecting." (Hours a respondent listed in the blanks were counted-others,
as above, mentioned in comments were merely noted.) "It took untold hours over
nine months to get two bathrooms installed."
Another recurring category is secretarial and social secretarial functions. One
Ambassador's wife, an FSO on forced leave of absence, spends an hour or so
each morning in their office at the Residence helping her husband "because the
Embassy is short-staffed". Guest and Christmas card lists are revised. A number
of women list two or three hours a month spent "trying to reach people on the
phone about official things".
In what may be a change from earlier times, only one response mentions
"baking for a party at the Residence-3 hours."
Time spent learning non-world languages is itemized by some. "I enjoy it but
knowing * * * is particularly important so I can speak to my husband's contact's
wives." Others teach English to local officials or diplomatic wives. Several wives
cite use of their own professional skills : "36 hours per month/voluntary legal
assistance work." "Lecturing on American education at the bi-national ' center."
Perhaps the most telling part of the answers to these questions is that the
women responding consider what they are doing to be official whether others
would do so. or not.
Three-quarters of the spouses responding contribute time to community building
activities in one way or another. This includes attending Embassy or American
Women's Clubs, children's Christmas and Halloween parties, Girl and Boy
Scouts and above all, helping newcomers. For most women, this takes less than
20 hours a month (half of one work-week). Ambassadors' and Charges' wives
average 18 hours, much of it in parties or other forms of welcome for newcomers.
Community building, however, is the only area covered by the survey in which
massive time involvement bears no relation to the husband's job. The wife of a
junior officer with no representational responsibility, for instance, lists 53 hours
a month as chairman of the Welcoming Committee. A male dependent spouse
lists 32 hours in Embassy Women's Association functions. Other than for those
who note they are officers of Wives Clubs, large periods of time invested in com-
munity building seem to be seasonal-during the peak arrival times for new-
comers or at the time of the annual Embassy bazaar or major post party for
children or the local staff, or the 4th of July picnic.
The survey form suggested that time involved in community building might be
of a different nature, perhaps less official, than other official functions. One
Ambassador's wife thinks that for her, at least, it is no different from her other
obligations as the wife of her husband. A number of women report supporting
school functions or giving children's parties "even though I have no children."
The survey in no way addressed itself to the respondents' feelings about the
work they do or what they think about remuneration. On the whole, the re-
sponses are noncommital but cooperative, just as the cumulative picture the
survey presents is of basically cooperative, wryly hard working women.
Yet not everyone is totally cheerful. Some, as already quoted, are tired. "I think
what dismays me most of all," says another, "is that my contribution is neither
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recognized nor appreciated-whether it be marketing to have a dinner party or
whatever. If you want good food you must go to various markets to buy it-one
pace for fish, another for meat, another market for fruit, flowers somewhere else,
soft drinks at the supermarket. Sometimes it takes half a dozen trips. And no
one really cares."
Several women remark that they feel specific jobs should be paid for. "I won't
do (a price survey) again unless I'm paid." "If I were paid even minimum wage
for the hours I put in, I could afford graduate school when we get home."
Just as clearly, there are those who feel the opposite. "I do not wish to be
remunerated. Ambassadors' wives get plenty of appreciation, compensation
enough-and too much attention !" Other women remark "I do what I do by
choice." A substantial number of the respondents clearly, however, feel obliged
by the circumstances they find themselves in to do what they are doing, and
regard it as a contribution to official functioning of the Mission of which they
see themselves a part.
QUESTIONS, NOT ANSWERS
In the final analysis, a survey such as this raises more questions than it suggests
answers. The broad picture is clear enough. The survey bears out common
knowledge that many spouses contribute to the official functioning of U.S. Mis-
sions around the world to a greater or lesser degree. The more responsible an
employee's position in terms of representation and post-leadership, the more
likely the spouse is to participate in official functions and the more time-consum-
ing that participation is apt to be.
Yet paradoxically-although the survey results merely hint at it-there is
other evidence of a growing trend for some of these same spouses to want, or
need, jobs of their own. Can, will the present degree of contribution by spouses to
official functioning (between one and three work-weeks a month from a large
cumber of people even more from others) be continued? If it is, or if it is not,
what are the implications for the Foreign Service? For spouses?
Are these contributions a function of traditional social roles? Of the System's
expectations of wives? Of wives' expectations for themselves? Of the local com-
munity's expectations of "Embassy Wives"? How dependent is the system on
receiving them? What are the needs of the individuals who make them? What
are the alternatives?
Both spouses in many Foreign Service marriages are contributing participants
in that Foreign Service career or at least to the Foreign Service. What is the
dependent. spouse's economic share in that career? Is the dependent spouse
contributing to the marriage-partner employee or to the Foreign Service or
both? What are the appropriate forms of recognition for the many contributions
being made by spouses? Is anyone obliged to care?
Ultimately, perhaps, the question is what is representation? Who represents?
Why? What is effective? Necessary? A study of representation and the Depart-
ment's needs in that regard has already been called for. This time-use survey
and its documentation of hours, work-weeks, contributed further underscores
the need for clarification of the representation issues.
The CHAIRMAN. Where is your liaison office?
Ms. DORMAN. As one goes into C Street at the State Department,
turn directly to the left and it is the first bank of offices on the left.
The CHAIRMAN. Who manages it now, voluntary employees?
Ms. DORMAN. No, Janet Lloyd is the director. She is an FSR-3 and
there is a deputy director, an FSR-5.
The CHAIRMAN. Who pays their salary?
Ms. DORMAN. Under management, the Department of State. And
there is a secretary. And also attached to this office is the skills/talent
bank coordinator who is working there. And there is also an educa-
tion counselor there too at the moment.
The CHAIRMAN. Now in your group, and I raised this with you be-
fore, do you represent all spouses, including the male spouses of
female officers? Do you have male members?
50-230-80-23
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Ms. DORMAx. We don't at the moment. As a matter of fact we are in
the process, I have already designated a chairman of a committee to
look into our organization in its broadest possible sense. We are look-
ing into the possibility. First of all we have to change our name a
little bit. Because we have had people who have shown a decided.in-
terest of joining among the males, not so much the male. spouses today
but male officers, unmarried officers in point of face have been very
interested in joining our group.
I would like to mention here that in the skills/talent.bank there. are
24 male spouses aboard, which is very important. And we have been
dealing very much up until now with women's affairs, not just
spouses. We have women officers, we have secretaries, and "we have
the staff corps, right down the line as members in recent times. So we
are very well represented among the women, as far as the women are
concerned.
EMPLOYMENT OF SPOUSES IN POSTS, ABROAD
The :C-IAIRDIAN. What are your views with regard to the emplo-
ment of spouses in a post abroad when the Foreign Service Officer
involved has a responsible job in that same post? In other words it
is obvious that an Ambassador's wife should probably not be work-
ing in the administrative section. On the other hand should the con-
sular affairs wife be working in the administrative section, or should
the administrative officer's wife be working in the administrative
section ?
Ms. DORMAN. Well, I think it preferable if possible if she could
work in another office. We have a situation now where there is an
ambassador just going out whose wife is a career Foreign Service
Officer and she is working I believe for ICA at the particular post.
I don't think it -necessary for them to work at another organization.
I think it can cause less conflicts if the husband and wife are not
working in the same division.
I can see problems there but everybody might not agree with me.
Ms. CURRAN. I think it would have to be handled on an individual
basis. I think most posts and the management of most posts would be
very sensitive to that kind of situation and would probably make a
very good decision as to who should be employed where depending
upon their relationship and their personality I think might even come
into play there. 0
But I don't think you could really write-rules about it. I think people
would bend over. backwards to be careful about that sort of thing.
. The CHAIRMAN. I believe you favored the approach of the Schroeder
bill on retirement benefits and survivor annuities for divorced spouse
which would automatically give a former spouse married to a retire-
ment system participant credit for at least 10 years of marriage to a
Foreign Service Officer, giving her at least 10 years of the pro-rated
share. But doesn't the approach of the draft Foreign service bill,
requiring a court order before this could happen, have the advantage
of taking into account any special circumstances?.
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Ms. RYAN. This is a very difficult problem that has many: intractable
aspects. The problem with the court order approach that the State
Department has undertaken is first of all the expense of recourse to
the courts. We are talking about women who frequently-the problem
is that, they don't have resources. There is also the problem that the
courts and the lawyers, the judges and lawyers alike don't know the
special circumstances of Foreign Service life that is required that until
1972 had the wives graded on their husband's efficiency reports, that the
job itself means that you virtually have no opportunity:to create your
own economic base. You tend to be cut off from your community where
you were raised so you have no kind of community roots. And there is
as we all know no precedent in law. That is probably: the most im-
portant drawback. 't'here are no precedents. What is not addressed in
this bill is having some kind of survivor annuity for a former spouse.
We have a number of cases where people have spent 25. or. 30 years in
the Foreign Service with their husbands, being graded, in their hus-
band's efficiency reports, and their husband remarries and the sub-
sequent wife receives the fruits of these years that the former wife put
in and she is left penniless in many cases. So the Schroeder bill I believe
makes no requirement of time but is simply on the overlap between the
years of service and the years of the marriage. So that if the career were
20 years and you have been, married 10 years of the time that the spouse
was in Government employ you would receive automatically half of
the survivor annuity and half of the pension.
The CHAIRMAN. You say half the pension. Does that mean half of
the husband's retirement pension?
Ms. 1tYAN. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. His retirement pension would be reduced by half?
Ms. RYAN. That is right. We feel that marriage is an economic
partnership.
The CHAIRMAN. Why would it be a half because if it is a partner-
ship-I agree where the wife plays a very real role in it, but I am not
sure she plays 50 percent of the husband's success.
Ms. RYAN. It wouldn't be half. It would be if she had been married
for 5 years and his career was 20 years
The CHAIRMAN. But for the 5 years they were married it would be
half ?
Ms. RYAN. Five years they were married while he was in Government
service. If they were married before he came into service; that period
of marriage would not count. This is not a perfect system
The CHAIRMAN. You may be right. I think my wife has helped me
fantastically through the years. f am not sure she has helped me 50
percent. I like to think she has helped on a 40-60 basis.
Ms. DORMAN. I hope that, doesn't get back to her, Senator Pell.
[The following information was supplied. by Ms. Ryan to clarify
the above discussion:]
BREAKDOWN OF THE SCHROEDER BILL
The'Schroeder bill apportions the pension of a government employee on a pro
rata basis between the government employees career and' the' length of the'
marriage in those years. The maximum spousal share of a pension would
be 50 percent in a case where the marriage extended through the government
employee's entire career. Therefore a marriage that lasted 10 years of a 20
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year' government career would qualify the spouse for,25, percent of the pension
.and 50 percent of it survivor annuity.
The CHAIRMAN. How do you feel on the question of the incentive
pay ?Do you believe that is a good idea or not or are you familiar with
that provision where they would pay some Foreign Service officers
extra money for doing a good job, somewhat like a major general
getting extra money for doing a good job and not if he didn't. What
is your view on that?
Ms. DORMAN. Well, unofficially, Mr. Chairman, because we are really
an autonomous organization and not under the Foreign Affairs agency
so I cannot speak officially on that, unofficially I do not agree with that
at all. I do like your idea of putting us alongside the Marine Corps. I
thought that was delightful.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the way you feel. Thank you very much. I
particularly congratulate you on your Family Liaison Office because
I have heard of, it and know it is doing a good job. I hope we can give
whatever support we can in this legislation. I can't guarantee we will,
but I would like to.
Ms. DORMAN. We appreciate that very much.
The CHAntiAN. Our next witness is Mr. Cecil Uyehara, Foreign Af-
fairs Chapter, Asian and Pacific American Federal Employees
Council.
Please go ahead and proceed.
[Mr. Uyehara's biography follows:]
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF CECIL H. UYEHARA
For the past 15 years, I have been involved in programming, budgeting, plan-
ning and evaluation. of U.S. economic assistance programs in various countries,
e.g. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Latin America region, political-economic policy anal-
yses, program operations in varying combinations.
I am the Director, Program Operations Staff, Latin America Bureau, and
have been the Assistant Director for Development Planning in Afghanistan, Chief,
Programming Div., Vietnam Bureau, all in the Agency for International Develop-
ment, and senior budget examiner in the former Bureau of the Budget, and geo-
political analyst in:the U.S. Air Force.
Awards include Federal Executive Institute senior executive training in 1978;
Commissioner's Award of the U.S. Civil Service Commission for distinguished
service as'member of the Federal Personnel 'Project, 1978; Career Education
Award for Federal Civil Service Employees, National Institute for Public Affairs,
Harvard University, 1963-64.
Publications have centered on Japan: co-authorship of The Social Democratic
Party of Japan (1966) ; Leftwing Social Movements in Japan, An Annotated
Bibliography. Another study concerned "the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and Scien-
tific Advise," in Knowledge and Power (1966).
Professional and civic organizations include : Foreign Affairs Chapter, Asian
and Pacific American Federal Employees Council, Chapter President, 1977-78;
Association for Asian Studies ; Japan America Society of Washington, D.C.
member, Board of Trustees, 1977-81; Columbia University Seminar on Modern
Japan, Vice Chairman, 1979-80; Asia Society, Afghanistan Council, New York;
Japan-America Student Conference, Inc., member, Board of Trustees.
Education: BA(48) Keio Univ.; MA(51) Univ. of Minnesota; 1963-64; Har-
vard Univ. Kennedy School of Government. Language : read and speak fluent
Japanese.
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STATEMENT OF CECIL H. UYEHARA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHAPTER,
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AMERICAN FEDERAL EMPLOYEES COUNCIL,
WASHINGTON, D.C.; ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE LEE, DEPART-
MENT OF STATE; AND DR. JOSE ARMILLA, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Mr. UTEHARA. We do have a longer statement which we will submit
for the record and we also have the summary.
Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to testify on the pro-
posed Foreign. Service Act from. the perspective of Asian and. Pacific
Americans. My name is Cecil Uyehara. I am with the Agency for
International Development. With me on my left is George Lee with
the Department of State and on my right is Dr. Jose Armilla, U.S.
International Communication Agency.
Today we are appearing before you in our personal capacities on
behalf of the Foreign Affairs Chapter of the Asian and Pacific Ameri-
can Federal Employees Council., which is a national organization of
Asian and Pacific Americans in the Federal service.
We appear today first to show that the manner in which the 1946
Foreign Service Act has been implemented has resulted in discrimina-
tion against Asian Americans and exclusion of them from a meaning-
ful role in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.
Second, we seek your support for equitable and equal opportunities
for employment of Asian Americans in the foreign affairs agencies on
the basis of qualifications, training, ability, and merit. And third, to
solicit your support for specific amendments to the proposed 1979
Foreign Service Act to make equal opportunity in all: aspects of em-
ployment in the foreign service a statutory requirement of the act.
We would like to emphasize that the Asian Americans as a group
is one of the most highly trained in the United States-and simultane-
ously one of the least utilized in the U.S. foreign policymaking process
where we must utilize every resource that we have. - '.
As other minorities have played a major and successful role in com-
municating with the Third World for example, so too could the Asian
Americans make a successful and constructive contribution. Unfortu-
nately despite the concentrated pool of talent among Asian. Americans
they have not been able to participate. Well, what progress has been
made?
In the Department of State there was. only one Asian American at
the State's policymaking level 2 years ago. None of the Asian Amer-
ican FSO-1 or GS-15's have been appointed or promoted to senior
level policymaking positions.
In AID the exclusion of Asian Americans from senior positions is
much more glaring. Despite the fact that among all minority groups
Asian Americans have the highest percentage of qualified employees
from which selections could have been made, none have been promoted.
Only one has been appointed to a senior level position and even there
without commensurate grade and from outside the Agency.
Furthermore, at almost all tirades Asian Americans have longer
time-in-grade than the average for other employees.
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In USICA -lack of promotion opportunities has further reduced
through attrition the already small number of Asian Americans in
the agency. The only Asian American at the policy level is a deputy
area director, and that person again is not a career employed. Thus
despite the promise of affirmative action, Asian Americans have made
no progress whatsoever at the policy level. in the foreign affairs agency
in the past 2 years.
We wish to make it clear that the Asian Americans do not want
special preferential treatment, lower standards or tokenism. We, like
other minorities, women and American citizens in general seek equal
opportunities for just, fair, and equitable treatment on the basis of
training, qualifications, merit, and demonstrated ability.
There is unfortunately a widespread feeling among Asian Ameri-
cans that they are looked upon as foreigners in their own country, ex-
cluded from the main stream.
Affirmative action, in the view of Asian Americans means positive
measures which will place them like other American citizens in posi-
tions commensurate with their skills and potential. It also means posi-
tive acts to remedy underrepresentation when presented with a choice
between equally qualified candidates.
Among the ethnic groups Asian Americans are the best educated.
In 1976 for example the percentage of Asian Americans in their
twenty's who had completed at least 4 years of college was much higher
than for the nonminority. The figures showed 52 percent of Chinese
Americans, 44 for Japanese Americans and 43 for Philippine Ameri-
cans had completed 4 years of college in comparison with 28 percent
for the nonrmority. The college completion rate for these Asian
Americans was 6 percent higher than for the nonminority.
The CHAIRMAN. Could you talk a little louder.
Mr. UYEHARA. By employing Asian Americans in highly visible
positions, State; AID, and USICA will be more representative and
effective in carrying out their responsibilities to represent the United
States abroad. The presence of Asian Americans in the various ranks
in the foreign _affairs agencies would reflect the values and diversity of
American society. At present we feel Asian Americans are an under-
utilized national resource. Adequate consideration of Asian Americans
for senior. level positions would increase the size of the qualified ap-
plicant pool, "thereby increasing competition for high level policy
menu to the proposed Foreign Service' Act. Our suggested addition
would strengthen- as a statutory mandate the principle of eual and
equitable opportunities for employment and augment, not* weaken,
the merit. principle. They would help prevent management and per-
sonnel staffs from overt and covert discriminatory practices and
direct them- 'to apply and effectively implement the principle of
equality of treatment in all phases of employment in' the foreign
affairs agencies: It' is said that this is ' not necessary" since such a
requirement is already in other laws,, but the obvious needs to be
stated in forceful,terms. - i
In light of the foregoing we solicit your support for several amend-
positions.
In the proposed bill equal employment opportunity is mentioned as a
subordinate objective. We strongly recommend that if equal employ-
ment opportunity [EEO] is a serious objective, that it be explicitly
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stated as an independent, repeat independent, objective in the proposed
act in the same way other objectives of the act are stated.
Based upon the urgency, appropriateness, and necessity of assessing
EEO progress, we ask the subcommittee to include under the re-
sponsibilities of the Inspector General a statutory requirement to
examine whether the merit and equal employment opportunity prin-
ciple has been observed in the management of the Department and
missions abroad.
We also call for the inclusion of equal employment opportunity
principles in the selection, promotion, and the assignment of per-
sonnel under this act. As an additional safeguard we would also
recommend that a representative of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, together with other agencies now specified in
the proposed act, be made a statutory member of the Board of the
Foreign Service.
Our prepared statement recommends specific word changes for
inclusion in the Foreign Service Act of 1979.
In conclusion, we thank you again for your interest and attention
and your valuable time in listening to us. We believe that you are
our highest resort at this time. Furthermore, we believe if this pro-
posed Act is enacted by the Congress, it will, like its predecessor, govern
the U.S. Foreign Service for several decades. It is essential that the
principle of equal employment opportunity be clearly and un-
equivocally included in the act as it is finally acted upon by the
Congress.
While we feel that such principles must be included in the. act at
this time, we sincerely hope that when this act, if it is enacted, is next
reviewed by a Congressional committee in the future we will have so
progressed in fulfilling the American dream that the equal employ-
lnent principle will not be necessary and can be deleted with unanimous
agreement.
This is the end of my summary statement. If you have questions, we
will answer them.
[Mr. Uyehara's prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CECIL H. UYEHARA
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate
this opportunity to testify on the proposed Foreign Service Act from the per-
spective of Asian and Pacific Americans.
My name is Cecil H. Uyehara. I am with the Agency for International Develop-
ment. With me are, on the left, George Lee.with.the Department of State, and
on my right, Jose'Armilla of the United States International Communication
Agency. Today we are appearing before you in our personal capacities on behalf
of the Foreign Affairs Chapter of the Asian and Pacific American Federal Em-
ployees Council which is 'a national organization of Asian and Pacific Americans
in the Federal Service.
The Chapter's membership comprises Asian and Pacific American employees
in the foreign affairs agencies ; namely, the Department of State, the Inter-
national Development Cooperation Agency, Agency for International Develop-
ment, and the United States International Communication Agency. Membership
is, of course, also open to Asian and Pacific American employees in other Federal
agencies engaged in foreign affairs, for example, ACTION, Treasury, Commerce,
Agriculture and the Drug Enforcement Agency and to any non-Asian Ameri-
cans who support our objectives.
The Federal Government defines an Asian and Pacific Islander as any person
having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the
Indian sub-continent or the Pacific Islands. This area includes, for example,
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356
China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Guam and Samoa. Hereafter, the term
"Asian Americans" will be used for convenience.
Whatever our origins, we are Americans and following the American tradi-
tion, we are speaking out today about our repressed hopes and competences. We
take this opportunity respectfully to draw to the attention of the Subcommittee
the record of the Department of State, AID, and USICA on the employment of
Asian Americans which is far worse than that of other mniorities (except
probably Native Americans).
We appear today :
First, to show that the manner in which the 1946 Foreign Service Act has been
implemented has resulted in discrimination against Asian Americans and exclu-
sion of them from a meaningful role in the formulation and implementation of
U.S. foreign policy.
Second, to seek your support for equitable and equal opportunities for employ-
ment for Asian Americans in the foreign affairs agencies on the basis of qualifica-
tions, training, ability and merit ; and
Third, to solicit your support for specific amendments to the proposed 1979
Foreign Service Act to make equal opportunity in all aspects of employment in
the Foreign Service a statutory requirement of the Act. President Carter on
February 24, 1977, in commenting on equal employment opportunities for minori-
ties, noted :
"I think, to be perfectly frank, that the State Department is probably the
department that needs progress more than any other and I am determined that
this will be done."
Secretary Vance. in accepting the report of the Department's Executive Level
Task Force in June 1977 and the Equal Opportunity Plan for 1977, stated :
"It is the policy of the Department of State to promote equal opportunity in
employment for all persons, to prohibit discrimination in employment because of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and to achieve equal opportunity in
all personal operations through a continuing affirmative program."
The Foreign Affairs Chapter supported State's and AID's affirmative action
program and ? initiated a series of discussions and exchanges of letters with
management both in State and AID. The Chapter had urged the management in
State and AID (1) to make a sustained effort to recruit qualified Asian Ameri-
cans from the outside, and (2) to consider and appoint Asian Americans already
employed within State and AID to positions from the junior level to the senior
levels.
What progress has been made? In the Department of State, as you can see in
Table 1, there was only one Asian American at State's policy-making level two
years ago. None of the Asian American FSO-1 or GS-15's have been appointed or
promoted to senior level policy-making positions.
In AID, the exclusion of Asian Americans from senior positions is much more
glaring. Despite the fact that among all minority groups, Asian Americans have
the highest percentage of qualified employees from which selection could have
been made, only one has been appointed to a senior level position and even there,
without commensurate grade, and from outside the Agency. Furthermore, at
almost all grades Asian Americans have longer time-in-grade than the average
for other employees.
In USICA, lack of promotion opportunities has further reduced through
attrition the already small number of Asian Americans in the Agency. The only
Asian American at the policy level is a Deputy Area Director and that person is
not a career employee.
Thus, despite promises of affirmative action, Asian Americans have made no
progress whatsoever at the policymaking levels in the foreign affairs agencies in
the past two years. After I have completed this statement I could, if you wish,
provide you with examples of how the positions of Asian Americans have
deteriorated.
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State (1979 work force-12,793): 1
None
I
Loss.
Assistant secretaries____________________________
Deputy assistant secretary----------------------- None
Ambassadors/DCM's---------------------------- None
Principal officers-------------------------------- None
------------------------ 1
Office directors
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
1
Loss.
-----
GS 16-18 None
GS 15
None
2
None
(I)
GS 13-14
---------------------------------------------
--------------
-------
FS 1-2
-------------------------------------------------
-
--------------
---
-
FSO 3
-----------------------------------------------
5
--------------
--------
FSO 4-5
-----------------------------------------------
9
--------------
------
FSR 1-2
-------------------------------------------------
1
--------------
----
FSR 3-------------------------------------------------------
3
--------------
FSR 4-5----------------------------------------------------
D 97 k f e4 021)0
AI ( wor orc ,
Assistantadministrator -------------------------- None
Deputy assistant administrator------------------- None
Mission director-------------------------------- None
Deputy mission director------------------------- 1
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
I
Loss.
R
FS 1-2 --------------------------------------- None
None
N
one
None
None
None
GS/AD 16-18-----------------------------------
GS 15----------------------------------------- 6
2
Gain.
1 Gain.
FSR 3
GS 13-14
-------------
No change
-------------------------
12
FSR 4-5--------------------------------------
16
Gain.
(1979 work force-4,293):
Senior Washington leadership (1 GS 17) ------------ 1
1
No change
Country public affairs officer--------------------- None
FSIO 1-2-------------------------------------- None
FSIO 3---------------------------------------- 4
None
None
4
None
None
No change
FSIO 4-5-------------------------------------- 6
8
2
2
GS 16-18-------------------------------------- (a)
(a)
(
)
GS 15----------------------------------------- None
G 13 14 9
S
FSR 1-2--------------------------------------- 1
None
9
None
None
No change
1
Loss.
FSR 3
-------------------------------- 1
1
No change
---------
FSR 4-5--------------------------------------- 33
32
1 Loss.
I Data not available for 1977, hence net change cannot be determined.
2 1 GS 17 is already counted in the senior leadership.
We wish to make it clear that Asian Americans do not want special treatment,
lower standards or.tokenism. We, Asian Americans, like other minorities, women
and American citizens in general, seek equal opportunities for just, fair and
equitable treatment on the basis of training, qualifications, merit and demon-
strated ability. There is unfortunately a widespread feeling among Asian Ameri-
cans that they are looked upon as "foreigners" in their own country, excluded
from the mainstream. Asian Americans feel that they have the dubious distinc-
tion of being a minority among minorities, a "double minority" if we may use
the term.
Also, we should like to state that for Asian Americans equal opportunity means
that they be judged and rewarded on the basis of merit without regard to factors
not relevant to their job performance and potential. Affirmative action, in the
view of Asian Americans, means positive measures which will place them like
other American citizens, in positions commensurate with their skills and poten-
tial. It also means positive acts to remedy under-representation when presented
with a choice between equally qualified candidates.
We are confident that Asian Americans can perform in the Foreign Service
and Civil Service in accordance with the highest professional standards. Of all
American ethnic groups, Asian Americans are the best educated. In 1976, the
percentage of Asian Americans in their twenties who had completed at least four
years of college was much higher than for the non-minority. The figures showed
that 52 percent of Chinese Americans, 44 percent of Japanese Americans and 43
percent of Philippine Americans completed four years of college in comparison
to 28 percent for the non-minority. The college completion rate for these Asian
Americans was 61 percent higher than for the non-minority (U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights, Aug. 1978).
By employing Asian Americans in highly visible positions State, AID and
USICA will be more representative and effective in carrying out their responsi-
bilities to represent the U.S. abroad. Only when a significant number of Asian
Americans serve in. the foreign service and civil service at all levels will we be
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able to counter effectively the impression throughout the world that Asian Ameri-
cans have no role in policy-making-an impression which is damaging to United
States interests. The presence of Asian Americans in the various ranks in the
foreign affairs agencies would reflect the values and diversity of American
society. Misassignment and inadequate use of available qualified Asian Americans
in these agencies is a waste of talent ; Asian Americans are an "under-utilized
national resource." Adequate consideration of Asian Americans for senior level
positions would increase the size of the qualified applicant poll, thereby 'increasing
competition for high level policy positions.
Asian Americans in policy positions abroad would show the world that the
U.S. foreign affairs agencies are democratic and representative of the American
people. This would heighten the credibility of U.S. policies and concerns for
fundamental human rights, political, social and economic rights and free demo-
cratic institutions.
Only when Asian Americans are employed in ranking positions in State, AID
and USICA can they participate substantively, contribute to foreign policy views
and articulate this country's core national interests.
In light of the foregoing, we solicit your support for several amendments to
the proposed Foreign Service Act. Our suggested additions would strengthen, as
a statutory mandate, the principle of equal and equitable opportunities. for em-
ployment. They would help prevent management and personnel staffs from overt
or covert discriminatory practices, and direct them to apply and effectively im-
plement the principle of equality of treatment in all phases of employment in the
foreign affairs agencies. It is said that this is not necessary since such a require-
ment is already in other laws, but the obvious needs to be stated in forceful terms.
In any case, if it is already stated there is obviously no harm in reiteration and
emphasis in the Foreign Service Act.
In the proposed Bill, equal employment opportunity is mentioned as a subordi-
nate objective. We strongly recommend that if equal employment opportunity
is a serious objective that it be explicitly stated as an independent, repeat in-
dependent objective in the proposed Act-in the same way that other objectives
of the Act are stated. Based on the urgency, appropriateness and necessity of
assessing EEO progress we ask the Subcommittee to include under the responsi-
bilities of the Inspector General a statutory requirement to examine whether
merit and equal employment opportunity principles have been observed in the
management of the Department and Missions abroad. We also call for the in-
clusion of equal employment opportunity principles in the selection, promotion,
and assignment of personnel under this Act.
As an additional safeguard we would also recommend that a representative
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (together with other agencies
now specified in the proposed Act) be made a statutory member of the Board
of the Foreign Service.
We propose the following additions to the proposed Foreign Service Act. (The
underlined parts are our proposed additions).
(Chapter 1, General Provisions, Sec. 101.b) as a separate objective: to create
and execute in a vigorous manner a systematic and sustained equal employment
program in order to assure that the Foreign Service is representative of the
American people.
(Chapter 2, Sec. 205. The Inspector General). Under the direction of the Secre-
tary, the Inspector General shall inspect the work of each Foreign Service post
at least every three years, shall inspect periodically the bureaus and offices of the
Department of State, shall examine whether merit and equal opportunity princi-
ples have been observed in the management of the Department of State and Mis-
sions abroad, and shall perform such functions as the Secretary may Prescribe.
(Chapter 2, Sec. 206. The Board of the Foreign Service). The President shall
establish a Board of the Foreign Service to advise the Secretary . and shall
include senior representatives of the Department, the International Communica-
tion Agency, the International Development Cooperation Agency, the Office of
Personnel Management, the Office of Management and Budget, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission and such other agencies as the President may
designate.
(Chapter 3, Sec. 301.b) The Secretary shall prescribe appropriate written, oral.
physical and other examinations for appointment to the Service (other than as a
chief of mission) in accordance with merit and equal opportunity principles.
(Chapter 5, Sec. 511.a) The Secretary may assign a member of the Service,
in accordance with merit and equal opportunity principles, to any position .. .
(Chapter 6. See. 601.a) Promotions in the Service shall be based upon merit
and equal opportunity principles.
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In conclusion, we thank' you 'again for your interest and attention and
valuable time in listening to us. We believe that you are our highest resort
at this time. Furthermore, we believe that if this proposed Act is enacted by
the Congress; it will, like its predecessor, govern the U.S. Foreign Service for
several decades. It is essential that the principle of equal employment oppor-
tunity be clearly and unequivocally included in the Act as it is finally acted
upon by the Congress. While we feel that such principles must be included in the
Act at this time, we sincerely hope that when this Act, if it'is enacted, is next
reviewed by a Congressional committee in the future we will have so progressed
in fulfilling the American Dream that the inclusion of the equal employment
opportunity principle will not be necessary and can be deleted with unanimous
agreement.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much indeed. Lam a little con-
cerned here because the Foreign Service is already subject to the
same equal employment opportunities legislation that the rest of the
Government is. I am wondering if you believe the Service should be
subject to special provisions different from those in general law? The
phenomenon you are stating or the injustice to which you referred is
one that is Government-wide. It is not just the Foreign. Service, would
that be correct?
Mr. UYEHARA. That is probably true, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. So I am wondering if it would be right to try to
approach it in one particular service. How do you feel for instance
about the military service? Would there be the same inequitable
treatment there ?
Mr. UYEHARA. Well, we would like to see it specified .clearly and
unequivocally in all legislation, yes, sir. Because for instance in the
Civil Service Act, the Reform Act, there are eight merit principles.
listed in title I. The first one does concern itself somewhat with equal
opportunity. It is rather weak. It says, "Recruit to achieve work
force- from all segments of society with selection and advancement
solely on the basis of merit after fair and open competition which as-
sumes equal opportunity." If , equal opportunity principles are, to be
applied, that seems to me to be a rather weak statement which assumes
equal opportunity.
If it is important, we recommend that it be included explicitly as
1 of the specific objectives among 10 others to be achieved in the.
Foreign Service Act. The Foreign Service Act mentions "Fostering
equal employment opportunity principles." Fostering, again, is a
weak statement. One can do all kinds of things to foster something
but never quite get there. We think it is serious enough in. light of the
past historical record to put special emphasis on equal opportunity
in the Foreign Service Act.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much for the points you have
made and your. testimony and being with us. Thank you very much
indeed. -
[The following information was subsequently supplied for the
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AMERICAN
FEDERAL EMPLOYEE COUNCIL,
Washington, D.C., January 11, 1980.
Hon. CLAIRBORNE PELL,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR PELL : We appreciated the opportunity to testify on Dec. 14,
1979 on the proposed Foreign Service Act of 1979. We limited our testimony
record.]
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to an area of interest to us which needs stronger legislative support than it
now receives in the Act.
During the hearing you aptly described the U.S. Foreign Service as an elite
corps, and compared it to the U.S. Marine Corps. An elite corps brings to mind
a group with a strong esprit de corps, the best and the brightest drawn from
erll segments of American society to serve at all levels in the U.S. Foreign Service.
If all conditions are equal, the Asian American group, though small in number,
but one of the most highly trained and educated groups in the U.S. would have
a much larger participation at all levels than their numbers in the population
would suggest. According to a just completed study of Asian Americans in the
Federal Service by Professors Patricia A. Taylor and Sung-soon Kim of the
University of Virginia, Asian Americans are under-represented in the highest
levels of the government although they have the highest levels of educational
attainment. The National Research Council survey on doctorates also under-
scores
this point. As shown below, Asian Americans received a dispropor-
tionately larger number of doctorates in comparison to their population in the
U.S. (1.5-2 percent) would suggest.
1976-77
1977-78
Asian-Americans----------------------------------------------------------------
1907
21
031
American Indians---------------------------------------------------------------
215
,
172
Blacks-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1,108
1
100
Hispanics----------------------------------------------------------------------
471
,
532
Nonminority --------------------------------------------------------------------
29,012
28,015
Total
31,713
30,850
12.9 percent.
2 3.3 percent.
Asian Americans are conspicuously absent from the higher councils of the
U.S. Government. Because conditions are not equal, their participation in foreign
policy is, unfortunately, much lower than it should or could be.
Title I of the Civil Service Reform Act refers to eight merit system principles.
The first principle ends by "assuming equal opportunity"-this is hardly a ringing
clarion call and the above data wofild suggest that nothing can be safely assumed.
The proposed Foreign Service Act calls for fostering the development of policies
and procedures concerning equal'opportunity among several other factors. This
again is a passive statement, hardly a statement of strong dedication.
In light of the historical record of the foreign affairs agencies, and if the
Foreign Service is to be representative of the American people and if equal op-
portunity is a serious principle which needs to be executed with determination
then there is an urgency to make it a mandatory requirement in the proposed
Act-(1) as an independent objective, (2) as part of the Inspector General's re-
sponsibilities and. (3) as a factor in the selection, assignment and promotion
process.
While we feel that these few changes would result in it greater role played by
all minorities and women, including Asian Americans, in U.S. foreign policy, the
far more important result would be that the U.S. Foreign Service would more ac-
curately reflect the value and diversity of American society-in other words, it
would more effectively fulfill one of the objectives of the Act, i.e. make it more
representative of "all segments of American society."
We hope you will be able to support these proposed changes, the specific word-
ing for which was included at the end of our prepared statement.
Yours sincerely,
ELLIOTT K. CrrAN.
Chapter President.
The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Mr. Smith Simpson, retired
Foreign Service Officer.
Mr. Simpson, welcome.
STATEMENT OF SMITH SIMPSON, RETIRED FOREIGN SERVICE
OFFICER, ANNANDALE, VA.
Mr. STMPSON. Candidates for the Foreign Service come from all
parts of the country, all income levels, all kinds of educational institu-
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tions, small, intermediate and large, private and public, religious and
secular, with every conceivable variation in the quality of instruction,
background and experience.
Up to a point, this diversity is healthy and we should build upon it.
But unless we recognize its extent and what it means in terms of ability
to represent, the United States and to engage effectively in interna-
tional politics, we can easily hoodwink ourselves, as in fact we have
been doing.
The result is that we are inducting into the Foreign Service officers
who rarely know well their own country in that thorough sense which
overseas representation demands. Many cannot answer accurately and
intelligently the simplest questions concerning it which foreigners are
likely to put to them. This includes questions concerning its political
philosophy and social problems, its gross national product, the size,
composition, and importance of its foreign trade and the factors deter-
mining the adverse levels of that trade as well as sometimes the
simplest geographical, economic, political, and social phenomena. Poor
secondary education is responsible for some of this for relatively few
candidates take courses, say, in geography at the college level.
As with the United States, so with world geography, and history,
and impact id governmenave a reat
political philosophies which have arn global
systems. On all of these, other governments
sonable expectation that the representatives of a world power will be
well informed so as to engage in intelligent discussions and exchanges
of views. In this category -belong- tl a cthose n cultures, the uphreligions
avals of oud
tribal loyalties which play so b
times and with which our representatives must be familiar
going with osuf-
ficient profundity to detect and analyze what is m ~, on,
beneath the surface, to establish relations of confidence and influence
with people, who may also be beneath the surface, and to offer timely
advice to all concerned.
There is a third area of professional concern, including diplomacy
itself, international law, international organization, our treaty com-
mitments and other security arrangements and techniques of national
defense in which educational preparation of Foreign Service officers
is woefully inadequate. This area lies at the core of our Foreign policy
objectives, and our competence in international maneuver. These are
not matters separate from the other areas for they are all interactive.
The essence of diplomacy is international politics and that is a me-
lange of the national politics, the cultures and sometimes the religions
of all the other members of the world community. on in our officers' knowledge
But we find an extraordinary
of these things, both at the time of their admission to. the Service and
in subsequent stages of their careers. Indeed, almost no American
university offers any instruction in the art and science of diplomacy.
In this basic, professional subject newly commissioned officers are
completely untutored and what they learn of it over the years comes
to them in the fragments of personal experience, thus condemning
this country to an ever faltering, reactive posture in world affairs as
individual officers gain that, fragmentary exc environmental and
Finally, there is a whole area of population,
scientific problems with which our diplomacy is compelled to deal
but on which courses are nonexistent in many of our institutions of
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362.
higher learning. The range of sciences involved currently in our-world
problems-cosmography, anthropology, social biology, social psy.
chology, sociology, ecology and the like-is immense and there is no
way by which individual candidates can summon them in university
course work in international affairs. A special effort of synthesis is
required. .
Thus, curriculum gaps conspire with those resulting from candi-
dates' choice of majors and the growing complexity of the problems
afflicting the world community to require a concerted effort by our
Government to; better equip our diplomatic representatives.
All of this means that our diplomatic representatives are called
upon to do a first-class, complicated job without having had a first-
class, well-synthesized preparation for it. This preparation can only
be provided. by- a diplomatic or foreign affairs academy of a post-
graduate character. By making it post-graduate we would build upon
the diversity of our educational system at the same time as providing
an essential instrumentality for filling the present gaps of officers
and greatly honing their skills in the practice of a dynamic rather than
an overly cautious and reactive diplomacy.
Instruction would be provided in the art and science of diplomacy,
including covert and military, so as to equip diplomatic officers far
better than` they are now to contribute effectively to an integration of
our strategies and tactics in the world community. Legislative state-
ments of objectives will not accomplish this integration. No number of
Presidential: and congressional admonitions to chiefs of missions,
urging them to .assume full responsibility for the direction,, coordina-
tion, arid- supervision of all U.S. officers will do it. Only suitable edu=
cation and training can effect it.
. If,such a'govern lent academy should educate and train not only
diplomatic officers but all of those who .deal with foreign affairs in
the Federal Government, this would provide a community of knowl-
edge, - perception, of the national interest, and recognition of the re-
sources'available for the pursuit of that interest. It would also promote
an esprit de corps needed to effect that degree of policy integration
and coordination of maneuver which Communist and other totalitarian
states achieve by party ideology, organization, and discipline and
which provides 'them an appreciable edge over democratic countries in
the rough and tumble of international politics. Democracies must move
in their own ways to redress this imbalance and enhance - their
effectiveness.
Such an, academy would provide an officers' candidate school. Only
those successfully completing its program of studies would be offered
commissions in the Foreign Service or appointed to foreign affairs
positions in the executive departments.
As I point out in my forthcoming book, "The Crisis in American
Diplomacy"
The educational and training process must be viewed as a continuing one.
To enable officers to participate in it-not only through classes but self-educa-
tional effort as well-the size of the diplomatic service must be expanded to
make possible the release of officers for educational and training assignments
and the leisure required for self-development through study and reflection.
Reading programs must be instituted in every mission and post. Sabbaticals must
be provided every officer on a regular basis.
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363
-I would add that something akin to the Military Establishment's
command and staff school should be made a part of this program of
continuing education and training.
We cannot move too quickly along this line. We are in a tou yyh bind
in the world and the world is not going e oa e omr a more omati d rf place
in the foreseeable future. We must p p
and our foreign affairs officials in all parts of our Government-.to
deal.with it.. C
f More funds will be needed from iated to n nat onal ds purpose. We
those funds as app p
i
ld
ew
v
shou
.r macy is in fact a component of that defense. Mr. Simpson.
ou verm much.
k
h
y
an
CMAN -
Id thtile in
HAIR. when reae arc I first : became interested in you]
the the StdSeJournal I tCcOne Day in the Life of Simas hought that-your views had a grreeatdeal
and the State Department-')
of merit. I am not sure I agree with the thrust of your statement that
there should be sort of like a-graduate or undergraduate academy of
that I sot:. SThis enator idea tha on had discussed in the
idea in the early 1960's. It has
knnow. Senator r Symingtngt I was particularly
been going, on for quite a while as you know. Why p that
m
the langu e so thaour t iwould not ha eaconfuso n' as obvi usly result d
in the consideration in the consideration of that case. The thoug1ht. I have is to, introduce
in-service Ac that a school for junior officers loto the nger' than military's
ine
-service officer candidate
present 8 weeks, or whatever training junior FSO's now get, that would econom really teach them_ the essence al report ahu good. contain, is rep rt should
pro-
political
contain,?hat a good
cedures are in the Service so they don't 'ggo out in the field having to now learn by the appna, course system, which is the way
3 months odone
more for
and we would have
grade l vellike the and military seCommand and GeneralaSt ff School.
specific
grade le
The idea would be not to deal with generalities but with . s
hen
w
because
dealin job-related s I think we do m ch better to send ourlpeople to the great
and theories,
nforhose fudrawing from a ndame tal fields of sknowof backg~ounds and
ledge. But when. it
institutions,
comes to applied knowledge, then the situatioPL to science like ke mind
similar to' that in science you have applied ou come and-you have pure science such as physics. When y
science that means takig the theoretical knowledge that you have
and utilizing it in practical ions.
o the applied use of the knowledge
In this case I am thinking
people already have.
Do you follow my thought? I may not have expressed it very aptly.
What are your reactions? i weeks
Mr. SrmpsoN. My feeling, Senator, is that the present 5. /2
which we devote to preparing newly commissioned officers to the
Foreign Service is absurd. The world is much too complicated for this
kind feel chat unin the til we regard the field of them for diplomacyewith the
abroad. I
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same seriousness we regard the military, we are shortchanging our-
selves as well as the officers we are sending abroad.
The CHAIRMAN. What I am saying is very like the military. The
military has a 3-month officers' candidate school for entering officers
and the Command and General Staff School midway through. I am
talking about that same sort of structure. But are you suggesting there
be an academy like West Point or Annapolis?
Mr. SIMPSON. I am suggesting an academy but of a postgraduate
character rather than an undergraduate character such as the military
academy.
The CHAIRMAN. I think maybe somewhere in between both of our
thoughts there, might be a good compromise. I appreciate your views.
Incidentally, do you have any views on the Foreign Service bill that is
before us?
Mr. SIMPSON. My remarks are addressed to that part of the bill,
Senator, which relates to the Foreign Service Institute. It seems to me
that the thinking which has gone into that particular part of the bill
is extremely prosaic. This part of the bill could have been written in
1946 and probably was a part of the Foreign Service Act of that year.
I would like to see that part of the bill amended so as to provide for
far more serious education and training of our officers.
The CHAIRMAN. Good. I thank you and thank you very much indeed,
Mr. Simpson, for being with us.
[The following information was subsequently supplied:]
[From the Foreign Service Journal, September 19791
ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF SIMAS KUDIRKA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT
(By Smith Simpson')
PROLOGUE
A widespread feeling exists that something is basically wrong with our diplo-
matic performance. With the initiative in international politics seized by others
in vital areas, we are viewed at home and abroad as being outmaneuvered to the
imperilment of our national interests and indeed our national safety. A subtle,
indefinable weakness appears to be at work and we sense the desperate need of
taking remedial action.
But what action? Before the question becomes so politically charged as to
excite a flood of confusing gibberish in a presidential campaign, we should take a
hard, professional look at our diplomatic establishment and the quality of its
performance.
Does that mean we should engage in the conventional pursuit of "restructur-
ings the State Department and Foreign Service? Or does it mean we should think
in terms of something infinitely more subtle and profound?
As a department and Foreign Service officer I was early convinced that some
organizational innovations and rearrangements were needed to improve our dip-
lomatic effectiveness, and some have been made, but far more basic corrections
were needed in the minds and attitudes of officers. I became persuaded that it is
these that account for our inadequate overall performance. The State Depart-
ment has failed to educate and train incoming officers to a point at which they
properly conceptualize their responsibilities and has failed to keep educating and
training them in sufficient quantity throughout their careers to perfect the skills
and performance demanded by world politics.
I Smith Simpson, a retired Foreign Service officer, is author of Anatomy of the State
Department as well as many articles on U. S. diplomacy. These articles have appeared in
the Journal, The Nation, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science and the New York Times.
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I-low do we come to grips with so shadowy it challenge as this? Its very nebu-
lousness has caused all reformers over the years to shy away from it. A possible
approach is by analysis of specific instances of failure. One such instance is
offered here, which, by antedating the present administration,, suggests basic
rather than simply contemporary causes of inadequacy.
Originally investigating this instance on the heels of its occurrence, so as to
interview the officers involved and observers while their minds were fresh and
documentation could be easily obtained. I found it difficult to publish the anal-
ysis. The performance of colleagues was in question and I succumbed to the
temptation to shelve it. However, our diplomatic performance has become pro-
gressively more inadequate relative to the nation's needs and neither general
hand-wringing over this situation nor tinkering with the Foreign Service Act of
1946 has got us anywhere. Basic, specific reforms must be undertaken and they
can be distilled only from basic, specific failures. Unless we professionals possess
the will and courage to engage in this distillation and to circulate its results, the
nation will continue to indulge its dissatisfaction in expressions of general un-
ease, importuning oratory and political claptrap, inviting a round of circus-like
scapegoating such as recently overtook the Central Intelligence Agency. To con-
centrate attention upon issues, I use no names in this analysis. Participants are
identified only by title or positions held. What is important is diagnosis of
disease, not identification of bodies.
The day was November 23, 1970. The place was off Gay Head Bluff, Martha's
Vineyard, in territorial waters of the United States. A U.S. Coast Guard cutter,
the Valiant, was moored alongside a Soviet ship, the Sovetskaya Litva, for an
exchange of views concerning Soviet fishing practices which were depleting
marine stocks in the Atlantic off New England. Similar meetings with Soviet
fishing fleets had been held off both our coasts pursuant to fishing agreements
between the two countries. The groundwork for this particular discussion off
Gay Head had been laid by the American embassy in Moscow. It was no
impromptu event.
Simas Kudirka, a Lithuanian crew member of the Sovetskaya Litva, alerted a
visiting party from the cutter of his intention to defect and later got himself to
the cutter where his presence was accidentally discovered by one of a Soviet
party paying a return visit. A Soviet spokesman for the party-apparently a
KGB agent-conveyed to the Coast Guard skipper (whom I will hereafter call
"the skipper") his awareness of the defection but made no request for Kudirka's
return, apparently in deference to well-known U.S. policy on political asylum and
the fact that the ships were in U.S. territorial waters. However, he intimated
that the Soviet side would be appreciative if Kudirka's return were volunteered
by the Americans.
In a series of radio-telephone conversations with superiors in Boston, the
skipper received orders from the admiral in charge of the Coast Guard district
to return Kudirka if so requested by the Soviets. Horrified by this and well aware
of what punishment would be meted out to Kudirka if this were done, and with
the defector emotionally pleading for asylum, the skipper stalled for time. From
the admiral's chief of staff came a strong intimation that the skipper might find
it expedient to elicit from the Soviet captain a formal request for Kudirka's
return, as this would "make the record look good."
Two hours later, the admiral repeated his order. The agonized skipper, having
received a formal request for Kudirka's return-a request which KGB agents
aboard the Sovetskaya Litva, by this time aware of the American confusion and
indecision, seemed to have pressed that ship's reluctant captain to make-now
obeyed. He permitted Soviet crewmen to board and search the cutter, locate and
seize the hapless defector, savagely subdue him, wrap him in a blanket, bind him
with yards of cordage and remove him. The ships were now unmoored, the skipper
having taken this precaution in the event of a reversal of the admiral's order,
and the Lithuanian was returned to the Soviet vessel on a lifeboat-ironic term-
generously supplied by the cutter.
The denial of asylum being completely at variance with long-established U.S.
policy, the ensuing furor raised questions of what policy and operational controls
the State Department had exercised. The following sets forth the State Depart-
ment's role in the affair:
1:15-Coast Guard headquarters in Washington received a telephone call from
its Boston chief of staff (the admiral being ill at home, although in telephonic
communication with his chief of staff) advising that cutter officers had been
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signaled by Kudirka of an intention to defect. So inadequate were communica-
tion lines and practices between Coast Guard and the State Department-not-
withstanding the presence for some years of Soviet fishing fleets and earlier
discussions off our coasts-that an hour and a half were consumed in a search
for the proper office in the State Department to alert. Logically, it turned out
to be the office of Soviet affairs.
2:45-In that office a senior Foreign Service officer heading the bilateral politi-
cal relations section (herafter called "section chief") was notified by the Coast
Guard of the prospective defection. He promised to call back advice as soon as
he had a copy of the Boston message, which was provided him within a half hour
by the Department's operations center.
3:15-The section chief, as promised, called the Coast Guard. Mindful of
attempts by the Soviet government to fake defections in the past so as to gain
intelligence information or to create embarrassments for the United States, he
advised that "the possible defector should not be encouraged." This advice, while
proper, was of negative tenor and of no great assistance for it left unanswered
what should be done if Kudirka defected without encouragement, which was the
possibility the alert signaled. The section chief then concluded his call with the
request to keep him posted, adding that if defection occurred it would have to
be handled according to circumstances. "Handled" is an operational term, refer-
ring to how a policy should be carried out, but the policy itself was not stated.
The section chief never advised, at this time or later, that if the defector
appeared to be genuine, he should not be returned (Slip No. 1 in the State Depart-
ment). This "keep me informed" approach sealed the State Department to a
reactive diplomacy.
4:00-Coast Guard headquarters, preparing to close down for the day (its
working hours ending at 4:00), called the section chief to report that no further
news had been received. It had not called Boston to make certain, before closing,
that it had the latest available information, nor did the section chief request it
to do so (Slip No. 2 in the department). He described that day as having been,
like all days, hectic, with Kudirka's but one of many' problems he had had to
deal with.
6:00 or thereabouts-The section chief left for home, without having advised
any superior of the alert (Slip No. 3) or having sent (or even considered sending)
a department officer to Boston to preclude any possible foul-up-to keep in touch
with the situation, render policy guidance on the spot, ensure prompt communi-
cation with the department and reduce the risk of misadventure in what can
always be a tense and tricky situation (Slip No. 4). "There was no one I could
send," he ? said. Furthermore, it would have been "unprecedented" to do 'so, and
he "could not imagine anyone in the office agreeing to it." So he did not raise the
issue with any superior. But it would have been an effective way of taking charge
and restraining an admiral in Boston from 'going off on his own tangent:
While the department's report to the president on this affair states that the
section chief informed a colleague (who was to stand duty that night) of the
Coast Guard message, the duty officer confided to me that he had not been briefed
as to the specific facts or the applicable policy. He had just recently joined the
office of Soviet affairs, had never before been confronted by a defection case and
was specific in his statement to me that there had been no discussion with him
of U.S. policy in defection cases, of possible complications or problems to antici-
pate and what to do if any of these materialized. However, he was a Foreign
Service officer, of mid-career rank, with eight years' experience, including a year
in embassy Moscow (as a publications procurement officer), and subsequent
tours in Paris and Brussels in connection with NATO affairs and in the State
Department's bureau of intelligence and research. He had just recently joined
the office of Soviet affairs.
This failure to brief a duty officer-especially a newly arrived one-certainly
merits identification as Slip No. 5. The section chief did not even ask to be kept
informed in the course of the evening or, if he did, the duty officer did not hear
him say so (Slip No. 6).
7:45-The duty officer at Coast Guard headquarters alerted a state watch
officer (posted in the department's operation center) that Kudirka had reached
the Vigilant, requested to stay, and "was being returned at this time at written
request of his ship's master." This electrifying report that defection had occurred
and the State Department's instruction (to be kept informed of developments)
had been disregarded did not electrify the duty officer to whom the message was
relayed at his home. Although unfamiliar with the background of the message,
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the watch officer had the sensitivity to detect the possible need.of action and
he suggested that the duty officer call the Coast Guard. Instead, the duty officer
procrastinated (Slip No. 7). For an hour he did nothing. This was all the more
extraordinary since the message was phrased in the continuing present-"was
being returned." During this hour he could have saved Kudirka, for the message
failed to take account of the struggle which a defector would put up for his
freedom and possibly his life.
The duty officer for the bureau of European affairs (of which the Soviet
affairs office is a part) was notified at this time by the watch officer, but never
seems to have entered the scenario thereafter,, apparently assuming that the
responsible office was "on the ball." He did not so much as check with the duty
officer for Soviet affairs to inquire what the report was about (Slip No. 8). Such
an inquiry might have. activated the latter by generating an exchange of views.
The latter simply holed up, paralyzed either by ignorance of all the essential
facts, by a lack of elementary operating training or by an astonishing deficiency
in the instinct to act, or all three.
9:00-11:00-Sometime within this period the duty officer called his depart-
ment's watch officer to inquire if further information had come in. None had.
Again, the watch officer suggested he call the Coast Guard. This time the duty
officer did so, was informed that the Coast Guard duty officer was asleep and,
still indecisive, phoned back the watch officer for advice whether he should insist
upon speaking to his Coast Guard counterpart. Advised he should, he had the
Coast Guard duty officer roused, thereby narrowly averting another-slip;
The Coast Guard duty officer, reporting that no further message had arrived
from Boston, promised to submit a "Situation Report" the next morning. The
duty officer could still have spared Kudirka his ordeal and his government
ensuing, embarrassment of global reach had he requested and insisted upon a
call to Boston but, in his irresolute way, was content with the promise of a
morning report (Slip No. 9), which, to anticipate the narrative, was never made.
Nor did the duty; officer call his superior, the section chief, for guidance (Slip No.
10). He did not himself call Boston (Slip No. 11). Nor did the section chief, as
a precaution, call the duty officer the entire evening (Slip No. 12). So the duty
officer retired for the night as the luckless Kudirka was being brutally beaten
and kicked, trussed in blanket and, cordage in the presence of the horrified skip-
per, crew and fisheries negotiators, thrown abroad the- cutter's lifeboat and.
delivered to his masters. - - ; -
What are we to make of this eerie and disastrous sequence of events? Where
were all, those qualities claimed by the establishment to constitute the. hallmark
of the career Foreign Service 'officer and to distinguish- him generally from
political appointees-unique knowledge and . superior knowhow,, acute and
trained sensitivity, a good sense of initiative and timing and professional skill?
Except by the watch officer,. none-of these were demonstrated. On the contrary,
a most excruciating ineptitude, - commonly associated with the worst of, political
appointees, was exhibited-and one of the officers involved was of senior rank.
The diplomatic establishment is forever pleading that the reason-,it, cannot
turn in a more airtight performance than it does is because foreign relations
are international in nature, dependent not upon our will alone but on that of
other governments as well. But here was one foreign policy situation clearly
within the department's control and it was, just as clearly, bungled. Presidents
have long been exhorting the department to cease being what John F. Kennedy
called "a bowl of jelly" and to "take charge." Here was a situation in which,
patently, the department could have done so. It proved to be what President
Kennedy had termed it.
All the more disturbing was that this had occurred in the office charged with
managing our relations with a government whose dynamic diplomacy exploits
every vacuum, every weakness, every mistake presented by its rivals.
The outrage of the president, congressmen and the public over this incredibly
slipshod performance was instant and tidal. With an oath directed at "that god-
damned State Department," the president ,ordered reports from it and the De-
partment of Transportation (in which the Coast Guard is situated). As dismay
spread around the world, the U.S. reputation for knowing its policies and inter-
ests and being able to act effectively in accordance with them took a nose dive.
As this came in the midst of our disastrous involvement in southeast Asia, the
dive was all the steeper. But when the president received the departments' reports
any follow through he might have had in mind evaporated. Either he was
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swamped by other problems or he may have been stumped by the thicket of
unfamiliar questions which the situation posed.
The State Department itself, always reluctant to confront basic questions con-
cerning its performance, dismissed the Kudirka affair as an unpleasant episode
not symptomatic of systemic weakness. It appointed no board of inquiry, as did
the Coast Guard. It issued no reprimands, as did the Coast Guard. And it took
no remedial steps save the most obvious : (1) issuing the Coast Guard and other
government agencies a statement of U.S. policy on political asylum (which it
had failed to do before despite the patent opportunities of defection provided by
offshore Soviet fishing vessels), (2) defining for the Coast Guard channels of
communication with the department, and (3) inviting Coast Guard representa-
tion on interagency bodies dealing with asylum cases.
These steps took care of locking the Coast Guard stable ex post facto, but the
basic questions requiring address slipped like quicksilver through the depart-
ment's fingers. As the furor subsided so did its concern. A brilliant, illuminating
flash of lightning had streaked across the sky, revealing a startling sequence of
inexcusable slippages, but when the flash was over all excitement and curiosity
vanished. Other problems, other crises, other brush fires closed in. Events con-
spired with a chronically meager staffing pattern to produce days too hectic and
burdened for officers to think beyond their immediate work-load. The latest
cable, the latest telephone call, took its customary priority. "Keep me informed,
and if you don't call back I'll assume there is no problem" resumed its sway as
an operating principle-a reactive stance, not one of positive assumption of
responsibility and leadership. Kudirka and his unhappy experience, which should
have taught so much, wound up teaching nothing at all.
Were the slippages in this case only personal, as one would like to think. so
that other officers would, in all likelihood, have acted more responsibly? Or were
they systemic? Even if simply personal, they raised enormous questions of sys-
temic nature :
What weaknesses in the selection system permit incompetent, indecisive officers
to be commissioned?
Are officers reasonably adequate when commissioned but inadequately educated
and trained when inducted and thereafter?
Does the system fail to instill an adequate conceptualization of diplomacy and
diplomatic functions and responsibilities?
Do deficiencies in the promotion system permit unqualified officers to move up
the ladder to mid-career and even senior ranks?
Do conditions of service contribute to producing overworked, jaded minds,
overly vulnerable to negligence and to incapability of distinguishing the relative
importance of situations and taking effective charge of those of highest priority?
Do such systemic factors seal the United States in to an excessively cautious
and essentially reactive attitude in international politics?
To come to grips with these shadowy questions requires a close familiarity
with the diplomatic establishment and, frankly, I have been holding back the
publication of this analysis in the hope that someone other than myself would
pick up this, or a similar, case and assume the invidious task of analyzing the
conduct of colleagues which our general situation requires. But the national
interest commands that some such analysis be produced without further delay.
Consider first the selection of officers. There is no system for the selection of
stationary State Department staff apart from that of the general civil service.
Stationary officials other than civil servants acquire temporary sojourn in the
department when some president or influential congressman wants them to have
a government job, or occasionally a political appointee or friend in the depart-
ment wants a special assistant. No special orientation or training in the dynamics
of diplomacy is provided such appointees or civil servants.
Commissioning in the Foreign Service has traditionally involved a written
and oral examination. The written tests the range of a candidate's general
knowledge and culture and his IQ. It does not test any conceptualization of
diplomacy. The oral examination, superseded this year by a so-called "assess-
ment procedure," has permitted a probing of personal qualities, but since the
interviewers have been drawn from the diplomatic establishment and that esta-
blishment pervasively thinks of itself in pedestrian fashion, as a collection of
bureaus, offices, "cones" and "jobs," with no synthesizing conceptualization of
diplomacy as a dynamic international political process, they have naturally
examined candidates as though they were simply entering a bureaucracy, with-
out reference to political aptitudes and action mentality. With recruitment itself
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369
directed not to the political arena, but to colleges, students of events. rather than
activists predominantly came before the oral panels.
Fortunately, the department's recruitment has been substantially supple-
mented by self-starters who have come forward as candidates on their own
impulses, after trying careers in private business, in the military and in govern-
ment. The average age of all candidates currently hovers around 29. Still, they
constitute a mystifying melange of people prepared and people unprepared for
international politics and therefore prophesy an extraordinary range of perform-
ance behavior. This has been aggravated by the waiver of the written exami-
nation, under the pressures of Equal Opportunity, for candidates from four
ethnic groups : American Indians, blacks, Hispanic-Americans and Asian-
Americans.
To give two examples from a recent Foreign Service class of what this is doing
to the Foreign Service :
Officer A graduated from a polytechnic institute with a BS in management and
from a university with a masters in mathematics education. He taught math and
science in public schools for eight years. He thus had no background, educational
or employment-wise, in foreign affairs and none in US government and history,
including US foreign policy and diplomatic history, international law and inter-
national organization. In the whole international area, he was as complete a
novice as a high school senior.
Officer B began his college education at a university but dropped out. After
drifting through Central and South America as a tourist and student and through
Europe as a tourist, he settled down in the United States as a bricklayer for a
year and a half. This was all the preparation he had for representing and
explaining this country and its policies abroad, answering questions concerning
our history, culture, politics and social problems and engaging in the wide-
ranging complexities of international politics.
These two officers came from ethnic groups exempted from the written exam!-
nation. Such exemption, thus, results in the department commissioning officers
wholly unprepared in foreign affairs. Rather than obtaining learned diplomatic
officers, it is inducting the most superficial imaginable. We must recognize, how-
ever, that other candidates not so exempt and with better academic backgrounds,
still possess serious gaps. Those strong in Americana are weak in foreign affairs
and vice versa. Nearly all, exempt or not, are illiterates in diplomacy, untutored
in international strategies and tactics, which constitute the essence of inter-
national politics. Even if exemptions from the written examination were not
being accorded ethnic groups, the department's claim that the Service gets "the
cream of the nation" has become a meaningless shibboleth. "The cream" is no
longer good enough for the needs of a world power.
No psychologist has ever been co-opted to assist oral panels in threading their
way through a mystifying melange of applicants, either as a panel member or
adviser. Since the panels have consisted simply of rotating Foreign Service
officers of varying degrees and kinds of experience, with no training in the
interviewing art, the weaknesses of candidates have often gone undetected or,
o t best, superficially explored. In view of the exactions and dangers of modern
diplomacy, this is serious remissness indeed and is surely related, to the psycho-
logical problems which have overtaken the Service, aberrant behavior (reported
in the media), alcoholism, disinclination to serve in hardship posts ranging from
Moscow to Africa, and indeed to serve abroad at all. This dissipation of zeal
for overseas duty, commitment to the nation's needs and discipline have worked
to the detriment of our diplomatic performance. Contrasting with the higher
degree of commitment and discipline in the diplomatic services of other govern-
ments, it is inevitable that our effectiveness must have relatively declined.
For some years, candidates have not been subjected to any'special stress in
the course of oral interviews, so that no one could judge how well they might
be expected to react to particularly difficult or embarrassing-still less to haz-
ardous-situations, or even to relatively simple ones like Kudirka's. Quite the
reverse, for examiners, succumbing to the current easy-going, socializing psy-
chology of our society, have felt that the interview itself is enough of a strain,
and so have been making it as pleasant and relaxed as possible. In a hard and
dangerous world. this has not only exposed the diplomatic establishment and
the nation to risks they should not be exposed to but gives candidates a totally
false impression of the highly demanding calling they aspire to ,enter and the
unflappable self.-control it exacts. One detects, indeed, in the attitudes of three
of the officers involved in the Kudirka affair precisely this relaxed, easy-going
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370
mentality, devoid of . political. sensitivity, discipline and : teamplay. Thus, the
selection system has joined hands with deficiencies; and may have subtly sowed
debilitating attitudes where none originally existed. -
If nothing in the selection process in recent years has remotely suggested the
Herculean challenges awaiting successful candidates or tested anything approxi-
mating the sensitivity and resourcefulness demanded of them, this particular
defect may be somewhat mitigated by an experiment introduced this year of
replacing the hour-and-a-half or two-hour oral interview by a day-long "assess-
ment procedure" borrowed from major corporations. This stimulates a "day on
the job." The candidate is, given a stack of material with which he might be
expected to be confronted in a typical workday. He must dispose of this, decid-
ing the questions posed. Lacking tutelage in international politics, he will of
course come up with some superficial or even cockeyed decisions, but at least this
type of test should help to screen out the indecisive and unimaginative. It is
difficult to conceive the two principal officers involved in the Kudirka case taking
such a test without raising serious questions concerning their qualifications.
At "the same time, it would be a serious mistake to adopt any entrance test
which aggravates the American penchant for approaching foreign affairs as a
collection of "problems" on which one concentrates one by .one and makes deci-
sions to the exclusion of broad political considerations. One must keep in mind
the essential nature of diplomacy, which is not to keep' one's in-box contents
flowing: into one's out-box, but to keep a political process flowing, with an eye
to foreign policy objectives. The principal limitation of the innovation is that
it is a desk-job test and smacks too much of the widespread antihumanist,
managerial belief that papers,, desks and "decisions" are more' important than
people. It may well reinforce the debilitating conceptualization of the diplomatic
process as a mere collection of in-boxes and out-boxes, offices, "job," cones, paper-
work and "problems," rather than a political process of international maneuver
to obtain certain strategic goals.
One has to remember, also, that ' in international as in national and local
politics, people of more profound political instinct are imaginative and resource-
ful in personal relationships rather than in executive-desk type of in-box and
out-box work. The essence of diplomacy is personal persuasion in a cross-
cultural, cross-historical context-in which tact and personal agreeableness are
important factors-not managing a desk or an office of one's own compatriots
and certainly not in a business-oriented type of organization. Some combination
of a decisive-minded, management type test with a vastly improved oral exami-
nationmight provide the ideal solution.
The socializing; make-them-feel-at-ease philosophy which has metamorphosed
American education and has come to characterize our oral examination, pervades
the five-and-a=half-week, so-called basic officers course given- to- all newly com-
missioned officers., So much in this case-that officers are commissioned before
not after completing the course, during which no examinations are given to test
the degree to which material has been absorbed. Indeed; this is not a "course"
at all but a fleeting, superficial exposure to a grab-bag of-subjects most of which
are-unsynthesized with either, the. substance or the objectives of the diplomatic
process.
The first priority of the "course has been to introduce officers not to-diplo-
macy-that is abjured as too "remote" and "high-flown" for new officers (even
though their average age is 29)-but to "the work" of the State Department and
Foreign Service?(a purely bureaucratic concept); to orient, officers to the terms
and conditions; of their employment (including the department's medical and
insurance program,. employee-management relations, the career development sys-
tem and the like) and to make- a gingerly thrust at some of the core skills they
need in oral and written communication, reporting and analysis- of information
they gather, -negotiating (a one-day simulation) and the supervisory-management
skills required of a junior officer.
The.second priority has been to develop a faint understanding of the relation-
ship between "individual job. assignments" and the overall.-formulation and
implementation of U.S. foreign policy, of diplomatic social practice, of some
questions of international law which rise to the level of the department's legal
adviser (rather than the broad questions which diplomatic and consular officers
may be.expected to face) and the roles of the White House, executive depart-
ments and Congress in policy formulation and. implementation.- The general
outlines of U.S; ? foreign -policy were once sketched but are not. now. Even when
sketched important areas have been omitted- such as those relating to defection
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and asylum, basic though these are to what the United States stands for in the
world. The interests and activities of the federal foreign affairs community are
touched upon, but not synthesized in a total conception of American strategies
and tactics. Not even the role and resources of the Central Intelligence Agency
were covered in any meaningful way until recently, when the buffetings to which
the agency has been subjected by Congress and the press have knocked sufficient
humility into its head to get down off its high horse of exaggerated secrecy. This
part of the "course" has never included the Coast Guard.
Whether this introduction to the Service provides any grounding in U.S. foreign
commitments, (including our defense treaties) and the reasons for them or the
policies and commitments of other important governments, depends upon the
conductor of the course and since there is a constant succession of conductors,
both substance and quality in these areas differ astonishingly.
Even when there is some slight grounding in such vital matters, there is none
at, all in others equally critical, including the Soviets' political, economic and
military strategies and tactics, or in the crucial question of the sources of anti-
American feeling around the .world, in international law generally (although we
profess a consummate dedication to it), in international organizations and the
resources and problems they present to us, or-most startling of all-in diplo-
macy generally, although this is the profession the officers are entering and the
principal means by which governments are seeking their objectives. Occasionally,
a conductor (such as the present one) explores some diplomatic functions, such
as protocol, negotiation, d46marches and interviewing skills, but there is never an
analysis in depth of the diplomatic process and the role it plays in our national
security and welfare and that of the international community. Hence, apart
from negotiation under the present conductor, there are no case studies of a
problem-solving nature in the.dynamics of the international political process,
comparable to those, for instance, which good schools in business management
employ to prepare aspirants to business careers. Nor is there the slightest sug-
gestion.of the contributions which a complex of sciences is making to the analysis
of our world-cosmography, anthropology, social biology, social psychology, soci-
ology, ecology and the like-especially of the underdeveloped areas. All in all,
the basic officers' preparation is a resounding hosanna to superficiality and
amateurism. Needless to say, the sounds which the American diplomatic per-
formance generate include many eerie and discordant ones-as in the Kudirka
case-and this accounts in no small part for our slippage in world esteem. .
Apart from the one exercise in negotiation, the department. propagates the
false conception that diplomacy is hazy, largely individual, instinctive, felt-
understood in encounter experience, incapable of analysis and verbalization, to
be practiced by people off the seats of their pants, rather than a sharp, brisk,
politico-economic-cultural-military competition of ideas, moves and counter-
moves-demanding of practitioners the highest degree of learning, altertness;
complex calculation and systematic teamplay. This false conception has vast
psychological ramifications, invading the entire diplomatic establishment and
creating a fertile incubation culture for Kudirka-like slippages and worse. This
is why even in so relatively simple a matter as dealing with the Soviets on a
defection question or the siting and construction of embassies in our respective
capitals we are outsmarted; They know the game and too many of our officers do
not.
. Not being conceptualized as professional in nature, the preparation of officers
is cast in the image of its conductors. These being Foreign Service officers and
therefore constantly rotated, orientation content is subject to equally constant
and bewildering mutation as each conductor experiments, adding here, subtract-
ing there, according to his individual experience and perceptions. Human rights,
for example, are now much emphasized in the basic orientation, as youth prob-
lems were in President Kennedy's time. If the department viewed its task clearly
and did it well, such things would be covered all the time and this extraordinary
erraticism of content and quality would disappear.
Confronting the same problem, the military establishment has overcome it by
reducing courses to writing, ensuring that basic subjects are covered thoroughly,
in a professional manner, while permitting instructors to contribute their own
experience, insights. and personality to instruction. The department's casual,
relaxed approach to its instructional responsibilities is- symptomatic of a pro-
found misperception of diplomacy, the modern world and its own role and cannot
but profoundly influence the performance of officers and therefore its own com-
petence relative to our military establisment, our intelligence agency and other
governments.
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Of equally psychosomatic effect, the course propagates the notion that past
experience is of no relevance. No warnings, by case studies or otherwise apart
from anecdotes by course conductors-are given of mistakes committed in the
past by either our diplomats or those of other governments to sharpen apprecia-
tion of hazards and pitfalls. None of the critical analyses of the department pub-
lished over the years is required reading-to stimulate thinking of some breadth
and depth of the kind of an organization they are stepping into, what inadequacies
to anticipate and compensate for and what changes to work for. The excuse is
given that all of these studies are "out of date," but all together they constitute a
palimpsest of American thinking-and non-thinking-on foreign policy making
and diplomacy, throwing light upon perennial problems in these two areas. Thus,
a wholly passive, irresponsible, even disdainful, attitude toward the organization
as a whole and its problems is induced.
Not even biographies and memoirs of diplomats are required to be read to
stimulate a professional search for clues to the nature of diplomacy, what
functions it performs relative to the nation's security, and what to do or avoid
doing in their own careers to achieve a satisfactory quality of performance in
the shortest possible time. Such reading would provide some transfer of con-
ceptualization and experience from officer to officer and from generation to
generation, badly needed in a system of constantly rotating officers. Inciden-
tally, also, it would inculcate a professional attitude sadly lacking in the diploma-
tic establishment, as was all too vividly attested by the loose-jointed, unprofes-
sional way the office of Soviet affairs handled the Kudirka case.
Orientation, thus, is little more than a transient situational disturbance in
the lives of the officers and a perfect exegesis of Santayana's admonition that
those unware of the past are condemned to repeat it. It is also an exegesis of
the complementary Simpson axiom that those ignorant of the past do not know
what good things to perpetuate. It confirms the American insistence of living
in a fool's paradise of the present, chopping up history into little daily bits, and
disregarding the perspectives of the past, leaving too many of us unable to
detect basic trends. It is as though those associated with the course over the
years were followers of Rousseau and believed that "our existence is nothing
but a succession of moments perceived through the senses."
Might this suggest that while we get to know a lot, we understand little and
perhaps explain why World Bank officials say that in their travels they go to
American embassies for the most up-to-date information but to others-the
British, French and West German-for insights and perspectives into ' what
the information means. It helps also to explain our failure to understand and
to attract following in countries respectful and even reverent of the past.
How these deficiencies penalize officers is common observation. One reason-
perhaps the principal reason-the China-born officers who became "China hands"
in the 1930-40 period ran afoul of the State Department, as they did also of
the "red-baiting" McCarrati-McCarthy-Hurley-Nixon-Chambers-Budenz crowd,
lies here. They were simply not adequately trained for their exacting profes-
sion and their free wheeling helped to do them in. It is the duty of the State
Department to provide every entering officer with the best possible foundation
and discipline, with risks of his committing errors reduced to a minimum. It is
fair neither to the officers nor to the nation to dig for officers what T. E. Law-
rence called "a shallow grave of public duty."
One needs only to compare this approach to the rigors of foreign affairs with
the preparation exacted by the legal and medical professions to see the en-
ormity of its misperception. To be admitted to the practice of law one must
have capped a liberal arts education with three years in a law school and further
demonstrate, through a rigorous bar examination, a grasp of the substance and
procedures of jurisprudence. For the practice of medicine, requirements are even
stiffer, since human life is involved-four years in medical school on top of
general college work (in which stated pre-med courses are required) and a con-
cluding internship in which further searching examination is made of knowl-
edge, judgment and general capability. Diplomacy, like the law, concerns justice
and order and involves maneuvering, bargaining and hard negotiating with
these ends in view but on a global scale, encompassing different cultural, eco-
nomic, political and legal systems. Like medicine, diplomacy concerns people's
lives, not only those of individuals, as in the Kudirka case, but, again, on a very
large scale, with successes and failures affecting the lives, health and fortunes
of whole populations. The State Department, instead of measuring tip to such
formidable responsibilities and requiring, before commissioning, a rigorous educa-
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tion and training, coasts along with the most relaxed and minimal standards
conceivable.
Even a business-like brokerage, which might seem to be relatively simple-
merchandising stocks, bonds and units in various types of investment funds-
approaches its challenge responsibly. First-class firms put their candidates for
account executive through a grueling 29 weeks of courses, after which come
stringent examinations by the New York Stock Exchange, the .National Associa-
tion of Security Dealers and the Chicago Board of Trade. Are foreign policy
making and diplomacy really so much less demanding, with so much less of an
impact upon the nation and the global community?
Or take something simpler than brokerage : customer service of a public utility.
The Philadelphia Electric Company puts applicants through a 13-week train-
ing to prepare them for work in that department. This provides not only a
searching study of all possible customers' problems but psychologically jacks up
the applicants' appreciation of the importance of what they will be doing if
selected. Just what is the State Department trying to prove by a five-week-
plus orientation? That diplomacy is simpler and easier than serving customers of
a large electric utility, or its candidates are all that better prepared for their
monumental tasks-or that foreign affairs constitutes a kind of Willy Loman
occupation, "riding on a smile and a shoeshine?"
When, at various times, I have challenged this relaxed unprofessional prepara-
tion of Foreign Service officers, the objection has been made that the recruits
would rebel against a thorough and tested preparation. "They are fed up with
courses and examinations." I have been admonished. "They have had enough of
studying and examinations. They want to get going."
What would candidates for the legal and medical professions be told if they said
after finishing college or graduate school they were fed up with studying and
examinations and just wanted to "get going," practicing law or medicine? What
would first-class brokerage firms or the Philadelphia Electric Company say to
applicants who "rebelled" against rigorous preparation? They would say: "Then
you are not for us. Try something else." The State Department says : "Come on
in anyway. We'll teach you on the job." The Kudirka case shows dramatically
this can be so much malarkey. Few officers acquire on the job everything they
need to know to be learned, sagacious, responsible diplomatic officers of a
world power. Few can be intelligent and useful in any profound sense who are
simply the product of what John Dewey called their own "undergoing." One
needs to recognize that there is a wisdom of centuries not submissive to the fluctu-
ations of time, assignments and daily chores.
The fact that on-the-job training is by fits and starts, by catch-as-catch-can
fragments, from supervisors who learned the same way, straps a Kudirka-like
time bomb to every Foreign Service officer. Piecemeal, job-related thinking be-
comes so fragmentary, limited and pedestrian as to become superficial, a sure
way of fusing habit and tradition with anachronism, exaggerated individualism
and repeated errors in our conduct of foreign affairs. This is why no govern-
ment department is so beset by folklore and mythology, by-guess-and-by-God
notions and cliches as the State Department. It explains why there is no per-
vading esprit de corps, team play and sustained organizational morale in our
diplomatic establishment. To anyone familiar with the casual and disorganized
fashion in which that establishment was run before World War II, the Kudirka
case is dispiritingly reminiscent, revelatory of how old attitudes, mental proc-
esses and operational norms perpetuate themselves in a totally different and
far more complex and dangerous age.
On-the-job training also exaggerates the American penchant of viewing foreign
affairs not as international politics and therefore in terms of strategies and
tactics, which are the dynamics of diplomacy, but as so many "problems." We
thereby run the risk of losing sight of the broad political environment in which
problems arise and must be resolved. Governments having an overall strategy
acquire the momentum we have seen Soviet diplomacy acquiring in Africa and
the "arc of crisis" from Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf while we try to separate
out from the web SALT, Israeli-Egyptian relations, Rhodesia and other "prob-
lems" for individual treatment.
Tinder this system, learning tends to become excessively individualized. This
is why the department, the Service, the basic officers course and diplomacy itself
become, each, as I have had occasion to point out before, a kind of Rorschach
inkblot, conceptualized not professionally but solely in response to the stimuli of
individual experience.
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Finally, on-the-job learning is the slowest possible kind. We are a world power
and the state of the planet is such that we can no longer afford the luxury of offi-
cers assuming responsibilities of initiative and leadership only after years of
service. The Kudirka case dramatically demonstrates that even with eight years'
experience a mid-career officer can be so unanalytical and irresolute he cannot
satisfactorily handle the simplest kind of a situation and a senior officer of
eighteen years' experience does not know how to manage even one subordinate,
cannot clearly articulate an important policy for the guidance of others and
cannot, therefore, coordinate State Department interests with the operations of
another agency.
The fact that the diplomatic establishment has some well-rounded, competent
officers is in spite of, not because of, its commitment to on-the-job training, and
these officers are far too few. Only when the average, run-of-the-mill officer
possesses a shap strategic and tactical conceptualization of diplomacy and is
trained to act in accordance with it can our democracy hope to contest success-
fully the kind of diplomacy waged by the authoritarian regimes which have
replaced in modern times the Philips of Macedonia and Alexander the Greats of
other times.
This brings us to the metastatic effects which working conditions exert upon
the minds and attitudes of officers. These accentuate what the selection procedure
and orientation begin : the creation of a bureaucratic instead of a dynamic politi-
cal mind. For decades the staffing pattern of the establishment has been too lean
to permit the development of effective educational and training programs for a
sizable proportion of officers, the adequate development of officers by supervisors,
or even self-development through individual reading and sabbaticals. The absence
of reflective and creative thinking in our diplomacy for which the nation has
been pleading for years stems in part from this, for the effect of overly stringent
staffing is that officers work with their minds to the grindstone, not infrequently
required to perform clerical tasks, as were officers in our consular posts in Iran,
and thus so preoccupied with daily chores as to lose sight of the large ends
toward which chores are supposed to be directed.
As one of our officers writes from London :
The tight staffing pattern of the Foreign Service does not only make it
practically impossible for an adequate training program at the State Depart-
ment's training institute to have sufficient inputs at all appropriate points in/
officers' careers. It also effectively insulates consular officers from developing
political, economic or commercial skills or participating in those functions in
connection with their consular assignments. In posts where I have served, I have
observed that the sheer pressure of work (brought about in large part by
-insufficient staffing) leaves officers in such a state of physical and mental weari-
ness at the end of each working day that they simply have no energy left to
expend on reading or social contacts or other activities ordinarily thought to be
part of the responsibilities of a Foreign Service officer.
-This could have been written from any of our consular posts in Iran in recent
years.
. In the Kudirka case, this kind of staffing left the section chief pleading he
had no one to send to Boston to take charge on the spot and himself apparently
too fagged out to keep on top of a situation brought to his attention during the
day. In a wearied conri!~dition, he closed. the door of his mind as well as of his
office at six o'clock. H67had earlier served a tour of duty at the Treasury Depart-
ment and noticed that the State Department was keeping that sister department
insulated from policies and actions. Yet he could not, even in a specific instance
obviously demanding the closest kind of collaboration, breach the insulation
of the Coast Guard by issuing it a clear policy instruction and. following up on
its execution. "Perhaps," he said when it was all over, "we should have a liaison
officer over there [at Coast Guard headquarters]." Perhaps we. should also have
alert,. trained, unfatigued, take-charge officers in. greater numbers in the State
Department. Attitudes, not the lack of organizational devices, or an up-dated
version of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, are At the root of many of our, serious
problems.
Year after year, Dean Rusk used to boast before Congressman. John J. Rooney's
subcommittee on appropriations that he was not requesting any personnel in-
creases for the diplomatic establishment, despite accumulating needs and in-
creasing workloads. "We are just working harder," he used to say. This was
demagogy of the worst kind, all the more destructive because two government-
wide reductions in personnel (to which President Nixon was.to add a third)
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had already stripped the diplomatic establishment to dangerously reduced staffing
levels, and we are'traveling that same road in the present administration.
"Working harder" breeds slippages of the Kudirka kind, as constant, day-long,
week-in-and-week-out barrages of problems numb the senses, constrict attention
span and inevitably induce mismanagement. In a broader sense,` "working harder"
over the years has also meant working harder at the same old lines of policy.
the same old bureaucratic notions of diplomacy, in accordance with the same
old shallow ideas of what the United States and the free world community need
to do to ensure a. preservation of their values and interests. Since some of the
policies up to the time of the Kudirka affair had to do with Vietnam, "working
harder" meant digging the nation ever deeper into that swamp. With no time to
back off for fresh thinking and fresh perspectives, overworked minds simply
cannot respond alertly and creatively to either immediate or long range, subtle
or overt challenges.
The Kudirka affair and Vietnam, each in its own way, were symptomatic of
the department's inability to conceptualize diplomacy in sharp enough terms to
relate diplomatic actions to resources. Equally symptomatic-and reinforcing
this deficiency-is the absence of a diplomacy planning staff. A policy planning
staff has existed since General Marshall introduced it in 1947 in the hope of
inducing in the State Department the planning functions and mentality of the
military's general staff. But there is still no planning staff for the execution of
policy and therefore no coordination of resources-human and other-for the
global implementation of the policies decided upon by the president and secretary
of state. Such a staff could, among other things, stimulate adequate educational,
training and personnel development programs and conditions and press for a
staffing pattern appropriate to the diplomatic needs of a world power. Every
company of any importance has a management action planning system to enable
it to operate by plan and anticipation rather than by simply responding to
situations.
Ili the promotion of officers the department has been as inefficient and resource-
less as in selection, education, training and staffing, because officers are doing, in
too many cases unprofessionally, the evaluations on which promotions are given.
Here, again, psychologists have not been enlisted to assist in resolving the problem
of supervisors who cannot write professional, objective evaluations of subordi-
nates. Without such'evaluations, the department can too often fail to make the
right promotions .or assignments. It simply cannot weed out the incompetents, the
vacillating, the indecisive, the people unwilling or unable to take charge and
prevent them from, going through all the ranks even to ambassadorships. The
other side of this coin is that officers, have not been instilled in the basic course
with the professional criteria which would make them willing toaccept objective
evaluation.
Tlie Kudirka case?thus, is a lens which brings to a focus what has happened
over the years to US diplomacy in. Latin America, In Vietnam, Africa and the
Persian Gulf and 'what characterizes generally our relations with the Soviet
Union and will undoubtedly characterize our relations with the Peoples Republic
of China. Other governments are as mystified by our fumbling conduct as was the
skipper of the Valiant and they are as traumatized as he by our incompetence
in meeting some of our simplest diplomatic challenges. They feel-and many
Americans feel=as Wellington said he felt after reviewing untrained troops dur-
ing the Peninsular campaign : "I don't know what effect these men will have on
the enemy, put, by God, they frighten me."
The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Mrs. Cynthia A. Thomas,
Foreign Service Reserve officer, from-Washin- on.
Mrs. Thomas is also originally from Rhode Island. Welcome.
[Mrs. Thomas' biography follows.]
BIOGRAPHY OF MRS. CYNTHIA A. THOMAS
Mrs. Thomas is the widow of FSO Charles William Thomas whose tragic death
initiated some personnel reforms in the Department of State.
Dirs. Thomas was .born in Providence, Rhode Island on July. 20, 1938. She
received her B.A. from Sarah Lawrence College in International Relations in
1958.
Experience :
1971-present-Foreign Service Reserve Officer. Currently, political - analyst
in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecua-
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376
dor. Formerly, International Relations Officer for Latin American Affairs in
the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental. and Scientific Affairs.
1963-Professional Actress, Broadway.
1962-Assistant Education Editor, Bantam Books.
1961-Assistant Foreign Correspondent, Business Week, Milan.
1958-1962-Editorial Researcher, Time Magazine.
Mrs. Thomas has two daughters, Zelda and Jeanne Marie.
STATEMENT OF MRS. CYNTHIA A. THOMAS, FOREIGN SERVICE
RESERVE OFFICER, POLITICAL ANALYST
Mrs. THOMAS. I think I should introduce myself. In addition to
being a Foreign Service Reserve officer, presently political analyst
for three democracies in Latin America, I am also' the unofficial and
uncompensated Ombudsman for Foreign Service offi,,rs who have some
difficulty with the personnel system, mainly because my husband,
who died nearly 9 years ago, was a victim of that system.
My remarks will be brief. I hope that this committee decline to
report favorably on the Foreign Service Act of 1979, S. 1450, until
and unless a grievance procedure guaranteeing the fullest measures
of due process to all employees of the foreign affairs agencies is con-
tained therein. When world opinion is focused on our Foreign Service
officers held hostage in Iran, it would seem an appropriate action.
A grievance procedure exists under section 1101, but these proce-
dures were the result of the impasse between the House and Senate
Conference Committee in 1975, which legislated essentially the interim
grievance procedures the Department of State was forced to imple-
ment in the wake of public outcry, court cases, and congressional
inquiries.
The statute tacked onto the Foreign Affairs Authorization bill,
November 29, 1975, was complicated enough, but the grievance system
which. it delineated was further complicated by the requirements that
a grievance be thoroughly considered and resolved administratively
within the agency. A report prepared by the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in 1972 contains a comparison between the proposed For-
eign Service grievance procedures at the time and the interim regula-
tions then in effect. There are only slight variations between the Senate
and House versions. Later versions in both Houses came together on
September. 24, 1975 in S. 1080 and H.R. 9805.
The Bayh bill, as it came to be known in the Senate, was reported
out of the Foreign Relations Committee three times and passed by the
full Senate four times. However, on the House side, action was blocked
at the committee level by the former committee chairman, former
Congressman. Wayne Hays.
The reason I call your attention to the comparison of procedures
is to illustrate that, though the language is more comprehensive in the
current grievance legislation, its limitations are almost as great, as its
denial of due process were in the original interim procedures. There
is only one respect wherein the proposed law differs from the one that
was passed in 1975, and that is to provide a further deterrent to a
grievant by awarding the exclusive bargaining agent in the Depart-
ment of State, the American Foreign Service Association, the power to
deny to the individual his right to appeal to the grievance board.
The original Bayh/Cooper/Humphrey/Scott bill was introduced in
the Senate in June 1971, following the tragic death of Charles William
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Thomas, a Foreign Service officer. Despite an outstanding record of
20 years of loyal and distinguished service, Mr. Thomas was dismissed
for failure to be promoted. As may be seen in the findings of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee report, published in 1974 (appendix C),
Mr. Thomas was unable to appeal his arbitrary selection-out because
no appeal body existed. '
The Director General was the final appeal authority, and no hearing
in the Department of State was granted for 16 years. Despite the fact
that there is an appeals procedure now, in reality the final appeal body
is still the Director General, or in actual practice, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Personnel. The reference to "The Secretary" in the legis-
lation is in reality a myth since the Secretary himself habitually dele-
gates this authority downward.
Though the regulations state that, if the Department's Grievance
Staff rejects a grievance, it person can appeal to the Grievance Board,
most major areas are not grievable.
I would like this committee to request information from the Griev-
ance Staff on how many major grievances on selection-out, nonpromo-
tions, unfair reprisals, discrimination, and capricious, arbitrary, or
other malicious acts arising in the administration of the personnel sys-
tem or performed by personnel authorities are brought before the
Grievance Staff. Obviously, there aren't any. The legislation is careful
to exclude grievance based on these acts on the part of the personnel
authorities.
Worse yet, the Grievance Staff's major role is to provide an ex-
tended delaying and potentially cruel, career-damaging informal con-
sideration of a grievance by forcing the victim to go to the very people
that committed the acts complained of. This provision "legislates"
some of the cruelest aspects of the Foreign Service personnel system,
by ignoring the human element that a person will risk his entire career
by going to a Grievance Board only when he feels that it is iii extremis.
In contrast the legislation cosponsored by this committee'iin'prior
years provided for a clear and unimpeded path to the Grievance
Board for a review of a grievance upon its merits without subjecting
the grievant to a series of dangers, humiliations, and.possible ir-
reparable damage to his career.
A grievance was once defined by the Senate Foreign Relations com-
mittee as "any complaint against an injustice, unfair treatment of
an employee or aspect of his situation or from any action, documents
or records, which result in career impairment or damage, monetary
loss to the employee, or deprivation of due process. It shall include
but not be limited to action in the nature of reprisals and discrimina-
tion, actions related to promotions or selection-out."
Now, let us examine how different the present law is:
Definitions of grievances were rewritten in so restrictive a manner
as to deprive grievants of the opportunity to protest the prevalent
general injustices and policies concerning a wide range of items such
as promotions, misassignment, discriminatory treatment or favoritism,
and selection-out
The present law restricts grievances against selection-out to invol-
untary retirement caused by violations of law and regulation or to
erroneous or falsely prejudicial material in performance files, which
is much less likely in the case of selection-out for time-in-class, that
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378
is, failure to be promoted within a specified number,of years. Officers
selected-out for time-in-class often receive consistently above average
performance reports over a period of years. On the other hand, a
generally below, average officer may be singled out for the occasional
outstanding report. Consequently, the above average performer is
selected out: The result has been a continuous loss to the Foreign Ser-
vice of highly talented officers.
One of the many serious defects of the legislation is the failure to
order the reinstatement of officers wrongly selected-out, rather than
merely to recommend their reinstatement to the Agency head. The
Agency head, despite a clear recommendation by the Board, can refuse
to reinstate an`of$cer, no matter how meritorious his claim, on the. pre-
text that the officer no longer meets the needs of the' Service. Worse
yet, any such. adverse decision on the part of the Agency head is spe-
cifically excluded from judicial review.
The failure to order the reinstatement of officers wrongly selected-
out is a most, regrettable and ironic provision. The original impetus
toward legislation providing for a Foreign Service grievance proce-
dure was furnished by the tragic death of my husband Charles W.
Thomas, nearly 9 years ago. Subsequent private legislation which
provided for the relief of Charles W. Thomas, deceased,. gave evidence
to the grievous wrong done to him by the Department of State. .
Furthermore, the President of the United States, Gerald Ford, in a
subsequent letter, expressed the hope that legal measures would be
enacted to prevent recurrences of the situation which led to this
tragedy. Yet, the grievance legislation finally resulting from Mr.
Thomas' death. did not provide for the rectification of the wrong.
In other words, if Mr. Thomas were still alive, he would still be unable
to bring a grievance under the present system. Moreover, if he could
bring a,grievance, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel could
refuse to reinstate; him for any reason whatsoever on the pretext that
he and his skills were no longer needed by the Foreign Service, and he
would specifically be prevented from appealing. such an arbitrary.
decision in the courts.
I have been working in the Department of State many years. I could
relate to you a number of telling cases. But, I will talk about FSO
Temple Cole, who died last summer at the age of 49 of a heart attack.
I believe, Senator Pell, you commended this officer for his very fine
work on refugee affairs some years ago.
It is a sad long case and a complicated story. I know- from personal
experience that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel and the
Director. General refused to give this man elementary due process of
law.
[The following-information was subsequently supplied:]
STATUS OP TEMPLE COLE CASE
The answer to a question at a noon briefing on July 9, 1979; regarding this
officer was the following :
"A. In May of this year, several persons requested that the Bureau of Per-
sonnel look into the possibility of granting Mr. Cole a retroactive promotion on
compassionate grounds. After a careful review of the situation, the Department
concluded that it does not have the legal authority to grant retroactive promo-.
tions in the absence of a recommendation by an EEO Appeals Examiner or by a
Grievance Board or. Panel (22 U.S.C. 8993B). Mr. Cole, himself, had not per-
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sonally requested such a promotion ; nor did he have any formal EEO complaint
or grievance against the Department pending at the time of his death."
Mrs. THOMAS. I would like to point out to this committee that the
several persons referred to by the Department were: (1) myself; (2)
a friend of Mr. Cole's, who was the attorney that argued the Lindsay v.
Kissinger case before Judge Gesell, resulting in the decision which is
a part of the Foreign Service Act now-the right to a hearing for
anyone selected-out for low ranking; and (3) the third person was,
ironically, an. Assistant Secretary for Human Rights. But we did not
approach the Department of compassionate grounds. We believed that
due process should be extended to Mr. Cole while he was still alive.
I hope this committee will investigate thoroughly the legal authority
which the Department says it lacked in the matter of Mr. Cole. Per-
haps Mr. Cole's :case will .provide the lever to break the inhuman sys-
tem that the State Department has written for itself.
I am also concerned about the case of former FSO David Hughes,
a Chinese specialist who was condemned for his miserable judgment
in qquestioning a regulation that is now moot. It had to do at the time
with marrying an alien. He wants to reenter the Foreign Service. He
just happens to be fluent in Cantonese and Mandarin.
I would appreciate your looking into that matter. There are many
others. I could go on and on. But I would like to refer this committee
to the excellent testimony provided by the Government Accountability
Project of the Institute for Policy Studies which has been submitted
for inclusion in the record. This testimony provides keen analysis and
a reasonable appeal in support of the fullest measure of due process,
whichthey identify as the Bayh bill of U.S. Senate.
[The information referred to appears on p. 427.]
Mrs. THotAs..I. don't know what reasons can be given any further
for the delay.
Thank you.
[Mrs. Thomas' prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MRS. CYNTHIA A. THOMAS
Mr. Chairman, I ask that this Committee decline to report favorably on the
Foreign Service Act of 1979, S. 1450, until and unless a grievance procedure
guaranteeing the fullest measures of due process to all employees of the foreign
affairs agencies is contained therein.
A grievance procedure is provided under Chapter 11, p. 131, Section 1101, but
these procedures were the result of the impasse between the House and Senate
Conference Committee in 1975, which legislated essentially the interim grievance
procedures the Department of State was forced to implement in the wake of
public outcry, court cases, and Congressional inquires.
The statute tacked onto the Foreign Affairs Authorization Bill, November 29,
1975, was complicated enough, but the grievance system which it delineated was
further complicated by the requirements that a grievance be thoroughly consid-
ered and resolved administratively within the agency.
The legislated grievance procedures contained in S. 1450 provide a modicum
of due process, but a little bit of due process is not enough ! I would like to refer
to a report prepared by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1972, "Back-
ground Material on Foreign Service Grievance Procedures." The Frontispiece
contains a comparison between the proposed Foreign Service grievance proce-
dures at the time and interim regulations then in effect in the Department of
State, AID, and USIA. The bills' numbers were H.R. 9188, Representative Hamil-
ton ; H.R. 10304, Representatives Hamilton/Buchanan/Fascell and others. On
the Senate side, they were known at the time as S. 3526, S. 3722, Senators Bayh/
Cooper/Fulbright. The Bill in the House that was identical to the Senate Bill
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at that time was H.R. 15457 (Biesta). There were numerous other identical bills
in both Houses. If you want to refer to Appendix A of my testimony, you can,
see that there are only slight variations between the Senate and House versions.
Later versions in both Houses came together on September 24, 1975, in H.R.
9805 and S. 1080.
The "Bayh Bill," as it came to be known in the Senate, was reported out of
the Foreign Relations Committee three times and passed by the full Senate four
times. However, on the House side, action was blocked at the Committee level by
the former Committee Chairman, former Congressman Wayne Hays, who worked
hand-in-glove with management officials of the Department of State on this'
matter and with a certain faction within the American Foreign Service Associa-
tion until he departed the Congress'
The reason I call your attention to the comparison of procedures is to illustrate . .+
that, though the language is more comprehensive in the current grievance legisla-
tion, its limitations are almost as great, and its denial of due process is nearly as
keen as they were in the original interim procedures. There is only one respect
wherein the proposed law differs from the one that .was passed in 1975, and that
is to provide a further deterrent to a grievant by awarding the exclusive bar-
gaining agent in the Department of State, the American Foreign Service Associa-
tion, the power to deny to the individual his right to appeal to the appeal body.
I urge the Committee to replace Chapter 11 of S. 1450 by the provisions of the
original "Bayh/Cooper/Hamilton/Buchanan/Fascell" proposed legislation which
was introduced as S. 1080, September 24, 1975. Attached at Appendix B is the
original (S. 2659).
The original Bayh/Cooper/Humphrey/Scott Bill was introduced in the Senate
in June, 1971, following the tragic death of Charles William Thomas, a Foreign
Service Officer. Despite an outstanding record'of twenty years of loyal and dis-
tinguished service, Mr. Thomas was dismissed for failure to be promoted. As
may be seen in the Findings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report,
published in 1974 (Appendix C), Mr. Thomas was unable to appeal his arbitrary
selection-out because no appeal body existed.
The Director General was the final appeal `authority, and no hearing 'in the
Department of State was granted for'sixteen years. Despite the fact that there
is an appeals procedure now, in reality the final' appeal body is still the Director
General, or in actual practice, the Assistant Secretary for Personnel. The, refer-
ence to "the Secretary" in the legislation is in reality a myth since the Secretary
himself habitually delegates this authority downward. Though the regulations
state that, if the Department's Grievance Staff rejects a grievance, a person can
appeal to the Grievance Board, most major areas are not grievable. Thus, due
process becomes largely a sham. I have brought along a chart prepared by the
Grievance Staff for persons who may be planning a grievance. It is a confusing
and ambiguous maze. (See Appendix D.)
I would like this 'Committee to request information from the Grievance Staff
on how many major grievances on selection-out, non-promotions, unfair re-
prisals, discrimination, and capricious, arbitrary, or other malicious acts arising
in the administration of the personnel system or performed by personnel author-
ities are brought before the Grievance Staff. Obviously, there aren't any. The
legislation is careful to exclude grievances based on these acts on the part of
the personnel authorities.
Worse yet, the Grievance Staff's major role is to provide an extended delaying
and potentially cruel, career-damaging informal consideration of a grievance by
forcing the victim to go to the very people that committed the acts complained
of. This provision "legislates" some of the cruelest aspects of the Foreign Serv-
ice personnel system, by ignoring the human element that a person will risk
his entire career by going to a Grievance Board only when he feels that he is
in eatremis. ?
Furthermore, the Grievance 'Staff requires that the grievant submit his case
to them in writing for review before he can get to the Grievance Board to re-
quest a formal hearing. I refer you to Appendix E, letter of FSO Robert Allen
and his accompanying situation. He believes that the Department's purpose has
been to evade, to delay, and to Obfuscate. He believes that ample evidence could
' In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1976, I pointed out that
Mr. Lars Hydle, the then appointed (not elected) Vice President of the AFSA (without
allowing a proposed referendum by the membership) deceived the Congress into believing
that the 7,000 members supported a compromise on the Bayh/Fascell Bill.
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be gathered to support a class-action suit against the Department for violations
by the Grievance Staff of the right to due process.
The legislation co-sponsored by this Committee in prior years provided for
a clear and unimpeded path to the Grievance Board for a review of a grievance
upon its merits without subjecting the grievant to a series of dangers, humilia-
tions, and possible irreparable damage to his career.
A grievance was once defined by your Committee as "any_complaint against
an injustice, unfair treatment of an employee or aspect of his situation or from
any action, documents or records, which result in career impairment or damage,
monetary loss to the employee, or deprivation of due process. It shall include
but not be limited to action in the nature of reprisals and discrimination, actions
related to promotions or selection-out : the content of any efficiency report or
related records; separation for cause, denial of salary increase within a class,
etc."
Now, let us examine the present law :
1. Definitions of grievances were rewritten in so restrictive a manner as to
deprive grievants of the opportunity to protest the prevalent general injustices
and policies concerning a wide range of items such as promotions, misassign-
ment. discriminatory treatment or favoritism, and selection-out.
2. The present law restricts grievances against selection-out to involuntary
retirement caused by violations of law and regulation or to erroneous or falsely
prejudicial material in performance files, which is much less likely in the case
of selection-out for time-in-class, i.e., failure to be promoted within a specified
number of years. Officers selected-out for time-in-class often receive consistently
above-average performance reports over a period of years. On the other hand,
a generally below-average officer may be singled out for the occasional out-
standing report. Consequently, the consistently above-average performer is
selected-out. The result has been a continuous loss to the Foreign Service of
highly talented officers.
3. The choice of Grievance Board members gives too much of an in-house
character to the Board by permitting former employees of the foreign affairs
agencies to serve on it, including former members of the "interim" Grievance
Board, or of the Department's Office of Personnel. Most of these latter can be
expected to perpetuate the evils of the interim grievance procedures which an
independent and impartial membership would have eliminated. Section 1111
should also eliminate from Grievance Board membership all former officers
and employees of the Department or other foreign affairs agencies. While retired
Foreign Service employees are theoretically free from pressures exerted by high
management personnel and other Department officials, they, in fact, as Foreign
,Service Reserve appointees, must please those high officials or find themselves
removed from a desirable and lucrative position. Some of the Foreign Service
Grievance Board members have now been members for about eight years. Board
membership has become a highly desirable second career for them, which they
might be ill-advised to place in jeopardy through grievance decisions strongly
opposed by management.
4. Hearings are essentially closed instead of being entirely open to public
scrutiny. An open system would have helped to prevent some instances of
Departmental abuse of due process rights.
5. The Department's Grievance Staff has sought to deny access by grievants
to relevant documentation. This practice should be explicitly prohibited and
penalized in the law, as well as restrictions on the appearance of witnesses.
6. One of the many serious defects of the legislation is the failure to order the
reinstatement of officers wrongly selected-out, rather than merely to recommend
their reinstatement to the agency Head. The agency head, despite a clear
recommendation by the Board, can refuse to reinstate an officer, no matter how
meritorious his claim, on the pretext that the officer no longer meets the "needs
of the Service." Worse yet, any such adverse decision on the part of the agency
head is specifically excluded from judicial review. Keep in mind that it is not, in
fact. the "agency head" who actually wields this great power, but, as Senator
Fulbright once called the personnel system, "a self-perpetuating board of
directors."
The failure to order, the reinstatement of officers wrongly selected-out is a
most regrettable and ironic provision. The original impetus toward legislation
providing for a Foreign Service grievance procedure was furnished by the tragic
death of Charles W. Thomas eight years ago. Subsequent private legislation which
provided for the relief of Charles W. Thomas, Deceased, gave evidence to the
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382
grievous wrong. done to him by the. Department of State 2. Furthermore, the
President of the United States, Gerald Ford, in a subsequent letter, expressed
the hope that legal measures would be enacted to prevent recurrences of the
situation which led to this tragedy. Yet, the grievance legislation finally resulting
from Mr.. Thomas' death did not provide for the rectification of the wrong. In
other words, if he were still alive, he would still be unable to bring a grievance
under the present system. Moreover, if he could bring a grievance, the Secretary
of State -(in, actual fact, the Deputy. Assistant Secretary for Personnel) could
refuse to reinstate him for any reason whatsoever on the pretext that be and his
skills-were no longer needed by the Foreign. Service, . and he would specifically be
prevented from appealing such an arbitrary decision in the courts.
I have been working in the Department of State eight years. I could relate to
you a number:of telling cases. But, I will talk about FSO Temple Cole, who died
last summer. I believe, Senator Pell, you commended this officer for his very fine
work on refugee affairs some years ago. The answer to a question at a noon
biiefing on July 9, 1979, regarding this officer was the following :
"Q. What is the status of the Temple Cole Case?
"A. In May of this year; several persons requested' that the Bureau of Per-
sonnel look into the possibility 'of granting Mr; Cole a retroactive promotion on
compassionate grounds. After a careful review-of the situation, the Department
concluded that it does not have the legal authority to grant retroactive pro-
motions in the absence of a recommendation by an EEO Appeals Examiner or
by a Grievance Board or Panel (22U.S.C. 8993B). Mr. Cole, himself, had not
personally requested such a promotion ; nor did he have any formal EEO com-
plaint or grievance against the Department pending at the time of his death."
I would like to point out to this Committee that the several persons referred
to by the Department were: (1) myself; (2) a friend of Mr. Cole's, who was the
attorney that argued the Lindsay v. Kissinger case before Judge Gesell, resulting
in the decision which is a part of the Foreign Service Act now-the right to a
hearing for anyone selected-out for low ranking'; and, (3) the third person was,
ironically, an Assistant Secretary for Human Rights. But we did not approach
the Department on "compassionate" grounds. We believed that due process
should be extended to Mr: Cole while he was :still alive.
.I hope this Committee 'will investigate thoroughly the legal authority which
the. Department says it lacked in the matter of Mr.- Cole. Perhaps Mr. Cole's case
will provide. the lever to breakthrough the inhuman system 'that the ; State
Department.has written for itself.
I am also concerned about the case of former FSO David! Hughes, a Chinese
linguist who "was condemned for his miserablejudgment" in questioning a regu-
lation that is now moot. He wants.to reenter the Foreign Service.
I would appreciate your looking into that matter.
In conclusion, I would like to refer this Committee to the excellent testimony
provided by the Government Accountability Project of the Institute for Policy
Studies, which has been submitted for inclusion ,in- the record. This testimony pro-
vides keen analysis and a reasoned appeal in support of the fullest measure of
due process which they identify as the Bayh Bill of the United States Senate.
I will be happy to provide this Committee with further documentation and any
assistance I am able to afford to provide a system of justice for the Department
of State.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Would it not be a correct statement that the mili-
tary service retirement-out provision gives even less protection than
the Foreign Service provision, and yet that occurs in maybe 100 times
the number each year?
Mrs. THOMAS. But when we have evidence that FSO's are being
hurt, and this committee is itself on record for having supported the
Bayh bill, why compare the Foreign Service to the military? Why
not do something about the Foreign Service?
2 Report No. 93-741, March 22, 1974, For the Relief of Charles William Thomas, Deceased
(Appendix C). to Accompany S. 2446.
9 The case was Lindsay, Cole, Starbuck, and Foo V. Siasinger, 367 F. Supp. 949 (DDC'
1973).
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The CHAIRMAN. I was with a lieutenant commander the other day
who was not being promoted to commander, he had been too long in
grade, and who is going to have to make a second career. I would like
to see everybody make commander and make captain and make
admiral. And it is very hard to determine who will and who won't.
In any case, we will follow up your specific points here and try to
inform you if we find some information, which I hope we will, in that
regard.
Which would you prefer, the grievance procedures under title VII
of the Civil Service Reform Act, which applies to the rest of the
Government, or those of chapter XI of the proposed bill?
Mrs. THOMAS. Under title VII.
The CHAIRMAN. You prefer those? All right. Do you think the
Foreign Service Grievance Board can gain knowledge and under-
standing of the system without having retired FSO's on it?
Mrs. THOMAS. I think it is terrible to have retired FSO's serve
because this then becomes a second career. They are tied into the
system. It should be as it was originally stated in the Senate Foreign
Relations Bill, an independent body.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I thank you very much indeed for being
here, Mrs. Thomas.
Mrs. THOMAS. I thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. This concludes this hearing of the subcommittee
which will meet again on Wednesday at 10 o'clock, in this same room.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m. the hearing adjourned, to reconvene at
10 a.m., Wednesday, December 19,1979.]
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FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1979
UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, OCEANS,
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washinngton, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room
4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell [chairman
of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present : Senators Pell and Hayakawa.
The CHAIRMAN. Today, the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans,
International Operations, and Environment will continue its hearings
on S. 1450, Foreign Service Act of 1979.
Our witness this morning is the Honorable Ben Read, Under Secre-
tary for Management of the Department of State. The purpose of the
hearing is to provide the State Department with an opportunity to
comment on the criticisms and proposals that were presented during
last Friday's hearing with public witnesses and union representatives.
I understand, Mr. Secretary, you have a short statement you wish
to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEN H. READ, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. READ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first introduce Harry Barnes, who is the Director General of
the Foreign Service and Director of Personnel, and Jim Michel,
Deputy Legal Advisor and principal draftsman of the bill before you.
Last July when Secretary Vance described to this committee the
main features of the bill, he observed that since the days of Benjamin
Franklin and the Committees of Correspondence our diplomats have
risked their lives in the service of our country. He stated that at no
time in the post war period has service been more difficult or dangerous
than it is at present. Recent events have illustrated the point all too
clearly.
Foreign Service has often become hazardous, frontline duty as evi-
denced by events in Teheran, Islamabad, Kabul, Tripoli, Managua
and San Salvador. At many other posts, our people have to work and
live under conditions of physical danger, stress and lack of amenities
(385)
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which are highly disruptive in human and social terms. More and
more employees have been split from their families for long periods
because of the deteriorating conditions of overseas assignments, and
now, of course, because of widespread dependent evacuations as well.
Despite these most trying circumstances, the Foreign Service has
performed with singular dedication and high competence.
During such times the members of the Foreign Service deserve the
best personnel system, conditions of service and support that we can
provide. Without such measures it will be increasingly difficult in the
Secretary's view and mine to conduct foreign affairs and to staff our
overseas posts effectively in the early 1980's. That is why we think
that the new Foreign Service Act is so important, even more important
now than when it was introduced last summer.
I am proud to be able to testify this morning on behalf of the pend-
ing administration bill, which is, as you well know, the product of ex-
tensive deliberations and discussions within the Service and within the
executive branch. We believe that it is fully responsive to the request
for a comprehensive plan to improve, simplify, and strengthen the
Foreign Service which was called for in the amendment proposed by
yourself 3 years ago, and it is the product of the work of two adminis-
trations, as you also are well aware.
With your consent, I will 'concentrate on three aspects of the bill
which represent the most significant departures from existing law and
practice : (1) simplification and rationalization of the Department's
dual Foreign Service-Civil Service personnel systems; (2) the Foreign
Service career performance requirements for tenure, compensation,
promotion, and, retention ; and (3) employee-management relations
and related matters.
;Turning first to the Foreign Service-Civil Service relationship in
the Department of State, the bill would resolve a long-standing dis-
pute by its acceptance of and clear distinction between the Depart-
ment's dual Foreign Service-Civil Service systems.
Advocates of the dual systems as well as advocates of inclusion of
both worldwide and domestic categories in a single Foreign Service
system have seen their competing views reflected in the various con-
gressional, executive branch, public and private studies spanning three
decades. The dual systems, which was an underlying premise of the
Foreign Service Act of 1946, was supported in three major reports by
the Wriston 'Committee in 1954, by AFSA in 1968, and by the Murphy
Commission -in 1975. The unitary worldwide system was backed by
the Hoover Commission in 1949, the administration-supported but un-
successful .Hays bill in 1965-66, and the "Diplomacy for the Seven-
ties" report in 1970.
Starting in 1971., the Department and USIA [United States In-
formation Agency] initiated an administrative personnel policy based
on a single service concept. Special inducements, including partial or
complete exemption from overseas service, were offered to Civil Serv-
ice employees in both agencies who converted to Foreign Service status.
By 1975 the Department was criticized in a report by the Civil Service
Commission for its neglect and lack of career opportunities for its
Civil Service employees.
The problems with making the single service system work were
recognized explicitly at the end of the Ford administration in the
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Department's- interim report on January 10, 1977, to Congress in
response to. its request for a "comprehensive plan" to improve and
simplify its personnel systems. That report, which was filed, as you
will recall, by my predecessor, Larry Eagleburger, found that :
A central reality which no earlier study or plan has changed-although some
may not have faced it fully-is the existence of a domestic category of people in
the Department and USIA who supply essential skills and continuity of service
which cannot be met effectively by a world wide service."
Our examination of past efforts to create a single service has made clear that
the Foreign Service Act cannot serve as an instrument to manage a domestic
service. Efforts to implement this program have not been successful. Uniformity
has not brought equity or management efficiency.
We agree fully with those conclusions. The lack of success of the ad-
ministrative policy to achieve a single system is illustrated by the fact
that there were approximately 3,100 Civil Service personnel in State
when the policy went into effect in 1971; there are approximately 3,100
today. It has been an ever'receding goal.
. Many persons providing policy and support assistance essential to
the Department's ability to conduct foreign affairs are needed and
willing to serve in Washington only. But 600 persons with such purely
domestic 'orientation in State have been given Foreign Service status,
900 in USICA, with the resulting cited management inefficiencies.
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, as the committee well knows,
provides numerous improvements in the conditions of Civil Service
rank-in-position employment in all departments and agencies, in-
clud'ing State and USICA, with new opportunities, risks and benefits
linked to: performance, particularly in the new Senior Executive Serv-
ice. But' as you will also recall, the Foreign Service was exempted,
thanks in large part to your own efforts, from many of the provisions
of the 1978 'act in recognition of the basically different conditions of
service, in particular the need for frequent rotation from position to
position and the consequent reliance on a rank-in-person system.
The pending bill would recognize the dual Foreign 'Service-Civil
Service systems and the need to restore a rational and equitable divi-
sion between these, while promoting compatibility and interchange
between the systems under common principles whenever appropriate.
The transition objective of the bill is to convert Foreign Service
domestic employees to the Civil Service system, if they are not obli-
gated to accept and needed for worldwide, rotational assignments, and
to do so as quickly as possible but, at the same time, to guarantee the
protection of individual rights and the' preservation of existing pay
and benefits.
This conversion plan would permit Foreign Service domestic em-
ployees with skills designated by the Secretary as needed abroad, and
who are willing and otherwise qualified to accept true worldwide obli-
gations to elect to remain in the Foreign Service system.
Other Foreign Service domestic employees in the Department of
State would have a 3-year period in which to accept conversion to the
Civil Service system or to leave the Department.
Conversions to the Civil Service would take place under the follow-
ing conditions : No loss in salary, and with unlimited protection against
downgrading as long as the employee did not voluntarily move to an-
other position ; the right to remain in the Foreign Service retirement
and disability system (for those already members) or, alternatively,
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to elect to move to the Civil Service retirement system; and the kind
of appointment offered on conversion would parallel that currently
held-career Foreign Service would receive career GS appointments,
career candidates would receive probationary or career conditional GS
appointments, and those on time-limited appointments would be of-
fered GS time-limited appointments.
Second, I would like to emphasize and.illustrate the reasons for the
features of the bill to which Secretary Vance and I attribute highest
importance : Linking the grant of tenure, advancement, compensation
and incentive pay, as well as retention in the Foreign Service more
closely to high levels of performance.
The interaction of basic elements of a well working career personnel
system and the absolute necessity for closer linkage of such elements
to performance than at present has been painfully illustrated during
the last 4 years. I refer to the impacted situation at senior levels which
has caused pervasive problems at all levels and revealed serious struc-
tural flaws. This situation has been partially alleviated recently, but
could recur at any time under slightly different circumstances and is
worth careful examination.
For years, many persons in the most senior levels in the Service have
been exempted from annual performance evaluation and selection out
for substandard performance. This placed heavy reliance on voluntary
and mandatory retirement as the primary means of senior attrition
which, in turn, largely determined the limits on promotions in all
junior and middle ranks.
In February of 1977, a long delayed executive pay raise granted
by Congress went into effect and resulted in more than a 50 percent
drop in voluntary retirements, because many members of the Service
who were considering such retirement decided to serve for 3 years at
the new salary rate to obtain fullest pension benefits.
In June of 1977, a lower court decision prohibited use of the 60-year
retirement limit set in the 1946 act on constitutional grounds, and
until the ruling was reversed by the Supreme Court in April of this
year, mandatory retirements stopped altogether.
Thus, largely by the coincidence of two events completely beyond
administrative remedy, senior departures from the Service slowed to
a mere 5 percent from more than double that rate in more normal
times.
This situation was aggravated by two additional factors : an ad-
ministrative move in 1976 to extend to 22 years the combined permis-
sible time in classes 1 and 2; and the actual or virtual cessation in sev-
eral recent years of selection out for substandard performance.
The combination of all these factors required us to set the lowest
promotion rates since World War II in 1977 and to reduce intake
accordingly. Obviously, this had a crippling effect on morale, and
some excellent and most promising younger persons were lost to the
Service as a result. That the Foreign Service has performed as well
as it has under these circumstances is a tribute to its highly dedicated
personnel.
To prevent recurrence of such situations, we are suggesting a multi-
faceted approach in the bill to achieving higher performance require-
ments for all aspects of Service life. The bill would establish a new
Senior Foreign Service [SFS] for the highest three ranks, paralleling
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with adaptations the new Senior Executive Service. Present Career
Ministers and eligible FSO/FSRU/FSR-1's and 2's who are obligated
to and needed for worldwide service could elect to join the Senior
Foreign Service within 120 days of the date of enactment of the bill.
Membership in the SFS during and after transition would involve
greater benefits and risks based on performance. Performance pay
would be available for outstanding service within the same limits as
provided for the Senior Executive Service in the 1978 law, but with
greater stress on analysis, policy advice, and other factors which deter-
mine success in the Senior Foreign Service.
Variable short time-in-class rules and selection out for relative sub-
standard performance on the recommendations of annual selection
boards are procedures which are retained and tightened and made
applicable for the first time to all members of the highest three ranks
of the Service. Current voluntary and mandatory retirement provi-
sions of the law, which are vital for the proper operation of the
Service, are retained.
Under a new proposed procedure, members of the Senior Foreign
Service and other members of the Service whose maximum time in
class expires after'they reach the highest class for their respective per-
sonnel categories, may continue to serve under renewable limited
extensions of their career appointments, not to exceed 5 years. Such
extensions would be granted only on the basis of selection board rec-
ommendations and the needs of the Service.
A rigorous SFS threshold procedure is proposed under which mem-
bers of the Foreign Service at the new threshold class (FS-1) must
request consideration for promotion into the SFS and then would
remain eligible for a period of time, say 5 years, specified by the
Secretary.. .
If not promoted on the recommendation of the selection boards
during that time, the member would be "passed over"-a concept bor-
rowed from the military-and would no longer be eligible for pro-
motion into the SFS. This, it is expected, would enable such persons
to make more timely second-career decisions than is now permitted.
Middle and junior ranks of the Foreign Service are also more closely
tied to performance. After transition to the new system, selection out
for substandard performance will be applicable for the first time to
all Foreign Service personnel.
The bill would require all persons seeking career Foreign Service
status at any level to pass a strict tenuring process, a status which is
presently conferred almost automatically in many cases.
Within-class salary increases could be increased or withheld for
outstanding or poor performance on the basis of selection board
recommendations.
All of these performance-related features and others would enable
the Foreign Service to overcome and avoid the crippling structural
~,defects, such as the ones I have cited, which now encumber the system
and deter advancement and retention of the ablest. I am confident that
it would produce a stronger, more professional and efficient Service,
better equipped to meet its heavy future requirements.
Third, and finally, the bill includes a new chapter 10, governing
employee-management relations, replacing Executive Order No. 11636,
which has covered such matters since 1971.
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The Department favors placing employee-management on a sound
statutory basis for several reasons:
The existing Executive order states that the foreign affairs agencies
should take into account developments elsewhere in the Federal
Government ;
It would obviously be unfair to deny a Foreign Service employee a
legislated labor-management program when such a legislated pro-
gram has been granted to over 2 million other Federal employees in
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978;
The chapter is an essential element of the bill in that it adapts to
the special needs of the Foreign Service the labor-management pro-
gram
provided for other Federal employees; and
It guarantees employees the right to participate in matters which
have a direct bearing on their careers.
The chapter differs from the present Executive order in the follow-
ing key respects :
It creates an independent Foreign Service Labor Relations Board
consisting of the Chairperson of the Federal Labor Relations Au-
thority and two public members;
It retains the single, agencywide bargaining unit with certain ex-
ceptions for personnel, security, inspection, and audit officials;
It provides for judicial review of decisions by the Foreign Service
Labor Relations Board;
It provides for-the resolution of disputes arising in the implementa-
tion of the collective bargaining relationship; and
In a related provision in chapter 11 on grievances, the exclusive
employee bargaining organization must' represent, or agree to other
representation in the processing of, employee grievances.
There are, of course, many other important features of the bill, such
as the provision for :
Reducing to two below the Senior Foreign Service the more than a
dozen existing personnel categories and subcategories and placing them
under a single pay scale; opportunities for Foreign Service spouses
and family members; equal opportunity; greater compatibility among
the personnel systems of the agencies authorized to use Foreign Service
personnel.
I think you may find it preferable to approach these and other issues
through the summaries and section-by-section analysis we have sub-
mitted or through questions.
We will be glad to try to respond now or later to any such question
or requests for additional information.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
[The following information was subsequently supplied:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF.DR. RICHARD L. BLOCK, ESQ., CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN
SERVICE GRIEVANCE BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
It is a privilege to have been 'invited to appear before these two Committees
and testify about grievance procedures, the Foreign Service Grievance Board
and that part of the legislation you are now considering relative to the Grievance
Board. I hope my information will be useful. I shall be pleased to attempt to
answer questions you might have.
It is unusual for an arbitrator such as myself to be involved in the construc-
tion or modification of a grievance system. In private industry, where I am active
on a full-time basis as an arbitrator, the neutral is called into the act after the
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parties-management and union-have sat down together and decided upon the
role of the arbitrator and the limits of his or her power and authority. To be
invited to contribute in any context to the rules of the game is a unique
experience.
The grievance system for the Foreign Service is itself unique, as indicated by
its genesis. While management (the State Department) and labor (the American
Foreign Service Association) were in consultation and, to a certain extent, in
agreement, Congress became involved as a third party and ultimately put its
legislative stamp on this grievance system. Similar machinery in industry and
the private sector is based exclusively on agreement between the parties, often
enshrined in the work contract, without the benefit (or handicap) of legislative
endorsement.
You may be aware of some of the background of our present system and earlier
Congressional interest in the establishment of a grievance system for Foreign
Service employees of the three Foreign Service Agencies. I did not come on the
scene until 1976, after the legislation was enacted, when I was invited to become
a member of the Board. Sandy Porter was Chairman at that time and played a
substantial role in dealing with the groundwork on our present regulations.
The Board presently consists of fifteen members, eight of whom; myself in-
cluded, are professional labor arbitrators, and seven of whom are retired em-
ployees of the Foreign Affairs Agencies. The range of experience and arbitration
expertise on the Board is extremely broad. All arbitrators are members of the
National Academy of Arbitrators and the Board includes, of the eight arbitra-
tors, the current Secretary-Treasurer, three Past-Presidents and a President-
Elect of the Academy.
The staff of the Grievance Board currently consists of eight employees sup-
plied by the respective Agencies. Our staff serves an impressive range of func-
tions. In addition to guiding each case from original'filing through final hearing,
and marshalling all necessary paperwork and records, they become intimately
involved with "sanitizing" all Opinions to conform with Privacy Act demands,
so that the Opinions may be distributed to all parties. This function is performed
in the interest of building a body of common law case precedent for the parties.
They also prepare Summaries of each Decision, to be released on an expedited
basis to the various agency house organs. Administrative support for the Board-
quarters, compensation for Board members, supplies, travel costs, etc.-is sup-
plied by the Department of State. Unlike the private sector counterparts, then,
the grievance machinery is cost free to the grievants.
At any time there are approximately thirty to forty cases at the Board at
various stages. In Calendar Year 1978, thirty-eight decisions were issued, twenty-
three involved hearings and fifteen were decided solely on written stipulations of
the parties. In several other cases, the parties were receptive to our overtures as
mediators, wherein we sought to arrive at a mutually-acceptable solution, rather
than issuing, judge-like, our decisions as arbitrators.
. Turning to the Grievance Chapter of the proposed legislation, some overall
comments are in order. I serve as the Umpire and arbitrator for a number of
federal agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service, Labor Department,
Treasury Department, Community Services Administration, Justice Department,
and others. I am also familiar, in general. with arbitration systems in and out of
the federal sector. My judgment, supported by my arbitrator colleagues on the
Board, is that this is the single best federal sector system we have seen. For the
most part, the Act is well-structured and adequately responsive to the needs of
the parties. And, I have been most impressed both with the quality of the presen-
tations by the parties, as well as the responses by the Board.
Now to the draft legisation before you. In the main, the draft represents
reorganization of present legislation. Some new functions are assigned the
Board-the hearing of cases relative to selection out for cause, resolution of
certain disputes between management and the employee organizations, for exam-
ple. I contemplate no significant problems in accommodating these new matters,
although the demands on the time of the arbitrators and, perhaps, more signifi-
cantly, on the staff, must always be monitored.
By virtue of its size and other inherent institutional impediments, it would
be unrealistic to expect a governmental system in general, and this bargaining
relationship in particular, composed as it is of five individual participants, to
function with the ease and efficiency of a private sector relationship. But there
are modifications which would go a long way toward strengthening the potential
of this internal dispute resolution system.
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? Let me -bring an interpretative problem to your attention. In a decision issued
some two years ago, we concluded that the Agency erred in its interpretation
of a regulation which, had resulted in depriving the grievant of a shipping al-
lowance. We ordered the Agency to reimburse the officer. However,. the Comp-
troller of the Agency refused, contending the payment would have been illegal
and would, therefore, have resulted in personal liability to that Comptroller.
The Agency desired to seek an opinion from the General Accounting Office. That
created a substantial dilemma. The Foreign Service Act reads as if the proper
recourse in appealing a Board decision is to a Federal District Court. And, this
Board was not created to serve as a trial forum for the GAO. At the same time,
one can understand the Agency's reticence to move, faced as it was with con-
flicting mandates. Clarification here is in order.
As you know, the Act provides that, in certain respects, our decisions are
binding. In other areas: we issue only recommendations. While I personally
believe that parties settle their own disputes more readily when the final step is
binding, I; am not particularly troubled by the existence of recommendations,
inasmuch as the scope of that area subject to recommendations only is reasonably
narrow, dealing, for the most part, with retroactive promotions. Moreover, the
legislation does require that when a recommendation is rejected, the Agency's
reason for so, rejecting will be stated in writing. There are three grounds. One
can surely justify rejection of a recommendation based on national security
reasons or if it is contrary to law. But the third category refers to substantially
impairing the.."Efficiency,, of the Service." If it is the Congressional intent to
confine management's discretion in these areas to cases of real and substantial
conflicts presented by a Board decision-and the overall structure of the Act
suggests this-then this third category is, at the least, insufficiently precise. Our
experience has been that the Agency wishing to support the grievance system
will accept our recommendations if at all possible. But the Agency wishing to
undercut the system and to suppress grievances by employees will reject recom-
mendations whenever possible, citing "Efficiency of the Service," sometimes rep-
resented as "Morale of Other Employees," or similar generalities which trans-
late into, "we're doing it because we want to." The system should be designed
to inform Agency heads that a rejection in this context may not be founded on
the mere premise that it would somehow disturb the business-as-usual routine.
I recommend deletion of this portion of the Act in its entirety.
A significant problem also exists with respect to Sections 692(1) (C) and (D)
of the present Act, giving "Former Officers" the right to grieve (1) denials of
allowances or financial benefits or (2) circumstances allegedly illegal or improper
in connection with certain employees' involuntary retirement. The provision is
troublesome. Who is a "Former Officer"? Is it someone who is off the rolls under
any circumstances? Part D-the involuntary ,retirement provision-refers only
to employees separated six years before the passage of the Act. Does this mean
a current employee who is terminated may not file a grievance because he or she
is off the rolls? Reasonably, one would reject this interpretation. The Agency
should not be able to defend on the basis of an employee's standing when the
challenge is to the very action creating that standing. But what is reasonable
in our view may not necessarily square with legislative intent.
An earlier draft of these changes appeared to have resolved the "Former
Officer" problem, much to my delight. I see, however, that the change has not
survived in the present draft. much to my disappointment. I would commend
it to your attention and urge a modification. It is a change which I cannot help
but believe would be welcomed by all parties concerned.
The other portion of this provision is also troublesome. what is a "financial
benefit"? Did Congress really intend a former officer to be able to grieve denial
of any money claim? Or was this intended to apply only to those continuing
federal benefits, such as pensions, for example, which would clearly have a con-
tinuing impact on a former officer's life? If this was the intent, and I suspect it
was, the Act should be amended to say so.
In plenary session, the Grievance Board has discussed these questions at sub-
stantial length. We have reached our own conclusions as to what position should
be taken, absent further expression of Congressional intent. But we are not, and
should not be, in the legislative business and would earnestly seek your assistance.
A final request. We are occasionally confounded by a dearth of legislative his-
tory relating to this Act. It would be most helpful if, in its Reports, these Com-
mittees would endeavor to distinguish between changes which are merely clari-
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fying in nature, and those which are intended to effect substantive changes in
the statute.
I thank you for the opportunity to have addressed you, and welcome any
questions you may have about our operations.
The CHAIRMAN. This, I realize, is a pretty vital matter to the future
of the Foreign Service and morale in the Foreign Service, and the
welfare of our Nation. I think its importance is in inverse proportion
to the attendance of the press, as I look at an absolutely empty press
table, and the attendance at this hearing.
I don't know whether it is necessary to state this, but this is almost
of the same importance as the Rogers Act of 1924, and the Foreign
Service Act of 1946. This will be the third step along that line, pre-
sumably, increasing the professionalism of the Foreign Service, which
already is a very professional organization.
I notice that you say that selection out is going to apply to everybody
in the Foreign Service. Does that apply to those at the lowest levels,
the junior levels?
Mr. READ. From the very highest to the very lowest, after a transi-
tion period, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. This is much more severe than the military, because
the selection out process does not start with the military until, for
example, in the Navy, you make lieutenant commander or lieutenant.
Mr. READ. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the reason for the increased severity of the
program?
Mr..READ. Selection out with the appropriate safeguards that the
bill contains was felt to be desirable by the members of the Foreign
Service themselves at all levels. Where there is not an up or out system,
there has been impediment to the promotion and advancement of the
ablest, and that has been recognized, I am proud to say, from the top
to the bottom. We have paid great attention to these safeguards. There
are some transition features which I alluded to earlier.
The CHAIRMAN. There were several points that were brought in the
hearing earlier last week that concern me. One of them was this ques-
tion about the ability of the executive branch, the President and the
Secretaries, to turn over the Senior Foreign Service officers if they
found them incompatible.
I happen to have been a Foreign Service officer at the time of the
McCarthy period, and nobody would say that John Foster Dulles was
not a worthy citizen, or a decent man, but at that point, many people
were trembling because of the way in which a Foreign Service officer
could have his career lightheartedly ruined.
As I look at this bill now, it would make it even easier for another
period under a John Foster Dulles and a Senator McCarthy to move
along the same route. At least then there was some career protection
under the act of 1946, but as I read now, under the proposed Senior
Foreign Service, you could just not renew their contracts after 3 years,
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and it seems to me that you could get rid of everybody whose thinking
was out of step with your own, if you were the Secretary of State.
Mr. READ. Just to the contrary, there are safeguards in the bill, Mr.
Chairman, that do not exist today to prevent just such a politization
or heavy-handed action by any administration. For the first time, there
are explicit limits on the numbers of noncareer senior officers who can
be appointed; to wit, 5 percent. This is provided in a provision of the
bill that is pending before you. No such provision in the law exists
today.
The CHAIRMAN. I see that, but what you could then do is get rid of
your senior people and use your junior people. You don't have to re-
place them with people from the outside, necessarily. At the time of
McCarthy, there were not many people brought in from the outside;
Scott McLeod and a few others, and that was it.
So that is not a safeguard. That is a procedure. I still don't see what
there is to prevent, within the 3 -year period, which I think is the period
of time of these contracts, having a pretty complete turnover.
Mr. READ. The safeguards are multiple, and not just the 5 percent
age limit that I alluded to, which, I might add, is in contrast to 10 per-
cent governmentwide, and 25 percent in any one agency limit in the
civil service. I
We have also the fact that selection boards of career officers would
administer the extension of career appointments, and while they would
be given the total numbers which may be extended and promoted in
a given year, they are also required to follow the 5-percent rule. So
they can determine whether there are people ready to promote in a
mass promotion upward or not, and it is their determination and
not the management function of any future administration that would
be determinative.
So the combination of those factors is a very powerful inhibition.
The CHAIRMAN. Correct me if I am wrong, but am I right in saying
that these Senior Foreign Service officers will have 3-year appointments
or contracts? At the end of that contract, it will be up to the Depart-
ment to judge whether the contract will be renewed.
Mr. READ. We are thinking in terms of 3, 4, or 5 years. There is no
precise determination yet.
The only function of the management of the Department at any time
in the future will be to determine the numbers of those that should be
extended or promoted, and not the names. The actual process of
extending or promoting would remain firmly under the control of
the selection boards.
The CHAIRMAN. But the number would remain in management's
hands.
Mr. READ. That is correct, but within the statutory guidelines that.
you could not simply vacate the senior ranks and leave the noncareer
at 5 percent. You would always have to have that balance.
The CHAIRMAN. What statutory guideline?
Mr. READ. There is a provision in the bill pending which would limit
to 5 percent the total noncareer element in the Senior Foreign Service.
The CHAIRMAN. We just keep repeating ourselves. My point is that
if you wanted to get rid of all the people whose contracts came up,
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when it came to filling those slots,. your would: just move; younger, and
hopefully more malleable people.
Mr. READ. My point is that the selection boards could say, in their
wisdom-they are made up of career members predominantly, as you
know-"We do not think that there are as many junior officers ready
to move up."
The CHAIRMAx. Then, they would move the junior officers.
At the time of McCarthy, they' did not bring in, as I said earlier,
many people from the outside. I think that they brought in less than
5 percent noncareer, but it still made everybody toe the line, and be
very leery about going down and taking a course in Soviet affairs, or
anything of that sort. I don't see any protection in this at all.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, if I may. I think there is a very great
distinction between the analogy of the McCarthy period and the struc-
ture created by this bill.
In the early 1950's, the individual stood alone against the system.
Whatever allegations were made, it was the responsibility of that in-
dividual to defend himself or herself as best he or she could against
the existing structure of the Department of State and the U.S.
Government.
This bill recognizes an evolution in labor-management relations, and
in the individual rights of public employees, which have been developed
by the Congress and by the courts. Indeed, a part of that evolution
occurred as a direct result of actions that were taken against Foreign
Service officers in the 1950's who did go to court.
In-.this bill, you have, first of all, a statutory labor-management
relations program. We have an agencywide bargaining unit. So the
individual stands represented. by an organization empowered to
negotiate with management on behalf of the individual.
Second, there is an independent grievance board, which was estab-
lished.by the Congress, and which is retained in this bill, which pro-
tects the individual's rights.
Third, there is a criterion for. action by the selection boards which
are the competent body to decide who gets his or her appointment
continued or who does not; that criterion is merit. A departure from
that criterion, and a recommendation based on political rather than
performance standards would be subject to the whole process of the
labor-management chapter and the grievance chapter that are set
out here.
So I don't think that the risk is at all enhanced, but to the contrary
there are very significant safeguards against the occurrence of that
sort of thing by virtue of this bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't you agree that the criterion for selection
out has been broadened in this bill as opposed to the present procedure?
Mr. l\IICHEL. The criterion for selection out?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. MICHEL. No. Indeed, the emphasis is on merit principles
throughout this bill. These merit principles have been elaborated
in the Civil Service Reform Act in much more detail than exist-
ing law.
Mr. READ. Selection out has been extended to persons who do not have
that procedure invoked at present, who have been isolated and im-
mune from it. But it is. the same procedure, with the same safeguards.
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CONFLICT WITS MERIT PRINCIPLES IN BILL
The CHAIRMAN. Isn't one of the basic tenets of the Service now
that Foreign Service employees should be retained on the basis of the
adequacy of their performance. Section 602 (b), I believe it is, provides
that consideration should also be given to the need for attrition. That is
a broadening right there.
Doesn't that provision conflict with the merit principles that have
been incorporated in the bill?
Mr. MICHEL. No, because the need for attrition, for a flow of talent-
entry into the Foreign Service, advancement opportunities, and reason-
able numbers of people coming into the Foreign Service, and a reason-
able number of people leaving the Service-is a statistical thing. It
has nothing to do with the performance of one individual.
The individual's performance is going to be evaluated by these selec-
tion boards which have a great deal of independence, and are made
up primarily of career people. The whole operation of the system by
the management of the State Department is subject to the constraints
of the labor-management relations process, and to the opportunity for
review by the Grievance Board.
There is a difference between the'system's operation statistically and
its effect on an individual-the concern was that an individual might
be treated unfairly. What we are saying is that the bill contains con-
siderable safeguards to protect the rights of each individual employee.
The CHAIRMAN. Section 612 of the bill makes the records of current
and prospective assignments one of the criteria for promotion or re-
tention in the Senior Foreign Service. Why do you believe that pros-
pective assignments should be a criterion for either promotion or re-
tention ? It seems to me that this is getting away from merit.
Mr. READ. We have put that as a proposed provision, Mr. Chairman,
because the selections boards today have, of course, the written record
only of the supervisor of that employee right up through his career.
The CHAIRMAN. It is getting now where you have to judge between
the person whose supervisor says, "He is very good," or "He is very,
very, good." If you say, "He is poor," then the poor fellow who writes
the report is liable to have a grievance proceeding brought against
him.
Mr. READ. The nuances of writing those reports and reading them
are well known to you. The selection boards, I think do strikingly well
in sorting their way through them on the whole. There is no fail-safe
system. We are proud of the system, and the Service is proud of the
system.
We are suggesting the addition of this element of assignability as
a useful new element for the selection boards to consider because at
present selection boards and the records do not show whether a person
is very narrowly eligible, and a person for whom there is great diffi-
culty in finding appropriate placement.
Obviously, to work this out in an equitable and fair manner, and
make it a matter of a person's file, which would be subject to inspec-
tion and examination as anything that goes before selection boards,
should be and must be very carefully designed to include only matters
which are of record, to wit, which bids he had put in for in a given
year for the next assignment, and whether those bids were picked up
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or not picked up. We think that that is a relevant external judgment.
on the person's eligibility for advancement that would be useful to,
the selection boards. That is the reason for this new proposal.
Mr. BARNES. Mr. Chairman, if I could go back to a point that you
made earlier. Your concern, as I understood it, had to do with the
possibility that a future Secretary of State might be able to remove
the entire Senior Foreign Service.
The CHAIRMAN. Or could give a Senior Foreign Service officer a
nothing job, which would then force him out because of the prospec-
tive assignment point.
Mr. BARNES. I was talking more of the earlier concern you had ex-
pressed, and I wanted to make one point, if I could; namely, in the
discussions that we have had with the American Foreign Service
Association, the point has come out, and they, of course, can speak to
this themselves, the importance that they attach to there being a regu-
lar, predictable upward flow of talent through the ranks of Foreign
Service, including into the Senior Foreign Service ranks.
That sort of concern, in addition to the type of legislative history,
in effect, being set now by the comments you were raisin; and the
questions to which we are responding, it seems to me that we have set
a clear idea that that sort of abuse could not take place.
The CHAIRMAN. I know you believe that you are ri?ht, but I wonder
if there is anybody in this room who was in the Service at tha time of
McCarthy.
Mr. BARNES. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. I see Mr. Vance in the background there. But not
PARACHUTE PROVISION
I think one way to have avoided that would have been if you had
had a parachute provision. What decided you against a parachute
provision, which I believe the Civil Service has. I am not saying that
there should be an analogy with the Civil Service, I am always trying,
to get you to go toward the military services. But have you considerea
the idea of a parachute provision?
Mr. READ. We considered it very carefully, Mr. Chairman. and we
found that it really was inimical to the entire, basic, fundamental
premise of the Foreign Service personnel system, right back to the
Rogers Act.
As you know, in the 1946 act there is a provision that says as fol-
lows : "The Foreign Service should become an instrument of foreign
policy which insures the rapid advancement of men of ability to posi-
tions of responsibility and the determination of men who have reached
their ceiling of performance." This was obviously written before
certain recent social revolutions .
The up or out principle which has been badly impeded by the struc-
tural defects, which this bill is designed to get at. is the cornerstone
of our whole approach to personnel. We think it is completely inap-
propriate to have a person who has been promoted to the top ranks,
to have a cushion of going back to serve at a lower rank. Obviously,
there would be a disgruntlement factor, and it would be absolutely
contrary to the up or out principle.
50-236-80-26
too many were.
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The CHAIRMAN. I am just wondering if an administration talked
about positive loyalty being one of the more important qualities in
Government service-how the selection boards would define positive
loyalty? This would mean, presumably, loyalty to the President and
to the administration.
Mr. READ. I am not a good interpreter of those words, which I have
always had difficulty with, and they go back to the beginning of the
Dulles period. They have been used in quite different contexts over
the years.
The precepts which the selection boards follow do not attempt to
define such intangibles in any way, shape or form. They are very
closely hammered out in negotiations between AFSA and manage-
ment, as you know, do not attempt to get into such phraseology at all.
The CHAIRMAN. I think this concern, which was expressed by a
couple of our witnesses last week, is a very real concern, indeed. If the
spirit of McCarthyism witchhunting should come in again, there would
be, I am sure, many victims of it; so I want to make sure that there
are as many safeguards against this spirit as there can be.
Mr. READ. So do we, Mr. Chairman. I guess no bill, no piece of law
can safeguard against all forms of abuse that one could hypothesize
of a future political circumstance. But we do feel, and we think we
can document it, that this bill contains a large number of safeguards
that do. not exist today, and would be helpful to counteract such
situations.
The CHAIRMAN. There are an excellent couple of sentences that for-
mer Ambassador Herz stated, which I would like to read into the
record :
I believe that section 602, which makes retention in the Senior Foreign Service
a matter of the Secretary's appreciation of "needs of the Service to plan for
continuing admission of new members." Section 641, which allows the Secretary,
by regulations, "to increase or decrease such maximum time for a class as the
needs of the Service.may require" opens the way to mass dismissals of Senior
Foreign Service Officers by some new administration that would be convinced
that they all lost China, or lost Africa, or were "pinks" of fascists, or in some
other way incongenial.
I still don't see why you could not do that on a mass basis; replacing
them with young Foreign Service Officers who yet had not had an
opportunity to lose China, or lose Africa.
Mr. READ. Theoretically you could do that today. But you have more
safeguards under this bill than you have today against any such out-
rage. The labor-management provisions which Mr. Michel referred to,
the percent limit on noncareer persons in Senior Foreign ranks, the
access to the special counsel for merit system protection board are all
new proposed safeguards.
The CHAIRMAN. As I understand the proposed law, you say that in
special circumstances set forth by regulation, the Secretary may re-
move an individuals name from the rank order list submitted by a
selection board, or delay the promotion of an individual name from
such a list. Is that in the present law?
Mr. READ. It is in present law, and the reason for that, Mr. Chair-
man, is that from time to time, after a selection board sits, when
management cannot and is precluded from any conversations with the
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399
boards for perfectly good and understandable reasons, a security mat-
ter may come up, an investigation may start, a criminal indictment
may occur. This provision has been used very rarely, I am.happy to
say, but it has been designed for use in such circumstances only.
Mr. BARNES. Mr. Chairman, I know Ambassador Herz very well,
and I have read his statement. I don't believe, from what I know of
him and in reading the statement, that he is trying to say that there
should not be a movement upward in the Foreign Service, or that the
Secretary should pay no attention to the requirements of the Service
for different types of categories of talents.
The CHAIRMAN. No, but what he is saying is that there must be
some protection, in case a new administration should come in in this
next election, going in one extreme direction or another extreme direc-
tion, and chop off a lot of heads. We want to stop that. ,
Mr. READ. I think that the implication of his remarks, at least the
excerpt you read, is that that could be personalized. A future Secretary
of State could say: "We don't like. you people who have been doing
African affairs," or whoever it may be. This cannot be done. The selec-
tion board makes the determination, and the management can only
give numbers. The selection board does the ranking as to who is most
qualified from 1 to 100, or whatever the number maybe.
There is no way in which a malevolent management can accomplish
.such a gross violation of rights.
BONUSES PAID TO SFSO'S
The CHAIRMAN..The selection boards have a very important func-
tion and devote a great deal of time to recommending promotions. How
much more of their time is going to be taken up 'by this question of the
prepared bonuses that will be paid to Senior Foreign Service Officers?
Mr. READ. We think that it would be a complementary determina-
tion by them that would not unduly extend their deliberations or add
to the burdens upon them. It is hard to quantify that, of course.
The CHAIRMAN. Probably one of the two career men with you have
served on a selection board, how-much . more time do you think will
be taken in trying to figure out what the bonuses should be.
Mr. READ. Mr. Barnes ?
Mr. BARNES. I have, indeed, served on selection boards, Mr. Chair-
man. Let me add one point before responding specifically to your
question.
We are working now on various ways to make the work of selection
boards still more efficient in terms of the use of the members' time.
We are working on this, in part, through trying to develop a type of
evaluation which will be more effective in itself. We will be having
discussions before long with-the American Foreign'. Service Associa-
tion on this point.
My hope would be that as a result of those discussions, that by the
time we come to implementation of the new act, already the time spent
by the board members will be more productive.
In terms of the specific function of looking at bonuses, as you know,
what a board is required to do is to look at the records of all the people
whom they are reviewing. They rank those people in terms of their
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-excellence. They also identify those people who are at the bottom
spectrum of the class.
In terms of the performance pay, the bonuses, we contemplate it
now, those bonuses would be awarded to individuals who are in the
top portions of the class. The board-remember I am. referring here
only to the Senior Foreign Service, not to all the boards which
-cover
The CHAIRMAN. My question is a very simple one. What percentage
more of time would it take?
Mr. BARNES. 1 was making sure that we were starting from a com-
inon ground in terms of what the board, does, and I think that that is
pertinent in replying to your question.
The CHAIRMAN. I know what a promotion board does.
Mr. BARNES. The board would look at the people that it had ranked
in the upper categories of the Foreign Service and determine which of
those should receive the performance pay. My guess would be that it
would probably take not much more than about 10 percent additional
time.
We have done the basic work already in terms of reviewing the
whole class.
WITNESS OPPOSITION TO PAY BONUS
The CHAIRMAN. I hope you are right, but I am not sure that you
would be.
As you know, at the hearing last Friday we did not have a single
witness who supported the bonus pay system. We had one witness who
did not oppose it, and that was AFSA, Pbel'ieve. "We have chosen not
to oppose it, which is somewhat different from supporting it," that
person said, and we had a few other witnesses=I would say about
half dozen,-who responded along similar lines. How do you account
for this diversity of view from your own?
Mr. READ. I would like to say that several of those witnesses, Mr.
Chairman, were retired persons who would not benefit from it., not
that they do not have their own strong and perfectly correct views on
whether it is appropriate or not appropriate.
The CHAIRMAN. Two were rntire4., I think.
Mr. READ. None of the witnesses are, perhaps, as well placed to speak.
as the proposed future Senior Foreign Service officers, who will be the
primary beneficiaries.
I would like, if I may, to introduce into the record a letter which I
have received from Ambassador David Newsom, who is the Chairman
of the Board of Foreign Service. '
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be incorporated into the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
BEN H. READ, Washington, D.C., December 18, 1979.
Under Secretary for Management,
Department of State.
DEAR BEN : This is to reconfirm the support of the Board of the Foreign Service
for the performance pay provisions of the proposed Foreign Service Act of 1979.
The Board devoted considerable time and attention to studying the provisions
of the proposed Act, including the concept of performance pay. Following briefings
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and its own deliberations on this subject, the Board on August 2 formally en-
dorsed the performance pay provisions in a resolution the text of which is
.attached to this letter.
As I stated in my letter to Secretary Vance on August 4 conveying the Board's
decision and resolution, "Central to the Board's conclusion on this subject was
the consideration that, under present circumstances and given the prior passage
by the Congress of Civil Service legislation containing performance pay provi-
sions, the only practicable way now available to ensure that senior level Foreign
Service officers have the opportunity to attain salarly levels comparable to those
,of the top levels of the Civil Service is through the adoption of similar perform-
ance pay provisions. The Board noted that this position supports the general
principle that Foreign Service pay opportunities should maintain comparability
with those of - other. government and private sector professionals."
I hope that this restatement of the views of the Board of the Foreign Service
will be helpful in your continuing discussions of these provisions of the proposed
Act both with the Congress and other interested groups.
Sincerely,
DAVID D. NEwsoM.
Chairman, Board of the Foreign Service.
Mr. READ. I would like to read a brief resolution, which was passed
by that Board on August 2, 1979, which is as follows :
BOARD OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE RESOLUTION
The Board of the Foreign Service-
Having considered the question of performance pay within the.context of the
Foreign Service legislation currently being considered by the Congress ;
Believing that it is desirable to maintain comparable opportunity for compen-
sation between the senior levels of the Foreign Service and the Senior Executive
.Service
Endorses the concept of performance pay in the Administration's proposed.
Foreign Service Act of 1979.
The CHAIRMAN. This was not in AFSA's statement, was it?
Mr. READ. No. This is a Board of Foreign Service resolution.
'The CHAIRMAN. The Board of Foreign Service-Mr. Barnes is the
head of it, is he not!
Mr. READ. No.
Mr. BARNES. No; I am not. Ambassador Newsom is the head of it.
Mr. READ. Management is not on that Board. There are four Senior
Foreign Service officers. The others are
Mr. BARNES. Representatives of other Departments, the Department
,of Commerce, the Department of Labor.
The CHAIRMAN. It is a management group, basically?
Mr. READ. No.
The C1 AIRMAN. It is certainly not an employee group.
Mr. READ. It represents the senior ranks of the career Foreign
'Service.
The CHAIRMAN. It is like saying that the Cabinet is an employee
.,group.
Mr..'READ. .Just to the contrary, -these.. are career people who have
come up through the system. They include Ambassador Newsom, Am-
bassador Pickerin-
Mr. BARNES. George Vest is an Assistant Secretary.
Air. READ. George Vest is in as good a position to speak for Senior
Foreign Service officers as anyone else.
The CHAIRMAN. There must be some people behind this unwise idea,
or it would not have crept into the legislation itself, I can see that.
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Mr. READ. You have also received, because we were given a courtesy
copy, a letter from the president of AFSA, which is dated yesterday;
which makes very clear, of course, that if there is no alternative to
receiving comparable compensations to the Senior Executive Service,
they would support the SFS performance pay.
The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, but going back to the Board of Foreign
Service for a moment, is that an elected group?
Mr. READ. It is an appointed group.
The CIZAIRMAN. There is a certain difference, I think, in viewpoint
between those that are elected and those who are appointed. You get
appointed from your bosses, and you get elected by the people below.
Mr. READ. But it is simply a fact, Mr. Chairman, as you know, that.
the American Foreign' Service 'Association does! not have among its-
membership. proportionately as many senior members of the Foreign.
Service as are represented at other levels of the Service.
If I could just add a word on that, and I know we have deeply di-
vided views in response to your representation, when we met a few
days ago, I did speak to the Secretary again to ask him to review this
issue. We continue to support strongly performance pay Mr. Chairman,
because we simply do not feel that in good conscience we could rec-
ommend leaving senior members of the Foreign Service, now and in.
the future, in a substantially disadvantaged posture with counterparts
of the civil service.
We feel that it would be in violation of the Pay Comparability Act
of 1971 to do so, which provides, "equal pay for substantially equal'
work."
The CHAIRMAN. But that could be achieved through another wav,.I
would think. You could have the bonuses paid to everybody, and it
would be perfectly legitimate. The real. reason for this, to oversimplify
it, I guess, is as a gimmick to try to get around the Federal pay ceiling,.
which the Civil Service has worked out by the bonus. It is a gimmick-
that works well, but there is a difference between the Civil Service, the-
Foreign Service, and the military service.
I would suggest that a way could be found of spending exactly the.
same amount of money, if that is the objective, on the Foreign Service-
officers by giving everybody a bonus for being in the Senior Service at.
that grade and for that time. That would be absolutely legal and
constitutional.
Mr. READ. We found that the great majority of Congress, in passing
comparable provisions in the Civil- Service Reform Act, simply
thought that it was unreasonable to ask taxpayers to pay for increased
salaries for these senior ranks without a relationship to higher per-
formance rather than just across the board bonuses.
We are copying exactly here, as you know, what Congress enacted
a year ago, and we do not see 'any alternatives.
The CHAIRMAN. But this was for the civil service. Do you think that
it should be done for the military service, too, that a major general
should get a bonus? So far the incentive has been very effective in the
possible promotion to lieutenant general.
Mr. READ. Scotty Campbell, in appearing before you last July, said
that he would not be opposed to that, as you know.
If I can now, I would like to go back to a point that Ken Bleakely-
made in his letter of yesterday, which I think is extremely well put_
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He said : "Financial incentives have never been a prime motivation of
the Foreign Service, but they are important to employees and their
families." With the cost spiral that we are facing abroad, it is impossi-
ble for us to put forward anything that would leave our people at a
disadvantage compared to their counterparts.
The CHAIRMAN. In reaching your conclusion, have you looked into
the reason why the Air Force had started this unwise concept, and has
abandoned it?
Mr. READ. Yes. It was quite nongermane. We have looked into it
since last week's hearing. I guess that it may have been Ambassador
Herz who raised that point or Ambassador Vance, I forget which.
As near as we can determine, what was being referred to there was a
provision of law, found in 37 U.S. Code 206, called responsibility pay.
This authority can be used by any of the Armed Services. It is cur-
rently being used by the Coast Guard, and the Navy has requested
administrative authorization to use it.
It is a limited parallel to what we are talking about, when you look
at the details. We do believe that it is not an idea which is alien to the
services, and the fact that the Navy is now requesting to use it is cer-
tainly some evidence to that end.
RAISE BASE PAY TO COMPENSATE FOR LOSS OF PERFORMANCE PAY
The CHAIRMAN. Could you see your way to supporting an amend-
ment designed to raise the base pay of all the Senior Foreign Service
levels to compensate. for the elimination of the performance pay
provisions?
Mr. READ. Under existing law, the President's pay agent, which is
OMB and OPM, make that determination for the executive branch.
So you would be getting, I am afraid, a purely personal viewpoint if I
ventured an opinion.
We don't, as a practical matter, see any possibility of obtaining a
general raise, either within the executive branch or within the
Congress.
The CHAIRMAN. We can try. In other words, if you would support it
as an amendment, we could put it in the Senate bill, and go to con-
ference with the House, and see how it goes.
Mr. READ. How would you articulate it?
The CHAIRMAN. I am not a lawyer. It is up to lawyers to articulate
it. The concept is perfectly simple, it is the same amount of money. I
agree with you that the Foreign Service is grossly underpaid con-
sidering the risks that its members run. As you may know, I am work-
ing on getting this thought into this Teheran resolution. I am aware
.of the fact that more ambassadors have been killed in the last 10 years
than general and flag officers in both the Korean and Vietnam wars.
The threat to life'and limb is tremendous.
I want a higher salary for all the Foreign Service, but I don't like
this picking and choosing.
Mr. READ. We feel that the prevailing view of both branches is
heavily against an across-the-board raise and in favor of performance-
related compensation.
The CHAIRMAN. My view, as shown by the attendance at this hear-
ing, is that nobody is vitally interested. in this matter. I am vitally
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-interested in it, and I am prepared to. discuss this matter for quite a
long time in the committee, if the bill is brought up with this pro-
vision in it, which is against my wishes. I do think that that factor,
particularly if your personal view is not to oppose, should be brought
into it, and we can go to conference with the House and see where we
:are.
Mr. READ. This is an honest difference of opinion, Mr. Chairman,
as you well know. We are very respectful of your views, and we know
how deeply felt those views are.
We think that performance pay is a very justifiable way of reward-
ing the senior officers who are the outstanding performers in the
Service.
The CHAIRMAN. If you had to make a political decision as to whether
you would rather lose performance pay and not have the bill, or have
it eliminated and have the bill, you would just as soon have the whole
bill postponed. Would that be correct?
Mr. READ. I don't think that it would be useful for me to speculate
on that because I hope very much that it will not come down to that
choice.
The CIIAIRMAN. Certainly, if there was a provision in the bill to the
-effect that all Senior Foreign Service officers would have the money
divided up amongst themselves, you would not want to see the bill
falter on that issue?
Mr. READ. We feel that there should be a distinction in these bonus
:arrangements in favor of those who have turned in outstanding per-
formances. We feel that that is a valid and justifiable concept.
The CHAIRMAN. You don't feel, then, that this is a gimmick or a
way of trying to insure that your Senior Foreign Service officers get
more salary, which is a perfectly understandable reason, and that that
-is the main reason for it?
Mr. READ. Far from it. We think that it is an equitable reward for
those who have done outstanding duty.
The CHAIRMAN. As you said, we will just; have to agree to disagree
on this very strongly, and move on to some of the other issues that
we have here.
There is a rollcall vote going on, so I think that this is an appro-
priate time to recess. I will be back in a few minutes.
(Recess.]
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.
I apologize for these rollcall votes, but they are unpredictable.
The Office of Management and Budget rejected the State Depart-
ment request for the $24 million required to bring about pay com-
parability between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service at the
lower and middle grades. This came out, as you know, of the Hay
recommendations which came out of my legislation.
Mr.. READ. They have not taken final action on it as of this time,
Mr. Chairman. The Secretary and I are going over this afternoon to
argue the point.
The CHAIRMAN. I would hope that you would argue as vigorously
for the Hay Commission Report as you do for the idea of the bonus
-pay.
Mr. READ. We feel most strongly about this.
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The CHAIRMAN. I think it means a great deal, more, not only in-
terms of dollars, but in overall benefit to the service. I just would
hope that you would argue vigorously for that.
Mr. READ. This is another area where we are much indebted to you
for the amendment which was put in a year ago. It pointed out cor-
rectly that the present links were created in 19'62, and obviously the
workload and the responsibilities of the Foreign Service have doubled
and trebled under any criteria you wish to apply. Hay Associates is
certainly one of the most prestigious firms working in this field, and
I think that their findings are very good.
The CHAIRMAN. I recognize, too, that the Hay study would not
benefit the Senior FSO's.
Mr. READ. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. I realize that that problem is there. But I would
hope in view, as you say, of my strong interest and desire to be of help
that you would work a little harder in trying to figure some way of
skinning the cat to achieve your objective, which is increased com-
pensation for Senior FSO's, and my objective which is not to have a.
performance pay system.
I have usually knocked' myself out to be of support to the Depart-
ment, but you have not knocked yourselves out trying to figure out
some other ways of skinning this cat, and I wish you would.
Mr. READ. We are pushing to the outer edges of the arguments for
equal pay for substantially equal work as required by law. No effort
has been spared, I can assure you, on the pay comparability front.
The CHAIRMAN. My point is that I wish you would make the same
efforts to meet my objections as well.
Mr. READ. I wish we saw a way to do it. We simply at this-point do.
not, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. What about limiting Senior Foreign Service officers''
pay to the executive salary schedule, which is higher than the Civil
Service schedule?
Mr. READ. We do not think that there would be support for that in
either branch. We may, of course, be wrong, but we don't think that.
that proposal would stand the test.
The CHAIRMAN. Could we try to work something out and see if it.
would? I think that if the Department agreed, it might be accepted'
by the Senate, and then we could go to conference and see how it
evolved.
Mr. READ. The pay agents of the President, under the 1971 legisla-
tion, are,required to safeguard the comparability principle, and they-
would find violation of that principle in such a move.
The CHAIRMAN. I don't mean to keep hitting this dead horse, but I
think that perhaps the best way of legally getting around it might be-
the idea of the mass bonus for people in those jobs, taking into account
the increased. hazard that Foreign Service officers have to accept as
a way of life.
Mr. READ. That, unfortunately, would be vulnerable to the argu-
ment that they were receiving more than comparable pay for com-
parable work.
The CHAIRMAN. Not when you crank into it the risk of assassination._
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Mr.. READ. That, indeed, should be, cranked in, but above the cap
where such considerations do not apply anywhere, I have to be pessi-
mistic about the acceptability of that argument.
EXTRA COMPENSATION FOR STAFF CORPS FOR OVERSEAS FACTOR
The CHAIRMAN. What are your ideas with regard to extra compensa-
tion for the staff corps for the overseas factor, for the extra responsi-
bility that they assume abroad?
Mr. READ. The Hay Associates Study, which was, of course, turned
over to Congress in June, has a number of suggestions for adjustment
upward for that factor, which we believe to be justified.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that full pay should be granted to
officers who are temporarily serving . as principal officers? In other
words, since charge pay, as you know, is half at this point, could that
be made full pay, and also for Foreign Service officers detailed out-
"side the service?
Mr. READ. The Secretary has discretion to provide that. The current
regulations call for, as you indicated, half pay after a certain number
,of days as charge. We could take a new look at that, if you wish. It has
been a policy which has been in effect for many years, and we will be
..glad to reexamine it and submit a memorandum on that, if you would
like.
The CHAIRMAN. I don't feel strongly on it. It would be- a way, if you
-want to rewaxd officers for superior performance.
Mr. READ. Charges performances are not always superior,
-unfortunately.
Mr. BARNES. Or for prolonged periods of time.
SPOUSAL RIGHT IN FSO SURVIVOR BENEFIT INSURANCE
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that spouses should have a vested
-right in the Foreign Service officers' survivor benefit insurance?
Mr. READ. We feel that there are rights which should be vested in
surviving spouses, and that this bill presents some instances where we
are attempting to move in that direction. We have other proposals
which are pending at the Office of Management and Budget for addi-
tional provisions of law that could be considered along these lines.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that the employment opportunities
of Foreign Service dependents should be increased?
Mr. READ. I do, indeed, and that has been part of the central thrust
.of the new Family Liaison Office, which has been set up in the Depart-
ment, and now, I am glad to say, in 68 posts abroad, to find such
employment outlets for spouses and dependents.
INCREASED REPRESENTATION ALLOWANCE
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that there should be increased repre-
sentation allowance, so that people are not out of pocket as they are
now when they give parties for official purposes?
Mr. READ. The. representation. allowance, which has been provided
by the Congress, we estimate now covers 96 to 97 percent of out-of-
pocket expenses of our officers. The Congress has been far more gener-
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407
ous in recent years than when I. was in the Department in the 1960's
in that regard. That is a pretty fair reimbursement, as I am sure you
will agree.
The CHAIRMAN. It is.
The Foreign Service spouses, do they receive reimbursement for
representation activities undertaken for the benefit of the United
States?
Mr. READ. Undertaken outside of the United States?
The CHAIRMAN. Undertaken for the benefit of the United States.
Mr. READ. We think that that is, in special circumstances, presently
permitted and fully justified. Where, for, instance, the spouse may
have special links to members of ? an opposition party, or dissident
faction with which the Government wishes to be in contact, and where
the employee might not have such contacts, the Ambassador, in his
judgment, could authorize reimbursement under those circumstances.
It Is hard to write, as you can readily appreciate, rules and regula-
tions to provide for all such circumstances.
ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN SERVICE LABOR RELATIONS SYSTEM
The CHAIRMAN. Why did the administration choose to create a
separate Foreign Service labor relations system, rather than the
adoption of the Civil Service system?
Mr. READ. 1 will ask Mr. Michel to address that, if I may.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, the bill in a sense does not create a
new labor management system for the Foreign Service. It continues
the separate system which already exists for the Foreign Service under
Executive order.
As in the case of the Civil Service Reform Act, which drew from
a system in place by Executive order, the labor management chapter in
the Foreign Service bill draws from the labor management system
for the Foreign Service that was in place by Executive order.
There is a history of bargaining under that system. There are special
,circumstances of Foreign Service employment which are quite dif-
ferent from the Civil Service, as you have pointed out.
The system has worked. We believe that there are features of the
Civil Service labor management system that would not work in the
Foreign Service. While we have looked to the Civil Service legislation
for parallelisms, where parallelisms were justified, we have also tried
to retain the special needs of the Foreign Service, and have adapted
the labor management chapter accordingly.
The CHAIRMAN. The unions have requested a bargaining unit as
large as possible, including a substantial number of supervisory per-
sonnel. What are your views on this issue, and will the inclusion of
supervisors create a conflict of, interest?
Mr. READ. The bill is largely a reflection of the current situation.
As you know, in the rotational rank in person system which we have in
the Foreign Service, people move in and out of supervisory positions
in a way that is not paralleled anywhere in the Civil Service, and many
very junior Foreign Service officers have supervisory responsibilities
for Foreign Service national employees, for instance.
So if we adopted the provision of the Civil Service Reform Act
employee management provisions, we would be excluding under
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various estimates 60 to 80 percent of the members of the Service
from the bargaining unit, which obviously would be in no one's interest
to do.
REINCORPORATING FSIO'S AS CONE OF FOREIGN SERVICE
The CHAIRMAN. What would be your reaction to reincorporating the
Foreign Service information officers as a separate cone to the Foreign
Service? You have your administrative, your economic, your political,
and your consular cones, and could include the FSIO's.
The reason I ask that question is, the FSIO Corps came out of my
legislation some years ago and was really designed at that time as a.
means of 'permitting USIA to select out some of the people they
wanted to. It has served its purpose; and I think that there would
be more cross-fertilization. if it was part of the Foreign Service. What.
is your view on that?
Mr. READ. Under chapter 12 of the bill, as you know, we have called
for movement toward maximum compatibility between the systems,
recognizing their different missions, and different purposes and
objectives.
Ambassador Reinhardt, when he was before you last July, was:
asked the same question by you, and stated that ICA would oppose
its reabsorption in the Foreign Service as just an additional cone, be-
cause of the traditions and different objectives of the ICA.
The CHAIRMAN. What 'is your view? I am not asking you for Am-
bassador Reinhardt's view.
Mr. READ. I think that the present provisions of law are a correct:
reflection of the greatest obtainable degree of compatibility that
makes sense at this point.
Somewhere way back in tho reporting sections under title II, von
will note that the Secretary is required, on a yearly basis, to file
progress reports with the Congress on steps taken toward greater
compatability.
The CHAIRMAN. You would agree with me that the information
function, propaganda, or whatever you want to call it, is basically
a cone like the existing cones are, and that in order to get real cross-
fertilization-also I think that there have only been two FSIO's who,
have ever been chiefs of mission. In order to get real, cross-fertilization,
it should all be one big Service. I believe you have more than two
consular people, administrative people, and economic people who-
have risen to carry the Ambassador's briefcase.
Mr. READ. While there are only two right now at the ambassadorial.
rank, there have been substantially more in the recent past that have.
served as ambassadors.
The CHAIRMAN. There are only two who have reached chief of mis-
sion status.
Mr. BARNES. Actually, our. present Ambassador to.Rumania is a,
career information officer. There . are three : Togo, Botswana, and
Rumania.
The CHAIRMAN. At any rate, I don't think that I agree with that
thought. The problem is. that for many things, like Frankenstein,
you create them, and then you cannot.uncreate them. I sort of wonder
if, on balance, I did a service to the country in creating the FSIO'
Corps or not. I think that now I would like to see it be a cone in the
Department.
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Incidentally, does the cone system still exist? I know there was some
effort made to move away from it.
Mr. BARNES. It still exists. We are giving some thought now and
have started some discussions with AFSA about modifying the cone
system, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The cone system basically means that a person
spends two-thirds, maybe three-fourth or his or her career in that
particular cone.
Mr. BARNES. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think that it needs modification? Why
isn't that a pretty good idea ?
Mr. BARNES. Because we think that we require, particularly at the
senior levels of the Foreign Service, people with more diverse back-
ground, more diverse experience. We find that the cone system has
been applied in a way which makes for overly narrow people, so we
are looking at ways of keeping the benefits of some specialization, with-
out incurring some of the difficulties that we have had.
RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTERS
The CHAIRMAN.The AFGE made-an appeal for retirement benefits
for a group of employees who served as international.broadcasters with
RFE [Radio Free Europe], Radio Liberty, and the Armed Forces
Network.
Does the administration have a position on AFGE's proposal in this
regard?
Mr. READ. We do have a position, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. What is it?
Mr. READ. Perhaps I could state it for the record later on, because
I am simply not up to date on that.
The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.
[The information referred to follows:]
SUPPORT FOR AFGE AMENDMENT
[Submitted by Department of State]
Since this is a proposal to amend the Civil Service retirement system, I would
defer to OPM. However, I can tell you that the Administration has strongly
opposed this proposal in the past because it would provide a benefit to these
employees in 'addition to benefits they agreed to work for at the time and it
would establish a precedent for doing the same thing for other Government
employees with prior service in other Government-funded activities.
Persons who worked for the "Radios" knew they were not contributing to the
Civil Service, Foreign Service or CIA retirement system and were not earning
benefits under those systems.
With respect to the adverse precedent that would be established by the enact-
ment of this section, many Federal employees have prior service in various past
and present Government-funded activities for which they do not have retirement
credit. Many Government-funded 'activities today have their own retirement
systems, as does RFE/RL ; but many persons left these- organizations, either
before the retirement systems were established,. or without sufficient service to
have earned a vested retirement benefit. An unknown number of such persons
are now Government employees and undoubtedly would like Federal retirement
credit for their prior service in these Government-funded activities. Federally-
funded state and local government -organizations, the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, the U.S. Railway Association, and the National Railroad Passen-
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ger Corporation (AMTRAK) are examples,of such organizations. Appropriated'.
funds have been or are used to pay the salaries of employees of these organi-
zations. This amendment would provide a precedent for enacting similar legis-
lation for both persons who are now Government employees and who become,
employed by the Government in the future following service in Government-
funded organizations.
The CHAIRMAN. Also AFGE proposed that any person who is ap-
pointed as 'a Binational Center' grantee, and has completed 5 years of"
satisfactory service in that capacity, or any other appointment under-
the Foreign Service Act of 1946, should become a participant in the-
Foreign Service retirement and disability system, and make an appro-
priate contribution to the Foreign Service Retirement Fund.
What are your views on this proposal, or would you like to submit:
that for the record? -
Mr. READ. I would 'like to do the same,: if I-may, Mr. Chairman..
[The information referred to follows:]
SUPPORT FOR SECOND AFGE, AMENDMENT TO. GRANT RETIREMENT BENEFITS TO,
FORMER BINATIONAL CENTER. GRANTEES
[Submitted by Department of State]
The Departmenthas'opposed this amendment in the past and we must continue-
to do so.
The Grantee program started in 1948. Grantees served ' under contracts until
1966; when they were converted to Foreign Service staff employees of USIA.
Foreign Service staff employees of USIA did not come under the Foreign Service-
retirement system until authorized by P. L. 90=494 of August 20, 1968, and then,
only if.they had completed ten years of continuous service in the Foreign Service.
There were several hundred Grantees who resigned prior to 1966 without
becoming Federal employees so far as we know. Approximately 50 of them.
completed 5 years as a Grantee and.would benefit by this amendment. To grant
them Foreign- Service retirement credit, would provide. them' benefits in excess
of those provided other staff employees of USIA at that time. Similarly, to
provide Foreign Service retirement credit to' those who converted to Foreign,
Service staff employment and who did not complete ten years of service, would
provide a benefit not provided other staff employees at that time. Such staff'
employees received Civil Service retirement credit.
The CHAIRMAN. There will be various 'other questions that will be
submitted to you for the record. We can leave the record open for at
least a week. I think that some of my colleagues may have questions,.
and the record would be left open for them.
Mr. READ. We will be happyto respond.
ADOPTION OF GRIEVANCE PROVISION PROCEDURES
The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Thomas, an expert on grievance procedures,.
advocates the adoption of a grievance provision embodied in the bill
S. 1080, introduced in 1975.
I was wondering if the administration had considered that legisla-
tion in formulating its provision, and what is the administration's-
position with regard to that proposal ?
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, the grievance chapter in this bill is
largely a codification of the existing law. The bill to which you refer-
is one that was not enacted by the Congress. The Congress enacted a
quite different system as an amendment to the 1946 Foreign Service-
Act.
That system has been in place and'has,worked effectively. We think
it has been generally accepted as the best, or certainly one of the best,.
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grievance' systems in public employment anywhere.' We had extensive
consultation with employee organizations, with the professional arbi-
trator who chairs the Foreign Service Grievance Board, and with his
staff, and concluded that with only slight modifications a continuation
of the existing Foreign Service Grievance Board was the right thing,
rather than to have, any fundamental change in that system in this
bill.
The CHAIRMAN. I was very struck last week with the testimony of
the Foreign Service women, and their point that spouses who had
fully participated in their husband's life, or their wife's life, for many
years and then were divorced deserved a portion of the usufruct for
those years of endeavor. '
I was wondering if - you had examined this proposal, and had' any
way of meeting its objective?
Mr. READ. We have, indeed. We are sympathetic to the point, Mr.
Chairman. We submitted a bill to the Office of Management and Budget
last summer which would authorize survivor benefits to former spouses
of deceased Foreign. Service members, either by the election of the
rneinber, and sometimes they would, like to make such choice, or by
court decree.
There are presently no such benefits, as you know, and persons who
have accompanied their. spouses throughout a long career, are some-
times cut off in cruel circumstances, as some recent cases poignantly
remind us.
The bill does also acknowledge the direct contribution by Foreign
Service spouses in two or three other respects. In section. 101 (b) (5) in
the statement of purposes, a section which we hope, if enacted, will be
useful in State court processing of claims in the future, it gives explicit
recognition to the special hardships that are encountered by Foreign
Service families.
In another provision in 821(b) (2) the bill acknowledges the direct
contribution by Foreign Service spouses by granting them, a vested
right to survivor annuity after 10 years of accompanying a member
of the Foreign Service on various assignments.
I think.that these are long overdue steps.
The CHAIRMAN. I think also they were concerned, not just with
death benefits, but with pension rights.
Mr. READ. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. I think that those, are even more important. There
was one suggestion made that it should be done on a pro rata basis.
If a man and woman had been married for 10 years, then were
divorced, and he married somebody else for another 10 years, that they
would, then, divide it up. Could that be worked out?
Mr. READ. -I don't think so. I don't think that any mechanical for-
mula would apply to the ,great diversity of human experience. I think
that any formula would be made a mockery of by the first case that
came along. '
The CHAIRMAN. How would you handle that situation?
Mr. READ. By a court determination, which, of course, might find
either spouse having deserted the other, or who knows what the cir-
cumstance might be.
The CHAIRMAN. I hate to see us opening more litigation. You don't
think that some simple solution could be arrived at, that the ears of
marriage could actually be taken into account on a pro rata basis? ,
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Mr. READ. We have not thought of one that really just would not
look absolutely topsy-turvy in an actual case situation.
The CHAIRMAN. You have probably studied it more than I have.
I like the idea. particularly since if there is one profession where the
husband and the wife are a team, it is the Foreign Service.
Mr. READ. We agree with that wholeheartedly, but we just don't
know of any single formula that would fit the enormous spread of
facts that could be imagined.
The CHAIRMAN. I wish that you might go back to the drawing board
and see if you can figure out something with the Foreign Service
women. They did come up with some very specific suggestions.
Mr. READ. And some very good ones. We don't mean to close the
door here on any good ideas.
The CHAIRMAN. I think that this about winds up this hearing.
Before absolutely wrapping it up, is there anybody in the room who
has further comments to make, or any further suggestions? I recognize
that there are a lot of people who are pretty familiar with the Foreign
Service.
Mr. READ. Perhaps I could offer one other thing for the record, if
I may, Mr. Chairman. I would like to put in a short brief on why we
consider the retention of mandatory retirement at 60 very, very impor-
tant to the future health of the Service.
The CHAIRMAN. That statement, without objection, will be put into
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
THE NEED FOR CONTINUATION OF MANDATORY RETIREMENT IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE UNITED STATES
To manage and execute U.S. foreign policy, the Nation needs a highly capable,
mobile corps of dedicated personnel able and willing to assume a wide range of
demanding ddties?tsohetimes under difficult, and dangerous conditions, often at
short notice, anywhere in the world.
MANDATORY RETIREMENT
The Congress has determined that-normally Foreign Service personnel should
retire no later than age 60. This reflected the fact that the Foreign Service,-with
the special nature of its mission and its unusual conditions of service, is much
more analagous to the military services than to other civilian services of the
government. The state of readiness for any kind of service worldwide, expected
of members of the Foreign Service, corresponds closely. to what is expected from
members of the armed forces. In fact, it was the military model from which the
Congress drew the provision for retirement in the Foreign Service.
As the Supreme Court noted in its 8-1 decision in the Vance v. Bradley case,
the Congress not only has held this view since 1924 but has expanded its appli-
cation subsequently : "Congress not only retained the lower retirement age for ?
Foreign Service Officers when it reorganized the Foreign Service in 1946, but
it also lowered the age to 60. In expanding the coverage of the Foreign Service
retirement system to reach others than' Foreign Service Officers, Congress ob-
viously reaffirmed its own judgment that the system should provide a lower
retirement age than in the Civil Service system, just as it. did in 1978 when it
repealed the mandatory retirement of Civil Service employees but left 'intact
the rule for those under the Foreign Service System."
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Approximately 60 percent of the Foreign Service is serving abroad at any one
time in contrast to about 5 percent in the Civil Service where foreign duty is
generally a volunteer matter.
Foreign Service personnel are assigned and reassigned regularly and spend a
substantial portion of their careers overseas.
The conditions of service in the Foreign Service are unusually demanding.
For example, 95 percent of Foreign Service personnel aged 21 to 29 are medically
the rule for those under the Foreign Service System."
to 59 are able to do so. (There is a similar trend among spouses)
PERCENTAGE OF STATE FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL WITH A CURRENT MEDICAL EVALUATION MAKING THEM
UNAVAILABLE FOR ASSIGNMENT TO ALL POSTS AS OF FEB. 28, 1979
21 to 29-----------------------------------------------------------------------
30 to 39-----------------------------------------------------------------------
40 to 49-----------------------------------------------------------------------
50 to 59-----------------------------------------------------------------------
5 2
8 6
18 11
32 19
This situation is now manageable. However, if mandatory retirement were to
be eliminated or the age raised significantly, the ability of the Secretary to
assign personnel to otherwise appropriate posts would be reduced to the point
that it would become excessively difficult for him to meet his worldwide
responsibilities.
And as the Supreme Court stated in its decision, it would appear sensible
"that the Government would take steps to assure itself that not just some but
all members of the Service have the capability of rendering superior performance
and satisfying all of the conditions of the Service."
The Congress did, however, provide for two exceptions to the existing manda-
tory retirement rule. These exceptions permit the retention of extraordinarily
capable officers past the time of mandatory retirement.
(A) The Secretary's Waiver.-The Secretary may make an exception to the
retirement when it is in the national interest to do so.
(B) Presidential Appointees.-Career personnel serving in positions to which
they have been appointed by the President (as Ambassadors or Assistant Secre-
taries) are exempted from the requirement while serving in such positions.
There are 95 career persons currently holding such appointments of whom 4
are 60 or older.
CONCLUSION
Under these circumstances, we recommend that mandatory retirement be
retained as a general rule and that the Secretary and the President continue to
be authorized to make exceptions as seems appropriate.
The CITAII{MAN. Along that line, I cannot help but note that in the
past few years there seems to be a definite disadvantage to approaching
60, as I have seen so very many able and competent Foreign Service
officers in their fifties who are permitted to retire.
I realize that this opens the way for younger officers, but it does
mean that we have some awfully able officers that are not being used.
It is a tough decision, I know, that you have to make.
Mr. READ. It was particularly severe during the period when the
courts had stopped all mandatory retirement. We attempted to do
equity to people in that sort of circumstance, and we will continue to
do so. It is not an easy problem, as you know.
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The CHAIRMAN. I think that in other services, isn't 65 the usual
retirement age?
Mr. READ. There is no limit in the civil service since the Civil Service
Reform Act.
The CHAIRMAN. No, in the other foreign services, British, German,
French?
Mr. READ. It varies. We could give you a table of the 10 or 12 major
countries.
The CHAIRMAN. I would appreciate it, if you would, and we would
put that in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mandatory retirement ages for selected other foreign services
Australia -----------------------------------------------------------
Canada -------------------------------------------------------------
France ------------------------------------
-------------------------
German Federal Republic---------------------------------------------
Great Britain--------------------------------------------------------
The Netherlands -----------------------------------------------------
Norway ----------------------------------- ---------------------------
Spain -------------------------------------
--------------------------
Italy ---------------------------------------------------------------
room cares to make?
If not, this hearing is concluded, and the subcommittee will ad-
journ, to meet at the call of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject
to call of the Chair.]
[Additional questions and answers follow:]
How. BEN H. READ'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR
DELL
Question 1. Affirmative Action : How will the bill affect affirmative action ef-
forts in the Department?
Answer. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 stated that the Service should be
"broadly representative of the American people," but it contained no specific pro-
visions relating to equal employment opportunity or affirmative action.
The bill retains a finding that the Foreign Service should be representative
of the American people (Sec. 101(a) (3) ). In addition, it currently states that
one of its ten objectives is-
"to foster the development of policies and procedures which will facilitate
and encourage entry into and advancement in the Foreign Service by per-
sons from all segments of American society, and equal opportunity and fair 6
and equitable treatment for all without regard to political affiliation, race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or handicapping
condition."
We believe this will be further strengthened in the House of Representatives,
so that the first portion will read :
"to foster the development and vigorous implementation of policies and
programs, including affirmative action programs, .
"
This change will provide strong statutory support for the Department's af-
firmative action programs, and will represent an advance from all current
legislation.
The Bill thus gives legislative endorsement to the continued development and
implementation of affirmative action programs in order to assure equality of
opportunity in the Foreign Service.
The above-quoted statutory objective closely parallels the merit principles con-
tained in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 2301). These merit priu-
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other points that anybody in the
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ciples are made expressly applicable to the Foreign Service by section 102(7)
of the Bill, and compliance with them is directed in connection with the appoint-
ment (Sec. 301(b)), assignment (Sec. 511(a)), and promotion (See.601(a)) of
Foreign Service personnel.
Question 2. How many employees of the Department of State are minorities
(meaning blacks, Hispanics, Oriental Americans and American Indians) and
women? How many minorities (meaning blacks, Hispanics, Oriental Americans
and American Indians) and women are foreign service officers?
Answer. As of the end of 1978, the Department of State had 2,050 minority
employees and 4,782 women employees in an overall total of 12,793. Detailed
studies are attached. Statistical studies based on the data for the end of 1979
are expected to be available in February or March.
The attached studies based on 1978 data show 161 minority and 307 women
Foreign Service officers in a total of 3,414. These data, however, are not fully
comparable with the data for 1977 because of a change in the initial designation
given to entering junior officers. Since January 1978, entering junior officers
have been designated as career candidates and have been given commissions
limited to four years as Foreign Service Reserve officers rather than being im-
mediately commissioned as Foreign Service officers. In preparing the studies
based on employment data at the end of 1979, we intend to show career candi-
dates separately so as to be able to make comparisons.
In the interim, the best indication of the number of minority and women
Foreign Service officers and career candidates is a total figure calculated as of
November 1979 which includes Foreign Service officers, career candidates, and
officers appointed through the two special emphasis programs, who also enter
initially as Foreign Service Reserve officers. In this group of 3,634 officers, there
are 292 minority officers and 423 women officers.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MINORITY EMPLOYEES-BY SUBGROUP AND PAY PLAN AS OF DEC. 31, 1977, AND DEC. 31, 1978
Total Total Black Hispanic American Indian Oriental
popula-
Pay plan (Dec. 31) tion Number Percent Number Percent Number Perecnt Number Percent Number Percent
CA:
1977 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1978
CM: Change -?---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1977------------- 39 1 2.6 1 2.6
1978------------- 38 1 2.6 1 2.6 ------------------------------------------------
Change.__----_
FSO:
1977-------------
1978------
Change--------
FSR:
1977-------------
1978-------------
Change-__-__-_
FSRU:
1977-------------
1978-------------
Change........
FSS:
1977-------------
1978-------------
Change........
Total FS:
19Y1-------------
1978-------------
-1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3,475 159 4.6 102 2.9 38 1.1 1 -------- 18 0.5
3,376 161 4.7 105 3.1 37 1.1 1 -------- 18 .5
-99 +2 +.1
2, 226 210 9.4
2, 224 221 9.8
+18 +11 +.4
767 53 6.9
964 85 8.8
+3 +.2 -1 ----------------------------------------
157 7.1 36 1.6 1 -------- 16 .7
151 6.7 48 2.1 1 -------- 21 .9
-6 -.4 +12 +.5 ---------------- +5 +.2
40 5.2 8 1.0 ---------------- 5 .7
65 6.7 12 1.2 ---------------- 8 .3
+197 +32 +1.9 +25 +1.5
2,529 174 6.9 98 3.9
2,539 183 7.2 109 4.3
+10 +9 +.3 +11 +.4
9, 036 596 6.6 397 4.4
9, 161 650 7.1 430 4.7
+4 +.2 ---------------- +3 +.1
51 2.0 2 0.1 23 .9
47 1.9 3 .1 24 .9
-4 -.1 +1 -------- +1 -------
133 1.5 4 -------- 62 .7
144 1.6 5 .1 71 .8
+11 +.1 +1 +.1 +9 +.1
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
DEPARTMENT OF STATE-Continued
MINORITY EMPLOYEES-BY SUBGROUP AND PAY PLAN AS OF DEC. 31, 1977, AND DEC. 31, 1978-Continued
Total Total Black Hispanic American Indian Oriental
popula-
Pay plan (Dec. 31) tion Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Numbor Percent
GS:
1977_____________ 3,411 1,414
1978------------- 3,300 1,336
41.5 1, 339 39.3 37 1. 1 11 0.3 27 0.8
40.5 1,268 38.4 36 1.1 7 .2 25 .8
Change -------- -111 -78 -1.0 -71 -.9 -1 -------- -4 -.1 -2 ________
EGG:
1977_____________ 296 57 19.3 8 2.7 . 25 8.4 ---------------- 24 8.1
1978_____________ 332 64 19.3 11 3.3 25 7.5 1 .3 27 8.1
Change -------- +36 +1 -------- +3 -I-.6 -------- -.9 +1 -E.3 +3 --------
'.Total, CS:
1977_____________ 3,707 1,471 39.7 1,347 36.3 62 1.7 11 .3 51 1.4
1978------------- 3, 632 1, 400 38.5 1, 279 35.2 61 1.7 8 .2 52 1.4
Change -------- -75 -71 -1.2 -68 -1. 1 -1 -------- -3 -.1 +1 --------
,.Total, FS and CS:
1977_____________ 12,743 2,067 16.2 1,744 13.7 195 1.5 15 .1 113 .9
3978_____________ 12, 793 2, 050 16.0 1, 709 13.4 205 1.6 13 .1 123 1.0
COMBINED FOREIGN SERVICE AND
Total Total Total Total
popula- minori- popula- minori- Percent
tion ties Percent tion ties Percent difference
Senior level:
CA-------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------
CM------------------------------ 39 1 2.6 38 1 2.6 ----------
FSO/R/RU-1 and GS/GG-18/17______ 456 10 2.2 445 12 2.7 +0.5
FSO/R/RU-2 and GS/GG-18/16------- 565 16 2.8 565 16 2.8 ----------
Subtotal, senior level ------------ 1,060 27 2.5 1,048 29 2.8 -I-.3
Middle level:
FSO/R/RU-3, FSSO-1 and GS/GG-15/
14----------------------------- 1,237 54 4.4 1,260 58 4.6 -F.2
FSO/R/RU-4, FSSO-2 and GS/GG-15/
13----------------------------- 1,468 79 5.4 1,494 94 6.3 -F.9
FSO/R/RU-5, FSSO-3 and GS/GG-15/
12----------------------------- 1,429 156 10.9 1,574 179 11.4 +.5
Junior level:
FSO/R/RU-6, FSSO-4 and GS/GG-11/
1 _________________________ ___ 1,635 234 14.3 1,743 237 13.6 -.7
FSO/R/RU-7, FSSO-5 and GS/GG-9/8. 1,932 386 20.0 1,790 384 21.5 +1.5
FSO/R/RU-8,FSSO-6 and GS/GG-9/7- 1,751 321 18.3 1,846 315 17.1 -1.2
Support -8 level:
26.2 773 241 31.2 +5.0
FSS-8 GS/GG~_______________ 969 254
FSS-9 and GS/GG-5--------------- 618 256 41.4 643 239 37.2 -4.2
FSS-10 and GS/GG-4/3/2/1-----__-- 644 300 46.6 622 274 44.1 -2.5
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
Total Total Total Total
popula- minori- popula- minori- Percent
tion ties Percent tion ties Percent difference'
ALL FOREIGN SERVICE (FSO/R/RU
AND FSSO/FSS)
CA--------------------------------------
------------
----------
--------
------------
---------
----------
-----"
CM----------------------------------
39
1
2.6
38
1
2.6
FSO/R/RU-1 ----
450
10
2.2
440
12
2.7
+. 5'
FS0/R/RU-2
543
15
2.8
543
16
2.9
+.1
FSO/R/RU-3/FSSO-1-------------------
1,018
38
3.7
1,059
40
3.8
+.1
FSO/R/RU-4/FSSO-2-------------------
1,310
64
4.9
1,336
74
5.5
+.6
FSO/R/RU-5/FSSO-3-------------------
1,248
115
9.2
1, 397
139
9.9
+.7
FSO/R/RU-6/FSSO-4-------------------
1, 287
118
9.2
1, 390
121
8.7
-.5
FSO/R/RU-7/FSSO-5-------------------
1,255
107
8.5
1,184
118
10.0
+1.5
FSO/R/RU-8/FSSO-6-------------------
775
54
7.0
749
59
7.9
+.9
FSO/R/RU-8/FSSO-7-------------------
464
33
7.1
570
34
6.0
-1.1
FSS-8 -------------------------------
506
33
6.5
310
26
8.4
+1.9
FSS-9 -------------------------------
100
7
7.0
108
8
7.4
+.4
FSS-10 ------------------------------
41
1
2.4
37
2
5.4
+3.0
Subtotal, support level___________
647
41
6.3
455
36
7.9
+1.6
Total, FS_______________________
9,036
596
6.6
9,161
650
7.1
+.5
FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER (FSO)
CA--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CM----------------------------------
39
1 2.6
38
1 2.6
----------
FSO-1-------------------------------
341
8 2.3
335
9 2.7
+.4
FSO-2 -------------------------------
310
9 2.9
315
8 2.5
-.4
Subtotal, senior level____________
690
18 2.6
688
18 2.6
__________
FSO-3-------------------------------
655
16 2.4
683
18 2.6
+.2
FSO-4-------------------------------
803
31 3.9
773
36 4.7
+.8
FSO-5-------------------------------
590
68 11.5
613
71 11.6
+.1
FSO-6 -------------------------------
397
24 6.0
486
18 3.7
-2.3
FSO-7-------------------------------
318
2 .6
160
--------------------
-.6
FSO-8-------------------------------
61
--------------------
11
------------------------------
Subtotal, junior level____________ .
FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE (FSR)
FSR-1-------------------------------
60
1 1.7
49
2
4.1
+2.4
FSR-2-------------------------------
126
5 4.0
119
6
5.0
+1.0
Subtotal, senior level___________
FSR-3------,------------------------
198
15 7.6
178
12
6.7
-.9
FSR-4-------------------------------
285
16 5.6
270
13
4.8
-.8
FSR-5-------------------------------
378
28 7.4
430
41
9.5
+2.1
Subtotal, middle level___________
FSR-6-------------------------------
462
55 11.9
476
52
10.9
-1.0
FSR-7-------------------------------
534
71 13.3
592
81
13.7
+.4
FSR-8-------------------------------
183
19 10.4
130
14
10.8
+.4
Total, FSR______________________
2,226
210 9.4
2,244
221
9.8
+.4
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
Total
popula-
tion
Total
minori-
ties Percent
Total
popula-
tion
Total
minori-
ties Percent
Percent
difference
FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE
FSRU 1UNLIMITED (FSRU)
----------------------------
FSRU-2 ------------------------------
Subtotal, senior level____________
'FSRU-3
'
108
5 4.6
146
8
5.5
+.9
FSRU-4------------------------------
124
13 10.5
191
20
10.5
----------
fSRU-5 ------------------------------
109
6 5.5
173
11
6.4
+.9
Subtotal, middle level ----_______
FSRU-6------------------------------
166
14 8.4
183
26
14
2
+5
8
FSRU-7
95
12 12.6
98
.
16
.
16
3
.
+3
7
FSRU-8------------------------------
9
1 11.1
8
1
.
12.5
.
+1.4
Subtotal, junior level ------------
Total, FSRU____________________
FOREIGN SERVICE STAFF (FSSO/FSS)
FSSO-1------------------------------
57
2 3.5
52
2
- 3.8 .
+.3
FSSO-2------------------------------
98
4 4.1
101
5
4.9
+.8
FSSO-3------------------------------
171
13 7.6
181
16
8.8
+1.2
Subtotal, middle level___________
FSSO-4
262
25 9.5
245
25
10.2
+.7
FSSO-5
308
22 7.1
334
21
6.3
.
-.8
FSSO-6------------------------------
522
34 6.5
600
44
7.3
+.8
FSSO-7------------------------------
464
33 7.1
570
34
6.0
.
-h 1
Subtotal, junior level-___________
FSSO-8------------------------------
506
33 6.5
310
26
8.4
+1.9
FSSO-9----------------- ------------
100
7 7.0
108
8
7.4
+.4
FSSO-10-----------------------------
41
1 2.4
37
2
5.4
+3.0,
Subtotal, support level___________
Total, FSSO/FSS________________
ALL CIVIL SERVICE (GS/GG)
GS/GG-18----------------------------
2
--------------------
2
------------------------------
GS/GG-17----------------------------
4
--------------------
3
-----------------------=------
GS/GG-16----------------------------
22
1 4.5
22
-------------------- -4.5
Subtotal, senior level____________
GS/GG-15----------------------------
121
12 9.9
101
11 10.9 +1.0
GS/GG-14----------------------------
98
4 4.1
100
7 7.0 +2.9
GS/GG-13----------------------------
158
15 9.5
158
20 12.7 +3.2
GS/GG-12----------------------------
181
41 22.7
177
40 22.6 +.1
GS/ GG-11---------------------------
281
98 34.9
285
95 33.3 -1.5.
GS/GG-10----------------------------
67
18 26.9
68
21 30.9 +4.0
GS/GG-9-----------------------------
407
157 38.6
361
149 41.3 +2.7
GS/GG-8 -----------------------------
270
122 45.2
245
117 47.8 1.2.6'
GS/GG-7-----------------------------
512
234 45.7
527
222 42.1 -3.6
Subtotal, junior level____________
GS/GG-6-----------------------------
463
221 47.7
- 463
215 46.4 -1.3
GS/GG-5-----------------------------
518
-249 48.1
535
231 43.2 -4.9-
GS/GG-4-----------------------------
317
-126 ' - 39.7
332
130 39.2 -.5
GS/GG-3-----------------------------
176
100 56.8
175
96 54.9 -1.9
GS/GG-2-----------------------------
94'
63 67.0
70
42 60.0 -7.0
GS/GG-1---------------------------
16
10 62.5
8
- 4 - -50.0 -12.5
Subtotal, support level --------___
Total, CS-----------------------
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
Total
popula-
tion
Total
minori-
ties Percent
Total
popula-
tion
Total
minori- Percent
ties Percent difference
CIVIL SERVICE (GS)
GS-18-------------------------------
2
--------------------
2
------------------------------
GS-17-------------------------------
3
--------------------
3
------------------------------
GS-16-------------------------------
21
--------------------
22
------------------------------
Subtotal, senior level -___________
GS-15-------------------------------
112
11 9.8
91
10 11.0 +1.2
GS-14-------------------------------
89.
4 4.5
90
7 7.8 +3.3
GS-13-------------------------------
143
15 10.5
144
20 13.9 +3.4
GS-12-------------------------------
170
41 24.1
166
40 24.1 ----------
GS-11 -------------------------------
268
96 35.8
272
93 34.2 -1.6
GS-10 -------------------------------
54
14 25.9
55
17 30.9 -5.0
GS-9 --------------------------------
377
147 39.0
333
139 41.7 +2.7
GS-8 --------------------------------
237
110 46.4
212
104 49.1 +2.7
GS-7 --------------------------------
472
229 48.5
485
217 44.7 -3.8
GS-6 --------------------------------
372
202 54.3
344
190 55.2 +.9
GS-5 --------------------------------
492
246 50.0
500
227 45.4 -4.6
GS-4 --------------------------------
316
126 39.9
329
130 39.5 -.4
GS-3 --------------------------------
175
100 57.1
175
96 54.9 -2.2
GS-2 --------------------------------
92
63 68.5
69
42 60.9 -7.6
GS-1 --------------------------------
16
10 62.1
8
4 50.0 -12.1
Subtotal, support level -----------
1,463
747 51.1
1,425
689 48.4 -2.7
CIVIL SERVICE (GG)
GG-18---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GG-17------------------------------- 1 ------------------------------------------------------------
GG-16------------------------------ I 1 100.0 ------------------------------ -100.0
GG-15------------------------------- 9 1 11. 1 10 1 10.0 -1.1
GG-14------------------------------- 9 -------------------- 10 -----------------------------
GG-13------------------------------- 15 -------------------- 14 ------------------------------
GG-12------------------------------ 11 -------------------- 11 ------------------------------
Subtotal, middle level ----------- 44 1 2.3 45 1 2.2 -.1
GG-11------------------------------- 13 2 15.4 13 2 15.4 _______
GG-10_______________________________ 13 4 30.8 13 4 30.8 __________
GG-9________________________________ 30 10 33.3 28 10 35.7 +2.4
GG-8-------------------------------- 33 12 36.4 33 13 39.4 +3.0
GG-7-------------------------------- 40 5 12.5 42 5 11.9 -.6
GG-6 ________________________________ 91 19 20.9 119 25 21.0 +.1
GG-5-------------------------------- 26 3 11.5 35 4 11.4 -.1
GG-4-------------------------------- 1 -------------------- 3 ------------------------------
GG-3-------------------------------- I ------------------------------------------------------------
GG-2-------------------------------- 2 -------------------- I ------------ ------------------
GG-1------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, GG_______________________ 296 57 19.3 332 64 19.3 --___-___-
SUMMARY BY PAY PLAN
Foreign Service:
FSR_____________________________ 2,226 210 9.4 2,244
FSRU____________________________ 767 53 6.9 964
FSSO/FSS------------------------ 2,529 174 6.9 2,539
1 2.6 ----------
160 4.7
221 +.4
8.8 +1.9
183 7.2 +.3
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
MINORITY EMPLOYEES-BY GRADE AND PAY PLANS: 1?YR STUDY-Continued
Civil service:
Total Total Total Total
popula- minori- popula- minori- Percent
tion ties Percent tion ties Percent difference
GS------------------------------
3,411
1,414
41.5
3,300
1,336
40.5
-1.0
GG------------------------------
296
57
19.3
332
64
19.3
----------
Total, civil service---------------
3, 707
1, 471
39.7
3,632
1,400
38.5
-1.2
Grand total---------------------
12,743
2,067
16.2
12,793
2,050
16.0
-.2
Sources: Per/Mgt/OS Quarterly Summary of Employment and FADPC Computer Report (excluded are noncareer chiefs
of mission, FS/GS unclassified, consular agents, resident staff, wage board, WAE, and contract.)
COMBINED FOREIGN SERVICE AND
CIVIL SERVICE
Senior level:
CA
CM------------------------------
39
--------------------
38
---------
FSO/R/RU-1 and GS/GG-18/17__-_--
456
12 2.6
445
14
3.1
+0.5?
FSO/R/RU-2 and GS/GG-16---------
565
23 4.1
565
28
5.0
+.9
Middle level:
FSO/R/RU-3, FSSO-1, and GS/GG-
15/14--------------------------
1,237
123 9.9
1,260
115
9.1
-.8
FSO/R/RU-4, FSSO-2, and GS/GG-
1 -----------------------------
1,468
198 13.5
1,494
209
14.0
+.5
FSO/R/RU-5, FSSO-3, and GS/GG-
12-----------------------------
1,429
326 22.8
1,574
352
22.4
-.4
Junior level:
FSO/R/RU-6, FSSO-4, and GS/GG-
11/10--------------------------
1,635
538 32.9
1,743
563
32.3
-.6
FSO/R/RU-7, FSSO-5, and GS/GG-
9/8----------------------------
1,932
885 45.8
1,790
804
44.9
-.9
FSO/R/RU-8, FSSO-6/7,and GS/GG-7_
1,751
985 56.3
1,846
1,137
61.6
+5.3
Subtotal, junior level ------------
5, 318
2, 408 45.3
5, 379
2, 504
46.6
+1.3
Support level:
FSS-8 and GS/GG-6---------------
969
728 75.1
773
575
74.4
-.7
FSS-9 and GS/GG-5---------------
618
479 77.5
643
481
74.8
-2.7
FSS-10 and GS/GG-4/3/2/1---____--
644
509 79.0
622
504
81.0
+2.0
ALL FOREIGN SERVICE (FSO/R/RU
AND FSS/FSSO)
CA--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CM---------------------------------- 39 -------------------- 38 ------------------------------
FSO/R/RU-1-------------------------- 450 11 2.4 440 14 3.2 +.8'
FSO/R/RU-2-------------------------- 543 20 3.7 543 25 4.6 +.9
FSO/R/RU-3/FSSO-1------------------- 1,018 89 8.7 1,059 81 7.6 -1.1
FSO/R/RU-4/FSSO-2__---------------- 1,310 144 11.0 1,336 155 11.6 +.6
FSO/R/RU-5/FSSO-3------------------- 1,248 236 18.9 1,397 265 - 19.0 +.1
Subtotal, middle level----------- 3,576 469 13.1 3,792 501 13.2 +.1
FSO/R/RU-6/FSSO-4------- ---------- -- 1,287 -- 342 26.6 1,390 367 26.4 -.2
FSO/R/RU-7/FSSO-5----------------- -- 1,255 384 30.6 1,184 359 10.3 -.3
FSO/R/RU-8/FSSO-6------------------- 775 344 44.4 749 370 49.4 +5.0
FSO/R/RU-8/FSSO-7------------------- 464 238 51.3 570 349 61.2 +9.9
Subtotal, junior level------------
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
Percent
Total Women Percent Total Women Percent difference
FSS-8------------------------------- 506 353 69.8 310 204 65.8 -4.0
FSS-9------------------------------- 100 57 57.0 108 69 63.9 +6.9
FSS-10------------------------------ 41 37 90.2 37 34 91.9 +1.7
Subtotal, support level........-- 647 447 69.1 455 307 67.5 -1.6
Total, FS-----------------------
FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS (FSO)
CA--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CM---------------------------------- 39 -------------------- 38 ------------------------------
FSO-1 ------------------------------- 341 8 2.3 335 11 3.3 +1.0
FSO-2------------------------------- 310 8 2.6 315 9 2.9 +.3
Subtotal, senior level------------ 690 16 2.3 688 20 2.9 +.6
FSO-3------------------------------- 655 39 6.0 683 40 5.9 -.1
FSO-4------------------------------- 803 51 6.4 773 57 7.4 +1.0
FSO-5------------------------------- 590 85 14.4 613 94 15.3 +.9
Subtotal, middle level----------- 2,048 175 8.5 2,069 191 9.2 +.7
FSO-6------------------------------- 397 75 18.9 486 104 21.4 +2.5
FSO-7------------------------------- 318 57 17.9 160 26 16.3 -1.6
FSO-8------------------------------- 61 14 23.0 11 3 27.3 +4.3
Subtotal,juniorlevel ------------ 776 146 18.8 657 133 20.2 +1.4
Total, FSO--------------------- 3, 514 337 9.6 3, 414 344 10.1 +. 5
FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE (FSR)
FSR-1------------------------------- 60 3 5.0 49 3 6.1 +1.1
FSR-2------------------------------- 126 6 4.8 119 11 9.2 +4.4
Subtotal, senior level ------------ 186 9 4.8 168 14 8.3 +3.5
FSR-3------------------------------- 198 19 9.6 178 15 8.4 -1.2
FSR-4------------------------------- 285 51 17.9 270 35 13.0 -4.9
FSR-5------------------------------- 378 64 16.9 430 72 16.7 -.2
Subtotal, middle level----------- 861 134, 15.6 878 122 13.9 -1.7
FSR-6------------------------------- 462 105 22.7 476 87 18.3 -4.4
FSR-7------------------------------- 534 110 20.6 592 106 17.9 -2.7
FSR-8------------------------------- 183 20 10.9 130 24 18.5 +7.6
Subtotal, junior level------------ 1,179 235 19.9 1,198 217 18.1 -1.8
Total, FSR--------------------- 2,226 378 17.0 2,244 353 15.7 -1.3
FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE
UNLIMITED (FSRU)
FSRU-1----------------------------- 49 -------------------- 56 ------------------------------
FSRU-2------------------------------ 107 6 5.6 109 5 4.6 -1.0
Subtotal, senior level------------ 156 6 3.8 165 5 3.0 -.8
FSRU-3----------------------------- 108 21 19.4 146 16 11.0 -8.4
FSRU-4------------------------------ 124 16 12.9 191 33 17.3 +4.4
FSRU-5------------------------------ 109 38 34.9 173 48 27.7 -7.2
Subtotal, middle level----------- 341 75 22.0 510 97 19.0 -3.0
FSRU-6 ------------------------------ 166 31 18.7 183 39 21.3 +2.6
FSRU-7------------------------------ 97 11 11.6 98 16 16.3 +4.7
FSRU-8----------------------------- 9 1 11. 1 8 -------------------- -11.1
Subtotal, junior level------------ 270 43 15.9 289 55 19.0 +3.1
Total, FSRU-------------------- 767 124 16.2 964 157 16.3 +.1
Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/10/27: CIA-RDP85-00003R000100060001-4
Percent
Total Women Percent Total Women Percent difference
FOREIGN SERVICE STAFF
(FSSO/FSS)
&SSO-1------------------------------ 57 10 17.5 52 10 19.2 +1.7
FSSO-2-------------------- _--------- - 98 26. 26.5 102 30 29.4 +2.9
FSSO-3_____________________--------- 171 49 28.7 181 51 28.2 -.5
FSSO-4______________________________ 262 131 50.0 245 137 55.9 +5.9
FSSO-5 ------------------------------ 308 206 66.9 334 211 63.2 -3.7
1FSSO-S------------------------------ 522 309 59.2 600 343 57.2 -2.0
FSSO-7 ------------------------------ 464 238 51.3 570 349 61.2 +9.9
'FSSO-8------------------------------ 506 353 69.8 310 204 65.8 -4.0
'FSSO-9------------------------------ 100 57 57.0 108 69 63.9 +6.9
'FSSO-10---------------------- _------ 41 37 90.2 37 34 91.9 +1.7
Subtotal, support level__________ 647 447 69.1 455 307 67.5 -1.6
ALL CIVIL SERVICE (GS/GG)
GS/GG 18---------------------------- 2 ------- 2 ---- - -
GS/GG-17---------------------------- 4 1 25.0 3 -------
-----------------------
GS/GG-16____________________________ 22 3 13.6 22 3 13.6 __________
GS/GG-15____________________________ 121 19 15.7 101 16 15.8 +.1
GS/GG-14---------------------------- 98 15 15.3 100 18 18.0 +2.7
GS/GG-13---------------------------- 158 54 34.2 158 54 34.2 __________
GS/GG-12____________________________ 181 90 49.7 177 87 49.2 -.5
GS/GG-11---------------------------- 281 146 52.0 285 150 52.6 +.6
GS/GG-10---------------------------- 67 50 74.6 68 46 67.6 -7.0
'GS/GG-9----------------------------- 407 280 68.8 361 246 68.1 -.7
-GS GG-8----------------------------- 270 221 81.9 245 199 81.2 -.7
,GS/GG-7----------------------------- 512 403 78.7 527 418 79.3 +.6
GS/GG-6----------------------------- 463 375 81.0 463 371 80.1 -.9
GS/GG-5----------------------------- 518 422 81.5 535 412 77.0 -4.5
GS/GG-4----------------------------- 317 258 81.4 332 273 82.2 +.8
GS/GG-3----------------------------- 176 134 76.1 175 142 82.6 +6.5
GS/GG-2----------------------------- 94 67 71.3 70 47 67.1 -4.2
?GS/GG-1----------------------------- 16 13 81.3 8 8 100.0 +18.7
CIVIL SERVICE (GS)
-GS-18 ------------------------------- 2 -------------------- 2 -- - -
-GS-17------------------------------- 3 --------------=----- 3
GS-16 ------------------------------- 21 3 14.3 22 3 13.6 -.7
?GS-15-------------------------------
?GS-14-------------------------------
?GS-13-------------------------------
?GS-12-------------------------------
112 17 15.2 91 13 14.3 -.9
89 15 16.9 90 18 20.0 +3.1
143 48 33.6 144 49 34.0 +.4
170 85 50.0 166 82 49.4 -.6
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CGS-11 --------------------------------
GS-10------ ________________________
-GS-9 --------------------------------
GS-8 --------------------------------
GS-7 --------------------------------
GS-6 --------------------------------
,GS-5 --------------------------------
GS-4 --------------------------------
GS-3 --------------------------------
,GS-2 --------------------------------
GS-1 --------------------------------
Percent
Total Women Percent Total Women Percent difference
268
139.
51.9
272
142
52.2
+.3
54
44
81.5
55
40
72.7
-8.8
377
264
70.0
333
230
69.1
-.9
237
201
84:8 -
212
179
84.4
-.4
472
370
78.4
485
384
79.2
+.8
372
308
82.8
344
287
83.4
+.6
492
403
81.9
500
383
76.6
-5.3
316
258
81.6
329
272
82.7
+1.1
175
134
76.6
175
142
81.1
+4.5
92
67
72.8
69
47
68.1
-4.7
16
13
81.3
8
8
100.0
+18.7
CIVIL SERVICE (GG)
GG-18-------------------------------------------------------------
GG-17------------------------------- 1 1 100.0 ----------------------------------------
~GG-16------------------------------- 1 ------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal,senior level ------------ 2 1 50.0 ________________________________________
GG-15-------------------------------
GG-14-------------------------------
GG-13-------------------------------
GG-12-------------------------------
9 2 22.2
9 --------------------
15 6 40.0
11 5 45.4
10 3 30.0 7.8
10 ------------------------------
14
11
5
35.7
-4.3
5
45.5
__________
8
61.5
+7.7
6
46.2
----------
16
57.1
+3.8
20,
60.6
----------
34
81.0
-1.5
84
65.1
+1.5
84
70.6
-3.0
29
82.9
+9.8
1
33.3
+33.3
-
13 7 53.8 13
13 6 46.2 13
30 16 53.3 28
33 20 60.6 33
GG 7 40 33 82.5 42
Subtotal, junior level ____________ 129 82 63.6 129
91 67 . . 73.6 119
26 19 73.1 35
1 ____________________ 3
1
CG-2 _____-
2 1
Subtotal support level___________ 121
Total, ------------------------ 296
BY PAY PLAN
Foreign Service:
FSO_____________________________ 3,475
FSR_____________________________ 2,226
FSRU-___767
FSSO/FSS2, 529
Total, Foreign Service ----------- 9, 036
Civil service:
GS--------------- ____3,411
GG------------ 296
Total; civil service_ _____________ 3,707
337 9.7
3,376
344
10.2
-F.5
378 17.0
2,244
353
15.7
-1.3
124 16.2
964
157
16.3
+.1
1,416 56.0
2, 539
1, 438
56.6
+.6
2, 255 25.0
9,161
2,292
25.0
----------
2,369 69.5 .
3,300
2,279
69.1
-.4
182 61.5
332
211
63.6
-1-2.1
2, 551 68.8
3, 632
2, 490
68.6
-.2,
Sources: Per/Mgt/OS Quarterly Summary of Employment (excluded are noncareer chiefs of mission, FS/GS unclassified,
consular agents; resident staff, wage board, WAE, and contract)..
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Question S. How many minorities (meaning blacks, Hispanics, Oriental Ameri-
cans and American Indians) and women ambassadors does the United States
have and where are they representing the United States?
Answer. Currently there are 15 minority ambassadors, 10 black and five His-
panic, and 13 women ambassadors. The posts at which these ambassadors are
serving as chiefs of mission are:
Black Chiefs of Mission: Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, German Democratic
Republic, Haiti, Kenya, Mali, Romania, Spain, and United Nations.
Hispanic Chiefs of Mission: Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and
Honduras.
Women Chiefs of Mission: Barbados, Grenada and Dominica, Belgium, Burma,.
Cameroon, Finland, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Mali, Malta, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Suriname, and Togo.
Question 4. Which are the key positions presently being held by women and
minorities (meaning blacks, Hispanics, Oriental Americans and American Indi-
ans) officers in the Department and abroad other than ambassadors?
Answer. Some of the key positions, in addition to chief of mission, held by
women and minority officers are :
Women
Department of State : Number
Assistant Secretary-----------------------------------------------
3
Deputy Assistant Secretary or equivalent--------------------------
10
Overseas :
Personal rank of ambassador during appointment to present position__
1
Deputy Chief of Mission------------------------------------------
2
Principal Officer ---------------------------------------------------
6
Minority of"icer8
Department of State :
Assistant Secretary_______________________________________________
1
Ambassador-at-Large ---------------------------------------------
1
Personal rank of ambassador during appointment to present position
(USUN) ------------------------------------------------------
1
Deputy Assistant Secretary or equivalent--------------------------
5
Chief of Protocol-------------------------------------------------
1
Overseas
Deputy Chief of Mission__________________________________________
3
Principal Officer--------------------------------------------------
1
Question 5. What is the Administration doing to improve the personnel situa-
tion for minorities (meaning blacks, Hispanics, Oriental Americans and Ameri-
can Indians) and women at the State Department?
Answer. A number of steps have been taken to increase the number of minority
group members and women hired as Foreign Service officers, including the estab-
lishment of numerical goals for members of minority groups entering the serv-
ice as junior officers, and for members of minority groups and women entering at
mid-career officer levels. The affirmative action junior officer program has been in
existence in one form or another since 1967. As of January 1980, a total of 244
officers have been hired through the program, of whom 205 remain in the Foreign
Service and 69 are now career Foreign Service officers.
At mid-career levels, 52 women and minority officers have entered since 1975
when the program began, 49 of whom remain in the Service. Most mid-level en-
trants are not yet eligible to seek conversion tocareer status.
Assignment procedures have been adopted to try to assure that members of
minority groups and women receive full and fair consideration for executive level .
and program direction assignments in the Department and at posts abroad. A sys-
tematic effort is made to involve minority and woman officers heavily in design-
ing and carrying out recruitment and examination programs for the Foreign
Service, including staff and specialists as well as FSOs.
Question 6. Why Is the State Department having so many problems recruiting
minorities (meaning blacks, Hispanics, Oriental Americans and American
Indians) and women for the foreign service?
Answer. It is a matter of interpretation whether the Department has had excep-
tional problems recruiting members of minority groups and women for the For-
eign Service. In the past two years, 82 minority officers have come into the
Service through the Affirmative Action Junior Officer Program (AAJOP) for
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members of minority groups, and an additional 32 have come in through the mid-
level affirmative action program for members of minority groups and women.
This is a significant number in a corps of only about 3,600 officers altogether.
Minority officers now constitute eight percent of Foreign Service officers and
candidate Foreign Service Reserve officers and women over 11 percent. Without
any numerical goals for hiring of women, 25 percent of junior officers entering this
group in FY-1979 were women, an increase of about ten percentage points over
the average of recent years.
Although the Department has had reasonable success in hiring minority and
women officers in the last two or three years, some problems were experienced.
Members of minority groups historically have not applied for the Foreign Serv-
ice in large numbers, and it was decided to reorient recruiting efforts to reach
audiences with large minority components. Much greater attention is now given to
contact with colleges and universities with large numbers of minority and women
students. The Department sends recruiters to meetings and conventions of orga-
nizations representing minority groups and women, and advertises career possi-
bilities in publications with predominantly minority readership. Approximately
ten percent of candidates appearing for the Foreign Service written examination
in December 1979 identified themselves as members of minority groups, reflecting
the favorable results of these intensified efforts to recruit minority candidates.
This emphasis is to be retained.
An additional factor affects efforts to recruit women. Some potentially quali-
fied women do not seek careers in the Foreign Service because they do not consider
themselves available for assignment world-wide.
Question 7. Please provide details on the operation and record of the EEO
junior- and mid-level hiring practices at the State Department.
Answer. An Affirmative Action hiring program was established in the Depart-
ment of State in 1967. As a result of this Foreign Service Officer Affirmative
Action Hiring Program, we have hired 244 minority Junior Officers, 69 of whom
have been commissioned as Foreign Service Officers and granted tenure. Thirty-
nine have left the Service and 135 are probationary Foreign Service Officer
candidates. In the Mid-Level program, we have hired 52 Foreign Service Officer
candidates in grades 5, 4 and 3 since 1975.
The Secretary each year establishes Affirmative Action hiring goals for Junior
and Mid-Level candidates. In FY-78 of a total hiring goal of approximately 200,
the minority goal was 43, and 43 minorities were appointed as Junior Foreign
Service Officer candidates. In FY-79, out of a total of 200, the Junior Officer
Affirmative Action goal was 43 and we hired 39 minority candidates. For FY-80
the Junior Officer Affirmative Action goal is 47. During the first quarter of this
year we hired 9 Junior Officer minorities.
In the Mid-Level hiring program the goal for FY-78 was 29, appointments were
18; for FY-79 the goal was 33, appointments were 12; the goal for this year is 33
and to date 5 have been appointed.
The Department emphasizes opportunities for members of minority groups and
women in its regular recruitment program for Foreign Service Officers, especially
for applicants making the required passing score on the FSO written examination.
All female Junior Foreign Service Officers are appointed through this process.
The number of minority applicants passing the written examination, however,
has not provided an adequate pool to permit us to meet the Affimative Action goal
through this method alone. We therefore have conducted direct recruitment of
minorities, substituting the requirements of college education for a passing score
on the FSO examination.
Qualified minority candidates recruited directly are scheduled to take the oral
assessment along with non-minority candidates who have passed the written
examination. Minority candidates who achieve a passing score in the oral assess-
ment are eligible for further processing, which consists of security investigation,
medical examination, and the Final Review Process. The Final Review Process
(FRP) is a review by four FSO's in the Office of Recruitment, Examination and
Employment-two Examiners, the Staff Director of the Board of Examiners for
the Foreign Service, and the Executive Director-of all information available
on the candidate. The scores which these four Examiners give the candidate are
averaged and constitute 25% of the candidate's total score.
In the Mid-Level program, direct recruitment is undertaken for minorities and
women. The examination consists of three phases: _(1) Initial review to deter-
mine that the application meets the minimum qualifications of age, citizenship,
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and experience to compete in the program. (2) A Qualifications Evaluation Panel
(QEP) which reviews in detail the background and qualifications of the candidate
with regard to time, duration, and quality and to identify the presence of func-
tional skills needed in the Foreign Service. (3) Candidates whom the QEP
determines have the background and qualifications necessary for a successful
career in the Foreign Service are then examined by a three person Board of
Examiners Panel. Candidates who pass the one and one-half hour oral examina-
tion are then subjected to security investigation, medical examinations, and Final
Review by a suitability panel. Candidates who pass all phases of the examination
are offered appointments in the middle levels of the Foreign Service (FSR 5?
4 or 3).
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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT,
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES,
Hon. CLAIRBORNE PELL, Washington, D.C., January 4, 1980.
Chairman, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and
Environment, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington,
D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : On behalf of the Government Accountability Project, we
want to thank you for requesting our testimony on S. 1450. The bill would re-
structure the Foreign Service personnel system, purportedly to "strengthen and
improve" the Foreign Service. Our testimony will concentrate on sections 205
and 1101-1131, establishing an office of Inspector General and restructuring the
grievance process, respectively, and sections 602 and 641, concerning the proposed
Senior Foreign Service.
The Government Accountability Project (GAP), a project of the Institute for
Policy Studies, is a non-profit public interest group formed in 1975 to help restore
and maintain confidence in the federal system by making public officials account-
able for their activities. In pursuit of these goals, GAP works to broaden public
understanding of the role of the federal employee in preventing illegal govern-
ment activities.
GAP has been especially concerned about civil servants whose careers are
destroyed for having spoken out against governmental wrongdoing. Through
public education, personal counseling and selective legal action, GAP works to
protect the right of all federal employees to initiate criticism without fear of
retaliation, and to provide these men and women with vital support. See, e.g.,
GAP's publication, "A Whistleblower's Guide to the Federal Bureaucracy" (1977).
The Foreign Service Act is particularly timely, in light of the State Depart-
ment's own perspective on the proper role of a Foreign Service officer. In a speech
reported in the October 15, 1979 issue of the Federal Times, Under Secretary of
State David D. Newsom described the two principle qualifications as loyalty and
competence. Wisely he defined competence as including "warning your principals
of problems to come. . ." Understandably, senior officials do not want to be caught
by surprise on an issue.
But what is the proper response if the responsible senior official refuses to
listen, or even recognize a serious national problem? Apparently, in that event
the State Department expectation is that the Foreign Service officer will serve
his or her boss, rather than the public. Under Secretary Newsom characterized
"discipline of expression" as a key component of loyalty. He described foreign
service officers who follow their conscience through public disclosures as a serious
threat to national interests, warning that "never has the problem been as grave
as it is today."
In our opinion, this blanket philosophy is a prescription for coverups and un-
constitutional repression of freedom of speech. As the Supreme Court noted
almost twelve years ago in a landmark First Amendment decision, Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968), it is "essential" that public officials
who are the most informed about issues of public importance "be able to speak
out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal." Although
all citizens must obey legitimate restrictions against disclosure of classified in-
formation, the Foreign Service appears to impose severe restraints upon the in-
dividual conscience as a condition of employment. That philosophy is a disservice
to accountable government.
? From GAP's experiences with personnel systems throughout the federal govern-
ment, we have found several premises which are essential for the efficient, pro-
(427)
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ductive, and equitable management of all employees. Each of these premises
emphasizes the need for personnel mechanisms which are allowed to operate
independently of the agency in which they are involved. GAP has examined
S. 1450 in light of these premises, determining if the proposed legislation will
provide :
1. A guarantee of due process, enforced by an independent office free from even
the appearance of conflict-of-interest, for participants in the system.
2. An adequate structural safeguard to protect against reprisals for those 16-
employees who disclose abuses or participate within the grievance system.
3. Meaningful sanctions against supervisors and managers who impose such
reprisals.
4. An independent mechanism to examine the substantive issues raised by
whistleblowers, allowing them a place to make confidential disclosures of
wrongdoing.
5. Maintenance of employees' high morale and resulting productivity, through
concrete protection of their rights.
S. 1450 is alarmingly deficient in each of these categories, making the possi-
bility of a strong and efficient Foreign Service personnel system a dream rather
than reality. Because of the blatant disregard of these essential premises within
this proposed legislation, implementation of S. 1450 would be actually a step
away from efficient management of employees. While the sponsors of S. 1450
correctly assert that the strength and competence of the Foreign Service rests
upon its personnel system, the proposed legislation itself would do little to cor-
rect the well-known inequities of that system. Following closely in the foot-
steps of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, S. 1450 embraces many of the short-
comings found in the earlier legislation. Three areas about which S. 1450 con-
tinues to be sorely lacking, as is existing law, are in the provisions for the office
of the Inspector General, the grievance system, and the Senior Foreign Service.
The Foreign Service personnel system will continue to be inefficient and in-
equitable until the essential premises for a balanced system are incorporated
in these areas. Any meaningful personnel system must provide for the
establishment of :
1. an Inspector General operating independently of the Secretary of State,
2. a grievance system guaranteeing due process to grievants, and
3. a Senior Foreign Service with equivalent merit system safeguards as the
Senior Executive Service in the Civil Service Reform Act.
11. ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION
A. Inspector General-Chapter 2, Section 205
In December of 1978, the Comptroller General reported to Congress that
"Essential changes must be made in the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended,
if the State Department's Office of the Inspector General, Foreign Service, is
to have the flexibility it needs to improve its evaluation processes." Section 205
provides for the establishment of the Office of the Inspector General. However,
it falls short of providing for an Inspector General with the independent operat-
ing authority he needs to discharge his duties effectively.
One change proposed, Section 205(a) of S. 1450, would extend the maximum
time period between inspections from two to three years, as recommended by
the Comptroller General. This change was intended to alleviate the burden of
inspections placed on an inspection staff that is "sometimes spread too thin
to do a thorough analytical job." 1 However, cutting back on the number of A
evaluations made by the Inspector General would not necessarily lead to more
-thorough analysis.
Instead a positive approach is needed to increase the efficiency of the Inspec-
tor General, such as a guarantee of adequate staff and resources. A benefit from
increased staff and resources would be the formulation of a clearer mandate
and stronger support for the functions of the office. The evaluation and review
functions of the Inspector General should be central to the process of strengthen-
ing the Foreign Service and its personnel system, particularly by identifying
.inappropriate acts and procedures. To reduce the amount of required inspec-
tions, as done in Section 205(a), in the interest of "flexibility" is to sacrifice
the Inspector General's much needed oversight capabilities.
Another major impediment to an active and objective Inspector General is the
decisive role of the Secretary of State in the Inspector General's activities. The
1 Comptroller General Report, State Department's Office of Inspector General, Foreign
Service, Needs to Improve Its Internal Evaluation Process 1(1978).
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Inspector General's independence is severely limited by the influence of the Sec-
retary's management offices, which not only approve the budget and operations
of the Inspector General, but also decide on the suitability of his recommenda-
tions. Throughout Section 205, the Inspector General is tied even closer to the
Secretary, bound again and again to "the direction of the Secretary." This clause
could easily be used to subvert every mandate of authority given to the Inspector
General and runs contrary to the very principles of objective evaluation and
oversight as expressed by Congress in the Inspector General Act of 1978. This
act, while not binding on the State Department, can be viewed as the voice of
Congress supporting the necessary independent movements of an Inspector Gen-
eral. It is worth noting the observable differences between Section 205 of S. 1450
and the Inspector General Act of 1978.
Section 205(b) implicitly limits the Inspector General as to what programs
and activities can be evaluated by virtue of the "under the direction of the Sec-
retary" stipulation. By allowing the Secretary the authority to guide the direc-
tion of the Inspector General's inspections, the effectiveness and objectivity of
these inspections are severely compromised. By implementing the words "under
the direction of the Secretary." Section 205 runs contrary to Section 3(a) of
the Inspector General Act of 1978 which states :
"The Inspector General reports to, and is under the general supervision of the
head of the Agency. However, the head of the Agenry may not prohibit, prevent
or limit the Inspector General from undertaking and completing any audits and
investigations which the Inspector General deems necessary, or from, issuing
any subpoenas deemed necessary in the course of such audits and investigations."
(Emphasis added).
Section 205(c) also affords the opportunity for a misuse of authority by giv-
ing the Secretary "blank check" authority to dismiss any Foreign Service In-
spector, or to suspend from duty any member of the Service other than a Chief
of Mission. Characteristically, in the Department of State, such authority is
actually exercised by the management officials whose activities would be most
susceptible to criticism by a truly independent Tnspecto.r General. So any un-
checked authority given to the Secretary can be presumed to be unchecked au-
thority delegated downward to those who would be least in favor of the inde-
pendent operations of the Inspector General.
Finally, Section 205 omits a vital component of the Inspector General Act of
1978. This is Section 5(b) of the Act which serves to maintain the independent
behavior of the Inspector General by guarding against any alteration or deletion
of the Inspector General's findings by an Agency head-in this case, the Secre-
tary. A comparable statement to that of the Inspector General Act of 1978, Sec-
tion 5(b), should be included within Section 205 of S. 1450, reading as follows:
"The head of the Agency may submit his own comments along with the In-
spector General's report, but may not generally prevent the report from going to
Congress or alter or delete the report."
With these recommended changes in Section 205, the Inspector General would
be better equipped to pursue the vigilant and independent course of action desig-
nated by Congress. Thus the Inspector General would be allowed to direct reme-
dial attention to improper, inefficient, inequitable, or illegal conduct wherever it
may be found within the scope of the Inspector General's investigations.
We do not perceive any valid reason to deny Foreign Service employees an
independent Inspector General. While the State Department often engages in
sensitive assignments, Foreign Service whistleblowers are not excluded from
coverage of the Office of the Special Counsel under the Civil Service Reform Act.
As the Conference Report on the Reform Act observed, "Foreign Service officers
are not excluded from coverage of the prohibited personnel practices." (S. Rept.
No. 95-1272, 95th Congress, 2d Session 128 (Comm. of Conference 1978).) It
would be unfortunate for the Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection
Board to become overburdened with complaints from the Foreign Service, due
to the absence of an independent office at the State Department.
B. Grievances-Chapter 11
The urgent need for a fair and equitable grievance system within the Foreign
Service has been a recurrent issue before this subcommittee since 1971. As Rep-
resentative Lee Hamilton of Indiana, testifying before a House Subcommittee,
stressed : "Unless all employees believe that the grievance system is fair and
impartial, no grievance system will work." Under the proposed legislation of
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S. 1450, the grievance system continues to suffer from a "credibility gap," a gap
which seriously impedes the airing and resolution of grievances within the
system. The problems of the Foreign Service grievance system continue and
promise to continue as long as the guarantee of due process is sidestepped.
Throughout Chapter 11 of S. 1450, provisions are qualified and the language is
couched in terms which evade the guarantee of due process to grievants. We
urge the subcommittee to adopt, in place of these inadequate provisions, a more
comprehensive guarantee of due process as formulated in H.R. 9805 which was
introduced by Representative Hamilton on September 24, 1975, or in the identical
S. 1080 introduced by Senator Bayh on the same day.
Section 1101. Definition of Grievance.-Within Section 1101, as contained in
this draft legislation, the definition of grievance is so narrow that many very
serious grievances are excluded, such as promotions, assignments, discrimina-
selection-out and retaliatory attrition or limited appointments. In effect,
tion,
this section handcuffs the system to a position of very limited jurisdiction. A
much more inclusive definition of grievances is needed within this legislation
to replace the exclusive nature of the present wording. One such inclusive and
more appropriate definition of grievance can be found in S. 1080.
(B) `grievance' shall mean a complaint against any claim of injustice or
unfair treatment of such officer or employee arising from his employment or
career status, or from any actions, documents or records, which could result
in career impairment or damage, monetary loss to the officer or employee, or
deprivation of basic due process, and shall include, but not be limited to, actions
in the nature of reprisals and discrimination, actions related to promotion or
selection-out, the contents of any efficiency report, related records, or security
records, and actions in the nature of adverse personnel actions, including sepa-
ration for cause, denial of a salary increase, (in-step increase in salary), writ-
ten reprimand placed in a personnel file, or denial of allowances."
Section 1103(b) Freedom of Action.-Under this section, 1103(b), the union
becomes the exclusive representative for grievants within the bargaining unit.
Several serious problems stein from this provision :
First, individual members of the bargaining unit would thereby be deprived
of the right to choose their own representative for presenting their positions to
the Grievance Board. Besides putting undue demands upon an organization that
lacks suitable resources, this also places a large amount of authority within
the union. Operating under this stipulation, the union as the exclusive repre-
sentative becomes a determining factor in who is allowed access to the Grievance
Board. In lieu of these shortcomings of Section 1103(b), it is our recommenda-
tion that the working of this passage be amended as follows :
"The grievant has the right to a representative of his/her own choosing at
every stage of the proceedings." S. 1080
It is significant that in December 14, 1979 testimony, even Robert H. Stern of
the American Foreign Service Association reported, "Indeed, we would prefer
that the monopoly on access to the grievance board not be imposed." Mr. Stern's
position was echoed in December 14, 1979 testimony by Kenneth T. Blaylock,
President of the American Federation of Government Employees.
Section 111.1 Composition of the Grievance Board.-Although S. 1450 makes
the gesture of requiring Grievance Board members to be "well-known for their
integrity," the specifics of Section 1111 may defeat this premise. Former mem-
bers of the "interim" Grievance Board or the Department's Office of Personnel
would be eligible as well as any former officers or employees of the Department
or any other foreign affairs agencies. We agree with Foreign Service Reserve
Officer Cynthia Thomas' December 14, 1979 criticisms of these loopholes. She
noted perceptively that former members of the grievance or personnel system
"can be expected to perpetuate the evils of the interim grievance procedures
which an independent and impartial membership would have eliminated." She
further observed that even a retired officer retains a potential conflict of interest
through his or her status as Foreign Service Reserve appointee, "a desirable
and lucrative position."
Section 1112 Board Procedures.-This section outlines the regulations and
procedures under which the Grievance Board operates. Again, the language in-
cludes too many reservations and qualifiers to allow the Grievance Board to
perform its functions adequately. Section 1112 (1-2) and Section 1112 (8) are
the most troublesome provisions.
Section 1112(1) delineates the circumstances under which the Board could
hold a hearing. Section 1112(2) follows this by describing the circumstances
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431
the hearin could be open to others. und
which gi veer the B and arbitrary authority. The questionhof@whtwo ether or sub-sections, to hold 2,
hearing is fundamental to the grievance process. To allow the Grievance Board worthiness of a grievance, i.e., the
However, this potential
necessity ofy authority is t to invitem misuse of this power.
of a hearing, ,
misuse of authority could be avoided if the Board were required to conduct
good
e operation of hearings should be the be open unless the lBoardhdetermines for these
hearings whever
reason that ey antee of due process should w thin the grievance i system. S. 1080 add esses these guartwo
points in a more evenhanded manner :
"The Board shall conduct a hearing in any case filed with it. A hearing shall
be open unless the Board for good cause determines otherwise." also poses some
Section 1112(8) Suspension of Action.-Section 1112(8)
serious problems in its attachment of a stipulation to its Suspension of Action
passage. Again, the and reservations placed on it. A bettervprovision hwould suspend departmental
actions which are related to or may affect a grievance pending before until the grievant from any reprisals made, by the D pa Department until the G the
Board has ruled on the case. However, within S. 1450 the head of the agency,
or the Chief of Mission, or principal officer is allowed to exclude the grievant
from the premises or relieve him from his functions before the Board comes to
any ruling. Thus the grievant is stripped of this protection from ~ mora equitablg
a decision from the Grievance Board. To amend this passage,
provision would be written as follows :
"If the Board determines that (a) the Department is considering any action
(including, but not limited to, separation or termination) which is related to.
or may affect, a grievance pending before the Board, and (b) the action should
be suspended, the Department shall suspend such action until the Board has
ruled upon such grievance." S. 1080
With this amended wording, the authority to suspend action rests in the
Grievance Board's hands rather than in the hands of those who are very likely
the source of the grievance. This seems to us to be a much wiser appropriation
of authority.
Section 1113 Board Decisions.-One of the major weaknesses of the whole
grievance system is to be found in this section. The Grievance Board's lack of
authority to make binding its own ruling undermines its raison d'etre. By only
being able to recommend a remedy to the Agency head, the Grievance Board is
rendered fairly impotent. If the Grievance Board is to be more than a kangaroo
court, it must be able to back its ruling with some authority. As it reads in
Section 1113, the agency head may choose whether or not to follow the Board's
recommendation according to an ambiguous definition of the ruling's compliance
to "the needs of the Service." To allot the Grievance Board authority in regards
to its rulings would be to issue a vote of confidence in the grievance system
itself. However, to hold back on this transfer of authority from the agency head
to the Grievance Board is to diminish the value of the grievance system as a
whole. It is for this reason that we strongly urge that Section 1113 be amended
to make the decisions of the Grievance Board binding. A provision as found
in S. 1080 could be used in place of the current wording.
"The Board's recommendations are final and binding on all parties, except that
the Secretary may rejecc any such recommendation only if he determines that
the foreign policy or security of the United States will be adversely affected.
Any such determination shall be fully documented with the reasons therefore
and shall be signed personally by the Secretary, with a copy thereof furnished
the grievant.
"After completing his review of the resolution, recommendation, and Record
of Proceedings of the Board, the Secretary shall return the entire record of the
case to the Board for its retention. No officer or employee of the Department
participating in a proceeding on behalf of the Department shall, in any manner,
prepare, assist in preparing, advise, inform, or otherwise participate in, any
review or determination of the Secretary with respect to that proceeding."
We are similarly disturbed by the narrow scope of Board remedies. There is
no provision for disciplinary action against the perpetrators of illegal reprisals.
While Section 1113(b) (5) permits "other remedial action as may be appropriate
in procedures agreed to by the Department and the ezelusive representative"
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432
it is highly unlikely that the State Department would voluntarily accept dis-
ciplinary sanctions.
The significance of this loophole, as well as the effective limitations on the
Board's authority to suspend pending actions, is that a supervisor has nothing
to lose by engaging in a frivolous reprisal. At most the retaliation may be
neutralized eventually at no penalty to the perpetrator of the reprisal, and after
the grieved employee has suffered significant emotional, professional and finan-
cial hardship. Section 1113 (b) should have specific provision for disciplinary
sanctions against those responsible for illegal reprisals that violate merit system
principles.
C. Senior Foreign Service Sections
We agree with Professor Herz's December 14, 1979 testimony that the specific
provisions for the Senior Foreign Service appear "tailor-made for unscrupulous
use against senior officers suspected of holding views divergent from those of
an incoming new administration." The problem is not with the concept of a
manipulation. The Act e shbut with the absence of ould be modified to conform to the analogous Senior
Executive Service established by the Civil Service Reform Act.
The flaws of the proposed Senior Foreign Service (SIPS) include :
1. The priority given to attrition in Section 602(b), in direct conflict with the
merit principle of retaining employees on the adequacy of their performance.
2. The absence of a "parachute clause" in Section 641 entitling those removed
from the SFS for reasons other that misconduct or malfeasance to placement in
a meaningful non-SPS position ; and
3. The unprecedented authority in Section 641(b) for the Secretary to make
"limited extensions" of SF S appointments, thereby stifling dissent and creativity
by leaving SIPS members in a constant state of uncertainty about their future.
III. MINIMUM PRINCIPLES FOR AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM
Any legislation which promises, as does the Foreign Service Act of 79, to
strengthen and improve the personnel system must provide a safe mechanism
for the disclosure of agency misconduct. However, it is increasingly obvious that
that the Foreign Service Act of 1979 fails to institutionalize effective protection
for Foreign Service Officers who disclose agency abuses. It is ironic that legis-
lation which proposes to increase "compatibility between the Foreign Service
and Civil Service" actually contributes to a growing disparity between the two
systems. The Civil Service Reform Act includes Foreign Service employees under
the umbrella of the Office of the Special Counsel. But in terms of internal
Foreign Service personnel policy, S. 1450 represents a major step away from
the governmental self-cleansing mechanism" established by the Reform Act.
At a minimum an effective Foreign Service personnel system should include:
1. an explicit commitment to pursue merit system principles (5 U.S.C. 2301)
and to guard against prohibited personnel practices (5 U.S.C. 2302).
office of 2. establishment of structural guarantees to insure the independence of the
Inspector tlGenen le should ebeiappoin appointed by thelPresidentewiand pressures. The
th the advice and
consent of the Senate. But only the President should be authorized to remove
the Inspector General, and only for inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance.
While the Inspector General Office would be formally a part of the State Depart-
ment, it should present a separate budget annually for congressional approval.
This would build congressional oversight into the system.
duty
Service employee todetermnine whether thell whi tleblfwer's reprisal
disclosure was based
on a reasonable belief that illegal or improper activity has occurred, and whether
there are reasonable grounds to believe the reprisal was linked to the disclosure.
Whenever these conditions are met, the Inspector General should have the
authority to issue recommendations for agency action to neutralize the retalia-
tion. If the Secretary does not comply within a reasonable period, the Inspector
General should have the authority to request the Merit System Protection Board
to order compliance.
4. authority for the Inspector General to investigate confidential disclosures
from Foreign Service employees or former employees, and order the Secretary
to investigate and report on any disclosure, if the Inspector General determines
that there is a substantial likelihood the information discloses violations of any
law, rule or regulation, mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority,
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or substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. The Inspector
General should work with the whistleblower to evaluate the adequacy of the
Secretary's investigative report and corrective action. Both the report and the
evaluation should be available to the public, with appropriate deletions man-
dated by the Privacy Act and the FOIA.
5. authority for the Inspector General to issue a complaint to the Merit
Systems Protection Board recommending disciplinary action against any official
responsible for an illegal reprisal against a Foreign Service whistleblower.
6. a requirement for the Inspector General to submit semi-annual reports to
Congress summarizing the activities of the audit, investigative and inspection
units of the Foreign Service. These reports should include instances of sig-
nificant wrongdoings or patterns of wrongdoings as determined by the Inspector
General; a summary of matters referred for prosecution and the results of such
prosecutions; and a statistical summary of audit and inspection records com-
pleted during the reporting period. Under no circumstances should the Secretary
of. State be permitted to alter or delete the contents of any Inspector General
reports.
7. modification of the proposed grievance system to incorporate broad juris-
diction ; the employee's right to a representative of his/her choice ; a district
prohibition against even potential conflicts of interest in Grievance Board mem-
bership ; the right to an open hearing ; Board authority to suspend contested
personnel actions during pending investigations ; and Board authority to issue
final decisions. including disciplinary sanctions against those responsible for
illegal personnel actions.
8. modification of the Senior Foreign Service provisions to conform to the
Senior Executive Service of the Civil Service Reform Act.
We apprecate the opportunity to submit this testimony. Please do not hesitate
to request our further assistance.
Sincerely,
Louis A. CLARK,
Director.
DEBORAH K. BURAND,
Intern.
DEAR SENATOR PELL : Having recently retired from the Department of State
as a senior Foreign Service Officer, I would like to express my views on the
proposed restructuring of the Foreign Service (revision of the Foreign Service
Act of 1946).
Let me begin by saying that I fully support the consolidation of overseas em-
ployees into a single Foreign Service and of domestic employees into the Civil
Service, thereby eliminating the dog's breakfast of FSOs, FSS, FSR, FSR-U,
etc. I also favor the provision which would bring about pay comparability be-
tween the Foreign and Civil Services. These changes are long overdue and have
widespread support within the Foreign Service.
There are, however, many other provisions in the proposed restructuring with
which I and my former colleagues do not agree.
First, I question the whole need for a Senior Foreign Service. The main thrust
of the Senior Executive Service is toward what the Foreign Service already
has: a rank-in-the-man system based on regular competition for promotion. I
have a sense of change simply for administrative conformity between the Civil
and Foreign Services. I am particularly concerned over the threat which Am-
hassador Martin Herz has so sbly set forth for yolr Committee-that as pro-
posed. the Senior Foreign Service would open the upper ranks of the Foreign
Service to serious political abuse and critically weaken the ability of senior
officers to press differing views on their political superiors without fear of los-
ing their appointments and ending their careers. Many of my senior colleagues
sti llserving share this view.
I also oppose the concept of performance pay, on which Ambassador Sheldon
Vance has testified. I understand the Air Force tried and abandoned something
like it. The local press has reported the Penna. Ave. Development Agency's un-
happy experience with performance pay, and I've been told that other Federal
agencies are having difficulties trying to develop criteria for awarding such
pay equitably. The Foreign Service will have the same problems. Frankly, it's
Ilan. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
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an insult to our Ambassadors and Sub-Cabinet officers and other senior officers,
who aren't in their jobs for more money. A large part of the impetus for per-
formance pay comes from an effort to break out of the freeze on top executive
salaries. The Congress should find a solution to this problem directly, without
trying an indirect solution that will cause more problems than it will cure.
My colleagues and I appreciate your interest in the Foreign Service as a ca-
reer and I am guardedly optimistic that your Committee will correct the de-
ficiencies in the Administration's proposal to give the Service a bill that will
truly strengthen it. As events are proving, the country clearly needs it.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
MONCRIEFF J. SPEAR.
P.S.-I hope that you will ask the Department of State for the draft regula-
tions for the implementation of this proposed legislation. I think it will give
you a much better idea of what they really have in mind for the Senior Foreign
Service.
RESTON, VA., January 15, 1950.
Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR CHURCH : I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending to the Chair-
man of the Senate Subcommittee that is considering Foreign Service "reform"
legislation, urging that he support amendments to the Bill proposed by State
Management to incorporate provisions paralleling the "Bayh Bill" that passed
the Senate four times in the early 1970's.
I urge you to impress upon Senator Pell your continuing support for due
process in Foreign Service personnel operations.
Sincerely,
Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Subcommittee on International Operations, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : The Government Accountability Project (GAP), in a
letter of January 4 to you, contends that better Foreign Service grievance pro-
cedures and more independence for the State Department Inspector General
would serve the intent of S. 1450, to "strengthen and improve" the Foreign
Service.
Many Foreign Service Officers share the view that the GAP analysis and pro-
posals would, if reflected in the final bill that will be recommended by your Com-
mittee, significantly benefit professional diplomacy.
The GAP approach parallels the eloquent testimony of Cynthia Thomas before
your Committee, as well as provisions of the "Bayh Bill" that received Senate
approval in four consecutive years (1971-75), only to be blocked by Congressman
Wayne Hays.
As you may recall, my own analysis of the Foreign Service personnel system
was spelled out in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as
published in the Committee's hearing records on the "Bayh Bill" (October, 1971),
the Macomber confirmation hearing (March, 1973), and the Foreign Service pro-
motion list (February, 1976). I hope you will ask your staff to review this cri-
tique, in the context of other information that has come to its attention with
S. 1450.
The thrust of that testimony was that guarantees of due process could, in
due course, sharply rectify the inequities and inefficiencies that have plagued
the Foreign Service, particularly during the Watergate years.
State Management has held that such fundamental reforms-carefully avoided
in the original version of the bill you are considerinb are incompatible with
existing Foreign Service personnel operations. That is true. Due process would
mean Foreign Service promotions and assignments would be less based on the
arbitrary and capricious manipulation that has determined Foreign Service
careers in the past, and more on experience, proven ability, and prior
achievements.
The attached memorandum reflects some serious health and family problems
that have arisen as a consequence of the system as it now exists.
I urge you to weight the GAP recommendations very carefully.
Sincerely,
JOHN J. HARTER.
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U.S. GOVERNMENT-MEMORANDUM,
November 26,1979.
To : (Addressee deleted.)
From : PGM/PPO-John J. Harter.
Subject : Paper on the Iranian crisis and the Foreign Service image.
Betty Ann Weinstein of the I.C.A. Advisory, Referral, and Counselling Service
contends there is an urgent need for authentic information to document the stress
that normally characterizes life and work in the Foreign Service.
I have so far been unable to identify reliable or comprehensive data to illus-
trate hazards related to terrorist activity experienced in recent years by I.C.A.
personnel or attacks on our overseas libraries. I.C.A. sources assume such infor-
ination from State would probably include relevant incidents involving I.C.A.
and A.I.D. personnel. If this should not prove the case, I can pursue this further.
Alternatively, I might be able to develop specific information relating to past
situations that attracted public notice in Cairo, San Salvador, and Santo Domingo.
However, Ms. Weinstein suggests that such dramatic developments represent
only a part of the threats to psychological health in the Foreign Service.
"Many distraught families, with very serious problems, appeal to our office for
help," she says, "and in many cases the problems stem from direct conflicts be-
tween family needs and work requirements."
For example, she explained, many officers have felt compelled to save or advance
their careers, to accept assignments at difficult posts, at which dependents were
not allowed, or did not choose to go to. The Officers believed such assignments
would lead to their promotion and improved professional outlook that would com-
pensate them for the temporary disadvantages.
"When a personnel officer urges such an assignment," she said, "it puts tre-
mendous strain on the officer to accept it. He naturally wants his career to prosper,
and he is persuaded that a temporary sacrifice will, in the long run, be beneficial."
In some cases, temporary separation seems the only way of avoiding selection
out, she said. But in practice, she has found, the resulting situation-where the
wife and children remain in the United States without support from the head of
household-puts "intolerable strain" on families, and has, in many cases, led to
critical family, psychiatric, or even cardiac difficulties.
Wife and child abuse has resulted in some cases, she says.
"Generally, no one knows about this. The wife who turns to our Center for help
feels compelled to keep her problem secret for fear of further increasing the
threat to her physical well being, or her husband's career."
Ms. Weinstein emphasized that her comments were "subjective impressions."
She said to date there has been "no scientific study" of these issues. "We need
objective information" about these matters, she emphasizes.
WOMEN'S ACTION ORGANIZATION,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
December 18, 1979.
Hon. Senator CI.AInORNE PELL,
Chairman,, Subcommittee on Arras Control, Oceans, International Operations
and Environment, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washing-
ton, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : Your Subcommittee has before it the proposal by the
Department of State called "The Foreign Service Act of 1979". The Women's
Action Organization of State, A.I.D. and U.S.I.C.A. are concerned because the
proposed legislation does not mandate equal opportunity in employment, its defi-
nition of "merit principles" does not prohibit discrimination based on sex, race,
etc., nor provide for affirmative action, and does not establish a basis in law
for the offices charged with equal employment opportunity in the three agencies.
We are especially concerned by these lacunae in the proposed legislation be-
cause there are important groups who claim that the Department of State, AID
and ICA are not bound, in their dealings with their Foreign Service employees,
by the amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1963 in Title VII, nor the Executive
Orders on equal opportunity and affirmative action because the Civil Service
Commission was designated the implementing agency.
The need for a legislative mandate becomes clearer when the role and status
of current women employees in the three foreign affairs agencies is examined.
As you might expect, there are few women officers and fewer in the upper
grades and in the most advantageous occupational categories (career cones).
Nor do current trends appear to be directed toward a significant improvement
in the foreseeable future.
I understand that your Subcommittee had only one day for hearings on the
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proposed legislation. The Women's Action Organization wishes to submit for the
record two recent documents summarizing the role of women employees. One
is our testimony before the House Subcommittees on International Operations
and on Employee Ethics and Utilization on July 18, 1979, concerning the legisla-
tion. (We wish to note that subsequent to that tesimony our professional asso-
elation-the Ameri-Can Foreign Service Association-reversed itself and came
out in favor of equal opportunity in employment and affirmative action.) The
second is a "Profile of Women in AID" prepared by our organization in Septem-
ber 1979.
We believe that the Foreign Service of the United States should be representa-
tive of the American population as a whole : to bring to the effort of developing
and implementing our foreign policy the best talent available, to present to the
peoples and governments abroad tangible evidence of the diversity of our great
nation, and to ensure equal justice for all current and prospective federal
employees.
Thank you very much for your consideration.
MARGUERITE COOPER KING,
Vice President for State.
STATEMENT BY MARGUERITE COOPER KING, VICE PRESIDENT FOR STATE OF THE
WOMEN'S ACTION ORGANIZATION
The Women's Action Organization represents employees-and their spouses-
of the three foreign affairs agencies: State, AID and USICA. It began as an
Ad Hoc Group in 1970 dedicated to the removal of discrimination from our
personnel system and to promote equal opportunity for all employees, regard-
less of sex.
This Ad Hoc Group to Improve the Status of Women in the Foreign Affairs
Agencies received the Presidential Management Improvement Award for 1972
for the reforms it stimulated. These included the revision of policies and regu-
lations to remove barriers and penalties imposed on Foreign Service women
employees who married, to prohibit discrimination in assignments, to establish
the right of family members to be considered "private persons" and the right
to work abroad, among other reforms.
In recent years we have supported upward mobility programs for support
and officer level employees in the Civil and Foreign Services, participated in
the Department's review and formulation of an affirmative action program,
supported class action suits against the Department of State for sex discrimina-
tion, sponsored the Spouses' Skills/Data Bank and the formation of the Family
Liaison Office, and provided a series of programs for all employees explaining
the available procedures for personal career advancement.
I have come before you today on behalf of the Women's Action Organization
to-ask that equality of opportunity in all aspects of employment in the Foreign
Service be included as a statutory requirement of the Foreign Service Act of
1979. In its present form, the legislation describes as an objective (sections 101
(a) (3) and (b) (2)) that the Foreign Service should be representative of the
American people, operated on the basis of merit, with fair and equitable treat-
ment for all. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 also called for a representative
Service-but it is not now representative in numbers, grades, functions and
regions.
We have not come here to complain but to set out the facts. And. to sugge,,t
some parts of the proposed legislation that need to be changed to facilitate equal
employment policies and practices to ensure that American foreign interests are
represented by the best that this nation has to offer.
Let me speak first about women employees of the Department with some men-
tion of our sister agencies, AID and ICA. Then I will turn to the concerns of
Foreign Service spouses-overwhelmingly, but not totally, women.
Foreign Service officer-level women in the three agencies face similar prob-
lems. They are few in number, they make up only a miniscule proportion of the
senior grades and policy-making positions, they are not given positions com-
mensurate with their qualifications and potential, and their promotions are
slower than for their male colleagues.
Let us first look at Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) In the Department of
State. Women make up only 1.0 percent of the FSO corps. I have provided a
chart so that we can see where the women are and what kind of work they are
doing. (Table at page 441 of the attached, part of a brief filed in the U.S. District
Court for D.C. as part of two class action suits brought against the Department.)
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Before .going :to the chart, I want to draw some distinctions between the per-
sonnel systems of: the Foreign Service..and the Civil Service. In the former, there
are eight Foreign Service Officer grades (plus Career Minister) going from the
bottom . (FSO-8) to the top (FSO-1, Career Minister). Second, unlike the Civil
Service, Foreign Service. personnel are not hired for a specific position in which
they may. hope .to. move up to increasing responsibility. Foreign Service Officers
are considered generalists ; they are given certain specialties or functions, and
periodic assignments, usually within that broad specialty.
To go back- to thee chart, it tilts south-by-west: most women are in the junior
levels, FSO-8 to 5. There is a dearth of women in.the senior grades. Only 2.4
percent of all women FSOs are at the FSO-1 level,:and 1.8 percent are at the
FSO-2 level. For purposes of comparison, those percentages for men FSOs are
8.6 percent and+10.0 percent, respectively. I wish I could say that we. are at
least.doing better than before. That is not true. The percentage of women are
actually decreasing in the top grades, as detailed on page 442 of the attached
brief. .
The chart also shows that women have been placed in career categories-
specialties or?functions-where the opportunities for advancement are severely
limited. Senior grades are concentrated in the executive, program management,
political and economic/commercial functions. But where are all the women
found? Concentrated in the consular and administrative functions. The,?rela-
tionship between function and promotion is analyzed on page 442 of the attached.
There appears to be no rational, performance-related reasons for such con-
centrations based on sex. Until there is a more equal distribution, women can
not hope to advance to the top in comparable percentages with their male col-
leagues nor can management be assured that they are getting the best personnel
at the.highest level of our career Service.
Key to advancement is assignments-made for each officer on the average of
every two years. It is the way you gain additional experience and responsibility,
learning how to. deal with the varied and complex aspects of our foreign rela-
tions, to negotiate, represent, and develop policy on behalf of your country.
Yet the assignment process is overwhelmingly in the hands of men where the
"old boy" .network perpetuates the selection- of a few for the best positions, with-
out requiring open competition among all' -qualified : candidates.
In competing for assignments women candidates face several roadblocks
obstacles that exist largely in the minds of the men (and the few women) , mak-
ing-,.personnel.decisions. Women are not given supervisory positions generallya
they fail to recognize the leadership qualities in women and often presume that
men do not ? like to. be supervised by women.. Stereotypes about what~,kind of
work is. "appropriate" or "natural". to women limit-their assignment choices.
Let me give you. some examples : women are seen as personnel or consular -offi-
cers; but not as labor or politico-military officers. Such stereotypes ignore! Indi-
vidual qualifications and limit assignments for women.
Gallant but old-fashioned assignment officers are often reluctant .to!:assign
women officers to hardship or hazardous posts. But, women took the, same-oath
of office and expect to take their fair share of such duty. Such assignments can
often be career advancing. It is this .same old-fashioned attitude that makes
assignment officers believe that women officers cannot be effective in countries
where local law and/or custom accord low status to their women. The tproblem,
I assert, is in the minds of American personnel officers rather than in--the minds
of other diplomats and host country officials.
/) Women have served with excellence in every part of the globe including the
Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia. My personal experience; has been
that the prestige of the U.S. diplomatic corps is universal and that personal
competence and skills-not sex-are the basic criteria for success as a diplo-
mat, as in any other career.
The effect of such bias in assignments has been to, limit the opportunities for
women and to fail to use efficiently the resources of the Foreign Service: 'A' study
by my organization in 1975 showed that of all senior Foreign Service career
women officers, 43 percent were serving in positions at least one grade beneath
their personal rank.'This is most graphically illustrated by career ambassadorial
assignments. Not only are women chiefs of mission few and far between-six
career women are such-but they are appointed to"those countries to' which we
assign the lowest level of priority and importance in U.S. foreign relations (see
page 443 of the attached).
There are other officer categories in the Foreign Service. The reserve limited
and unlimited officer categories and Foreign Service Staff Officers face the same
stereotypes by personnel officers that limit women's entry, assignments and
promotions in disregard of their individual qualifications and potential:
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Most women in the Foreign Service are secretaries, at :the staff or support
level below the officer grades. The President. of the American Foreign Service
Association, Lars Hydal, mentioned these problems on ihdy 9. We agree that
they are deprived of appropriate professional status, adequate pay including coni-
pensation for long overtime and standby duty, and that they are unfairly hit
by local duties and taxes their higher-salaried officer colleagues are exempt from.
We support his call for priority negotiations by the Secretary to protect non-
commissioned employees from such local duties and taxes and for increased funds
to ensure appropriate language and area training for staff personnel.
In addition to' these problems relating to the secretarial profession, Staff
Corps women are also disadvantaged in comparison with their male colleagues.
In promotions, in 1977, 67 percent of all Staff Corps women were eligible for
promotion against 33 percent for men, yet their promotions were only 11.6 percent
compared to 16 percent for men. In part, this is because men. are concentrated in
Staff functions that have higher career ceilings than women : women have dif-
ficulty breaking into those functions.
Outside of the Foreign Service proper- there is. 'a large segment'of the employee
population at State who "are Civil Service. While we are here to address an At
titled and almost entirely concerned with the Foreign Service, the-Civil Service
is ? a `little over one-third,the size of- the Foreign Service" (3,632 versus 9,161).
However, the Civil Service component at State has historically been neglected.
That was the finding of a 1975 Civil Service Commission Study ("Personnel Man-
agement in the Department of State") which:, went onto say.that "performance
evaluation and training of Civil Service employees is ineffective, lacks adequate
planning and follow-through and fails to meet even minimum requirements." It
also said that "promotion program administration fails to.meet even basic and
minimal merit system requirements, causing serious violations and providing no
assurance to' management that the best qualified are selected and no assurance
to the employees that they are. being equitably considered." Civil Service. women
are overwhelmingly at the bottom of the ladder : only'6 percent of all Civil Serv-
ice women employees at State are at the senior-and the middle levels, 43 percent
are GS-7 through 11, and 51 percent are GS-6 and below.
Because of -the slow pace of progress, in 1976 we decided that it was necessary
to seek justice by going outside of the Department. We joined. in support of a
class action suit charging' systemic discrimination by the Department against
women FSOs. After "almost three years, that and a parallel suit have just been
certified for class action last month. The Department has failed to respond to
the issues and sought endless delays.
We must, in honesty, look at this situation from a historical perspective. So
-long as women had to be single as a condition of employment, a Foreign Service
career was of limited appeal. Women employee's position today is the accumulated
result of many years of discrimination that cannot be overturned at once. We
believe that we must begin by ending current practices of discrimination and
locating' skills and resources that are now underutilized and take affirmative
action to place those resources where we need them to get the job done.
For many years affirmative action plans have been time-consuming but largely
ineffectual exercises. The Department paid only lip-service to equal opportunity :
senior leaders made pronouncements that were ignored in practice. Secretary
Vance made 'a new attempt when he came aboard and formed an executive level
task force on affirmative action., The Women's Action Organization provided
studies and suggested remedies. Although not as specific or -effective as we had
hoped, we joined with several employee groups, representing minorities in support
of the task force recommendations.
Those were, however, emasculated along the road when they were turned over
to the career. ranks to translate into specific plans of action. Those who believe
in these stereotypes and do not realize that their gallantry is a form of dis-
crimination, were unlikely to come up with relevant affirmative actions that
would address the special problems of women and minorities. Even the surviving
recommendations of modest effect were attacked and challenged by our own
professional association, AFSA.
This is a bleak picture indeed, and it is no better for minorities at State. I
wish I could tell you that the Department was moving toward becoming an equal
opportunity employer. It is not. I do, however, want to record our appreciation
for Secretary Vance's personal attention and leadership in awakening in State
some realization that the present distribution of rewards and responsibilities
reflects a long history of bias, and Assistant Secretary Moose's wise leadership
of the affirmative action task force.
It should be clear from the above that the Department on its own is unable or
unwilling to carry out the goals mentioned in the first chapter of the proposed
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In order to ensure oversight and implementation of this responsibility for the
Department as, a whole it is proposed that the Inspector Generals responsibili-
ties should include, an examination of whether merit and ,equal opportunity
section 301 (General Requirements of Appointment). (b)should add
"equal opportunity"? following "merit" (to read in accordance with merit
and equal opportunity principles.")
section 511 (Assignments to Foreign Service Positions) ; (a) ,,add "and
-equal opportunity" following "merit" (to read in accordance with merit
and equal opportunity principles")
8cctioa, 601. (Promotions Based on Merit) (a) add "and equal opportunity"
following "merit" (to read "shall be based on merit and;equai,opportunity
principles".
act-to De representative of the American people, to ensure merit principles for
selection and advancement and equal opportunity in all aspects' of employment.
The Office of Equal Employment Opportunity is not mentioned. in the bill ; its
mandate needs to be strengthened. ,
More. than that, equal opportunity in all aspects of employment must be re-
quired under the. law you are now considering. For that purpose, we propose the
following changes :
The Act calls for maximum capability among the personnel' system of ,State,
AID and ICA. I regret to assure you that women Foreign Service employees of
those agencies also face. discrimination in all aspects of employment.,
AID lags behind.both State and ICA in the proportion of women in the senior
ranks ; in AID, women are generally absent from policy positions and from
mid-level positions with significant programs and policy roles; entering junior
officer classes have included few women; and, the Agency does not provide ade-
quate opportunities for low- and mid-level women with needed skills, interest
and potential to advance. In recent years, the position. of Foreign, Service career
women has deteriorated while the Civil Service women have remained stationary.
It is with considerable misgivings, therefore, that women in AID, contemplate
a change in the Agency's personnel system toward one more, heavily staffed
under Foreign Service than Civil Service rules.
In ICA, the percentage of women Foreign Service Information Officers is
16 percent; slightly better than the comparable figure in. State. They. are, con-
centrated in the "cultural" rather than "informational" functions. There is
the now familiar dearth of women in the senior grades, policy and managerial
positions,; there.is discrimination in assignments to certain. geographic regions.
Women in the Civil Service are clustered in the lower ranks and in;certain
sex-stereotyped functions. ICA Foreign Service secretaries have many of the
same problems as their State counterparts. This"'situation has not changed
basically in the past two years. There has been an overall decrease of 1 percent
of women FSIOs, a decrease in the intake of women as junior officers and in
women Civil Service officers at the middle level.
Given the familiar pattern of discrimination and lack of progress toward equal-
ity of opportunity, we suggest that the Board of the Foreign Service, with an
interagency mandate for Foreign Service personnel, include in its responsibilities
the promotion of personnel policies and practices based on merit and equal oppor-
tunity principles (section 206)?.
While we support a strong professional association to represent employees' con-
cerns, we have often found AFSA unsympathetic to the concerns of women officers
and spouses. We understand the feelings against what has been called "reverse
discrimination" and believe that steps taken in the name ofaf&rmative action in
other places have sometimes been foolish. I believe that the Women's Action Orga-
nization has been responsive to these fears and have proposed responsible reme-
dial actions that would genuinely open up competition, so that women and minori-
ties could compete on the basis of merit.
So long as AFSA's membership is preponderantly white males, we will con-
tinue to have misgivings about its willingness to represent our interests. For the
moment, we have no changes to suggest in the proposed Act relating to Labor-
Management relations but are studying them to ensure that our rights are
protected.
Before I conclude, let me say something on behalf of Foreign Service family
members. We sponsored the Spouses' Skills Bank because we support the employ-
ment abroad of spouses and believe that the Department is the loser when it fails
to recognize spouses as potential employees and is being arbitrary and unjust
when it places obstacles in the way of their employment outside of the mission.
We worked along side the Association of American Foreign Service Women for
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the creation o! the Family Liaison Office in the belief that information and
counselling' waa essential for our Foreign Service families..
We are actively examining the problem, mentioned by the AFSA President, of
Staff Corps perception that training and assignment benefits recently promoted
for family members adversely affect Staff employees' opportunities. We do know
that there is a regular cadre of qualified spouses who take their skills and desire
for employment from post to post around the world. They serve ? with ? limited
appointments and save the Government transportation and housing costs. Others
serve in Part-time Intermittent and Temporary (PIT) positions to fillin'during
periods of peak workloads. Such employees have met American standards of job
qualification and' should not be expected to accept local standards of pay (section
333(a) and 451(a)(1)). ,:
The women and men who have joined and supported the Women's Action.Orga-
nization have done so because of their commitment to equal opportunity and
their concern about being able to sustain a healthy family life despite the dis-
ruptions and difficulties of our mobile occupation.
I appreciate the time you have given today to consider the conditions of employ-
ment for women in the Department of State and our sister agencies and of the
concerns and Iresonrces of family members of the Foreign Service. We hope you
will. see to it that equal employment opportunity is more firmly captured in
your'bill,
IV-CURRENT STATISTICAL EVIDENCE FURTHER DEMONSTRATES SYSTEM.4TIc SEX
DISCRIMINATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1. INTAKE OF WOMEN AS FSOS
As we have: noted previously (February-17, 1978, Mem., p. 9) , while 44.percent
of)college,graduates were women, in fiscal years 1970-1977 women made-up only
7 'percent;?6.pereent, 17 percent, 16 percent, 22 percent, 13 percent; 201per6ent;and
1.6 percent of the officers appointed to the Foreign Service. Memorandum;, Junior
Officer Intake,' FY-66 through March 1977, Richard Masters, PER/BEX;:to Dud-
ley Miller PER/REE, March 2, 1977. In 1978, only 16 percent of the.offi'cers ap-
pointed were women.'FSO Intake By: Exam (By Sex), M/EEO; 10/5/78; P1. Ex.
3..Thus; since 1975;; the iaverage`intake has-been only 16 percent women'., This is, in
spite);bf the fact that. -recent statistics show women earning more bachelor's
degrees';than' men'!ij -foreign area studies and foreign -languages-:(Report on
Women in ?iAlnericai, The, United- States- Commission for UNESCO, pct' 16, Pl.
Em', 41)7: I:,,..
-Foreign.tanguages..____----------=-------------------------- ----------=-----
4'4879` .
,?
4,600
Foreign area studies__._:-------------=-------------------------------------------;
:.1739
1,464
2. PLACEMENT OF WOMEN IN CONES AND PROMOTIONS r
..
We have explained previously how the Foreign Service is divided into func-
tioiial fields of concentration which are referred to as cones. February 17,
1978, Meiji.;. p .' 9.' Within cones, there is further division into functions:' %e have
previously shown that female Foreign Service officers are disproportionately
placed in cones which provide less responsibility and are less', advantageous
in terms of career advancement. Women are placed far more than men into
the cones which have fewer positions in the upper classes and which receive
fewer promotions. They therefore have far less opportunity to reach"the top.
See August' 24, 1976, Mem., pp. 4, 12-14; February 17, 1978, Mem., pp. 32-33;
July 7, 1978, Mem., pp,. 6, 7.
Department' of State statistics as of December 31; 1978, and ofJanuary 31,
1979, further demonstrate this disparity.' The Department's own analysis of
March 1979, shows that on December 31, 1978, only 36.4 percent of all women
were in the Executive, Program Direction, Political, or Economic/Commercial
cones or functions while 63.6 percent of the women were in the Administrative
and Consular cones. Women FSOs by Primary Skill (Cone) 12/31/78, M/EEO.
3/79, Pl. Ex. 19.1n addition, the following table, derived from ' the Depart-
ment's own statistics, compares male and female. FSOs. by rank and cone or
`function as .of, January 31, 1979, and reveals little, if any, change. froln earlier
statistical patterns.
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