USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T01083R000100130002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Se rct-
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
s -
SOV UR 84-OOIX
January 1984
COPY 5 7 3
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome. They may be
directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the
table of contents.
Secret
SOV UR 84-001 X
January 1984
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Contents
The USSR and Africa: Perspective) 1 25X1
Policies and Prospects
The socialist and often authoritarian character of African regimes
and the persistence of anti-Western attitudes in former colonial
states give the USSR important advantages in its African policy.
The Soviets are well-equipped to meet African demands for arms
and military support, but they are much less willing and able to
provide the economic aid required over the longer term. As a result,
Moscow's success in Africa has been mixed, and its prospects are
uneven.
The Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship: Strong Ties Despite 5
Differences
Soviet pressure for increased access to Ethiopian naval facilities,
Ethiopia's requests for additional military assistance, and its inabil-
ity to meet its debt payment schedule are causing increased
squabbling between the USSR and its key African client. Still, the
relationship remains strong because of Ethiopia's importance to the
USSR and Moscow's crucial role as arms supplier in Addis Ababa's
war against various insurgent groups.
The USSR's Growing Military Involvement in Southern Africa
The Soviet position in Angola and Mozambique is being challenged
by worsening security and economic situations that are partly
caused by South African pressure. While unwilling to provide
meaningful economic aid, Moscow is prepared to provide more
weapons rather than risk its regional role
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The Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa
The USSR has used military assistance extensively in Sub-Saharan
Africa to build influence with governments, to affect the outcome of
conflicts, and to secure access to naval facilities and airfields. To
accomplish these objectives, it has provided $5 billion in arms and
military equipment to African nations since 1978. Nearly 5,000
Soviet military advisers and technicians are currently in Africa.
Economic relations between the USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa
have expanded rapidly since the mid-1970s, reflecting the USSR's
greater involvement in the region. Because Moscow prefers to rely
on its military assistance program rather than economic aid to
project its presence in the region, its ability to expand relations
through economic ties is probably limited.
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Other Topics Soviet Security Policy on the Chinese Border F_~ 25 25X1
Despite recent improvements in Sino-Soviet political relations,
prospects for a reversal or even a significant relaxation of the Soviet
military buildup opposite China appear slight, at least during this
decade. In its political and military dealings with China since the
early 1960s, Moscow has judged that a strong military posture is
indispensable to its security. In addition, the military strategy that
Moscow has adopted against China, coupled with the geopolitical
situation in East Asia, leaves little room today for major force
reductions.
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Soviet-Peruvian Military Relations and Political Ties
Lima's financial problems and Moscow's continued willingness to
provide attractive financing are likely to ensure the USSR's position
as Peru's primary source of weapons over the next few years. In light
of the Peruvian military's rightist views and the Belaunde govern-
ment's hostility toward the USSR, however, Moscow probably will
be unable to translate this position into political gain in the near
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Soviet Educational Reform To Accent Vocational Training (u) 35
Largely motivated by the labor shortage, a Politburo-sponsored
commission has drafted proposals for changing Soviet general
education. The proposals recommend placing greater emphasis on
vocational education, particularly at the secondary level, and lower-
ing the school entry age to six years.
Soviet Pledge on Nuclear Missile Targeting
initiative on arms control.
A debate in recent months over the prospects for US-Soviet relations
under the Reagan administration reveals pessimism regarding any
significant breakthrough. The door remains open, however, for
maintaining a dialogue on secondary issues while awaiting a new US
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The USSR and Africa:
Policies and Prospects
Perspective I 25X1
The socialist and often authoritarian character of African regimes and the
persistence of anti-Western attitudes in former colonial states give the
USSR important advantages in its African policy. The Soviets are well-
equipped to meet African demands for arms and military support, but they
are much less willing and able to provide the economic aid required over
the longer term. As a result, Moscow's success in Africa has been mixed,
and its prospects are uneven.
Soviet leaders are driven by a mixture of motives in Africa. They are
influenced by their perception of trends in their rivalry with the United
States and their view of the Soviet Union's rightful role in the world. They
also welcome an opportunity to demonstrate their solidarity with the self-
proclaimed Marxist regimes in the region and thereby encourage the
growth of similar regimes elsewhere in the area. These factors reinforce
one another and impart considerable momentum to the Soviet commitment
to the African countries where Moscow's presence is greatest-Angola,
Ethiopia, and Mozambique.
The USSR, however, has no vital security interests at stake in the region;
indeed, its military objectives in Africa are-aside from Indian Ocean and
Persian Gulf concerns-of a regional rather than strategic character. (See
the article "The Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa.") Nor do
economic considerations play a significant part in Soviet policies toward
Africa. (See "Soviet Economic Ties to Sub-Saharan Africa.") The Soviets
already possess adequate domestic resources of most of the strategic raw
materials found in the region, and any attempt to interrupt deliveries of
South African strategic materials or Persian Gulf oil would bring the
USSR into an unwanted confrontation with the West.
1 Secret
SOV UR 84-OO/X
January /984
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Arms sales and associated training and advisory packages are the longest
standing instrument of Soviet policy in the Third World and continue to be
the USSR's major means of influence in Africa. As discussed in the article
on Soviet-Ethiopian relations, the USSR has used these tools and exploited
foreign and insurgency threats in Ethiopia to develop a strong position in
Addis Ababa with little likelihood of any serious setback in the next few
years. Despite such gains, the Soviets have reason to be concerned that
their future role in Africa is highly dependent on the security situations
that prevail in such key states as Angola and Mozambique.
It is not certain to what lengths the Soviets might go to maintain the
MPLA in power in Angola, but, as the article on Soviet prospects in
southern African states, the USSR has escalated its military support to
Luanda over the past year, assumed a more active advisory role, and
endorsed a greater Cuban troop presence to halt and reverse the momen-
tum of the UNITA insurgents. Recently delivered Soviet equipment will
improve Luanda's capability to conduct a counterinsurgency, protect its
garrisons, and develop a more adequate air defense against South African
attacks on newly arrived weaponry and associated personnel. Soviet
advisory personnel are also playing a more active role in Angola, operating
a squadron of AN-12 transport aircraft and upgrading communications
with Moscow.
Security problems in Mozambique are less critical than Angola's, but
Soviet military officers in Maputo have helped to plan operations and to
operate transport aircraft for internal military use. Moscow's major success
in Africa has been in Ethiopia, where Soviet military assistance has
sustained a pro-Soviet regime in Addis Ababa and led to access to naval fa-
cilities on the Horn of Africa. Whereas Soviet transfers of military aid can
affect the outcome of internal' or regional conflicts, as in the Angolan Civil
War or the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, it is extremely difficult
to alter the basis of African politics and garner genuine political influence.
The USSR does not have a commensurate economic penetration of even
those African states with which it has close political and military ties.
Continued Soviet reluctance to extend significant economic assistance to
even its closest clients, in fact, could create strains in bilateral relations in
Africa and could limit Soviet opportunities to exploit certain Third World
situations. The Soviet hard currency position is better than it has been for
the past several years because of increased oil exports, the stabilization of
oil prices, and the leveling off of imports, all of which make the "cost of
empire" more manageable. Nevertheless, aid has been a sore point in
relations with Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, whose leaders have
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been unhappy with Soviet willingness to meet their demands on develop-
ment and have been looking elsewhere. Soviet military assistance will
remain crucial to those regimes, but Soviet restraint in the economic sphere
could provide openings for Western nations
Soviet prospects in Africa are uneven, and successes will depend largely on
the tendency of African leaders to acquire as much weaponry as possible,
regardless of the level of threat, and on the impact of South Africa's
policies on other black African states. Persistent ethnic, religious, ideologi-
cal, and territorial conflicts within and between states will provide many
opportunities for the USSR. The Soviets will be particularly successful in
states such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique where their clients face
serious insurgent threats.
Nevertheless, the Soviets are probably concerned by the possibility of a
Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, US success in gaining military
facilities in Kenya, the pro-Western stance of Nigeria, and their general
inability to offset Western economic influence. Soviet officials have
acknowledged, moreover, that the USSR's poor domestic performance is
undermining the credibility of the socialist model abroad. Moscow has no
illusions about its ability to capitalize on uncertain situations in Zambia
and Zimbabwe. Whatever their disappointment, however, the Soviets are
content to play a waiting game, taking whatever opportunities arise to
increase their influence and meddle in African affairs.
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The Soviet-Ethiopian
Relationship: Strop Ties
Despite Differences
Soviet pressure for increased access to Ethiopian
naval facilities, Ethiopia's requests for additional mili-
tary assistance, and its inability to meet its debt
payment schedule are causing increased squabbling
between the USSR and its key African client. Still,
the relationship remains strong because of Ethiopia's
importance to the USSR and Moscow's crucial role as
arms supplier in Addis Ababa's war against various
insurgent groups.
Continuing Bilateral Frictions
Despite the generally strong bilateral relationship that
has developed since the mid-1970s, Soviet access to
naval and air facilities in Ethiopia has been a long-
time source of friction. At the time of Somalia's break
with Moscow in 1977,
senior Ethiopian officials were resigned to acced-
ing to Soviet requests for facilities in order to retain
Moscow's military support. The Soviets, however, did
not immediately press for such facilities, at least in
Soviet Objectives and Basis ofInlluence
The USSR has sought a strong relationship with the
Mengistu regime-its sole asset on the strategic Horn
of Africa-to enable it to support naval forces in the
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, to counter US influ-
ence in the region, and to give it the potential to
project air and naval power there. Presumably, the
Soviets also believe that the development of socialism
in Ethiopia would demonstrate the benefits of the
Soviet "model" for emerging Third World states and
support Moscow's claims of a pro-Soviet tilt in the
world correlation of forces. Moreover, the Soviets may
view Ethiopia as a potential springboard from which
to support or promote other leftist movements in
Africa.
Moscow's position in Ethiopia rests primarily on its
role as an arms supplier. While the military threat
from Somalia has largely diminished, Addis Ababa
still needs significant military assistance to conduct its
campaigns against insurgents in Eritrea and Tigray
Provinces. Since 1976 the Soviets have agreed to
provide the Mengistu regime roughly $4 billion in
military assistance, of which some $2.6 billion has
been delivered. The USSR also provides about 1,700
military advisers and 1,000 civilian technicians, and it
partially subsidizes the Cuban presence.'
' The US Embassy in Addis Ababa reports signs of an imminent
drawdown of the 6,000 to 9,000 Cubans in Ethiopia; about 2,000
are expected to remain as a security force near the capital. The
Cuban forces have not been militarily active since the 1978 Ogaden
campaign; Castro has not allowed them to participate in the
Eritrean counterinsurgency. Given their limited utility in recent
years, we do not believe a drawdown would necessarily diminish
part because of the uncertain security situation.
Continued instability in Eritrea may have prompted
Moscow to push for more modest facilities in one of
the isolated islands of the Dahlak Archipelago. Ef-
forts to develop a small facility on Dahlak Island
began in April 1978. Since that time, we believe that
Moscow and Addis Ababa have reached a mutual
understanding giving the Soviets nearly exclusive use
of this austere facility.
The Soviets do not have similar access to the key
coastal ports in Mits'iwa and Aseb. Since 1978 there
have been scattered reports of Soviet requests-and
pressure-to construct private facilities in or near
these ports, but Mengistu has resisted such efforts.
Soviet combatants have called infrequently in both
ports.
Since mid-1983 Moscow has made several requests to
enhance its naval access in Ethiopia. It has asked:
? To assume full responsibility for the defense of
Dahlak Island.
? To place an additional 70 technicians on the island.
? To assume control of the proposed construction base
facilities near the port of Aseb.
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The Soviets have also asked South Yemen for new air
and naval facilities near Aden. Inasmuch as these
requests roughly coincide with the upsurge in US
naval activity in the area joint amphibious exercises
with Egypt, Kenya, and Oman and the ongoing
construction of new facilities at the Somali port of
Berbera-they suggest that Moscow may be looking
ahead to what it will need to counter the expanding
US role.
Soviet efforts to enhance and consolidate political
influence have also contributed to tensions in bilateral
relations. Moscow has had difficulty in establishing
broad political ties in Addis Ababa, largely because
Mengistu controls the political structure there. From
Moscow's perspective, Mengistu's virtual monopoly of
power is a mixed blessing. On the positive side, this
clear delineation of authority must be welcome to the
Soviets when contrasted with the factionalism that
plagues Angola. On the other hand, if Mengistu
sought to alter radically Ethiopia's pro-Soviet align-
ment-as Sadat did in Egypt-the Soviets would have
few assets with which to counter such a move. Simi-
larly, the lack of political assets could jeopardize
Moscow's position in a post-Mengistu succession
struggle
To remedy this problem, the Soviets have pressed
Mengistu to create an Ethiopian Communist party
since 1978. Such a party would abet Moscow's efforts
to further institutionalize socialism in Ethiopia and,
more importantly, would give Moscow the opportuni-
ty to cultivate a politically reliable cadre that could
further strengthen Soviet influence and leverage with
Mengistu. Judging by Mengistu's foot-dragging on
the party question over the past five years, he too
recognizes the implications of such a party on his
position and is working to ensure that the party, when
finally established, does not threaten his political
power.
Mengistu's sidestepping of the party question has not
diminished Soviet efforts to build influence elsewhere
in the Ethiopian military and civilian bureaucracies.
Through the presence of some 1,700 military advisers
and another 1,000 civilian technicians, the Soviets try
to cultivate influence within the military forces and
government ministries. Soviet military advisers are
attached to each Ethiopian division headquarters and
possibly at the brigade level as well, according to
attache reporting. Moreover, the US Embassy in
Addis Ababa has reported that Army Gen. V. I.
Petrov, Commander in Chief of Soviet Ground
Forces, has advised Ethiopian commanders in each of
the last two counterinsurgency campaigns in the
north.
On the civilian side, the Soviets reportedly have urged
Mengistu to replace Western-educated Ethiopian offi-
cials with others trained in the USSR and Eastern
Europe. In some cases, Soviet and East European
advisers have been attached to specific departments;
each of the recently established regional economic
centers reportedly will have such advisers.F__1
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To increase Soviet presence and influence, Moscow
has also sought to become involved in Ethiopia's long-
term economic policies. During the visit of a high-
level Soviet economic delegation in March, State
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portedly offered advice on the subject of timing and
economic-sector priorities for Ethiopia's proposed 10-
year plan; he also strongly urged that Ethiopia not
incur any new debts to Western countries.
While the Soviets would clearly like to become an
essential component in Ethiopian economic planning,
their economic aid commitments have not met Ethio-
pian expectations-and have prompted frequent com-
plaints from Addis Ababa. Although Ethiopia has
received a large amount of Soviet assistance by Soviet
standards, such aid has been inadequate to meet
Addis Ababa's major economic needs. Since 1974 the
USSR has extended some $550 million in credits and
grants, half of which is in the form of commodity
credit and oil subsidies-an unusual concession by
Moscow. The rest of Soviet economic credits have
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been directed toward oil and gas exploration in the
Ogaden, the Gambela irrigation project, the Dire
Dawa cement plant, and small projects in transporta-
tion and agriculture.
In recent months Moscow's rejection of an Ethiopian
request for new military hardware and for reschedul-
ing of debt navments has led to new tensions.
Embassy in Addis Ababa reported rumors that the
USSR had turned down an Ethiopian request to
cancel or delay military debt payments during the
September visit of Defense Minister Tesfaye Gebre-
Kidan to Moscow. Mengistu was also reported to be
upset that General Secretary Andropov would not see
him; this Soviet refusal, however, may have been
related to Andropov's poor health.
Prospects
While the Soviets may be only partially successful in
efforts to expand and consolidate their influence in
Ethiopia, they will nevertheless retain a strong posi-
tion there with little likelihood of any serious setback
in the next few years. Indeed, Moscow may believe
that Addis Ababa's continued dependence upon Sovi-
et military assistance and its expected inability to
meet its first major debt payment, scheduled for
1984-about $200 million-will make Mengistu
more forthcoming on Soviet requests. In this context,
the Soviets may have been encouraged by Mengistu's
public suggestion that an Ethiopian Communist party
will be created on the 10th anniversary of the revolu-
tion in September 1984. Despite continuing frictions,
we believe the bilateral relationship will remain
strong, primarily because both sides need one another.
Ethiopia remains Moscow's key asset on the Horn of
Africa, and the USSR is the only superpower pre-
pared to meet Ethiopian military needs. Moscow will
continue to rely primarily on its role as an arms
supplier to maintain and strengthen its influence in
Ethiopia. While the military threat from Somalia has
largely diminished, Addis Ababa still needs signifi-
cant military assistance to conduct its campaigns
against insurgents in Eritrea and Tigray Provinces.
Even if Mengistu were ousted, the intractability of the
Eritrean situation, Ethiopia's weak financial position,
and the limited possibility that a Western Power
would assume Moscow's role as military supplier all
point to a continued-and major-involvement with
the USSR.
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The USSR's Growing
Military Involvement
in Southern Africa
Since the mid-1970s the USSR has established a
significant political and military presence in southern
Africa by providing military aid to the victorious
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) and the Front for the Liberation of Mozam-
bique (FRELIMO). Soviet weapons, some of them
manned by Cubans, and-Soviet military planners now
play major roles in defending both Luanda and
Maputo. Arms and related training and advisory
services form the main component of Moscow's in-
volvement in Zambia and its efforts to establish a
presence elsewhere in the region.
Soviet activities in southern Africa are intended to
weaken Western political and economic influence
while enhancing Moscow's credentials as a supporter
of Third World aspirations and black African griev-
ances. The USSR also seeks to use its position in
Angola and Mozambique to advance Soviet interests
in nearby countries, particularly in support of black
nationalist groups seeking to overturn white minority
rule in Namibia and South Africa. Moscow has
obtained the use of military facilities in Angola for
occasional naval reconnaissance flights and a continu-
ous warship patrol, but it has no interest in signifi-
cantly expanding the activities of its own forces in the
region.
The Soviet position in southern Africa faces a serious
challenge in the months ahead from a deteriorating
security situation and faltering economies in both
Angola and Mozambique. The National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has, with
South African backing, steadily expanded its power
and reach, achieving major gains in the past year.
This has forced Moscow to counter with more weap-
ons, logistic support, and other help to protect its
political position in Luanda. In Mozambique, another
South African-backed insurgency, by the National
Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO), has prevent-
ed Maputo's consolidation of control and similarly
forced the Soviets to increase military aid. F
In both countries, increasing reliance on Soviet weap-
ons will preserve Moscow's position for the time
being. The future outlook, however, may be cause for
Soviet concern. Both Luanda and Maputo may ulti-
mately be forced to explore a negotiated settlement
that the Western Powers are in the best position to
mediate. Moreover, the deteriorating economies in
Angola and Mozambique are already prompting both
countries to look increasingly to the West for econom-
ic aid that they have been unable to obtain in
adequate quantity from the USSR.
Roots of Soviet Influence
Moscow's position in southern Africa developed out of
its support for black nationalist aspirations during and
immediately after decolonization. The collapse of
Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique and the
spillover of the Rhodesian civil war into Zambia
created turbulent conditions that Moscow played to
its advantage. A major Soviet-Cuban intervention
brought the MPLA to power in Luanda, and the
USSR displaced China as the main Communist bene-
factor of FRELIMO. Soviet-supplied air defense
equipment somewhat reassured Zambia after it had
been vulnerable to Rhodesian air raids on guerrillas
operating from Zambia.
The successful establishment of Soviet-backed re-
gimes in southern Africa enhanced the USSR's status
as a superpower. It showed that Moscow had over-
come its inability to project meaningful power deep
into Africa, which was evident during the turmoil in
the Congo (now Zaire) in the early 1960s. In Angola
and Mozambique the Soviets established themselves
as benefactors of states more distant from the USSR
than any except Cuba yet influenced by Communist
power. The Soviet role was formalized in friendship
treaties signed with Angola in 1976 and with Mozam-
bique in 1977.
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Support for Angola
The Soviet commitment to Angola's defense has been
underscored by a substantial increase over the past
year in the pace of deliveries of military equipment to
counter insurgent inroads and South African incur-
sions. Deliveries in 1983 included MIG-21 fighters,
MI-8 transport helicopters, MI-24 helicopter gun-
ships, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and more
advanced antiaircraft missiles. Moscow has also put a
dozen Soviet-piloted transport aircraft at Luanda's
disposal and otherwise helped make its forces and the
Cuban troops in Angola more mobile. While the
number of Soviet military advisers in Angola is
believed to have remained in the range of 1,000 to
1,200, they may be assuming greater command and
control functions. There are 30,000 Cuban military
personnel in Angola, of whom 22,000 to 23,000 are
combat troops.
Angola's leaders are divided over relations with the
USSR, and the Soviets are concerned about the
durability of their political position in Luanda. Con-
tacts by President dos Santos with the West have
worried Moscow, which is apparently relying on a
pro-Soviet faction in the MPLA to protect its inter-
The growing UNITA
threat may have made dos Santos more amenable to
Soviet concerns because the survival of his regime
now more obviously depends upon Soviet arms and
Cuban soldiers.
Soviet statements on the situation in Angola have
shown increasing alarm about the security situation
and have reaffirmed Moscow's commitment to assist
the regime. Press commentaries this past fall have
portrayed the insurgency as threatening the "inde-
pendence of Angola." A TASS commentary in early
November warned that "the USSR and other coun-
tries of the socialist community will not leave the
Angolan people in the time of trouble and will
continue to support them in every way." This is the
strongest public statement of support that the USSR
has made so far. A more authoritative "TASS state-
ment" on 5 January accused South Africa of trying to
overthrow the Angolan Government but stopped short
of promising support to prevent it.
Despite their military largesse, the Soviets apparently
remain unwilling to offer significant economic aid.
With Angola's oil income largely devoted to paying
for military help, its diamond exports endangered by
UNITA operations, its main agricultural areas
caught in guerrilla raids, and its industry slowed by
chronic shortages of spare parts and raw materials,
Luanda is moving toward economic collapse. In Janu-
ary 1982 Moscow and Luanda signed an agreement
for $2 billion worth of long-term projects, but the
Soviets have not provided the kind of short-term
assistance that could help check a decline in living
standards. As a result, Angola has turned to the West
for aid but has found potential donors reluctant to
plunge into such an unsettled situation
Aid to Mozambique
Mozambique faces a problem less critical than Ango-
la's, but it nonetheless has serious difficulties with
RENAMO. Although RENAMO lacks a cohesive
leadership or wide popular appeal, South Africa has
used it successfully to prevent President Machel's
FRELIMO government from consolidating its politi-
cal or economic position
The USSR has supplied Maputo with basic military
equipment and training since 1975, but as RENAMO
has become stronger the Soviets have also sent in-
creasingly sophisticated weapons. During 1983 these
included MIG-21 fighters and MI-24 helicopter gun-
ships. The Soviets also supplied transport aircraft,
including two Soviet-operated transports for internal
military use. As in Angola, Soviet military officers
help plan operations and Cubans provide technical
services such as flying fighters and helicopters. The
Soviet and Cuban military presence in Mozambique is
much smaller than in Angola-about 800 Soviet
military personnel and an estimated 800 to 1,000
Cubans.
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The USSR has been no more generous with economic
aid for Mozambique than for Angola, and Maputo's
problems are equally severe-perhaps worse now as a
result of prolonged drought. Like Angola, Mozam-
bique suffers from economic mismanagement, declin-
ing industry, and a disrupted agricultural economy.
Machel's disappointment with Soviet support was
indicated by his visit to Western Europe in October in
search of economic aid and alternative sources of
arms.
Soviets and Namibia
Moscow supports the Southwest African People's
Organization (SWAPO), which claims to be the repre-
sentative of the Namibian people. The Soviets provide
financial assistance and weapons to the organization,
scholarships in the USSR, and diplomatic support in
world forums. SWAPO's leadership is divided in
attitudes toward future relations with Moscow, how-
ever, and the Soviets probably are uncertain what
influence they might have if a Namibian settlement
put SWAPO in power.
The USSR would prefer a peaceful Namibian settle-
ment rather than prolonged war if the problem could
be separated from the Angolan conflict. But Moscow
wants a settlement to be achieved without a Western
mediation role that would give credit to the United
States and its allies in the eyes of black African
countries. When the five-nation contact group ap-
peared to be making progress toward a settlement in
1981, the Soviets encouraged the Frontline States-
countries representing black African interests in Na-
mibia-to stiffen settlement terms in order to obstruct
that progress. Although settlement efforts are now
moving slowly, the USSR would be expected to try in
the future to block any arrangement worked out
primarily by the West
Other Countries
Military assistance is Moscow's entree in the region,
and, indeed, in the Third World generally. In south-
ern Africa as a whole, arms aid has won the Soviets
little political influence beyond Angola and Mozam-
bique, since other countries lack the same dependence
on continuing Soviet supplies.
The USSR began selling MIG fighters and other
military equipment to Tanzania in the mid-1970s. By
the early 1980s, Dar es Salaam found itself in debt for
equipment that was scarcely usable, and it was unhap-
py with the military training provided by the Soviets.
At the same time, Moscow has been unresponsive to
pleas for help in meeting Tanzania's large Western
debts.
Zambia turned to the USSR for air defense equip-
ment after Rhodesian raids on guerrilla camps around
Lusaka during the latter stages of the Rhodesian civil
war. But the Zambians soon became disillusioned
with the capabilities of the equipment and advisers
they obtained. A few officials sympathetic to the
USSR remain in high positions in Lusaka, but the
relationship has cooled while Moscow still tries to
collect the bills from the near-destitute Zambian
exchequer.
In Zimbabwe, Moscow has not yet been able to
overcome the results of its support for Prime Minister
Mugabe's rival, Joshua Nkomo, during the independ-
So far, however, Mugabe has failed to respond. When
he indicated last autumn that he might be interested
in visiting Moscow-partly to offset visits to the West
and demonstrate his nonalignment-Moscow report-
edly rebuffed him with a ham-handedness that fur-
ther strained relations.
The other three countries of southern Africa-
Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho-are too conscious
of their vulnerability to South African pressure to
countenance much Soviet activity. Moscow has sup-
plied some third-hand armored equipment to Botswa-
na, reportedly offered free weapons, and tried to gain
access through sports programs and the cultivation of
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political dissidents. A resident Soviet Embassy was
opened in Lesotho and a charge was accredited on
21 October 1983
Soviet Prospects
Soviet troubles in southern Africa have not yet
reached a point that is likely to force a basic reassess-
ment of Moscow's policy in the region. The rising
military costs so far have been sustainable and the
potential returns in prestige, presence, and prospects
for eventual further gains-in Namibia and, perhaps,
even South Africa-remain large.
Present trends, however, seem to be going against
Moscow in most areas except Namibia, where West-
ern settlement efforts have stalled. Soviet unwilling-
ness to loosen economic purse strings-underscored in
General Secretary Andropov's remarks last June that
Third World countries must depend primarily on their
own economic efforts-means that Moscow will do
little about its clients' faltering economies. South
Africa's willingness to continue military pressure
from its periphery signals a persisting security threat
and further damage to those economies. Moscow's
concern about its role would be even greater were the
West to offer significant economic aid to Angola and
Mozambique while convincing South Africa to reduce
its pressure.
The commitment of new and improved military equip-
ment to Angola during the past year, including some
of the USSR's best weaponry, demonstrates Moscow's
resolve to defend its most important client in southern
Africa. Moscow's determination to avert a defeat of
the MPLA and an eclipse of its Angolan role may
well have been strengthened by the setbacks it has
recently been dealt elsewhere.
Faced with the prospect of indefinitely increasing
demands for military and economic aid, the Soviets
might eventually explore a negotiated settlement be-
tween the MPLA and UNITA. Low-level Soviet
officials have already raised the issue in private
conversation. The head of the Soviet Foreign Minis-
try's department for southern Africa mentioned this
possibility to an American on 2 December, but he
denied that Luanda was currently considering talks
with UNITA.
Secret
The USSR is less deeply committed in material or
prestige to the Mozambique Government but faces a
similar situation there. For the time being,
RENAMO is unlikely to mount a major threat to the
government, but its steady pressure is eroding Mapu-
to's strength. Moscow's inability to provide the kind
or quantity of assistance that could effectively counter
RENAMO's challenge makes the FRELIMO regime
another seemingly endless burden on the Soviets.
Moscow might, therefore, eventually welcome a deal
between Maputo and Pretoria to reduce guerrilla
pressure, even though this would hamper Mozam-
bique's support for black nationalist organizations
harrassing South Africa. For the moment, however,
Moscow seems prepared to put more weapons into
southern Africa rather than risk its present position
there.
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necrer
The Soviet Military Presence
in Sub-Saharan Africa
The USSR has used military assistance extensively in
Sub-Saharan Africa to build influence with govern-
ments, to affect the outcomes of conflicts, and, most
importantly, to obtain access to naval facilities and
airfields in the region. To accomplish these objectives,
the Soviet Union has provided nearly $5 billion in
arms and military equipment to countries in the
region over the past five years (see table), responding
quickly and massively at critical junctures to support
governments with which it is allied. Nearly 5,000
Soviet military advisers and technicians are currently
in Sub-Saharan Africa, and about 2,000 African
military personnel are in training courses in the Soviet
Union. In addition, there are more than 30,000 Cuban
soldiers in Africa, principally in Angola and Ethiopia.
The Soviet Navy routinely operates off the eastern
and western coasts of the continent.
Where Third World governments perceive internal or
external threats, they are often vulnerable to a Soviet
program of inducements that typically encompasses
weapons deliveries, naval visits, and a military adviso-
ry presence and is likely to lead to pressures for access
to facilities. This has been the case in Africa, al-
though Moscow's efforts to parlay military assistance
into military privileges there have met with mixed
success. They have led to an extensive military pres-
ence and substantial political influence in Angola and
Ethiopia, and access to facilities in both. In Somalia,
however, despite massive military assistance, the Sovi-
ets in 1977 lost access to facilities they had developed,
and their use of Guinean facilities has been sharply
Angolan civil war and constraints on the use of
facilities in Guinea, the Soviet focus shifted south to
Luanda.
Angola. A surge in Soviet deliveries of arms to Angola
in 1983 reflected Moscow's growing concern about
the deteriorating security situation there. There was a
substantial increase in the number of sea deliveries,
and-for the first time since the mid-1970s-numer-
ous air deliveries. The new supplies (see table) includ-
ed systems more sophisticated than the Angolans had
previously received, such as MI-24 helicopter gun-
ships, which should improve the effectiveness of gov-
ernment forces against the insurgents, and SA-6
surface-to-air missiles, which could make South Afri-
can air attacks more costly for Pretoria. The Soviets
also increased their AN-12 transport aircraft in An-
gola from two to 12 during 1983 and upgraded
communications capabilities between Moscow and the
1,500-man Soviet Military Assistance Group in Luan-
da. This surge in assistance probably is geared more
to protecting Moscow's equities in southern Africa
than to gaining additional military facilities in the
region.
The small Angolan naval base at Luanda can provide
replenishment services, but the Soviets must maintain
a repair ship there to maintain and repair their
surface ships and submarines. Pairs of TU-95 Bear D
maritime reconnaissance aircraft periodically deploy
for several weeks to Luanda, from where they fly
surveillance missions over the South Atlantic.
curtailed.
Soviet presence and facilities in West Africa have
developed separately from those in East Africa and, to
a large extent, are oriented toward a different set of
problems.
Soviet Military Activities in West Africa
Soviet naval presence off West Africa originated as a
response to local crises and opportunities. Initially, in
1969-70, these were in Guinea and Ghana. During the
mid-1970s, with major Soviet assistance during the
Guinea. Despite the loss in 1977 of access to Conakry
for maritime reconnaissance aircraft, limitations on
the use of port facilities, and a substantial drop in the
Soviet military presence in Guinea, the Soviet Navy
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Soviet Military Assistance to Selected Sub-Saharan African States, a 1978 to Mid-1983
Country
Value of
Principal Aid Items,
Country
Value of
Principal Aid Items,
Total Deliveries,
1982-83
Total Deliveries,
1982-83
1978 to Mid-1983
1978 to Mid-1983
(million US $)
(million US $)
Angola
1,009
6 Osa-II-class missile pa-
Guinea
35
trol boats
Guinea-Bissau
12 MI-24 Hind helicopters
Madagascar
Artillery, small arms, air-
16 MI-8 transport
craft replacement parts
helicopters
Mali
75
Trucks, radars
8 SA-8 and 20 SA-6 sur-
Mozambique
293
3 AN-26 Curl transport
face-to-air launchers
aircraft
8 SA-9 launchers
65 medium tanks
15 SA-3 launchers
12 BTR-60PB armored per-
19 MIG-21 fighter aircraft
sonnel carriers
8 BM-21 rocket launchers
24 BMP infantry combat
19 T-62 medium tanks
vehicles
100 armored personnel
15 MIG-21 fighter aircraft
carriers
9 MI-8 and 8 MI-24
helicopters
Nigeria
92
2 MIG-21 trainers
Ethiopia
2,237
31 MIG-21 fighter aircraft
Seychelles
8
2 Zhuk-class patrol craft
6 to 12 MIG-23 fighter
2 coastal surveillance radars
aircraft
10 SA-7 surface-to-air
1 Petya-II-class light frigate
missiles
1 Polnocny-class landing
AAA guns
ship
Tanzania
260
106 ZSU-23/4 self-pro-
Zambia
218
pelled antiaircraft guns
Zimbabwe
0.4
1,000 AK-47 rifles
25 122-mm howitzers
92 medium tanks
29 BTR-60PB armored per-
sonnel carriers
10 MIG-23 fighter aircraft
2 BE- 12 Mail maritime re-
connaissance and ASW
aircraft
a Excludes states that did not receive substantial assistance in
recent years.
to President Toure to allow construction of a new, to use the airfield regularly. Given the lack of an
secure naval facility near Conakry, part of which internal or external threat to the Guinean Govern-
would be reserved for use by the Soviet Navy. Mos- ment, the Soviets probably do not have much leverage
cow also has repeatedly raised the question of new on Toure at this time)
Bear D deployments. Thus far, Toure has refused
such requests, although military transports continue
25X1
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Soviet Military Presence in Africa
Guinea
Algeria
Ivory
Coast
Upper
Volta
hana
Central African
Republic
Zaire Rwand
Saudi
Arabia
` VA.R. P D.R.Y
Acmorna .amen IS' Yamei
NAVAL PRESENCE,WEST AFRICA
1 cruiser or destroyer
1 diesel attack submarine
1 minesweeper
1 amphibious ship
3 auxiliaries
1 research ship
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Soviet military adviser
(number in parentheses)
Naval support facility
Port of call
Airfield (naval
reconnaissance aircraft)
?pl~i 00~
Sao Tome and Principe o
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
NAVAL PRESENCE,INDIAN OCEAN
2-3 general purpose submarines
3 major surface combatants
1 mine warfare ship
1-2 amphibious ships
15 auxiliaries
4 research ships
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Other States. Moscow has put considerable effort into
developing relations with a number of other West
African states-recently Ghana, Congo, Benin, and
Nigeria-and has shown interest in their naval facili-
ties. The Soviets have not undertaken an intense
campaign to gain access to port facilities in any of
these countries, but during 1983 they were successful
in obtaining at least one stopover for transport air-
craft in Nigeria and Ghana.
Soviet Military Activities in East Africa
Naval facilities in East Africa are used to support the
Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron, whose principal oper-
ating area is the western Arabian Sea and southern
Red Sea. These operations are chiefly supported from
Ethiopia and South Yemen. In addition, Soviet IL-38
May naval reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare
aircraft are stationed in South Yemen and Ethiopia
for monitoring US and other Western navies in the
northern Arabian Sea.
In recent years the Soviet Navy has been more active
in the southern Indian Ocean. In each of the past
three years Soviet naval ships visited the Mozambican
ports of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala more than 20
times, and they have operated more often in the
Mozambique Channel. Major Soviet task groups tran-
siting the region-including a recent one led by the
Kiev-class aircraft carrier Novorossiysk-also make
official calls in Mozambique and Seychelles.F_~
Whereas the naval presence off West Africa seems
largely responsive to regional interests and contingen-
cies on land, the Soviets probably view their ships in
the Indian Ocean as a counter to US and French
influence. The Western naval presence there has been
relatively large since the US-Iranian crisis in 1979,
and the Soviets view US facilities at Diego Garcia and
along the rim of the Indian Ocean as providing
important military and political advantages to the
United States. The USSR also has used its Navy
effectively as a tool to build political influence with
East African governments.
Ethiopia. Large-scale Soviet support to Ethiopia be-
gan in 1977, during the Ogaden conflict, with an
impressive air and sea delivery of arms and high-level
Soviet military direction to assist Addis Ababa in
defeating a Somali invasion. Ethiopia has received
some $2.6 billion in weapons and equipment since
then. Last year this assistance included advanced
MIG-23 Floggers, a Petya II-class light frigate, and
two maritime reconnaissance and ASW aircraft (see
table). The USSR has a substantial military advisory
presence in Ethiopia-currently some 1,700 men
whose efforts are abetted by some 6,000 to 9,000
Cuban advisers and combat troops. During the last
two years, the Soviets have been deeply involved in
supporting Ethiopian operations against insurgents in
northern Ethiopia. Top-ranking Soviet officers, such
as Ground Forces Commander in Chief General
Petrov, have been sent in at key junctures to review
and supervise operations.
At the same time, there are problems in the relation-
ship, particularly due to Soviet pressure for increased
access to Ethiopian facilities, irritations over Soviet
unwillingness to notify Ethiopian officials when Soviet
naval ships enter Ethiopian waters, and resentment
over conditions for military assistance. (See article on
Soviet-Ethiopian relations.)
The only "Soviet facility" in East Africa is located on
Ethiopia's Dahlak Island, where Soviet ships appear
to have virtually unimpeded access (see inset).
Mozambique. Since the mid-1970s Moscow has sup-
ported Mozambique against South Africa and its
client insurgents. The Soviets responded with in-
creased arms shipments as the threat to Maputo grew
severe in mid-1982. They accelerated delivery of this
aid with the first military transport flights to that
country and may even have diverted a seaborne
shipment of arms destined for Mali to Mozambique
last January. More recent shipments included the first
MIG-21 fighter aircraft and MI-24 Hind helicopter
gunships; the helicopters especially should improve
Mozambican capabilities for countering rebel activi-
ties. The Soviets recently installed in Mozambique a
signal intelligence system that probably improves
their capability to monitor military activity in south-
ern Africa and naval activity throughout the south-
western Indian Ocean. Two Soviet AN-12 military
transports also are stationed in Mozambique to pro-
vide logistic support.
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VO\.. G?
Soviet interest in access to naval and air facilities in
Ethiopia dates back to 1977, when large-scale Soviet
military assistance to Addis Ababa began and Soma-
lia broke with Moscow. Instability in Eritrea and the
insecurity of Aseb and Mits'iwa may have prompted
Moscow to press for more modest facilities in one of
the isolated islands of the Dahlak Archipelago. Work
on Dahlak Island began in April 1978 with the
arrival of an 8,500-ton floating drydock that had
been in Somalia. The Soviets subsequently improved
these facilities, adding housing for some 200 person-
nel, two floating piers, fuel storage tanks, and heli-
copter pads. We believe that Moscow and Addis
Ababa have a mutual understanding giving the Sovi-
ets nearly exclusive use of this facility, which pro-
vides the bulk of the support and maintenance re-
quired by the Indian Ocean Squadron.
Since 1980 the Soviets also have stationed two IL-38
May maritime patrol and antisubmarine warfare
aircraft in Asmara; these are supported by a pair of
AN-12 Cub transport aircraft.
Madagascar. Although it has received substantial
Soviet assistance over the past several years, the
Malagasy Government does not allow forces from
outside the Indian Ocean to call at its ports or use its
airfields for purposes other than assistance to Mada-
gascar. Deliveries of weapons and military equipment
have dropped sharply over the past two years, proba-
bly in part because Madagascar's economy is in such
desperate shape it cannot pay for those it has already
received. Nearly one-quarter of some 200 Soviet
military advisers departed in June 1983. Nevertheless,
President Rasiraka has allowed the establishment of
three signal intelligence sites with direction-finding
antennas similar to the one in Mozambique.
Seychelles. By repeatedly sending ships to provide 25X1
security on request when President Rene feels threat-
ened or is leaving the country, the Soviet Navy has
played a key role in developing influence in Victoria.
In addition to port calls, the Soviets for the first time
last year received permission to land military trans-
ports en route to Madagascar and Mozambique. The
Soviet Navy also may be interested in securing contin-
gency bunkering facilities in Seychelles. Last sum-
mer, Soviet personnel reportedly investigated the pos-
sibility of restoring five old naval fuel storage tanks on
Ste. Anne Island in Victoria Harbor.
ance-probably with mixed success.
25X1
25X1
continue to seek additional access to regional facili- e25X1
ties, using a combination of inducements-primarily
arms shipments and other types of military assist-
Outlook
Moscow's interest in increasing its influence in Africa
and in retaining and expanding its access to military
facilities there is unlikely to diminish. The Soviets will
We judge that the USSR's access to port facilities is
sufficient to support its current naval presence off
East and West Africa. The Navy would no doubt
prefer some additional services, redundant access, or
more isolated and secure facilities, but it is quite
capable of managing, given typical Soviet operating
practices (low activity levels and reliance on afloat
facilities), with those it currently uses.' We do not
believe that the level of Soviet naval activity in the
waters off West Africa would justify development of a
facility even on the limited scale of the Dahlak Island
complex.
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25X1
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The situation with respect to airfields for deployment
of maritime reconnaissance aircraft or stopovers by
military transport aircraft is different. Soviet access
to such facilities has been limited, and Moscow
probably places a high priority on obtaining addition-
al rights. In West Africa, Luanda is too far south to
serve as a base for covering all the Central Atlantic
sea lanes in which the Soviets probably are most
interested. Consequently they are likely to continue to
press for Bear deployments in Conakry, and we are
likely to see initiatives elsewhere in West Africa.
In the Indian Ocean, Soviet reconnaissance aircraft
flying out of South Yemen and Ethiopia can cover
much of the northern Arabian Sea area in which the
US carrier groups operate. Nevertheless, Moscow
probably would like to monitor Western naval move-
ments elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, and it may well
judge that developments in southern Africa will pose
such requirements in the future. They probably are
interested in obtaining access to at least one airfield in
the southern Indian Ocean that would support recon-
naissance flights. The Soviet use of several new
airfields in East and West Africa as transit points for
military transports en route to southern Africa may
well represent a more vigorous effort to establish
precedents for reconnaissance access in the future, as
well as a variety of contingency stopover points that
would facilitate arms deliveries.
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Sub-Saharan Africa
Soviet trade with and aid to Sub-Saharan Africa have
expanded rapidly since the mid-1970s, reflecting the
USSR's greater involvement in the region. Moscow's
willingness and ability to meet the military needs of
key clients-especially Ethiopia and Angola-are the
overriding factors determining Soviet presence and
influence in the region. Soviet economic assistance is
minimal, especially in comparison with Western aid.
Precisely because Moscow prefers to rely on its
military assistance program rather than economic aid
to project its presence in the region, its ability to
expand relations with Sub-Saharan Africa through
economic ties is probably limited.
Recent Trends in Trade
Soviet trade with Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding
deliveries of most military equipment, grew from
relatively meager beginnings in the early 1970s to
more than $1.1 billion in 1982 or about 7 percent of
total Soviet trade turnover with the LDCs' (see table
1). Most of this expansion occurred in Soviet exports
to key client states, mainly Angola and Ethiopia. The
value of imports declined after 1980, reflecting sharp-
ly falling commodity prices and Moscow's efforts to
curb hard currency purchases in 1981 and 1982.
Soviet exports and imports are limited to a relatively
small number of trade partners and commodities. F_
Between 1975 and 1982 Soviet exports to Sub-Saha-
ran Africa grew at an annual rate of almost 25
percent, accounting for 11 percent of total reported
Soviet exports to individual LDCs.2 This expansion
has resulted entirely from increases in exports to four
African countries-Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, and
Mozambique. Exports to other Sub-Saharan countries
'According to estimates made by Dr. Herbert Block in The
Planetary Product in 1980: A Creative Pause, Sub-Saharan Africa
accounted for 12 percent of total GNP for the non-Communist
LDCs. 0
' Because a large share of Soviet exports to the developing countries
reported in official trade statistics is not specified by partner
country, it is possible only to calculate a rough share going to Sub-
Saharan Africa. Most of the unreported trade is believed to be
military supplies, and the share exported to African nations can
declined by 50 percent between 1975 and 1982. Soviet
trade reporting for the first nine months of 1983
indicates that these trends continued last year.
Soviet trade expansion with Nigeria-the region's 25X1
only major oil producer-is the result of large Soviet
contracts won in the latter part of the 1970s, in the
heyday of OPEC spending. These multibillion-dollar
contracts, which call for the USSR to build two oil
pipelines and a steel mill, have earned substantial
amounts of hard currency and probably will continue
to do so over the next eight to 10 years. The expansion
of Soviet exports to Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozam-
bique appears to be driven largely by political and
strategic considerations. This is not to say these
exports are free-for its commodities Moscow de-
mands cash on delivery or extends credits, which it
expects to be repayed.
Soviet exports to Sub-Saharan Africa consist primari-
ly of machinery and equipment, crude oil, and petro-
leum products. The combined share of these commod-
ities in total exports to the region grew from 39
percent in 1970 to 90 percent in 1982. If deliveries to
Nigeria for the pipelines and the steel mill projects
are excluded, about half of Soviet machinery and
equipment deliveries consist of transport vehicles and
aircraft, many of which are intended for military use.
Most of the remaining machinery exports are con-
nected with various Soviet development projects. Al-
most all of the petroleum exports have gone to
Ethiopia.
The pattern of Soviet imports from the region differs
sharply from export trends. Since the early 1970s
these imports have grown at half the rate of overall
Soviet imports from the Third World. In part, this
reflects the inability of the African countries to supply
Moscow with critical agricultural products-grain,
meat, sugar, and vegetable oils. Nor has the USSR
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Table 1
USSR: Trade With Selected Sub-Saharan
African Countries, 1970-82
Total Non-Communist
1,183
1,241
2,649
LDCs a
Sub-Saharan
93
141
186
Africa
a Excludes Soviet exports to the LDCs which are not specified by
country; these are believed to consist largely of Soviet arms. Thus,
the actual level of trade with both Sub-Saharan Africa and all
LDCs is understated.
become' an important importer of Sub-Saharan non-
agricultural raw materials. Imports of these commod-
ities have stagnated at a level under $100 million
b May understate the actual level of trade with this region as a
result of exclusion of data in official Soviet trade statistics for a
number of countries since the late 1970s.
region during the first nine months of 1983, imports
for the year will remain substantially below the 1980
level.
since 1980.
More important, between 1980 and 1982, the value of
Soviet imports from the region fell by more than 45
percent-partly because of Moscow's efforts to reduce
overall hard currency expenditures by cutting back
nonessential purchases such as cocoa, coffee, and
wood products. In the case of coffee, the Soviets
diverted purchases to Latin America. In addition,
falling world commodity prices further reduced the
value of imports from Sub-Saharan Africa, including
those from Ethiopia and Angola. While a strength-
ened Soviet financial position and slightly higher
world commodity prices appear to have contributed to
an increase in the overall value of imports from the
Military Trade and Aid
As with Soviet trade in general, military agreements
and deliveries have expanded rapidly since 1975 with
most of the growth in sales and deliveries to Ethiopia
and Angola (see table 2). Through 1975, Soviet
military sales and deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa
accounted for only 5 percent of both total sales
agreements and deliveries to the LDCs. Between 1975
and 1982, however, this share rose to 12 percent.
About 60 percent of this trade has gone to Ethiopia
and Angola to support the Marxist regimes in these
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Table 2
USSR: Military Agreements and
Deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa,
1955-82
Agreements
Deliveries
1955-82
1976-82
1955-82
1976-82
Total Non-Communist
LDCs
78,477
56,381
56,820
41,266
Sub-Saharan
Africa
7,475
6,542
5,463
4,784
Ethiopia
3,942
3,936
2,252
2,329
Angola
782
758
774
774
Mozambique
318
294
290
295
Other
2,433
1,554
2,147
1,486
countries. Moscow is also the major supplier of mili-
tary equipment to a number of other Sub-Saharan
nations-including Mozambique, Tanzania, and
Zambia
The USSR has been the most generous in its military
aid to Ethiopia. While this reflects, in part, Ethiopia's
poor financial position, it also indicates the political
importance Moscow attaches to this relationship.
Almost all of the estimated $4 billion worth of
military equipment sold to Ethiopia since 1975 has
been discounted by 50 percent from the foreign trade
list price; that is, the Ethiopians were charged only
about $2 billion for the arms they received. These
sales have, for the most part, been financed with 10-
year credits at an annual interest rate of 2 percent
with most of the payments not scheduled to begin
until 1984. Nevertheless, with debt service payments
to the USSR expected to climb to about $200 million
in 1984, Ethiopia already has approached the USSR
for further debt rescheduling. No agreement has yet
been reached, but Ethiopia's poor financial position
may leave Moscow with no alternative but to agree to
a moratorium on scheduled payments.
Soviet financial terms with other Sub-Saharan coun-
tries are less generous, though much more so than
Soviet sales to OPEC arms clients in the Middle East,
where most sales are made for cash with substantial
downpayments. Generally, the terms of Soviet credits
are for 10 years with interest rates of 2 to 4 percent,
but few price discounts or deferred payments are
granted. Moreover, Moscow usually demands cash
payments in advance for spare parts and services. It
does not hesitate to pressure even key client states,
such as Angola and Mozambique, to make the re-
quired payments. According to US Embassy sources
in Maputo, for instance, half of Mozambique's air-
craft were grounded in late 1982 because of a lack of
hard currency to purchase the required spare parts.
and rescheduling.
the USSR suspended deliveries of military
equipment to Zambia in early 1983 when that country
suspended payments for arms already delivered.
When necessary, the USSR will reschedule debt
payments, but usually only after protracted haggling.
It prefers to negotiate barter arrangements. In the
past, it has accepted Zambian cobalt in lieu of cash
payments,
Angola recently agreed to supply 40,000 barrels of oil
per day to the USSR and Eastern Europe in repay-
ment for military purchases.
The Economic Aid Program
Of the estimated $23 billion of Soviet economic aid
disbursed since the program began in the mid-1950s,
only about $3.5 billion has gone to Sub-Saharan
Africa. As with Soviet trade and military sales, this
aid is concentrated on a few countries and most has
been extended since 1975 (see table 3). About 70
percent-almost $2.5 billion-has gone to Nigeria
(principally for the steel plant mentioned above),
Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. Other relatively
large aid recipients-those receiving $100-250 million
in aid-include Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Somalia.
Most of the aid to these four countries as well as
other, smaller recipients was extended during the
1960s and early 1970s, however, and Soviet economic
involvement in these countries has since dropped
considerably.
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Table 3
USSR: Economic Agreements and
Deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa,
1954-82
Mill in Nigeria and preliminary work on the construc-
tion of the Kapanda dam and hydropower station in
Agreements
Deliveries
1954-82
1976-82
1954-82
1976-82
Total Non-Com- 23,336
munist LDCs
11,289
11,105
4,935
Sub-Saharan 3,530
Africa
2,526
1,402
895
Ethiopia
647
542
431
405
Angola
438
438
32
30
Mozam-
bique
178
164
39
40
Nigeria
1,207
1,200 ,
270
265
Guinea
236
4
218
30
Ghana
106
13
35
5
Somalia
164
4
101
30
Mali
120
31
98
25
Other
434
130
178
65
The level of Soviet economic assistance to Sub-
Saharan Africa is paltry in comparison with Western
aid. In most instances Soviet largesse does not begin
to supply the levels of aid required to spur economic
development for even the USSR's largest aid recipi-
ents. Only a small portion of this aid consists of food
grants, generally in 2,000- to 5,000-ton donations of
grain with occasional grants of up to 25,000 tons.
Mostly, Soviet assistance consists of long-term credits
(10 years at annual interest rates of 2 to 5 percent)
tied to Soviet exports for specific projects. As with the
military aid effort, Soviet economic aid to Ethiopia is
the notable exception to these general terms. Most of
the USSR's support to Ethiopia since the mid-1970s
has been commodity credits and grant aid, mostly in
the form of oil subsidies and credits.
Much of Soviet economic assistance in Africa is
devoted to developing mineral resources-bauxite in
Guinea and gold in Mali. A portion of the output is
often exported to the USSR in repayment. The USSR
also participates in a number of agricultural, fishery,
and power projects and assists in constructing a wide
variety of small industrial facilities. Only two large
projects are currently under way-the Ajaokuta Steel
Angola
Although the USSR's economic assistance program in
Sub-Saharan Africa is small, it does provide Moscow
with a useful, low-cost tool to project its presence in
the region. Enhancing the program's usefulness to the
Soviets are an estimated 10,645 Soviet economic
technicians-25 percent of all Soviet technical advis-
ers currently in the Third World. These technicians
are concentrated in Nigeria (5,000), Angola (1,500),
Ethiopia (1,000), and Mozambique (1,000). Except for
a few doctors and teachers provided free, the Soviets
charge heavily for their services-over $50,000 a year
for project managers and nearly as much for geolo-
gists, interpreters, and other less senior personnel.
Thus, these technicians not only increase the Soviet
presence in Africa, but also provide Moscow with an
additional source of hard currency.
Prospects for the Future
Despite the stinginess of Soviet economic aid and a
generally hard-nosed attitude toward financing arms
sales, those African states that have become tied to
the USSR are likely to remain so because of noneco-
nomic factors. Moscow's willingness and ability to
respond quickly to meet the military needs of key
regimes in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are
the overriding factors influencing the closeness of
their relationship to the USSR. This Soviet respon-
siveness has most recently been demonstrated by
stepped-up military deliveries in 1983 to bolster the
Angolan armed forces. The presence of surrogate
forces and advisers-mainly Cubans and East Ger-
mans-increases Moscow's ability to aid its African
clients. As long as the Marxist regimes of Ethiopia,
Angola, and Mozambique are threatened by insurgent
forces, the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa
will remain strong.
Whether Moscow's position would remain as strong
with an improvement in the security situation in these
countries is less clear. Moscow makes no secret of its
unwillingness and/or inability to supply the Third
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World with the types and large amounts of aid
required by the region or supplied by the West.
Mozambique, disappointed with the low level of Sovi-
et aid, has adopted a policy of expanding economic
ties with the West. In addition, several African
countries once close to the USSR-including Guinea,
Benin, and Congo-have become disillusioned with
Moscow's assistance programs and are strengthening
their Western ties.
For these reasons, the Soviet ability to expand rela-
tions with this region through economic ties is proba-
bly limited. Moscow is well aware of the limited
catalogue of goods the Sub-Saharan countries can
offer. The USSR cannot export the food and consum-
er products needed in these countries; nor is Soviet
equipment, with its reputation for poor performance,
particularly attractive to African countries. Thus,
military trade appears to be the primary means of
expanding Soviet presence and influence in Sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly in situations where Mos-
cow can capitalize on instability within the region. F
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Secret
Other Topics
Soviet Security Policy on
the Chinese Border
Although political relations between the USSR and
China have improved since early 1982, prospects for a
reversal or even a significant relaxation of the Soviet
military buildup on the Chinese border appear slight,
at least during this decade. During their political
discussions since October 1982, the Soviets and Chi-
nese have agreed on several ways to expand their
political contacts but remain deadlocked on key secu-
rity issues. Moscow has refused to make any unilater-
al concessions on troop deployments until political
relations improve, and Beijing insists that political
relations cannot improve until basic security issues are
resolved. Meanwhile, Moscow continues to strengthen
its military forces opposite China, adhering in the
process to a military strategy that leaves little room
for force reductions.
The Soviet Military Buildup Opposite China:
Phase I
The current posture of Soviet forces on the Chinese
border is the result of a process that began in the early
1960s, when Moscow realized that Beijing was a
potential military foe. Soviet military writings typical-
ly suggest that the purpose of military deployments is
not just to deter potential enemies from attacking but
to defeat them if they do. The normal way to win a
war, according to this literature, is with a strategic-
level offensive: a large-scale operation designed to
strike the enemy's entire armed forces and their
infrastructure and ultimately to destroy its ability to
fight. In the Far East, however, the Soviets almost
certainly found it necessary to focus initially on the
lesser objective of deterring or containing a Chinese
attack, both because their border with China was
largely unprotected and because they faced an imme-
diate threat of border incursions instigated by an
unpredictable Chinese leadership. The Damanskiy
Island clashes of 1969 gave substance to these fears.
During the initial phase of the buildup-1965-72-
the Soviets appear to have concentrated on achieving
two immediate military objectives: creating strong
defenses where attack seemed most likely and devel-
oping the ability to launch shallow offensives into
China. By 1972 the Kremlin had deployed 19 ready'
divisions to positions on the Chinese border from
which they could cover all likely invasion routes, and
it backed these forces with 21 not-ready divisions
distributed among the four military districts opposite
China. The Soviets also built up air defenses around
all major military and population centers in the Far
East as well as along the eastern portion of the Trans-
Siberian Railroad.
By 1972 Moscow probably had achieved a capability
to protect its territory in the east against Chinese
ground and air forces. This judgment is based not only
on the disposition of Soviet forces, but also on the fact
' Ready divisions are the most highly manned and the best equipped
and trained: they are at least minimally prepared for combat
operations with little or no mobilization. Not ready divisions would
require extensive mobilization of both men and equipment and
therefore would not be available for immediate combat operations.
In the case of the Far East, they would require about 50 days to
reach a minimum level of proficiency sufficient for offensive
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that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) organized
and equipped its forces to fight a war of attrition
against invading forces-it did not give them the
equipment, training, and logistics for an offensive into
Soviet territory. PLA doctrine also called for nothing
more than a defensive war on Chinese territory
against Soviet invaders.
The Soviet Buildup: Phase II
Changes in the Soviet force structure in the Far East
since the early 1970s suggest that Moscow subse-
quently decided to go beyond its initial military
objectives and develop the capability to launch a
strategic-level offensive against a relatively small but
vital part of China: northern Manchuria. The Soviets
probably realized that, although their existing forces
could repel a Chinese invasion, they could not prevent
temporary crossings of Soviet borders and the result-
ing significant damage to Moscow's interests in bor-
der areas. They also may have feared that the Chinese
could defeat the limited offensive thrusts for which
they had prepared. Finally, Soviet statements in the
1970s about the "Chinese threat" revealed concern
over the possibility that China would attack, not on its
own, but during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. Moscow
probably hoped that its capability to seize northern
Manchuria would guarantee good behavior by the
Chinese even in a NATO-Pact war and, if not, permit
the Kremlin to quickly knock China out of the war. F
Moscow enhanced its ability to coordinate such an
operation in 1978 when it formed the High Command
of Forces in the Far East, the only peacetime Soviet
theater command. It probably controls all convention-
al Soviet forces opposite China.
Moscow also increased its offensive capabilities
against China by modernizing its theater nuclear
forces in Asia, principally by deploying SS-20
IRBMs. The first SS-20 base opposite China was
begun in 1976. The Soviets currently have 135 opera-
tional SS-20s targeted against Asia, and we estimate
that they will have between 216 and 270 by the end of
the decade. These missiles enable Moscow, in case of
war, to destroy or disable key elements of the military
infrastructure within China, most importantly those
that can strike a nuclear blow against the USSR. In
addition, Soviet theater strike capabilities have been
improved since 1982 by the permanent basing of
Y-class SSBNs in the Sea of Japan and the institution
of regular patrols there. A secondary theater strike
role was always considered inherent in the Petropav-
lovsk-based Y-class units, but earlier patrols were all
conducted off the US coast.
Significant evidence of Moscow's plans for conducting
a ground offensive against China is found in the
positioning of newly created ground divisions on the
border since the early 1970s. During 1972-82 the
Kremlin added three new ready and 11 not-ready
divisions. All three ready divisions were established in
Mongolia. This brought to nine the number of ready
divisions on the western borders of Manchuria, where
Soviet defensive requirements, compared with those in
the Far East Military District, are relatively minor.
These divisions would probably spearhead a Manchu-
rian offensive and would be supported, as defensive
requirements permitted, by the forces in the Far East
Military District. The Soviets may also be creating a
theater reserve behind this force: since 1972 they have
added five new not-ready divisions that could support
any offensive into western Manchuria
Force modernization has also provided improved tac-
tical air support for such an operation. During the
early 1970s Moscow substantially upgraded the capa-
bility of most of its fighter-bomber regiments to
provide close air support to ground forces by replacing
their MIG-17 fighters with specialized fighter-bomb-
ers (Fitters and Flogger Ds, Fs, and Js). The effects
were particularly pronounced in the Transbaikal Mili-
tary District, where many of the fighter-bomber
regiments opposite China were concentrated. Begin-
ning in 1976, the Kremlin also upgraded its deep-
interdiction capability against China by introducing
the Fencer light bomber, first in existing Beagle
bomber regiments and then in converted fighter-
bomber regiments. This increase in the ground attack
capabilities of Soviet air forces in the area is particu-
larly dramatic, since China's air defenses would prob-
ably be ineffective against them.
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 Figure 1
Soviet Ground Force Divisions Opposite China
6a
Aral Sea
Turk stan
Milita y
District
Central Asian
Pakistan
NIN
1973-82
Afghanistan
*KABUL
Tank Motorized Tank Motorized
division rifle division division rifle division
Ready 5 C J
Lake -
Balkhash
Chinese line
of control
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Soviet Uni
Iberian
Milita District
Novosi sk
Urumqi
Military Region
Lake
Baikal
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Trarisbaikal
ilitary District
Beijing
Military
Region
Korea,
fS'YONGYANG-1
* -,r
27
~
South'
Korea
East
China
Sea
JAI1ppins
Sep
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Moscow also has enhanced the offensive strength of
the Transbaikal Military District by concentrating its
tank modernization program opposite China there. By
1982 all of the divisions in this district had received
T-62 or T-72 tanks to replace their T-54s and T-55s,
while only 38 percent of the divisions in the Far East
Military District had T-62s. This bias in favor of the
Transbaikal Military District only became apparent
around 1978, although the introduction of T-62s
opposite China had begun a decade earlier. By 1982
this district also had a preponderance of the self-
propelled artillery deployed opposite China, enhanc-
ing the capability of its artillery units to support fast-
moving tank operations.
The Primacy of the Military Approach
Since the mid-1960s Moscow has periodically made
initiatives toward conciliation with Beijing, but until
recently all such overtures were rejected by the
Chinese or proved fruitless. Both because of Chinese
inflexibility and its own conviction that military supe-
riority is essential to security, Moscow has been
unrelenting in its efforts to strengthen Soviet forces
opposite China.
Moscow's economic investment in its ground forces
(the main element of its posture) opposite China has
increased steadily since 1965 (see figure 2). Expendi-
tures for the force as a whole have fluctuated some-
what, but this has been due primarily to the modern-
ization of air regiments at irregular intervals. In
addition, although the Kremlin withdrew border
troops from disputed islands in 1969, it has not
disbanded or even pulled back a major ground force
unit opposite China since 1960, either to demonstrate
serious interest in political rapprochement or for any
other reason. Finally, Moscow has not changed its
military policies even when they seem to conflict with
political initiatives. For example, the Soviets continue
to stengthen their forces in Mongolia even though the
Chinese are particularly sensitive to this issue, which
Beijing treats as a major obstacle to normalizing
relations.
The consistency with which the Soviets have imple-
mented their military policy against China despite
changes in their political tactics during the past 20
years underscores the strong and enduring consensus
in the leadership that military strength is essential to
Figure 2
Dollar Costs of Soviet Forces Opposite China:
Estimated Growth, 1965-82
a Includes ground forces, frontal aviation, LRA,
VTA, SRF, PVO, and KGB forces.
Soviet security. There is probably also a consensus,
however, that a dual political and military approach
to China offers significant advantages. Soviet leaders
probably believe that political initiatives help to mute
foreign opposition to their military buildup without
significantly endangering it. They may also believe
that the buildup will eventually make China more
willing to compromise in political negotiations, while
providing insurance against the failure of those
negotiations.
Prospects
The apparent long-term consensus behind the Soviet
military program and the lack of any evidence of
willingness to modify it, even in connection with the
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latest round of political discussions, indicate that
there will be no significant change in Moscow's
overall military policy against China in the near
future. It almost certainly will be some time before
the current Sino-Soviet dialogue reaches a point
where the Soviets are tempted to make major military
concessions. Resource constraints, although increas-
ing, are also unlikely to force any significant alter-
ations, at least in the 1980s.
Any changes that Moscow might decide to make
would probably be limited to token actions designed to
create or sustain momentum for political progress
without altering the essential elements of its current
military posture. Such actions could include symbolic
force reductions to elicit or respond to Chinese conces-
sions at the negotiating table. They would probably
focus on Soviet offensive capabilities, since these
would have the greatest political impact on the Chi-
nese.
There is currently no sign, however, that the Soviets
are considering such actions, and, indeed, all the
evidence presently available seems to argue against
even token changes in the Kremlin's security policy
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Secret
Soviet-Peruvian
Military Relations
and Political Ties
Despite the Peruvian military's growing dissatisfac-
tion with Soviet arms, Lima's financial problems and
Moscow's continued willingness to provide attractive
financing are likely to ensure the USSR's position as
Peru's primary source of weapons over the next few
years. Given the Peruvian military's rightist views and
the Belaunde government's hostility toward the
USSR, however, Moscow apparently doubts its ability
to translate this position into significant political
influence in the near term. Instead, the Soviets will
try to use their Peruvian connection to establish
similar military supply relationships with other South
American countries while cultivating better ties with
Peruvian opposition forces
Political Changes in the Peruvian Military
Relations between the Soviets and the Peruvian mili-
tary have deteriorated over the past year-in large
part because of the influence of anti-Communist
general officers.
that it runs the risk of being rce of
arms and training for Peru.
US military sources describe Lt. Gen. Carlos Briceno,
who retired as Army commander and president of the
Peruvian joint command in December. as conservative
and staunchly anti-Communist.
Briceno protested the Soviet downing of
the KAL airliner in September by refusing to go to
Moscow to renegotiate Peru's military debt
Briceno's hostility toward the Soviets may be due in
part to his belief that outside elements are backing
and coordinating Peru's Sendero Luminoso terrorist
group. (We have no evidence of this.) Attache reports
state that he believes Communist electoral gains will
encourage Sendero Luminoso and harm democracy in
Peru. Before he retired, he expressed to US officials
his interest in obtaining US equipment. Like other
former Peruvian military chiefs, Briceno probably will
remain an influential factor in the future. Many in the
Army hierarchy reportedly share Briceno's view that
the Soviet connection must ultimately be broken, and
his successor has expressed this opinion.
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command of the Peruvian Air Force could significant-
ly alter the political outlook of this branch to the
detriment of Soviet interests.
the new leadership is likely to have more positive
predecessors
Moscow probably is also troubled by the reported
deterioration of its relationship with the Peruvian
National Intelligence Service (SIN). US Embassy
sources report that over the years the KGB has
regularly sponsored SIN Army officers for intelli-
gence training in the USSR. The KGB's formal ties to 25X1
the SIN, however, were damaged in early 1983 when
officers of the traditionally anti-Soviet Peruvian Navy
The Military Supply Relationship
The Soviet military supply line to Peru is Moscow's
main source of influence with the Peruvian military.
Over the past two years, however, Peru has made
several attempts to diversify its supply of new military
equipment. US Embassy officials report that Lima is
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negotiating the purchase of 15 US-made Sikorsky
Blackhawk assault helicopters for the Army's use in
its campaign against terrorism and insurgency,
poor Soviet logistic support for the Soviet-
made MI-6 and MI-8 helicopters in the Peruvian
inventory prompted this move.
The Air Force is also reportedly still trying to close its
long-pending purchase of 26 French Mirage 2000
fighter aircraft. US military sources state, however,
that since August Moscow has made at least two
counteroffers of Soviet-made aircraft on favorable
terms. Lima reportedly rejected the latest offer, in
October, of MIG-23 fighter aircraft because of previ-
ously inadequate maintenance and logistic support
from the USSR for Peru's SU-22 aircraft.
Chronic maintenance problems have motivated the
Peruvians to develop an indigenous maintenance ca-
pability.
a transfer-of-technology agreement with the USSR
three years ago that provides training of Peruvian
technicians in the maintenance of SU-22 fighter
engines and the eventual manufacture in Peru of
related tools, special equipment, and spare parts.
The Peruvians, however, are reluctant to turn to third
countries for spare parts and supplies for Soviet
equipment for fear of Soviet reprisals. According to
attache reports, the Peruvian high command believes
that Moscow could harm Peru's military readiness by
reducing supplies and cutting off logistic support if
Lima looks elsewhere. These reports state that, al-
though significant segments of the high command
now believe that Peru's dependence on the USSR for
military supplies must be reduced, the Peruvians do
not wish to jeopardize their fighting capabilities.
Peru's Financial Problems
Lima's $11.6 billion foreign debt also is a major
obstacle to any effort to diversify Peru's arms sources
and reduce its military dependence on the USSR. The
Peruvian economy remains depressed, and Lima is
struggling to meet the austerity targets set by the
International Monetary Fund as a condition for refi-
nancing a portion of Peru's debt.
While Western firms have been leery of Peru's cre-
ditworthiness, Moscow continues to demonstrate its
willingness to work around Peru's financial difficul-
ties. Although Lima owes the USSR an estimated
$1.2 billion for military purchases, in September the
Soviets agreed to reschedule payments of $411 million
coming due in 1983 and 1984 over the next eight
years. US Embassy officials report that the Soviets
have gone out of their way to accommodate Peru by
accepting as part of the package a payment-in-kind
arrangement in nontraditional Peruvian exports such
as textiles. We judge that Peru will act pragmatically
and look toward the Soviets in the future if the West
cannot offer technologically advanced equipment on
more generous terms
armed forces.
Moscow has sought to preserve its position by main-
taining a low profile with the government while
cultivating close ties with all branches of the Peruvian
the near term.
Prospects
Largely because the Soviets perceive the government
of President Belaunde as hostile to their interests,
Moscow apparently doubts its ability to derive politi-
cal influence from its ties to the Peruvian military in
signaled by the results of the November municipal
election could improve Soviet prospects in Peru=
the Soviets over
the past year have cultivated ties with the American
Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), the moder-
ate-leftist coalition party that made substantial elec-
toral gains in November. By developing relationships
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with APRA politicians, the Soviets reportedly hope to
get more accurate assessments of the Peruvian politi-
cal scene, and, should APRA win the 1985 presiden-
tial election, an alternative avenue to influence in the
Peruvian Government.
the
Soviets believe that the failure of the Belaunde gov-
ernment to solve the nation's social and economic
problems coupled with leftist electoral gains might
precipitate a coup before the 1985 presidential elec-
tions.
rightist elements would be the likely
leaders of such a move and that a coup would
probably harm Moscow's interests. There are no
indications, however, that military leaders are now
preparing to stage such a coup.
Whether or not the Soviets can increase their political
influence within Peru, we believe that Moscow sees
the maintenance of its military relationship with Lima
as important to the success of its efforts to establish
similar ties elsewhere in South America. According to
attache reporting, since the Falklands war the Soviets
have approached the Argentine and Bolivian militar-
ies with offers of arms and training. Although the
Soviet-Peruvian military relationship has not been
problem free, Moscow may believe that its continued
willingness to do business with Lima's anti-Commu-
nist government and armed forces will strengthen its
image as a reliable arms supplier. We believe, there-
fore, that the USSR will continue to make every
effort to keep its Peruvian foothold intact. In the
absence of more attractive offers of financing by
Western arms suppliers, Lima's financial problems
greatly enhance the prospects of Soviet arms sale
efforts.
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secret
Soviet Educational Reform To
Accent Vocational Training F_
A Politburo commission established following the
June 1983 Central Committee plenum issued compre-
hensive draft proposals for reforming Soviet education
in January. The proposals-issued after six months of
public debate on how the educational system could be
changed to better serve the economy's needs-offer
few concrete measures but strongly urge increased
vocational training, particularly in the general second-
ary schools (roughly equivalent to US.academic high
schools). The reforms will be formally enacted in a
few months, probably with little change.
The commission also recommended restructuring the
general education system so that children will start
school one year earlier, at the age of 6. General
education will become an 11-year program with the
additional year in the primary grades (1 to 4). The
incomplete secondary program will remain five years
(grades 5 to 9); and general secondary will still be a
two-year program (grades 10 and 11).
The emphasis on vocational training is intended pri-
marily to help offset the decrease in the number of
young people who will be entering the labor force
during the 1980s. Specifically, the Soviets are seeking
to make a larger proportion of youth available for
employment at an earlier age and, most important, to
increase the number of skilled workers and improve
the match between job openings and suitably trained
personnel. The changes that will be made are in line
with the traditional Soviet educational policy of giving
priority to meeting short-term manpower needs. But
the price for the immediate gains could be a long-run
reduction in the supply of much needed highly trained
entrants into the professions, increased emphasis on
vocational work in these schools seems inconsistent
with their purpose.
Past and Present Emphasis on Vocational Education
The current proposals to expand vocational education
are a continuation of an earlier policy that has had
little success. In December 1977 the Council of
Ministers, in anticipation of declining increments to
the labor force, adopted a resolution calling for an
increase in vocational training in secondary schools.
Such training was to increase from two to four hours
weekly, curricula and text books were to have a more
polytechnical, practical orientation, and material
deemed to be "of secondary importance" was to be
eliminated. The resolution was designed to make
secondary school graduates better suited to the econo-
my's immediate needs, without abandoning the gov-
ernment's commitment to universal secondary educa-
tion. The draft proposals reiterate the provisions of
this resolution, calling for further streamlining of the
academic curriculum, "stepping up the polytechnical
thrust of the content of education," and increasing the
time spent on labor training.
The 1977 resolution established completion of the
eighth grade (ninth under the new system) as the point
for choosing which secondary education track to
follow, a decision that largely determines career possi-
bilities. Since the mid-1970s almost all eighth-grade
graduates have moved on to some type of secondary or
vocational school. The different types of schools, their
current programs, and proposed changes are listed
below:
manpower.
There also appears to be an essentially ideological
element in the proposals that might dilute the future
quality of the professional component of the labor
force. Perhaps reflecting an official attitude that
vocational training is important in molding the char-
acter of Soviet youth, the draft program urges more
vocational training even in the general secondary
schools. Since they are supposed to train future
? General secondary schools will continue to offer
academic training and some polytechnical experi-
ence in a traditional two-year program leading to
higher education.
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Table 1
Distribution of Eighth-Grade
Graduates
Table 2
Distribution of 10th-Grade General
Secondary School Graduates
Year
Entered Admitted to F
ull-Time Stud
y
Work Force Vocational-
Technical
General
Secondary
Specialized
Secondary
1965
42.5 12.3
40.0
5.2
1975
2.3 31.6
60.9
5.2
1980
0.5 33.1
60.2
6.2
? Specialized secondary schools now provide both
eighth- and 10th-grade graduates technical training
at the semiprofessional level for careers such as
'technicians, nurses, and elementary school teachers.
The four-year course for eighth-grade graduates
devotes approximately 75 percent of its time to
technical subjects and applied training. The course
for general secondary school graduates is one and a
half to two and a half years and consists essentially
of technical training. Under the new system, the
course length will be two or three years.
? Vocational-technical schools will continue to offer a
three-year course providing a specific skill and a
secondary education. The one- to two-year course
offering only vocational training for general second-
ary school graduates will be limited to one year
under the new system.
? Schools for working and rural youth will continue
to provide secondary education on a part-time basis.
The emphasis on vocational education since 1977 has
not worked out as planned. As shown in table 1, there
was little decline between 1975 and 1980 in the
proportion of eighth-grade graduates entering general
secondary schools.
The regime wanted to reduce the number of youths
choosing the academic track, not only to increase the
number being trained in specific skills and for specific
trades, but because, as Soviet surveys have indicated,
15-year-olds (eighth-grade graduates) are more will-
ing to take blue-collar jobs than 17- or 18-year-olds
Year Entered Admitted to Full-Time Study
Work Force Vocational- Specialized Higher
Technical Secondary
1965 16.2 42.4 41.4
1975 55.3 12.9 16.0 15.8
1980 41.2 26.9 15.6 16.3
(10th-grade graduates). The new proposals do not
specify the proportion of students to attend each
secondary track, but they do call for the number of
students entering secondary vocational-technical
schools to double
Since 1977 Soviet educators have staged a massive
public relations campaign to raise the prestige of
wageworker occupations and to steer students away
from a college-bound track, the traditional path of
upward mobility in Soviet society. The State Commit-
tee for Labor and Social Problems has been tasked
with directing an ambitious program of career coun-
seling for students about to enter a secondary school
program.
Current educational arrangements are also contribut-
ing to wasteful use of manpower. First, a smaller
proportion of secondary school graduates are going on
to higher education-about 16 percent since 1975
compared with over 40 percent in 1965 (see table 2).
More important, a larger share of these graduates-
43 percent in 1980 versus 29 percent in 1975-
subsequently enroll in specialized secondary schools or
technical schools of the vocational-technical system.
In 1982, 66 percent of the youths admitted to special-
ized secondary schools and 30 percent of those admit-
ted to technical schools were graduates of general
secondary schools. This large-scale sequential enroll-
ment in two basically (though not entirely) parallel
school systems has meant at least an extra year of
schooling for numerous youths and consequent delay
of their entry into the labor force. Interestingly, the
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aMeCL
proposed reforms apparently will not change this
situation; the commission is recommending a one-year
course in secondary vocational-technical schools or a
two- to three-year course in specialized secondary
schools for students who want more advanced techni-
cal training. Some secondary school graduates will
enter the labor force at an earlier age, however, if the
draft proposals to lower the minimum entry age for a
number of occupations or industrial operations are
adopted.
? Gradually integrating 6-year-olds into general edu-
cation schools beginning in 1986 as teachers and
programs become available. The purpose is to (a)
lighten the academic load for children in the prima-
ry grades and allow for an emphasis on basic skills
and (b) permit some mothers to enter the labor force
a year earlier than might otherwise be possible.
? Possibly decreasing the course length for specialized
secondary school graduates who enroll in higher
educational institutions to avoid repetition of basic
course work.
? Expanding vocational training in all school pro-
grams. The proposals recommend attaching each
school to a base enterprise that would act as a
sponsor or patron. Vocational training in general
secondary schools will be upgraded, primarily
through increased use of interschool production
combines. These combines consist of facilities set up
by local governments and industrial and agricultur-
al enterprises. Students work at the combines one
day a week during the school year and three weeks
during the summer. Currently, there are about
2,500 interschool production combines, which train
a third of general secondary school students. Plans
are being formulated to increase the number of such
facilities to 3,200 to train over half of the students
by 1985.
? Training more teachers by increasing admissions to
teachers' colleges and upgrading their education by
extending the present four-year course by one year.
Measures designed to make teaching more attrac-
tive will include wage increases, preferential hous-
ing, and improved living and working conditions.
Reform Likely To Have Limited Impact
The proposed reforms are to be implemented gradual-
ly. Many of the proposals have been made before, but
issuing a comprehensive reform program suggests a
willingness heretofore lacking in allocating the human
and material resources required to reform the educa-
tional system. However, at least in the short run, even
with massive investment, attainment of the program's
objectives faces formidable obstacles. For example,
reducing enrollment in general secondary schools and
correspondingly increasing it in vocational-technical
schools may be frustrated by shortages of the latter
schools, particularly in Central Asia, the Caucasus,
and some'sections of the RSFSR.
Reliance on the interschool production training com-
bines to augment vocational training in the general
secondary schools appears to be misplaced. Educators
complain that one "work" day each week merely
provides superficial acquaintance with an occupation
and a minimal skill level. Furthermore, the physical
facilities, teaching materials, and tools used in the
program are considered unsatisfactory, and the pros-
pects for improvement are not promising. School
administrators have no financial authority and rely on
the enterprises and ultimately the responsible ministry
for financing. But the program enjoys little support
from enterprises and ministries, which see it as more
hindrance than help in meeting production targets.
A similar educational reform was attempted, without 25X1
success, under Khrushchev a generation ago. Initiated
in 1958, it also came in response to a labor shortage,
the result of a severe decline in the number of persons
reaching working age in the late 1950s and early
1960s. Khrushchev overhauled the Soviet school sys-
tem to provide increased amounts of polytechnical
training at the secondary level, expand part-time
education, and upgrade vocational-technical schools.
After several years, general dissatisfaction with the
reform seemed to outweigh its merits. Most schools
did not have the necessary materials or qualified
teachers to give adequate vocational training. Stu-
dents complained of being overworked and showed
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little interest in employment in industry or agriculture greater stress on training that leads to excessively
mainly because they often were assigned only menial narrow specialization could leave the USSR ill
tasks during training sessions. On-the-job training, a equipped to deal with the demands of an increasingly
key part of Khrushchev's program, was not based on complex economy in an era of rapid technological
vocational interest, but on proximity of the factory to change.
the student's home. Managers objected to lackadaisi-
cal student participation on the job, and enterprises
were reluctant to spend time on training students. As
a result, part-time educational programs often suf-
fered from inferior instruction and high dropout and
repeater rates, resulting in a decline in the quality of
higher and specialized secondary education. The mea-
sures were rescinded by 1965 when a 10-year program
of general secondary education was reinstated and
polytechnical training was virtually eliminated.
Though the current reform proposals are less extreme
than the unsuccessful Khrushchev reforms, the Sovi-
ets face the same problems in revamping the schools
now that they did 25 years ago-a shortage of
vocational schools, training materials, and qualified
production instructors, unwillingness by enterprises to
provide training, and the negative perception of wage-
worker positions held by students and their families.
In fact, the resistance may be stronger now because of
the gains made in educational attainment since the
1960s
The objectives of the current reform are also open to
question. Gearing the educational system to deempha-
size the academic curriculum at an early stage in life
and to promote more rapid placement of young people
with finely tuned vocational skills into the labor force
could help ease the short-term manpower squeeze.
But Soviet education is already vocationally orient-
ed-in the RSFSR, for instance, one-third of the
hours in general secondary schools are devoted to
labor training'-and pushing it further in this direc-
tion could jeopardize long-term Soviet interests. Low-
ering the quality of general education and placing
' Most vocational-technical schools devote about 60 percent of
course time to vocational and polytechnical subjects. The quality of
academic instruction is lower in these schools than in general
secondary schools. The draft proposals recognize this and call for
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Briefs
Efforts To Spur Two party-state decrees in early December criticized the halfhearted way Soviet
Labor Brigades= industry has introduced the brigade system of organizing labor-small groups of
workers that are assigned resources and tasks according to a contract with
enterprise management. The lack of success of the brigade program is another
example of the difficulty Andropov has encountered in implementing even
relatively moderate reforms. The new decrees listed several incentives for brigade
leaders that are designed to breathe new life into the system but failed to provide
monetary rewards for enterprise managers to encourage the introduction of
brigades; this omission makes it likely that the decrees will have minimal impact.
The Soviet leadership has been pushing hard for extensive use of brigades since
1979, touting this method as an effective way to raise productivity through
enlisting worker self-interest. A worker's remuneration under this system is tied
both to the output of the brigade as a whole and to his individual contribution to
that output. Andropov has given even greater emphasis to the brigade system than
Brezhnev, making it a key element in his plans for revitalizing the economy. Even
though 60 percent of industrial workers have been organized into brigades, most
brigades, according to the December decree, exist in name only or have not been
integrated into actual production. Only half of the brigades are operating under
contracts, and wages continue to be paid on an individual basis, ignoring the link
with brigade performance. A key reason for the limited use of brigades appears to
be opposition by ministerial and working-level managers, who see the contractual
arrangements of the system as diluting their authority over workers.
Retail Price Cute On 1 December the USSR reduced prices of selected consumer durable goods by
13 to 30 percent. This was the third round of price cuts since an unannounced rise
in prices in February 1983. The earlier price reductions took place in April and
September. These cuts-like those in the past-are probably designed to reduce
inventories, particularly of poor-quality items, and the US Embassy reports that
they have indeed stimulated some increase in sales. Chairman of the State
Committee on Prices Glushkov indicated in Pravda that there would be more price
changes-both upward and downward-in the future, but he made clear that
prices of basic foodstuffs and other staple items would not fluctuate.
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 historical rates of less than 1 percent.
In the first official acknowledgement of the price rises of February, Glushkov said
the three price cuts since then would offset the inflationary impact of those
increases, resulting in a net annual saving to consumers of 1.6 billion rubles. Prices
charged by the state for consumer goods appear to have risen sharply in the last
two years. According to official data, Soviet retail prices-following an unprece-
dented increase of about 3.5 percent in 1982-rose at an annual rate of 1.7 percent
for the first six months of 1983, reflecting both the retail price increases in
February and the first round of reductions in April. The subsequent reductions in
September and December may have brought inflation for the year closer to
Commitment to Soviet authorities have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to a five-day, 41-
Five-Day Workweek= hour workweek despite the pressures of a growing labor shortage. The nonfarm
labor force was shifted from a six-day to a five-day workweek in March 1967 with
the expectation that a shorter workweek would boost labor productivity, raise the
efficiency of plant and equipment, and provide more leisure time for workers. The
regime's assurances of a five-day workweek are evidently intended to calm popular
fears, generated by the discipline campaign, that improvements in worker welfare
enacted long ago might now be in jeopardy.
Soviet-Japanese
Relations F_
policies would not change.
Premier Tikhonov's uncompromising statements on bilateral relations in Pravda
earlier this month suggest that Moscow does not expect the recent Japanese
elections to affect Tokyo's foreign policy. Tikhonov, answering questions from the
Japanese press, accused the government of Prime Minister Nakasone of taking its
cue from the United States in "dismantling the entire system of Soviet-Japanese
relations" established during the postwar period. Soviet media coverage of the
elections portrayed the setback dealt to Nakasone's Liberal Democratic Party as
evidence of popular opposition to Tokyo's pro-US policies but predicted that those
Soviets to take the first step.
The Tikhonov interview suggests the Soviets have concluded they have little to
gain from demonstrating flexibility, at least at present. Moscow apparently
believes that its best course is to keep hammering away on the dangers of Japan's
security ties with the United States, in the hope that Japanese public opinion will
eventually force changes in Tokyo's foreign policy. Tokyo believes it is up to the
Soviet Pledge on A Soviet general who advised the USSR's delegation to the Geneva INF talks
Nuclear Missile recently told a Spanish newspaper that the USSR would not target nuclear
Targeting= missiles against Spain as long as it remains "denuclearized." He said that, in spite
of Spain's accession to NATO and the presence of US bases, Moscow considers
Spain a neutral country and seeks good bilateral relations.
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The USSR has long maintained that it would not target nuclear missiles against
any country not having nuclear weapons, but it has recently reemphasized that
pledge to some NATO countries in an apparent effort to limit INF deployments.
The general's statement reflects Moscow's reluctant acceptance of the current
Spanish Government's evident desire to remain in NATO and to consider future
integration into the military structure. Moscow recognizes that US nuclear
weapons are not deployed or permanently stored in Spain at this time. The
statement appears tacitly to accept the fact that the US airbases at Zaragoza and
Torrejon and the naval base at Rota periodically handle nuclear-armed aircraft
and ships.
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Viewpoint
The views expressed in the following article are the author's; they do not
necessarily represent a consensus of CIA analysts.
Soviet Views on Relations
With the United States P
Since September 1983 Soviet statements on bilateral
relations indicate a period of heightened debate over
the prospects for US-Soviet relations under the Rea-
gan administration. Some participants in the discus-
sion argued that no progress is possible so long as the
current United States administration remains in of-
fice, and others alleged that political and economic
forces are influencing the United States toward com-
promise, despite the administration's anti-Soviet dis-
position. This discussion appears to have concluded
with a policy decision late last year to maintain
dialogue on secondary issues and to leave the door
open for a new US initiative on arms control, despite
pessimism over the prospect of any significant break-
through.
The Debate
The analysis of US policy in Soviet media is frequent-
ly more textured than the official line publicly formu-
lated by the highest Soviet officials would suggest. At
times when significant policy decisions need to be
made, Soviet discussants often express strikingly dif-
ferent views on how to assess or anticipate US actions.
These views are frequently advanced with an eye to
influencing particular non-Soviet audiences, but they
also suggest policy advocacy and reflect debate that
will ultimately result in a policy decision.
"once and for all" any "illusions" about the possibility
of an evolution for the better in US policy. The
influential political commentator Aleksandr Bovin
predicted in November that President Reagan's re-
election would mean "four more years of nervous
tension, conflicts, arms race, and nuclear missile
brinksmanship." The newly appointed head of the
Institute of World Economics and International Rela-
tions went even further, arguing that current US
policy was no aberration attributable to the Presi-
dent's personal view, but a reflection of the wishes of
the US ruling "oligarchy."
In contrast, a somewhat less gloomy view held that,
while the US administration was disposed to be anti-
Soviet, its policies were subject to moderating influ-
ences. An article by the prominent political observer
Fedor Burlatskiy, published shortly after the KAL
incident in Literary Gazette, was remarkably upbeat,
arguing that pressure from the American public, the
Congress, and West European leaders had forced the
President to pursue a less rigid course. Burlatskiy
cited the resumption of arms control talks and the
renunciation of economic sanctions against the USSR
as milestones in this development, and he suggested
that the forces he had cited, along with electoral
considerations, were moving events in a "construc-
tive" direction at Geneva.
In the weeks following the KAL incident, a number of
Soviets aired the view that no progress in bilateral
relations was possible as long as the current US
administration remained in office. General Secretary
Andropov expressed a view close to this when he said
on 28 September that recent events had dispelled
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Coinciding with Burlatskiy's article was an interview
on Czechoslovak television with the deputy chief of
the Central Committee's International Information
Department, Vadim Zagladin. Zagladin argued that
"objective" factors, including the mounting US deficit
and a growing US peace movement, would constrain
the US administration from embarking on a new
round in the arms race and that public opinion in the
United States was forcing the administration to modi-
fy its hardline position. The director of the Institute
for the USA and Canada, Georgiy Arbatov, also
noted the potential influence of public concern on
administration policy, although he was less sanguine
about its near-term effects.
Soviet Policy-How Intransigent Is It?
This discussion was apparently the precursor of a
major reconsideration of Soviet policy toward the
United States that may have taken place around the
end of November, when the US Embassy noted the
simultaneous absence from public view of a number of
key specialists on bilateral relations. Although the
Embassy reported initial signs that this review may
have resulted in a decision to shut down the US-Soviet
dialogue completely, subsequent indications suggest
that the resultant policy was based on a synthesis of
the two views outlined above, but was somewhat more
consistent with the second one. The Soviets now
appear to be seeking to maintain a dialogue with the
United States on secondary issues and to be leaving
the door open for a new US initiative on arms control,
while expressing doubt that significant progress is
likely.
Toward the end of December, the Soviets informed
the United States that they were prepared to resume
the interrupted bilateral talks on improving the direct
Moscow-Washington communications link, and bilat-
eral discussions on nonproliferation issues are continu-
ing. Bovin, moderating his earlier position, has af-
firmed that the Soviets will continue to negotiate with
the United States and has even suggested that an
agreement on the establishment of additional consul-
ates would be possible
On the other hand, the Soviets have maintained a
pessimistic line regarding the possibility of any major
breakthrough in bilateral relations, particularly on
arms control. Immediately after the United States
announced the upcoming meeting in Stockholm be-
tween Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromy-
ko, TASS issued a statement clearly intended to
throw cold water on any Western hopes that the
Soviets had moderated their position. It accused the
US Government of "spreading optimistic statements"
and went on to assert that neither the Stockholm
conference nor "bilateral contacts" could substitute
for the Geneva talks. A few days later, Gromyko
made a tough speech characterizing US appeals for a
resumption of arms talks as "hypocrisy" and "propa-
gandistic dope." He reiterated Andropov's condition
of 24 November that the West must display a willing-
ness to return to the situation existing prior to US
INF deployment in order for the talks to resume.
Despite these public rebuffs, the Soviets have given
several private hints that they would be prepared to
respond to a new US offer at Stockholm. Moreover, a
Moscow television commentator on 25 December
explicitly denied that the USSR intends to await the
outcome of the 1984 election before entering into
serious contacts with the United States, and he stated
that Moscow is "ready to deal with any US presi-
dent." He went on to say that the USSR would have
no objection to talks aimed at strengthening interna-
tional security, provided there is an "energetic and
clear" demonstration of good will from the United
States. Burlatskiy wrote in Literary Gazette on
4 January that it would be "premature" to say that
hope for an arms agreement has collapsed.
In summary, after a period of discussion the Soviets
appear to have rejected the option of hunkering down
and freezing bilateral relations altogether until the
1984 Presidential election. Their gloomy pronounce-
ments are more than just propaganda, but they appear
to want to maintain a dialogue in case there may be
some movement by the United States on major issues.
Their pessimism over the immediate prospects for
bilateral relations appears to be coupled with a desire
that no further deterioration take place and that
nothing be done to jeopardize the possibility of im-
provement over the longer term.
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