USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Directorate of Top See. et
USSR Monthly Review
Top Seeret
SOV UR 83-012JX
December 1983
Copy -Z7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Please make the following changes to the USSR Monthly Review for December
1983:
Page 10, figures 2 and 3. The gold lines in both graphs represent total aircraft, not
just third-generation aircraft as the labeling implies.
Page 11, figure 4. The red line in this graph represents total helicopters, not just
attack helicopters as the labeling implies.
Page 11, final paragraph. The designator for the Flanker aircraft is SU-27, not
SU- 17.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Directorate of Top Secret
USSR Monthly Review
table of contents.
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome. They may be
directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the
Top Secret
SUV IIR NMI 2]X
December 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
Contents
Prospects for Soviet Perspective
Military Modernization
During the past two decades the Soviet military has undergone a
dramatic modernization that has firmly established the USSR as a
superpower. Most widely noted has been the accumulation of
strategic nuclear systems, but this issue of the USSR Monthly
Review surveys Soviet military growth in a variety of dimensions-
in the military forces, in industry, and in resource management.
Though the pace of weapons procurement has slowed during the last
few years, the pace of military research and development has not.
We expect military modernization to continue at least as fast as in
recent years, and, if the Soviets surmount the economic and
technical constraints currently facing them, weapons procurement
could return to the dynamic growth rates of the past
iii Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
A major modernization of Soviet general purpose theater forces
begun in the mid-1960s continues today. This program has equipped
the bulk of the theater air forces with late-model aircraft but,
though massive by Western standards, has been well short of what
would be needed to fully modernize the Ground Forces. We expect
the Soviets to continue efforts to modernize their theater forces,
although economic problems, demographic constraints, and short-
comings in their defense industries may prompt increasingly diffi-
cult force development choices.
Modernization in the Soviet Aircraft Industr~ 13
Since the mid-1960s the Soviet aircraft industry has been moderniz-
ing its manufacturing plant and equipment. The Soviets now have
under development several new aircraft that we believe incorporate
technology advances permitted, at least in part, by this moderniza-
tion program. The pace and scope of the program, however, do not
appear sufficient to enable the Soviets to acquire soon a manufactur-
ing capability equivalent to that of Western countries.
Fielding High-Technology Weapons in the 1980s: The Challenge 17
to the VPK
The Soviets have a powerful executive management structure for the
expeditious development and production of weapon systems. While
this structure and its methods of operation are effective for fielding
weapons using the technologies of the past, the Soviets had serious
difficulties in the 1970s with bringing more advanced technology to
the battlefield in a timely manner. These difficulties may be
overcome in the 1980s if current technologies can be redesigned and
repackaged in increasingly capable weapons.
Top Secret iv
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
Soviet Force Modernization in the 1980s: Resource Implications= 21
Soviet resources devoted to weapons procurement grew rapidly from
the early 1960s through the mid-1970s. Although we believe
weapons procurement showed little or no growth from 1976 through
1982, the level was such that substantial modernization continued.
Our uncertainty about why weapons procurement did not grow
during this period clouds our assessment of future resource trends,
but not our perception that modernization of key strategic and
general purpose forces will continued
Other Topics
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
25X1
,.25X1
GJ/~ I
25X1
25X1
Briefs Soviet Force Preparedness in Eastern Europe
Increased Military Support to Angola
Underground Medical Facilities
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
Prospects for Soviet Military
Modernization
Perspective' 25X1
Since the mid-1960s the Soviets have produced 8,000 strategic offensive
missiles, 15,000 combat aircraft, almost 50,000 tanks, and about 400
major warships and submarines for their forces in a continuous moderniza-
tion process that has solidified their superpower status. During this period,
the qualitative and quantitative improvements provided by these programs
have shifted both the strategic and theater military balances toward the
Soviets. To support this buildup, the Soviets have developed a powerful
executive management structure for developing and producing weapon
systems. The weapon acquisition process:
? Has expedited major weapon program decisions through early consider-
ation by the highest levels of leadership and used special procedures to
cut through the normally inefficient state economic apparatus.
? Has emphasized evolutionary development and early deployment result-
ing in incremental improvements in technical capability and a steady
stream of new systems.
? Has employed a vast network of facilities to develop and produce a wide
range of weapons in large quantities.
Soviet expenditures for weapons procurement have not grown since the
mid-1970s, but the high absolute levels have underwritten substantial
modernization. (See article on resource considerations.) A review of
weapons research and development and production indicates that during
the 1980s the Soviets plan to:
? Continue the broad modernization of strategic offensive forces with
major production programs for each of the primary strategic force
elements. These programs will increase the number of warheads while
reducing overall force vulnerability. In addition, the long-range cruise
missiles now in the late stages of development will add a new dimension
to the Soviet strategic threat.
1 Top Secret
SOV UR 83-012JX
December 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
? Achieve a major modernization of strategic defensive forces, including
deployment of new interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and an
airborne warning and control system.
? Sustain the modernization programs for conventional and theater nuclear
forces, especially for those forces deployed opposite NATO. Substantial
construction of ships and submarines for naval missions is also pro-
gramed.
The Soviets now find themselves in a threat environment where more rapid
technological improvement is necessary to maintain the relative capability
of key elements of their forces. Despite the momentum of current
programs, the Soviets face some challenges in trying to match the level of
technical progress being made in Western weapons. The article on the
aircraft industry points out that the Soviets have been modernizing aircraft
production facilities since the mid-1960s, emphasizing the acquisition of
numerically controlled machine tools, but continue to have problems in
areas such as complex automated control. To achieve improved combat
performance with its newest designs, the industry will have to master some
of the production technologies used in the United States since the 1970s.
And if the aircraft industry is representative of the defense industry, the in-
fusion of advanced production equipment and practices is likely to be
uneven and difficult.
Another obstacle to incorporating advanced technology for production of
Soviet weapons is the acquisition management system itself (see "Fielding
High-Technology Weapons in the 1980s: The Challenge to the VPK"). The
same procedures that encourage rapid development and deployment by
putting a premium on meeting deadlines discourage the innovation and
risk-taking required for major technical advances. The Soviets have
employed a variety of design and manufacturing practices to compensate
for the resulting technology lag. Ingenious packaging and creative design
approaches have enabled them to field systems whose performance is more
competitive than the underlying technology would suggest. The issue
facing Soviet weapons planners and designers is whether this approach will
continue to be effective
The number of military programs planned for the 1980s for which we have
direct evidence indicates that modernization will continue at least as fast as
in recent years. Depending on how the Soviets cope with current economic
and technical constraints, weapons procurement could return to the
dynamic growth rates of the past.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
Modernization Trends in
Soviet Theater Ground
and Air Forces
In the mid-1960s the USSR began a major modern-
ization of its general purpose theater forces. Initially,
this effort may have been a response to the years of
neglect under Khrushchev, who had emphasized the
development of strategic forces to the detriment of
conventional war-fighting capabilities. It probably
was further influenced by an evolving Soviet doctrine
that began to recognize the possibility of a large-scale
conventional conflict and to stress the use of mobility
and massed nonnuclear firepower to overcome the
opposition.
Soviet modernization efforts show few signs of falter-
ing in the short term, despite chronic problems in the
economy and systemic shortcomings in defense indus-
try. Although the total outpouring of military produc-
tion has been massive by Western standards, we
believe it will remain well short of what would be
needed to fully modernize the theater forces. Only
about 40 percent of the ground forces, the "active"
divisions, are reasonably modern; the low-strength
reserve forces have benefited only modestly from the
modernization program. The theater air forces, on the
other hand, are largely equipped with late-model
The technological sophistication of the new systems
coming into the forces varies. Some, such as tanks and
artillery pieces, are as technically advanced as any the
United States has fielded. In other areas, such as
tactical aircraft, the Soviets are only on the threshold
of introducing systems comparable to those widely
deployed with US and Allied forces
Ground Forces
The Soviet Ground Forces consist of 212 divisions
with a peacetime manning of 1.8 million men. We
consider 83 of these divisions to be "active" (NATO
Category A and B divisions). These divisions are
manned at more than 50 percent of their authorized
wartime strength in peacetime, are well equipped and
trained, and are considered fit for combat on or soon
after mobilization. The "reserve" force comprises the
other 129 divisions. These are manned at low strength
or unmanned in peacetime, are poorly equipped, and
are unfit for combat without substantial postmobiliza-
tion training.
Equipment modernization has been limited primarily
to the active force (see figure 1), but there are 28
reserve (NATO Category C) divisions located in the
western USSR that also receive some new equip-
ment-especially tanks-on a priority basis. The bulk
of this force modernization, therefore, has been ori-
ented against NATO's Central Region.
Weapon Inventories. The quality of new equipment
has improved substantially during the past several
years. Nonetheless, most of the equipment now in the
hands of troops was first introduced before or during
the 1960s, and some was developed during the 1940s
and 1950s. Equipment fielded since 1970 is in short
supply, even for forces in Eastern Europe.
25X1
The testing, production, and eventual introduction of
new weapon systems into the force is a long process.
Developing and testing a new ground forces system
usually takes from seven to 12 years. Even when new
systems are fielded, technical problems sometimes 25X1
delay widespread introduction. Moreover, the ground
forces have not enjoyed the priority for modernization
that has evidently been accorded the missile and air
forces. Finally, while procurement of major combat
vehicles has been at high levels by Western standards,
it has been inadequate to achieve forcewide modern-
ization.0 25X1
25X1
Tanks. Soviet tank modernization programs began to
make an impact on the force by the late 1960s. Today,
tanks fielded since 1960 make up about 65 percent of
the total inventory. Tanks fielded since 1970 (the
T-64, T-72, and several recently introduced variants)
are still in short supply, however, and constitute only
about 35 percent of the force.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
Figure 1
Vintage of Weapons in Soviet Ground Forces, 1983
Given the size of the current tank inventory and
current rates for the acquisition of new tanks-about
1,800 enter combat units each year-large numbers
of older tanks will remain in the force for the rest of
this decade. The Soviets probably will rebuild and
improve most of these older tanks, however. By 1990
we expect models introduced since 1970 to constitute
about 90 percent of the tanks opposite NATO's
Central Region but only half of the overall inventory.
Fire Support. Modernization of Soviet fire-support
weapons is reflected in the growth of the variety,
number, and capability of rockets and missiles, a
modest increase in self-propelled artillery, and im-
provements in ammunition. The total number of
artillery tubes (howitzers, gun-howitzers, and guns)
throughout the force has risen substantially because
of increases in the number of units, incorporation of
artillery in maneuver units, and an increase in the size
of many artillery batteries from six to eight tubes.
This rapid growth has necessitated the return to
service of old artillery pieces and, in some cases, the
reactivation of old antitank guns in lieu of field
artillery pieces. The age of the tube artillery force of
nearly 30,000 tubes may be offset somewhat by Soviet
improvements in munitions. Modern improved con-
ventional munitions have been tested, and at least the
newer 152-mm tubes are capable of firing nuclear
artillery shells.
There also has been a movement toward self-propelled
artillery, but less than 10 percent of tube artillery
currently is self-propelled. With an expected increase
in the rate of introduction of self-propelled artillery,
we estimate that by the end of the decade about 40
percent of the artillery in Soviet forces opposite
NATO's Central Region will be self-propelled (com-
pared with about 20 percent in 1982).
Ground Forces short-range missile and rocket inven-
tories have risen from fewer than 250 launchers in
1960 to nearly 1,500 in 1982. The major divisional
system today, and probably for the remainder of this
decade, is the FROG-7. A new missile-probably an
improved version of the SS-21-was first fielded in
1981 in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
(GSFG), and 10 of 19 divisions there now have this
system. We also expect the SS-23 missile system to be
introduced soon in nondivisional missile units.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Too Secret
Soviet forces have also received new multiple rocket
launchers and mortars. The BM-27 multiple rocket
launcher is entering service in nondivisional units, and
a truck-mounted 122-mm system (called the Grad-1)
is being fielded in maneuver regiments along the Sino-
Soviet border. A nondivisional weapon, the 240-mm
self-propelled nuclear-capable mortar, was introduced
in the mid-1970s in special nuclear artillery units
(heavy artillery brigades). Two new 82-mm mortar
systems have entered service in motorized rifle units,
and we anticipate the introduction of newer models of
self-propelled mortars over the next few years.
Troop Carriers. The number of troop carriers-
armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehi-
cles-increased from 7,300 in 1960 to nearly 53,000
in 1983 as a result of a continuing Soviet program to
mechanize infantry forces. There are still many units,
however, that are short of troop carriers or that use
trucks as troop carriers, and over 20 divisions have no
means of troop transport. We believe the Soviets place
a high value on infantry fighting vehicles and will
continue to field them on a priority basis.
A new version of the BMP infantry fighting vehicle-
the BMP-2 (with a 30-mm gun) -began to enter
service in motorized rifle regiments and motorized
rifle battalions of reorganized tank regiments in 1981.
The BTR-70 armored personnel carrier entered serv-
ice in 1979. Both of these newer systems remain in
short supply, however.
Antitank Systems. The Soviets still depend heavily on
guns for antitank defense but introduced two new
antitank guided missile (ATGM) systems-the man-
pack AT-4 and the vehicle-mounted AT-5-in 1975.
Most low-strength units, however, still use antitank
guns in lieu of ATGMs. We expect the Ground Forces
to retain their old antitank guns while continuing to
field new ATGM systems.
Air Defense. Since the mid-1970s the Soviets have
gradually replaced the 1950s-era S-60 57-mm AA
gun in divisional air defense regiments with SA-6 or
SA-8 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Maneuver regi-
ments have retained AA guns, including the self-
propelled ZSU-23-4, and added SAMs-the SA-9 or
SA-13. Nondivisional units have switched from old
AAA guns to the SA-4 SAM (introduced in the late
1960s).
Currently, 90 percent of the 83 active divisions and 85
percent of the maneuver regiments for these divisions
have SAMs. Virtually none of the lower category
units now have SAMs. The SA-11 SAM system
entered into troop testing during 1983 in the western
USSR, and we expect that it will be introduced in
another year or two as a replacement for the SA-6.
We also expect that the Soviets will introduce follow-
ons to the SA-8 and the aging SA-4 during the latter
part of this decade.
Theater Air Forces
The Soviets also have taken steps over the past decade
to improve the capabilities of their air forces by
reorganizing, expanding, and reequipping them.
Unlike the situation in the ground forces, where
improvements have been concentrated against
NATO's Central Region, the modernization of the-
ater air units has occurred throughout the force
25X1
Reorganization. A major restructuring of the air and 25X1
air defense forces took place in 1980 as part of the
larger reorganization of Soviet military forces. During 25X1
this restructuring, theater air forces were augmented
by large numbers of fighter-interceptors formerly
belonging to the national air defense forces. The
Soviets also created Army Aviation to give combined-
arms commanders greater control of the helicopter
forces intended to support them. The separate Long-
Range Aviation component was replaced by five
strategic air armies, which were given, in addition to
the medium and heavy bomber force, about 20 per-
cent of the aircraft that formerly were part of Frontal
Aviation.
Fighters. Fighter forces subordinate to the air forces
of the military districts increased from about 1,550
aircraft in 1970 to almost 3,100 in 1980, despite a
shift of 225 fighters to the strategic air armies. There
were some gains in the size of the force through the 25X1
1970s, but most of the growth reflected the transfer of
some 1,200 national air defense fighters to the control
of the air forces of the military districts during the
reorganization.' Since 1980 the size of the counterair
' Despite their transfer to the air forces of the military districts, we
believe that most of these aircraft retain their primary role of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
Figure 2
Fighters in Military District Air Forces
3,000
Figure 3
Ground Attack Aircraft in Military
District Air Forces
2,000
a The transfer of older air defense interceptors to the air forces of
the military districts in 1980 caused the abrupt rise in the number
of first- and second-generation fighters.
First- and second-generation aircraft
250
I
0 1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
fighter force has declined by about 10 percent
through the conversion and reequipping of regiments
throughout the USSR to perform ground attack
missions.
Maintaining the capabilities of the fighter force
through modernization has been an important consid-
eration for the Soviets. By 1979, for example, the
force had been almost completely reequipped with
third-generation aircraft, primarily late-model
Fishbeds and Floggers (see figure 2).
Ground Attack Aircraft. The ground attack force
(light bombers and fighter-bombers) subordinate to
the air forces of the military districts has grown from
about 1,600 aircraft in 1970 to over 2,200 in 1983 (see
figure 3). Increases through the early 1970s reflected
the activation of units that were equipped with first-
generation Fresco aircraft for duty along the Sino-
Soviet border. The transfer of several ground attack
units to the strategic air armies caused a decline in
the size of the force in 1980 and 1981. The Soviets
more than made up for these losses, however, by
activating several new units and subsequently convert-
ing fighter regiments to the ground attack mission.
Although some growth in the ground attack force
continued after the major buildup on the Sino-Soviet
border was completed in 1973, most of the emphasis
has been on force modernization. This modernization
has been marked by the advent of Fencer, late-model
Fitter, and ground attack Flogger aircraft as replace-
ments for older Brewers, Fitters, and Frescos. Third-
generation ground attack aircraft currently make up
about 90 percent of the force, compared with only 10
percent in 1973.
Helicopters. The Soviet helicopter force has grown
more rapidly than any other element of the Air
Force-from about 900 in 1970 to almost 4,400 today
(see figure 4). Through about 1975 increases in the
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Ton Secret
Figure 4
The Soviet Helicopter Inventory
I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
helicopter order of battle reflected additional trans-
port and general purpose helicopters. Thereafter,
deployments of new models of attack helicopters
accounted for most of the gain.
Our analysis of Soviet plans for conventional air
operations indicates that the rapid growth in the size
of the helicopter force probably was driven by at least
two developments. The first was a growing Soviet
perception that during the first days of a war few
fixed-wing aircraft would be available for direct
support of the Ground Forces because most would be
committed to theater-level air and air defense opera-
tions. The second development was an increased
emphasis on airmobile and air assault missions in
front operations.
Outlook
Despite various economic problems, adverse demo-
graphic trends, and shortcomings in the defense
industries, we estimate that the growth and modern-
ization of Soviet theater forces will continue. In the
ground forces, for example, continued reliance on the
tank to dominate the battlefield will impel ground
force planners to develop means to counter NATO's
increasingly lethal antitank weapons. Soviet solutions
seem oriented toward increasingly heavy divisions,
substantial increases in firepower, closer integration
of combined-arms operations by tactical units, and a
continuation of emphasis on modernizing forces oppo-
site NATO's Central Region.
The Soviet Air Forces are beginning to deploy the
next generation of fixed-wing aircraft. Of the three
major fighter programs we expect over the next 10
years, the MIG-31 Foxhound is now being deployed,
the MIG-29 Fulcrum is in series production and
should be deployed soon, and the SU-17 Flanker
should be available in the next year or two. We expect
these fourth-generation aircraft to make up nearly
half of the Soviet fighter inventory by the end of the 25X1
decade. We also expect to see a new family of fighter-
bombers fielded in the mid-to-late 1980s. The helicop-
ter force almost certainly will continue to grow over
the next several years to flesh out remaining division- 25X1
and army-level aviation units and to meet the de-
mands of air assault forces. 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
Modernization in the
Soviet Aircraft Industry
Since the mid-1960s the Soviet aircraft industry has
been modernizing its manufacturing plant and equip-
ment. Evidence on the program is syarsd
but it apparently has been initiated at most, if not all,
of the industry's major facilities. The program should
enable the Soviets to produce the more advanced
aircraft that have been developed by the Ministry of
Aviation Industry since the mid-1970s.
Evolution ofManulacturing Requirements
Soviet aircraft designed and built in the 1950s and
into the 1960s had simple, conservative designs. They
could be manufactured largely by labor-intensive
techniques using basic machine tools. There was
minimal use of machined parts, and all machining
was reduced to the extent possible. For example, a
manufacturing analysis of the engine for the MIG-21,
which was designed during the 1950s and entered
production in the early 1960s, indicated that, except
for one or two parts, the engine could have been
produced with machine tools found in a typical 1930s-
era US aircraft plant. Even the MIG-23, which was
designed in the mid-1960s, has very few compound
curved sections compared with Western aircraft,
greatly simplifying structural design and manufactur-
ing requirements. The manufacturing requirements
for these systems were consistent with the capabilities
of the Soviet aircraft plants in the early 1960s.F
This design approach has forced the Soviets to make
compromises in mission requirements to ease manu-
facturing problems. For example, the military re-
quirement for the Foxbat interceptor called for a
speed capability higher than what could be achieved
with an all-aluminum structure,
the Soviets, rather than meeting the
thermal design problems associated with these speeds,
limited the amount of time the aircraft could stay at
elevated speeds to a few minutes, just long enough to
intercept a target. This compromise enabled the Mi-
koyan Design Bureau to meet the mission requirement
with a simplified structure that could be built using
known production techniques. Probably the most sig-
nificant impact of the traditional Soviet design ap-
proach is that it results in most cases in heavier 125X1
structures, which usually translate to lower perform- L:.)A I
ance levels. 25X1
is the inadequate manufacturing technology in the
production sector that has been the primary factor
inhibiting Soviet adoption of more complex aircraft
technologies.
Soviet designers have complained
that they frequently must "design down" to accom-
modate the weaknesses in the manufacturing sector.
Visitors to Soviet aircraft plants during the 1960s and
into the 1970s described some of the plants as resem-
bling US aircraft plants of the 1930s.
25X1
25X1
25X1
The penalty for failing to adequately modernize pro-
duction capabilities has been a slow rate of incorpora-
tion of new technology in Soviet aircraft designs.
Previous Soviet attempts to depart from the deliberate
evolutionary approach and to base designs on technol-
ogy that is not well understood or assimilated by the
production sector has resulted in lengthened, expen-
sive, high-risk development programs. A prime exam- 25X1
ple is the TU-144, which incorporated a number of
new technologies. Its development program involved
concurrent technology and design efforts because it 25X1
was in competition with the Concorde. Although the
development program continued for 23 years, the 25X1
Soviets were unable to solve the technological prob-
lems, and the TU-144 was never placed in regular
operational service.
Modernization Requirement 25X1
More modern aircraft require much higher quantities
of machined parts, are made of special steel alloys and
other materials that have higher strengths and are
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
therefore harder to machine and fabricate, make
more extensive use of nonmetallic materials, and
require much more careful control of manufacturing
processes. Most of these new processes require spe-
cialized types of machine tools and other manufactur-
ing equipment. Modernization of the Soviet aircraft
industry will depend on the USSR's ability to produce
modern machine tools, to adopt new investment poli-
cies that will encourage the installation of the tools in
aircraft factories, to provide plants with the technical
advice (and trained personnel) to support the contin-
ued use of the new equipment and technologies, and to
eliminate within the industry the resistance to change.
Some of the modernization has been keyed to the
introduction of new production programs to a plant.
For instance, when the TU-144 supersonic transport
was being introduced into production at the aircraft
plant in Voronezh, substantial quantities of new ma-
chine tools had to be installed at the plant, especially
to handle the large number of titanium parts on the
aircraft. Although these tools, which were probably
installed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, were not
as capable as Western machine tools of that vintage,
visitors to the plant in 1973 and 1974 noted that they
were fairly modern. The equipment in the titanium
machine shop contained single-spindle, three-axis
milling machines that were apparently similar to early
US-built automated milling equipment in the alumi-
num machine shop; US visitors noted numerically
controlled machines that were "essentially equivalent
to ours." Although none of this equipment incorporat-
ed features usually seen in US aircraft plants of the
time, such as five-axis milling machines operating
with all axes under simultaneous computer control,
for the Soviets these tools represented significant
advances.
A number of articles in the Soviet press have men-
tioned aircraft industry modernization programs:
? In 1976 an article noted that aircraft engine Plant
19 in Perm' "would be completely reequipped with
program-controlled and other sophisticated machin-
ery to replace the present lathes. The reequipment is
expected to treble the output of plane and helicopter
engines."
? An article appearing in 1978 indicated that the
airframe plant in Kuybyshev which manufactures
the TU- 154 civil transport was being retooled and
modernized. According to the article, the modern-
ization program would increase the productivity of
the plant 2.5 times.
? An article published in 1982 described the reequip-
ment of the aircraft engine plant in Zaporozhye.
? A Pravda article in February 1983 discussed the
modernization of the aircraft engine plant in Ry-
binsk, which it said would greatly expand the plant's
productive capacity.
Characteristics of the Modernization Effort
The pace and scope of the modernization effort are
uneven and do not appear to be sufficient for the
Soviets to achieve soon a manufacturing capability
similar to that of Western countries. For example, the
effort does not seem to be a continuous process. In an
interview with a French journalist, the director of the
plant in Voronezh indicated that his plant would not
be receiving new tools for the current IL-86 produc-
tion program that was introduced there in about 1980.
According to the director, the plant would continue to
use the tools and equipment installed at the plant for
the TU-144 program. This equipment is now at least
10 years old. One US manufacturer has estimated
that the machinery required to produce state-of-the-
art technologies becomes obsolete in about 10 years.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
The capital investment policies generally followed by
the production plants have tended to favor the con-
struction of new plant floorspace at the expense of
purchasing more modern equipment. According to the
recent Pravda article discussing the modernization of
the aircraft engine plant in Rybinsk, throughout the
entire industry only 39 percent of total capital invest-
ment for industrial purposes was used to acquire new
machine tools and other manufacturing equipment.
The plant managers and other administrative person-
nel have usually opted to spend the funds on the
construction of new buildings rather than the pur-
chase of new manufacturing tools and equipment.
Installation of new equipment interrupts the produc-
tion flow and adversely affects bonuses tied to quanti-
ty rather than quality.
Even when funds are available, the machine tools
produced in the Soviet Union are less capable than
those available in the West. Soviet numerically con-
trolled equipment, for instance, consists mostly of
single-spindle, two-axis machines that in the United
States are considered first-generation equipment. It
appears that most, if not all, of the most capable
Soviet machine tools are developed by the aircraft
industry itself. The civilian machine tool industry is
estimated to be even further behind the West in the
ability to produce modern machine tools.
the numerical controls are especially poor. As a
result, the Soviets install large quantities of imported
controls on these tools
while many of their basic machine tools are good,
their bearings wear rapidly, causing frequent break-
downs and loss of accuracy.'
Although the Soviet Union is estimated to be the
world's largest importer of machine tools, the aircraft
industry uses little Western equipment.
only 5 percent of the equipment stock
_
of the Soviet aircraft industry is imported.F
Some
examples of the types of Western equipment installed
Soviet New-Generation Aircraft
Flanker
1977
F-15-type fighter
Fulcrum
1977
F-16/ 18-type fighter
Blackjack
1981
B-1-type strategic bomber
Condor
1982
C-5A-type heavy airlifter
RAM M
1982
U-2-type high-altitude
reconnaissance
RAM Q
1982
Possible tactical bomber
IL-96
1985/86
(est.)
Long-range wide-bodied
transport
TU-204
1985/86
(est.)
Possible B-767-type transp
ort
25X1
in aircraft plants are numerically controlled presses
from Sweden, milling machines from West Germany
and Japan, and automated rivet-making equipment
from the United States. The rivet-making equipment
was installed in the airframe plant in Gor'kiy that 25X1
manufactured the Foxbat and is now producing the
Foxhound, the newest Soviet fighter to enter opera-
25X1
25X1
One reason for the resistance to modernization is the
lack of technical support available to the production 25X1
plants to assist in solving problems associated with the
introduction of new manufacturing methods and ma-
chinery. Modern aerospace manufacturing technology 25X1
is complex and requires carefully controlled condi-
tions. Often the ability to make new processes work
comes only after extensive experimentation in the
manufacturing environment. Equipment associated 25X1
with new technological processes is often itself new 2bAl
and, thus, temperamental and difficult to operate 25X1
correctly. In the Soviet system the separation of the
manufacturing research and engineering personnel
from the personnel of the manufacturing plants is a 25X1
strong barrier to the improvement of manufacturing
processes. 25X1
2oA]
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Outlook
The Soviets now have under development several new
aircraft that we believe incorporate technology ad-
vances permitted, at least in part, by the moderniza-
tion program. A partial list of these aircraft is shown
they will be more complex aircraft. They will proba-
bly contain more compound curvatures on wings and
fuselages, may utilize lighter weight construction
practice, and incorporate more complex features, such
as high-lift devices, that will make them more
adaptive to a wider range of operating conditions.
Thus, the gains the Soviets have made in recent years
will permit the Soviets to produce aircraft roughly
equivalent to those the West developed in the late
1960s to mid-1970s. The West, however, now has
under development aircraft that will incorporate even
more complex structures and technologies. Serious
shortcomings in the Soviet aircraft industry may limit
Soviet responses to these systems. Key advances to be
incorporated in the next generation of Soviet aircraft
will depend on a continuation of the modernization
program and on technology acquired from the West.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
Fielding High-Technology
Weapons in the 1980s: The
Challenge to the VPK
The Soviets have a powerful executive management
structure for the expeditious development and produc-
tion of weapon systems.' While this structure and its
methods of operation are effective for fielding weap-
ons using the technologies of the past, the Soviets had
serious difficulties in the 1970s with bringing more
advanced technology to the battlefield in a timely
manner. These difficulties may be overcome in the
1980s if current technologies can be redesigned and
repackaged in increasingly capable weapons. But if
ever newer technologies are required for new systems
and evolutionary design proves ineffective, the man-
agement structure will exacerbate the predictable
difficulties that will accompany this effort.
Executive Management
The Soviet weapon acquisition process is character-
ized by early and complete presentation of weapon
program decisions to the highest levels of the leader-
ship. Major programs are launched by the signatures
of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and
General Secretary of the Communist Party. The
Military Industrial Commission (VPK), as a working
body of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers,
functions as the leadership's expediter. As such, the
VPK epitomizes the command-economy approach to
weapons acquisition. This approach employs special
procedures and practices to cut through a normally
inefficient state economic apparatus.
Decisionmaking Process. The VPK oversees the draft-
ing and coordination of decision documentation, re-
ducing the time that is lost in the decisionmaking
process. The VPK-directed coordination and approval
of program decisions reportedly requires as little as
two to six months, in contrast to the two to four years
that civilian customers can spend obtaining approvals
for the development of new products and securing
contractual obligations from developers. This process
also establishes clear lines of accountability and firm
commitments to deadlines.
Priorities. To facilitate rapid development and ensure
fairly predictable supplies, planning documents for
development, production, and construction organiza-
tions place military projects at the head of the list of
projects to be completed. If unforeseen shortages of
materials and components arise, the VPK and the
party Defense Industrial Department stand ready to
enforce these priorities. Special bonuses are autho-
rized so that labor can be obtained quickly to over-
come unforeseen changes or disruptions that would
otherwise undermine schedules.
These systemic priorities enjoyed by the defense
industries should be distinguished from the leadership 25X1
decisions that determine the overall level of defense
spending. The former are essentially privileged posi-
tions in the queue for the delivery of resources after
25X1
25X1
Momentum. Many of the resources in weapon pro- 25X1
gram decisions are not the object of discretionary
leadership choice, but are simply the result of inertia
inherited from past programs. Weapon program deci-
sions involve complicated trade-offs between re-
sources, technical objectives, development goals, and
timing. In a Soviet-style economy, program resource
allocation decisions are more difficult than in a
market economy because of the need to integrate such
decisions with resource allocation in economywide
planning. Major physical resources are explicitly allo-
cated by planners and not distributed by a market
auctioning process. To make the process manageable, 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
capital investment is chosen as the main instrument in
five-year plans for resource allocations among major
sectors of the economy. This limits leadership discre-
tion on resource allocation largely to the changes
affecting capital investment and facility staffing,
rather than to those affecting the detailed reallocation
of current production.
In this way, physical capital and manpower come to
be dedicated over the long run to product specializa-
tions that are institutionalized in the defense industri-
al ministry structure. Like their civilian counterparts,
defense industrial ministries divide responsibilities
among functionally standardized subordinate organi-
zations. The dedication of such support functions as
construction, materials development, and manufac-
turing technology to one product specialization limits
the flexibility of the system to shift resources between
products. This creates a momentum for the continued
use of resources for weapon programs that is difficult
to reverse.
Impact of Program Practices
Program practices ensure that early choices of basic
materials and manufacturing technologies will not
change over the course of development. In its quest to
focus on the most easily controlled elements of a
program, the VPK-driven apparatus emphasizes con-
current development of subsystems and an early and
strict commitment to a final schedule of deployment.
As a result, developers make a very early commitment
to the materials, component, and manufacturing tech-
nologies to be employed. Furthermore, the early com-
mitment to a deadline motivates them to choose
weapons technologies that are well within the prevail-
ing capabilities of Soviet production plants. Little
adjustment is made for new developments afterward
because of the threat this would pose to schedules.
Where development of subsystems employing ad-
vanced technology is undertaken concurrently with
system development, more conventional subsystems
are developed in parallel as a form of insurance.
individual components and parts in a complex weapon
system is extremely large relative to the ability of
small executive staffs such as the VPK to monitor the
performance of the many subcontractors involved.
Such staffs cannot evaluate esoteric engineering ex-
cuses over a wide range of product developments, and
the proliferation of VPK orders would diffuse its
authority and undermine its credibility.
As a result of these low-risk program practices, Soviet
weapon technologies, with some exceptions, lag those
of the West. The first Soviet onboard digital guidance
computer was flown on a ballistic missile in 1972, 11
years after the first such computer was introduced in
the United States, and it embodied a less advanced
level of component technology than the US computer.
Similarly, the first Soviet phased-array radar-the
Flat Twin-was initially installed at Saryshagan in
1972, 13 years after the first US phased-array radar
was deployed aboard ships.
Compensating Design and Production Practices
The Soviets have employed a variety of design and
manufacturing practices to compensate for technology
lag:
? Considerable ingenuity is spent in clever packaging
and application where available technology does not
readily produce advanced performance. For exam-
ple, the SA-6 radar uses dated tube technology to
perform the functions of more advanced electronic
circuits to give the SA-6 greater target acquisition
and tracking capabilities than previous Soviet SAM
systems.
? In other cases, designers employ brute force tech-
niques to compensate for limitations in underlying
technology. Soviet over-the-horizon radars use very-
high-power transmitter tubes to emit a strong signal
rather than advanced computer processing tech-
niques to extract targeting information from weak
signals.
The early selection of low-risk technology is rein-
forced by the chief designer's lack of options to
accelerate technological development. Any materials
or production processes that have to be developed for
a system must be explicitly identified by chief design-
ers in the initial VPK decree. However, the number of
2.5X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
? Finally, designers employ straightforward tech-
niques to circumvent difficulties with high technol-
ogy at the expense of other, less pressing military
requirements. For example, in the SA-10 system,
rather than using a complicated signal processor to
screen out ground clutter, the Soviets simply mount
the system's radar on a 30-meter-high tower to
reduce ground clutter and thereby enhance low-
altitude coverage. Maintainability and transport-
ability suffer somewhat, but the essential military
mission is accomplished and the technological re-
quirements are minimized.
Using these techniques, Soviet designers often develop
weapon systems whose performance on the battlefield
is better than the underlying technology would sug-
gest. In effect, Soviet design ingenuity is enera11
more advanced than the technology use
The Soviets also often rely on the direct imitation of
Western weapon designs to save time and money in
development. This allows them to select a proven
design without much preliminary investigation and to
use Western test data to evaluate their own designs.
However, this practice does not directly address the
problem of technology. The transfer of paper designs,
specifications, and configurations rarely involves the
transfer of underlying technology in the form of better
materials or processes.
The Problem ofAdvanced Technology
The combination of executive management, weapon
design, and manufacturing practices that constitutes
the Soviet style of weapon acquisition has produced a
large quantity of formidable arms in the past. How-
ever, in the 1970s the Soviets began to experience a
growing number of difficulties in the development of
highly advanced systems that have prolonged sched-
ules and delayed deployments. For example:
? The Soviet SS-X-24 medium solid-propellant ICBM
was probably scheduled to begin deployment in
about 1978, but difficulties in developing an accept-
able solid-propellant motor have delayed its deploy-
ment to about 1985.
? The Pechora ABM phased-array radar, which was
authorized for construction in 1973, was intended to
become operational in 1981. Significant problems
with the electronics have postponed this milestone
until about 1986.
? The SA-10 surface-to-air missile system, which the
Soviets probably began designing in about 1967,
appears to have been intended for deployment in
? The SH-08 ABM interceptor program and the
SA-12/antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) pro-
gram, which appear to be technologically related,
have both experienced delays. The SH-08 and
SA-12 began flight tests in late 1973; and the
ATBM, in the spring of 1974. None of these
weapons have been deployed as yet
The command-driven institutional and managerial
practices, which have served so well in the past, have
probably compounded the technical difficulties and
prolonged the search for solutions to problems in these
and other programs. These practices-exemplified by
the VPK approach to programing-ensure that tech-
nical delays in one area will have a ripple effect
throughout system development. Subsystems well
along in development may have to be redesigned to
accommodate solutions to problems elsewhere in the
system. The inability of command decrees to advance
technology across the board means that advances will
be highly uneven. Advances in a selected component
or material-explicitly ordered in a decree-may
prove incompatible with a lagging technology else-
where in the system. Early commitments and prompt
accountability of developers to the executive leader-
ship motivate developers to search for excuses and
scapegoats-rather than solutions-in the short run.
This, in turn, hinders the long-run search for resolu-
tion. Finally, the momentum of resource commitment
to programs means that manpower and facilities
committed to a program may be idled for extended
periods while technical problems are resolved else-
where in the program.
The Soviets can regain their former momentum if,
having mastered the technologies of the 1970s, they
then can apply traditional, evolutionary, but clever
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
design practices to improve weapon preformance in
the late 1980s and 1990s. In this case, late 1970s
technologies will be translated by the design practices
previously described into increasingly effective weap-
on systems. On the other hand, weapon performance
may not keep up with the challenges from the West
by the reuse and redesign of these technologies in
subsequent weapon programs. Then the Soviets will
probably feel compelled to continually upgrade mate-
rials, component, and manufacturing technologies.
The resulting high turnover of new technologies would
preclude the use of simplicity, brute force, and the
ingenuity that comes from familiarity with older
technology. In this case, the VPK-orchestrated devel-
opment process will probably not be able to avoid
protracted and costly development in future weapon
programs.
Top Secret 20
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
Soviet Force Modernization
in the 1980s:
Resource Implications
Soviet resources devoted to weapons procurement
grew rapidly from the early 1960s through the mid-
1970s. Although we believe weapons procurement
showed little or no growth from 1976 through 1982,
the level was such that substantial modernization
continued. Our uncertainty about why weapons pro-
curement did not grow during this period clouds our
assessment of future resource trends, but not our
perception that modernization of key strategic and
general purpose forces will continue.
Soviet Defense Spending: Trends Since 1965
Total Soviet resources devoted to defense-measured
in constant ruble prices-grew in real terms at rough-
ly 4 to 5 percent annually in the period 1965-76 as the
Soviets vigorously pursued both R&D and weapons
procurement programs. We estimate, however, that
much slower growth of total outlays has occurred
since 1976, at about half the annual average rate of
the 1965-76 period.' The slower growth in defense
spending coincides with slower growth in Soviet GNP,
and we estimate that a fairly constant share of GNP
has been devoted to defense since the early 1970s-on
the order of 13 to 14 percent when measured in
constant prices.
The slowdown of growth in total spending results from
almost no growth in 1976-82 in the largest category of
spending, military procurement. In turn, the trend in
procurement expenditure observed since 1976 reflects
relatively slow or negative growth in its three major
components-naval ships, missiles, and aircraft. F_
It is important to note that, despite the plateau in
military procurement since 1976, the Soviets contin-
ued to significantly improve and, in some cases,
expand their forces over the period. This is because
Soviet procurement during 1976-82 remained at a
very high level, roughly 50 percent higher than that of
the mid-1960s. The high level of procurement has
provided sufficient resources to sustain ongoing pro-
curement programs as well as undertake a number of
new programs
Force Modernization, 1976-82
Since 1975 the Soviets have continued their long-
standing efforts to improve both their offensive and
defensive strategic forces. In the 1976-82 period, they
procured about 2,500 ballistic missiles and more than
doubled the number of reentry vehicles (RVs) and 25X1
bomber weapons available for strategic operations,
from about 5,000 warheads in 1976 to over 10,000 in
1982. They also continued to improve their strategic
air defense, building a sophisticated defensive network
with good capabilities against aircraft penetrating at
medium and high altitudes. Major programs included:
the replacement with new missiles of over 700 older
ICBMs and the deployment of 18 additional D-class
SSBNs; the addition of over 300 SS-20 launchers and
100 Backfire bombers; the replacement of older air
defense interceptors with 1,400 new-generation air-
craft; and the introduction of the SA-10 in late 1980.
The weapons inventory of Soviet ground forces ex-
panded during this period as the USSR increased the
size and firepower of its divisions and added 13 new
combat divisions. The Soviets concentrated on deploy-
ing new and increasingly sophisticated land arms,
which increased both the firepower and mobility of
their ground forces. Major programs included the
procurement of about 15,000 tanks (primarily T-64s
and T-72s), over 30,000 armored vehicles, and over
10,000 artillery pieces, including a large number of
self-propelled guns and howitzers
The Soviets also continued to modernize their tactical
air forces primarily through the continuation of a
number of procurement programs begun in the early
1970s. The new aircraft incorporated more sophisti-
cated avionics and had greater payload capability
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
than the aircraft they replaced. Major procurement
programs included about 1,000 fighter-interceptors,
over 1,500 fighter-bombers, and almost 800 light
bombers
During 1976-82 the Soviets continued their efforts to
build an open-ocean navy with greater endurance and
improved survivability constructing 75 major surface
combatants, all equipped with guided missiles. They
have also constructed 81 general purpose submarines,
most of which were nuclear powered
Factors Behind the Recent Procurement Trend
We do not have any information on what the actual
procurement plans were for the 10th Five-Year Plan
(FYP), 1976-80.
Beyond the relatively sparse evidence available on
procurement intentions in the 10th FYP, we can
identify several major factors that may have damp-
ened the growth in defense outlays since 1976. We
cannot be sure, however, that these factors alone, or
even in combination, fully explain the trend of the last
six years. Initially, at least, the absence of growth in
military procurement can be attributed to concurrent
gaps between the procurement cycles of several large,
expensive weapon programs.
These concurrent dips in major systems procurement,
however, are only a partial explanation of the slow-
down. Other factors appear to involve technical prob-
lems, industrial bottlenecks, and weapons-specific
policy decisions:
a
number of major weapons ran into technical delays
that pushed their serial production back at least a
few years. In other areas, the Soviets apparently had
problems manufacturing systems even when testing
was completed successfully.
raw material, energy,
and transportation bottlenecks disrupted military
production, but the evidence is largely scattered and
we cannot measure the extent of their impact on
procurement.
? Decisions to comply with the SALT I and unratified
SALT II agreements also slowed the pace of pro-
curement growth in certain areas.
Implications for Force Modernization in the 1980s
The new trend we have observed in military procure-
ment, together with slower economic growth and the
unsettled leadership picture, raises the question
whether the Soviets will continue to show little growth
in military procurement, seek some marginal increase,
or attempt to return to (and possibly even exceed) the
growth rate of the 1966-76 period.
On the one hand, there is evidence suggesting that the
Soviets are planning a broad-based and pervasive
modernization program through the mid-1980s. As a
result of the expansion of floorspace at Soviet produc-
tion facilities that occurred during the 1976-80 plan
period, defense industrial capacity appears to be
sufficient to support substantial force modernization.
Moreover, since 1981 the expansion of R&D facilities
has continued and about 60 major new weapon sys-
tems have been deployed. We project that over 60
more could reach initial operational capability by
1985. Over half of the total are of completely new or
highly modified designs-a larger share than in any
five-year period since the mid-1960s.
Any major effort to pursue an intensive, broad-based
modernization of the forces that would sharply accel-
erate growth of military procurement would mean
overcoming certain constraints. For example, Soviet
economic growth continues to be sluggish and is
projected to average only about 2 percent annually
through the end of the decade. This reflects the likely
continuation of lagging productivity, raw material
shortages, and transportation bottlenecks from which
the defense industries do not appear to be totally
isolated. A sharp upswing in procurement of military
hardware would draw important resources-skilled
labor, high-quality plant and equipment, raw materi-
als, and energy-from other sectors of the economy.
Such a development would probably, in the long run,
erode the industrial base supporting the defense effort
by limiting investment resources available for the
expansion of industrial capacity.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Too Secret
We believe that, beyond general economic constraints
likely to affect weapons production, there is also the
question of whether the Soviets will be able to over-
come the technical and manufacturing problems with
advanced weapons that have contributed to the recent
procurement slowdown. Some of the constraints ap-
pear pervasive and will be difficult for the Soviet
system to correct. Further, we expect the potential for
design and manufacturing difficulties to increase as
the proportion of new weapon systems embodying
Soviet state-of-the-art technology increases.
Despite these conflicting indicators which cloud our
assessment about the pace and level of future weapons
production, it is clear that the Soviets plan to continue
to modernize their forces. We remain confident that
improvements will be made across the board in key
strategic and theater forces areas and probably will
include, among others, new ICBM programs, new
fighter and interceptor aircraft, general purpose sub-
marines, and tank modernization programs. Further,
we believe the Soviets are likely to procure these new
systems in large numbers. The difficulty arises in
determining which programs or combinations of pro-
grams will be pursued and at what pace. We believe
that not all systems currently under development will
be introduced, certainly not in concert. Thus, while we
believe that it is possible that additional resources
could be made available to support modernization at a
slightly more rapid pace than at present, it is unlikely
that growth in military procurement during the 1980s
would attain the high rates seen in the mid-1960s to
mid-1970s.
23 Top Secret
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Iq
Next 12 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Briefs
Soviet Force Changes in Soviet training patterns in East Germany a
nd the apparent exten
sion
Preparedness in of the troop rotation period suggest the USSR is using n
ew approaches to mai
ntain
Eastern Europe
[
the combat preparedness of its ground forces.
at least six of the 19 Soviet divisions in Eas
t Germany have adop
ted a
avoiding repeating elementary training as new recruits arrive every six months.
25X1
25X1
25X1
new training program that allows more time to master combined-arms tactics by
The Soviets may be experimenting with ways to control steep fluctuations in the
preparedness of ground force combat units while making more efficient use of the
limited training space in East Germany. Since 1968 troop rotation has involved the
rapid turnover of about one-fourth of the conscripts-uniformly throughout the
force-with a resulting temporary plunge in combat preparedness every half year.
The new approach aims to isolate rotation effects to those small units that will be
completely manned by new conscripts, which train in their garrison areas, while
units that do not receive them continue with more advanced field training.
Tactics for
Disarmament
Conference
Soviet and East European delegations in Helsinki, evidently to court West
European opinion on the INF deployment issue, were unusually cooperative last
month in adopting on schedule an agenda and timetable for the coming Confer- 25X1
ence on Disarmament in Europe. Soviet negotiators at the preparatory meeting
indicated that, once the conference opens in Stockholm on 17 January, the East in-
tends to introduce contentious issues. These would include nuclear-free zones and
an extension to the Atlantic of the area covered by some military confidence-
building measures. 25X1
Eastern attempts to raise nuclear and other issues opposed by the United States
and its allies will make the Stockholm talks much more difficult. A Soviet press
handout in Helsinki confirmed that INF will be a major Eastern issue there.
Moscow almost certainly will use the conference to exploit any West European
discontent following the first INF deployments
41 Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Iq
Next 10 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/05: CIA-RDP84T01083R000100120005-1