USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T01083R000100110002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
SOV UR 83-01 IX
November 1983
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Directorate of
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome. They may be
directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the
table of contents
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SOV UR 83-011 X
November 1983
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Contents
Andropov's First Year Perspective: Andropov's Political and Policy Momentum
Since becoming General Secretary last November, Yuriy Andropov
has accumulated more power than any of his predecessors at
comparable points in their tenure. Despite his personal political
gains over the year, however, there has been little momentum in the
policy sphere, and no additions to the voting ranks of the Politburo
have been made since November. Continuity has been the main
theme of the Andropov tenure thus far in both domestic and foreign
affairs. In both spheres there has been some momentum that could
presage change in the days ahead. Time, however, is Andropov's
main enemy. His age (69) and poor health are not likely to allow him
a lengthy tenure, and the regime is ill prepared for a new succession
now.
Andropov on Top: An Assessment of His Authority and Power
Andropov has clearly emerged from his first year in office as the
Politburo's preeminent member and the Soviet Union's major
spokesman on a broad range of issues. At the same time he needs to
exploit the opportunities provided at upcoming plenums to add
clients or remove rivals in the Politburo and build support within the
Central Committee to push through his proposals for changes in
managing the economy.
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Andropov's Foreign Policy Performances
General Secretary Andropov's immediate assertion of a leading role
in foreign policy and the self-confident rhetoric of the leadership on
international issues suggested a potential dynamism in Soviet policy
that was not present in Brezhnev's final days. Nevertheless, the past
year has witnessed a substantive approach to external issues that is
similar to Brezhnev's and-more surprisingly-very limited person-
al involvement by Andropov in comparison with even Brezhnev's
final months. Poor health alone cannot explain the fact that he has
traveled only once outside the USSR, held few meetings with
foreign leaders since Brezhnev's funeral, and rarely commented on a
series of important regional issues.
The consumer welfare policies and approaches espoused by Andro-
pov to date are not likely to be wellsprings of long-term, significant
benefits for Soviet consumers. Andropov has been careful not to
raise consumer expectations, playing down the material aspects of
consumption and stressing instead the role of socialist values and
popular commitment to the system as determinants of the overall
"quality of life."
Problems and Prospects of a New Succession
Andropov's advanced age and uncertain health suggest the possibili-
ty of a new succession at any time, but the regime is not well
prepared for a transfer of power.
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Other Topics The Foreign Policy Decisionmaking Apparatus Under Andropov F_J 25
The decisionmaking apparatus inherited from Brezhnev has under-
gone relatively minor alterations, although the prominence of both
Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov has
increased. Andropov has less need for extensive staff support, given
his considerable experience in foreign affairs before becoming
General Secretary, and thus far only three men have been publicly
identified as his foreign policy aides. A second group of influential
men around Andropov is made up of informal advisers and speech-
writers who have long-term links to the General Secretary.
A Progress Report on Sino-Soviet Relations
The third round of Sino-Soviet consultative talks in Beijing that
ended last month resulted in no breakthroughs on major bilateral
and international issues, but the two sides are making progress
Briefs Nuclear Missile Deployments
Pipeline Computer Control Development
Decree on Industrial Innovation Ignored
Soviets Selling Microcircuits
Soviet Manganese Purchase
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Andropov's First Year
Perspective: Andropov's Political
and Policy Momentum 25X1
Since becoming General Secretary last November, Yuriy Andropov has
accumulated more power than any of his predecessors at comparable points
in their tenure. From the outset he projected the image of a sober, "take
charge" leader. Many Soviet officials even seemed to be upbeat about his
prospects, and they had high expectations that he would quickly provide
forceful and effective rule. Despite his personal political gains over the
year, however, there has been little momentum in the policy sphere, and no
additions to the voting ranks of the Politburo have been made since last
November. The slow pace of Andropov's policy initiatives probably stems
from expectations that were unrealistic, his innate caution in pressing for
major changes, political opposition and bureaucratic resistance to change,
and his uncertain health. (See the lead article in this issue for an
assessment of Andropov's first year in political terms.)
Andropov appears to be looking first to the appointment of new cadres
before embarking on new policies. Indeed, some personnel appointments
made by the new General Secretary (those of Geydar Aliyev, Grigoriy
Romanov, and Nikolay Ryzhkov, for example) suggest a willingness to
promote tough, no-nonsense politicians and technocrats to tackle the Soviet
Union's problems. In the process, such former Brezhnev proteges as
Nikolay Shchelokov and Sergey Medunov have been ousted, and players
beholden to Andropov have replaced them. A new Central Committee
Economics Department has been created.
In the foreign policy arena it is doubtful that Andropov intended to make
any significant departures from Brezhnev's policies (see "Andropov's
Foreign Policy Performance"). As a Politburo member and KGB chief
under Brezhnev, Andropov helped to shape the basic foreign policy strategy
that continues under his own leadership. He has focused on arms control
measures, assuming a major role in putting forth new Soviet proposals on
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INF, MBFR, and ASAT, and taking the propaganda offensive in response
to the scheduled INF deployment. A failure to prevent INF deployment
will test his policies toward the United States and Europe-areas that top
his foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, bureaucratic lethargy may
account for the lack of effective moves to improve relations with China or
Japan. In sum, Andropov has reacted to foreign policy problems, but he has
not set a bold new course)
On domestic issues, Andropov has focused his attention on the need to
revitalize the Soviet economy, attempting to "get the country moving
again" after the lethargy of Brezhnev's last years. He is aware of the
tensions that declining economic growth and inefficiency are generating in
Soviet society, and he is convinced of the need to combine regime firmness
toward the population with greater rewards for hard work. So far,
Andropov has stressed making the current system work better. He has not
introduced any major changes in Soviet economic mechanisms or resource
allocation priorities. Although changes in both may be in the offing, they
are likely to be evolutionary in nature and preceded by considerable debate
and experimentation. Andropov recognizes that any program of change he
proposes must contain elements that appeal to both reformist and conserva-
tive interests within the regime
Some of Andropov's economic decisions, such as tying monetary incentives
more closely to performance and, on an experimental basis, giving
managers more authority, have been favored by "reformers." Conservative
elements in the party, on the other hand, probably approve of Andropov's
administrative measures (the discipline and anticorruption campaigns) that
have contributed to an upturn in productivity this year. In dealing with is-
sues of consumer welfare, Andropov has openly attempted to dampen
material expectations and sought to instill a more conscientious attitude
among Soviet workers (see "Andropov and the Consumer").
Time, however, is Andropov's main enemy. His age (69) and uncertain
health are not likely to allow him a lengthy tenure. Vacation and illness, in
fact, kept him out of action at least 12 continuous weeks this fall. If he is to
be more than an interim leader, if he really intends to reshape Soviet policy
for the future, he will have to push harder in the days ahead. In the foreign
policy area, Soviet strategies will need to be revised, while on the home
front economic stringency could force tough choices on resource allocation
shifts. Andropov will have to act more boldly and decisively, even if this en-
tails greater political and health risks.
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If Andropov does leave the scene soon, the regime would face a difficult
choice in selecting his successor (see "Problems and Prospects of a New
Succession"). Sickness, death, and the consequences of earlier political
battles have so reduced leadership ranks that the regime is not well
prepared for a succession. At present the other senior party secretaries
appear to have the best chances of succeeding Andropov: Mikhail Gorba-
chev, who is being promoted by Andropov; Grigoriy Romanov, whose age
and experience give him a good shot at the top party job; and Konstantin
Chernenko, who is still nominally number two in the party. However, there
is no ideal succession candidate, no one has a lock on the post, and no one
could be expected to emerge in as strong and authoritative a position as
Andropov has in so short a time. Thus, a succession in the near term
probably would make the Soviet leadership scene more uncertain, resulting
in less room for maneuver both at home and abroad.
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Andropov on Top:
An Assessment of His
Authority and Power
During Yuriy Andropov's first year in office, he
clearly has emerged as the Politburo's most powerful
member and the Soviet Union's major spokesman on a
broad range of issues. The June party plenum and his
elevation to the presidency further confirmed the
General Secretary's political standing, adding consid-
erably to his personal authority and political prestige.
He does not have any strong political rivals, and his
position appears secure. The domestic agenda, more-
over, has become increasingly dominated by themes
associated with Andropov, such as the anticorruption
and labor discipline campaigns and proposals for
change in managing the economy
In spite of such accomplishments, Andropov's failure
to significantly alter the political balance in the
Politburo-either by promoting supporters or remov-
ing opponents-coupled with his cautious approach in
proposing new economic policies suggests that he has
encountered some resistance. His age and uncertain
health make it unlikely that he can successfully push
through a comprehensive economic program unless he
moves at the coming plenums to gain additional
political support and power. Failure to do so, coupled
with a lack of physical vigor, could result in his being
perceived as an interim leader, one who would have
difficulty generating support for Politburo changes or
controversial economic initiatives. Moreover, Andro-
pov needs to concentrate on building support within
the Central Committee, bringing into its ranks a new
generation of skilled managers and technocrats to
follow his lead, implement his policies, and bolster his
position. His ability to consolidate his power and place
his stamp on the direction of Soviet policy thus will
hinge on the personnel issue.
Andropov's Progress in Consolidating Power
All previous party leaders (Stalin, Khrushchev, and
Brezhnev) consolidated their positions by expanding
their influence in cadre selection and reshaping the
top ruling bodies (Politburo and Secretariat) to ensure
support for desired programs. In the post-Stalin era
this process has depended less on intimidating the
opposition than on building authority, demonstrating
indispensability as a leader to various constituencies,
and constructing policies that appeal to these constitu-
encies.
Andropov has made rapid progress in acquiring the
authority conferred by the offices and titles (Presi-
dent, Chairman of the Defense Council) that his
predecessor took years to publicly acquire. His rival,
Konstantin Chernenko, even referred to him as
"head" of the Politburo at the June plenum-a
plaudit Brezhnev did not receive until nine years after
he became party leader. Nonetheless, it is not yet
clear whether the General Secretary can translate his
political standing into effective political power.F_
The importance of personnel appointments in achiev-
ing this latter goal is evident. From the beginning,
Andropov has sought to convey an image of strong
leadership that contrasts sharply with the perceived
inertia of the late Brezhnev era. Numerous Soviet
officials had privately criticized Brezhnev's unwilling-
ness to remove incompetent or errant officials and
repeatedly stated that under Andropov things would
change.
the discipline and anticorruption campaigns will be
used to gain control of the party apparatus and bring
in individuals more attuned to modern management
methods and more supportive of Andropov's policy
initiatives. Several Andropov consultants-most nota-
bly Fedor Burlatskiy-have stressed that even modest
reform goals must be preceded by a rejuvenation of
art ranks, F
Most recently, in
discussions with US Embassy officials, maverick Sovi-
et historian Roy Medvedev underscored the impor-
tance of personnel changes, describing the placing of
skilled individuals in the Soviet hierarchy as
Andropov's paramount goal.
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Despite the chorus predicting extensive personnel
changes, Andropov's use of this tactic to expand his
political support in the leadership has been limited to
date. The June party plenum did strengthen his
position. The addition of Grigoriy Romanov to the
Secretariat weakened the influence of Konstantin
Chernenko. This move, when combined with the
apparent alliance Andropov has formed with Mikhail
Gorbachev, the party secretary reportedly responsible
for personnel assignments, has substantially enhanced
the General Secretary's influence over the
Secretariat.
At the same time Andropov has been less successful in
creating a Politburo solidly behind him, despite the
opportunities presented by a depletion of the leader-
ship ranks. The full membership of the Politburo has
not been altered since last November, and two pre-
sumed Andropov clients who are potentially eligible
for advancement-Yegor Ligachev, head of the Cen-
tral Committee department which oversees cadre
appointments, and party secretary Nikolay
Ryzhkov-failed to move up. Reports persist of an
anti-Andropov faction in the Politburo whose mem-
bers are said to include Brezhnev loyalists Konstantin
Chernenko, Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, and Kazakh
party chief Dinmukhamed Kunayev.
Andropov's caution in introducing new programs and
reports of factionalism in the Politburo suggest that
this opposition cannot easily be overcome.
Andropov's
ability to promote significant economic reforms has
Andropov still lacks the Polit-
buro support necessary to streamline the Soviet sys-
tem and deal with problems of low productivity,
absenteeism, and supply bottlenecks. While the extent
to which Andropov wishes to carry economic "re-
form" is still unclear, his speech to party veterans in
August clearly places him on the side of innovation.
Personnel Change-Picking Up the Pace?
Recently there have been signs that Andropov has
given particular attention to changes within the party
apparatus, especially those slots traditionally confer-
ring membership in the Central Committee. Since last
November about two dozen Central Committee mem-
bers have died or been retired. These vacancies pre-
sumably have given Andropov the opportunity to fill
them with new individuals that are more beholden to
him. Two longtime Brezhnev associates-Georgiy
Pavlov (chief of the Central Committee's Administra-
tion of Affairs) and Sergey Trapeznikov (chief of the
Science and Educational Institutions Department)
have retired, giving the General Secretary another
opportunity to install candidates of his own choice in
the senior ranks of the Central Committee apparatus.
Moreover, two new deputy ministers, Vasiliy Lezhe-
pekov and Kirill Vostrikov, have been appointed to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs MVD
Andropov also intends to utilize the party elections
now under way to increase his power by removing
incompetent leaders. This process could be considera-
bly facilitated by the presence of two Andropov
allies-Yegor Ligachev, head of the Central Commit-
tee department overseeing the elections, and Mikhail
Gorbachev, the senior secretary responsible for cad-
res. At the same time, this strategy must be judicious-
ly applied. An extensive housecleaning could alienate
the majority of local party officials, whose support is
essential to successful implementation of Andropov's
economic program.
Although the "reporting and election" meetings are a
normal part of the cadre renewal process mandated by
CPSU statutes, those scheduled for late 1983-early
1984 have been described as especially significant
ocal party leaders will be judged
by strict standards of accountability, an interpretation
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buttressed by an article in an August issue of Partiyn-
aya Zhizn' (Party Life). In a September meeting with
US Embassy officers, Richard Kosalopov, editor of
Kommunist and a Central Committee member, aban-
doned his usual reticence in discussing personnel
matters and intimated that significant changes in
lower- and middle-level party officials could be ex-
pected.
Perhaps to increase his opportunity to make further
appointments, Andropov has also sought to convey a
message to aging cadres that retirement is no dis-
grace. Departing officials are now routinely thanked
for their years of government service. In Pavlov's case,
his retirement notice was preceded in the central press
by the announcement of a ceremonial tribute to
Brezhnev in the former general secretary's home-
town. The timing of this tribute suggests that
Andropov may be trying to reassure Brezhnev hold-
overs that, although he wishes to install his own team,
this need not be at the expense of Brezhnev's reputa-
tion or those who were closest to him. Instead,
Andropov will seek to persuade older cadres of the
benefits of timely retirement. His address to party
veterans in August, and their orchestrated response to
his speech, in addition, seemed designed to convey the
message that the older generation should step aside.
The Struggle in the Politburo
The ongoing election campaign, coupled with opportu-
nities offered by the natural attrition in leadership
ranks, could be exploited by Andropov to create a
Central Committee presumably more in line with his
policy preferences. According to Medvedev, major
changes will occur among oblast first secretaries (the
single-largest component in the Central Committee)
as a result of the elections. These changes will then be
ratified at an early party congress producing a new
Central Committee. The Council of Ministers, the
second-largest group represented in the Central Com-
mittee, will also undergo wholesale changes, including
the eventual replacement of its head, Premier
Tikhonov.
To effect extensive changes in the Central Commit-
tee, Andropov would need strong backing in the
Politburo. Although he does not now have a firm
majority in that body, the next plenum and the one
following in the spring will provide new opportunities
to add clients or remove rivals. While there has been
little in the way of political gossip concerning the
upcoming plan and budget plenum, Andropov's posi-
tion would be strengthened by the promotion of
several officials who are thought to be members of
what one Soviet has called the Andropov team and
appear to be good candidates for advancement. 25X1
Ligachev's appointment to the Secretariat and
Ryzhkov's elevation as a candidate Politburo member
would be a strong signal that the leadership balance is
moving in Andropov's direction. The promotion of
Vitaliy Vorotnikov, an Andropov client who as
RSFSR Premier is currently enjoying favorable me-
dia attention, or Mikhail Solomentsev, the party
Control Committee chairman, as full members would
help even more. Removing political opponents at this
point would probably be more difficult but cannot be
ruled out. Continued reports about Chernenko's ill
health and Andropov's reported desire to make Gor-
bachev the number-two man in the Secretariat sug-
gest that Andropov's chief rival might be under
increased pressure to retire.
In any event, Andropov's alliance with Gorbachev and
Ligachev should enable him to keep placing allies in
key personnel slots. The success of his economic
policies (he will seek to take credit for the rate of
GNP growth this year), despite their limited applica-
tion, could also increase his support among key con-
stituencies. He almost certainly continues to enjoy the
backing of Defense Minister Ustinov and Foreign
Minister Gromyko and the institutional support of the
KGB. Andropov's previous position as head of the
KGB also may serve to inhibit any active opposition
on the part of his rivals, who appear to lack a strong
leader around whom to rally.
He will need a good deal of political skill, nonetheless,
to project the image of a dynamic leader confronting
difficult policy choices without provoking opposition
from those resistant to change. In addition, he must
continue to maintain an image of physical vigor or
risk being perceived as an interim leader. Such per-
ceptions, if widely held, could make it difficult to
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generate support for Politburo changes or controver-
sial economic initiatives. His continuing absence from
the political scene will not help him in this regard.
These problems suggest that the outcome of Andro-
pov's efforts to tighten control over the party appara-
tus and press forward with programs to improve the
Soviet economy is by no means certain, although on
balance it seems likely that he will make further
progress in doing so.
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Andropov's Foreign
Policy Performance
The Brezhnev era represented the USSR's most suc-
cessful period of international development, and Gen-
eral Secretary Andropov's immediate assertion of a
leading rule in foreign policy and the self-confident
rhetoric of the leadership on international issues
suggested a potential dynamism in Soviet policy that
was not present in Brezhnev's final days. The im-
proved leadership rankings at the outset of Andropov,
Defense Minister Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Gro-
myko-the key players in national security affairs
during the Brezhnev era-also pointed to a significant
consensus on foreign policy issues and the prospect of
greater Soviet activity to enhance the USSR's inter-
national position. Nevertheless, the past year has
witnessed a substantive approach to the external
issues that is similar to Brezhnev's and-more sur-
prisingly-very limited personal involvement by
Andropov in comparison with even Brezhnev's final
months
With the exception of arms control issues, Soviet
foreign policy during Andropov's first year has been
marked by few initiatives and little imagination. Poor
health alone cannot explain the fact that he has only
traveled once outside the USSR (and then to a
Warsaw Pact meeting nearly one year ago), held few
meetings with foreign leaders since the Brezhnev
funeral, and rarely commented on a series of impor-
tant regional issues. Andropov has been associated
with no major initiatives on regional issues, and even
with regard to Eastern Europe-an area of special
expertise and experience-there are no indications of
policy lines that are different from Brezhnev's.
Andropov's need to concentrate on more pressing
domestic issues as well as the intractability of many
foreign policy problems apparently account, in part,
for the meager results in foreign policy during his first
year.
Continuity in the Foreign Policy Team
Before becoming General Secretary, Andropov had
long experience and a political stake in issues related
to foreign policy. He played a key role, along with
Gromyko and Ustinov, in supporting Brezhnev's de-
tente policy in the mid-1970s. It is, therefore, no
surprise that he has continued the basic strategy he
inherited from Brezhnev and retained Brezhnev's
foreign policy team largely intact
Andropov has had considerably more input in shaping
Soviet foreign policy than Brezhnev did when he took
power in 1964. Andropov already holds the three key
national security policy positions-General Secretary,
President, and Chairman of the State Defense Coun-
cil. He still cannot change Soviet policy unilaterally,
however, and must consult with his Politburo col-
leagues-particularly the senior Moscow-based mem-
bers involved in foreign policy issues-and broker
changes with key institutional interests like the mili-
tary. This limits his ability to make dramatic or rapid
shifts.
Arms Control
Andropov has focused most of his attention on arms
control issues, particularly INF. In doing so, he has
strongly reaffirmed Moscow's commitment to arms
control. He has not dramatically changed longstand-
ing Soviet positions but has attempted to infuse new
dynamism and vigor into the basic Soviet positions
and has modified them in order to appear not to have
lost the initiative to the United States. He has person-
ally articulated all the key Soviet pronouncements on
INF.
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Scarcely a month after replacing Brezhnev, Andropov
elaborated an offer, first broached on the eve of
Brezhnev's death, to reduce Soviet IRBM launchers
to a level equal to that of British and French interme-
diate missiles. The move served to divert attention
from the US "zero option" and to intensify pressure
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Andropov also has acted as principal regime spokes-
man for Soviet INF positions with the West Europe-
ans and has attempted to ensure Warsaw Pact support
for countermeasures in meetings with East German
and Hungarian leaders.
Andropov belatedly showed some concern for Western
demands to limit Soviet SS-20s in Asia, but delays in
articulating Moscow's position probably cost the Sovi-
ets credibility at the talks and internationally. In
January SPD leader Hans-Jochen Vogel went public
with what he thought was a promise by Andropov to
dismantle some SS-20s after an INF agreement rath-
er than transfer them to the east. Moscow, however,
failed to table such an offer until August, thus
embarrassing Vogel-the Soviets' preferred candi-
date-on the eve of the West German elections. F_
Under pressure from the United States, China, and
Japan, Andropov finally sought to reassure China and
Japan by pledging in a 27 August interview to destroy
any excess SS-20s if an agreement is achieved. He
went on, however, to assert lamely that existing
SS-20s were not meant for offensive use against them.
Despite this concession the Soviet leader of the INF
delegation maintained until mid-September that the
proposal referred only to dismantling launchers and
would not entail destroying missiles. Soviet officials
had to correct this in a Moscow news conference
which made clear that the offer included dismantling
missiles as well as launchers.
Andropov proclaimed on 27 October yet another
"concession" by offering to reduce the number of
SS-20 launchers in the western USSR to 140. The
move presumably was intended to stimulate the flag-
ging West European peace movement, but, in fact, it
came as a disappointment to many West Europeans,
who had expected larger reductions. The beginning of
NATO INF deployments signals the failure of
Andropov's major foreign policy effort since assuming
office
Andropov has also unveiled several other arms control
proposals to regain the initiative after US proposals.
In December he proposed a mutual nonaggression
treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In late
June, Moscow tabled new MBFR proposals including
certain provisions for on-site inspections, thus answer-
ing a major criticism of earlier Soviet proposals.
During his meeting with US senators in August,
Andropov offered to place a moratorium on the
testing of Soviet antisatellite systems if the United
States would refrain from testing similar weapons and
called for a new treaty banning antisatellite and
space-based weapons.
relations.
US-Soviet Relations
Andropov's emphasis on arms control has led him to
devote considerable attention to relations with the
United States. He met Vice President Bush at Brezh-
nev's funeral and hinted at a willingness to hold a
summit meeting with President Reagan if tangible
results could be achieved. These moves fit a strategy
of appearing to take the high road in US-Soviet
Meanwhile, Andropov waged an active campaign to
influence US public opinion in the spring and sum-
mer. It appears that he and his advisers at this point
viewed the growing nuclear freeze sentiment as their
best hope of pressuring the White House into arms
control concessions. They may have calculated that
the approach of the 1984 elections would encourage
the President to moderate some of what they see as his
"anti-Soviet" positions in order to improve his
electoral prospects.
By the end of the summer, it appeared that Andropov
was signaling interest in lowering the level of confron-
tation between Washington and Moscow. Moscow
had compromised on the wording of the final CSCE
document in Madrid and agreed to discuss upgrading
the hotline after an initially skeptical reaction. The
Soviets also kept their promise to allow the Pentecos-
tals to emigrate. In late August President Reagan
lifted some trade restrictions, and the United States
and the Soviet Union signed a new long-term grain
agreement. Andropov told West German Chancellor
Kohl in July that he was willing to meet the President
sometime before the spring of 1984.
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The inept, ill-considered Soviet handling of the KAL
shootdown has, nevertheless, raised questions in the
West about Andropov's image as a sophisticated
spokesman on foreign policy issues. Moscow consid-
ered that the strong US response was politically
motivated by anti-Soviet elements and answered US
criticism with countercharges equating US actions
with those of Nazi Germany. The Soviet defense was
slow in developing, and it should have been apparent
in Moscow that the eventual line-that the United
States used the KAL flight to collect intelligence, in a
deliberate provocation-was lame and bound to alien-
ate the Western public. The shootdown made any
summit meeting unlikely in the near term and severe-
ly undercut Soviet efforts to appeal to the American
public over the heads of the US leaders.
Asian Policy
On bilateral relations with China, Andropov has not
advanced any new initiatives. While calling in broad
terms for improved relations, he has relied more on
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and party profession-
als to do the spade work and has not authorized any
major concessions on troop reductions or third-party
issues (Afghanistan, Vietnamese occupation of Kam-
puchea, or Soviet troops in Mongolia), which Beijing
sees as crucial to a breakthrough. Moreover, an
authoritative article in September indicated that no
major change in Soviet positions was likely, suggest-
ing that Andropov is still unwilling or unable to
sanction major concessions that could bring about
rapid results. Nevertheless, the Soviets have managed
some improvement in economic and political relations
without making any concessions to Chinese demands,
which is perhaps all that could have been expected. F_
Nor has Andropov initiated any major changes in the
Soviet approach elsewhere in Asia. The emergence of
Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, who has taken a
harder line on defense issues and the Northern Terri-
tories, led to a downturn in Soviet-Japanese relations.
Andropov in his August interview on Asian INF
called for improved relations, but, as with other Soviet
"peace" efforts, this has probably been undermined
by the KAL shootdown.
In Southeast Asia, Moscow has attempted to reassure
Vietnam of continuing support despite efforts to im-
prove relations with Beijing. Andropov met Vietnam-
ese party leader Le Duan in July but has yet to meet
Laotian or Kampuchean leaders, leaving these chores
to Gromyko and Ustinov. In Afghanistan, Andropov
has sanctioned some tactical adjustments, but earlier
speculation in the West that Moscow might withdraw
its troops has proved unfounded. The Soviet situation,
in fact, has probably worsened in Afghanistan, where
the Babrak government has failed to establish inter-
national credibility and the insur ency has become
more pervasive.
Third World
Andropov's first year has witnessed no gains in the
Third World except for the Middle East, where last
year's Israeli invasion of Lebanon provided opportuni-
ties for preserving the critical relationship with Syria.
Andropov, Gromyko, and Ustinov probably played
leading roles in the initial decision in the summer of
1982 to upgrade military support for Syria after its
defeat at Israeli hands in Lebanon. The Soviets
carried through on delivery and manning of the SA-5
antiaircraft missiles despite the risks of becoming
more deeply involved in Middle East hostilities. They
have also delivered SS-21 tactical missiles to the
Syrians-the first delivery of this weapon to non-
Soviet forces.
In the war between Iran and Iraq, Andropov has
continued Moscow's tilt toward Baghdad. As a result,
Soviet relations with Iran have deteriorated even
further. Andropov avoided committing the USSR
beyond rhetorical, political, and low-level military
support to Libya's intervention in Chad. He has also
maintained a low profile on fighting in Lebanon and
has failed to provide more than rhetorical support to
Arafat in his internecine struggle.
Soviet client regimes in southern Africa face an
increasingly serious security threat from insurgents
backed by South Africa, and the Soviets have had to
increase deliveries of more sophisticated military
hardware to maintain the regimes in Angola and
Mozambique. The deteriorating security situation has
abetted Soviet efforts to impede US diplomatic moves
aimed at reducing tensions between South Africa and
its neighbors.
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In Central America, the Soviets appear to be more
concerned about the possibility of increased friction
with the United States. Andropov, perhaps as a result,
has yet to meet any Cuban leader for extensive
bilateral discussions. In his June Central Committee
speech, Andropov suggested that the USSR is not
willing to underwrite the economies of emerging
"progressive" states like Nicaragua. Similarly, com-
ments from Soviet officials avoid any hint that the
USSR has made a military commitment to defend the
Sandinista revolution.
Prospects
Soviet foreign policy continues to operate in an envi-
ronment largely created by Brezhnev, but INF de-
ployment in Western Europe will provide Andropov
with a major test. Andropov's response to deployment
will be the first genuine test of the creativity and
effectiveness of his foreign policies, particularly to-
ward the United States and key European countries.
In the Third World, there have been no reversals, and
he seems determined to carry on Moscow's longstand-
ing opportunistic policy of exploiting political instabil-
ity to expand Soviet influence. All indications so far,
however, suggest that he remains cautious and will
not overcommit the regime, particularly if such a step
risks direct military confrontation with the United
States. Andropov does not appear willing to use
Moscow's increasingly strained resources to bankroll
additional Third World clients.
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Andropov and
the Consumer
The Andropov regime appears to be taking a cautious
approach on consumer issues. Without impinging on
defense or industrial investment, it has little room for
maneuver unless and until the Food Program pays
some return and more resources can be spared for the
provision of soft goods, consumer durables, and serv-
ices. Moreover, the regime does not view major
improvements in consumption as an urgent necessity.
Indeed, the General Secretary stressed in his June
plenum speech that improvement in the Soviet stand-
ard of living will be slow.
The regime apparently is willing to settle for slow
growth in consumption because the cost of doing
otherwise would be extremely high. Moreover, it
believes that other means are available to motivate
the work force: specifically, greater wage differentia-
tion and sterner penalties for poor work performance.
Andropov has been careful not to raise consumer
expectations, playing down the material aspects of,
consumption and stressing instead the role of socialist
values and popular commitment to the system as
determinants of the overall "quality of life."
What Andropov Inherited
Among the most difficult challenges facing Andropov
when he became Secretary General of the Communist
Party of the USSR one year ago was that of improv-
ing worker performance just as the increase in real
consumption of the Soviet population had virtually
come to a halt.
Although the standard of living had improved sub-
stantially during the Brezhnev era, it remained low in
comparison with those of developed Western countries
and most East European countries. Moreover, by the
late 1970s the Soviet Union was clearly in the midst
of a downward drift in economic growth that tended
to force greater attention to investment in priority
sectors like energy, transportation, and heavy indus-
try. Finally, four successive years of disappointing
agricultural production, combined with continuing
growth in personal disposable income, led to widening
gaps in demand for and supply of "quality" foods.
Queueing, informal rationing, and special distribution
of meat, milk, and butter spread widely during 1979-
82.
For some time before the death of Brezhnev, the
regime had been concerned by the agricultural sec-
tor's inability to support a standard of living commen-
surate with the USSR's great-power standing. The
persistence of this condition was seen as an embar-
rassment and a contributing cause to the broader
problems of consumer discontent and slow growth in
labor productivity. The Brezhnev Food Program, un-
veiled in May 1982 after several delays, was intended
to reduce the costly dependence on imports of feed
grain and food; upgrade the variety, quality, and
nutritional balance of the diet; and, in general, to'
convert the farm sector from one that is a brake on
economic growth to one that is a strong contributor.
Moscow's response to slowing growth in material
welfare in the Brezhnev era has been twofold and has
brought mixed results. One attempted remedy, the
continuing effort to tighten the reins on money income
growth, has slowed the accumulation of purchasing
power. Although this approach has contained the
potential pressures of suppressed inflation, it has done
little to improve the consumer's lot. Moscow has also
consistently attempted to improve the match between
the mix of goods and services and consumer desires
and to improve product quality. But the predominant
factor accounting for imbalances in consumer mar-
kets remains the problem of assortment. Attempts to
achieve equilibrium between demand and supply for
specific products have been hindered by the regime's
failure: (a) to adjust relative prices, resulting in a
pervasive seller's market in which prices for goods
generally do not reflect scarcity or cost, and (b) to
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provide effective incentives for producers to respond
to consumer desires, to innovate, and to exercise
stronger quality control.
What Andropov Has Done
Like Brezhnev, Andropov seems to feel that, until the
agricultural sector can guarantee a higher quality
diet, directing additional investment resources to pro-
vide the accoutrements of a well-developed consump-
tion sector has to be postponed. In the 1980s the
Soviet consumer cannot look forward to widely avail-
able personal care services, well-designed and spa-
cious housing, or widespread car ownership.
The range of responses that Andropov considers ap-
propriate and feasible to deal with the near stagnation
in consumption is limited. Under Andropov, the re-
gime has generally followed the Brezhnev approach to
consumption problems: it has endorsed the Food
Program, it is slowing aggregate income growth, and
it is pursuing administrative measures intended to
force enterprises to produce a better quality and
assortment of consumer goods. Since early this year,
several decrees relating to consumer goods and
services have appeared; their general tone indicates
high-level frustration and irritation that the variety,
quality, and general availability of consumer goods
and services are not improving. But the decrees do not
appear to provide many, if any, additional resources.
Finally, Andropov is trying to grapple with a situation
apparent in the last years of the Brezhnev regime:
having relied increasingly upon material incentives
instead of discipline, the regime had neither strong
positive or negative incentives at its disposal to influ-
ence worker performance in a period of slowing
growth of real consumption. Although Andropov
would like to have both, he recognizes that the
economy is not going to provide much consumption
growth in the near future, and, accordingly, he has
taken several disciplinary measures to improve worker
effort.
The most recent measure dealing with worker disci-
pline and incentives was a decree in August calling for
tougher measures against absentees, drunks, and oth-
er offenders. It provides for loss of pay and vacation
privileges, demotion, or even dismissal for those guilty
of such offenses while offering positive incentives for
good workers. Managers are subject to disciplinary
proceedings for failing to ensure labor discipline. F
Although initially the concept of worker discipline
was applied to blue-collar workers and directed large-
ly at absenteeism, drinking on the job, and high labor
turnover, Andropov has extended it to society at large,
and the concept of discipline now implies social order
and popular commitment to the system. It is the
antithesis of what a recent Pravda editorial
condemned:
Unfortunately, people who live in their own little
world of exclusive petty concerns, pushing commu-
nity interests into the background, are still very
much with us. This can be seen in manifestations
of a private-ownership, nationalistic mentality;
local self-interest; parasitism; money grubbing;
acquisitiveness; drunkenness; and so on. An indif-
ferent, narrow-minded attitude toward life is in-
compatible with the makeup of a conscientious
Soviet citizen.
While the discipline campaign provides the negative
incentives, Andropov's approach toward remuneration
is designed to be a positive motivator. He has harshly
attacked wage leveling, and he is making a stronger
effort to link remuneration to the contribution of each
worker. So far, however, except in agriculture, little
systemic change in the direction of broader pay
differentiation has occurred. Instead, factory manag-
ers and trade union leaders have been told to reward
better workers with more bonuses and privileges.=
What Andropov's Policies Will Achieve
The consumer welfare policies and approaches es-
poused by Andropov to date are not likely to be
wellsprings of long-term, significant benefits for Sovi-
et consumers.
The Food Program. Although the Food Program has
long-run potential for more efficient food production,
implementation probably will be slow. Even if the
program's 1990 targets for per capita consumption of
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quality foods are met on time, consumption of these
highly desired foods would still remain substantially
below present per capita intake achieved in countries
with comparable levels of economic development. In
addition, because of high demand for quality foods
and because personal disposable income will continue
to grow, the supply-demand gap for these products is
likely to remain large0
Adjusting Enterprise Incentives. The pronounced dis-
equilibrium in markets for individual consumer goods
and services can be traced to the inability of the
planning system to ensure a mix of goods that would
satisfy consumer demand at existing prices and to the
failure of quality control at all stages. Enterprises
generally lack a strong interest in the marketing side
of their operations, despite an extensive history of
government efforts to change this attitude. A new
success indicator that tasks heavy-industry enterprises
to produce a specified amount of consumer goods per
ruble of the enterprise wage fund is not likely to help
much, because it does not relieve enterprises of the
obligations to meet their primary output targets.
Labor Discipline. Andropov's efforts to improve disci-
pline will not endure unless some way of firmly and
consistently tying worker remuneration to perform-
ance is devised that does not depend upon an endless
stream of decrees and harangues from the top. Estab-
lishing this link between remuneration and perform-
ance would require a reversal of the pronounced trend
toward wage leveling that occurred under Brezhnev.
Andropov has indicated that he will continue to push
for more wage differentiation. Although a thorough-
going and time-consuming revision of wage norms to
reward higher skill levels and output would be neces-
sary to carry out Andropov's intention of promoting
productivity, this step would not be sufficient. Labor
productivity growth is hampered by several problems
outside the individual worker's control, such as late
deliveries of supplies, equipment breakdowns, and
faulty technical specifications. As it is, workers re-
ceive only half their wages when they are standing
idle through no fault of their own, a situation that
contributes to poor morale and falsification of output
statistics by managers unwilling to antagonize their
workers
Finally, even if the wage system is eventually struc-
tured so that payment corresponds more closely to
contribution to production, better workers will be left
with the quandary of how to translate their relatively
higher incomes into an improved standard of living if
the desired consumer goods are not available. Most
workers are unlikely to accept Andropov's thesis that
the quality of life does not necessarily equate with
material consumption.
Slowing Wage Growth. Although Andropov has said
more than once that the consumer economy as a
whole is plagued by too much purchasing power, the
chief problem is one of assortment. The imbalances in
the Soviet consumer goods market are less the conse-
quence of excess purchasing power relative to the
overall supply of consumer goods and services than
the result of disequilibrium in markets for specific
categories of goods and services or items greatly
desired by consumers.'
Looking Ahead
The policy implications of this situation cannot be
encouraging from the perspective of the Soviet leader-
ship. Although a continuation of the policy of slowing
wage growth and allowing selective price increases for
nonessential goods will help to prevent the growth of
excessive purchasing power, this policy does little to
provide incentives for workers. To reinforce incentives
would require major restructuring of relative retail
prices and substantial increases in the supply of
quality foods, housing, and personal services-gener-
ally bringing the product mix into greater conformity
with demand. It would also require greater attention
to relative wages to bring individual incomes more
' The evidence lends little support to the theory that repressed
inflation caused by a faster growth of incomes than of total goods
and services available for purchase is the reason for pervasive
disequilibrium in consumer markets. First of all, our estimates of
personal money incomes and outlays over the last decade and a half
show generally equivalent rates of growth. In addition, the dispos-
able income that Soviet households have been saving is a decreasing
share of their annual income gains. Finally, comparisons of the
USSR with countries where consumer markets are in equilibrium
suggest that the ratio of net financial assets to consumption outlays
in the USSR is not disproportionately high
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into line with workers' contributions to production. As
past Soviet experience shows, it is far more difficult to
carry out these initiatives than to control the growth
of household incomes.
The Andropov regime, while trying to dampen con-
sumer expectations and to instill a more conscientious
attitude among workers, still hopes to achieve some
slow growth in the availability of consumer goods and
services. We judge that Moscow would be highly
reluctant to allow consumption levels to decline from
their present level and will continue to import sub-
stantial quantities of consumer goods, in part by
pressuring its CEMA partners for more deliveries of
these goods. The 1984 economic plan and the discus-
sions surrounding the compilation of the 1986-90 plan
will provide more clear-cut evidence regarding Andro-
pov's intentions in the consumer arena.
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Secret
Problems and Prospects
of a New Succession P
Soviet party leader Yuriy Andropov's absence from
this year's anniversary ceremonies in Moscow-no
general secretary has missed them in 30 years or
more-is almost certainly due to a worsening of his
physical health. His frail health in fact has been
evident from the outset of his tenure and has given
rise to speculation that the regime could face a new
succession at any time.
There are signs, moreover, that the bureaucracy has
been concerned about Andropov's physical staying
power, even while the new leader's hold on power is
the Politburo is haunted by the question of
succession and hard pressed to decide who from
among its ranks could fill the position of general
secretary if Andropov leaves the scene any time soon.
There are good reasons for Soviet concern over the
succession: sickness, death, and the consequences of
earlier political battles have so reduced leadership
ranks that the regime appears less prepared for a new
succession than it was when Brezhnev died last year.
Moreover, no likely candidate starting from among
the senior party secretaries-Konstantin Chernenko,
Mikhail Gorbachev, and Grigoriy Romanov-and
including the darkhorses Dmitriy Ustinov and Viktor
Grishin-now seems to have a better than 50-50
chance to be selected. This situation strongly suggests
that the next succession will be more controversial
and tumultuous than the last one. Each of the best
placed candidates-senior secretaries Chernenko,
Gorbachev, and Romanov-have significant political
liabilities, and Andropov's seeming support for Gorba-
chev will not be much help once he is dead.
Perhaps it will take a little longer than usual, but a
new leader will emerge within a matter of days. No
new leader is likely to have the power, authority, and
prestige that Andropov had when he gained the post,
and any new leader after Andropov is likely to
encounter more difficulty in consolidating his posi-
tion. As a result, the possibility of protracted turmoil
within the leadership cannot be ruled out.
The Potential for an Early Succession
Although Yuriy Andropov has been party chief for
only a year, his advanced age and uncertain health
have raised questions among Soviets and Westerners
alike about the length of his tenure. Indeed the illness
that prevented Andropov from attending the revolu-
tion ceremonies in early November-Khrushchev and
Brezhnev never failed to attend-points to the Soviet
leadership predicament. Andropov took office at age
68 (he is now 69)-almost 10 years later in life than
any of his predecessors. While the specific nature of
his current health problems is unknown, the official
explanation that he has a cold is almost certainly an
understatement of the problem. Unofficially, Soviets
report that he has a kidney ailment, but, whatever the
exact nature of the problems, there is no doubt that
his health is frail.
At the same time his political position remains solid:
Andropov is treated deferentially by his Politburo
colleagues, he has the most authoritative voice in the
leadership (while out of sight this fall, his remarks on
the KAL shootdown and INF were prominently pub-
lished in the Soviet media), and he was accorded top
leadership status in the displays of leader portraits
and slogans during the November anniversary cere-
monies. Moreover, there is no evidence of organized
opposition to his role in the Politburo.
While Andropov has from the outset seemed political-
ly healthy, concern about his physical status began
the day of Brezhnev's funeral and has heightened
since then. During the June 1983 visit to Moscow of
Finnish President Koivisto, for example, Finnish offi-
cials were surprised that Soviet authorities permitted
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Andropov to appear before the foreign press, an
appearance which highlighted his poor condition.
Another example of Andropov's physical weakness
occurred the following month, when a long-scheduled
meeting between Andropov and West German Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl had to be delayed because of
Andropov's health. Even Soviet propagandists have
been unable to show Andropov in good physical form.
A US Embassy officer who saw a Soviet documentary
film on Andropov that was released to movie theaters
this summer reported that, despite the film's efforts to
portray Andropov in the most favorable terms, he
came across as a very sick man. Andropov's 12-week
absence from public view since late summer has also
served to raise doubts about his health status. He
postponed a planned trip to Bulgaria, reportedly
called off a planned Warsaw Pact summit meeting,
and the fall meetings of the Central Committee and
Supreme Soviet remain unscheduled as of 14 Novem-
ber, possibly because of Andropov's uncertain health
status.
Soviet officials in Moscow and abroad have been
openly discussing Andropov's health during the past
year, indicating that it has become a subject of
concern at least within the middle level of the
bureaucracy:
? On one occasion a Soviet Embassy officer in Bel-
grade passed along a story that Andropov had
diabetes, on another that he had kidney trouble.
? A Radio Moscow official told Embassy officers that
Andropov's health was not good and that he had
kidney trouble.
Andropov appeared weak and unsteady
during the session, and his appearance cast a mood
of uncertainty among Central Committee members
about how long he would rule.
These perceptions, if widely shared in the bureaucra-
cy, probably have slowed Andropov's effort to consoli-
date his position and could increase his vulnerability
to political challenge. There is no question, moreover,
that Andropov's long absence this fall has hurt his
chances to push in new policy directions.
question of succession and hard pressed to decide who
from among its ranks could fill the position of general
secretary if Andropov leaves the scene. Sickness,
death, and the consequences of earlier political battles
have so reduced leadership ranks that the regime
appears less prepared for a new succession than it was
when Brezhnev died last November. For example,
without Andropov the party will have the smallest
Politburo since the early 1950s, and there is no leader
in the Secretariat who has experience comparable to
that of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, or even Andropov.
Moreover, when Brezhnev died there were at least two
leaders well placed (holding membership in both the
Politburo and Secretariat) and with the requisite
experience to become general secretary: Andropov,
who had been moved to the Secretariat several
months before Brezhnev's death; and Brezhnev's pro-
tege, Konstantin Chernenko. Chernenko, however,
has suffered health problems during the past year.
Role of the Politburo and Key Leaders
The succession decision is most likely to be made in
the Politburo by the senior core of remaining leaders:
senior secretaries Chernenko, Gorbachev, and Roma-
nov, Premier Tikhonov, Defense Minister Ustinov,
Foreign Minister Gromyko, Moscow party boss Gri-
shin, and Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy. It will
be in the interest of these leaders to move quickly in
order to avoid conflict and political paralysis and to
project an image of decisiveness abroad. While a
coalition could form "in the corridor" before a formal
Politburo meeting, all 10 remaining full Politburo
members will have a vote on the succession question.
Only if the Politburo is unable to reach a consensus
would the decision shift to the more than 300 voting
members of the Central Committee. If the Central
he Po it uro is haunted by the
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.,ca I cI
Succession Frontrunners
Position:
Central Committee
Secretary
Responsibilities:
Personnel appointments
and agro-industrial sector
Age:
52
Advantages: Andropov's choice, high visibility, recently
expanded responsibilities, Central Committee
clout
Liabilities: Junior, limited experience, probably lacks
military and defense-industrial support
Position:
Central Committee
Secretary
Responsibilities:
Ideology
Age:
72
Liabilities: Passed over once before, not fully trusted, ill
health
A,
Position:
Central Committee
Secretary
Responsibilities:
Heavy and defense-related
industry
Age:
60
Advantages: Administrative experience, probable support
of defense sector, image of toughness
Liabilities: Ambitions threaten other leaders, lacks
central party experience
Dmitriy Ustinov
Position:
Defense Minister
Responsibilities:
Military Affairs
Age:
75
Advantages: Past experience in Secretariat, military
backing
Prospect: Interim leadership candidate
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Committee gets involved in the decision, support for
individual leaders among its members, especially from
key oblast party officials, would become very impor-
tant in the selection process.
Best Placed Candidates
Precedent suggests that Andropov's successor will
come from the party secretaries who hold voting
membership in the Politburo-criteria met now only
by Chernenko, Gorbachev, and Romanov. Chernenko,
now 72 and in ill health, must be considered a
candidate for Andropov's job, but he has significant
liabilities as well as some strengths. He was passed
over last time, reportedly because he lacked support
from such key leaders as Ustinov and Gromyko, both
of whom continue to be important players in the
Politburo. Indeed, Chernenko's star seemed to fade
soon after Andropov took office, although he has
maintained the nominal number-two position in the
party. Chernenko was absent during April and May
for apparent health reasons-he probably cannot be
counted on to be in political life for a long period-
and appeared to have been slighted in some of the
Soviet press treatment of the June Supreme Soviet
session and party plenum. Moreover, during
Andropov's absence for vacation and health reasons,
Chernenko was said
to be sharing party oversight responsibil-
ities with others, a sign, that he
was not fully trusted in the top supervisory role.
There is more recent evidence, however, of a minor
political comeback for Chernenko. Over the past few
weeks his public level of activity has picked up: he has
met with the Mexican Communist Party leader,
Algerian officials, and Czechoslovak propagandists;
he attended a conference of Bloc party officials in
Moscow; and he published articles in prominent ideo-
logical journals. The strongest signal that he remains
an important factor in the leadership-and, hence, in
the succession-is the highlighting of his position as
unofficial party second in command at the recent
anniversary ceremonies.
have a life-threatening disease such as cancer, how-
ever, he could be the choice of those in the Politburo
who are reluctant or unable to choose among the other
younger and better qualified candidates for the job.
Moreover, the younger contenders might not even
fight him for the job, if they perceive him as a weak
and short-term prospect whose tenure would enable
them to build strength for the future. These are
admittedly poor reasons to select Chernenko, and the
odds are less than 50:50 now that he would emerge on
top in a succession.
Gorbachev's prospects have improved in recent
months, apparently because Andropov has consciously
expanded his responsibilities in the leadership. Indeed,
a Soviet Embassy officer in Belgrade, who has provid-
ed much insight on Kremlin politics over the past two
years, told a US official in August that Andropov
wants Gorbachev anointed as number two in the
party. The diplomat also stated that Gorbachev's high
visibility reflected an expanding portfolio that in-
cludes economic matters, agriculture, cadre policy,
and ideology. A reliable Soviet informant also told our
Moscow Embassy that Gorbachev is the senior secre-
tary in charge of cadres, and Medvedev has indicated
that Gorbachev (with others) may be chairing Secre-
tariat meetings in the absence of Andropov.
Soviets touting Gorbachev may be drawing conclu-
sions from public events that suggest the scope of
Gorbachev's activities, in fact, is growing. For exam-
ple, Gorbachev presided at the appointments of two
officials in July, served as master of ceremonies at a
prestigious gathering of party veterans with Andropov
in August, and that same month opened a Central
Committee conference on cadres. In September he
also attended a meeting of Soviet education-a new
task for him. Gorbachev is also aided by his youth and
apparent good health. Irrespective of his new responsi-
bilities, his agricultural portfolio alone gives him
much political clout. He deals with numerous oblast
and kray party first secretaries from farm areas, and,
by his own count, oversees 15 ministries that are
responsible for more than two-fifths of Soviet GNP.
Chernenko still has the same liabilities that prevented
his selection last time, plus the further problem of ill
health-indeed, there would probably be reluctance
to elect another sick man. Assuming that he does not
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Gorbachev's expanding role in the leadership does not
now easily convert into additional political muscle for
him. So far, under Andropov, he has presided over
only two important personnel shifts, and in neither
case were "his" people installed. In short, he has not
had enough time to make the cadre function work for
him. Moreover, he probably cannot count on the
support of the important heavy industry and defense
constituencies in a succession fight. In this sense,
Gorbachev's political base is narrower than it might
seem from the growing scope of his public activities.
Lastly, while Gorbachev is helped by Andropov's
support, such support will not help after Andropov's
passing unless he does more for him while he is on top.
Romanov's prospects, on the other hand, are probably
better than they appear on the surface. While he has
had little visibility since becoming a party secretary,
and his portfolio is narrower than Gorbachev's-he
evidently is responsible for heavy and defense indus-
try-Romanov is probably perceived by the more
conservative elements in the party as the better
choice. For example, he has had experience as a
manager of a key regional party organization with
strong ties to the industrial and military sectors.
Moreover, he is an ideological conservative who has
taken a harder line than many of his colleagues on
foreign policy issues. In a time of trouble for the
USSR at home and abroad, the Soviet leaders after
Andropov may look to the more conservative candi-
date as the better choice.
Romanov, in fact, has been considered a succession
candidate for over a decade, ever since then king-
maker Mikhail Suslov installed him as Leningrad
party leader in 1970. Since then he has been restless
with ambition, generating recurrent rumors that he
would be transferred to Moscow as either a party
secretary or premier. After Andropov took office he
began to receive broader exposure in the leadership
(his attendance in April at the Karl Marx commemo-
ration in Berlin was seen in this context). Moreover,
Romanov sat with Andropov and Gorbachev at the
meeting of party veterans in August and recently was
referred to favorably in remarks by a regional party
leader.
His arrogant personality and open political self- .
promotion as well as stories regarding his scandalous
behavior that have been circulating in the Soviet
Union probably account for current perceptions
among some Soviet observers-including a Soviet
Embassy officer in Belgrade and Roy Medvedev-
that he has limitations as a politician. Some foreign
observers, such as our Consul General in Leningrad,
on the other hand, now speak of a more sophisticated
Romanov who is trying to pose as a gentleman on his
best behavior. More importantly, according to both
US and Canadian Ambassadors to Moscow, Roma-
nov in recent exchanges has appeared to have a good
grasp of the main issues-this contrasts with his
earlier performance where he seemed to be ignorant
of some of the basics.
Darkhorses
None of the senior secretaries is an ideal candidate:
? Gorbachev, 52, may be viewed as too junior, both in
age and experience, for the top party job and may
lack support from the military-industrial sector.
? Romanov, 60, has served only a short time as a
national party secretary (since June 1983) and has a
reputation for roughness that might not serve him
well. His tendency in the past to frequently shuffle
cadres may also be cause for concern among party
bureaucrats.
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? Chernenko seems to have few pluses other than his 25X1
presence in the leadership and probably is not the
choice of the military-security constituents
The lack of ideal candidates for the general secretary
position could lead the Politburo to turn to others
outside the Secretariat, such as Ustinov, Grishin, or
Shcherbitskiy. Such a course is unprecedented. For-
mer Azerbaijan party leader Geydar Aliyev, brought
to Moscow under Andropov as a full Politburo mem-
ber and First Deputy Premier, is also a darkhorse
candidate
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Ustinov has the advantages of past experience in the
Secretariat (1965-76) and service in the important
military sector. At age 75, however, he is the second-
oldest full member of the Politburo and has suffered
from poor health. Nonetheless, if the regime wanted
to send a signal that things are under control while
recognizing that only an interim choice has been
made, they could take the unprecedented step of
selecting outside the Secretariat and pick Ustinov.
Such a compromise choice would be only a first step,
however, in a more protracted, potentially more con-
troversial succession.
Grishin had been mentioned by Soviet officials as a
possible "compromise candidate" during the previous
succession and could become one this time around.
Located in Moscow, he has a definite political advan-
tage over his other regionally based colleagues. How-
ever, he too is handicapped by health problems and is
not part of the Andropov coalition.
Shcherbitskiy is probably the most influential leader
outside Moscow and has extensive experience in eco-
nomic management. His continued failure to move to
a national-level position, however, is still a serious
handicap for him. Moreover, some Soviet officials
who have touted him in the past now state that
Shcherbitskiy will remain on the margins of power. F
Aliyev is known for his political ambition and ability
to shift loyalties to get ahead. For that reason,
however, he may not be trusted by his colleagues. As a
Muslim, moreover, he probably would not be consid-
ered acceptable for the top party post by the Slavic
majority in the party
After Andropov?
Even if the next leader could positively be identified-
and Gorbachev and Romanov seem to be front-
runners-his present views insofar as they could be
discerned probably would provide only a general sense
of the direction Soviet policy would take in the
immediate post-Andropov period. These views proba-
bly would be modified as he attempted to gain support
and even further altered by political calculations, the
exigencies of events, and the broader perspective of
his new post (witness foreign policy specialist
Andropov's concentration on economic problems).
As of now, the younger candidates to succeed
Andropov-Gorbachev and Romanov-seem to share
Andropov's basic domestic policy views. Both men
probably view Soviet economic problems as heading
the domestic agenda; both are strong advocates of
discipline and greater efficiency in labor and produc-
tion; and both are vigorous leaders who seem open to
innovation, experimentation and change, albeit within
strict ideological bounds. Romanov, an inveterate
ideological conservative, sharply cracked down on
dissidents as Leningrad leader. Gorbachev, in con-
trast, at least appears to be more pragmatic and could
be more flexible, less doctrinaire, in the ideological
and social sphere. Chernenko's views on Soviet do-
mestic issues are more widely known than those of his
younger colleagues in the Secretariat. He has long
advocated investment in consumer goods sectors and
greater attention to the social factor in domestic
affairs, and he has stressed traditional solutions to
economic problems. In recent pronouncements in the
ideological sphere, however, he has taken a more
conservative line.
In the foreign policy area, certain stylistic differences
seem apparent within the party Secretariat. Gorba-
chev, although lacking in foreign policy experience,
projected an image of quiet self-assurance, flexibility,
pragmatism, and intelligence during his recent trip to
Canada. By contrast, Romanov, with over 20 foreign
trips and fairly wide contact with foreign diplomats
over the years, has far greater experience in foreign
affairs. In their published statements, Romanov has
taken a harder line than Gorbachev on foreign policy
issues. During his May 1983 visit to Canada, Gorba-
chev hewed closely to the established foreign policy
line in both public and private remarks. Romanov's
remarks in the foreign policy area have tended to
focus on arms control issues and seem to evince a
special interest in US-Soviet relations. While most of
his public remarks have taken a hardline, ideological
stance, he has posed on occasion as a partisan of
better relations with the United States in private.
Chernenko's public remarks during the Brezhnev era
were more enthusiastic than most other Soviet leaders
in his support of improved relations with the West,
particularly the United States, and of arms limitation.
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In the likely crisis atmosphere of an early Andropov
succession, however, no new leader could afford to
look weak or indecisive, nor could he retreat from any
perceived challenge to Soviet interests abroad.
Collectivity to the Fore
If the succession occurs soon, no new leader is likely to
have the power, authority, and prestige that Andropov
had when he gained the post, and any of the above
candidates would probably encounter more difficulty
in consolidating his position. The presence of strong
political rivals from the outset-something that
Andropov has not had to face-would make the
maneuvering in the Politburo particularly intense and
the new general secretary's position more vulnerable.
The age structure of the Politburo might allow a
younger candidate to consolidate power sooner, as
older members die off, but rivalry among younger
leaders would also intensify
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Other Topics
The Foreign Policy
Decisionmaking Apparatus
Under Andropov
The decisionmaking apparatus inherited from Brezh-
nev has undergone relatively minor alteration, al-
though the prominence of both Foreign Minister
Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov has in-
creased. Andropov has less need for extensive staff
support, given his considerable experience in foreign
affairs before becoming General Secretary, and thus
far only three men have been publicly identified as his
foreign policy aides. A second group of influential
men around Andropov is made up of informal advisers
and speechwriters who have long-term links to the
General Secretary.
Gromyko's influence is probably at its highest level
ever. In March 1983 he was named First Deputy
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, a post that-
combined with his job as Foreign Minister-gives him
greater authority over the government's entire foreign
policy apparatus, including the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and the State Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations. This assignment has made him the most
senior of the three first deputy chairmen in the
Council, by virtue of his tenure in the Politburo. It
strengthens his authority-and that of Andropov-
against Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, who has not been
allied with Andropov and was out of the country at
His Foreign Policy Allies
Andropov, Andrey Gromyko, and Dmitriy Ustinov
probably constitute an informal triumvirate for the
making of foreign policy. All have extensive experi-
ence in this field, but it was not until Brezhnev's latter
years that they entered the innermost circle of lead-
ers. In November 1981, for example, Ustinov gave the
major policy speech on the eve of the celebration of
the October Revolution, the first time that a Defense
Minister had done so in over two decades. In 1982 he
wrote a series of articles in Pravda-not linked to any
holiday or anniversary-on Soviet defense policy and
arms control.
Under Andropov, Ustinov's prominence has increased.
His statements to TASS on 6 December 1982 about
arms control and security issues, for example, suggest-
ed a degree of policy authority that Brezhnev would
have reserved for himself, and the content and media
play of the TASS interview underlined Ustinov's
the time of Gromyko's promotion
Andropov's Stqff
In the Brezhnev era, the General Secretary's personal
staff played an important role in making foreign
policy decisions. The staff included a number of high-
ranking foreign policy specialists who provided the
expertise Brezhnev lacked and helped him become the
USSR's preeminent foreign policy spokesman. Ac-
cording to US Embassy contacts in Moscow, however,
the staff's size and role often annoyed the personnel in
the Central Committee departments who dealt with
foreign affairs, particularly because some Central
Committee functions evidently were often preempted
by Brezhnev's aides.
importance in Soviet defense policy.
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Andropov has less need for such extensive staff
support, given his considerable experience in foreign
affairs before becoming General Secretary. He also is
more intellectually vigorous than Brezhnev was in his
later years and is not likely to need so much guidance.
However, any General Secretary needs a staff that
can assign tasks to the bureaucracy, coordinate its
actions, and regulate the flow of information coming
to him.
Thus far, only three men have been publicly identified
as Andropov's aides: Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov,
Arkadiy Vol'skiy, and Viktor Sharapov. Aleksandrov
is the only holdover from Brezhnev's staff and seems
to have responsibility for Soviet relations with the
West. Vol'skiy, an engineer and former first deputy
chief of the Central Committee's Machine Building
Department, is probably concerned primarily with
domestic affairs and industrial production.
Sharapov worked for Andropov at the KGB and has
edited collections of Andropov's speeches and articles,
including one collection published after Andropov was
named President, and a reprint of Andropov's 1982
Lenin Day speech. Before joining the KGB in 1972,
Sharapov was a Pravda correspondent in the United
States, China, and Vietnam. He faithfully attacked
US foreign policy in his role as a journalist, but we
know little about his current views on foreign affairs.
His "Kitchen Cabinet"
A second group of influential men around Andropov
apparently is made up of informal advisers and
speechwriters rather than formal staff aides. These
include Georgiy Arbatov, Fedor Burlatskiy, Vladimir
Kryuchkov, and Aleksandr Bovin.
Arbatov, a member of the Central Committee, has
long been prominent as the head of the Institute of the
USA and Canada and is Moscow's top expert on the
United States. He has known Andropov since he
worked for him in the Central Committee's Bloc
Relations Department in the mid-1960s and has
served as an important adviser to the Soviet leader-
ship since the Institute was created in 1967.1 1
Burlatskiy has known Andropov at least since 1959,
when he worked under him in the Bloc Relations
Department of the Central Committee. Burlatskiy
currently heads the Department of Philosophy of the
Committee's Institute of Social Sciences, but he has
told foreigners that he spends most of his time writing
speeches for Central Committee members and serving
as an informal adviser to Andropov. An expert on
Sino-Soviet relations, he has told Westerners that
much of his published analysis of Chinese domestic
politics was intended as thinly veiled commentary on
issues facing the Soviet Union, such as economic
reform and Stalin's legacy.
Kryuchkov has been a personal friend and confidant
of Andropov since at least the mid-1950s, when he
served under Andropov in the Soviet Embassy in
Hungary. In 1967 Andropov took Kryuchkov with
him to the KGB, and in late 1974 Kryuchkov became
chief of the First Chief Directorate, the KGB compo-
nent in charge of foreign intelligence. In late 1978 or
early 1979 he became a deputy chairman of the KGB.
oolminded, clever,
and a good organization man. He is one of the very
few individuals mentioned as a "protege" of
Andropov.
Bovin frequently appears on Soviet television in his
official position as a political commentator for Izves-
tiya but also claims to be an unofficial consultant and
speechwriter to top party leaders and one of Andro-
pov's principal advisers. The two have known each
other at least since the late 1960s, when Bovin, like
others in the "kitchen cabinet," worked for Andropov
in the Bloc Relations Department. He has had a
visible public role in foreign affairs since Andropov
became General Secretary. When asked in early 1983
whether he carried a message to Chinese leaders
during a recent trip to Beijing, for example, he replied
that he "was" the message, implying that Andropov
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had sanctioned his trip as a signal to China. He has
told foreigners that foreign policy would be more
dynamic, decisive, and flexible under Andropov than
under Brezhnev, but that its broad outlines would
remain the same
Some of these men, particularly Bovin and Arbatov,
may very likely be more than advisers. Andropov has
apparently used them to relay informal messages to
foreign governments. They may, therefore, assume
positions in the future as instruments of the foreign
policy apparatus as well as advisers to the top leaders.
Other Changes
Although Andropov has brought in his own group of
personal advisers, he has made few significant
changes in the foreign policy establishment. With the
exception of Gromyko's appointment as First Deputy
Premier, the highest level change has been the promo-
tion in December 1982 of Viktor Chebrikov from
First Deputy Chairman to Chairman of the KGB.
(Andropov's immediate successor in the KGB post,
Vitaliy Fedorchuk, replaced Minister of Internal Af-
fairs Nikolay Shchelokov, a Brezhnev crony who fell
victim to Andropov's anticorruption drive.)
Chebrikov joined the KGB in 1967 with Andropov
but is generally considered more of a party official
than an intelligence professional. Before joining the
KGB he spent over 20 years in a succession of party
posts in the Dnepropetrovsk region of the Ukraine, the
former political stronghold of Brezhnev.
Chebrikov's appointment will probably have little
direct effect on Soviet foreign policy, and his appoint-
ment most likely had more to do with Andropov's
concern for domestic than foreign affairs. It seems
unlikely, moreover, that Andropov will allow Chebri-
kov to use the KGB to establish an independent role in
foreign policy decisionmaking, because to do so would
diminish some of Andropov's own authority. The
KGB is probably still one of Andropov's most impor-
tant bases of power.
Institutional Representation on the Politburo
Another unresolved question concerns the institution-
al representation of various foreign policy organiza-
tions on the Politburo. When the Ministers of Defense
and Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the KGB
were promoted to the Politburo in 1973, the distinc-
tion between Politburo "decisionmakers" and institu-
tional "executives" was significantly blurred. The
lack of turnover since that time, however, has made it
difficult to determine whether this decision represent-
ed a precedent for the longer term or reflected
Brezhnev's need to place allies on the Politburo to
support his foreign policy and particularly his ap-
proach to US-Soviet relations.
For a decade there has not really been a test case.
Ustinov was already a Politburo member when he
became Defense Minister in 1976. Andropov's imme-
diate successor in the KGB was in office only a few
months before he was transferred to another post.
Chebrikov assumed the KGB chairmanship in De-
cember 1982. The departure of Gromyko or Us-
tinov-either by death or retirement-from their
ministerial posts would raise the issue of institutional
representation again. No current Politburo members
or candidates have the type of experience to make
them likely successors to either man, requiring the
Politburo to look outside its own ranks to fill these
institutional positions.
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It does not follow, however, that Chebrikov or the
future Foreign or Defense Ministers will necessarily
assume seats on the Politburo. The Politburo will
certainly rely upon them, just as it relies upon other
heads of government institutions, but this reliance is
no guarantee of promotion. As in the case of Chebri-
kov, men such as Andropov might have strong reason 25X1
to prefer that these new "executives" remain in the
political background. If so, the gap between execu-
tives and decisionmakers that existed prior to 1973
may soon reemerge. 25X1
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A Progress Report on
Sino-Soviet Relations
Although the third round of Sino-Soviet consultative
talks in Beijing that ended in October resulted in no
breakthroughs on major bilateral and international
issues, the two sides are making some progress toward
better relations. The political dialogue will continue,
and the parties have agreed to a further expansion of
contacts. These contacts still are quite limited when
measured against either country's dealings with the
United States, but they are striking compared with
the situation prevailing less than two years ago.
Ups and Downs in the Political Dialogue
Both sides appear to have entered into the second
round of consultative talks held in Moscow in March
1983 optimistic that the other side's problems with the
United States might make it more accommodating.
But both' appear to have emerged from those talks
discouraged over the other's obduracy.
before the National People's Congress, reiterated that
Moscow must make a serious move toward meeting
Beijing's "positive proposals" at the March talks
Moscow, stung by Zhao's remarks, within a few days
accused him of making a "slanderous assertion" about
a Soviet threat to China, repeating "hackneyed accu-
sations" against Vietnam and Kampuchea, and mis-
representing Soviet attempts to defend Afghanistan
from "imperialist aggression." This was the first
attack on a Chinese leader by name since the resump-
tion of the Sino-Soviet dialogue last fall, and it
presumably was meant to underscore Moscow's refus-
al to make unilateral concessions on these three issues
that China insists are the main "obstacles" to better
relations. The Soviets followed up with another broad-
side in Izvestiya on 19 June, complaining that the
Chinese media were continuing to spread "malignant
assessments and misrepresentations" of Soviet foreign
policy and equating it with Washington's "aggressive
Moscow vented its frustration first. An Izvestiya
commentary on 19 April broke a seven-month mora-
torium on media criticism of China when it accused
the Chinese of creating artificial obstacles to im-
proved relations, especially with its "fabrications"
about a Soviet threat.
In a press interview with East European journalists on
the eve of his departure for Yugoslavia and Romania
in early May, Chinese General Secretary Hu Yao-
bang complained about Soviet sabotage along the
border, revealing that some 200 Soviet "spies" had
been arrested by the Chinese in the last year alone.
Hu also said that the situation in southeast Asia could
lead to conflict between the USSR and China. F_
The Chinese subsequently claimed they canceled a
visit by Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa to Beijing in
May and decided against letting Chinese Vice For-
eign Minister Qian Qichen stop off in Moscow for
talks en route home from Eastern Europe the same
month. This probably was because of Mongolia's then
unpublicized expulsions of its Chinese minority. On
6 June Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, in a speech
militarist course."
Even as the rhetoric was heating up, however, both
sides managed to handle a few potentially thorny
problems in relatively low-key fashion. For example,
they pulled their punches during the Chinese artillery
attack on the Vietnamese border in April. China's
show of force to punish the Vietnamese for their
offensive in Kampuchea was limited despite the rheto-
ric about a "second lesson." Moscow responded with
restraint and did not give fulsome expressions of
support for its Vietnamese ally.
The two sides were similarly circumspect in handling
Mongolia's expulsion of its Chinese minority, a move
that almost certainly had Moscow's approval. The
Chinese eventually delivered a formal protest to the
Mongolians on 3 June, almost three months after the
expulsions began, but they avoided blaming the Sovi-
ets. Moscow publicized the Mongolians' case but was
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careful not to rub salt in the Chinese wounds. The
Chinese have remained silent since then, even though
press reports indicate the expulsions are continuing at
the rate of about 100 a week
Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa to Beijing
In early July the Soviets took some steps to check the
seeming downturn in the dialogue by making a pro-
posal on behalf of the USSR and all its European
allies for joint cooperation against "imperialism." The
Chinese reportedly rejected the proposal, but they did
agree to reschedule Kapitsa's trip to Beijing.
In August a Chinese Embassy officer in Moscow
informed US officials of plans for the two countries'
foreign ministers to meet at the UN General Assem-
bly this fall, and leaders of both countries made
conciliatory public statements that helped meet the
other's security concerns. In a Pravda interview on 27
August, General Secretary Andropov stressed the
need for better relations in view of the current
exacerbation of the international situation-an allu-
sion to Soviet problems with the United States-and
expressed confidence both sides wanted to curb mili-
tary spending so as to free resources for domestic
economic programs
Two days later, in an interview in the Italian Commu-
nist Party paper L'Unita, Hu Yaobang tried to meet
Soviet concerns that normalization of bilateral rela-
tions not jeopardize Soviet interests in third countries.
Hu noted that China has never hurt Vietnam, Kam-
puchea, Afghanistan, or Mongolia and will "never
harm them in the future," thereby offering a guaran-
tee, of sorts, of good behavior. The Chinese response
to Andropov's conciliatory remarks was given in a
banquet speech for visiting King Hussein of Jordan on
2 September. Chinese President Li Xiannian wel-
comed Andropov's expression of interest in improved
relations and expressed his own hope that the "obsta-
cles" will be removed so that normal relations can be
established. Li, like Hu, avoided putting the burden of
removing these "obstacles" entirely on Moscow. F_
decision not to have Foreign Minister Gromyko at-
tend the UN session. According to an American
correspondent in Beijing, the meeting was to have
focused primarily on the agenda for the next round of
talks in Beijing. The Soviets reportedly tried to ar-
range a meeting at another neutral venue-Romania
or Yugoslavia-but the Chinese refused.
Press and diplomatic sources report that, during
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa's visit to
Beijing in mid-September, the two sides agreed to
open a second channel of communications at the
deputy foreign minister level. Chinese Vice Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen will visit Moscow next year. I
The Soviets evidently made the suggestion in the hope
of channeling talks about the Kampuchean, Afghan,
and Mongolian issues into the new forum. Kapitsa has
said they also want to persuade the Chinese to
cooperate on those foreign policy issues such as the
Middle East and South Africa where the two sides
have similar positions.
Although the Chinese agreed to the new talks, they
apparently did not drop their right to raise interna-
tional issues at the normalization meetings. They
evidently wanted in part to demonstrate progress in
Sino-Soviet relations on the eve of Secretary of De-
fense Weinberger's visit. Beijing may also see in the
new forum another channel for putting pressure on
Moscow for movement on Vietnam, Afghanistan, and
the Soviet military buildup on its border.
China also accepted Soviet offers to assist in rehabili-
tating two to four Soviet-built industrial plants, sub-
stantially increase bilateral trade and student ex-
changes, and further expand scientific and cultural
contacts. The Chinese, however, reportedly rejected a
Soviet proposal for regular meetings at the foreign
minister level and for a resumption of the border
talks. The Soviets are likely to continue pushing the
latter proposal.
The Chinese did not let the KAL shootdown in early
September derail Kapitsa's trip to Beijing, and they
did not support international efforts to condemn
Moscow. The planned foreign ministers' meeting,
however, was one of the casualties of the Soviet
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Secret
The Third Round of the Normalization Talks
The third round took place in Beijing from 6 through
28 October with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Ilichev and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qian as
chief negotiators. the Chinese are
pressing Moscow to replace the "overly ideological"
Ilichev as a negotiator. Moscow, however, reportedly
is reluctant to do so because the only other Sinologist
of comparable rank is Kapitsa, and the Soviets are
reluctant to close down their newly opened second
channel of communication to Beijing.
China entered the talks with its,leverage enhanced by
the recent improvement in Sino-US ties and the
downturn in Soviet-US relations. The Soviets recog-
nized this and probably were concerned that they give
no sign they were prepared to bend because of it. Two
major Soviet journal articles on the eve of the talks-
the first in 18 months-implicitly urged Chinese
concessions. They argued that Beijing's military posi-
tion had actually deteriorated because of its new
relationship with the United States
During the round, Soviet diplomats complained that
China appears to have added yet another obstacle to
its list of preconditions for better relations-Soviet
SS-20 deployments in the Far East. Chinese officials
say they have not been reassured by Andropov's
statement that SS-20s removed from Europe as a
result of an INF agreement there would not be shifted
to the Far East and were determined to raise the
issue. One day after Kapitsa left Beijing in Septem-
ber, Peoples Daily for the first time publicly called on
the USSR to "considerably reduce" its missiles in the
Far East.
the Soviet approach in
the consultative talks has involved normalization
without accommodation-a fair description of Soviet
policy to date. The Soviets have resubmitted proposals
for better relations that have long been on the table.
These include:
? Conclusion of a statement establishing the princi-
ples of bilateral relations, first suggested immedi-
ately after Mao's death.
? Conclusion of a nonuse-of-force or nonaggression
pact, broached in the aftermath of the 1969 border
clashes.
? Cessation of press polemics and propaganda, prof-
fered every time that talks have been held since
relations began to deteriorate in the 1950s. F-7
The only new proposal that Moscow put forth when
these talks resumed in 1982 involved certain confi-
dence-building measures (CBMs). No good informa-
tion is available on what precisely these entail, but
they may be similar to the CBMs that have been 25X1
agreed to or proposed between the Soviets and other
nations, such as advance notification of exercises and
no first use of nuclear weapons. Western press reports,
citing sources close to the Soviet side, also say that
Moscow proposed that the Chinese and Soviet border
guards exchange information on their training and 25X1
make reciprocal factfinding cross-border visits. The
Soviet objective is to first reduce tensions with the
Chinese and then to use such a reduction in tensions
to change the international perception of Soviet weak-
ness in the Sino-Soviet-US triangular relationship.
China has rejected these proposals and put forth
specific suggestions for removing the three obstacles
to better relations. It has given wide publicity to its
demands on all three questions. Vietnam must declare 25X1
its intention to withdraw from Kampuchea uncondi-
tionally and then actually begin withdrawals and to
cease hostile acts against China. China will then
agree to negotiate with Vietnam. Soviet troops must
withdraw from Afghanistan and Mongolia, and the
Soviets must reduce the number of troops and missiles
along the Sino-Soviet border, preferably to the level
prevailing in 1964.
The Soviets have responded to Chinese discussion of
the obstacles by encouraging Beijing to talk directly
to the Vietnamese and the Mongolians. They have
also attempted to reassure the Chinese that Soviet
involvement in Afghanistan poses no threat to their
security, and the Soviet military posture on the border
dialogue on these issues thus far appears to have been
sterile, with each side essentially talking past the
other
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Both parties recognize, however, that their dialogue
with one another enhances their respective leverage in
relations with the United States. Thus, each time they
have met they have generally agreed to some addi-
tional resumption of heretofore banned cultural, eco-
nomic, or scientific contact.
The Areas of Progress
The most important area of progress in the past year
probably has been in the trade relationship. In March
the two sides signed an agreement that will increase
this year's trade turnover to $800 million-the high-
est level since the early 1960s. The Soviets are
arguing that this trade should be at the same level as
Sino-US trade-$5 billion. Although the Chinese do
not appear that eager for Soviet goods, the two sides
reportedly have already agreed on substantially high-
er levels for next year.
In addition, the two sides have:
? Agreed to resume local border trade and reopen five
border crossing points along their eastern and west-
ern frontiers.
? Signed a civil air protocol that permits a mutual
expansion in air service.
? Increased cultural, sports, and tourist exchanges-
nonexistent in the 1960s and 1970s.
? Resumed visits by the "Friendship Societies."
? Agreed to exchange a limited number (10 this year,
more next) of students and a wide variety of techni-
cal personnel.
? Signed a new accord calling for a larger exchange of
books and other published materials.
Prospects
Although Beijing and Moscow see major benefits to a
further easing of tensions, the legacy of mistrust will
not be easy to overcome and will continue to compli-
cate negotiations. The territorial dispute is particular-
ly difficult to deal with, because concessions by either
side would set precedents that third parties could cite
in pressing their own claims against China and the
USSR. Both sides almost certainly also fear that any
concessions on such an important issue would only
whet the other side's appetite for more. In addition,
the leadership in both capitals may be unsure of the
ability of their opposite numbers to deliver on any
bargain.
The two countries are well aware that any agreement
or disengagement along the Sino-Soviet border must
take into account the interests of the military estab-
lishments. A decision to offer major concessions on
troop cuts, for example, would-even in the best of
circumstances-entail acrimonious debate, especially
in Moscow. This would be an unattractive proposition
for Andropov, who particularly needs the military's
support in the current period. The Chinese leaders, for
their part, might also be reluctant to get into a row
with their top military leaders once Deng Xiaoping
leaves the scene.
There seems to be little prospect, therefore, of a major
breakthrough soon, and the Sino-Soviet dialogue,
even under the most favorable circumstances, is un-
likely to lead to a full rapprochement-with both
sides cooperating on a wide variety of issues and
treating each other as equals-within the next five
years. The most either side seems to expect, or
perhaps would even want, is a limited detente-a
further relaxation of tensions, an increase in trade and
other bilateral contracts, and some movement on the
border dispute and other security issues. In moving
toward this objective, moreover, both sides will pro-
ceed cautiously to maximize their leverage with the
United States and minimize the damage to their other
interests in Asia.
Nonetheless, if the current process stays on track, the
two sides probably will eventually repair a good deal
of the damage that was inflicted on their relationship
during the 1960s and 1970s. The parties, by simply
adhering to their present course of one small step at a
time, could make considerable progress in expanding
trade, scientific, and technological exchanges and the
like. They might then reach the point where they
would be willing to initiate serious negotiations over
one or more of the main stumblingblocks to improved
relations. For example, they might arrange parallel
talks between the USSR, China, and Mongolia on
mutual force reductions. Progress on such issues
would be likely to be slow, however, mainly because of
the military and geographic disparities.
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Secret
Briefs
Nuclear Missile The Soviet Defense Ministry's announcement late last month that preparations
Deployments have begun for deploying "operational-tactical" missiles in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia increases the probability that the Soviets plan to move SS-12/22
ballistic missiles, as well as SS-23s, into Eastern Europe as one response to the
NATO INF deployments.
The announcement, which was carried by TASS and Radio Moscow, said that an
understanding had been reached with East Germany and Czechoslovakia and that
work had started in those countries in preparation for the deployments. Use of the
term "operational-tactical" clearly indicates that in their earlier threats to deploy
new missiles in Eastern Europe, the Soviets were referring to the SS-12/22, which
has an operational range of over 900 kilometers, or the SS-23, which has a range
of 500 kilometers. The term would not apply to the SS-21-a "tactical" missile al-
ready fielded with more than half of the 19 Soviet divisions in East Germany. De-
ployment of the SS-23, which is designed to replace the Scud-Bs already in 25X1
Eastern Europe, probably would not require the permission of the host country.
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USSR: Comparison of 1967 and 1982 Percent change
Wholesale Price Revisions
1967 1982
Revision Revision
Wholesale Price According to data recently released by the Central Statistical Administration,
Increase Soviet industrial wholesale prices increased 12 percent in 1982. The largest
increases occurred in fuels (62 percent), electric power (23 percent), and ferrous
metals (23 percent). Machinery prices were reported as having fallen.
The magnitudes of the 1982 price revisions were substantial by Soviet standards.
Overall industrial prices, for instance, were raised more than during the last major
revision of wholesale prices, which occurred in 1967. The continued surge in
industrial material prices reflects in large part higher costs associated with
developing lower quality raw materials in less accessible locations. Last year's
revision of industrial wholesale prices is intended to boost industrial profit margins,
promote resource conservation, and spur the production of higher quality goods.
But prices play a limited role in the allocation of resources in the Soviet Union, so
the changes, other than raising profit margins, are not likely to help much in
achieving these goals.
Pipeline Computer A French firm under contract to develop a computerized control system for the Si-
Control Development berian export pipeline is being impeded by lack of information from the Soviets
and by technical problems. Moscow has so far refused to provide operating data
needed to prepare software, reportedly delaying fulfillment of the contract. The
French company also has encountered serious technical problems in developing the
system
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the contract completion date, citing pipeline construction delays and cost overruns
The firm reportedly had hoped to begin operational testing of software for the
system in January 1984, but in July the Soviets requested a one-year extension of
contract until it has received a tested program for the system.
The Soviets may be unable to provide the necessary data because they have not de-
cided how they will integrate the control system and the existing pipeline grid. In
addition, Moscow may intend to evade its obligations to make payments on the
Decree on Industrial The Central Committee recently attacked a major R&D facility-the Ural
Innovation Ignored= Scientific Center-for disregarding the regime's August decree on "measures to
stimulate scientific and technical progress in the national economy." In reporting
the Committee's criticism, Pravda indicated that the decree was being widely
The decree, a highly publicized step to increase productivity and innovation, is
hortatory and vague for the most part but does include a few specific measures. On
1 January 1984 all industrial output will be divided into two classes-top quality
and first quality. Articles that fail to reach the first-quality level are to be
withdrawn from production within two years. To accelerate the process of quality
differentiation, the price of such goods will be lowered 30 percent, while the price
of all top-quality articles will be raised 30 percent. To raise the importance of pro-
gress in science and technology (S&T) as a performance indicator, plant managers
will be required to submit and fulfill an annual plan for the introduction of new
technology or suffer a reduction in their total bonus payments of up to 25 percent.
These directives are not likely to remove the systemic constraints which currently
inhibit the pace of technological development. Marginal improvement in Soviet
S&T performance may result, however, from any additional investment resources
shifted to this area and from the threatened sanctions aimed at making R&D and
production enterprise managers take their S&T responsibilities more seriously. F
Soviets Selling The USSR reportedly is successfully marketing Soviet-manufactured series-74
integrated circuits in Japan and, to a much lesser extent. in the United States
the Soviets have taken advantage of the opportunity created when
one-third the price being charged by Japanese and US firms.
Japanese and US firms concentrated on producing more advanced semiconductors.
The Soviets recognized there would be a shortage of series-74 circuits, which they
have been producing for more than a decade. They are selling the circuit-a basic
component widely used in civil and military production worldwide-at less than
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The Soviets probably hope to gain some market recognition by selling integrated
circuits in Japan and the United States-world leaders in this field. It is not clear
how the foreign sales will affect supplies of these devices in the USSR. The
military, however, presumably would be insulated from any disruptions.
Soviet Manganese Ithe
Purchases Soviets have purchased as much as 500,000 metric tons of high-grade manganese
ore during the first half of 1983-about 400,000 tons from Australia and the rest
from Gabon. This purchase is the first evidence of Soviet manganese ore imports in
over a decade. With about 30 percent of known world reserves, the Soviet Union is
the largest producer of manganese ore, and production was about 10 million tons
last year. The Soviets, however, have been plagued by declining quality of their
ore. We believe the high-quality imported ore is needed to blend with Soviet ore
for use in new Japanese-designed electric furnaces for the manufacture of high-
grade ferro-manganese, a compound used to increase the hardness and wear
resistance of steel.
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