USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T01083R000100090005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
Top Seeft4
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Top Secret
SOV UR 83-009JX
September 1983
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Directorate of
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
table of contents.
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome. They may be
directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the
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Contents
The Growth of Soviet Perspective
Nuclear Forces
in the Far East The Soviets are increasing the size and effectiveness of their
strategic forces in the Far East. They have made extensive deploy-
ments of land-based missiles and aircraft for use in this theater and
added ballistic missile submarines for both intercontinental and
regional attack. In 1978 a High Command was established in the
Far East to ensure centralized command and control of Soviet forces
in the region. Since then, increased emphasis on joint-force opera-
tions has been evident in exercises. The improvements in the Soviet
military posture have increased the concern of East Asian nations
over Moscow's political intentions in the region and have caused a
number of them to seek closer ties with the West.
SS-20s in the Eastern USSR
the Soviets will press ahead with the expansion of their SS-20-
IRBM force in the eastern USSR during the 1980s, raising the
number of launchers in this region from the current 108 to at least
216 and possibly as many as 270.
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East Asian Perceptions of the Soviet Military Buildup
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The Soviet military buildup has reinforced a pervasive suspicion of
the USSR shared by nearly all East Asian countries. With varying
degrees of concern, they believe that Moscow is intent on becoming
an East Asian power, primarily by attempting to derive political
influence from its growing military capabilities. The general East
Asian desire to avoid closer political and economic links with
Moscow should persist as long as a credible US deterrent to Soviet
military power continues to exist.
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Recent organizational changes and equipment augmentation in two
and possibly three divisions indicate that the Soviets have begun to
introduce a new army corps structure. The new corps, which is
larger than a division, will be better able to conduct limited, self-
contained actions while separated from the main body. This could
make it useful for economy-of-force, forward detachment, counter-
penetration, and operational maneuver group missions. It might also
be used in a rear-area protection role.
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Angola and the US Initiative on Namibia: The View From 37
Moscow F__1
of extracting concessions from Luanda and Washington
Recent Soviet behavior suggests that Moscow will continue to mix
pressure and blandishments to undermine the US initiative on
Angola and Namibia. If Luanda nonetheless opts for the US
proposals, the Soviets would probably consider new obstructionist
tactics, including provocations designed to sour South Africa on the
prospective settlement. Should they fail in this, or forgo such tactics
altogether, they might consider offering their "cooperation" in hopes
Trends in Soviet Naval Activity off West Africa
limited response to the hostilities in the Falkland Islands
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The growth of the Soviet naval presence off West Africa during the
past 18 months reflects increased support for the regime in Angola,
the deployment of task groups to show the flag in the region, and a
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The Labor Discipline Campaign-Round II
USSR-China: Joint Inspections on Border Rivers
Grain Harvest Nearing Completion
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Viewpoint Did the Soviets Deceive the United States During the
SALT I Negotiations?
At several crucial points in the SALT I negotiations, the Soviets are
alleged to have deceived the United States about strategic capabili-
ties soon to be available to Moscow and as a result obtained an
Interim Agreement on Offensive Forces that was extremely advan-
tageous to them. This article argues that, while the Soviets engaged
in tough and sharp bargaining, they do not appear to have engaged
in deliberate and consistent misrepresentation. They negotiated
vigorously to protect programs that they considered important, and
they considered themselves obligated to comply only with those
limitations to which they had explicitly consented.
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Perspective
The Growth of Soviet Nuclear
Forces in the Far East
The Soviets are increasing the size and effectiveness of their strategic
forces in the.Far East to counter perceived threats to their security
interests in the region and to increase their intercontinental strike capabili-
ties. They already have made extensive deployments of land-based missiles
and have continued the steady addition of nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs) and strategic aircraft
substantial additions are yet to come. Moscow's
concern over the capabilities of the US Navy in the Far East has
stimulated efforts to protect Soviet SSBNs. China's expansion of its missile
forces, the impending deployment of the Xia-class SSBN, and the steady
growth of Japan's modern Self-Defense Forces also have provided impetus
to the growth of Soviet military power in the region. The Soviet programs
are consistent with the steady development of the USSR's capabilities-
both tactical and strategic-that has been evident for many years, but they
have heightened concerns over Soviet political intentions in the region. This
issue of the USSR Monthly Review examines the growth of Soviet forces in
the Far East and the views of key Asian nations on the buildu
The most publicized development has been the growth of the SS-20 IRBM
force. The Soviets have constructed some SS-20 bases in the Far East each
year since 1976, but the moratorium on new SS-20 construction in the
western USSR in 1982 apparently has enabled them to accelerate the pace
of deployment in the East.
timate that as many as 270 missile launchers could eventually be deployed
there.
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Soviet D-class SSBNs have largely taken over the intercontinental mission
in the Pacific Fleet. As a result, several Y-class SSBNs have been assigned
to theater missions and have established regular patrols in the Sea of
Japan. From these patrol areas the SS-N-6 missile carried by the Y's can
strike targets throughout the Far East as distant as Guam and the
Philippines. As more D-class and eventually Typhoon-class SSBNs enter
the force, additional Y's probably will be assigned to the theater mission.
The capabilities of the Y's are considerably greater than those of the
G-class submarines they will be replacing
The growth in forces in the Far East and the diversity of potential threats
pose major command and control problems for the Soviets. The reestablish-
ment of the High Command in the Far East is one of several measures tak-
en by the Soviets to ensure the centralized command and control of the
military forces in that region. Headquartered in Ulan-Ude, the command
is intended to overcome the isolation of the Soviet forces in the Far East
from the General Staff in Moscow and to improve the Soviets' ability to
Since the mid-1970s we have noted an increasing number of joint-service
operations conducted in the Far East. In addition to the normal training
functions associated with Soviet military exercises, these operations have
tested the procedures established by the High Command to integrate and
operate the forces subordinate to it.
The significance of the continuing growth of Soviet forces in the Far
East-especially the SS-20 missiles-has not been lost on East Asian
countries. With varying degrees of concern, all believe that Moscow is
intent on becoming an East Asian power, primarily by attempting to derive
political influence from its growing military capabilities. Indeed, Moscow's
one major success in Asia-its alliance with Vietnam-stemmed from its
ability to provide major security assistance. The general East Asian desire
to avoid closer political and economic links with Moscow has caused some
of these nations to strengthen their ties with the West, particularly the
United States.
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SS-20s in the
Eastern USSR
New SS-20 base construction
indicate that the Soviets will press ahead with t e
expansion of their SS-20 IRBM force in the eastern
USSR' during the 1980s, raising the number of
launchers in this region from the current 108 to at
least 216 and possibly as many as 270. Moscow
apparently believes that a sizable force is required to
cover the more than 300 Chinese and US installations
we believe it might consider as potential time-sensitive
targets in the Far East. In exchange for US flexibility
on other issues in the INF negotiations, however, the
Soviets might agree to either a moratorium or a
ceiling on SS-20 deployments there that would allow
them to complete bases already under construction at
the time any proposal takes effect.
New Deployments
In the past, the identification of one SS-20 regimental
support base in a geographic area has been the initial
indicator of the formation of an SS-20 division con-
sisting of five or six regimental support bases.
to the two operational divisions in the Novosibirsk and
Drovyanaya areas. We estimate that each division
will have six subordinate regiments, with a total of 54
the oviets are creating two new SS-20 divisions in
the eastern USSR (at Barnaul and Kansk) in addition
photographic evidence indicate that
launchers.
Three new SS-20 bases of the ve
been identified this year We
estimate that one of these became operational in
February 1983, bringing the total number of opera-
tional SS-20 regiments in the east to 12 with 108
launchers (see figure 1). The other two bases at
Barnaul are in the early-to-middle stages of construc-
tion and probably will be completed by early 1984.
' For the purpose of this paper, the term eastern USSR is defined as
the territory east of 80 degrees east longitude, which includes bases
Soviet Military Requirements in the Far East
We do not know how the Soviets calculate require-
ments for this missile system in terms of their expect-
ed losses, the need to maintain reserves, and reliability
factors. Nor are we certain how they plan to allocate
SS-20s for use against specific targets. In any case,
they apparently believe they need a sizable SS-20
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We have identified some 300 separate installations in
the region that, from Moscow's standpoint, might
qualify as time-urgent targets for ballistic nuclear
missiles. Most of these critical targets are in China.
They include approximately 160 ballistic missile
launchers,2 100 airfields able to handle nuclear-capa-
ble IL-28 or TU-16 bombers, a few command centers.
US installations in the Far East also would be candi-
dates for SS-20 targeting early in a conflict. The
Soviets doubtless plan to strike at those US installa-
tions supporting or controlling forces capable of deliv-
ering nuclear attacks against Soviet territory. There
are some 25 to 30 of these targets, including major
airfields, nuclear weapons storage sites, naval facili-
ties, and important command and communications
centers.
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At a minimum, Soviet targeting requirements proba-
bly dictate that Moscow have a nuclear force ade-
quate to assure destruction of these approximately
300 time-sensitive targets. In addition, there are many
strongpoints, tactical airfields, assembly areas, ad-
ministrative centers, and similar targets which would
be candidates for nuclear strikes. Although the Sovi-
ets have an impressive array of tactical nuclear
systems in the eastern USSR, targets deep within
China cannot be covered by these forces, and some
might require the higher accuracy of the SS-20.
Intermediate- and long-range bombers and subma-
rine-launched missiles also are earmarked for use
against softer, less critical Asian targets, and elements
of the ICBM force could be used on a contingency
basis.
Impact on INF Negotiating Position
We believe that the new SS-20 deployments in the
eastern USSR probably are part of a longstanding
program and are not directly related to the INF
negotiations. The Soviets almost certainly made the
decision to build new bases in the east before the talks
were under way.
Moreover, the Soviets have consistently refused to
consider SS-20s based in the eastern USSR as being
within the scope of the current INF talks. Moscow
has thus far maintained that any changes in eastern
deployments would be contingent on separate INF
negotiations including all nuclear weapons in Asia.
construction of additional new bases this year.
There is little prospect that the Soviets will agree to
dismantle forces already in existence in the eastern
USSR. It is possible, however, that in exchange for
US flexibility in other areas of INF, they might agree
to a moratorium or ceiling on eastern SS-20 deploy-
ments. Moscow would almost certainly insist that any
such arrangement would have to permit completion of
at least the bases already under construction at the
time any proposal takes effect. Such an arrangement,
if entered into by the end of 1983, would permit
Soviet deployment of at least 144 SS-20 launchers in
the east-more if, as we expect, Moscow begins
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East Asian Perceptions of the
Soviet Military Buildup
The Soviet military buildup has reinforced a pervasive
suspicion of the USSR shared by nearly all East
Asian countries. With varying degrees of concern,
they believe that Moscow is intent on becoming an
East Asian power, primarily by attempting to derive
political influence from its growing military capabili-
ties. The general East Asian desire to avoid closer
political and economic links with Moscow should
persist as long as a credible US deterrent to Soviet
military power continues to exist.
China
The Chinese regard the Soviet Union as an expansion-
ist power challenging US strategic preeminence in
Asia and, of course, as the principal threat to China's
own security. They view the steady buildup and
modernization of Soviet forces in the region as con-
sistent with these objectives.
The bulk of China's conventional forces-well over a
million men-are deployed toward the Sino-Soviet
border and opposite Mongolia where Soviet armored
forces pose a direct threat to Beijing. We believe
most, if not all, of China's small nuclear missile force
also is targeted against the Soviet Union. China's
defense doctrine of a "People's War" is designed to
fight a long war of attrition against the Soviets' better
equipped conventional forces.
To offset their obvious military inferiority and counter
Soviet pressure, the Chinese have sought since the
early 1970s to strengthen their ties with the West and
the United States in particular. We believe the Chi-
nese viewed the resumption of bilateral talks with the
USSR last year mainly as an opportunity to put
pressure on the United States. In addition, Beijing
probably hoped to gain greater room for maneuver
between the two superpowers and to probe Soviet
willingness to reduce tensions
They see these as cheap ways of keeping pressure on
the Soviets and helping to isolate Moscow politically.
Beijing almost certainly will continue to insist that the
Soviets accommodate Chinese security concerns in at
least one critical area-such as withdrawing support
from Vietnam in Kampuchea or reducing Soviet
forces along their mutual border-before political
relations can improve appreciably. Despite General
Secretary Andropov's positive statements last month
on SS-20 deployments and other security issues, the 25X1
Chinese-like the Japanese-remain highly skeptical
that Moscow is prepared to meet their demands that
Soviet forces in the region be reduced
Beijing recognizes that it must rely on the United
States as a strategic counterweight to the Soviets.
China also recognizes that its principal appeal to the
United States still is based on the notion that China- 25X1
despite its relative weakness-poses a second-front
consideration in Soviet strategic thinking. This factor,
however, is operable only so long as there is some
reasonable prospect of Sino-US cooperation in the
event of war. When this prospect is questioned,
Beijing's leverage with both Moscow and Washington
is undercut.
The US response to the Soviet buildup, especially
suggestions that Japan should play a larger security
role in the region, introduces other uncertainties for
Beijing. Discussion in Tokyo of an enhanced Japanese
military role, underscored by Prime Minister Naka-
sone's "aircraft carrier" remark earlier this year, has
shaken Beijing's perception of its own role in the
region. The Chinese do not want Japan to assume any
sort of regional security responsibilities because that
would diminish China's importance, complicate its
position regarding Taiwan, and-hypothetically, at
least-reduce its leverage on the Korean peninsula.
Chinese leaders may have similar concerns about a 25X1
regional arms race between the United States and the
In our view, opposition to Soviet expansion will re-
main the keystone of China's strategic policies. As a
result, the Chinese are unlikely to reduce their sup-
port for the Afghan rebels or the insurgents fighting
against Moscow's Vietnamese ally in Kampuchea.
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Soviet Union that reduces China's influence. We
believe these were the principal factors behind the
Chinese decision earlier this year to reopen discus-
sions of a strategic relationship with the United
States.
Japan
Tokyo's concerns regarding Soviet military deploy-
ments tend to be compartmentalized. In terms of
trends in conventional capabilities, the Japanese are
most sensitive to:
? Growth in the Pacific Fleet, which is seen as
potentially threatening to Japan's sea
communications.
? The creation of a ground force coastal defense
division on the southern Kurils in defiance of Ja-
pan's claim to the "Northern Territories."
? The buildup of Soviet air forces, particularly the
introduction of Backfire bombers.
In terms of nuclear forces, Tokyo has focused increas-
ingly on trends in SS-20 deployments. Japanese con-
cerns have grown as the number of missiles in the
eastern USSR has increased, particularly since the
Soviets suggested in early 1983 that an INF agree-
ment at Geneva might not rule out a shift in SS-20s
from Europe to Asia. Japanese officials believe it is
critical that the Japanese people not see their coun-
try's security interests being sacrificed to those of
Western Europe in an INF settlement.
Soviet military actions in Afghanistan and Poland
have begun to sensitize the Japanese to the possibility
of Soviet military moves against their own country.
Japanese officials, however, generally believe that
Moscow will attempt to use its military power for
political purposes:
? To overawe and intimidate Japan, particularly in
crisis situations.
? To drive a wedge between Japan and the United
States by emphasizing that Soviet forces are not
targeted on Japan-only US forces based in Japan.
? To abort the effort to strengthen the Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) by stimulating domestic Japanese
opposition to the government's allegedly "militaris-
tic" policies.
Tokyo's response over the past few years has been to
tighten alliance relations with the United States and
gradually strengthen the SDF. Prime Minister Naka-
sone has placed even greater emphasis on the impor-
tance to Japan of the Mutual Security Treaty with the
United States but has not tried to accelerate Japan's
defense buildup. We believe that, if he secures his
political base by winning the lower house election
expected early next year, he is likely to provide an
additional boost to defense spending.
Internationally, Nakasone is moving on two fronts to
prepare the way for a more rapid defense buildup:
? In East Asia, he is attempting to reassure Japan's
neighbors that they will not be threatened by a
modest Japanese effort to counter the increased
Soviet threat.
? To the other advanced industrial democracies, he is
stressing Japan's commitment to the Western camp
and its recognition that the security of the West is
indivisible.
At home, the Prime Minister is attempting to recast
popular Japanese views of military security issues and
emphasize Japan's role as a leader of the Western
camp. The Soviet military buildup-coupled with
Moscow's continued provocative behavior toward
Japan-is facilitating this task.
Korea
Korean officials on both sides of the DMZ probably
view the Soviet military buildup in East Asia with
mixed feelings. Bitter memories of Moscow's support
for Kim 11-song's invasion of the South in 1950 keep
Seoul wary, despite Moscow's continuing interest in
informal contacts. Continued Soviet economic and
military assistance to North Korea-albeit limited
and not of the type P'yongyang desires most-
reinforces these suspicions.
This profound distrust of the Soviets is also fed by
Moscow's moves outside the peninsula, including the
military buildup in the region, support for the Viet-
namese Communists, and the invasion of Afghani-
stan. The South Koreans believe Moscow has upset
the military balance of power in East Asia. Expanded
Soviet naval capabilities in Asia present a potential
threat to South Korea's access to needed resources
and export markets. Along with the Japanese, Seoul
also has recently focused attention on Soviet deploy-
ment of SS-20s in the Soviet Far East within range of
South Korea.
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These developments, however, strengthen the argu-
ment of those in Seoul who have pushed the idea of
South Korea as a forward base for US strategic
nuclear weapons. Even so, Seoul still worries that the
corresponding enhancement of US military capabili-
ties over the next few years may not redress the
imbalance the Soviets have created.
P'yongyang has not made an issue of the buildup in its
media, and we suspect that it derives some satisfac-
tion from the challenge the Soviet buildup presents to
the United States and the US allies in the region.
Because it has much warmer relations with China,
P'yongyang does IIoi publicly support an increase in
Soviet might along China's northern frontier and has
consistently turned aside Moscow's periodic efforts to
enlist North Korea in a Soviet-inspired Asian collec-
tive security arrangement.
The North Koreans, on the other hand, clearly do not
want the Soviet buildup to provoke an even stronger
US presence in Asia, strengthen US military ties with
South Korea and Japan, or encourage China to
deepen its strategic relationship with the United
States. North Korea probably fears that Soviet ac-
tions could cause the United States to seek basing
rights for strategic nuclear weapons in South Korea.
P'yongyang would perceive such a sharp expansion of
the US security commitment as a major new obstacle
to P'yongyang's ultimate goal of reunification on its
terms.
ASEAN
The ASEAN states for obvious reasons are less
concerned with the Soviet military buildup per se than
they are with Moscow's support for Vietnam and the
growing Soviet naval presence in the region. In this
context, the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of
Kampuchea in 1978 marked the major turning point
in ASEAN perceptions of Soviet intentions. Until
then, countries in the region saw China as the princi-
pal threat. While most Southeast Asians still have
residual doubts about China's long-term intentions in
the region, ASEAN states now clearly share a percep-
tion that the Soviet Union-with a strong assist from
Hanoi-has become the principal threat.
Singapore is the most vocal of the ASEAN states in
its denunciation of the Soviet presence in Southeast
Asia. Particularly alarming to the Singaporeans has
been the growing Soviet-Vietnamese security relation-
ship which has resulted in a stronger Soviet naval
presence in the South China Sea. Since the invasion of
Afghanistan, Singapore-despite Soviet entreaties-
has banned visits and repairs of Soviet naval vessels
and limited the number of visits by naval auxiliary
ships.
Thailand's concerns center on the Soviet-supported
Vietnamese troops along Thailand's border with
Kampuchea. The Soviet military buildup on China's
border, combined with the resumption of political
talks between the two Communist powers, almost
certainly has also created uncertainty in Bangkok
about China's willingness to try to obstruct Vietnam-
ese expansionism in the region. The Thai share
ASEAN concern over Soviet potential to dominate
the Straits of Malacca and are concerned that the
Soviet naval presence will expand to Kampuchean
waters.
The Philippines also focuses on Moscow's ties with
Hanoi, reflecting Manila's concern that Vietnamese
expansionism is fed by Soviet support. Manila has
consistently refused Soviet overtures for access to ship
repair facilities in the Philippines and has resisted
efforts by the Soviets to increase their diplomatic and
commercial presence in the country. Manila finds it
convenient, however, to use the threat of improved
relations with the Soviet Union both as leverage in its
dealings with the United States and to present a
nonaligned image to its nationalistic domestic audi-
ence.
Indonesia initially viewed the Soviet military presence
in Vietnam as a counterweight to perceived Chinese
ambitions in the region, long Jakarta's principal con-
cern. But Vietnam's continued occupation of Kampu-
chea, the threat to Thai security from Vietnam, the
growing Soviet naval presence in the region, and other
evidence of Soviet expansionism such as the invasion
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of Afghanistan have encouraged a less sanguine atti-
tude. Jakarta's discovery of Soviet espionage activity
in Indonesia in recent years has reinforced concern
over Soviet designs on the region. Since 1980 the
Indonesian military has conducted several major exer-
cises aimed at countering a potential Soviet-backed
Vietnamese invasion from the north and has initiated
a buildup in the strategic command stretching from
Sumatra to West Kalimantan to meet any threat to
Indonesian territory in the South China Sea.
Malaysian Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie voiced
concern over Soviet intentions in Southeast Asia in a
1981 white paper in which the Soviet Navy operating
out of Vietnamese ports is seen not only as a challenge
to China, but, more important for the regional bal-
ance of power, as a challenge to the US Navy. He
believes that the growth of Soviet capabilities to
counter the US military presence in Southeast Asia
threatens the security of ASEAN and the other non-
Communist states of the region. More recently, in the
wake of revelations of Soviet espionage activities in
the region and the abrasive April 1983 visit of Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa to the region, Ma-
laysian officials have renewed their criticism of Soviet
regional ambitions and reaffirmed their support for
Thailand on the Kampuchean question. Malaysian
officials privately welcome a continued US military
presence in the region, but at the same time are
careful to maintain their nonaligned credentials
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New Soviet Army Corps
The Soviets have reorganized and expanded at least
two and possibly three tank and motorized rifle
divisions to develop combat units similar to their
World War II tank and mechanized corps. We believe
additional selected divisions in most border military
districts and in some internal military districts and
groups of forces in Eastern Europe may adopt this
structure. The new corps, composed of four or five
brigades, is a significant departure from postwar
Soviet organizational philosophy. Its size, equipment,
and employment in exercises could make it useful for
economy-of-force, forward detachment, and counter-
penetration missions as well as for operational-tactical
missions such as those of operational maneuver groups
(OMGs). It might also be used in a rear-area protec-
tion role.
The new units,
are approximately the size of US ar-
mored or mechanized divisions but have brigades
rather than regiments. These brigades have battalions
composed of tank and infantry companies. Previously
the Soviet Ground Forces had not mixed these units
below regimental level.
formed. A likely pattern would be a corps in most
border MDs and in some internal military districts
and groups of forces. Conversion to an independent
army corps does not require the most modern equip-
ment; however, we expect that corps probably would
We believe that the corps structure that will develop
over the next year or so will consist of five maneuver
brigades and an air assault regiment.
engineering equipment, and probably tanks. Air de-
fense assets were both increased and placed at lower
echelons.
The Kyakhta corps also has an air assault unit
equipped with airdroppable BMD infantry fighting
vehicles, but the helicopter unit at Kyakhta cannot lift
We believe that as many as eight to 10 corps may be 25X1
have priority for receiving new equipment
strengths could be as high as 3,100 men for a tank
brigade and 3,200 men for a mechanized brigade.
The long-term development of the new army corps
will probably focus on the modernization of equip-
ment within the five-brigade structure over the next
few years. We expect the modernization of infantry
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The conversion of divisions to corps has included the
addition of BMP infantry fighting vehicles, artillery,
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Historical Origins of the New Corps
We believe the organization and mission of the new
corps have historical roots in the Soviet tank and
mechanized corps of World War II. During the war,
the bulk of the Soviet army consisted of infantry
divisions with few or no tanks or motorized transport.
Soviet military historians have written that corps
were created because a scarcity of qualified com-
manders forced the Red Army to adopt highly cen-
tralized, elitist organizations to get maximum value
from its precious mobile forces. The corps structure
centralized the scarce armored and motorized equip-
ment under a single commander, maximizing its
combat potential and increasing its responsiveness in
battle. A corps usually consisted of four mechanized
and tank brigades reinforced with various special
units (such as tank destroyers and assault engineers)
to tailor the formation for specific situations. The
corps became, in effect, a special formation at the
disposal of the front commander. Larger and more
powerful than the standard rifle division, it was able
to conduct sustained operations while separated from
the main force. It was also smaller and more respon-
sive than an army, making it well suited for rapid
deployment in operational-tactical missions. F__1
caused the Soviets, faced with staggering losses in
1941-42, to disband it in favor of independent bri-
gades. These brigades did not require as much staff
and special support and therefore could be more
easily handled by less experienced commanders. In
late 1942, when the Soviets had regained the initia-
tive, the corps was reinstituted.
Soviet military historians claim the tank and mecha-
nized corps were used primarily as mobile groups
during the war. Their specialty was exploiting breaks
in the lines and striking deep into the German rear to
seize important objectives. When its momentum was
lost, the corps would dig in its infantry and hold off
counterattacks until the Soviet main body could
catch up. We believe recent historical writings may
have given these formations more credit than is
warranted. In many cases, the authors seem to be
describing what they expect the modern corps to be
capable of, rather than its historical performance.
After the war, changes in doctrine, reductions in
force, and accompanying reorganizations led the So-
viets to abolish the corps formations. Doctrine was
modified because by the end of the 1950s increased
mechanization was thought to make all Soviet divi-
While this created a powerful formation, the large
number of specialists required to man the corps
fighting vehicles and tanks, a complete conversion to
self-propelled artillery, the introduction of self-
propelled mortars, and an upgrading of corps air
defense assets. We expect to see additional tracked
and self-propelled vehicles introduced, particularly in
the logistic support units of the corps, to improve its
mobility and self-sufficiency. We may also see an
expansion of air assault and material support regi-
ments to brigades.
Operational Implications
The Soviet armed forces' commitment to quick, mo-
bile offensives to carry the fighting to enemy territory
is unchanged since World War II, but their methods
and forces have continued to evolve in response to
sions capable of performing exploitation missions.
doctrinal innovation, changing battlefield technol-
ogies, and the character of prospective opponents. In
recent years Soviet ave been
particularly concerned with the i icu ties of success-
fully implementing offensive doctrine given the in-
creased lethality of the modern battlefield. This has
led to increases in the infantry and artillery comple-
ments of tank divisions and consideration of doctrinal
refinements like the OMG concept to restore high
rates of advance.
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The new corps at Minsk and especially the one at
Kyakhta will be better organized and equipped for
operating apart from the main body than their prede-
cessor divisions. Overall, their size and capability of
accepting logistic and fire support attachments should
give them greater staying power and combined-arms
balance than motorized rifle or tank divisions. The
corps should be better able to,roll over light opposition
or pin down stronger enemy units until the arrival of
more powerful friendly forces.
The brigades observed at Kyakhta and Minsk provide
their commanders with at least four preformed infan-
try-tank teams organized as mixed battalions resem-
bling US Army battalion task forces. We do not know
why the Soviets have adopted this structure, which
appears to be a change in their organizational philoso-
phy. The Soviets have a well-known dislike of ad hoc
solutions to combat problems, and they may have
concluded that composite units at the lower tactical
levels are essential to avoid having to assemble mixed
combat teams during combat.
We expect, however, that the new corps structure will
cause problems. For example, the assignment of tanks
and infantry into mixed battalions will require the
development of new tactics and training in small-unit
combined-arms operations. Battalion commanders,
unaccustomed to managing a mixture of weapons
types, will have to gain experience. Battalion staffs
will need to be expanded, and logistic and mainte-
nance problems will be compounded. The complexity
of and need for more training in combined-arms skills
are likely to necessitate higher peacetime manning
levels for active companies and battalions within the
USSR.
The Corps as an Operational Maneuver Group.
In Soviet doctrine,
e L)mu is an armor- eavy tormation varying in size
from division to army. A corps-sized OMG generally
would be committed after the start of an offensive
operation and used for preliminary exploitation prior
to introduction of the second operational or strategic
echelon. Once in the enemy rear, it would pursue
military-geographic objectives such as nuclear deliv-
ery systems, airfields, and river crossings. The OMG
is intended to be logistically self-contained and able to
operate separated from the main force. 25X1
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Stronger and more versatile than a division, the new
corps should also be faster and more responsive to
march orders from higher headquarters than an army.
This is because speed and responsiveness usually are
inversely related to the size of a combat formation. As
a front's OMG, where commitment could come as 25X1
early as the third day of battle and rapid exploitation
is crucial, a corps-sized formation might be commit-
ted faster and more effectively than an army. The
successful use of the corps in an OMG role would be
contingent upon solving the difficult problem of pro-
viding logistic support to the corps while it is separat-
ed from the main force.
Economy-of-Force Missions. In the US Army, ar-
mored cavalry serves in an economy-of-force role to
find the enemy and develop the situation with the
smallest force possible. It acts as a screen to provide 25X1
reaction time and maneuver space for the main body
and allow it to engage the enemy under favorable
circumstances. Armored cavalry conducts reconnais-
sance-in-force missions, relying on its heavy firepower
to destroy the enemy or at least force it to stop and de-
ploy.
Although we have no evidence of corps being used as
armored cavalry in command post exercises, the new
corps are organized and equipped for such a role. The
brigade structure is well suited to cavalry operations,
and the mix of tanks and armored fighting vehicles in
the composite battalions resembles that found in US
cavalry squadrons. The Soviets already have a recon- 25X1
naissance (armored cavalry) brigade in Mongolia that
has composite battalions structured like those of the 25X1
new corps, indicating they consider such a force 25X1
useful, at least in the Far East. 25X1
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The force requirements of armored cavalry and OMG
missions-firepower, responsiveness, speed, and abili-
ty to operate independently of the main force-are
almost identical. Therefore, the testing of a new corps
in the OMG role does not preclude its use as cavalry.
Operational-Level Forward Detachment. Like ar-
mored cavalry, the force required for a forward
detachment is almost identical to that of the OMG
because of the need to operate in advance of the main
body. The main difference between the OMG and the
forward detachment is that the latter is under the
command of the formation it is serving, while an
OMG would have its own command-staff element
(termed an operations group), which could provide
greater independence.
The corps' size makes it well suited to operate as a
forward detachment of an army. However, we have no
evidence yet of an entire new corps being used as a
forward detachment.
Counterpenetration Force. A corps like those at
Kyakhta and Minsk could be used to counter penetra-
tions of Soviet lines. A front or army commander
could hold the corps in reserve, relying on its respon-
sivness, mobility, and firepower to thwart advancing
enemy forces before they could fully exploit their
breakthrough. While we have no evidence that the
Soviets are considering this role for the new corps,
counterpenetration operations could assume greater
importance for the Soviets in light of the revived
emphasis on offensive operations in the US Army.F-
Rear-Area Protection. Another possible role for the
new corps is suggested by the two Soviet independent
brigades in Afghanistan (the 66th and 70th), which
conduct guerilla-suppression and rear-area protection
operations.' In forming the corps at Kyakhta, the
Soviets may have decided that a quick-reaction com-
bined-arms formation would be useful to protect the
Transbaikal-Mongolia region from Chinese incursions
during a Soviet advance into China. The corps'
7 These brigades are composed of a motorized rifle regiment, a
parachute/air assault battalion, and a multiple rocket launcher
battery. They do not have composite infantry/tank battalions as do
nal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
greater mobility and longer range fire support relative
to standard divisions could enable this task to be
accomplished with fewer troops. We do not, however,
have evidence of the new corps training for rear-area
protection-a role traditionally assigned to the Inter-
Implications
We conclude that the Soviets probably are not satis-
fied with their present force structure's suitability for
certain types of operations. Because the testing of the
new corps has followed on the heels of tests of the
OMG concept, we believe the new corps will conduct
OMG field tests. They also are equipped and orga-
nized to serve as armored cavalry, operational-level
forward detachments, or counterpenetration forces.
The corps might be used for rear-area protection,
although this function would probably be handled in a
more efficient manner by smaller units.
The size and additional equipment of the new corps
may provide them the quick response and maneuver
speed of a division as well as the additional firepower
and sustainability to conduct limited, self-contained
actions while separated from the main body. The
Soviets may be exploring whether such midsized
formations would help solve the problems of conduct-
ing a high-speed offensive in the lethal environment of
Although the Soviets must see some utility for the
corps against NATO, it might be less effective against
NATO than against other potential opponents in roles
other than counterpenetration. Strong NATO air
forces, numerous attack helicopters, and modern
mechanized forces well equipped with precision guid-
ed munitions could pose a serious threat to a corps
operating in advance of the main body.' For the corps
to attain its full potential as an OMG, we believe it
would require further improvements in logistics, air
defense, and reconnaissance.
' The OMG of a front would probably tend to operate toward the
first-echelon armies' subsequent objective, generally 150 to 200
kilometers in depth. A corps-size OMG could be vulnerable to
ambush and destruction if the enemy had adequate mobile reserves.
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We see many advantages for Soviet use of the new
corps against China or targets in the Persian Gulf
area. There the Soviets would have a better opportuni-
ty to control the air, and their opposition would not be
as mobile or as well equipped.
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Angola and the US
Initiative on Namibia:
The View From Moscow
Angola's dialogue with the United States over Na-
mibia and related bilateral issues has been a source of
concern to the Soviets since Luanda and Washington
began talks in late 1981. The Soviet leadership proba-
bly views a continued stalemate in Namibia-which
perpetuates Angola's dependence upon the USSR and
Cuba-as preferable to a settlement, which could be
seen as a Soviet "withdrawal" under US pressure.
Moscow's greatest
fear in southern Africa was that Angola's ruling
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) would "sell out" to the West.
The Soviets presumably believe that the establish-
ment of an independent Namibia between Angola and
South Africa, resolution of the domestic insurgency
problem, and the departure of the Cuban troops
would reduce Luanda's dependence upon Moscow for
military assistance. This in turn would undermine
Soviet influence in Angola, a country that is impor-
tant to the USSR because it:
? Is an important symbol of Moscow's willingness and
capability to project power to distant shores in
support of its friends.
? Is currently the only area on the West African
Coast where the USSR enjoys privileged air and
naval access; this ensures Moscow the ability to
monitor activity in parts of the South Atlantic, as
demonstrated in the Falklands crisis.
? Serves as the main Soviet entree into southern
Africa, through which Moscow can funnel support
to the Namibian insurgents of the South-West
Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) and-if it
decided to do so-to Zaire's Katangan rebels. F_
The Situation in Angola: Implications for Moscow
Some seven years after Moscow helped bring the
MPLA to power, the Luanda government still faces a
major threat to its position from insurgents of the
National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola
(UNITA), despite the support of some 25,000 to
30,000 Cuban military personnel.
stepped-up UNITA activity
during the past year has already led to greater Cuban
combat involvement-and a higher number of Cuban
casualties. The recent UNITA victory at Cangama-
one of the largest MPLA garrisons taken by the
insurgents-and the continued fear of new South
African military action probably prompted the un-
scheduled visit to Moscow of a high-level Angolan
delegation in late August and early September. The
visit by this group, headed by party secretary Lucio
Lara and Defense Minister Tonha, comes in the wake
of President dos Santos's trip to the USSR last May.
The economic impact of fighting a growing insurgen-
cy, maintaining a large Cuban force, and coping with
the recent decline in world oil prices (oil is Angola's
principal source of hard currency) have further com-
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These problems provide incentives for Angola to
resolve its security situation by agreeing to a US-
brokered Namibia settlement. Soviet concern about
this possibility probably has been heightened by re-
cent political developments in Angola. Last December
President dos Santos was accorded "emergency pow-
ers" by the MPLA Central Committee, ostensibly to
resolve Angola's economic and security problems. The
Soviets may believe this enhancement of dos Santos's
authority could lead to changes inimical to their
interests. The dismissal in December of several pro-
Soviet figures, including party secretary for ideology
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party chief Lucio Lara-probably fueled such appre-
hensions about the MPLA's future direction. Concur-
rently, the Angolans have maintained their dialogue
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with the United States; in April, for example, Interior
Minister Rodrigues met with Vice President Bush at
the White House.
Moscow's Response: Current Tactics
The Soviets have reacted to these developments with a
mixture of pressure tactics, continued shows of mate-
rial support, and some hints of flexibility.
To strengthen their position, the Soviets have intro-
duced some more advanced weaponry into the Ango-
lan arsenal, including SA-8 surface-to-air missiles and
paign to hold Cangama, for example, the Soviets sent
IL-76 and AN-22 heavy-lift transports to Angola with
deliveries of new military cargo. I
Moscow, however, apparently recognizes that it can-
not afford to alienate dos Santos totally if it is to
retain some influence in the event his diplomacy
succeeds in resolving the Namibia question. Thus,
during the May visit the Soviets also expressed some
tolerance for his efforts to negotiate a settlement.
Apart from reaffirming support for Angola's defense,
they acknowledged "the great importance Angola
attaches to the speediest just solution of the Namibian
problem" and assured Luanda that Soviet leaders
would give "full support" to the search for a settle-
ment. Such formulations are strikingly different from
those offered during Lucio Lara's January 1982 visit
to Moscow. At that time, the Soviets made no state-
ments of support for Angolan efforts to negotiate and
publicly warned Luanda against doing business with
the West.
from moving precipitately toward a settlement.
Prospects
Recent Soviet behavior thus suggests that Moscow
will continue to mix pressure and blandishments in its
attempts to undermine the US initiative on Angola
and Namibia. It will play on Luanda's security fears
and emphasize alleged US-South African collusion to
bring UNITA to power. Soviet chastising of dos
Santos for his "poor performance" indirectly reminds
him that other leaders are available. Given dos San-
tos's need to balance the MPLA's hardline and
moderate factions, this Soviet tack may inhibit him
If dos Santos were to assemble a coalition that was
prepared to move on the UNITA question and the US
package on Namibia, the Soviets would probably
pursue other tactics to try to obstruct a settlement.
For example, they could try to:
? Provoke South Africa into scuttling the settlement.
Toward this end, the Soviets could press SWAPO or
the South African insurgents of the African Nation-
al Congress (ANC) to undertake new military or
terrorist activity that would make it politically
unfeasible for Pretoria to relinquish Namibia; this,
of course, would require the cooperation of SWAPO
or the ANC. Short of this, the Soviets could employ
such active measures as disinformation and forger-
ies to sour Pretoria on the settlement.
? Discreetly encourage disgruntled elements in the
MPLA or directly promote a coup against dos
Santos, though this seems less likely. If the coup
failed, Moscow could find itself with little or no
influence within the MPLA. Moreover, given the
complex of factors that define Angolan politics-
race, tribe, ideology, and personality-the Soviets
could not be totally certain of the final outcome in
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Angola even if a coup succeeded. In addition, a
successful coup would probably further split the
party and weaken the military, with the attendant
effect of strengthening the position of Savimbi and
his UNITA insurgents. Disclosure of Moscow's
involvement in a coup would also raise doubts and
suspicions among African and other Third World
leaders who have close ties to the USSR.
If they were convinced that progress toward a settle-
ment was inevitable, the Soviets could decide that a
constructive tack would be more conducive to their
long-term interests. For example, they might offer
their "cooperation" in an effort to extract concessions
and assurances from the Angolans and the United
States. Moscow would probably insist that the pro-
spective settlement be finalized and implemented
under the auspices of the UN Security Council so as
to ensure a Soviet role in the process. The Soviets
would presumably press Luanda for strong assurances
about its future political orientation and continued
close ties to the USSR. Those assurances could take
the form of Angolan agreement to a continued
Soviet-and possibly Cuban-advisory presence in
Angola and the elevation of pro-Soviet ideologues to
key positions in the Luanda government.
Such concessions could somewhat assuage Soviet con-
cern that a Cuban troop departure from Angola
would be perceived as a Soviet defeat. Moscow would
concurrently try to exploit some political and propa-
ganda benefits from a Namibian settlement. The
Soviets, for example, would be likely to:
? Point to the MPLA's continued "leftist orienta-
tion"-and US recognition of the MPLA-as evi-
dence that the USSR had not suffered a setback.
? Claim credit for resolving the Namibia problem,
particularly if it were ultimately brokered under the
auspices of the UN Security Council.
? Cite its "constructive" role as evidence of its peace-
ful intentions.
? Claim a new success in independent Namibia, as-
suming that SWAPO won the UN-monitored elec-
tions. Moscow would claim that its support of
SWAPO was vindicated and that its victory was
further evidence of the positive shift in the world
correlation of forces.
Should they opt for a constructive role, the Soviets 25X1
might also try to exploit the settlement in the US-
Soviet bilateral context. For example, they could cite
their willingness to "deal with the United States" as a
gesture that warranted a reciprocal US move. Al-
though Moscow probably would expect little to come
of such a ploy, successful Soviet propagandizing of the
USSR's role in a settlement could diminish the image
of a Namibia settlement as a US diplomatic coup. F-
? Argue that the Cuban departure from Angola was
evidence of Havana's "unselfish" motives in aiding
the MPLA and other Third World regimes since
1975.
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Trends in Soviet Naval
Activity off West Africa
The Soviet naval presence off West Africa started as
a response to crises-Ghana's seizure of Soviet fishing
vessels in early 1969 and Guinean President Sekou
Toure's frequent requests for support following raids
by exiles in late 1970. This presence has been continu-
ous since August 1971.
Figure 1.
Soviet Ship-Days off West Africa, 1976-82
0 Hydrographic and space
t
h'
comparable period in 1982.
have varied from year to year, reaching a peak in
1978 with over 4,000 Soviet naval ship-days ' in the Ship-days
region. A three-year decline followed, with a low of 5,000
just under 1,600 ship-days in 1981, leading to specula-
tion about the future of the patrol. In response to
regional developments in 1982, the Soviet naval pres-
ence off West Africa jumped nearly 80 percent (see
figure 1). We expect the patrol to continue at about 4,000
the same level-total ship-days for the first five
months of 1983 are roughly the same as for the
3,000
The size and activities of the West African patrol Il Amphibious ships
Mission
The West African patrol serves during peacetime as a
token Soviet force in the region-adequate to signal
Moscow's political position in time of crisis. The
patrol is of particular utility in demonstrating Mos-
cow's support for the Marxist regime in Angola.
When required it has expanded its scope of operations
or its composition:
equipment to Marxist rebels during the Angolan
civil war of 1975-76 was a vital element in that
faction's success. The Soviet effort itself was greatly
aided by use of facilities in Guinea-aviation fuel
storage ashore and Soviet auxiliaries in Conakry. 0
The Alligator-class landing ship normally on patrol
off West Africa was supplemented with surface
combatants
Mine warfare ships
even
supports Ips
Auxiliaries
? The Soviet and Cuban airlift and sealift of military 1,000
TU-95 Bear D naval reconnais-
sance aircraft flew from Conakry probably to moni-
tor Western naval responses to the Soviet and
Cuban activities.
General purpose
submarines
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? In early 1981 a minesweeper that had been deployed
to Conakry, two other combatants, and three auxil-
iaries moved to an area off the Moroccan coast in
response to the seizure of Soviet fishing boats. A
minesweeper remains on patrol there as a reminder
of Soviet concern for its fishing fleet.
? In mid-August 1981 the Soviets responded to the
escalating conflict between Angola and South Afri-
ca by moving three combatants to Luanda. Subse-
quently, these ships were moved to Mocamedes-
closer to the battle zone-probably to signal greater
concern over South Africa's military actions. Soviet
ships continued to operate off southern Angola
periodically during 1982.
? Ships deployed to West Africa contributed to the
limited Soviet naval response to the Falkland Is-
lands crisis. Although it spent much of its deploy-
ment near Conakry, an F-class submarine may have
monitored portions of the northern leg of the British
Soviet naval ships also make show-the-flag visits to
other West African littoral states. In 1982 this type of
activity was highly visible. A Moskva-class helicopter
carrier made the first deployment of its class to the
region since 1974. It led a small task group that called
in Lagos, Nigeria, and Luanda. A second task group
visited Pointe Noire, Congo-the first Soviet naval
call there since early 1976.
We believe that in wartime the West African patrol
would play only a limited military role. The patrol is
small and has few combatants. It is unlikely to be
reinforced, and its limited logistic support is vulnera-
ble. The patrol would be most useful for monitoring
Western naval activity prior to hostilities. It could
also provide token interference to Western sea lines of
communication, but this is a low Soviet priority.F_
Composition
In recent years the Soviet presence in West African
waters has normally included a surface combatant, an
F-class diesel attack submarine, a minesweeper, an
amphibious ship (LST), auxiliaries, and research
ships. The units are deployed from the Soviet North-
ern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets. Ships like the
Alligator LST are ideal for the role-able to cruise
independently for long periods on the littoral and
capable of evacuating a threatened regime or Soviet
citizens if necessary.
During 1981, however, a landing ship was absent
from the patrol for the first time since 1971. A
general purpose submarine was present only a few
weeks, and no major surface combatants were in the
area for four months-limiting Soviet presence in the
area to the mine warfare ship cruising off Morocco.
This probably represents about the least Moscow can
deploy to the region without eliminating its capability
to rapidly respond to local crises and undermining
political ties in the region.
The composition of the force in 1982 returned to pre-
1981 levels:
? An Alligator landing ship was again present along
the littoral for several months.
? An F-class submarine returned for most of the year,
at least partially in response to the Falklands crisis.
? The presence of surface combatants more than
doubled from that of 1981.
? The presence of auxiliary and research ships in-
creased substantially.
? A V-11-class nuclear attack submarine operated in
the region and called in Luanda. Previously, V-II
units had been in the area only during transits to the
Indian Ocean.
The resurgence reflects the importance to Moscow of
visibly supporting Angola. Overt naval support to the
dos Santos regime in 1982 also included delivery of
missile patrol boats, antiship missiles, and coastal
defense radars.
Command, Control, and Communications
The Soviet naval force off West Africa is not a formal
squadron like that in the Mediterranean. It is a patrol
composed of the ships found in the West African
operational area. The senior naval officer present in
the area, who is usually aboard a landing ship or
surface combatant in Luanda, exercises command.
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Figure 2
Operating Area of Soviet Naval Forces off West Africa
Ivory
Coast
-Central African
Republic
Namibia
I Windhoek
Malawi
LIIOn I
Lusaka*
West?rn
SaKara
'Ghar
Accra
C Benin
090
LoI6~
Algiers I
Pointe Noire
Ango
~ Gr Se ~`
Italy Qya Turkey
Malta of Lab
Mediterranean Sea Cyprus
_Tripoli Is.
Libreville (Congo
Gabon i
Maseru
Pretoria
*
Mbabane
Swaziland'
Banju
The Gambia
Guinea-BisSb
Soviet ship deployment area
Soviet maritime aircraft
operating area
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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mobile short-range radio
relay vans were delivered to Angola in early 1983.
The radio vans could support increased naval activity
in the Angolan area. Similar equipment in Vietnam is
associated with a high-frequency direction finding
system.
Auxiliary ships provide the bulk of logistic support for
the West African patrol. The Soviets generally keep a
repair ship at a small Angolan naval base near
Luanda. Minor maintenance is performed in this
sheltered anchorage. Other auxiliaries replenish fuel
and stores in the port as well. Ashore support consists
of some housing and recreational facilities.
Use of Conakry for similar support activities has
diminished in recent years as relations between the
USSR and Guinea have cooled. Transiting ships
occasionally use other littoral ports as replenishment
points.
larly patterned in recent years, with several lone cans
Atlantic. Deployments to Luanda have been irregu-
landing rights for Bear D's in 1977, they have staged
periodically to Luanda although the facilities there do
not offer the same advantages. Luanda's greater
distance from the Soviet Union makes it necessary for
these aircraft to stop over in Cuba en route to and
from Angola, and aircraft in Angola are farther away
from the transit routes of Western fleets in the North
Outlook
The Soviets are likely to maintain their increased
commitment to Angola seen in 1982 and early 1983.
If tensions in the region escalate, they may be pre-
pared to upgrade the patrol by improving its commu-
nications capability and deploying more major surface
combatants. In any event, Moscow will continue low-
key attempts to better its access to airfields and
seaports in the region. We do not foresee any major
change, however, in the patrol's operations. It will
remain a flexible, though minor, formation configured
to serve the interests of Soviet foreign policy along the
West African littoral
Although the logistic support for the patrol is limited
by Western standards, it is adequate for peacetime
operations. We think it unlikely that the Soviets will
require expanded support in the future or be willing to
make the considerable investment necessary to up-
grade other facilities in the region.
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Briefs
Possible Preparations
for New ICBM F_
The expansion may be intended to support deployment of a new solid-propellant
ICBM. Two such systems-the SS-X-24 and the SS-X-25--currently are being
flight-tested and probably will begin deployment in about two or three years. The
SS-X-24-a MIRVed ICBM about the size of the MX-has been tested from
silos using modified SS-17 silo components and is a good candidate for deployment
in the SS-17 silos. The single-RV SS-X-25 might replace the aging single-RV SS-
I is at Kostroma, but initial deployment at the Soviets' only SS-13 complex (at
Yoshkar-Ola) would be more consistent with Moscow's claim that the missile is as-
sociated with SS-13 modernization.
Andropov on A TASS report last month stated that General Secretary Andropov told the head
INF Talks of a visiting US trade union delegation that the USSR will follow a constructive
and flexible line in the Geneva talks until the US Government, as a result of its
INF deployments in Europe, "compels us to concentrate on defensive countermea-
sures."
While promising "countermeasures," Andropov is refraining from stating categor-
ically that the talks would be broken off once deployment begins. In private talks
with West German Chancellor Kohl in July, Andropov parried a direct question
about the prospects for negotiations by downgrading their importance in the light
of the "new situation" that would be created by deployment. Andropov presum-
ably wants to avoid a repeat of the problems caused by Foreign Minister
Gromyko's remarks at a press conference in November 1979. On that occasion,
Gromyko categorically ruled out East-West arms talks if the NATO states agreed
to the INF basing decision the following month.
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Economic Experiment Moscow has announced an "economic experiment," to be instituted in selected
Announced F__7 industries on 1 January 1984, that is designed to boost worker productivity and to
stimulate innovation in industry. Although the implementing decree is vague on
specifics, some of the more important general measures are:
? Enterprises are to be allowed greater autonomy in using investment, wages, and
R&D funds to stimulate innovation and introduce new technologies; greater
access to bank credit to purchase new equipment; and increased flexibility to link
worker and management wages more closely with enterprise performance.
? The current number of plan indicators is to be reduced and enterprise
performance evaluated more strictly on the basis of (1) sales which meet contract
obligations for assortment, quality, and timely delivery; (2) scientific and
technological innovation; (3) productivity increases; and (4) production cost
reductions.
Most of the "new measures" called for have been tried unsuccessfully before. The
reordering of success indicators, for example, is a familiar gambit. Also, the call
for increased enterprise control over R&D, wages, and investment fails to define
how such powers would be exercised and implies that central authorities still would
retain leverage over plant activities.
The Labor Discipline Moscow has begun another phase of its campaign to improve labor discipline. It is
Campaign-Round IID introducing sanctions against laborers AWOL or drunk on the job and will give fi-
nancial rewards to more productive workers. These measures, announced in
August, are part of the strategy introduced by General Secretary Andropov last
December to stimulate the faltering economy. The initial phase included arrests
and police raids designed to get laggards off the street and back on the job. These
harsh tactics, however, have been largely abandoned because they fostered too
much resentment among the work force
The impact of this latest step on economic performance is likely to be less than the
regime hopes. While the managers appear to have greater authority to crack down
on shirkers, the sanctions are carefully limited. Moreover, a similar decree was
announced in January 1980 but was administered only half-heartedly and proved
largely ineffective. Managers have been reluctant to fire unproductive workers
because of the current tight labor market and cumbersome grievance procedures.
Judging from Andropov's statements, additional measures to reinforce labor's
commitment to better job performance may be forthcoming.
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Czechs Provide
Armored Vehicle Hulls
to Soviets
the Rubtsovsk Agricultural Machinery Plant was producing BMP
efficiently run working relationship.
armored infantry combat vehicles that incorporated hulls produced in Czechoslo-
vakia. The hull producer is believed to be the Construction Equipment and
Armored Vehicle Plant in Detva, Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia and Poland
have supplied completed armored vehicles to the Soviet Union in the past, but this
is the first known instance of a non-Soviet major subassembly being integrated into
a Soviet-produced armored vehicle. The time between the production of an
individual hull in Czechoslovakia and its final assembly into a BMP in Rubtsovsk
is very short, suggesting that the two facilities have a well-coordinated and
Soviets Warming Up Soviet officials and media have begun to give cautious support to the Contadora
to Contadora Effort = group-Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, and Colombia-by saying it is trying to
achieve "a just settlement of the conflict in the region." In May Mexico had
sought the USSR's endorsement of the group's role and objectives, but Foreign
Minister Gromyko said then that Moscow's endorsement might cause an adverse
US reaction. The change follows Cuban and Nicaraguan endorsements of the
Contadora effort.
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USSR-China: Joint
Inspections on
Border Rivers
and in Mexico and Costa Rica by roving Ambassador Mendelevich.
The Soviet attitude probably shifted as a result of growing concern about US
reactions to the Central American situation. Moscow may see the effort as a way
to check US activities that it believes could threaten the Sandinista regime and in-
crease chances for a US-Cuban or US-Soviet confrontation in the region. The
USSR could be moving toward a more direct and authoritative statement
following talks in Nicaragua by Soviet Foreign Ministry Secretary General Fokin
USSR and China have reached an agreement on
operations.
conducting joint inspections of shipping channels and navigational markers along
their border rivers. The agreement was taken into account on 22 July, when a dis-
pute over the placement of navigational markers on the Ussuri River was referred
to the joint inspection teams for resolution. An earlier agreement, reached in early
June, allows both sides to send work parties across the border for survey
insisting on addressing the major security issues impeding normalization.
The two agreements indicate that the USSR and China are seeking to cooperate
on routine border river matters despite the broad political problems that still divide
them. Moscow may hope that their conclusion could portend bilateral discussion of
its proposal for confidence-building measures to ease tensions along the disputed
border. Beijing has refused thus far to discuss such measures, however, and is
Grain Harvest With the grain-harvesting campaign in the final stages, it still appears likely that
Nearing Completion the USSR will produce about 210 million tons of grain this year-the best showing
since the 1978 record of 237 million tons. According to data released by the
Central Statistical Administration on 17 September, 100.8 million hectares, more
than 80 percent of the total area, had been cut. Except for recent delays caused by
rainfall in the northernmost parts of the grain region, this year's harvest has
proceeded at an unusually brisk pace. Moreover, the Soviet press indicates that the
quality of grain harvested thus far is much improved over last year. While grain
quality in the wet areas yet to be harvested probably will be somewhat poorer, cur-
rent weather patterns suggest that Soviet farmers should be able to complete the
harvest with little loss in quality.
grain procurement data also point toward a good crop this
year. Postharvest analysis of straw dumps indicates that actual grain yields
correspond closely with those estimated earlier in the crop season. Preliminary
grain procurement data from about one-third of the grain-growing oblasts indicate
that procurement plans have been fulfilled in several major growing areas.
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Far East
on Sakhalin Island where the SU-15 Flagon that shot down the Korean airliner is
The Soviet air defense posture in the Far East has stiffened since the shootdown of
the KAL airliner, and this probably caused the deliveries
demonstrating Soviet concern over
improving Japanese, US, and Chinese air capabilities in the area.
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Viewpoint
The views expressed in the following article are the author's; they do not
necessarily represent a CIA consensus.
Did the Soviets Deceive the
United States During the
SALT I Negotiations?
At several crucial points in the SALT I negotiations
for an offensive forces agreement, the Soviets are
alleged to have deceived the United States about
strategic capabilities that they had then or soon would
have. By taking advantage of US uncertainties about
their programs and by bargaining sharply about the
wording of several provisions, they are supposed to
have preserved their own ICBM and SLBM deploy-
ment plans from significant qualitative and quantita-
tive restraints. The result of their efforts is said to
have been an Interim Agreement on Offensive Forces
that was essentially compatible with their previously
The United States tried three negotiating approaches
to constrain Soviet missiles: first, a limit on the
number of heavy ICBMs that each side could possess;
second, a definition of a heavy ICBM that would
prevent the replacement of light missiles with heavy
ones; and third, a ban on increases in the dimensions
of silo launchers. During the negotiations, the Soviets
rejected the idea of incorporating explicit restrictions
on the numbers of light and heavy ICBMs into the
written agreement, although they accepted an obliga-
tion not to replace light ICBMs with heavy ones
during the process of modernization.
planned strategic offensive programs.
This article will examine the three most frequently
cited examples of.alleged Soviet deceptive behavior
during the SALT I negotiations. Through analysis of
the negotiating record and weapons development pro-
grams, it will endeavor to determine whether Soviet
conduct was marked by deliberate and consistent
misrepresentation of the issues or merely by sharp,
tough bargaining.
SS-19
A major US goal in the SALT I negotiations was to
limit the capability of the Soviets to attack and
destroy the Minuteman land-based ICBM force.
When negotiations began in 1969, the major threat to
US silos was posed by the "heavy" SS-9, a missile
that carried an extremely large warhead capable of
destroying a Minuteman launcher in spite of its
The Soviets also did not accept the US proposal to
define a heavy ICBM as a missile with a volume
greater than 70 cubic meters-the volume of the
"light" SS-11. They argued that the sides knew which
missiles were light and which were heavy through the
use of national technical means of verification. They
also said that a definition which permitted no increase
in the size of future missiles would be inconsistent
with other provisions that permitted modernization
and replacement.
Soviet negotiators were reluctant to ban any increases
in the dimensions of silo launchers, arguing that in the
process of modernization the sides might find it
necessary to make "certain insignificant alterations"
to them. One Soviet also noted that the size of a
launcher could be changed without making any
relatively poor accuracy.
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change in the size of a missile, and that the capabili-
ties of a missile could be changed without altering its
size. Such criteria, he continued, were therefore im-
perfect for distinguishing between light and heavy
missiles
Prior to May 1972, the US Intelligence Community
knew that the Soviets were developing several new
ICBMs, but virtually no flight test data on their
characteristics and sizes were available. The Commu-
nity estimated that a new missile in the SS-11 class,
but somewhat larger, was being developed and would
be fired from retrofitted SS-11 silos. While we had
indications that this missile (subsequently designated
the SS-19) could be launched from a canister of about
the same diameter as that used for the SS-11, we did
not know the diameter or length of the new missile
itself or, therefore, its volume.
The Soviets made clear during the negotiations that
they disagreed with the US-proposed definition of a
heavy missile and, while they did not discuss details
relating to the SS-19, were careful to oppose US
proposals that were inconsistent with its characteris-
tics. When a US adviser asked a Soviet in December
1971 if he would consider a 90-cubic-meter missile to
be in the "heavy" category (which was the US view),
his Soviet counterpart replied in the negative. Another
Soviet adviser expressed dismay with a US proposal to
define a heavy ICBM as a missile with a volume more
than 5 percent greater than that of the largest light
ICBM.
The Soviets had their own view of acceptable criteria
to distinguish between light and heavy missiles. One
of their advisers at SALT told a US colleague in
February 1972 that the dividing point should be
halfway between the volumes of the largest existing
missiles of both types, and that this point could be
determined by national technical means. F
1972 that the USSR had one, and perhaps two,
missiles of different dimensions under design as re-
placements for the SS-11 and intimated that testing
of these systems had already begun. He also said that
the volumes of these new missiles would fall below the
halfway point between current light and heavy
ICBMs. He acknowledged to his US interlocutor that
the "modernized SS-1 l" would be less than 140 cubic
meters, a number which he said was "not too far"
from the midpoint between the SS-11 and the SS-9.
Since the Soviets had endorsed the idea of a freeze on
construction of silo launchers from the beginning of
the negotiations, it was obvious that most, if not all, of
these replacement missiles would have to be deployed
in SS-11 silos.
Prior to the 1972 summit, therefore, the Soviets had
given US negotiators several indicators of their own
views on this subject. They had mentioned a criterion
for distinguishing between light and heavy ICBMs,
had indicated a likely size for the SS-19 that fell
within this framework, had suggested the extent of its
deployment, and had intimated that production of the
system was already under way. Even at the end of the
negotiations, when the United States placed a "unilat-
eral statement" in the formal SALT record that
defined a heavy missile as one "significantly greater
than the largest light ICBM now operational on either
side," the Soviets submitted a response that noted that
the subject had been discussed at length and that no
understanding had been reached. Moscow's position,
therefore, was consistently firm in reflecting a major
disagreement with the US side on this subject and did
not reflect an approach requiring deliberate and
consistent misleading of the United States.
Asymmetrical Ceilings
During the SALT I negotiations, the Soviets argued
that the US forward-area submarine bases permitted
US nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to
remain within firing range of the USSR a greater
percentage of time than Soviet submarines could
remain within range of the United States. The Soviets
also argued that the deployment of SLBM subma-
rines by Great Britain and France added to US
capabilities despite any direct limits on US forces.
Although taciturn regarding their new ICBM pro-
grams, the Soviets did not describe them falsely. A
senior Soviet negotiator told a US delegate in May
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Implications
The negotiating record, therefore, appears to show
that the Soviets practiced sharp and tough bargaining
on all of these issues but did not engage in deliberate
and consistent misrepresentation. They left it up to
the United States to learn enough about the USSR's
programs to negotiate effective limitations, did not
volunteer information readily, and did not correct US
ignorance or misperceptions when they worked to
Moscow's advantage. The Soviets were firm in setting
forth areas of disagreement with the United States
and negotiated vigorously to protect programs that
they considered important. They considered them-
selves obligated to comply with only those limitations
to which they had explicitly consented.
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