USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T01083R000100070003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
1UP
SOV UR 83-007JX
June
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
table of contents.
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome. They may be
directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the
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Contents
The Soviet Space Perspective
Program for the 1980s
Soviet interest in space has increased in the 1980s, with the
emphasis on enhancing military capabilities and increasing econom-
ic benefits. More advanced reconnaissance, navigation, and commu-
nications satellites, space-based weapons, and a series of manned
space stations are being developed to support a broad range of
objectives. The profusion of new spacecraft, launch vehicles, and
support facilities implies significant growth in cost during the early
1980s. However, much of the current interest, especially in the
manned program, may be diminished if the Soviets fail to complete
development of the requisite large launch vehicles.
In the first half of the 1980s the Soviets will develop and launch
more costly and more advanced space systems than they have since
they began to devote resources to space exploration. The dollar cost
(in constant prices) of research and development, hardware procure-
ment, and associated support-about $13 billion in 1981-is expect-
ed to almost double by 1986.
Prospects for Soviet Space-Based Weapons
The Soviets are developing space-based weapons using advanced
technological concepts, but deployment of these systems is still many
years away. In the meantime we expect the Soviets to continue to
upgrade their current antisatellite system-their only operational
space-based weapon.
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Prospects for Soviet Commercial Exploitation of Space Systems and 21
Related Services)
Moscow has clearly indicated its intention to compete for a share of
the growing international market for space systems and related
services. Although current Soviet marketing efforts are focused on
satellite launch and communications services, space-based manufac-
turing may ultimately prove the area in which the USSR enjoys the
greatest advantage over Western competitors.
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The Pope's visit to Poland highlights a problem that is likely to
become increasingly troublesome to the Soviets in coming years:
how to limit the challenge of the East European churches to
Communist ideology and political domination while being forced
more and more to depend on them to moderate discontent
The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies are in the early stages of a
modernization program to improve the combat capabilities of their
older tanks-the T-54s, T-55s, T-62s, and early model T-72s. We
estimate that the program will be completed in the early 1990s and
will cost about $11.5 billion-roughly one-third of what it would
cost to replace these tanks with the latest Soviet models.
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Problems in Integrating Automated Control Systems Into the Soviet 43
Economy
Faced with declining economic growth rates and a tightening labor
supply, the Soviet leadership has increasingly emphasized the use of
automated systems throughout the economy as a means of increas-
ing efficiency both in the planning process and in the management
of enterprises. Automation has not been successful, largely because
of the serious lack of qualified programers and the resistance to
computerization on the part of senior plant-level managers.
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Outlook for Soviet Grain Crop
Third Soviet Aircraft Carrier Operational
Soviet-Mexican Technical Cooperation
Soviets Seek Larger Presence in Spain
Skilled Manpower Shortage in Siberia
Efforts To Improve Mobilization Capabilities
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The Soviet Space Program
for the 1980s
Perspective I 25X1
The Soviet space program is enjoying a period of rapid growth similar to
that observed during the 1960s. Today, however, the emphasis is on
practical applications of technology to support intelligence and military
operations and provide economic benefits-rather than, as in the early
years, on programs designed primarily to enhance national prestige. The
Soviets view space as another theater for military operations and as a
workshop for developing and manufacturing new materials and hardware,
as well as a showcase for Soviet capabilities.
During the 1960s and into the early 1970s, the space program grew
rapidly, initially to demonstrate to the Soviet people and the world the
technological capability and potential strength of the Soviet Union. Many
missions were launched primarily to provide a series of space "firsts" and
to upstage US programs or were timed to support celebrations of interna-
tional Communist solidarity. In spite of Soviet statements concerning the
peaceful uses of space, the military quickly recognized the benefits of using
spacecraft for strategic reconnaissance, global communications, and naval
support. As early as 1962, a Vostok spacecraft, developed for the first
manned flights, had been converted to a photographic reconnaissance
satellite. The number of new military satellites increased steadily, and by
1975 more than 75 percent of the launches (and two-thirds of the cost) were
for military or military-related missions.
By the mid-1970s increasing economic problems and cancellation of the
SL-X- 15 booster development program, coupled with a series of highly
publicized failures in the expensive lunar and Mars programs, resulted in a
decline of projects involving only pure research and prestige. Emphasis
shifted from the lunar program to the expanded development of manned
space stations. Military spacecraft were launched in increasingly large
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SOV UR 83-007JX
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numbers, but most of this effort was devoted to maintaining the established
networks, and few new spacecraft were introduced. In general, dependence
on these vehicles to support day-to-day military operations remained low as
the Soviets continued to rely heavily on ground-based navigation. commu-
nications, and intelligence collection systems.
In the 1980s Soviet interest in space has increased-a record 107 satellites
were launched in 1982-with an emphasis on military and economic
benefits. During the decade we expect to see as many as 15 new satellites
which incorporate advanced technology to a greater degree than before in
an effort to improve satellite lifetimes, data transmission rates, and
The main goal of the manned space program in the 1980s is to establish
permanent manned complexes in space through a series of evolutionary
steps. The current phase is likely to involve docking multiple Cosmos
stations with a larger Salyut core to form a modular station for up to 12
cosmonauts. We believe that by 1990 the Soviets will launch a larger
permanent space station, with a habitable volume similar to the US
Skylab, followed in the 1990s by additional segments and modules which
would allow the station to accommodate over 20 cosmonauts. This complex
or space base would be serviced by the Soviet equivalent of the US space
shuttle.
All of the space stations to date have been used at least partly for tests of
military hardware, and some have served almost exclusively as military test
beds and reconnaissance platforms. The military roles of the new, larger
stations are expected to include reconnaissance, ocean surveillance, and
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possibly military space system research, development, testing, and evalua-
tion (RDT&E). These stations will also be used as workshops and
laboratories for materials processing and manufacturing to upgrade key
industries such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, and metallurgy; for relay-
ing Earth-resources and weather data; and as engineering bases for
servicing other satellites, constructing even larger structures, or assembling
spacecraft for eventual travel to other planets
In contrast to the US manned program, which currently is based on one ve-
hicle-the space shuttle-the Soviet manned program appears to be
planned around a variety of new vehicles now under development, includ-
ing a shuttle (apparently similar to the US system), a reusable space plane
similar to the planned but never flown US Dyna Soar, a series of space sta-
tions of increasing size, a broad range of crew ferry and resupply vehicles,
and probably a space tug. Two new launch vehicles-the first to use high-
energy, liquid hydrogen propellents-also are expected to be used to
support this ambitious development program.
In addition to developing new spacecraft and launch vehicles, the Soviets
are expanding the design bureaus, production facilities, assembly and
checkout buildings, and launch complexes associated with the space
program. At least two and possibly three new space support ships and other
tracking stations are being constructed to support future programs. This
more carefully planned, systematic progression contrasts sharply with the
crash programs of the early years, which resulted in a series of highly
publicized failures, and is indicative of high-level, long-range commitment
to the space program.
The profusion of spacecraft and launch vehicles necessary to support the
manned effort is one of the major factors in the rapid cost growth projected
for the 1980s, as noted in the lead article. Another factor is the large
number of new navigation and communications satellites to increase the
effectiveness of conventional and strategic forces. A series of advanced
lunar and planetary probes will be used, in addition to the manned
program, to enhance prestige abroad through a series of spectacular
"firsts." Improved Earth-resources, oceanographic, and weather satellites
are expected to provide increased economic benefits by locating promising
areas for mineral and gas exploration, pinpointing fish concentrations, and
producing accurate crop condition reports and harvest forecasts. Moreover,
Moscow has clearly indicated its intention to compete for a share of the
growing international market for space services. Although current market-
ing efforts are focused on satellite launch and communications services,
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materials processing in space may ultimately prove the area where the
USSR enjoys an advantage over Western competitors (see the article on
the prospects for Soviet commercial exploitation of space systems and
related services)
Estimated overall Soviet space program costs (for RDT&E, procurement,
and operations) are expected to rise from $13 billion in 1981 to almost
twice that amount by 1986. However, several of the new programs-
especially the new photographic satellite, shuttle, large space station, and
large planetary probes-are heavily dependent on the successful develop-
ment of the two new launch vehicles employing liquid hydrogen. Much of
the current renewed emphasis and resource commitment may again be
diminished if the Soviets fail to successfully develop these more advanced
launch vehicles.
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Trends in Soviet
Space Programs
The Soviets have an ambitious and costly space
program designed to support intelligence and military
operations and provide economic benefits. Objectives
include a permanent manned presence in space, im-
proved photoreconnaissance, data retrieval, missile
launch detection, ocean surveillance, and antiship
targeting, and expansion and replacement of existing
satellite networks.
Prospectus for the 1980s
In the first half of the 1980s the Soviets will develop
and launch more costly and more advanced space
systems than they have since they began to devote
resources to space exploration. The cost of research
and development (R&D), hardware procurement, and
associated support is projected to rise from $13 billion
in 1981 (roughly the same as the US total) to almost
twice that amount by 1986.' The Soviets are devoting
substantial resources to several comprehensive pro-
grams to:
? Expand considerably their man-in-space effort.
This program to create in space a workplace for
military and economic purposes will include a space
transportation system, a permanent space station,
and possibly a space tug to support the space station
and to transfer satellites from one orbit to another.
' Dollar estimates represent what it would cost to replicate Soviet
development and procurement of space systems in the United
States and then launch and operate the systems as the Soviets
would. Data are in constant 1981 US dollars. Because our cost
estimates cover only those existing or planned programs for which
we have evidence, they may understate overall program costs. F_
? Ensure rapid communications. Several new commu-
nications payloads-sharing a common spacecraft
platform-will provide faster, more reliable com-
mand and control over civil aircraft, ships, and
military units.
? Explore the frontiers of space. The Soviets intend to
launch a Venus radar mapping mission in 1983 and
two spacecraft in 1984 to deploy landers on Venus
en route to a rendezvous with Halley's Comet in
1986. They also intend to launch a lunar polar
orbiter and a lunar soil sampler for analysis of soil
from the dark side of the Moon. A manned flight to
Mars is under consideration.
lites.
Soviet Space Costs
During the period 1965-75 the Soviet space program
emphasized the maintenance of multisatellite commu-
nications and intelligence networks and the develop-
ment of the large SL-X-15,2 the Saturn V-class space
launch vehicle (SLV) designed to place a man on the
Moon. Estimated total costs rose at an average annual
rate of about 9 percent-from $7.5 billion in 1965 to
$12 billion in 1970. After 1971 annual space costs
declined somewhat but remained at about $10 billion
until 1974, when the manned lunar program was
canceled because of the failure of the SL-X-15 space
booster. The resulting abrupt decline in R&D costs
brought a reduction in overall costs despite an in- 25X1
crease in procurement costs, mainly for military satel-
Since 1978 Soviet space costs have shown renewed
growth as the emphasis has been redirected to
manned space stations. A variety of new programs,
including a follow-on to the SL-X- 15, development
work on a large space station, and new intelligence,
communications, and scientific satellites, have pushed
costs to new highs. Estimated total costs have doubled
from $10 billion in 1978 to a projected $20 billion in
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1983 for an average annual increase of 15 percent.
After 1983 growth is expected to be less rapid,
perhaps averaging about 6 percent a year through
1986.
Space R&D Costs
The largest part of the current growth in the Soviet
space effort is in the area of research and develop-
ment. Estimated R&D costs will rise from $4 billion
in 1981 to about $9 billion in 1984. They are expected
to increase less rapidly over the next several years
before declining slightly with the completion or near
completion of several programs.
Space Launch Vehicles. About 60 percent of project-
ed Soviet space R&D costs in the 1981-86 period are
associated with the development of new medium- and
heavy-lift launch vehicles. The heavy-lift vehicle, ex-
pected to be operational in 1986 or 1987, will be
capable of placing in orbit the Soviet version of the
US space shuttle orbiter, a Skylab-sized space station,
and planetary probes. The medium-lift vehicle, pro-
jected to be operational by early 1984, probably will
be used for the space plane now under development
and possibly for advanced reconnaissance satellites
and R&D flights of a space-based laser. Successful
development of the heavy-lift launcher is critical to
the pace of the Soviet space effort because existing
SLVs cannot lift the large spacecraft under develop-
ment.
Manned Systems. The other major cause of cost
growth in Soviet space R&D is the increased emphasis
on the development of manned systems: The Soviets
have under way a long-term program to establish a
The permanent manned space station that will suc-
ceed the modular station is expected to accommodate
12 to 20 crewmen. A new resupply vehicle based on
technology of the Cosmos 929 vehicle is also being
developed for use with the permanent space station.
The station may eventually be expanded to form a
space base for more than 20 cosmonauts.
Unmanned Systems. R&D costs devoted to unmanned
space systems are expected to remain relatively level
and represent a small percentage of total R&D costs.
For example, we estimate that in the 1981-86 period
they will represent only 14 percent of total R&D
costs, whereas R&D for manned systems will account
for 25 percent and SLVs for 60 percent of the total.
Nevertheless, the $1.2-1.5 billion annual costs in this
area will enable the Soviets to develop a greater
variety of unmanned satellites to aid in communica-
tions, intelligence, and oceanographic and Earth-
resources research as well as in military missions such
as radar calibration, command and control, timely
Space Hardware Costs
We estimate that Soviet space hardware procurement
costs, after remaining relatively constant throughout
the 1970s at $5-6 billion per year, will almost double
by 1986.
Manned Missions. The renewed emphasis on manned
programs will raise the hardware costs of these pro-
grams from about 9 percent of space procurement in
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1965-68 to almost 20 percent in 1983-86. As an
example of the magnitude of these programs, the cost
to procure, launch, and operate the small modular
manned station is estimated to be about $1 billion
with an additional $300-500 million required annually
to man and resupply the station
Communications. The proliferation of Soviet commu-
nications networks for both civil communications and
military command and control will generate steadily
increasing costs, which by the 1983-86 period could
amount to about one-fifth of space hardware costs. By
the mid-1980s, these satellites will provide global
military communications to aircraft, ships, and
ground forces as well as increased television and
common-carrier communications capability. F__1
Scientific, Lunar, and Planetary Missions. Soviet
emphasis on scientific, lunar, and planetary missions
declined in the late 1970s as a result of the aborted
lunar programs. According to Soviet announcements
and other sources, the USSR plans a resurgence in
this area that will include the unmanned Venus and
lunar missions mentioned earlier in this article and
space-based telescopes. The total program probably
will account for about 13 percent of hardware costs in
the 1983-86 period
Other Military Support. Costs for military support
satellites that provide navigation support, collect
weather data, and calibrate large ABM radars have
remained small over time, accounting for about 10
percent of growing space hardware costs.
Antisatellite Systems. We estimate the cost and the
share of antisatellite systems in total space hardware
costs will be less than 5 percent in the 1983-86 period.
Implications
The Soviet space program preempts a growing share
of the nation's most modern production and R&D
facilities and many of its finest scientific, engineering,
and managerial talents. In light of current economic
difficulties, we believe this program is subject to
intensive review. But Soviet leaders evidently believe
that the economic, military, and prestige payoffs from
the civilian and military space programs justify the
substantial costs. Nowhere is this more clear than in
the efforts to establish a permanent, continuously
manned, orbiting space station. For example, the
Soviets intend to manufacture pharmaceuticals, elec-
tronic devices, optical equipment, and metal alloys
aboard the space station. Manufacture of these items
in the absence of gravity, in some cases, results in
enhanced physical properties. These manufacturing
experiments have been publicized as having economic
value, but they probably will have direct military
applications as well. Although we are uncertain as to
the military experiments to be undertaken on the
space station, the Soviets are likely to pursue research
in submarine, aircraft, and missile launch detection,
space-based weapons, and other important defensive
and offensive missions
The investment in space in the 1980s will have a
significant impact in the coming decades on Soviet
scientific and technological advancement. The Soviets
appear determined to gain an edge over their competi-
tors in space and appear to be willing to devote
considerable resources toward that end.
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Prospects for Soviet
Space-Based Weapons
The early successes of Soviet and US space programs
demonstrated the potential for developing and deploy-
ing a variety of offensive and defensive weapons that
could alter the strategic balance. As a consequence,
the Soviets over the past two decades have incorporat-
ed space-based weapons into their doctrine and plan-
ning for strategic operations. A nonnuclear antisatel-
lite (ASAT) system with a limited intercept capability
has been their only success to date. At the same time,
Moscow has proffered a series of initiatives on arms
US potential to develop orbital conventional and
nuclear weapons. The Soviet ASAT program during
the 1960s had its own sponsor-induced momentum
but was also spurred by US military-oriented pro-
grams such as reconnaissance satellites and by means
for satellite inspection such as the manned orbiting
laboratory.
control in space' and since 1977 has consistently
criticized US "militarization" of space.
Recent Soviet statements reflect Moscow's concern
over prospective changes in the military balance in
space. Increased US spending for military space
programs, the recent creation of a US space com-
mand, the proclamation of a US space doctrine, and
the success of the space shuttle, in particular, have
heightened Soviet awareness of US advances that
have potential application to space weaponry. We
expect the Soviets to continue their efforts to perfect
technology for advanced-concept, space-based weap-
ons while at the same time pressing for a ban on
space-based weapons of all types to halt or slow down
US weapons development.
ASAT development was prob-
' The United States and the Soviet Union were able to agree on the
1967 Outer Space Treaty, which banned nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction in space. In 1978-79 the two countries engaged
in negotiations to limit ASAT weapons. In 1981 and 1982, at the
UN, the Soviets proposed a treaty to ban all weapons in space and a
resumption of the ASAT talks.
Future Directions in Space Weapons Technology
For at least the past 15 years, the Soviet military has
funded basic and applied research in directed-energy
weapons concepts such as high-energy lasers, particle
beams, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generating
devices. Of the three, the high-energy laser (HEL)
approach appears most feasible for a space-based
weapon. In a strategic context, HEL weapons would
be best suited for defensive roles (ASAT and air and
ballistic missile defense), and we believe that the
ASAT role is the most likely near-term objective of
Soviet HEL efforts. Because of their fragility and
orbital predictability, satellites are more vulnerable to
laser radiation than targets such as bombers and
ICBM or SLBM boosters. Moreover, if based in
' In this context, weapon will be defined to include only those space-
based systems assessed as having the ability to degrade, damage, or
destroy a space-based, airborne, or ground-based target.
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space, a laser would not be hampered by the adverse
propagation conditions that exist in the atmosphere. It
would have several potential advantages over the
existing Soviet orbital interceptor:
? It would not be limited to a single target and would
have a longer range.
? Attack warning time would be reduced to near zero.
? It would have a better capability against maneuver-
ing target satellites.
An ASAT weapon might be only the first of a number
of applications for Soviet space-based lasers. The
Soviets may attempt to use the experience and tech-
nology gained from development of the ASAT system
to develop an HEL system for ballistic missile defense
(BMD). However, the requirements for continuous
coverage by launch-detection systems and the large
numbers of satellites and launchers required to ensure
the rapid destruction of missiles make BMD the most
difficult and costly of potential space-based HEL
applications.'
Status of HEL Development
The Soviet military has been sponsoring HEL re-
search since at least 1969. The 24th Communist Party
Congress issued directives for continued growth of the
HEL program and designated it as a high national
priority for the 1971-75 plan.
We believe that the USSR's HEL efforts remain in a
stage the Soviets call scientific research work (NIR)
and that no funding has yet been. committed to a
weapon development program. The length of NIR,
coupled with the observable resources dedicated to it,
reflects the technical complexity of the effort and
underscores Soviet determination to demonstrate fea-
sibility and proceed toward an operating HEL weap-
on
In addition to perfecting an HEL or a particle-beam
device, the Soviets must demonstrate their mastery of
acquisition, tracking, and pointing (ATP) technology
before they can begin developing a weapon. We have
little information on Soviet ATP capabilities, particu-
larly for space-based systems. However, on the basis
of our assessment of their ATP-related technologies,
we estimate that the Soviets could now have the
capability to track a target precisely enough for some
ASAT applications and may achieve the necessary
accuracies for development of a space-based HEL
BMD weapon by 1990.
The Soviets probably have the capability to build an
acquisition system based on existing radar, optical, or
infrared technologies, but the extreme target tracking
accuracy demanded by a laser weapon in any strategic
defensive role will require the use of an electro-optical
precision tracker.
logical deficiencies
We believe that
the Soviets are continuing acquisition, tracking, and
pointing NIR aimed at overcoming design or techno-
`Scientific research work or NIR (nauchno-issledovatelskaya
rabota) is basic and applied research conducted preparatory to the
funding of a weapon development program. NIR includes: (a)
investigating new concepts, (b) developing and testing experimental
devices to verify technology, (c) completing a preliminary system
design, and (d) transferring technological expertise to a system
design organization if a weapon development program is autho-
rized. The funded development program, known as experimental
design work or OKR (opytno-konstruktorskaya rabota), involves
the complete, detailed design of a weapon system, including all of
its subsystems and-after the approval of the design-full-scale
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Outlook
Prospects for Continued Development of ASA T Ca-
pabilities. The longstanding Soviet commitment to
orbital ASAT development and directed-energy re-.
search indicates a strong desire to develop and deploy
space-based ASAT weapons. We expect the USSR to
continue efforts to improve its orbital interceptor not
only for potential operational use, but also as a hedge
against development and deployment of technological-
ly superior US systems. It is possible that an improved
orbital interceptor will be operationally maintained
well beyond the availability of a space-based HEL
weapon to ensure a reliable, redundant ASAT capa-
bility. This would be especially important as both the
US and USSR increase their reliance on space sys-
tems for intelligence gathering, navigation, and com-
mand, control, and communications.
Future Space Systems Availability. Prospects for the
deployment of advanced-concept, space-based weap-
ons such as HELs and particle beams are uncertain.
Historically, weapon availability has been difficult to
predict when viewed solely in terms of technological
capabilities or advancements. Efforts to assess the
status and measure the progress of Soviet HEL
projects have been complicated because of the diffi-
culty of distinguishing devices built solely to demon-
strate technological feasibility from those developed
Development of HEL weapons will begin once appro-
priate technologies have been demonstrated and veri-
fied. Typically, it takes 10 to 12 years to bring a
Soviet space system from initial design through proto-
type construction and flight-testing and into series
we estimate that a Soviet space-based HEL ASAT
could be in development for 15 or more years. We
would expect more ambitious applications of space-
based HELs or the development of a particle beam
weapon to take even longer.
Moreover, we would expect production rates to be
very low because of the labor-intensive method of
assembly, competition with other systems in develop-
ment, and hardware complexity. A low production
rate would preclude the timely deployment of an
effective space-based laser or particle beam ballistic
missile defense requiring tens or hundreds of satel-
lites.
By the mid-to-late 1980s, a new generation of Soviet
space launch vehicles, including a space shuttle, will
probably be available to support the development and
deployment of a space-based laser ASAT. The shuttle
will probably be used to test individual components
and subsystems prior to their integration. New heavy-
lift launch vehicles will allow the Soviets to incorpo-
rate heavier but more reliable off-the-shelf technology
in the system design. Hence, the use of mid-1980s
technology probably will provide the basis for deploy-
ment of an operational system before the year 2000.
Prospects for Deployment of Future Systems. We
expect that a Soviet space-based laser ASAT proto-
type probably could be launched by the mid-1990s.
We expect this first system to be a modest effort that,
once launched, will undergo several years of flight-
testing before becoming operational. Even after the
system is declared operational, the Soviets will proba-
bly continue testing modified or upgraded versions as
incremental improvements to their overall capability.
tems.
Soviet progress toward more ambitious applications of
directed energy will also be achieved incrementally.
An operational space-based HEL weapon for air or
ballistic missile defense roles probably will not be
available before the year 2000. Lengthy flight-testing
will be required to ensure a high degree of system
reliability. Once declared operational, the pace of
deployment will depend on the USSR's ability to
produce a relatively large number of satellites and on
the availability of launch vehicles and support sys-
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Prospects for Soviet
Commercial Exploitation
of Space Systems and
Related Services
Moscow has clearly indicated its intention to compete
for a share of the growing international market for
space systems and related services and products. Its
current marketing efforts are focused primarily on
satellite launch and communications services, where
its capabilities are expected to increase steadily in the
next 10 years and where it already is attempting to
underprice Western competitors. Because the USSR
is the world's leader in experiments on materials
processing in space, the manufacture of pharmaceuti-
cals, electronic devices, optical equipment, and other
products in space may ultimately prove the area
where it enjoys the greatest advantage over Western
competitors.
Soviet Incentives and Disincentives To Compete
Moscow has both financial and political incentives to
make commercial use of its space systems and capa-
bilities. Although there is great uncertainty as to the
eventual size of the market for space-related services
and products, Western space and industry analysts
estimate that the launching and manufacturing of
communications satellites alone will yield billions of
dollars of revenues a year by the late 1980s. Captur-
ing a share of this market would provide the USSR
with an important supplement to its other hard cur-
rency earnings. Moscow also would probably perceive
activity in space-related trade as a means of getting a
foot in the door for other Soviet high-technology
products. The Soviets would value the access to
Western space technology that might result from
Western use of Soviet launch services and almost
certainly would view commercial exploitation of space
as a means of increasing their national prestige and
influence.
Entry into the commercial market, however, will
require some changes in Soviet operating procedures.
Customers will need to know satellite capabilities,
obtain reliability data for launch vehicles, and require
access to satellite construction, launch, and support
facilities. Even when involved in joint space ventures,
the Soviets have often refused to provide information
requested by the other participating country. They
have never released data on the reliability of their
launch vehicles, do not maintain separate civilian and
military space facilities, and have generally denied
foreign access to military areas
Soviet Intentions and Capabilities
Notwithstanding these drawbacks, the Soviets have
indicated their intentions to market space-based ser-
vices and are apparently increasing their capabilities
to do so. Moscow's marketing efforts and its prospects
for success vary greatly with the type of space-related
service or product.
Launch Services. To date commercial firms, interna-
tional organizations, and governments have looked to
the US Atlas-Centaur and Delta expendable launch
vehicles and the shuttle to launch satellites into orbit.
The Atlas-Centaur and the Delta, however, are sched-
uled to be phased out by 1985, and US space and
industry analysts estimate that the shuttle will not be
able to provide all the launches that will be demanded
by non-Communist countries during the period 1986-
94. A recent US decision will allow US private firms
to buy US expendable launch vehicles and rent US
launching pads. The firms will, however, need to
prove their capability before large segments of the
commercial market will be willing to book launches
with them. Commercial customers of the shuttle also
will have the lowest priority, behind the military and
other US Government agencies, and could be bumped
from scheduled launches, causing even those firms
that already have booked a shuttle flight to consider
alternate launch vehicles.
The shuttle's main Western competitor is the French
Ariane booster to be used by the European Space
Agency (ESA). It has not yet, however, flown a
successful operational mission. The Japanese also are
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LICENSINTORG
Panorama
No. 5 ? 1982
A quarterly publication
of VIO LICENSINTORG, Moscow, USSR.
Appears in English, Russian, Finnish, French, German and
Spanish.
All articles and illustrations in this issue may be freely repro-
duced. The Editors would appreciate a copy.
Cover Picture:
The achievements
of Soviet
scientists
and designers
in space research
are universally
known.
Licenstransmash
is ready to assist
foreign firms
in launching
their artificial
earth satellites
by Soviet
carrier rockets.
developing expendable boosters based on US technol-
ogy, but an agreement between Japan and the United
States stipulates that they will not be used for third-
party launches without US permission
The Soviets also have been trying to market satellite
launch services:
? In 1981 and again in 1983, according to an official
with the International Maritime Satellite Organiza-
tion (INMARSAT), the Soviets offered to supply
launch vehicles for INMARSAT satellites during
the period 1988-89.
? In mid-1982 Vladimir D. Shibaev, director of the
Soviet export-import firm for transport machine
building, reported in a journal article that his firm
had a new capability to provide satellite launch
services, indicated that the firm was "talking" with
ESA with hopes for positive results, and stated that
contacts had been made with other companies.
? Shibaev subsequently reported a Soviet commercial
agreement for launching an Indian remote sensing
satellite in 1986 and an "arrangement" to launch
the ESA MAREC-C satellite. He expressed the
USSR's interest in a large number of orders for
launch services now and for the next 10 years. F_
The Soviets have said they will enter the market with
the SL 12/13 Proton booster. It has maintained about
a 90-percent reliability rate over the past 10 years and
has a payload capacity only about 10 percent less than
that of the US shuttle.
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Soviet and US Space Transportation Systems
68
Height (m)
56
1,699,000
Lift-off Weight (kg)
2,026,000
26,450
Lift-off Thrust (kN)
30,500
75,400
In-Orbit Weight (kg)
97,700
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the USSR is apparently capable of doing sq
While there is no evidence of Soviet intentions to
manufacture satellites for foreign countries or firms,
Leasing International and Domestic Communication
Services. Since about 1980 the Soviet-sponsored
INTERSPUTNIK organization has begun to com-
pete with the US-sponsored International Communi-
cations Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) in mar-
keting international communications services in the
Third World. INTERSPUTNIK, which has primari-
ly served the needs of nine Soviet Bloc members, is
smaller than INTELSAT, which currently provides
services to more than 120 countries. It is willing,
however, to undercut INTELSAT's prices. A satellite
voice circuit like that INTELSAT offers for $20,000
a year, for example, may be leased from
INTERSPUTNIK for $12,000
In 1983 INTERSPUTNIK concluded an agreement
to lease domestic communications services to India,
the first country not associated with INTERSPUT-
Manufacture of Satellites. Excluding Japanese and
Soviet Bloc requirements, US space analysts estimate
the total world demand for commercial communica-
tions satellites, including replacements, will be more
than 200 during the period 1983-95. Many of the
countries that will be contracting for communications
satellites are from the Third World and are not
capable of manufacturing satellites. Others are indus-
trialized nations that do not have space industries. In
addition to US firms, companies in at least six
Western countries can manufacture communications
Third World nations will not have communications
demands that require expensive, sophisticated satel-
lites. Although Soviet communications satellites
would have the cost edge initially, the life-cycle costs
would probably be higher. To date the lifetime of
Soviet communications satellites, however, has been
about two years as compared with an average of
approximately 10 years for Western satellites. Soviet
prices would need to be relatively much lower to offset
the increased costs incurred from frequent replace-
ments and the accompanying launch fees
ownership of ground receiving stations
Remote Sensing. Both industrial and developing coun-
tries are looking to data derived from remote sensing
satellites to locate mineral and energy resources, to
identify potential problems in such areas as agricul-
ture, for land-use studies, and for cartographic work.
Users can buy data in the form of a picture or a tape,
or own a receiving station for access to primary data
and pay a fee to the country that owns the satellite.
Countries concerned about national autonomy and
industrial espionage are leaning more toward national
Thus far the US Landsat program has provided most
of the data to consumers. Although the records of the
EROS Data Center and the NASA Goddard Distri-
bution Center indicate a relatively small primary
market-approximately $5.7 million per year in di-
rect sales-US industry and government analysts
estimate that there is a secondary market, which
could be as much as 50 percent greater. (Some users
obtain data from other users at a portion of the
original cost, or gratis.) The US commitment to
provide the data to both domestic and foreign users,
satellites or the associated ground stations
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however, does not extend beyond the mid-1980s.
Moreover, competition is expected in the later 1980s
from the French Spot program and from a Japanese
system.
In 1977 at the UN the Soviet Union publicly offered
to provide photographic services and data from outer
space to other countries and claimed that photographs
taken with up-to-date equipment onboard Soviet
spacecraft would satisfy the most exacting customers.
While this public offer has not been repeated, Mos-
cow may be delaying its marketing effort until it has
an operational system competitive with the US Land-
sat or the soon-to-be-operational French Spot system.
We believe Moscow's competitiveness will be helped
considerably when its multispectral scanning system
becomes operational in the mid-1980s. The Soviets'
massive mapping capabilities and competence to assist
developing countries in using the data, as well as their
policy of keeping the data from third countries' will
aid in marketing their remote sensing products. F_
There are indications that the development of remote
sensing equipment and techniques will be a Soviet-led
CEMA venture. For example, a March 1983 Eco-
nomic Gazette article describes CEMA efforts to
develop the technical equipment for the space seg-
ment of a remote sensing system and for the process-
ing, copying, and use of the data. The East Germans
are already marketing image processing equipment
and probably could not have made the decision to do
so without Soviet agreement.
Materials Processing. Experiments show that the zero
gravity of the space environment facilitates the manu-
facture of products that are difficult or impossible to
produce on Earth. The products most likely to be
produced in space are pharmaceuticals, electronic
devices, optical equipment, and metal alloys. Many of
these products will have important military as well as
commercial applications. Until permanent manufac-
turing facilities are established in space that can
produce materials of sufficient quantity, the potential
market cannot be estimated with confidence.
The Soviet Union is a strong supporter of regulating the dissemina-
tion of remote sensing data largely because of its concern over the
military significance of the data for those countries that do not have
Nations looking at the feasibility of space manufac-
turing include the Soviet Union, the United States,
France, West Germany, and Japan. The Europeans
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to their projects, and, in the case of Japan, space
manufacturing has been made a national priority.
Although some Western materials processing experi-
ments have been conducted, extensive experimenting
will not begin until the ESA-built Spacelab is orbited
for a week in late September 1983. There are plans
for private firms to begin manufacturing pharmaceu-
ticals onboard the shuttle by 1985, but the US
Government has no current plans for a permanent
space processing facility for the remainder of the
decade. The Japanese have no current capabilities for
permanent facilities, and a European facility is not
scheduled for launch until about 1986.
Soviet experiments in space manufacturing could give
the USSR an advantage over potential competitors
should it decide to commercialize its space-processed 25X1
products. The USSR has conducted the most exten-
sive experiments in this area onboard the Salyut 6 and
7 space stations. The Soviet press has claimed that
such experiments will lead to the creation of space-
based manufacturing facilities to produce pharmaceu-
ticals, semiconductors, alloys, and svecial glasses.
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Eastern Europe
The papal visit to Poland this month dramatizes a
problem that is likely to become increasingly trouble-
some to the Soviets over the next few years: how to
limit the role of the churches in Eastern Europe as
rivals to Communist ideology and potential seedbeds
for political opposition while having to depend in-
creasingly on them to moderate discontent arising
from frustrated consumer expectations and growing
pacifist sentiment.
Accommodation Despite Distrust
The Roman Catholic Church in Poland, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia and the Lutheran Church in East
Germany are the only broadly based institutions in
Eastern Europe that have preserved a significant
degree of independence under Communist rule.
Throughout the post-War period, the Soviets have
viewed the Catholic Church with antagonism and
barely concealed apprehension. They see the Church
not only as an ideological foe but as a focal point for
anti-Soviet and anti-Communist nationalism in sever-
al states of the region, and potentially in the Baltic,
Belorussian, and Ukrainian republics of the USSR.
The Soviets have also expressed concern that the
Church nurtures political opposition and is subject to
manipulation by forces in the West. These feelings
have crystallized most recently in Soviet charges that
the Church in Poland provided much of the impetus
for the independent trade union movement, Solidarity,
and for the opposition activity that has continued
under martial law.
Despite these misgivings, the Soviets have accepted
the modus vivendi that the East European regimes
have developed with the Church over the past three
decades, replacing the relentless oppression of the
Stalinist era. Moscow's acceptance has resulted large-
ly from its having recognized the difficulty and costs
of attempting to eliminate Church influence, but
experience has also shown, particularly in Poland, the
stabilizing role the Church can play in moderating
Moreover, Soviet acceptance of the varied patterns of
church-state relations among the respective East Eu-
ropean countries amounts to de facto acknowledge-
ment that policy toward the Church must be adapted
to local conditions. By the late 1970s, church-state
relations ranged from the strict control practiced in
Czechoslovakia to the near autonomy of the Polish
Church under Cardinal Wyszynski. The Vatican,
under Pope Paul VI, was pursuing a policy of Ostpoli-
tik designed to improve the lot of Soviet and East
European Catholics by seeking improved relations
with the Warsaw Pact regimes.
The Papal Succession and the Polish Crisis
The accession of John Paul II in October 1978 added
a new dimension to church-state relations in Eastern
Europe and provided abundant cause for heightened
Soviet anxiety. The new Pope's Slavic origins threat-
ened to arouse nationalist emotions and to intensify
interest in the Church, not only among his Polish
countrymen but in many other East European coun-
tries. Moreover, the political skills acquired during his
long tutelage under Cardinal Wyszynski and the vigor
with which he asserted his views suggested that he
would be a formidable adversary.
Despite misgivings hinted at privately by Soviet offi-
cials, Moscow nonetheless professed initially to see
positive aspects in the Pope's election. A Soviet
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Pope's early statements indicated an intention to
continue the effort of his predecessors to "normalize"
church-state relations in the "socialist" countries.
Moscow underscored its interest in the views of the
new pontiff by requesting a papal audience during
Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Italy in January
public demonstrations of opposition.
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The new Pope quickly demonstrated his intention to
pursue an aggressive policy toward the Eastern re-
gimes.
Meanwhile, a papal letter
addressed to the Hungarian primate, Cardinal Lekai,
and read in Catholic churches throughout Hungary,
appealed directly to Hungarian nationalism and im-
plied that the Hungarian Church should pursue a
more confrontational policy toward the government.
Of the Pope's early initiatives, the one which caused
Moscow the greatest concern was his triumphant visit
to Poland in June 1979. A Soviet commentary on the
visit spoke of the "duality" in Vatican policy toward
the East: while abandoning in some measure its
former anti-Communism, the Church was seeking to
extend its influence among the masses, and some
Polish clerics wanted to use the visit for "antistate"
goals. the Foreign
Ministry in Moscow subsequently concluded that,
although the Pope's calls for relaxation of internal
tension were constructive, the visit had a generally
negative effect on the political situation
The crisis that began in Poland a year after the papal
visit was perhaps the most frustrating problem the
Soviets have confronted in Eastern Europe, not least
because it resulted in a new level of dependence upon
the Church to prevent a breakdown of order that
could have required Soviet military intervention.
When the Polish regime appeared unable in the late
summer of 1980 to suppress the growing opposition
movement, the Soviets took the unprecedented step of
appealing directly to the Vatican. After initiating
contact in September 1980, the Soviets kept the Pope
apprised of their concern and repeatedly sought his
intercession with the leaders of Solidarity on behalf of
moderation. Cooperation was particularly close dur-
ing the critical period of March-April 1981. During
this time, Soviet propaganda avoided direct ctiticism
Since the imposition of martial law in December
1981, the Soviets have been more willing to criticize
the Polish Church publicly, particularly the alleged
support by some clerics of continued opposition activi-
ty. Nonetheless, the Soviets consented, at least tacitly,
to the papal visit.
economic sanctions
the regime in Warsaw had succeeded by early March
in convincing Moscow that the Pope's visit would
contribute to internal stability. The Soviets probably
hope too that it will bring about an easing of Western
The Challenge Elsewhere
While the activity and influence of the Polish Catho-
lic Church will remain of greatest concern to the
Soviets, there is growing potential for a clash of
interests between church and state elsewhere in East-
ern Europe.
In East Germany, the Lutheran and Catholic
Churches are the only religious institutions enjoying
widespread legitimacy. The Lutheran Church, which
comprises up to 60 percent of the population, has
criticized the regime publicly on several issues in
recent years. The most sensitive of these issues, from
the Soviet perspective, are those relating to pacifist
themes. The Church's efforts to persuade the authori-
ties to moderate their policies on mandatory military
training for East German youth and on possible
alternative service for conscientious objectors have
grown into a widespread though limited sponsorship
of East Germany's large, unofficial peace movement.
additional intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
Although the Soviets have not commented publicly on
the Church's role, their concern is probably tempered
with some positive feelings. The Church, anxious to
preserve the working dialogue developed with the
authorities over the years, has frequently acted as a
moderating influence on the unofficial peace move
ment and thereby spared the regime from having to
resort to more forceful suppression. The latter would
be particularly embarrassing for the Soviets while
they are attempting to cultivate West European paci-
fists in an effort to block NATO's deployment of
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At the same time, both the Soviets and the East
German authorities must be deeply concerned that
the Lutheran Church has now emerged as a spokes-
man on a politically sensitive issue with such broad
appeal. East German leader Honecker reportedly
warned a Lutheran bishop recently that the Church
should refrain from pursuing an independent path on
disarmament questions. Church leaders have since
backed off somewhat from their support of peace
activists, but they will remain under intense pressure
from Church members, particularly youth, to main-
tain an independent stance. The potential for church-
state tension remains high, more so as a dwindling
supply of draft-eligible young men will limit the
government's ability to accommodate conscientious
objectors in the years ahead.
Until recently, the Catholic Church in East Germany,
which comprises less than 10 percent of the popula-
tion, had not involved itself in political controversies.
In January, however, Catholic priests read their con-
gregations a pastoral letter denouncing the militariza-
tion of East German society and supporting conscien-
tious objection. The head of the East German
Catholic Church, Cardinal Meisner, recently told the
US Ambassador that the Church would continue to
avoid direct political activity, but he added that it
viewed its basic relationship with the state as "antago-
nistic."
In Hungary, as in East Germany, the Catholic hierar-
chy has avoided controversy while seeking the gradual
expansion of official tolerance for religious activity,
and the primate, Cardinal Lekai, has condemned the
pacifist activity of some dissident priests. Nonetheless,
church-state relations have been troubled by the
regime's refusal to allow construction of new
churches, and there are reports that the Pope remains
critical of Lekai for not pressing the state harder. At
the end of March, the Hungarian bishops departed
from previous practice by appealing to Church mem-
bers to "mobilize" on behalf of peace and disarma-
ment. The wording was cautiously neutral, but a
Hungarian official issued a public warning shortly
afterward against "irresponsible actions," such as
advocating conscientious objection, that could disturb
church-state relations.
In Czechoslovakia, where church-state relations are
already the worst in Eastern Europe, the regime
continues to suppress Catholic dissidents and mem-
bers of the unauthorized "underground church." Re-
lations with the Vatican have been strained further by
the Pope's refusal to allow Czechoslovak priests to
participate in the regime-sponsored organization
Pacem in Terris and by his consecration in January of
two Czechoslovak bishops, whom the authorities in
Prague accuse of anti-Socialist activity, to administer
to the exile community. The dialogue between the
Vatican and the regime is stalemated, and a rupture
of relations is possible. Czechoslovak leader Husak
charged in May that some circles in the West were
trying to "politicize" the Church and use it to incite
citizens against the regime.
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Outlook: Continuing Dilemma for Moscow
While the possibility of heightened conflict between
church and state in Eastern Europe over the next few
years appears high, there will also be a greater
probability of situations in which the regimes would
feel the need for church support. East European
economic difficulties-compounded by reduced access
to Western loans, difficulty in selling to hard currency
markets, and restrictions on Soviet deliveries of ener-
gy and raw materials-are unlikely to improve and
could worsen. Increased consumer frustration is like-
ly, and it could lead in turn to more open expressions 25X1
of political opposition. Although Poland is the most
likely setting, all East European countries are vulner-
able. Moreover, the problem could be compounded by
succession problems, in view of the advanced ages of
the East European leaders. Under these circum-
stances, the moderating influence of the churches will
probably become even more important.
The need to balance ideological concerns against
pragmatic considerations, and to prevent the churches
from becoming a base for political opposition while
using their influence as a force for moderation, will
require constant tactical adjustments. The Soviets will
have to accord the East European regimes more
flexibility to develop constructive working relations
with the churches but will be concerned at the same
time to limit any concessions allowing the churches to
propagate their views more actively.
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Because of the complexity and sensitivity of church-
state issues, situations are likely to arise that will
exacerbate differences of view between ideologists and
pragmatists within the Soviet leadership. The Soviets
are also likely on occasion to disagree with their allies
on whether to employ coercion or accommodation,
and this will impose additional strains on Moscow's
relations with East European leaders. The response of
the West to such situations will help determine wheth-
er the approaching period of particularly delicate
church-state relations in Eastern Europe results in
greater pluralism or greater repression.
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The Modernization of Older
Warsaw Pact Tanks
The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies are in the early
stages of a modernization program to improve the
combat capabilities of their older tanks over the next
10 years. We estimate the dollar cost of the program
to be $11.5 billion-roughly one-third of what it
would cost to replace these tanks with the latest Soviet
models.' Growing economic problems in the USSR
and Eastern Europe probably make the modernization
program an attractive alternative to a significant
increase in new tank procurement. The program also
offers the East Europeans an avenue to satisfy the
strong Soviet pressure for force modernization at a
much reduced cost to the national economies.
A Cost-Fective Response to a Perceived Threat
The Soviet modernization program apparently was
prompted by the recent improvements in NATO
forces and the prospect of a substantial upgrading of
Chinese military capabilities in the wake of better
Sino-Western relations. Growing economic problems
apparently have persuaded Moscow to reduce the cost
of responding to this perceived threat in part by
modernizing older tanks rather than procuring the
newest main battle tanks to station opposite China
and Iran. These modernized tanks, while not match-
ing the capabilities of new Soviet production models,
will be capable of engaging the tanks that are likely to
be in service in these countries during the rest of the
The Soviet modernization program may include a
rebuilding of as many as 22,000 T-54, T-55, and T-62
tanks, which were introduced beginning in 1949,
1958, and 1961, respectively, as well as improvements
to the fire control systems of about 3,000 early model
T-72s.2 Information on non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
(NSWPI Darticination is more limited.
We assume that the NSWP effort will include
the same improvements as the Soviet program. We
expect both programs to be completed by the early
1990s.
' The procurement costs expressed in this article are estimated in
1981 dollars and do not represent actual Soviet expenditures. When
measured in rubles, the relative cost of the modernization program
versus new tank procurement could be different. However, we
believe that the dollar cost estimates presented in this article reflect
a fair approximation of the relative magnitude of the program.
Dollar cost estimates are intended to represent what it would cost
the United States to produce the Soviet design using US production
technology, input prices, and profit margins. Dollar cost estimates
cannot be used in isolation to draw inferences about the relative
military effectiveness of Soviet equipment.
I These figures are derived from the Warsaw arc g~nd forces
projection that is contained in the Land Armaments and Manpower
Model (LAMM), a data base recently developed by CIA, DIA,
NPIC, and the US Army to facilitate the study of Warsaw Pact
century.
This strategy will result in substantial savings. We
estimate
that the dollar equivalent cost of modernizing
the T-54s, T-55s, and T-62s will be around $350,000
per tank.' In contrast, a new T-64B or T-80-the
latest Soviet tank models currently in production-
would cost an estimated $1 million. If the Soviets
fully modernize the roughly 25,000 T-54s, T-55s,
T-62s, and early model T-72s that we believe will be
in the active inventory in the early 1990s, the cost
could average an estimated $800 million annually for
the next 10 years. If a like number of new tank models
were purchased instead over the same period, the
average annual figure would be on the order of $2.5
billion.
These savings will be small relative to the overall
dollar costs of Soviet defense activities, and the
advantages of the program are further tempered by
the fact that new tanks would have a longer expected
'The T-54, T-55, and T-62 tanks are very similiar in design. For
estimating the cost of the modernization program, we treat the
modifications as being virtually identical
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service life than the modernized older model tanks.
The difference in expected service life would some-
what diminish the economic advantage of the modern-
ization program if considered over a period of 20 or 30
years instead of the next 10 years. Within the ground
forces, however, where an estimated 55 to 60 percent
of the cost in dollar terms for land arms procurement
is for tanks, the difference in costs over the next 10
years will be substantial. Moreover, the modernized
tanks will be more attractive to Third World custom-
ers, generating hard currency for the Soviets.
Economic considerations probably were also pivotal in
the development of the NSWP tank modernization
programs. The service lives of the improved T-54s and
T-55s will be extended; consequently, the need to
purchase new tanks during the next 10 years or so will
be reduced significantly. We estimate that moderniz-
ing these older tanks instead of replacing them with
the latest version of the T-72 will reduce the dollar
cost to the NSWP countries by more than $5 billion
over the next 10 years.'
These modernized NSWP tanks will be assigned to
units opposite NATO forces. They will not be able to
engage the latest NATO tanks on an equal footing,
but they probably could hold their own against many
older tanks, including the M-60 series and the Leop-
ard 1, both of which will remain in the NATO
inventory in substantial numbers for the remainder of
this century.
Planned Improvements
The Soviets began developing components for this
modernization effort as early as 1974.
The modernization program is
broad in scope and will apparently include upgrading
fire control, ammunition, protection, and mobility.
Fire Control. The Pact countries will replace the fire
control system on the T-54, T-55, and T-62-which in
recent years has become a weak point-with a mod-
ern, fully integrated system
'The future forces projection contained in the LAMM data base
indicates that, by the early 1990s, when we believe the Pact
modernization program will be complete, the NSWP countries will
nevertheless have procured about 5,000 T-72s in addition to
The recent US embargo on providing advanced micro-
electronics to Warsaw Pact countries reportedly has
had an adverse effect on Polish efforts to replace the
fire control systems in the T-55, and presumably on
other Pact fire control modernization efforts. Western
microchips are no longer available for use in fire
control components, and the Soviet and East Europe-
an substitutes are prone to failure as a result of heat
buildup.
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t e oviets have begun fielding
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an Improve
-mm armor-piercing round for the
T-62 and may have an improved 125-mm armor-
piercing round for the T-72 and T-64 under develop-
ment. These rounds apparently incorporate a
tungsten-alloy core, long-rod penetrator that probably
can penetrate at least 20 percent more armor than the
steel-alloy projectile it replaces.6 The T-54 and T-55
tanks have had improved tungsten-carbide armor-
piercing ammunition since the late 1960s.
the Soviets may be
developing a follow-on 125-mm solid tungsten-alloy,
long-rod penetrator round that could improve penetra-
tion by 40 percent over the original 125-mm steel-
alloy projectile. A similiar 115-mm round may also be
under development.
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Access to Western manufacturing technology and
equipment has enhanced the Soviet capability to
produce advanced kinetic energy ammunition.
Previously, the Soviets had little
success in mastering these manufacturing methods.'
Recent evidence indicates that they have now over-
come these problems, presumably through the acqui-
sition of the US technology
Protection. The Soviets apparently will attach exter-
nal armor plates to the glacis of the T-62, and
presumably to the T-54 and T-55 as well.F
(Improved radiation protective
liners will probably be installed to increase crew
survivability.
Mobility. The Soviets are developing new engines,
believed to be in the 650- to 700-horsepower range, to
replace the existing diesel engine in the T-55 and,
presumably, the T-54 and T-62. The additional
weight of the extra armor necessitates an increase in
engine power if the modernized tanks are to maintain
or improve their previous mobility.
Additional Items. The modernized tanks probably
will also be equipped with side skirts, smoke discharg-
ers, and better communications gear. Side skirts have
already been observed on T-62s in Eastern Europe
and Afghanistan
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the tank modernization program by beginning to
upgrade its T-55s in 1977.
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Polish, and Czechoslovak programs. The moderniza-
tion is probably being done at tank rebuilding facili-
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Problems in Integrating
Automated Control Systems
Into the Soviet Economy
Since the early 1970s the political leadership in the
USSR has placed a high priority on the development
of automated control systems (ASUs) as a means of
facilitating planning and reducing the cost of process-
ing the enormous volume of economic data generated
by the economy. ASU is a generic term used by the
Soviets to designate a wide variety of computerized
data processing systems from simple automated book-
keeping to complex systems for the collection, process-
ing, and distribution of economic data throughout the
economy.'
Automation has taken on added significance in recent
years because of the slowdown in Soviet economic
growth, which has forced Moscow to make increasing-
ly difficult choices concerning the allocation of re-
sources. The Soviets regard automation of planning
and management as a means of alleviating economic
difficulties by making the economy operate more
efficiently. This point was made by Brezhnev himself
as early as 1972:
Only by raising the economy's efficiency is it
possible to find assets and resources sufficient to
ensure simultaneously significant growth in the
worker's well-being, resourcesfor the economy's
rapid future development, and the requirements
for maintaining at the necessary level the country's
defense capability.... We must use these methods
Hof econometric modeling and systems analysis] to
establish a nationwide automated system of infor-
mation collection and processing.2
Brezhnev's exhortation was made possible by the
enhanced capabilities of the Ryad third-generation
computers which were coming on line in the early
1970s. These computer systems were the result of a
mid-1960s decision by the State Committee for Sci-
ence and Technology (GKNT) to forgo the further
' ASUs are also used by the military for troop and weapon systems
control, logistics and supply management, and administration.
' Speech commemorating 50th anniversary of the USSR
development of indigenous, general purpose comput-
ers and to concentrate on copying the IBM-360 series
and making use of the extensive library of IBM
software already available for use with the IBM-360
systems.' Soviet efforts in the field of automated
management have been frustrated, however, by short-
ages of quality software and hardware and bureau-
cratic resistance to change.
Problems
Soviet advocates of a comprehensive, nationwide ASU 25X1
have failed to realize the complexity of such an
undertaking, and progress has been much slower than
originally expected. The three main problem areas
that have prevented integration of ASUs into the
economy are (1) deficiencies in computer software
development; (2) supply bottlenecks, particularly in
peripherals; and (3) the resistance of plant managers,
who feel comfortable in their preautomation environ-
ment. (This resistance is not generally true of minis-
try-level officials, who are mainly concerned with the
number of ASUs installed, and not with the efficiency
of the systems. These officials generally overlook the
resistance of plant managers toward ASUs as long as
production plans are being fulfilled.)
Shortage of Computer Software. A major stumbling-
block in the Soviet drive to automate the economy has
been the lack of qualified programers in the USSR.
The academic orientation of Soviet software develop-
ment has resulted in a bias toward theoretical pro-
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programing backgrounds have been found to be poor-
ly suited for practical work. They are essentially
mathematicians more comfortable with concepts than
with utilitarian programing tasks. Of the 2,500 pro-
gramers at the Institute for Software Development in
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used in the IBM-370 series, but availability of these models is still
limited. The Soviets are thus dependent, at least for the time being,
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Kazan' in 1977, there were
who are more familiar with the particular needs of the
plant) ASU development would be more successful
who were very good)
The Soviets have also been notably unsuccessful in
their attempts to adapt IBM software to operate on
Soviet copies of IBM hardware. Despite the availabil-
ity of original IBM documentation, Soviet programers
have had difficulty in designing workable systems,
largely because the instructions contained in the IBM
documentation are inadequate and require IBM per-
sonnel to aid users. IBM has been understandably
reluctant to assist the Soviets in adapting software for
use on Soviet copies of IBM hardware.
In 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
US imposed an embargo on the export of high-
technology items (including all computer-related
equipment) to the Soviet Union. This destroyed any
prospect for direct US-USSR commercial cooperation
(at least in the short term) and forced the Soviets to
seek outside assistance in acquiring and modifying
original IBM software. Since imposition of the embar-
go, Bulgaria has become the largest supplier of IBM
software to the Soviet Union. In addition, India, in
1980, agreed to modify IBM software for the Soviets
in return for Soviet-made Ryad-series computers.
These countries are not affected by the embargo and
thus have maintained their access to most US soft-
ware technology
Soviet software development also suffers from a lack
of cooperation between the software institutes and the
end users. This point was made by the chief designer
at the Nizhniy Tagil Department of the Sverdlovsk
ASU Design and Planning Bureau, V. Morozov, who
reported that at one point in 1978 the bureau was
working on projects for plants from the Caspian Sea
area to installations near Moscow. The standard
procedure followed by the department designing an
ASU involved one short-term (one or two weeks) trip
to the plant of the potential user, a "cursory investiga-
tion," followed by "rapidly formulated agreements
and protocols." Morozov believes that this lack of
designer-user interface is the primary reason for the
large number of ASUs being rejected by the user
plants. He suggested that by decentralizing the design
process (assigning ASU projects to local designers
and designers more productive.
Management Resistance. A serious problem retarding
progress in Soviet ASU development is the resistance
by senior management toward automated systems
Thus, automated systems threaten the familiar Soviet
practice of stockpiling resources for future use as a
defense against the unreliable material supply system.
Shop foremen are hostile toward automated systems
because they impose time restrictions. Normally a
foreman can make up his production norm a day late
under the fudging allowed in the nonautomated sys-
tem. ASUs automatically take away this time cushion
and force plant directors to monitor daily production
figures more closely. To get around this, shop foremen
provide incorrect or incomplete data in their daily
reports, thus undermining the effectiveness of the
ASU.
Supply Bottlenecks. A major impediment to automa-
tion has been shortages of peripherals, including
memory units and input-output devices such as dis-
plays, printers, and terminals. The Deputy Chairman
of GKNT, Dmitriy Zhimerin, has stated that increas-
ing the output of peripheral devices is an urgent task
and that the shortfall in their production is holding up
widespread introduction of ASUs.
the primary obstacles preventing industrial users from
putting their new SM-1 and SM-2 minicomputers to
good use were the lack of good software and the
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absence of adequate input-output devices and other
peripherals. Peripherals were not always provided by
the plant which produced the computer, and, even
when they were, the producer assumed no responsibil-
ity for service or repair-either for peripherals or for
the computers themselves
The problem can be at least partly attributed to the
Soviet system of success indicators, which has hin-
dered progress both in the design of ASUs and in the
production of computer hardware on which they are
based. Soviet producers are driven by gross output
targets, often designed in physical units (number of
computers). When this is the case, the production of
peripherals does not contribute toward fulfillment of
the plan, and a computer producer will concentrate on
increasing the output of central processing units rath-
er than of peripherals. Because of this practice and
inadequacies in the overall supply system, incomplete
shipments of peripherals continue to act as a drag on
the effectiveness of computers in the economy.
Search for Solutions
Soviet leaders recognize the urgent need for enhanced
computing capability. They have gone on record
saying that the deficiencies in the supply and quality
of software and peripherals have resulted in a serious
underuse of already-installed computer systems. The
Soviets have attempted to overcome these deficiencies
in large part by intensifying their efforts to acquire
technology from abroad. The acquisition effort has
taken three different forms:
? Clandestine acquisition by Soviet agents of Western
technology or equipment.
? Acquisition of technology or equipment through
third-country sources (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and
India have been most active in this role in recent
years).
? Direct negotiations with Western firms or govern-
ments to gain access to technology through legal
means.
The following examples illustrate the breadth of the
Soviet acquisition effort in recent years:
? The West German authorities' recent arrest of
Gennadiy Batashev, reportedly a high-ranking KGB
operative, revealed that IBM software was high on
the KGB's "wish list" of wanted information.
Soviet Union has had a contractual arrangement for
the past three or four years with an Indian computer
firm to design and produce IBM-360 compatible
applications software for use on the Soviet Ryad-
series computers.
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tute for Software Development in Kazan' has been
specifically tasked with modifying original IBM
software for use on Soviet copies of the IBM S/360
computer in both the administrative and manufac-
turing sectors of the Soviet Union. Its primary
source for the original software in recent years has
been Bulgaria. Programers at the institute have
worked closely with the Bulgarians in developing
joint software packages.
' None of these items are directly available to the Soviets from US
firms since imposition of the 1980 embargo on high-technology
items. Moreover, the United States is attempting to persuade other
COCOM countries to refrain from exporting this type of technol-
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Outlook
ASU has been accorded a consistently high priority
by leaders in both the political and economic commu-
nities, but progress has been slow as the program has
shown important weaknesses in providing software
and hardware and in overcoming bureaucratic inertia.
These problems are likely to persist, although some
progress is being made in solving them. The Soviet
leadership has evidently decided to augment its pres-
ent computer-related capabilities by actively pursuing
Western technology (hardware and software) using
both legal and illegal means. Given the current system
of incentives and bureaucratic inertia, this depen-
dence on external sources for certain types of comput-
er-related technology is likely to continue for some
time.
Soviet
ecomonic officials at most levels are not yet ready to
accept ASU at the rate being imposed. The lack of
understanding on the part of management, the overall
distrust of the system by all users, and the shortage of
skilled personnel at the enterprise level to run the
system cannot be overcome in the short run.
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Areas Hardest Hit by Recent Sukhovey Conditions
500
1
Kilometers
1000
J
Slight
damage
Baltrc Sea
Poland
Black Sea
Cyprus;-. ,_..
Mediterranean
Lebanon
Iraq
Caspian
Sea
The United States Government hee not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
Cease-fire
China
roar; f i
Pakistan'-? India
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Briefs
Outlook for Soviet Soviet grain prospects have deteriorated somewhat in recent weeks because of crop
Grain Crop 0 damage caused by sukhovey conditions (hot, dry winds) in the southern European
USSR and a likely shortfall in the planned sown area. Nevertheless, an above-
average crop of 205-210 million tons is still possible if excellent weather prevails
throughout the remainder of the season. A crop of this size would fall far short of
the official target of 238 million tons, but would be well above the estimated
annual average of 185 million tons for the 1978-82 period.
Third Soviet
Aircraft Carrier
Operational
During late May and early June the southern portion of the Ukraine, the lower
Volga Valley, and the northern half of the North Caucasus were hit intermittently
with sukhovey conditions. Meteorological data 25X1
evidence that potential yields of both winter and spring grains were cut. We
estimate that overall crop losses caused by the sukhovey conditions totaled
approximately 10 million tons. 25X1
indicated that soil moisture reserves in these areas became critically low. 25X1
Moreover, the thin, uneven stands of grain fields seen on satellite imagery provided
hectare target
An additional 2-3 million tons of potential grain production have been lost because
of an estimated shortfall in plantings. On the basis of statistics released by the
USSR's Central Statistical Administration on 6 June, we believe that the area
sown to grain this year will fall some 2-3 million hectares short of the 124-million-
The Novorossiysk, the third Kiev-class aircraft carrier,
The new ship has just completed a normal four-year period of
fitting out an sea trials. Its complement of aircraft include at least 12 vertical-
takeoff YAK-38 Forgers and some 15 to 20 ASW helicopters.
the line, is being fitted out at Nikolayev
The Kiev, the Northern Fleet's other carrier,
currently is being overhauled at Nikolayev on the Black Sea. Its sister ship, the
Minsk, is in service with the Pacific Fleet. A fourth Kiev-class carrier, the last of
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Soviet-Mexican
Technical
CooperationF_
drilling equipment from a Mexican firm
The US Embassy in Mexico City reports that in early May a Soviet delegation led
by a deputy minister of petroleum toured the facilities of the Mexican state oil
company, Pemex, and signed a memorandum calling for technical cooperation.
The memorandum proposes scientific and technical exchanges in oil-related areas
such as drilling, production, and transportation. Details of future cooperative
projects reportedly are to be worked out by specialists. One Mexican official
played down the memorandum by telling a US diplomat that it is only an offshoot
of the Soviet-Mexican scientific and technical cooperation agreement of 1975. The
Soviets reportedly are also negotiating a purchase of $190 million worth of oil
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could limit Soviet opportunities to obtain such technology.
The USSR may hope to use any new cooperative arrangements to acquire
advanced US oil-related technology from Mexico, which is not a member of
COCOM and which imports substantial oil equipment and technology from the
United States. Mexico's efforts to avoid violating US export controls, however,
The USSR considers Spain the most promising country in which to enlarge its rep-
Presence in Spain I resentation, followin
an countries.
illegal Soviet activities
Spain wants to expand relations with the USSR as
Dos Santos's Visit There were no open signs of disagreement during Angolan President dos Santos's
to Moscow visit to Moscow in May, but the Soviets seem concerned about maintaining their
influence in Luanda. A party-to-party cooperation accord and a cultural and
scientific agreement were signed. Although the Soviets have not made an explicit
public pledge of increased military or economic support, Andropov did promise
"further support" to defending Angolan independence.
part of a general effort to increase trade. Madrid wants to regulate commercial re-
lations with Moscow, however, in order to bring the activities of Soviet representa-
tives under control. The expulsion from Spain in February of a Soviet official
accused of espionage demonstrates that the Socialists will respond vigorously to
aid to Luanda's firmness on Namibia and the Cuban withdrawal issue.
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The Soviets have warned the Angolans against developing ties with the United
States and other Western countries or taking part in the US-sponsored diplomatic
initiative on Namibia. Dos Santos praised Soviet military and economic assistanc25X1
to Angola and criticized US efforts to link Cuban troop withdrawals to a
settlement on Namibia. Moscow, however, almost certainly will seek to link new
Skilled Manpower Because Siberian higher educational institutions (VUZy) do not provide sufficient
Shortage in training in the specialities required by local industries, many positions in Siberia
Siberia0 requiring specialists with higher educations are being filled by technicians with
less training and workers without any formal training. Shortages of skilled
manpower are particularly acute in the energy resources and forest products
industries. Siberian VUZy train only about 20 percent of the country's graduates in
these specialities, even though work in these fields is concentrated in Siberia.F_
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To compensate, the authorities annually assign about 20,000 engineers from the
European USSR to Siberia, but few stay permanently. Turnover rates for VUZ
graduates run as high as 30 to 50 percent during the first three years. Moreover,
there is a high rate of permanent outmigration among Siberian young people sent
for training to other parts of the USSR. Recognizing the problem, Soviet planners
have called for expansion of existing VUZ training programs in Siberia. However,
chronic construction lags and difficulties in attracting teaching personnel to these
remote areas present formidable obstacles to fulfilling the plans
Efforts To Improve The Soviet General Staff has taken steps to integrate civil defense and military
Mobilization commissariat functions at republic and oblast levels in order to improve mobiliza-
Capabilities F___-] tion in wartime. Although we do not believe the consolidation has been implement-
ed nationwide, it may be in effect in some areas and at echelons below oblast level.
Since 1978 there have been indications of increased coordination between the civil
defense staffs and the military commissariats, which handle mobilization. In
to mobilize human and material resources effectively in the event of war
this has been a major
shortcoming of the civil defense program. Workers at many installations who were
to report for military duty during mobilization were also assigned civil defense
functions, and transportation assets were similarly assigned both mobilization and
civil defense duties. Other efforts to link civil defense more closely to the military,
have probably improved the ability of
the civil defense program to unction in wartime.
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