USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T01083R000100050002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of /
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
SOV UR 83-005X
April 1983
Copy 598
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Directorate of
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
Secret
Secret
SOV UR 83-OOSX
April 1983
Copy 599
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
table of contents
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome. They may be
directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the
Secret
SOV UR 83-005X
April 1983
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The KGB as an
Instrument of
Soviet Policy
Contents
indispensable to Kremlin policymakers
The KGB has-been used over the years to destroy real and imagined
enemies of the party at home and abroad, to ensure that party fiat is
faithfully followed, and to respond to a wide array of national
security interests. It has gained in status in recent years and is
The Role of the KGB in the Soviet System
The principal responsibility of the KGB-Committee of State
Security-is to ensure the security of the USSR and prevent any
threat to Communist Party control and the system of government.
The KGB directs the bulk of its energies and resources to this end.
Its activities abroad include the collection of foreign intelligence, the
acquisition of foreign technology, and the conduct of covert political
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Moscow regards "active measures" as a useful, regular supplement
to its conventional diplomacy. The KGB's special role in active
measures is to plan and carry out covert activities that require the
use of trained intelligence personnel. Covert press placements,
forgeries, and influence agents are staple items in the KGB's
arsenal.
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The KGB Suppression of Dissent
During the Brezhnev years dissent became more open and Soviet
policy toward suppressing it became more sensitive to potential
foreign policy implications. The KGB, nonetheless, proved equal to
this new challenge. By developing a more sophisticated approach
toward the dissident community, the KGB was able to quickly and
efficiently subdue the human rights movement.
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Other Topics Soviet Strategy Toward Japan:
The Economic-Political Connection
The Soviet Union once again is using a "carrot and stick" approach
to improve relations with Japan and to weaken Tokyo's ties to
Washington. The "carrots" include offers of reliable export markets
for Japanese goods and access to Siberian resources. Prospects for
successfully playing these economic cards are dimmed, however, by
a growing Soviet trade deficit with Japan, Moscow's concern over its
hard currency position, and diminished Japanese interest in Siberian
minerals and fuels.
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Regional instability and heightened black African security concerns
will enable Moscow to maintain-and possibly expand-its role in
southern Africa. Moscow will pursue a new opportunity in
Zimbabwe, where security tensions have prompted Prime Minister
Mugabe to improve bilateral ties and purchase Soviet arms. The
USSR's key clients, Angola and Mozambique, have been exploring
the possibility of accommodation with Pretoria and closer ties with
the West; nonetheless, Soviet influence-based largely on the
provision of military assistance-will be sustained by the growing
insurgency problem. In Mozambique, where the guerrilla threat is
especially serious, Moscow may have to consider a greater involve-
ment to preserve the pro-Soviet regime.
Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters in 1982
Expanded deployments to distant areas of the Pacific Ocean and the
waters off West Africa contributed to a 3-percent increase in Soviet
naval presence overseas in 1982, bringing ship-days close to the
record total of 1980. The Soviets used their naval ships and aircraft
to respond to regional tensions such as the Syrian crisis and to
hostilities in parts of Africa but made few advances in improving
their naval facilities overseas.
The East German Army is undertaking a program designed to
provide a more balanced combined-arms capability. It is adding
more artillery to its motorized rifle regiments and introducing later
model artillery and an improved variant of the T-72 tank.
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Hungarian Lectures on Management
KGB Interest in Western Agricultural Technology I 53
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Secret
The KGB as an
Instrument of
Soviet Policy
Perspective
Former KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov's elevation to the Soviet Union's
top party post came only a month before the 65th anniversary of the
intelligence and security service (originally known as the Cheka)-a
coincidence that served to underscore the increased influence of the KGB
as a political institution. Although several factors have contributed to the
KGB's rising status, it is the agency's ability to respond to a wide array of
national security concerns, both domestic and foreign, that has made it so
indispensable to Kremlin policymakers (see "The Role of the KGB in the
Soviet System").
Over the years the KGB has played a variety of roles that reflected the pre-
vailing priorities of the Soviet leadership:
? At the outset, the Cheka and its successor organizations concentrated on
seeking out and destroying the real and imagined enemies of the party at
home and opposing anti-Bolshevik organizations abroad.
? The KGB was used by Stalin to quash his political enemies and prevent
the coalescence of opposition groups, and by Beriya-in the wake of
Stalin's death-to advance his own political position. (As a result, the
Soviet leadership became highly sensitive to the use of the KGB for
political purposes, keeping subsequent KGB chiefs off the Politburo until
Andropov's appointment in 1967.)
? During World War II, the KGB was engaged in preventing large-scale
desertions from the army, collecting information on German and Allied
intentions and plans, and conducting sabotage operations behind German
lines.
Secret
SOV UR 83-005X
April 1983
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The current leadership, like those of the past, has its own set of priorities
that affect KGB operations. In the international arena, for example, the
Soviets are trying to encourage conflict between Western Europe and the
United States over arms control and East-West economic relations in order
to provoke divisions within the alliance. The KGB, working in concert with
the Central Committee's International and International Information
Departments, has amassed considerable experience in "influence" opera-
tions (see "The KGB's Role in `Active Measures' ") and has actively
encouraged the European peace movement. The KGB also has tried to
identify areas where the Soviet Union could take advantage of differences
between the United States and Western Europe over credit policies. KGB
resources will likewise be used to advance Soviet policy in other areas, such
as the Third World, where political and economic instability or Western
vulnerabilities become apparent
On the domestic front, Soviet economic problems now head the regime's
agenda. As a result, KGB reporting on foreign economic subjects has
received new impetus, and the collection of scientific and technical
intelligence, which has been highly beneficial to the Soviet economy,
undoubtedly will continue to be emphasized (see "The Role of the KGB in
Technology Acquisition").
The KGB also has a role in the implementation of one of Andropov's chief
initiatives in the economic area-the campaign to eliminate corruption. It
is the agency responsible for the prevention and detection of large-scale
graft and corruption. Vitaliy Fedorchuk, the KGB's former chairman and
the new Minister of Internal Affairs, reportedly has been charged with
routing out corruption in the militia (civil police) itself. He has enforced the
labor discipline campaign with such zeal, moreover, that he allegedly had
to be reprimanded for excessive harassment of Soviet workers. The
emphasis on discipline also has extended to areas of KGB responsibility, in-
cluding a continuation of the crackdown on dissidents that began last year
(see "The KGB and Suppression of Dissent" )~
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Although the discipline and anticorruption campaigns illustrate the utility
of the KGB as a policy instrument, they also reveal its limitations. Clearly,
"tightening the screws"-a KGB specialty-is no solution to the Soviet
economic dilemma and can be truly effective only if followed by economic
and structural reform. Success or failure, therefore, will depend not on the
KGB but on the readiness and ability of Andropov and company to take on
the political risks inherent in such a reform-risks that admittedly would
be even greater in the absence of a powerful KGB
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Secret
KGB-Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, SSSR
(Committee of State Security, USSR), represented
nationally and at the republic and local levels of
government throughout the USSR. Since its estab-
lishment in 1917, the Soviet state security service has
been known as the CHEKA, GPU, OGPU, NKGB,
MGB, and KGB.
Functions: The KGB's responsibilities are analogous
to those of such disparate agencies and organizations
in the United States as the CIA, NSA, FBI, military
counterintelligence services, the Treasury Depart-
ment and its subordinate law enforcement agencies,
including the Secret Service, the Coast Guard, the
Border Patrol, and the Customs Service.
Internal:
? Ensure internal security and eliminate any threat
arising from within the USSR to party control and
the system of government.
? Protect the borders of the country.
? Provide physical protection for leaders and impor-
tant installations of the party and state, and for
visiting foreign dignitaries.
? Supervise the development and installation of se-
cure communications systems.
? Recruit foreigners for espionage or as agents-Of-
influence once they return to their homeland.
External:
? Seek and transmit early warning information of
impending hostilities against the USSR.
? Collect political, economic, scientific, and military
intelligence and conduct counterintelligence
operations.
? Conduct covert political action operations (active
measures) to further Soviet foreign policy and
security interests.
? Neutralize any threat to the USSR arising from
anti-Soviet emigre and other hostile organizations
based abroad.
? Provide security for Soviet citizens and installa-
tions abroad.
? Train and monitor the work of friendly security
services and exploit their intelligence collection
successes.
Personnel Strength: Estimated to be as high as
240,000, of whom some 175,000 to 200,000 man the
Border Guard component. Some 40,000 are believed
to be involved in the counterintelligence and internal
security effort and 8,000 to 9,000 in foreign intelli-
gence activities.
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The Role of the KGB
in the Soviet System I
The principal responsibility of the KGB-Committee
of State Security-is to ensure the security of the
USSR and prevent any threat to Communist Party
control and the system of government. The KGB
directs the bulk of its energies and resources to this
end. Its activities abroad include the collection of
foreign intelligence, the acquisition of foreign technol-
ogy, and the conduct of covert political action.' F_
Organization and Authority
The KGB is a governmental body equivalent to a
ministry, but, like the Ministries of Foreign Affairs
and Defense, it is responsible not to the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers but to the Politburo. As is
the case with most ministries, the KGB is also a
constituent part of the government at the republic,
regional, and local levels. It is within this structure
that the KGB carries out its mandate nationally to
protect state security.
The KGB currently consists of approximately 240,000
staff employees organized in a complex structure of
directorates, departments, and special committees.
Supporting this apparatus is a vast network of agents
and informants drawn from citizens who are directed
or coerced to cooperate, or who do so for pay.
Ordinary citizens also provide assistance, voluntarily
reporting any suspicious activity in their neighbor-
hoods and places of work. Because of its penetration
of Soviet society, the KGB enjoys an image of being
pervasive and omniscient, an image it intentionally
cultivates. (For a description of the structure of the
KGB at the national level and the functions of the
various KGB components, see page 6 and the organi-
zational chart on page 7.
Authority. The KGB is the organization primarily
responsible for enforcing, and often interpreting, Sovi-
et law in all cases relating to national security. In
these cases, it not only is responsible for arrest,
detention, and interrogation of suspects, but it also
controls the preparation of the defense for the ac-
cused.
With the execution in 1953 of the last of Stalin's state
security chiefs, Lavrentiy Beriya, the party took steps
to ensure that the state security service would never
again become a power unto its own or serve as a 25X1
political power base for any individual. The entire
internal affairs and state security complex, for exam-
ple, was reorganized to ensure against the future use
of such a mechanism to threaten the power or domi-
nance of the party over the government structure.
The era of the midnight knock, unexplained disap- 25X1
pearances of citizens, and summary executions is past.
In carrying out arrests, detentions, and searches,
KGB officers usually follow procedures prescribed by
law. The KGB is still prepared, however, to resort to 25X1
intimidation, crude harassment, or arrest in cases the
authorities find exasperating. Two prime examples of
individuals who have experienced such treatment are
Andrey Sakharov and the now exiled Vladimir
Bukovskiy.
Role at Home
Despite the notoriety given its espionage and other
activities abroad, the KGB devotes the majority of its
resources to internal security operations aimed at
detecting and neutralizing any threat to the physical
well-being or the authority of the political leadership.
The KGB's responsibilities within the USSR are to
uncover espionage, subversion, and dissidence 2 and to
neutralize their proponents; to investigate crimes
against the state; to protect the borders of the country; 25X1
and to provide physical protection for political leaders,
important installations, and visiting foreign digni-
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Responsibilities of Principal KGB Components
First Chief Directorate. Foreign intelligence collec-
tion and covert political action.
Chief Directorate of the Border Guards. Guards the
border and the coastline against unauthorized entry
or exit, smuggling, and armed intrusions; also pro-
Second Chief Directorate. Internal security and
counterintelligence. Operates throughout the USSR
with aim of preventing challenges to authority of the
state. Counterintelligence effort is mainly in Moscow
and other cities with large foreign presence. Also
investigates senior party, government, and KGB offi-
cials and maintains security at sensitive industrial
facilities.
Third Directorate. Counterintelligence in the military
establishment, including military intelligence (GRU)
units.
Fifth Directorate. Combating ideological subversion
and dissidence within the USSR. Monitors the activi-
ties of various ethnic groups and antiregime elements
among the clergy and religious sects in the USSRL
Seventh Directorate. Surveillance support for KGB
operations in the Moscow area. (KGB staffs at the
republic, oblast, kray levels and in large cities other
than Moscow have their own surveillance support.F
Eighth Chief Directorate. Development and security
of all Soviet enciphered communications at facilities
at home and abroad.
Ninth Directorate. Security for all members of the
Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee, the
chairman of the KGB, the Ministers of Defense,
Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, as well as top
officials in the union republics. Also provides security
for high-level Soviet officials traveling abroad and
foreign dignitaries visiting the USSR.
vides guard personnel for Soviet Embassies.
Fifteenth Directorate. Security for official Soviet
installations and offices, including the Kremlin, and
the headquarters buildings of the Central Committee,
Council of Ministers, General Staff, and Ministries of
Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Internal Affairs as well
as KGB.
Sixteenth Directorate. Intercepts and deciphers for-
eign communications at home and abroad.
Operational- Technical Support Directorate. Provides
a wide range of technical support for KGB operations.
Investigation Department. Investigates such crimes
as espionage, treason, sabotage, unlawful flight
abroad, damaging state industry and transport facili-
ties, and currency speculation. Also acts as legal
adviser to components of the Second Chief Director-
ate regarding evidence required to justify detention
and support a charge.
Military Construction Directorate. Provides engi-
neers and specialists for construction of sensitive
military, party, and other projects, including Soviet
diplomatic missions in the West.
Administrative Directorates. Provide personnel, fi-
nance, and basic administrative and housekeeping
services.
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Figure 1
Committee for State Security (KGB)
Central Committee,
CPSU
Finance and
Planning
Chief Directorates
First (Foreign
Intelligence)
Second (Internal
Security and
Counterintelligence)
Third (Military
Counterintelligence)
Fifth (Ideology
and Dissidence)
Seventh
(Surveillance)
Fifteenth (Security
of Installations)
Ninth
(Government Guards)
Sixteenth
(Communications
Intercept)
CC/CPSU
Administrative Organs
Department
KGB Party
Committee
Investigation
Department
KGB Higher
School
II
Components engaged mainly in the collection
of foreign intelligence and operations abroad.
Operational
Technical (OTU)
Administrative and
Supply
Eighth
(Communications
and Cryptography)
Tenth Department
(Archives)
Government
Communications
Components whose operations are primarily
designed to ensure internal security.
Components supporting both internal security
and intelligence collection operations.
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Targets of the KGB's counterintelligence and internal
security operations at home include the population at
large; the Soviet armed forces; foreign embassies,
consulates, and trade missions; and visiting foreigners.
In combating espionage at home, the KGB closly
monitors the activities of foreigners living in or visit-
ing the USSR and also looks for opportunities to
recruit agents from among them
Counterintelligence in the Military. The KGB is
responsible for counterintelligence, countersubversion,
and general security in the Soviet armed forces and in
military-related research and armament production
facilities. We do not know what role, if any, the KGB
plays in providing security for the handling and
storage of nuclear weapons
The KGB's Third Chief Directorate (counterintelli-
gence in the armed forces) maintains a vast network
of informants which penetrates all echelons of the
military establishment, including units of the General
Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Its offi-
cers wear regular military uniforms and are assigned
down to at least regimental level. Informants are
drawn from among officers and enlisted men as well
as from the local Soviet or foreign population and are
tasked with reporting not only espionage activities and
breaches of security but also signs of anti-Communist
attitudes and behavior. The KGB's ultimate objective
in infiltrating the armed forces is to ensure that the
military does not become a source of political power
or influence independent of the party
Relationship With MVD. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD) is the organization chiefly responsible
for normal law enforcement. The MVD shares with
the KGB the task of combating corruption and certain
categories of criminal acts. The KGB becomes in-
volved when a case has security or significant political
or economic implications.
The MVD controls the uniformed police, a large
number of paramilitary units, and the prison and
labor camp systems. Until the end of Stalin's reign,
both the MVD and the state security service-though
nominally separate ministries-were in fact controlled
by Beriya. The breakup of the MVD empire and the
reorganization of the security services into the KGB
in the mid-1950s was part of an effort to prevent any
such awesome concentration of power in the hands of
a single man or organization in the future.
The Foreign Intelligence Effort
The First Chief Directorate is responsible for foreign
intelligence collection and covert political action
aimed at foreign targets.' The Directorate collects
intelligence through its officers stationed abroad un-
der diplomatic and trade cover as well as through
"illegals," Soviet intelligence officers who are docu-
mented as citizens of a non-Soviet Bloc country and
operate independently of the official Soviet mission.
Officers assigned to KGB residencies usually engage
in one of four operational specialties: political and
economic, counterintelligence, science and technology
(S&T), and support of illegal agents. If the Soviet
emigre community in a host country happens to be
sizable, an additional officer will be assigned to
monitor its activities or operate against it.
Illegals operate primarily against countries of strate-
gic interest where the USSR has no diplomatic
mission, for example, South Africa and Israel. Illegals
also serve in selected other countries where there are
official Soviet representations. In these instances they
supplement the coverage of KGB officers assigned to
the official mission. Two notorious illegals were
Rudolf Abel, who operated in the United States, and
Gordon Lonsdale, who served in the United Kingdom.
Directorate S, which controls illegals, is formally
responsible for developing assets abroad for sabotage
and assassinations in wartime, but we do not know
how vigorously it currently pursues this task.
The First Chief Directorate has long been the elite of
the KGB. Its officers are generally better educated
than those assigned to other components. Its ranks
include the sons of the Soviet urban elite, who see in
the First Chief Directorate an opportunity for their
progeny to enjoy a career in a privileged organization
and the possibility of assignments abroad.
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Recruitment of Foreign Agents. The emphasis in
recruitment is on individuals with unique access to
potentially valuable information, for example, intelli-
gence officers, diplomats, cipher clerks, military per-
sonnel, other government officials, journalists, and
academicians. The KGB seeks ideally to recruit on
ideological grounds but recognizes that sympathy for
the USSR and its goals hold little lure for most
potential targets. Its officers, therefore, look for indi-
viduals who are highly ambitious, avaricious, have
serious financial difficulties, or who have character
weaknesses that make them susceptible to blackmail.
The KGB sometimes also uses recruiters who can pass
themselves off as non-Soviet citizens when targeting
individuals who are assessed to be vulnerable but anti-
Soviet.
Relationship With the GRU. The Main Intelligence
Directorate of the Soviet General Staff complements
and competes with the KGB in the collection of
foreign intelligence. The GRU focuses on acquiring
strategic intelligence, which it interprets as military,
S&T, economic, and political information. Its collec-
tion assets include human agents, signals intelligence,
and overhead reconnaissance systems.
The KGB considers itself the senior and more profes-
sional service and no doubt feels that its responsibility
for the security and counterintelligence protection of
the Soviet military, including the GRU, proves the
point. KGB officers also tend to be better educated
and more broadly experienced than their GRU coun-
terparts, who are career military officers.
Andropov's Mark
Yuriy Andropov's tenure as the chief of the state
security service from 1967 to 1982 was longer than
that of any of his predecessors. During his chairman-
ship the image of the KGB improved considerably in
the eyes of the Soviet population. The role the state
security service played as an instrument of Stalin's
terror had made it an object of fear and loathing. The
emphasis on following legal procedures in criminal,
espionage, and subversion cases, begun under
Khrushchev and his KGB Chairman, A. Shelepin,
continued under Brezhnev and Andropov. It was
reinforced by a propaganda campaign to popularize
the KGB as protector of the Soviet state and society
from foreign spies and imperialist subversion. Under
Andropov, the KGB also attracted more sophisticated
and better educated recruits thanks mainly to its
enhanced image, the perquisites and significant pay
raises Andropov won for his officers, and the prestige
Recent improvements in status and a possible increase
in the size of the KGB include the expansion of the
KGB leadership, which by the last year of Brezhnev's
tenure had grown to include 10 deputy chairmen, and
the enlargement of the facilities at KGB headquarters
and the KGB First Chief Directorate. Since 1977 the
latter facility has added about 39,500 square meters
of workspace to the 29,200 square meters already
available. Although we do not know whether this
construction was required because of increased per-
sonnel, such an expansion could accommodate a
growth of almost 5,300 employees-a 135-percent
increase over the estimated 3,900 who were working
there prior to 1977.
Other changes also point to the KGB's enhanced
status. In 1978 the promotions of KGB First Deputy
Chairman Tsvigun (now deceased), Deputy Chairman 25X1
Tsinev, and border guards chief Matrosov to General
of the Army and of Deputy Chairmen Chebrikov and
Yemokhonov to Colonel General gave these officials
higher ranks than any of their predecessors had held.
(Tsinev is now the first deputy to KGB Chairman
Chebrikov, creating an anomaly in their military
ranks that has not yet been publicly corrected.) The
KGB also had more than its usual share of delegates 25X1
to the 26th Party Congress in 1981-a convocation
that saw Chebrikov, Tsinev, and Tsvigun all promoted
to full membership in the Central Committee.
The KGB and the Fight Against Corruption. Yuriy
Andropov's initial efforts as General Secretary have
focused on using the KGB to enhance the party's
moral authority and ability to provide effective lead-
ership. The personnel changes that have occurred
since he succeeded Brezhnev point to a high priority
on rooting out corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency,
and poor labor discipline
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Figure 2
KGB Chairmen, 1967-83
KGB Chairman May 1967-May
1982. Directed CPSU's relations
with bloc Communist parties from
1957 to 1967. Member of party
Secretariat from 1962 to 1967 and
nonvoting member of the Politburo
from 1967 to 1973, when he was
promoted to full membership.
Rejoined the Secretariat in May
1982 upon leaving the KGB.
Named General Secretary of the
CPSU two days after Brezhnev's
KGB Chairman May-December
1982. Joined state security service
in 1939, served as military
counterintelligence officer during
World War 11, and in Austria and
East Germany in the 1950s. KGB
Chairman for the Ukraine from
1970 to 1982. Became Minister of
Internal Affairs"in December 1982.
Within a month of his accession to the party's chief
post, Andropov fired the Minister of Internal Affairs,
Nikolay Shchelokov, whose organization had been
ineffectual in combating corruption and was itself
corrupt. Andropov replaced Shchelokov with Vitaliy
Fedorchuk, a KGB careerist who had served as a
military counterintelligence officer during and after
World War II and more recently as KGB chief in the
Ukraine, where he gained a reputation for dealing
ruthlessly with dissidents. Fedorchuk, who succeeded
Succeeded V. V. Chebrikov as KGB
Chairman in December 1982. First
joined KGB in 1967 after 20 years
as prominent party official in
Dnepropetrovsk. Elected to
Central Committee as candidate
member in 1971 and promoted to
full membership in 1981F-----]
Andropov as KGB Chairman in May 1982, was
followed in that position by Viktor Chebrikov who has
served in the KGB since 1967, the year Andropov
became KGB Chairman. Andropov has also recently
brought to Moscow Geydar Aliyev, a professional
KGB officer and subsequently First Party Secretary
in Azerbaijan, where he gained a reputation for
cleaning up corruption.
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With these personnel changes, Andropov now appears
to have laid the groundwork to use the KGB as a
principal instrument in his drive against corruption.
Some observers, commenting on these appointments,
see Andropov also poised to use his old organization in
the role of a super General Accounting Office in
investigations of corruption and economic misman-
agement. The question now is how widespread the
cleanup will be and how hi h u the part ower
structure it will extend.
Secret 12
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The KGB's Role in
"Active Measures"
Moscow regards active measures as a useful, regular
supplement to its conventional diplomacy.' The main
policy lines and themes of active measures campaigns
are decided at the highest levels of the political
system; ultimate approval rests with the party Polit-
buro and Secretariat. Campaigns are centrally man-
aged and implemented by the KGB and the Central
Committee's International Department, with assist-
ance from the Central Committee's International
Information Department.
The KGB's special role in active measures is to plan
and carry out covert activities that require the use of
trained intelligence personnel. This mission involves
several components of the KGB, which perform a
number of standing and ad hoc duties at the KGB's
headquarters and its residencies (stations) abroad.2F-
At KGB Headquarters
Within the KGB's First Chief Directorate (foreign
intelligence) is a special component charged with
planning and overseeing covert active measures. This
component, known since the early 1970s as Service A,
consists of at least 100 staff officers whose main
duties are to work with KGB residencies to plan and
implement active measures
The bureaucratic status of the active measures plan-
ning unit as a service, rather than a lower level
department, reflects the increased importance as-
signed these activities during the past decade. The
institutional predecessors of Service A included De-
partment D (for disinformation), formed in the late
' "Active measures" is a Soviet term used primarily in intelligence
contexts to refer to influence operations, as distinct from espionage
and counterintelligence. Active measures are not limited to the
intelligence sphere, however, and can include selected overt as well
as covert activities, all involving deceptive content or attribution
and going beyond traditional diplomacy and open propaganda to
1950s and converted some time prior to 1972 into
Department A (for active measures). Under then KGB
chief Andropov's orders, Department A was upgraded
in the early 1970s to a service, which in KGB
parlance denotes a component with worldwide duties
and authority to task other First Chief Directorate
units and deal directly with organizational units out-
side the Directorate.
Service A is almost exclusively a headquarters organi-
zation, and its officers rarely go abroad. Active
measures operations and agents in the field are con-
trolled by other Directorate components, usually the
geographic departments, and are typically run by
political-intelligence case officers at the individual
residencies. Service A must cooperate closely with the
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geographic departments, whose officers know what 25X1
field assets are available to implement active meas-
ures and can provide area expertise and advice on
foreign political and economic conditions. Service A
also keeps track of all active measures operations and 25X1
prepares a top-secret daily bulletin on such operations
worldwide, which is submitted to the Politburo
through the Central Committee Secretariat
In KGB Residencies
In implementing active measures, KGB officers in the
field can call upon any and all Soviet diplomats, trade
representatives, and other officials to support opera-
tions. KGB staff officers abroad who engage most
frequently in active measures are assigned to the
political-economic section (or "PR line," from the
Russian initials for political intelligence) of the resi-
dency. Certain PR-line case officers specialize in
active measures, dividing their time between intelli-
gence collection and influence operations. For exam-
ple, former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko esti-
mates he spent 50 percent of his time on active
measures. In the Tokyo residency, where Levchenko
was assigned in 1975-79, a half dozen PR-line case
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officers similarly specialized in influence operations
and formed an "Active Measures Group," which
handled some 25 agents.
KGB active measures officers abroad use a variety of
cover assignments. Many are assigned to embassies
under diplomatic cover, but others use nondiplomatic
and nonofficial assignments that provide access to
particular target groups in the host society. Journalis-
tic cover is especially favored because of the wide
access and freedom of travel that it provides
The KGB has long relied heavily on journalists and
journalistic cover to recruit foreign agents and influ-
ence foreign opinion in the Soviet interest. Since the
1920s it has not only consistently placed its staff
operational personnel under journalistic cover but has
also sought to recruit or co-opt legitimate journalists,
both Soviet and non-Soviet.'
KGB Active Measures Operations
KGB-run active measures operations take varied
forms, and their effectiveness is enhanced by employ-
ing different approaches simultaneously to promote a
given theme. Covert press placements, using non-
Soviet media assets, for example, will often be used to
convey substantive points and create the impression of
widespread acceptance for the policy themes being
pushed by Moscow. The KGB may also devise perti-
nent forgeries to provide documentary "evidence" for
certain points in overt and covert media material. In a
circular reinforcement, Soviet overt media, directed
by the International Information Department in coor-
dination with Service A, will often further publicize
and endorse the covertly placed propaganda and
forgeries. Agents-of-influence, front groups, and pub-
lic conferences and demonstrations stage-managed by
KGB-controlled assets are also used to promote active
measures themes among various target audiences. F_
' Two examples of KGB-controlled foreign journalists who worked
for years as agents-of-influence for Moscow are the Frenchman
Pierre-Charles Pathe' and the Dane Arne Herlov Petersen; both
cases are discussed in Soviet Active Measures, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, Second
Session (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.:
Levchenko's KGB experience illustrates the extent of
Soviet active measures operations in Japan:'
? He estimates that the KGB had over 200 recruited
agents in Japan during the 1975-79 period. Many
were used for anti-American active measures at one
time or another. These agents included journalists,
members of parliament, a former cabinet minister,
and leaders in Japanese political parties.
? One active measures operation was the formation of
a parliamentary group to promote Japanese-Soviet
political and economic cooperation. A Soviet agent,
who was a member of parliament, helped found the
group, and the KGB funded its staff salaries and
monthly magazine.
? The KGB heavily influenced the political platform
of the Japanese Socialist Party in the 1970s; 10 of
the party's high-ranking leaders were Soviet agents-
of-influence.
Another active measures operation, judged particular-
ly successful by the Tokyo residency responsible for it,
was the surfacing of a KGB-fabricated "last will and
testament" of former PRC Premier Chou En-lai
shortly after his death. The document was in fact
written and translated in Moscow by experts of
Service A, then sent to the Tokyo residency for
surfacing in a major conservative Japanese newspaper
through a KGB-controlled influence agent well placed
in the newspaper's hierarchy. Not until Levchenko's
defection in 1979 did it become known that this was a
Soviet operation. The bogus document was designed
to foster uncertainty in Japan about China's political
stability and intentions, at a time when a friendship
treaty was being considered, and to support PRC
leadership factions who might favor reconciliation
with the Soviet Union.
One main purpose of KGB active measures is to lend
credibility to major Soviet campaigns to deceive and
' For details of Levchenko's background and KGB experiences, see
the HPSCI Hearings, Soviet Active Measures, op. cit., pp. 138-198.
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Secret
distort. While the Soviet media daily bombard inter-
national audiences with overt propaganda, citing a
broad variety of sources, the KGB selectively rein-
forces certain themes with forged documents, rumors,
agent-of-influence activity, and covert press place-
ments.
Forgeries remain a staple item in the arsenal of active
measures, and examples have turned up over the past
year at an unprecedented rate of about one a month.
(Some 150 anti-US forgeries of suspected Soviet
origin have surfaced since the end of World War II.)
Recent forgeries have included State Department
cables, a Pentagon news release, US business firms'
correspondence, US officials' personal and official
correspondence, a Commerce Department memoran-
dum, US Army field manuals, and other US Govern-
ment documents.
Another type of active measures involves the use of
KGB officers to spread false rumors and engage in
"oral disinformation," including character defama-
tion. Sometimes the KGB will instruct its influence
agents to spread a particular story-for example, that
the US Government intends to support a particular
Third World leader until domestic opposition
emerges, then drop him. This technique was used
against the late President Sadat in Egypt.
KGB involvement in active measures also extends to
cooperative actions in the field with the International
Department. International Department officials, ex
officio, direct and oversee active measures by the
Soviet international front organizations, friendship
societies, and pro-Moscow nonruling Communist par-
ties as well as influence-related actions involving
foreign socialist parties and so-called national libera-
tion movements. KGB officers assist the International
Department to accomplish such tasks by providing for
covert transfer of funds, arranging special clandestine
communications, recruiting and running clandestine
agents, and at times covertly monitoring and working
with certain foreign groups overseen by the Interna-
tional Department, such as an illegal Communist
party.
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The KGB Suppression
of Dissent
When Andropov was its head, the KGB developed
new methods for dealing with dissidents which reflect-
ed a sensitivity to the regime's domestic and foreign
policy interests. Through skillful use of these and
other more conventional tactics, the KGB was able to
harass, isolate, and gradually destroy the human
rights movement in the USSR. Although the dissident
movement is now very weak, there is evidence that
dissenters are returning to the traditional under-
ground methods of operation which, in the long run,
may play into the hands of the KGB.
The KGB and Dissent in the Brezhnev Era
The Soviet Government has always viewed dissent as
illegitimate and sought to suppress "heretical" politi-
cal views and behavior. The severity of the repression
and the tactics used, nonetheless, have varied over
time. Under Stalin, politically deviant behavior was
often punished by death, long-term imprisonment, or
forced labor. The "thaw" following Stalin's death
created a somewhat more liberal atmosphere for
expressing unacceptable political views, but authori-
ties still kept tight control and prevented extensive
contacts between dissidents and the West. During the
Brezhnev years the policy on dissent underwent signif-
icant shifts as foreign policy interests became inter-
twined with domestic policy.
Initially, the Brezhnev regime moved to halt the more
outspoken criticism of Soviet society and leadership
that some intellectuals had begun to articulate in the
latter years of Khrushchev's rule. Beginning with the
arrest of Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuliy Daniel in
1965, the KGB concentrated on removing the best
known and most active dissidents. To facilitate this
crackdown, Andropov set up a new KGB directorate
(the Fifth) in late 1967 or early 1968 with responsibil-
ity for counterintelligence among the intelligentsia,
especially writers, artists, and scientists.
arms and trade negotiations. They permitted an in-
crease in Jewish emigration, which rose from 1,000 in
1970 to over 34,000 in 1973. The KGB relaxed
somewhat its public campaign against dissident activi-
ty, but continued to harass the movement in less
obvious ways. For instance, the show trials of the
1960s were replaced by semipublic or closed trials in
inaccessible locales.
The signing of the Accords of the Helsinki Confer-
ence for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 25X1
in 1975 touched off a new surge of dissident activity.
Yuriy Orlov and others announced the formation of
the Moscow Helsinki Group in May 1976, and Hel-
sinki Groups eventually were set up in four other
republics.' These dissident activists portrayed them-
selves as apolitical defenders of basic civil rights
rather than critics of the regime. They used the
various international human rights declarations
signed by the Soviet Government as their justification
and carried out their activities in an open manner,
routinely meeting with Western diplomats and jour-
nalists, who are always followed by the KGB. F
Meanwhile, other dissident factions, heartened by the
bold manner of the Helsinki Group activists, became
more assertive:
? Fathers Gleb Yakunin and Dmitriy Dudko spoke
out against the Russian Orthodox Church's bent-
knee attitude toward the state.
? Some members of the Moscow Writers' Union
attempted to publish an unofficial, uncensored
journal (Poiski).
? The unofficial trade union SMOT was established
to champion workers' rights.
' Helsinki Monitoring Groups were founded in Lithuania and the
Ukraine (November 1976 Geor i ary 1977), and Armenia
(April 1977).
During the early 1970s, the Soviets, conscious of
Western concern over human rights issues, made
some concessions to create a favorable atmosphere for
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The USSR, mindful of its international image, at-
tempted to slow the proliferation of dissent with KGB
warnings and low-level harassment. By 1976, howev-
er, the leadership was obviously taking the dissident
challenge more seriously. Andropov, in an April 1976
Lenin Day speech, said ". . . our country signed many
agreements and is going to carry them out scrupulous-
ly.... We did not agree, however, to facilitate actions
designed to harm socialism." He cautioned Soviet
citizens against exploiting the CSCE Accords.
As the warnings were ignored and dissent continued
to expand, and as the expected foreign policy benefits
failed to materialize, the regime apparently concluded
that domestic control had to be maintained even at
the expense of the Soviet Union's international image.
The Politburo evidently decided, in late 1976 or early
1977, to crack down hard on the dissident movement.
KGB Tactics
Whatever the policy, the regime has used the KGB to
orchestrate the legal and administrative process for
suppressing dissent. Under Brezhnev, however, the
KGB had to perform this function with greater
sensitivity to both the letter of Soviet law and the
international ramifications of its actions. Its methods,
as a result, have become more varied and sophisticat-
ed. While continuing to use such time-honored tech-
niques as apartment searches, surveillance, wiretap-
ping, and planting false evidence, Andropov and his
subordinates developed new procedures to harass and
suppress dissident activity.
Arrest on Criminal Charges. Some dissidents are
arrested on criminal rather than on "political"
charges, such as anti-Soviet behavior. For example,
Vyacheslav Chornovil, a member of the Ukraine
Helsinki Group, was convicted of rape and sentenced
to five years in a labor camp. (He was still serving a
term of internal exile from a previous political convic-
tion.) By using this tactic the KGB hopes to avoid
some of the international approbrium associated with
the arrest of dissidents and at the same time to
reinforce domestic propaganda that paints dissidents
as immoral renegades. Additionally, if the activist is
unknown in the West, his plight may not come to the
attention of concerned parties as it might if he were
Re-arrest. Other dissidents, already in prison or inter-
nal exile, are re-arrested on trumped-up political or
criminal charges and given another labor camp sen-
tence before their initial term is completed. Merab
Kostava, a member of the Georgia Helsinki Group,
was arrested while serving a sentence of internal exile
and received a new sentence of five years in a strict-
regime camp for resisting a police officer. This ap-
proach keeps dissidents not properly "rehabilitated"
out of action and serves to demoralize their friends
and associates.
Emigration and Exile. Many of the most prominent
and effective dissident intellectuals and "refuseniks"
(Jews who had been refused permission to emigrate)
have been allowed or forced to emigrate. Kronid
Lubarskiy and Valentin Turchin, both veteran activ-
ists, were forced out of the country in 1977. Lev
Kopelev and Vasiliy Aksenov, prominent intellectuals,
were allowed to go abroad in 1981 only to have their
citizenship revoked. Although this tactic brings some
bad publicity, it effectively deprives the dissident
movement of internal leadership. The KGB also uses
emigration as a reward for dissident refuseniks who
keep quiet while denying it to those who seek publicity
for their cause.
Confinement in Psychiatric Hospitals. This practice
increased markedly beginning in 1969 and is a KGB
favorite because the prisoner can be confined indefi-
nitely without being charged. In 1981 Amnesty Inter-
national estimated that up to 1,000 persons were
confined in psychiatric hospitals for political reasons.
This ploy is sometimes used if there is insufficient
evidence for a court conviction or to avoid unwanted
publicity. Vladimir Klebanov attempted to form an
unofficial trade union in 1978 and was immediately
placed in a psychiatric hospital. He was rumored to
have been released last year, but has not been seen. F
Harassment of Foreign Contacts. Dissidents in the
Brezhnev period depended on Western pressure on the
Soviet Government to provide some protection from
KGB persecution. They had been able to publicize
KGB harassment and to transmit their samizdat (self-
published) documents to Western publishers via a
charged with a political crime.
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KGB Campaign Against A leksandr Podrabinek
Aleksandr Podrabinek is a young Jewish activist. He
was a member of the Moscow Helsinki Group and a
cofounder of the Psychiatric Abuses Group. His book
documenting numerous cases of political prisoners
confined in psychiatric hospitals was smuggled out of
the USSR and was instrumental in the World Psychi-
atric Association's 1977 denunciation of Soviet psy-
chiatry. The following chronology details the KGB's
campaign against him:
March 1977
Detained for 15 days under administrative arrest
in connection with Orlov arrest.
Promised permission to emigrate for self and
family if he cooperated.
He refused.
April-October 1977
Detained and interrogated several times.
Apartment searched and samizdat materials
confiscated.
Lost job and could not find another.
Surveillance and frequent taunting by KGB agents.
10 October 1977
Detained following search of his apartment.
network of foreign diplomats and journalists. By
cutting off this foreign support and publicity, the
KGB denied dissidents their audience, and Western
governments and citizens' groups were unable to
monitor Soviet human rights abuses as closely as
To curtail contact between dissidents and Westerners,
the KGB sought to harass and intimidate diplomats
and Western journalists in the Soviet Union who had
close ties with the dissident community. In June 1978,
for example, a US journalist was detained and inter-
rogated for five days for alleged subversive activities
in connection with the Shcharanskiy case. The Soviet
press also has printed several accusatory articles
protesting improper activities of embassy officers on
behalf of dissidents. Last year, members of an official
Apartments of several friends and relatives also
searched.
A speargun, planted by the KGB, was found in the
apartment of brother, Kirill, who was detained.
December 1977
Told to emigrate (with family, including Kirill) or
Kirill, who had never been involved in dissident
activities, would be arrested.
29 December 1977
Kirill arrested for illegal possession of a firearm.
Later sentenced to two and a half years in labor
camp.
May 1978
Aleksandr arrested for anti-Soviet slander.
Later sentenced to five years' internal exile.
June 1980
Both brothers re-arrested while still serving origi-
nal sentences.
Both charged with anti-Soviet slander and sen-
tenced to three years in a strict-regime labor camp.
delegation of the Canadian Jewish Congress were
beaten and robbed when they attempted to meet with
a Leningrad refusenik. A US journalist was expelled
and Western tourists have received heavyhanded
treatment, including interrogations and strip searches.
KGB Effectiveness
The KGB was efficient and thorough in its campaign
against the human rights activists. The arrests began
in early 1977 with Yuriy Orlov, Aleksandr Ginzburg,
and Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. While the Moscow trials
of these three and other secondary figures claimed the
attention of the West, the KGB also focused its
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attention on the small but active republic human
rights groups, arresting most activists in the process.
Following the roundup of important leaders of the
Helsinki Groups, the KGB expanded its net to include
refuseniks, minority nationalists, and religious believ-
ers:
? The opposition group in the Russian Orthodox
Church was silenced by arrests and several public
recantations.
? Editors of the unofficial journal Poiski were arrest-
ed or forced out of the country.
? SMOT was decimated by arrests and may have
gone underground to regroup.
Many leaders of unofficial religious groups, members
of the USSR Chapter of Amnesty International,
several administrators of the Solzhenitsyn Fund, and
many Jewish refuseniks were also harassed and perse-
cuted. Jewish emigration was drastically cut in late
1979 and has been spiraling downward since, with
fewer than 2,700 visas issued last year.
By mid-1980 activists were forced to admit that the
human rights movement might not survive, and in
September 1982 the Moscow Helsinki Group-the
only surviving human rights organization-
announced its intention to disband. Although of little
consequence in practical terms, the demise of this
group signaled the extent of the KGB's victory in
subduing the dissident challenge to Soviet authority.
The sophisticated tactics of the KGB confused the
dissidents, keeping them off balance and unsure of
where the KGB would strike next. The unpredictable
use of leniency and harshness (for example, emigra-
tion as opposed to internment in a prison or psychiat-
ric hospital) was particularly disconcerting. Activists
were demoralized by the depletion of their ranks and
the realization that no new members were being
recruited. Mistrust among groups over goals and
objectives also became a barrier, as did physical
isolation from each other and foreign supporters
the overt methods of operation used by the human
rights movement, are more politically oriented, and
avoid contact with foreigners. These groups operate
underground and publish their documents anony-
mously. The existence of such groups was revealed
last summer when the KGB arrested members of a
reform-oriented Marxist Eurocommunist group whose
samizdat writings included articles on the Soviet
economic crisis and critiques of leaders of European
Communist parties.
The dissidents' return to the traditional, clandestine
mode of operation may ultimately be to the advantage
of the KGB. Such operations, of course, would be
more difficult to ferret out, but once discovered the
authorities would have a free hand in levying punish-
ment against the activists. It would be more difficult
for dissident groups to communicate with each other
and develop cooperation or a unified stance toward
the regime. The possibility of Soviet citizens becoming
aware of dissenting views and activities would be
greatly reduced. Finally, Western publicity and the
resulting complications would be avoided.
In any case, no matter what forms of dissent evolve,
the KGB probably will not release its grip on the
movement. Last year, when Andropov moved up to
the Secretariat, his successor instigated a campaign of
harassment and arrests, apparently to signal that even
though there had been a change in command there
would be no change in policy. The current KGB chief,
Viktor Chebrikov, a longtime Andropov associate,
almost certainly shares a commitment to tight domes-
tic control. Although the Soviets might be willing to
make isolated concessions-such as increasing emi-
gration or resolving sensitive problem cases-these
would be in response to specific foreign policy benefits
and would not signal an internal policy change.
Prospects
The dissident movement in the Soviet Union is at
present weak and fragmented as a result of KGB
persecution. However, there is some evidence that new
dissident groups are forming. They apparently eschew
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Secret
Other Topics
Soviet Strategy Toward
Japan: The Economic-
Political Connection
The Soviet Union once again is employing a "carrot
and stick" approach to improve political relations with
Japan and to weaken Tokyo's ties with Washington.
"Sticks" have predominated in the political sphere
lately, although a few "carrots" have appeared as
well. In the economic realm, the USSR continues to
rely on the "carrots" of export markets for Japanese
goods and access to Siberian resources to create
pressures within Japan for better political relations.
Moscow's short-term prospects are dimmed, however,
by the recent deterioration in political relations over
security matters. Its long-term ability to exploit the
economic relationship is undermined by a growing
Soviet trade deficit with Japan and by diminishing
Japanese interest in Siberia's minerals and fuels.
Other tactics to which the USSR can resort-territo-
rial concessions, military threats, or intensified propa-
ganda against Japanese "militarism"-appear either
too costly for Moscow or largely ineffectual. We
therefore expect the Soviets to continue and perhaps
even to step up manipulation of economic levers. F_
Soviet Objectives
Japan's military ties to the United States, its strategic
position adjacent to the Soviet Pacific Fleet's points of
access to the open ocean, and its military power make
it an important factor in Moscow's perception of the
power balance in Asia. Public statements by Soviet
policymakers have reflected increasing concern over
the Sino-Japanese rapprochement of 1978, Japanese
participation in economic sanctions against the USSR
since 1980, and movement toward greater strategic
cooperation between Washington and Tokyo since
1982. This concern, however, has not made Moscow
willing to offer concessions on.the key issues dividing
the two sides-most notably Japanese demands for
the return of the disputed Northern Territories.
Meanwhile, Japan's resource dependencies, reliance
on export markets for industrial goods, and geograph-
ic proximity to Siberia make it a natural economic
partner for the Soviet Union.
Moscow has suggested that political issues be set
aside while the two nations focus on increased trade
and economic cooperation, in view of what the Soviets
describe as "natural" economic affinities and Mos-
cow's genuine interest in Japanese pipe for energy
projects, technical assistance, and credits for Siberian
development. The Kremlin leaders probably hope to
use the demonstrated advantages of economic ties to
mute-if not eliminate-Soviet-Japanese political dif-
ferences over the long run and to forestall further
intensification of political conflict between the two
nations in the short term. The USSR is probably
hopeful as well that increased economic interde-
pendency, coupled with rising protectionism in the
United States and Western Europe, will encourage
Japan eventually to loosen its political ties to the
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Soviet Union
n \\
Disputed
"Northern Territories"
smkota re (administered by the Soviet Union
O and claimed by Japan)
North
Pacific
Ocean
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The Political Context
Until recently, the Soviet Union apparently attached
great hopes to its "peace offensives" to normalize
relations with Japan and to sidestep the contentious
Northern Territories issue. In the absence of a peace
treaty, Moscow has proposed that the two sides
negotiate:
? A Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation
(1978).
? Confidence-building measures in the Far East
(1981).
? A "no nuclear weapons" agreement-a formal com-
mitment by Tokyo not to produce, station, or import
nuclear weapons in exchange for a Soviet promise
not to use nuclear weapons against Japan (1982).
The Japanese, however,-have turned a deaf ear to
Soviet offers.
Moscow's most recent "peace offensive" stalled in
mid-1982 as both sides pursued conflicting security
policies. Tokyo's decision in late 1981 to increase
defense spending by 7.8 percent had already prompt-
ed expressions of concern by Moscow. The announce-
ment late last fall that Japan would allow the deploy-
ment of US F-16 fighter aircraft beginning in 1985
prompted new Soviet denunciations of Japanese "mili-
tarism." The Japanese meanwhile expressed height-
ened concern about the deployment of SS-20s and
Backfire bombers in the Far East and the moderniza-
tion of ground and air forces in the disputed Northern
The almost simultaneous change in leadership in both
nations at the end of 1982 produced no concrete
moves toward reconciliation. The refusal of General
Secretary Andropov to meet with then outgoing Prime
Minister Suzuki at Brezhnev's funeral in late Novem-
ber suggested from the outset that the new Soviet
leadership was inclined simply to "hang tough" on its
previous offers to Japan even as it signaled its inten-
tion to focus on improving relations with China. F_
The continued pursuit of conflicting security policies
exacerbated the conflict between Moscow and Tokyo
during the early part of this year. Prime Minister
Nakasone's January 1983 visits to Seoul and Wash-
ington prompted Moscow to denounce him by name,
and his characterization of Japan as "an unsinkable
aircraft carrier" elicited an immediate and unprece-
dented threat of Soviet nuclear retaliation. The Sovi-
ets, for their part, in early 1983 made public their late
1982 INF proposal to move some SS-20 missiles
eastward to Siberia-a move which prompted a for-
mal Japanese protest and a call for closer consulta-
tions with the United States and NATO on INF
To increase political pressure on Japan, the USSR has
also intensified its propaganda campaign against Jap-
anese "militarism," hoping to frighten the Japanese
public and Japan's Asian neighbors. Deputy Foreign
Minister Kapista reiterated these charges while visit-
ing Singapore in early April, less than a week before
he was due to arrive in Tokyo for working-level
consultations. To date, however, Moscow has reaped
Economic Tactics: Unfulfilled Expectations
Deteriorating Soviet-Japanese political relations may
have reinforced the Soviet leadership's perception that
expanded economic ties should be used to create a
more favorable political climate:
KGB officials in
early 1982 stressed the growing importance to the
USSR of both Japan's global economic power and
the opportunity to play on conflicting economic
interests-within Japan and between Japan and
other Western nations-to foster a closer Soviet-
Japanese relationship.
? By early 1982, according to a Pravda report, the
Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade was optimistic
that Japan would soon adopt "a more realistic
approach" to economic cooperation with the
USSR-a position reaffirmed by a December 1982
TASS release describing the development of trade
and economic cooperation as "an important factor"
in the emergence of "good-neighbor relations."
? In public statements as well a s r,rivate conversations
Soviet Far East
experts expressed considerable pessimism regarding
a purely political accommodation even as they
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remained optimistic that irreversible economic
forces would draw Japan and the USSR closer
together. In addition to the political benefits that
Moscow could anticipate from such a tactic, there
could be direct economic payoffs as well. These
might include further technical assistance from
Japan to develop Siberia's resource potential and
continuing supplies of large-diameter pipe and other
products for Soviet energy productio
In pursuit of these goals, Moscow intensified its
efforts to create a more favorable environment for
Soviet-Japanese trade and to promote long-term trade
commitments that might discourage future Japanese
participation in Western economic sanctions. Con-
crete measures during the past 12 months included
the following:
? The Soviets in their public statements have played
up their reliability as a trading partner, in contrast
to US moves toward protectionism and Chinese
cancellations of contracts.
? The Soviets encouraged the formation of a trade
mission, which was eventually organized by the
Japanese business community to travel to the USSR
in early 1983.
? The USSR continued to pressure Japan's Ministry
of International Trade and Industry, through the
Japanese business community, to violate OECD
credit guidelines in the interest of "the mutual
benefit of trade on a commercial basis."
Afghanistan and was the largest ever between the two
nations. Despite Tokyo's expressions of caution re-
garding any substantive benefits from the mission,
Soviet commentary prior to the arrival of the group
was decidedly upbeat. The mission met with leading
Soviet economic and political officials and received
favorable Soviet press coverage-a sign of the impor-
tance that Moscow attributed to this group and its
role as a potential lobby upon its return to Japan.
However, a close look at the record of Soviet-Japanese
trade, as well as the current status of Siberian
projects, casts doubt on Moscow's perception that the
lure of Soviet "gold" leaves the Kremlin holding all
the trumps. After spectacular growth in the early
1970s, the rate of increase in Soviet-Japanese trade
appears increasingly uneven, owing in part to political
constraints on the Japanese side (the Afghanistan and
Polish embargoes), occasional pent-up demand, and a
gradual slowdown in Japan's need for Soviet exports
(see table). The large surge in both total trade and
Soviet imports in 1982 resulted from orders for large-
diameter pipe and energy-related equipment which
may not be repeated. Soviet exports to Japan mean-
while have been stagnant since the mid-1970s.
Soviet officials themselves constantly point to the fact
that since 1979 Japan has slipped from second to fifth
place as a Soviet trading partner among Western
nations. From Toyko's perspective, whatever the un-
predictability of Sino-Japanese economic relations,
Beijing may still be more attractive than Moscow. In
1982 Soviet trade with Japan was equivalent to only
63 percent of Japan's trade with China. Meanwhile,
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
traditionally a strong proponent of increased Japa-
nese-Soviet trade, announced in February of this year
that it would not respond to a Soviet request that
Japan act to correct its trade imbalance with the
USSR by increasing imports
negotiate the kinds of large-scale loans the USSR has
nese banking community also remains reluctant to
The centerpiece of Moscow's strategy was the promo- requested to help finance plant orders from Japan.
tion of the private Nagano trade mission (named for
its organizer, the head of Japan's Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry), which traveled to Moscow in
late February 1983. This was the first such mission
from the Japanese side since the Soviet invasion of
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Soviet-Japanese Trade Million US $
Year Soviet
Exports
Soviet
Imports
Soviet
Balance
Total
Turnover
Percent
Change
in Turnover
1972
462
525
-63
987
1973
940
503
+437
1,443
36
1974
1,196
1,022
+174
2,218
65
1975
930
1,742
-812
2,672
20
1976
995
1,825
-830
2,820
6
1977
1,161
1,964
-803
3,125
11
1978
1,082
2,328
-1,246
3,410
9
1979
1,445
2,530
-1,085
3,975
17
1980
1,463
2,729
-1,266
4,192
5
1981
1,135
3,076
-1,941
4,211
NEGL
1982
1,049
4,037
-2,993
5,081
21
Moscow remains concerned about its hard currency
position and has probably reduced its expectations
regarding the value of East-West trade. The latter is
evident in expressions of disappointment over the
contribution of imported technology to industrial out-
put.
Diminishing Japanese domestic demand for Soviet
raw materials, coupled with a global softening of
commodity prices, also figures as a short-term con-
straint on expanded trade. In 1982 the USSR pur-
chased less than 3 percent of all Japan's exports while
providing little more than 1 percent of all Japanese
imports. Such statistics suggest a number of persistent
obstacles to Soviet efforts to create increased Japa-
nese economic dependency on the USSR as a basis for
political leverage.
Prospects for the future appear mixed. The lure of
increased Soviet plant orders from Japan, Moscow's
interest in Japanese robotics (in view of the Soviet
labor shortage), and the ongoing Soviet need for
Japanese steel products make increased trade attrac-
tive to both countries. On the Japanese side, for
example, weak and declining domestic demand for
heavy equipment makes exports of equipment more
critical, and such sales to the USSR during 1980-81
grew faster than those to any other area. In 1982, as
the USSR's trade representative to Tokyo Spandrian
reminded the Japanese, Japan's overall exports to the
USSR rose (largely as a result of energy-related
transactions) even as total exports to other areas
combined declined by about 9 percent.
On the other hand, the global softening of oil prices
and stagnating Soviet oil output are likely to reawak-
en Moscow's concern about its hard currency position
and make any expansion of trade or economic cooper-
ation more dependent than ever on new credits sup-
plied by the Japanese Government. Tokyo's hesitancy
in providing such support-owing to budgetary con-
siderations, opportunities elsewhere, and acquiescence
in a sanctions policy-is not likely to disappear in the
short term. However sympathetic some Japanese busi-
nessmen and trading companies might be to Soviet
calls for greater economic ties, the majority of them
have a far larger stake in trade with the United States
and Western Europe than with the USSR. Therefore,
while a minority may continue to press hard for a
reversal of Japanese Government policies, especially
those involving credit limitations and export controls,
the majority will probably hold back for fear of
antagonizing Japan's other, more important, trading
Nor is the future for expanded economic cooperation
in other Siberian development projects especially rosy.
There appears to be little current Japanese interest in
the five new Siberian projects proposed by the Soviets
prior to the invasion of Afghanistan (Udokan copper,
Vostochniy port expansion, pulp and wood chips,
asbestos, and a Far East steel mill). More importantly,
the Soviet side put forward no new proposals during
talks with the Nagano mission in February of this
year. Japanese press sources meanwhile suggest that
the Soviet preference for compensation deals (repay-
ing loans with output from plants or resource sites)
may prove a barrier to further cooperation. The same
message was relayed to Moscow by the leader of the
Nagano mission
The Sakhalin offshore oil and gas development proj-
ect, a cornerstone of Japanese-Soviet economic coop-
eration, faces a number of uncertainties. Tokyo must
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take into account the high cost of developing the
liquefied natural gas portion and a Japanese demand
that is lower than initially projected. Tokyo's lack of
enthusiasm probably accounts for the hardening of
the government's position on credits in early 1983-
unless or until end-user contracts are provided.
None of the Siberian energy projects will create
Japanese energy dependency on the Soviet Union.
Best case projections for Soviet fuel deliveries to
Japan in 1990 indicate that the USSR will provide at
most between 2.2 and 3 percent of Japanese energy
requirements. Energy "levers" for political purposes
A third option, increased military pressure in the
Kuriles, would adversely affect the USSR's relations
with other Asian countries and probably would in-
crease Japanese hostility in the short run. Increased
use of a "peace campaign" would mean returning to a
tactic that has proved less effectual in Japan than in
Western Europe.
For these reasons, Moscow will probably eschew any
single option while borrowing from all. Efforts to
forge stronger economic ties will continue to form one
of the main elements in Soviet strategy, owing both to
the political orthodoxy of such a tactic and its contri-
bution to a troubled Soviet economy. Soviet efforts to
stimulate both Japanese and Asian opposition to a
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thus appear quite feeble.
Options and Prospects
Moscow's near-term prospects for developing effective
political leverage over Tokyo by means of economic
"carrots" appear limited. Nevertheless, for lack of a
more effective alternative, and because of Moscow's
perception that economic linkages do have political
consequences, efforts to expand and intensify Soviet-
Japanese trade and economic cooperation will most
likely continue
Moscow may also judge that it has few realistic long-
term options for loosening Japan's ties to the West
other than the creation of economic leverage. To offer
total-or even partial-concessions on the Northern
Territories issue would create new vulnerabilities for
Soviet SLBMs in the Sea of Okhotsk and complicate
territorial discussions with China. The "price" for
Japan would certainly involve far more than the
signing of a largely symbolic treaty-probably politi-
cal and military concessions that any Tokyo govern-
ment would reject as too expensive.
A second alternative would have Moscow give up the
Northern Territories in return for Japan's becoming
an "Asian Switerzland." Such a proposal, however,
would increase Chinese and ASEAN fears of the
Soviet Union and would be more likely to elicit a
Japanese military buildup than political acceptance.
greater defense effort by Tokyo, and to the US
military presence in Japan, will continue.
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Moscow and Southern Africa:
What Next?
Developments in southern Africa may soon present
the Andropov leadership with new opportunities and
dilemmas. Zimbabwe may offer a significant opening:
heightened tribal rivalries and security concerns have
prompted Prime Minister Mugabe to improve rela-
tions with Moscow and purchase Soviet arms. South Africa; rival of Pan Africanist Congress.
Angola and Mozambique, Moscow's key clients in the
area, have been exploring the possibility of accommo-
dation with Pretoria and closer ties with the West.
These efforts were prompted by South Africa's in-
creasingly aggressive posture and Soviet tightfisted-
ness. Nonetheless, as long as insurgent groups are a
growing threat, neither country is likely to significant-
ly reduce its ties with the USSR, its leading arms
supplier. In Mozambique, where that threat is espe-
cially serious, Moscow may have to consider a greater
involvement in order to preserve the pro-Soviet re-
gime.
Elsewhere in the region, Soviet efforts to gain influ-
ence in Zambia and Botswana have met with little
success, and Moscow seems to be concerned about
China's efforts to reassert itself with the Soviet-
backed insurgents in Namibia and South Africa.l The major insurgent movement in Namibia
Zimbabwe: New Opportunities
Although Prime Minister Mugabe has effectively
locked the Soviets out of any real involvement in
Zimbabwe since his 1980 electoral victory over Josh-
ua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union
(ZAPU), recent domestic turmoil in ZAPU-dominat-
ed Matabeleland and heightened security concern
apparently have prompted him to reconsider
Glossary
ANC. African National Congress. Insurgent group in
BNF. Botswana National Front. A legal political
party in Botswana.
FRELIMO. Front for the Liberation of Mozambique.
Former guerrilla group which currently rules Mo-
zambique.
MPLA. Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola. Former insurgent group which currently
rules Angola
NRM. National Resistance Movement. Mozambican
insurgent group backed by South Africa.
PAC. Pan Africanist Congress. Insurgent group in
South Africa; rival of African National Congress.
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SWAPO. South-West Africa People's Organization. 25X1
UNITA. National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola. Angolan insurgent movement led by Jonas
Savimbi and backed by South Africa.
ZAPU. Zimbabwe African People's Union. One of the
major guerrilla groups which fought the white minor-
ity regime in Rhodesia before independence in 1980.
y concluding an arms deal with Moscow himself,
Mugabe probably hopes to preclude Soviet support to
ZAPU if renewed insurgency warfare should recom-
mence, and to ensure that he has alternative suppliers
should the violence in Matabeleland lead the West to
turn its back on his regime.
The Soviets are eager to develop a presence in Zimba-
bwe, particularly one that would enable them to build
ties to the military.
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Figure 1
Insurgent Activity in Angola and Mozambique
Gabon Congo
Angola
Namibia
*Windhoek
S. Africa
(Walv,c Bay
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Zaire
10
Tanzania
Harare
qr Zimbabwe
v f
Z l
Mbabane*
Swaziland
th
Africa
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
t Mase`h
Leegtf{o
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Figure 2
Mozambique President Machel with General
Secretary Andropov and Foreign Minister
Gromyko during March 1983 talks in the Kremlin.
Angola and Mozambique: New Dilemmas?
More problematic for the USSR are the recent
developments in Angola and Mozambique. Pretoria
and local insurgents backed by Pretoria are posing a
growing security threat to the pro-Soviet regimes.
Another concern is the economic disarray in the two
countries-in part the result of that threat)
To meet the military threat, Moscow has provided
additional military hardware, including some ad-
vanced weapons. Over the past year it has introduced
SA-8 surface-to-air missiles into Angola and more
modern armored personnel carriers into Angola and
More important, increased Cuban casualties in
Angola indicate that Cuban forces have become more
active in combating the insurgents of the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA). Havana also may be considering the intro-
duction of additional advisers-or possibly combat
troops-into Mozambique
The Soviets may also be considering an augmentation
of their advisory presence in Mozambique. A Soviet
Foreign Ministry official recently stated that it is not
enough to give arms to Mozambique, but that people
must be trained to use them. Moscow's concern was
evident in the high-level attention given to President
Machel during his visit to Moscow in March 1983- 25X1
he had individual meetings with General Secretary
Andropov, Defense Minister Ustinov, Foreign Minis-
ter Gromyko, and other leaders. However, they proba-
bly did not offer him the major increases in military
or economic assistance that he apparently was seek-
ing-to judge by Machel's public statements.
Financial issues have caused Moscow trouble with
Angola as well. The major irritants for Luanda have
been: having to pay the Cuban combat forces in
scarce hard currency, Soviet exploitation of Angolan
fishing waters, and Moscow's stringent credit terms.
Frictions have even developed over a 10-year aid
package, reportedly for $2 billion, agreed upon in
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early 1982.
the Soviets insist on including a large dam project,
despite the objections of the Angolans, who want to
channel funds toward agriculture and light industry.
Some Angolans reportedly view this project as a ploy
to ensure a long-term Soviet involvement in Angola.
Such friction probably explains why economic assist-
ance has become an important element of the US-
Angolan discussions on Namibia and normalization of
relations
Moscow is probably growing uneasy about the reli-
ability of these two important clients.
that elements of the ruling Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) might sell out to the
United States over the Cuban troop question. The
Soviets may also be disturbed by the following
developments:
? Several pro-Soviet members in the MPLA hierarchy
were demoted after President dos Santos assumed
emergency powers in early December 1982.
? Luanda has not broken off its yearlong dialogue
with the United States.
? The Angolans have had several direct talks with the
South Africans-reportedly to negotiate a cease-
fire.
? Luanda established diplomatic relations with China
in January 1983.
Soviet and
Cuban officials in Luanda recently warned dos Santos
about their dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in
Angola-and with his leadership. Moscow may have
similar concerns about Mozambique, where President
Machel has established a dialogue with the United
States and has made some tentative overtures to
South Africa
The Soviets have expressed displeasure at efforts by
Mozambique and Angola to seek arms and training
from Portugal. Similarly, they probably disapproved
when the two countries acceded to the so-called Berlin
clause-which states that West Berlin is part of
Western Europe-in order to qualify for economic
assistance from the European Community
On the other hand, Moscow presumably recognizes
that recent successes of UNITA in Angola and the
National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Mozam-
bique make it unlikely that either nation would
substantially reduce ties with the USSR, its most
important arms supplier.
some Soviet officials are also buoyed by
t e curren impasse over the Cuban troop issue in the
Namibia talks.
SWAPO and the ANC: The China Factor
Beijing's renewed activity in southern Africa may
eventually complicate Moscow's aims, particularly
vis-a-vis the South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) in Namibia and the African National
Congress (ANC) in South Africa-national liberation
movements which have generally been pro-Soviet. In
January 1983 SWAPO chief Sam Nujoma visited
Beijing,
January, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang met with
ANC leader Oliver Tambo in Lusaka during a swing
through Africa. Following the meeting, ANC spokes-
men expressed "guarded optimism" that China might
for the first time provide diplomatic and material
support.
Perhaps in response to these Chinese moves, the
Soviets have recently moved to establish contacts with
the ANC's chief rival, the Chinese-backed Pan Afri-
canist Congress (PAC), a group whose efforts to
mount operations against South Africa have been
ineffective to date. This move may also reflect a
reassessment of strategy toward rival guerrilla move-
ments-arising from the Soviet experience in Zimba-
bwe, where the USSR bet on the wrong horse.
Soviet relations with SWAPO and the ANC are
complicated because these groups have ties with
Angola and Mozambique and thus are affected by the
state of Soviet relations with the MPLA and with
Machel's Mozambique Liberation Front
(FRELIMO). For example, Moscow, which has pub-
licly stated its willingness to step up support for
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SWAPO's armed struggle in Namibia, would presum-
ably view an Angolan-South African cease-fire as a
major constraint on its ability to promote SWAPO
Elsewhere in the Region
Elsewhere in southern Africa, the Soviets have had
some success in establishing a presence, but such
gains have not been translated into real influence. In
Zambia they introduced a 65-man military advisory
group in 1980, following a major arms deal. However,
they have failed to gain major influence because of
President Kaunda's abiding suspicion of their motives
and his desire to stay strictly nonaligned. In the
unlikely event that Kaunda leaves or is ousted any
time soon, the left-leaning Defense and Security
Minister Grey Zulu might try to tilt foreign policy
toward the USSR; but such efforts would be tempered
by the need for consensus in Zambia's tribally based
collective leadership.
Soviet efforts to expand relations with Botswana have
met with little success. Moscow succeeded in estab-
lishing a small advisory presence after a $6 million
arms deal was signed in December 1980, but the
Botswanans subsequently concluded larger arms deals
with Washington. Highlighting the current impasse in
relations, four Botswanan military officers were dis-
missed on charges of spying for Moscow in November
1982, and the contract for Soviet advisers was allowed
to expire. Soviet efforts now focus largely on the
fortunes of the legal opposition party, the Botswana
National Front (BNF), and on attempts to broaden
cultural ties. The Soviets give some financial support
to the BNF, which has apparently furnished Moscow
with information on issues of regional importance,
and are attempting to establish a Botswana-USSR
friendship society organized around young Botswa-
nans educated in the Soviet Union
Outlook
Moscow will probably seek to maintain its position in
the region by supplying its clients with more and
better equipment to counter the South Africans and
by providing more training in counterinsurgency
against the Pretoria-backed local guerrilla groups.
The Soviets have shown in Angola and Mozambique
Nonetheless, the insurgent threat in Mozambique
may pose a dilemma for Moscow and Havana. Mos-
cow's attempt to preserve the FRELIMO regime by
gradually increasing military assistance may prove
insufficient. If convinced that FRELIMO could only
be preserved by a large Cuban combat force, Moscow
would have to weigh the importance of demonstrating
its commitment to Third World clients against the
potential damage to its "peace offensive" and its
attempt to undercut the US administration's call for
increased defense spending. Moscow also would have
to consider the impact of such moves on Pretoria,
which has clearly stated it would not countenance a
Cuban troop presence. A strong South African mili-
tary response would force Moscow and Havana to
choose between escalation and an embarrassing re-
In the economic sphere, Moscow's poor record on aid
questions-and the willingness of Western powers to
address economic problems in southern Africa-rein-
force black African efforts to balance ties between
East and West. Nonetheless, friction over economic
assistance will not seriously affect Moscow's position
as long as military needs remain the top priority for
China is unlikely to replace the USSR as the key
source of arms assistance in Angola and Mozam-
bique, but it could make inroads with SWAPO and
the ANC, whose military needs are relatively small.
Despite perennial frictions between Moscow and its
clients over aid questions and the potential challenge
posed by a revitalized China, regional instability and
heightened black African security concerns will en-
able Moscow to maintain-and possibly expand-its
that they are willing to do this.
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Soviet Naval Activity Outside
Home Waters in 19821
Throughout 1982, significant trends in Soviet naval
deployment patterns included:
? A decline in the presence of naval reconnaissance
aircraft at overseas bases. Deployment patterns to
Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cuba, and Angola were
interrupted, but deployments to Libya expanded
(see figure 1).
Figure 1
Distant Deployments of Soviet Naval Aviation
? A moderate increase in ship-days outside home
waters in the Pacific. The upturn reflected primarily
a larger presence in the South China Sea, particu-
larly for general purpose submarines.
? The use of naval forces to respond to regional
tensions or to indicate support for a local govern-
ment. Reinforcement of Soviet forces in the eastern
Mediterranean, port calls to Mocamedes, Angola,
and visits to Port Victoria, Seychelles, demonstrated
the political role of naval deployments.'
Soviet naval ships spent more than 56,700 ship-days
outside home waters in 1982 '-an increase of roughly
3 percent over 1981 and only 1 percent lower than the
record high total of 1980.
Syria, IL-38 May and
TU-16 Badger
Libya, IL-38 May
Ethiopia, IL-38 May
South Yemen, IL-38 May
Aircraft days in country
5,000
In the Indian Ocean, where the Soviet presence rose
substantially in 1980, ship-days continued the down-
ward trend begun in 1981. Deployments to the waters
off West Africa rose sharply as Moscow revived the 1,000
small patrol that operates in the region, partly in
response to increased concern about hostilities be-
tween Angola and South Africa. Ship-days in the
Atlantic and the Mediterranean changed only mar-
ginally, despite political tensions in both regions- 6
such as the Falkland Islands and Syrian crises. A task
group arrived in the Caribbean in December, too late
0
a
Vietnam, TU-142 Bear F
Vietnam, TU-95 Bear D
Angola, TU-95 Bear D
Cuba, TU-95 Bear D
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statistics for Soviet deployments outside home waters and deter-
mines the regional limits of distant deployments. A "shi
represents one ship away from home waters for one day
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Figure 2
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,
by Region
Caribbean Sea
West African waters
Mediterranean Sea
Indian Ocean
Pacific Ocean
80
81
Figure 3
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,
by Ship Type
1-lydrographic and space
event support ships
Auxiliaries
Amphibious ships
Mine warfare ships
Surface combatants
General purpose
submarines
SSBNs
to prevent a small decline in the average Soviet major surface combatants, and reduced deployment of
presence for the year. Pacific deployments increased ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to the Pacific.
moderately, as mentioned above. (Figures 2 and 3 summarize Soviet out-of-area de-
ployment since 1974 by region and type of ship.)
Changes in the composition of forces deployed to
foreign waters included the increased use of general
purpose submarines, cutbacks in the presence of
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Secret
Soviet Naval Aviation
Maritime reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) patrol aircraft continued to play a large role in
Soviet operations in distant areas, making continuous
or periodic deployments to six nations outside the
Warsaw Pact. Their presence outside the USSR
dropped by 13 percent, however, according to data
provided by the US Navy, and established deploy-
ment patterns were disrupted in several areas. F_
In the Indian Ocean area, where the Soviets have kept
three pairs of IL-38 May ASW patrol aircraft since
January 1980, deployments dropped by nearly a
quarter. the pair
that is normally at Asmara, Ethiopia, was withdrawn
for several months, and for part of the year there was
only one pair instead of two at Aden, South Yemen.
In the Atlantic, deployments of TU-95 Bear D long-
range maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Cuba-
which have taken place periodically since 1970-were
almost continuous until the end of the year, when
there was an extended gap of almost three months.;
During the same time period, there were no Bear D's
in Luanda, Angola. Bear D's operating from Angola
normally stop over in Cuba en route to and from their
Northern Fleet bases. Moreover, although the Bear
D's in Angola monitored the British transit to the
southern Atlantic in the spring of 1982 during the
Falkland Islands crisis, there were no aircraft present
in Luanda during the second half of the crisis.F___1
Moscow continued periodic deployments of IL-38s to
Libya throughout the year. (Soviet aircraft initially
deployed to Libya in the summer of 1981, following a
joint naval exercise with Syria.) During deployments
to Tripoli, the aircraft have conducted ASW patrols,
joint training with the Mediterranean Squadron, and
surveillance of Western naval forces.
Indian Ocean
According to US Navy data, Soviet ship-days in this
area declined about 4 percent in 1982 and were more
than 10 percent below the peak established in 1980.
The squadron generally had about 28 ships-four
fewer than were present during 1980, when the
United States expanded its naval presence in the
region in response to the Iranian hostage crisis. The
cutback during 1982 continued a trend begun in 1981,
when US force levels began to drop following the
resolution of the hostage crisis.
Throughout the year, the squadron included two or
three general purpose submarines, three surface com-
batants, two amphibious ships, and 15 auxiliaries. The
presence of general purpose submarines in the region
fell by roughly 30 percent, largely as a result of a gap
in the presence of F-class diesel-powered submarines
(SSs). There have only been two other such gaps since 25X1
F-class submarines began regular deployments to the
region in 1972. The Soviets continued to use V-class
nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) from the
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he initial deployment to the region of a V-III-
7
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class SSN from the Pacific Fleet took place during
1982. The increased number of V-class SSNs in the
Pacific Fleet may permit Moscow to reduce the
burden on the Northern Fleet of supplying SSNs for
operations in the Indian Ocean
The presence of surface combatants declined more
than 25 percent. Soviet combatants monitor Western
naval movements and spend most of their operational
time in the northern Arabian Sea, keeping a close
watch on the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Strait of
Hormuz. In October 1982 the Kiev-class VTOL 25X1
carrier Minsk made its first deployment to the Indian
Ocean as a Pacific Fleet unit. It operated in the
northern Indian Ocean for about one month, making
calls at Aden, South Yemen, and Bombay, India.
Reports from Western ships operating nearby indicate
that operations by its YAK-38 Forger aircraft demon-
strated improved flight proficiency, as would be ex-
pected as the pilots gain experience. The Forgers also
were observed for the first time carrying air-to-air
missiles. The Minsk apparently suffered an engineer-
ing casualty or fuel contamination, which may have
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cut short its deployment to the region, but it contin-
ued to conduct training and flight operations through-
out its return to Pacific waters. Its departure in
January 1983 left the Indian Ocean Squadron without
a major surface combatant for the first time since
1977.
Soviet ships continued to call at regional ports as part
of Moscow's effort to secure or expand its access to
naval facilities in the Third World. The calls in 1982
involved ports where the Soviets already receive logis-
tic support-Aden, South Yemen, for example-or
where facilities might prove valuable in the future,
such as Mozambique. According to the US Embassy,
the Soviets received permission to call in Mauritius in
November despite the new leftist government's pre-
election rhetoric about closing its ports to all foreign
warships. Soviet ships also called in the Seychelles
following an army mutiny during the summer and
during a period of domestic unrest in the fail. Use of
naval forces to show Soviet support for the troubled
regime of President Rene had occurred on several
earlier occasions.
The Indian Ocean Squadron gets the bulk of its
logistic support from its own auxiliary ships, which
make up about 50 percent of the Soviet presence in
the region. Moscow did not expand its land-based
The Soviets keep a small repair
ship, an 8,500-ton floating drydock, and a stores
barge there, and their yard oiler from Aden moves to
Dahlak on occasion. Moscow contracted for the repair
of two naval auxiliaries at Sri Lanka; we believe that
it hopes to use Colombo to compensate partially for
the exclusion of Soviet naval ships from Singapore
following the invasion of Afghanistan.
Pacific Ocean
Ship-days in distant areas of the Pacific rose by
almost 16 percent in 1982, countering the decline of
some 6 percent in 1981 and establishing a record total
for the region well above the 1980 level (see figure 4).
Analysis of US Navy data shows that the daily
average number of units on distant deployment was
35 (it was 30 in 1981). The increase reflects primarily
Figure 4
Soviet Ship-Days in the Pacific Ocean
liydrographic and space
event support ships
Auxiliaries
Surface combatants
General purpose
submarines
SSBNs
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a 90-percent rise in the use of general purpose
submarines, which offset the decline in the presence of
major surface combatants and SSBNs
In contrast to earlier years, the major factor driving
overall Pacific Ocean ship-day totals was operations
in the South China Sea, rather than the movement of
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ships to and from the Indian Ocean. The US Navy
does not compile ship-days for the South China Sea
separately
indicated that the Soviets generally kept two or three
surface ships, two or three general purpose subma-
rines, and eight auxiliaries there. Expanded opera-
tions in the South China Sea reflected primarily
increased submarine patrol activity.
Use of Cam Ranh Bay continues to be limited by the
lack of bunkering and repair facilities. The Soviets
keep a small repair ship and transporter dock there,
and the port is a convenient stopover for ships operat-
ing in the South China Sea or en route to or from the
Indian Ocean. Soviet ships, however, receive their
logistic support from naval auxiliaries deployed to the
area. Marginal improvements at Cam Ranh, such as
the expansion of berthing space, were taking place at
the end of the year. In addition, imagery shows that
the Soviets delivered an 8,500-ton floating drydock to
Ho Chi Minh City and have been using the facilities
there for upkeep on small naval auxiliaries. Ho Chi
Minh City might relieve a small part of the burden
imposed by the loss of access to Singapore.
The Mediterranean Sea
Soviet ship-days in the Mediterranean declined about
3 percent. Generally, the squadron included 44 or 45
ships, about half of them auxiliaries. For much of the
year, there were no amphibious ships in the region,
and there was generally one less submarine present
than in 1981. The presence of surface combatants
(including patrol craft) rose about 10 percent-less
than might have been expected, given the tensions in
the eastern Mediterranean.
Soviet reaction to the crisis in Lebanon and the
subsequent augmentation of US forces in the eastern
Mediterranean was a moderate reinforcement of the
squadron, similar to that of June-July 1981.
Moscow moved several large
combatants to the eastern Mediterranean and estab-
lished surveillance of US battle groups. Two cruisers
and the commander of the squadron remained in or
near Tartus, Syria, until early September. In addition,
a patrol was maintained off the coast of Lebanon.
Activities highlighting Moscow's commitment to Syr-
ia did not include a joint naval exercise as they did in
July 1981.
Soviet combatants called in Libya five times during
1982, building on the naval ties established during
1981, and conducted a joint exercise with Libyan
naval forces in October. Late in December,
a J-class cruise missile
submarine (SSG) and a repair ship called in Tobruk,
the first time either type of ship had visited Libya.
The repair ship stayed until mid-February 1983,
suggesting the possibility that Moscow may hope to
establish an upkeep capability in Tobruk similar to
that in Tartus. The Soviets have never fully compen-
sated for the loss of facilities in Egypt'-particularly
for the overhaul of submarines, which come from the
Northern Fleet-and would welcome the opportunity
to exploit Qadhafi's sense of vulnerability. We believe
that they are wary of his unpredictability, however-
as the abrupt withdrawal of the repair ship during US
naval maneuvers in the central Mediterranean dem-
onstrated-and will be cautious in their pursuit of
naval ties with his regime,
Atlantic Ocean
Ship-days in the Atlantic, which include many inter-
fleet transfers and transits to operating areas, de-
clined less than 1 percent. In 1982 there were general-
ly about 38 ships deployed to the Atlantic, including
eight SSBNs, 10 general purpose submarines, two
major surface combatants, and 17 auxiliary or re-
search ships. Changes in the composition of forces
deployed to the Atlantic included an 8-percent rise in
the presence of general purpose submarines and a
decline in the patrol time of SSBNs. Soviet activity
focused on normal spring training for the Northern
Fleet, including defense of SSBNs and their patrol
areas. Naval forces also monitored US SSBN transit
routes and Western naval exercises
Caribbean Sea
Soviet presence in the Caribbean declined more than
10 percent, largely because only part of the stay of the
Caribbean task group took place in 1982. The group,
which included a cruiser, a frigate, and a T-class SS,
' Soviet submarines are serviced in Syria and Yugoslavia, and
occasionally in Algeria. Naval auxiliaries and combatants are
repaired in Tunisia, and the Greek Government has permitted
individual contracts for repair of auxiliaries at designated ship-
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arrived in early December. The ships were in Havana
for the celebration of Cuban Armed Forces Day and
conducted ASW operations near Cienfuegos, as they
havt done in the past. The surface combatants also
operated in the Gulf of Mexico. Joint training with
Cuban naval forces complements Moscow's continued
support for the upgrading of Castro's navy. For much
of the year, the Soviets also kept a research ship and
an auxiliary in the region
West African Waters
An 80-percent increase in ship-days off West Africa
marked the revitalization of the West African patrol
after three years of declining Soviet presence. Accord-
ing to reports from Western air patrols, a diesel
submarine rejoined the contingent in the spring of
1982, and a major surface combatant and an amphib-
ious ship operated in the region for much of the year.
At least one mine warfare ship was present regularly
to patrol the fisheries protection zone that was estab-
lished in 1980 off Morocco
Soviet ships off West Africa have generally been
relatively inactive, spending considerable time in ei-
ther Luanda, Angola, or Conakry, Guinea. This pat-
tern held in 1982, but additional port calls empha-
sized Soviet political interests:
? In July a Moskva-class helicopter cruiser and its
escorts called at Lagos, Nigeria, marking the first
Soviet naval visit since 1976.
? Soviet ships made several calls to Mocamedes,
Angola.
? A V-11-class SSN operated off West Africa in
November and called in Luanda. Earlier calls by
V-class SSNs have been part of their transits to the
Indian Ocean.
The West African patrol contributed little to the
marginal Soviet response to the Falkland Islands
crisis. The diesel submarine may have monitored the
northern leg of the British transit to Ascension Island.
Intelligence collection ships (AGIs) watched part of
the transit and British activity at Ascension-where
Soviet AGIs periodically collect against US missile
tests. The surface combatants for the most part
remained in their normal operating patterns.
Outlook
We do not expect dramatic statistical changes in
Soviet deployments to distant waters in 1983. We
expect to see continued experimentation with general
purpose submarines as their availability increases,
particularly in the Pacific. SSBN ship-days may
remain below earlier totals as units are dismantled to
comply with SALT limitations and as the
Y-class submarines age.
Barring changes in US force levels in the Indian
Ocean, the Soviets will continue to adjust their com-
mitment there to reflect the lower level of tension and
increased commitments elsewhere, such as the South
China Sea. Soviet naval forces have already played a
part in responding to the continuing crisis in Lebanon,
but the level of reinforcement has not yet been
sufficient to create an overall increase in Mediterra-
nean ship-days. We believe that Moscow will pursue
naval access in vulnerable Third World states such as
Libya and Seychelles, but the level of its overseas
deployments will not depend on the success of these
efforts.
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Expansion and
Modernization of East
German Ground Forces
The East German Army is undertaking a program of
restructuring and equipment modernization designed
to give its forces a more balanced combined-arms
capability and to make them conform more closely to
the Soviet forces stationed in East Germany.
East German motorized rifle
regiment has formed a subordinate artillery
battalion, indicating that it is adopting an expanded
combined-arms structure similar to that of Soviet
MRRs. Newer equipment being introduced includes
122-mm M- 1974 self-propelled (SP) howitzers,
152-mm M-1973 SP howitzers, and an improved
variant of the T-72 tank (the M-1980/1).
Reorganization and Expansion
Motorized Rifle Regiments. MRRs constitute the
bulk of the maneuver elements of the East German
Army-its four motorized rifle divisions and two tank
divisions have a total of 14 MRRs and 10 tank
regiments. Accordingly, changes in the organization
and size of MRRs have a significant impact on the
We expect this pattern to continue, and over the next
several years each of the 14 East German MRRs will
probably form a complete three-battery howitzer bat-
talion (see figure 1). This would conform to the
18-tube organization seen in Soviet MRRs in the
The use of both towed and SP howitzers may be an
interim measure until the East German Army can
equip these units entirely with SP howitzers. (Current
Soviet artillery battalions normally do not contain
both towed and self-propelled howitzers unless they
are in the process of transition to all SP artillery.)
These towed D-30s are not newly manufactured and
may have been taken from the artillery regiments of
tank divisions, where they appparently were replaced
by new 122-mm SP howitzers. Nevertheless, the
D-30s are an improvement over the towed M-30
122-mm howitzers of World War II design with
which most East German MRRs are equipped. =
We believe that the organizational change will occur
gradually in the remaining MRRs, as D-30s are
replaced by SP howitzers in divisional artillery regi-
ments and as more SP artillery is purchased. Figure 2
shows the increase in new SP artillery through 1990 if
the reorganization continues at the present pace.C
If the upgrading of the MRR artillery element from a
single battery to a three-battery battalion is the first
step in a general reorganization of East German
MRRs along Soviet lines, then we would also expect
to eventually see their mortar batteries increase from
six 120-mm mortars to eight. Further in the future,
we would expect to see those MR battalions equipped
with BMPs increase from 31 to 43 vehicles and those
equipped with BTR armored personnel carriers to
increase from 31 to 40. Approximately 2,000 men, 72
BTRs, 216 BMPs, and 84 mortars would be required
to implement these changes in all 14 East German
We believe the formation of a subordinate artillery
battalion in a motorized rifle regiment is not an
isolated phenomenon but indicates the start of a
general reorganization and ex ansion of East German
MRRs. an East German
MRR equipped with MP armored combat vehicles
has a battery of six 122-mm SP howitzers. This
suggests that it also is in the process of forming an
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Figure 1
Features of Projected East German Army Reorganization
Motorized Rifle Regiment
(in motorized rifle and tank divisions)
Motorized Rifle
Battalion
(31 BMPs and 6
120-mm mortars)
r Motorized Rifle
Battalion
1 (43 BMPs and 8
L 120-mm mortars, J
LT-----_J I
Tank Regiment
(in a tank division)
Regimental
Headquarters
Tank Battalion
Artillery Battery
(8 M-30 towed
howitzers)
rArtillery Battalion
(2 batteries, each with 6
122-mm towed howitzers-
either D-30s or M-30s, and
M 1974
f 6
I battery o
122-mm self-propelled
howitzers)
Regimental
Headquarters
Motorized Rifle
Company
(with BMPs)
Motorized Rifle Battalion
(48 BMPs and 8
120-mm mortars)
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Figure 2
Projected Increase in Self-Propelled
Artillery in the East German Army
200 M-1973152-mm
self-propelled howitzer
M-1974 122-mm
self-propelled howitzer
This chart depicts the projected increase in
self-propelled artillery through 1990 if the
reorganization continues at the present pace.
Figure 3
Soviet Self-Propelled Howitzers
Tank Regiments. The reorganization of MRRs also
may presage a change in the organization of the East
German tank regiment (TR) to conform more closely
to the Soviet pattern of creating combined-arms for-
mations within the division. If so, the principal change
would be to expand the motorized rifle companies to
battalions in each TR for both tank divisions. To
implement this change would require approximately
Equipment Modernization
While the East German-Army is shifting its equip-
ment holdings as a result of reorganization, it is
simultaneously modernizing its forces by adding SP
artillery and fielding an improved version of the T-72
Artillery. The artillery regiment of one of the two
tank divisions recently replaced a battalion of D-30s
with self-propelled artillery and now consists of one
battalion of 152-mm SP howitzers and two battalions
of 122-mm SP howitzers.
We expect that the other tank
division's artillery regiments will convert to all self-
propelled systems within the year. Only one artillery
regiment of the four motorized rifle divisions current-
ly has SP artillery (one battalion of 152-mm howit-
zers); we expect the introduction of self-propelled
systems in such units to continue gradually through
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The fielding of the 122-mm SP howitzers in East
German divisional artillery regiments does not reflect
current Soviet practice. In Soviet forces in East
Germany, these howitzers are used only in maneuver
Figure 4
Projected Increase in T-72 Variants in
the East German Army
regiments; divisional artillery regiments use the heavi-
er 152-mm SP howitzers. This structure and the slow 2,000
pace in fielding this equipment probably reflect East
German budgetary constraints (this equipment has
been available for purchase for eight years). We
believe that the current structure is an interim meas-
ure and that at least one of the two battalions of
122-mm SP howitzers will be replaced with 152-mm
SP howitzers as additional funds are made available. 1,000
The replaced howitzers probably would be added to
the inventory of self-propelled weapons in the MRRs.
Tanks. The T-72 tank was first introduced into one
tank battalion of an East German tank division in
1979. In 1982 an improved T-72 variant, the M-1980/1,
was sighted for the first time in a different battalion
of this division. The introduction of what appears to
be a second and possibly a third battalion of T-72s
still leaves the vast majority of East German tank
battalions equipped with older T-55 tanks. We esti-
mate that improved T-72s will continue to be fielded
over the next eight to 10 years, gradually replacing
the older T-55s (see figure 4).
Evaluation
The reorganization of the East German MRR is
similar to that undertaken by the Soviet forces in
Germany in the mid-1970s. During that period artil-
lery batteries in Soviet MRRs were expanded to
battalions, artillery battalions were added to tank
regiments, self-propelled artillery was introduced, and
new-model tanks entered the ground forces. Soviet
tank regiments also expanded their motorized rifle
companies to battalion size
Additional artillery provides the suppressive firepower
the Soviets want for countering the proliferation of
NATO antitank weapons. When self-propelled, it
provides the survivability and flexibility for surprise
attacks, for the mobile battle and meeting engage-
ment, and for the subsequent exploitation operations
during which artillery must be able to keep up with
20U I ~// I I I I
0 1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
This chart depicts the projected increase in T-72 variants
if they continue to be introduced at the current rate.
tanks and armored personnel carriers. The tank mod-
ernization is an effort to keep pace with NATO tank
and antitank developments.
East Germany's adoption of a similar pattern of
reorganization and modernization is in response to
Soviet pressure to upgrade its forces. The current
program indicates that East Gemany will continue to
lead the other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in
the purchase of modern ground force equipment.
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Briefs
Sino-Soviet Talks The Soviet Union and China, while continuing to expand their bilateral contacts,
in Moscow End still appear to be talking past each other to a large extent on the key issues dividing
them. A Chinese party official has disclosed that at the recently concluded talks in
Moscow the Soviets proposed a nonaggression pact and mutual force reductions
along the Sino-Soviet border, but excluded Soviet forces in Mongolia from the
deal. The Chinese are said to have responded by reiterating their standard
preconditions for a normalization of relations. Both sides have, in the meantime,
hardened their public positions on the troop cut issue-the Soviets, by pointing to
US activities and the prospects of a Japanese military buildup as complicating
factors; the Chinese, by raising the SS-20 redeployment issue.
The correct atmospherics surrounding the talks and the fact that both sides are
keeping quiet about the precise nature of their exchanges suggest that some new
initiatives may have been tabled that they want to pursue. Beijing is, of course, al-
most certain to reject any Soviet initiative on mutual force reductions as long as
Soviet forces in Mongolia are excluded. Moscow, for its part, seems determined to
avoid any discussion of third-party issues at bilateral talks with the Chinese. The
Soviets may, however, be hinting at an interest in parallel agreements between the
USSR and China on the one hand, and China and Mongolia on the other, that
would see the contracting parties:
? Sign a nonaggression pact with each other.
? Agree on certain confidence-building measures akin to the commitments the
USSR has made in the West.
? Reach an understanding on troop cuts/withdrawals in the Far East.
We would, in any event, expect both sides to negotiate long and hard on these or
any other matters directly related to their security interests.
Gromyko's New Post (U) Foreign Minister Gromyko's promotion to first deputy premier last month
increased his status and gave him broad authority over the entire foreign policy es-
tablishment. It also strengthened Andropov's position in the Council of Ministers
Presidium, which oversees the government bureaucracy.
Gromyko's seniority on the Politburo makes him the most senior of three first
deputy premiers. His promotion diminishes the authority of Premier Tikhonov,
who has not been closely allied with Andropov and was on an official visit to Yugo-
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Soviet Union: Soil Moisture in Major Grain-Producing Areas
The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative. a,
Area with very low soil moisture
as of 1 April 1983. This area
produces about 25 percent
of the winter grain output.
lrtysh
`Moscow
Black Sea
-...J.nr~.,.`S
47 no-oCl
Pakistan India \
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Spring Grains
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Mid-April Crop (During the Soviet crop season-April to October-the USSR Monthly Review
Conditions F_~ will provide a brief update of the status of the 1983 crop.)
Crop conditions as of mid-April indicate that 1983 winter grain production in the
USSR is likely to be somewhat below the recent estimated five-year average of
some 60 million tons. This analysis is based principally on a small planted area and
poor growing conditions since last fall in several key crop-producing regions.
Winter grains normally account for about one-third of the total Soviet grain
dmancy in poor condition. Stands were thin, growth was uneven, and many fields
were being resown with spring grains. Dry soil conditions were evident across
much of the region, corroborating meteorological data and ground observations by
the US Agricultural Counselor. There is still time for the crops to overcome some
of these problems, but even a modest improvement will require ideal growing
conditions during the next two months
The generally poor crop prospects in the southern European USSR have been
partially offset by favorable conditions further north, where winter rye predomi-
nates. Sowing in this region was generally completed within the optimum time
periods, and adequate soil moisture levels have been maintained through the
winter. With spring fieldwork just recently under way, it is still too early to make
even a preliminary forecast of total 1983 Soviet grain output.
Soviets Testing On 10 March, Army Gen. Vladimir Tolubko, Commander in Chief of the
GLCM[ Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and a Deputy Defense Minister, announced in
Moscow that the Soviet Union possesses a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)
that is "currently in the testing stage." Earlier, in the February issue of the party
journal Kommunist, Tolubko had alluded to the likelihood of such a development.
His announcement probably is part of the continuing Soviet propaganda campaign
aimed at derailing US GLCM and Pershing II deployment in Europe. The fact
that Tolubko, and not one of the other deputy defense ministers, such as Army
Gen. Vasiliy Petrov, Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces, made the
announcement may indicate that the SRF eventually will have a long-range
GLCM in its inventory.'
Military The military newspaper Red Star announced on 26 March the first promotions of
Promotions top military leaders since Brezhnev's death last November. No changes in
assignments were included. Deputy Minister of Defense for Rear Services
Kurkotkin, Deputy Minister of Defense for Ground Forces Petrov, and First
Deputy Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev are the first officers since 1978 to
become Marshals of the Soviet Union. Deputy Minister of Defense for Strategic
Rocket Forces Tolubko was made a Chief Marshal of Artillery
'.In late March, Tolubko was promoted to Chief Marshal of Artillery and Petrov to Marshal of the So-
51 Secret
many winter gram fields in the southern crop areas had emerged from
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The four promotions show the leadership's general approval of the military and are
in contrast to recent dismissals of high officials in other ministries. Akhromeyev's
promotion marks him for a new post at the level of a Deputy Minister of Defense.
He could even become a candidate to succeed Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov
if a reshuffle occurs.
Hungarian Lectures The Hungarian First Deputy Minister of Industry recently addressed a Soviet
on Management high-level course on economic management at the Academy of the National
Economy of the Council of Ministers. The audience included leading representa-
tives of agriculture, food, light industry, trade, and transport. This reportedly is the
first time a non-Soviet lecturer has addressed such a group.
The event highlights the seriousness with which the leadership is studying the
applicability of Hungarian economic practices. Previous indications have included
favorable references to Hungarian and other East European economic reform
measures, particularly those affecting agriculture, in the speeches of Soviet leaders
and in the media. Direct exchanges in this area with the Hungarians, however,
generally have been at a lower level. The fact that the speaker represented
Hungary's industrial sector confirms that the Soviets are interested in a broader
range of Hungarian practices than agricultural techniques alone.
Reorganization in The Politburo continues to promote changes in agricultural management and has
AgricultureF--] approved a merger of agriculture-related ministries in two non-Russian republics.
'
s Ministry of Agriculture,
A decree in Georgia last month abolished the republic
Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, and the State Committee for
the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture and established a State
Committee for Agricultural Production. A similar reorganization was subsequent-
ly announced in Estonia.
Georgian and Estonian officials had publicly lobbied for the establishment of a
more powerful coordinating body at the republic level than was contemplated in
the Food Program reorganization last May. The current decision is a step in that
direction. Lack of cooperation between the now-merged organizations had been a
severe problem at the district and farm levels. The change, however, probably will
complicate relations between the republics and Moscow, where there is as yet no
organizational counterpart.
New Wage System At its 11 March meeting, the Politburo stressed the need for the "collective
for AgricultureF---] contract" system of wage payments in agriculture. This system has been strongly
supported by Mikhail Gorbachev, party Secretary in charge of agriculture, and
Ziya Nuriyev, head of the USSR's Commission for Questions of the Agro-
Industrial Complex. In the contract wage scheme, the farm supplies machinery
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KGB Interest in
Western Agricultural
I Technology
crop years they earn more under an hourly wage system.
and other inputs to a group of workers who agree to meet specific output targets.
Workers receive cash advances during the growing season with a final settlement
after the harvest depending on crop yields and animal productivity. The goal is to
eliminate piecework and hourly wages that only reward the quantit of work done
and give workers no stake in the size of the harvest.
According to Soviet press reports, experimental use of the contract system has
resulted in higher crop yields and lower production costs. Experiments also suggest
that there are large obstacles to successful widespread use, especially for schemes
that give the group of workers a relatively free hand in managing production.
Farms often do not supply inputs reliably. Many workers lack the skill to manage
crop production and to use and maintain machinery efficiently. Moreover, workers
have had little incentive to form contract teams in recent years because in poor
the KGB
in added Western agricultural and food-processing technology to its list of
collection requirements. We believe targets include genetic engineering tech-
niques, agrochemical processes, crop varieties, livestock breeds, and agricultural
equipment. Though most of this technology is available through trade, certain
patented processes and advanced components are commercial secrets or require
Over the past decade, the Soviets have imported large amounts of foreign
agricultural technology, but the benefits derived from these purchases have not
been as great as might be expected. For example, although factories of foreign de-
sign play a large role in bolstering Soviet output of fertilizer, production in these
plants consistently falls short of plan. In general, Soviet attempts to absorb
Western agricultural technology have not been fully successful because of
difficulties in adapting it to Soviet growing conditions and managerial practices.
Without a major improvement in Soviet ability to manage high-technology
agriculture, efforts to capitalize on Western innovations will only marginally
Soviet View on Several prominent Soviet physicists, in a recent conversation with a US physicist,
Curtailment of claimed that the decline in scientific exchanges between the United States and the
US-USSR Scientific Soviet IJninn has had a detriment l
ffe
h
-_
.. .
e
t
n t
eir
bilit
to
a
o
-??.~ ~.. -I... v ayyiiVu
Exchanges experimental research information. The Soviets admitted that in the past there
was an unfair information exchange ratio of 9 to 1 in favor of the USSR.. They
viewed the lack of such information as a significant loss but stated that the decline
in scientific exchanges has had little effect in the area of basic unapplied
theoretical physics, where the information exchange ratio was estimated to be 1 for
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Prospects for Recent Soviet surveys make clear that large-scale migration from labor-surplus
Central Asian rural areas in Central Asia during the 1980s to labor-deficit Slavic areas is
Migration unlikely. Reasons cited for the lack of mobility among the indigenous nationalities
i
f R
d
an
uss
o
include inadequate vocational training for industry, poor comman
language, lack of urban housing for the typical large family, strong cultural ties,
and negative perceptions of industrial employment.
There is also a positive incentive for most Central Asians to stay put. Because of
the large number of family members working on collective and state farms and the
heavy involvement in private farming, households of rural- and urban-type
settlement areas generally enjoy a higher standard of living than those in most
Central Asian cities, except the republic capitals. Indeed, the larger Central Asian
cities have attracted migrants from labor-deficit regions of the USSR because of
employment opportunities and lifestyle.
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