THE ROMANIAN GROUND FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00926R000200100004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
The Romanian
Ground Forces
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Top Secret
PI
SOV 84-10007CX
February 1984
Copy `'119
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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Romanian
Ground Forces
This paper was prepared by
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Theater
Forces Division, SOYA,
Top Secret
SOV 84-10007CX
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February 1984
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The Romanian
Ground Forces 25X1
Key Judgments Romania under Ceausescu has resisted Soviet domination more consistent-
Information available ly than any other member of the Warsaw Pact. Since the Pact's invasion of
as Q 15 December 1983 Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Romanians have regarded their nominal Pact
was used in this report.
allies as the most likely military threat and have adopted a Yugoslav-style
defense strategy-the only independent defense strategy in the Pact-to
deter a similar Pact intervention in Romania. To compensate for their
vulnerable strategic position, the Romanians have cultivated their diplo-
matic and economic relations with the West, China, and the Third World
to balance their ties with the Soviet Union.
Romania's fear of its allies is reflected in its ambiguous position within the
Pact's military structure. The Romanians interpret the Treaty of Warsaw
strictly as a defensive alliance. Although they have promised to support
their allies if NATO attacks, they have refused to participate in any joint
measures to prepare for war with NATO. To emphasize their position, the
Romanians have:
? Refused to participate in any joint field exercises since 1968.
? Rejected Soviet proposals to integrate the Pact's military forces in
peacetime.
? Refused to consult or inform the Pact of the reorganization of their
ground forces in 1980.
? Developed domestic defense industries and purchased Western and
Chinese weapons to reduce dependence on their allies.
Despite improvements in the Romanian ground forces in the early 1980s,
the Romanians could contribute little to a Pact campaign in the Balkans.
The Romanian ground forces are organized and prepared for regional
defense and are among the worst equipped and trained units in the Pact for
offensive operations. These units would require substantial Soviet assist-
ance and additional training before undertaking offensive operations
against Greece or Turkey. As a result, Romania's role, at least during the
initial stages of a Pact conflict with NATO, probably would be limited to
guarding the lines of communication between the Soviet Union and the
Balkans.
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Key Judgments
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19
Readiness and Training
22
Training
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Individual Training
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Equipment
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The Romanian
Ground Forces
Romania under President Nicolae Ceausescu has
resisted Soviet domination more consistently and
more vocally than any other current member of the
Warsaw Pact. Because it is bounded on three sides by
members of the Pact, Romania cannot risk withdraw-
ing from the alliance as Albania-which has no
common border with a Pact state-did in 1968.
Nevertheless, the Romanians have insulated them-
selves from Soviet control as much as possible. To
compensate partially for their vulnerable strategic
position, the Romanians have balanced their ties to
the Pact by cultivating diplomatic and economic
relations with the West, China, and the Third World.
They have often taken diplomatic positions critical of
Soviet policies, such as their denunciation of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Special Status
The Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 defined
the limits of Soviet tolerance for independence among
its Pact allies and also clarified Romania's subsequent
status within the Pact. Romania is the only current
member of the Pact that did not participate in the
invasion. As Pact forces entered Czechoslovakia,
Ceausescu warned publicly that the Romanians, un-
like the Czechoslovaks, would resist any similar "fra-
ternal assistance" by the Pact. To emphasize this
point, he mobilized Romanian ground forces.
In the aftermath, the Romanians took several meas-
ures to insulate their forces from the Pact. These
measures included:
? Adopting a Yugoslav-style defense policy, "the de-
fense of the nation by the entire population," based
on guerrilla warfare.
? Reviving the local militia forces, the Patriotic
Guards, as an integral part of the new defense
policy.
? Forming two new ground divisions-one on the
Soviet border and one near Bucharest-and a new
mountain infantry brigade.
? Refusing proposals by the Soviets for joint field
training and severely restricting their participation
in joint staff exercises.'
? Refusing to send Romanian officers to Soviet mili-
tary schools for training.
? Forbidding the presence in, or transit across, Roma-
nia of foreign troops or the deployment of Roma-
nian forces outside the country in peacetime. (The
Romanians have only permitted small Pact combat
units to cross their country three times over the past
15 years.)
? Developing domestic defense industries to reduce
their dependence on their allies for weapons and
military equipment.
The Romanians defend their position within the Pact
by interpreting the Treaty of Warsaw strictly as a
defensive alliance. They have promised repeatedly to
honor their commitments under the treaty if any of
their allies is attacked; however, they have refused to
conduct any joint military planning with their allies or
to accept Soviet proposals to increase Pact control
over national forces in peacetime.
Pact Control
The question of Pact control over national forces had
little impact on Romania until the late 1970s. Until
then, Soviet authorities emphasized the moderniza-
tion of their own forces and the need for their Pact
allies to adopt comparable standards of equipment
and training. Moreover, the Soviets stressed improv-
ing their own and allied military capabilities opposite
NATO's Central Region during this period; the Pact's
military capabilities opposite NATO's weaker South-
ern Region were regarded as less important. Despite
recent improvements, even Soviet forces in southeast-
ern Europe are still relatively poorly equipped and
trained in comparison with Soviet forces in central
Europe and the western USSR.
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The Pact's military structure until the late 1970s was
neither prepared nor authorized to control national
forces in peacetime. The Headquarters of the Com-
bined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, a virtual
adjunct of the Soviet General Staff, was created in
1969 to oversee and coordinate the development of
allied military forces. The role of its representatives in
the defense ministries in Pact countries-always Sovi-
In the late 1970s the Soviets secured the subordina-
tion of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces
to their own command in wartime.' Accordingly the
peacetime structure of the Pact was reorganized to
bring it more in accordance with the wartime
structure:
The Romanians firmly resisted these proposals.
Ceausescu's public denouncement in December 1978
of the Soviet proposal for peacetime commands in the
TMOs was the most blatant, but not the only, exam-
ple of Romania's opposition.
throughout this period the
sovereignty of the NSWP countries.
Romanians demanded command positions for NSWP
officers, particularly their own, on joint staffs and
argued that the Soviet proposals compromised the
Although Romania's opposition embarrassed the So-
viets, the rest of the Pact ultimately accepted the
Soviet proposals. The Romanians, however, refused to
accept any of these proposals and have refused to
participate in any command or procedures based on
these agreements.
Since then the Romanians have made concerted ef-
forts to isolate their forces from Soviet supervision
and control. They:
? Did not consult the Soviets in advance of the
reorganization of the Romanian ground forces in
1980.
? The Staff of the Combined Armed Forces was
restructured to allow wartime creation of staffs for
the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military
Operations (TMO) from it. This structure parallels
that of the Soviet General Staff.
? The Staff's authority over training in the national
forces was increased.
? Have refused requests to conduct joint planning for
the Combined Black Sea Fleet Command.
? New stages of readiness were introduced that per-
mitted the Pact commands to assume control of
national forces automatically at intermediate stages
of alert.
? East European forces down to regimental level were
integrated into a Soviet-controlled automated alert-
ing system.
? Pact procedures to create commands for the West-
ern and Southwestern TMOs in peacetime were
promulgated.
Recent Relations
Neither the crisis in the Romanian domestic economy
nor Andropov's accession to the top Soviet leadership
post has caused Romania to be more accommodating
to the Soviets. If anything, Romania's relations with
the Soviets are more strained now than they have
been for many years.
Ceausescu has continued his opposition to the Soviets
in recent meetings of Pact leaders. While resisting
Soviet proposals to increase military spending and to
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denounce NATO, Ceausescu has presented his own
proposals, which reflect Romania's concern for eco-
nomic problems rather than military security. During
a meeting of Pact leaders in Prague in January 1983,
Ceausescu proposed a unilateral freeze on military
spending by Pact members and a gradual reduction
by 15 to 20 percent by 1985. He also proposed a Pact
initiative for negotiations with NATO to reduce
conventional as well as nuclear arms in Europe.
Questions about the reliability of Romanian forces
complicate military planning within the Pact. To
maintain the image of Pact unity, Pact exercises must
include a role for Romanian ground forces; however,
this role must not compromise the possibilities of
success for other Pact forces.
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ning for Romanian military officers. Since the early
1970s Romania has concentrated on developing capa-
bilities for defense, not offense.
Pact Strategy
The Pact's primary military objective in the Balkans
during a war with NATO would be to control naval
access between the Mediterranean and Black Seas. To
achieve this, Pact forces would invade Turkey to seize
the Dardenelles and the Bosporus. The Pact's second-
ary aims would be to defeat or neutralize NATO
forces in Greece and Turkey.
Pact military planning in the early 1970s assigned
Romanian forces the role of supporting Bulgarian and
Soviet forces.
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the Bulgarian front at that time consisted of two 25X1
Bulgarian armies and a Romanian army stationed in
eastern Romania. The third Bulgarian army and the 25X1
second Romanian army were to be deployed to the
Yugoslav border to protect the Pact's western flanks 25X1
in the Balkans. Romanian units 25X1
would be attached to the Soviet Odessa Front.FI
army might also 25X1
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Concern over the reliability of the Romanians appar- 25X1
ently caused Pact planners to change the composition
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Whatever the role of its ground forces, Romania's
location makes it critical to the success of any Pact
campaign in the Balkans. The transfer of one or two
Soviet fronts to Bulgaria along the Black Sea coast
would depend primarily on the Romanian transporta- 25X1
tion system. To address this problem, the Soviets have
proposed repeatedly the building of a Soviet-gauge
railroad across Romania to Bulgaria similar to the
Soviet railroad across southern Poland. The Roma-
nians have always refused.
Romania's prohibition against foreign troops crossing
its country in peacetime limits joint training by Soviet
and Bulgarian forces. The Romanians generally per-
mit Soviet officers to cross Romania for staff exer- 25X1
cises in Bulgaria; however, even these crossings are
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Figure 1
Alternate Axes for Romanian Forces in Pact Exercises
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To overcome this obstacle, the Soviets inaugurated a
direct ferry link with Bulgaria in the late 1970s.
The ferry permits the
Soviets to reinforce Bulgaria quickly but is inadequate
to move major Soviet forces into the Balkans or to
supply them during offensive operations.'
Pact Exercises
Pact exercises may be less reliable as a guide to Pact
military planning for the Balkans than for any other
region. To ensure Romania's participation in staff
exercises, the Soviets apparently are willing to modify
the scenarios to meet Romanian objections. For exam-
ple, the Soviets
changed the scenario of a major Pact staff exercise in
1980 because the Romanians refused to place their
forces, even notionally, under a non-Romanian com-
mand.
The context of Pact exercises also may distort our
perceptions of Romania's role in a Pact campaign.
Since the late 1970s, the Pact has required that all
national exercises be conducted in the context of
theater operations. The Romanians do not follow this
rule, but the Soviets and Bulgarians do. As a result,
Soviet and Bulgarian exercises often include vague
descriptions of notional Romanian operations while
executing their own.
' The Intelligence Community estimates that the six ferries current-
ly operating between Ilichevsk and Varna have the combined
capacity to carry two motorized rifle regiments. Each crossing,
including time for loading and unloading, requires 29 hours one
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Romanian Strategy
The Romanians are extremely circumspect in describ- 25X1
ing whom they expect to fight. Their exercises still
include scenarios in which NATO forces invade Ro-
mania but also include attacks by their "northern
neighbor," that is, by the Soviet Union. At the lower
echelons they are occasionally more explicit. For
example, according to one emigre, the political officer
of his regiment always referred to the Soviet Union as
Romania's main enemy. 25X1
military operations against Romania.
Greece nor Turkey has modernized its military forces
to any great extent in over a decade. As a result, both
countries have shortages in the transport and logistics
capabilities needed to sustain offensive operations in
Romania. Similarly, Bulgaria and Hungary would
require Soviet assistance to conduct more than limited
assessment of the potential threat. None of the coun-
tries in the region except the Soviet Union is capable
of invading Romania. Yugoslavia's poorly equipped
forces are prepared for defensive operations. Neither
Romania's concern about the Soviets is a realistic 25X1
Romania's national defense policy, "the defense of the
nation by the entire population," is intended to deter
any aggressor by demonstrating the nation's will and
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Figure 2
Ultimate Pact Objectives in the Southwestern Theater
Poland',
v.st~la
Carpathian
MD
capability to fight. The Romanians assume that any
invader would be superior to their own forces and that
conventional defensive operations would ultimately
fail. To meet the threat, the Romanians have bor-
rowed heavily from Yugoslav military doctrine and
stress the use of mountainous terrain and guerrilla
forces to continue resistance.
Sovie
Kiev
MD
Odessa
MD -
The Romanians expect Patriotic Guards and paramil-
itary forces to play a major role in defensive opera-
tions. they expect
their ground units to be outnumbered in any engage-
ment. Mobilizing Patriotic Guards units, however,
could increase the size of Romanian ground units
severalfold locally and reduce an enemy's advantage.
Boundary representation Is
not neceeear~ y auttoritatWe
North
Caucasus
MD
Trans
Caucasus
MD
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Patriotic Guards units would release regular units
from support functions and form additional infantry
battalions.
Romania would conduct resistance in stages to wear
down an enemy while preserving its forces. Divisions
would avoid decisive engagements; instead, they
would conduct delaying operations along successive
lines of defense and ultimately retreat into the moun-
tains. As the divisions retreated, the Patriotic Guards
units would remain behind to attack the enemy's lines
of communication and to harass isolated units. F_
The Romanian strategy requires that resistance be
decentralized. The Romanians assume that any invad-
er would seize Bucharest and the primary rail lines
The scenarios of Romania's own exercises,
have been defensive since the mid-1970s. Exercises by
other Pact countries typically begin with a notional
NATO attack. After blunting the NATO advance,
Pact forces usually counterattack and drive deep into
NATO territory. Romanian exercises, on the other
hand, always stop after the successful defense, and
Romanian troops never move outside their own coun-
Since the Romanians formally adopted their Yugo-
slav-style defense strategy in 1972, the commands of
their military, paramilitary, and Patriotic Guards
forces have been reorganized to implement this new
strategy. As a result, the command structure that
emerged during the late 1970s, like the Romanian
defense strategy, is unique within the Pact.
In contrast to the rest of the Pact, the Romanian
wartime command structure is decentralized. Roma-
nia's defense strategy calls for local resistance, to
continue even if Bucharest and the national leadership
are overrun at the outset of an invasion. To direct this
local resistance the Romanians have strengthened
intermediate levels of command and have vested
county civil and military officials with more authority
for defense than is common elsewhere in the Pact.F_
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National Commands 25X1
As President of Romania, Secretary General of the
Romanian Communist Party (RCP), and Commander
in Chief of the Romanian Armed Forces, Nicolae
Ceausescu ultimately controls all military, paramili-
Council.
governmental, party, and military leaders, would be
formed if Romania were invaded. It is not a perma- 25X1
nent body in peacetime, however, and does not have
responsibility for military policy or planning.
Ceausescu is the designated President of the Defense
tary, and Patriotic Guards forces in Romania. A
National Defense Council, including the principal
Governmental ministries and party organs exercise
operational control of Romania's various forces in
peacetime. Separate commands within the National
Ministry of Defense control the naval, air, and air
defense forces as well as the border guards and civil
defense staffs. Romania does not have a separate
command for ground forces; the General Staff con-
trols these forces directly through four army com-
mands. Within the Ministry of the Interior, a separate
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Figure 3
Organization for National Defense
National
Commands
Ministry of the
Interior
National Ministry
of Defense
Border Guards
Command
Border Guard
Posts
Organization-
Mobilization
Directorate
Civil Defense
Command
Regiment
Group of
County
Staffs
County
Staff
Romanian
Communist
Party
Chief of Staff
for
Patriotic Guards
Territorial
Command
County
military
center
County Patriotic
Guards Staff
Brigade/
Battalion
command directs seven brigades of security troops.
Finally, a chief of staff on the Central Committee of
the RCP oversees the Patriotic Guards staffs in each
of Romania's 40 counties and in the four districts of
Bucharest (see figure 3).
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Intermediate Commands
During the late 1970s the Romanians reorganized
several components of the National Ministry of De-
fense to enhance the intermediate commands. These
changes, which probably were intended to improve
cooperation between the military and the Patriotic
Guards, included:
From left to right: Ion Coman, former Minister of Defense,
currently Party Secretary for Defense Affairs; Nicolas Ceausescu,
President of Romania, Secretary General of the Romanian
Communist Party, and Commander in Chief of the Romanian
Armed Forces; Constantin Olteanu, Minister of Defense;
Vasile Milea, Chief of Romanian General Staff..
A reshuffling of command personnel also accompa-
nied these changes. The majority of military com-
manders and the department heads in the National
Ministry of Defense have been appointed since 1980.
To direct the emerging command structure, in March
1980 Lt. Gen. Constantin Olteanu was appointed as
Minister of Defense and Col. Gen. Vasile Mileas as
' Among the other East European countries, Poland, Czechoslova-
kia, and Bulgaria are expected to form national fronts during a
Pact war with NATO; East Germany and Hungary are expected to
resistance behind enemy lines.
Chief of the Romanian General Staff (see figure 4).
Ion Coman, the former Minister of Defense, assumed
the position of Party Secretary for Defense Affairs.
County Defense Councils
The county defense councils are critical to Romania's
ability to implement its defense strategy. Unlike the
National Defense Council, the county defense coun-
cils are permanent bodies responsible for military
preparedness and civil defense in peacetime and for
local defense in war. If Romania is invaded, the
county defense councils are expected to reinforce and
support military units operating in their territory with
their own resources and, if overrun, to organize
Control of the county defense councils is firmly
entrenched in the RCP. In their attempts to legitimize
the national defense policy, the Romanians always
emphasize the role of local Communists in inspiring
and directing resistance against enemy forces in
World War II. To ensure this role in the future, the
First Secretary of the local committee of the party is
the head of the council, and the local party committee
controls the county's Patriotic Guards units. The
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Figure 5
Organization of the County Defense Council
President: First Secretary
of the local committee
of the Romanian
Communist Party
Vice President: President
of the executive
committee of the People's
Council
First Secretary of the
County Union of
Communist Youth
Chief of Staff of
county's Patriotic
Guards
Commander of the
local military
garrison or unita
Chief of Staff of
county civil defense
Commander of the
County Military
Center
Chief of the County
Inspectorate of the
Ministry of the Interior
Chief, Post and
Telecommunications
Division
council also includes the President of the People's ground units in less demanding missions, such as
Council, that is, the county government, and the guarding lines of communication and military facili-
heads of the civil defense staff, the local security ties, as well as conducting guerrilla warfare in areas
forces, and the county military center as well as overrun by enemy forces.
critical government services. The commander of the
local military unit is appointed to the council by the F
National Ministry of Defense (see figure 5).
Patriotic Guards
The Patriotic Guards would be the mainstay of any In line with the original concept of home defense, the
protracted resistance in Romania. The role of the Patriotic Guards are organized locally. Patriotic
Patriotic Guards has increased steadily over the past
decade. These units are now expected to replace
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Guards units are formed in factories, which bear the
costs of such units in peacetime. Membership in these
units is nominally voluntary, but emigres report that
employees, particularly reserve officers, are under
considerable pressure to join. Most, if not all, of the
Patriotic Guards have served in the Romanian armed
forces.
Patriotic Guards units are controlled by county staffs
in peacetime but are supervised by the military.
Paramilitary Forces
Like the Patriotic Guards, the Border Guards and the
Security Troops are expected to reinforce and support
ground units during defense operations. In peacetime,
the six brigades of Border Guards are distributed
along Romania's frontier to control entry into the
country; the seven brigades of security troops are
stationed throughout the country-roughly one bat-
talion per county-to preserve order and combat
terrorism. Upon mobilization the Security Troops
would be transferred to the National Ministry of
Defense and would be subordinated to local military
units.
The paramilitary forces are expected to release active
military units for combat and to maintain resistance
behind enemy lines. The Border Guards are expected
to provide the initial warning and defense against an
invasion and to guard rear areas. The Security Troops
are expected to assume a more active role. They
would guard rear areas and lines of communication
and, in areas overrun by the enemy, maintain resist-
ance by assassinating collaborators and harassing
Soviet lines. Despite Romania's independent defense
policy, it retained a centralized command structure
through the 1970s until new concepts of decentralized
command evolved. The changes that have occurred in
the ground forces since 1979 indicate a slow diver-
gence from the Soviet model. Romanian defense
policy is based on the Yugoslav experience, and recent
changes owe more to Yugoslav than Soviet practices.
Reorganization
The command structure of the ground forces through
the 1970s was inadequate to support Romania's de-
fense strategy. The two former armies-the 2nd
Army in Bucharest and the 3rd Army in Cluj-were
organized to support a Pact campaign in the Balkans,
not to control defensive operations by several divi-
sions, possibly fighting on different axes, and Patriotic
Guards units at the same time. The span of control,
particularly for the 2nd Army with six divisions, was
simply too great for the Romanians to control effec-
tively.
In April 1980 Romania formally replaced its two
previous army commands with four new army com-
enemy units.
The 4th Army was formed from the old 3rd Army and
included most of its predecessor's subordinates. The
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The Romanian ground forces, like their East Europe-
an counterparts, are organized essentially along
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Figure 6
Romanian Army Structure Before 1980 Reorganization
Motorized rifle division 3- Mountain infantry brigade
it) Army headquarters Tank division
Army command boundary (approximate) County (judet) boundary
other three armies were formed from the old 2nd
Army's subordinates and one motorized rifle division
from the old 3rd Army (see figures 6 and 7). The
Romanians have formed several new nondivisional
units since 1978 to support the new commands (see
table 1), but considerable differences continue to exist
in the capabilities of the four armies.
The new commands were created to improve coopera-
tion between ground and Patriotic Guards units as
well as to reduce the span of control. The Romanians
undertook several measures during the reorganization
to enhance this cooperation:
? County administrative boundaries were redrawn to
match the new army areas.
? Officers having experience with the Patriotic
Guards were appointed as commanders of the four
new army commands.
? Equipment, particularly tanks and armored person-
nel carriers (APC), was redistributed to balance the
capabilities of the 10 ground divisions.
While the reorganization improved Romania's defen-
sive capabilities, it complicated Romania's ability to
participate in a Pact campaign. The old 2nd Army,
which had been assigned as a reserve for the Bulgari-
an front, was now split into three separate commands.
Any attempt to use the three armies to perform the
original mission or to reconstitute the old 2nd Army
would require lengthy planning and preparations. F_
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Figure 7
Romanian Army Structure After 1980 Reorganization
Soviet
Union
Table 1
Major Romanian Ground Forces, 1983
Ground Armies Ministry Total Ground Forces
of Defense Formed Since
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1978
0 150
Kilometers
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The implications of the reorganization for the Pact
were apparent immediately to Romania's allies. In
addition, Romania had not notified the Pact of its
plans as required.
the Soviet Union and Bulgaria quickly demanded
explanations for the reorganization, particularly for
the new army commands on their borders.
The capabilities of the four armies vary according to
the immediate threat and the availability of other
forces. The more powerful 2nd and 4th Armies, each
with three divisions, cover Romania's borders with the
Soviet Union and Hungary. The 1st and 3rd Armies
each have two divisions. The capabilities of the 1st
Army, which protects the capital and most of the
Bulgarian border, are weak, but this weakness is
offset somewhat because most of the Romanian Air
Force is based in its area. The 3rd Army, which
covers the Yugoslav border, is the weakest of the four
armies, but the Romanians do not regard the Yugo-
slavs as a threat.
Military Production
The development of Romania's defense industries
during the 1970s probably determined the timing of
changes in Romanian ground units. Romania has
reduced its dependence on its Pact allies for military
equipment and now ranks third after Poland and
Czechoslovakia in military production among the East
European countries. It continued to buy military
equipment from its allies through the 1970s, but these
acquisitions shifted increasingly from basic weapons,
such as artillery and tanks, to more sophisticated
equipment, such as surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and
radars. the Soviets
have pressed the Romanians repeatedly since the late
1970s to improve their military capabilities, but there
is no indication that the Soviets have offered to
provide weapons to Romania on favorable terms.
gun mounted on a truck.
Romanian-produced weapons are based on foreign,
chiefly Soviet, designs, and the degree and success of
their modifications vary considerably. For example,
Romanian copies of Soviet armored personnel carriers
have West German-designed engines that perform
better than the original Soviet-designed engines. Sim-
ilarly, their adaptations of the T-55 tank, the TR-77
and TR-800, include more sophisticated fire-control
systems, including laser range finders. The new Ro-
manian self-propelled air defense system, on the other
hand, is simply a 1950s-vintage antiaircraft machine-
The recent economic crisis in Romania has had a
major impact on the acquisition of new weapons. To
acquire hard currency and to reduce costs, the Roma-
nians try to sell their weapons abroad, and such sales
apparently have priority over their own units. For
example, emigres report that Romania sells virtually
all of the TAB-77 APCs produced to its Pact allies.
The most dramatic example of this priority was the
recent sale of virtually all of Romania's TR-77 tanks
to Egypt.
four Romanian divisions equipped with these tanks
were reequipped with obsolete T-34 tanks by mid-
1983. Even if this sale accelerates the production of
TR-800 tanks, Romania will not make up the loss
until the end of this decade.
Domestic production may be a mixed blessing in the
long term, because most of these weapons are based
on old designs. Even with Romanian modifications,
the relative quality of these weapons is lower than new
weapons being introduced in other Pact ground forces.
Recent improvements in Romanian ground divisions,
therefore, have been largely the result of adding more
rather than better weapons. Moreover, the new weap-
ons have not corrected some of the major deficiencies
in Romanian units. For example, the artillery in
Romanian divisions has less range than that in Soviet
divisions.
25X1
25X1
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Figure 8
Table of Organization for Soviet and Romanian Tank Divisions
Soviet" 10,787 men
Romanian 7,576 men
Headquarters and
support units
Reconnaissance
battalion
Motorized rifle
regiment
2
217 360
1
785
,
,
1,630 281
1,902
4,725
2.469
Air defense
regiment
Surface-to-surface
missile/ FROG
battalion
Helicopter
squadron
1,011 490
829 335
169
130
220
0
Antitank Guided Missiles
AT-3
Air Defense
ZSU-23-4
Weapons
AT-5
ZPU-2/4
36
S-60
18
Rockets and Artillery Pieces
SA-7/14
NA b
SS-21 4-0
SA-6/8
FROG 0-4
SA-9/13
120mm M1938/43 mortar 40
122mm M-30 howitzer
122mm M1974 SP 72
Tanks
T-54/5; T-6
2; T-64; T-72
152mm M1973 SP 36-54
T-34; T-54/
5
BM-21/RMRL-21/74 18-0
76mm Zis-3
SU-76 Assault gun
Armored Pe
BMP
rsonnel Carriers
237
BTR-60/70
6-12
BRDM
16
TAB-72/TA
B-77
149
Helicopters
MI-24
MI-2
MI-6
a Soviet tank divisions in Eastern Europe,
b Data not available.
The Romanians may be planning to produce more
systems based on pirated Western technology were
expected to enter production in 1985-90. These sys-
tems, which include SAMs and antitank guided mis-
siles (ATGM), would correct some of the most critical
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weaknesses of Romanian ground units. In the past,
however, Romanian production plans usually have
slipped several years. The current freeze on military
spending probably will delay widespread deployment
of these systems.
Ground Divisions
Romania's 10 ground divisions are still organized
along Soviet lines. These divisions, however, are
roughly 25 to 30 percent smaller than their Soviet
counterparts. The US Intelligence Community as-
sesses a Romanian motorized rifle division to have
11,000 personnel compared with 13,000 in a Soviet
motorized rifle division. Similarly, a Romanian tank
division is assessed to have at least 8,000 personnel
compared with 11,000 in a Soviet tank division.F_
Past shortages of equipment probably caused the
Romanians to create small divisions and to use quan-
tities of older and less effective equipment (see figures
8 and 9). A comparison of the tables of organization
and equipment (TOE) of Soviet and Romanian divi-
sions indicates that:
? Unlike Soviet motorized rifle divisions, Romanian
motorized rifle divisions do not have multiple rocket
launcher (MRL) battalions.'
? Romanian motorized rifle divisions have chemical
defense companies, whereas Soviet divisions have
battalions.
? Only the motorized rifle regiments (MRR) in Ro-
mania's two tank divisions are fully equipped with
APCs; MRRs in Romanian motorized rifle divisions
usually have one or more battalions equipped with
trucks.'
? Romanian tank regiments do not have motorized
infantry battalions (MRB) as do Soviet tank
regiments.
? Romanian tank battalions have two companies in-
stead of three in Soviet tank battalions.
' One division, the 1st Motorized Rifle Division, has formed a
separate MRL battalion; as domestic production of MRLs in-
creases, other divisions probably will form similar battalions.
? The artillery battalions in Romanian MRRs are
equipped with 76-mm antitank guns, which have far
less range then the artillery typically found in
Warsaw Pact MRRs. Until recently, artillery sup-
port in Romanian MRRs was limited to a battery of
120-mm mortars.
In addition to shortages of equipment, Romanian
ground divisions are poorly equipped to combat tanks
and aircraft. The best new Romanian antitank and
antiaircraft equipment has not been issued to divi-
sions. For example, the three SA-6 regiments and the
two antitank regiments equipped with the new
TUN- 12, the Romanian version of the Soviet 100-mm
T-12 antitank gun, are nondivisional units, and the
three squadrons of Alouette-3 helicopters armed with
ATGMs are subordinate to the Romanian Air Force.
Only one division, the 67th Motorized Rifle Division,
is partly equipped with the new TUN-12 antitank
guns.
The Romanians may have tried to compensate for
some of their weapon shortcomin =Roma-
nian or anization-
al changes. Roma-
nian officers in the mid-1970s proposed forming
special, highly mobile antitank units. During the
reorganization, SU-100 self-propelled assault guns,
formerly used in divisional antitank regiments, were
attached to the tank regiments of seven of Romania's
eight motorized rifle divisions. The only motorized
rifle division that has not adopted this structure, the
67th, is also the only Romanian division to acquire the
new antitank gun.
APCs.
Effectiveness of Ground Divisions
Unlike Soviet divisions, there is very little difference
in capability among Romanian ground divisions. At
the outset of the reorganization, the Romanians redis-
tributed equipment, primarily APCs and tanks,
among the 10 divisions to balance their capabilities.
To some extent the redistribution reflected different
requirements for regional defense. For example, the
9th Motorized Rifle Division had more TR-77 tanks
than any other division; however, it ranked sixth in
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Figure 9
Table of Organization for Soviet and Romanian Motorized Rifle Divisions
Soviets 13,064 men
Romanian 10,721 men
Motorized rifle
division
Headquarters and
support units
Reconnaissance
battalion
Motorized rifle
regiment
2,047 360
204
1,850 271
214 7,173
6,006
Air defense
regiment
Surface-to-surface
missile/ FROG
battalion
Helicopter
squadron
1,145 1,276 490 169 200
823 1,102 335 120 0
Antitank Weapons Air Defense Weapons
100mm T-12/TUN-12 ZSU-23-4
AT-3 ZPU-2/4 36
S-60 18
Rockets and Artillery Pieces SA-7/14 NA C
SS-21 4-0 SA-6/7
FROG 4 SA-9/13
120mm M1938/43 mortar 72
122mm M-30 howitzer Tanks
122mm M 1974 SP 72 T-54/5; T-62; T-64; T-72 220
152mm M1973 SP 36-54 T-34; T-54/5
76mm ZIS-3
BM-21 / RMRL-21 /74 18b Armored Personnel Carriers
SU-76 Assault gun BMP 129-147
SU-100 Assault gun BTR-60/70 228-294
BRDM 16
BTR-60/TAB-72 273
Trucks as APC 120
Helicopters
MI-24
MI-2
MI-6
a Soviet motorized rifle division in Eastern Europe.
b Soviet divisions equipped with 18 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers have
36 M1973 self-propelled guns; units not equipped with BM-21s have 54
M1973 self-propelled guns.
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Figure 10
Organization of a Mountain Infantry Brigade
Like most East European divisions, Romanian divi-
sions are less effective than the Soviet divisions in
Eastern Europe.' The capabilities of Soviet divisions
vary widely, but the most powerful Soviet divisions
are stationed in Eastern Europe. For offensive opera-
tions, the Romanian divisions would be roughly half
' The Soviets categorize their ground divisions as "ready" or "not-
ready," based on the quantity and quality of equipment as well as
the peacetime levels of manning and training. Each of these
categories is subdivided informally into three types of divisions.
as powerful as these divisions.' The divisions in the
interior of the Soviet Union generally are equipped
with older weapons, are manned at lower levels in
peacetime, and conduct less training than their coun-
terparts in Eastern Europe. In terms of potential
effectiveness, the Romanian divisions are roughly
equivalent to the weaker cadre divisions in the Odessa
Military District, which borders Romania on the east.
' Estimates of the relative capabilities of Pact divisions were made
by applying weighted equipment values (WEV) to the inventory of
each Soviet division for 1982 as contained in the Land Armaments
and Manpower Model. As used in this study, WEVs are intended
only to provide a rough means of comparison between ground units.
This methodology, developed by the US Army, assigns scores to
weapons and combat vehicles on the basis of engineering analyses
of mobility, firepower, and armor protection and weights the scores
for each type of equipment according to its relative impact on a
unit's capabilities for offensive operations.
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Mountain Infantry Brigades
The four mountain infantry brigades, the only dedi-
cated mountain troops in the Pact, are expected to
perform critical defensive missions. Romania's moun-
tainous terrain increases the impact of small, lightly
armed units against larger and better equipped enemy
forces. As a result, the Romanians have assigned
these units, the elite of the Romanian ground forces,
to hold strategic mountain passes against the advance
of enemy forces.
Mountain infantry battalions, according to emigres,
are organized and equipped for specific missions and
are expected to operate independently. Emigres report
that a mountain infantry battalion might have up to
500 personnel after mobilization. The principal varia-
tion in weapons among battalions is in artillery. Most
battalions have one or two batteries of 120-mm
mortars; however, a few battalions also have a battery
of 76-mm mountain guns (see figure 10).
Patriotic Guards
Organization and equipment vary widely among Pa-
triotic Guards units.
the Patriotic Guards would be organized into battal-
ions and brigades if Romania were invaded; however,
emigres report that the size of the unit in peacetime
depends on the size of the factory, and company-size
units are typical. The US Intelligence Community
estimates that, if invaded, Romania probably could
mobilize 500,000 to 700,000 Patriotic Guards. Each
county, therefore, could probably form several bri-
gades.
The Romanians have made major efforts in recent
years to improve the weapons available to the Patriot-
ic Guards. According to emigres, Patriotic Guards
units were armed with World War II-vintage small
arms in the mid-1970s. In parades in recent years,
however, Patriotic Guards were always armed with
modern small arms.
Logistics
Logistic deficiencies also restrict Romania's capabili-
ties. The US Intelligence Community credits Roma-
nia with sufficient peacetime stores to suppnort
military operations for one month or less.
local authorities are responsible
for supplying units during defensive operations; how-
ever, these procedures are not intended to support
Pact offensive operations.
Prospects for Improvement
The most likely changes over the next several years
probably will be in the organization of ground units.
F omanian officers 25X1
were considering further reducing the size of divisions
in the mid-1970s. A change in the organization of
units probably would involve splitting some divisions
into brigades and forming other brigades by reinforc-
ing some regiments.
Romania's two tank divisions are the most likely
candidates for such a reorganization. According to
US defense attaches, there have been persistent ru-
mors to this effect since the late 1970s. If reorganized,
these two divisions could provide one tank brigade for
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each army, 125X1
There is, however, no evidence that the 25X1
years.
reorganization is taking place in either tank division
yet. The sale of Romania's TR-77 tanks probably will
delay any plans for such a reorganization for several
A reorganization apparently is already under way in
two motorized rifle divisions in southern Romania.
wo regiments-one
motorized rifle regiment in the 3rd Army and one
tank regiment in the 1st Army-have been expanded
beyond the size of their counterparts elsewhere in
Romania. Moreover, the increase in the number and
types of weapons and in the types of subunits in these
regiments reflects organizational patterns typical of
Yugoslav brigades rather than Romanian regiments
(see figure 11).
The Romanians will continue to field new weapons,
but the rate of deployment probably will depend on
the state of the economy. The most likely improve-
ments over the rest of this decade include:
? Introducing TR-800 tanks.
? Replacing trucks with APCs in motorized rifle
regiments.
? Introducing a new Romanian-designed infantry
fighting vehicle, the P224.
? Equipping antitank units with TUN- 12 antitank
guns.
? Forming multiple rocket launcher battalions in all
ground divisions.
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Figure 11
Comparative Organizations: Romanian Regiments and Yugoslav Brigades
Motorized Rifle Units Tank Units
Typical Romanian
motorized rifle
regiment
'ypical Romanian
enk regiment
Pte` ....--I
Motorized rifle
battalion Tank battalion Tank battalion Engineer company
26th Motorized
Rifle Regiment
Motorized rifle
battalion
Yugoslav motorized
rifle brigade
Tank regiment
1st Motorized
Rifle Division
Motorized rifle
battalion
Tank company
Yugoslav tank
brigade
Motorized rifle
battalion
301846 2-84
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Motorized rifle
battalion
Tank company
SU-76 battery
Self-propelled
artillery battery
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Figure 12
Deployment of Equipment, 1982-90
400 Mortars
Multiple rocket
launchers
200 - Mountain guns
0 0
Armored Personnel Carriers or Infantry Fighting Vehicles Antitank Weapons
2,500
Trucks as APCs
1,000 __-~~--
Fire Support
1,400
500 I AT guns \~-
0
Air Defense Weapons
~__ l I L 1 1 l
0 1982 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
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? Introducing Romanian-produced D-30 field guns to
replace 76-mm ZIS-3 guns in motorized rifle
regiments.
? Introducing M-1979 multiple rocket launchers and
D-30 field guns into nondivisional artillery units.
? Forming an SA-6 regiment for the 4th Army.
The recent and projected deployments of new equip-
ment will have a major impact on Romania's military
capabilities by the end of the decade. Figure 12
presents the Intelligence Community's projections of
the introduction of new weapons in the Romanian
ground forces during.1982-90. If economic conditions
do not delay these programs, the additional weapons
would represent a 13.4-percent increase in the poten-
tial combat effectiveness of Romanian ground forces
by 1990.
Despite the introduction of new weapons, Romania
will continue to lag the rest of the Pact. Romanian
divisions in 1990 probably will be comparable to
Soviet divisions in the early 1970s or to the better
East European divisions in the late 1970s. Because the
rest of the Pact has introduced new generations of
weapons and increased the numbers of weapons in
ground units, the capabilities of Romanian ground
units may actually decline relative to other Pact units
during this period.
Readiness
Manning Practices. Romanian ground forces are
maintained at relatively high readiness in peacetime.
In the Land Armament and Manpower Model
(LAMM), the US Intelligence Community assesses
five of Romania's 10 divisions as manned at 75 to
85 percent in peacetime and the remaining five as
manned at 55 to 65 percent (see table 2), levels
comparable to the ready divisions in the western
USSR. Manpower is not distributed equally within
these divisions but is concentrated in the combat
elements of the motorized rifle regiment and tank
regiment. Emigres report that many nondivisional
units and support elements within divisions are
manned at less than 50 percent in peacetime.F_
Table 2
Ground Divisions by Manning Category
True Division
Designator
Head-
quarters
Army
Category I
1st Motorized Rifle
Bucharest
1st
(75 to 85
ercent)
9th Motorized Rifle
Constanta
2nd
p
18th Motorized Rifle
Timisoara
3rd
11th Motorized Rifle
Oradea
4th
6th Tank
Turda
Mures
4th
Category II
57th Tank
Bucharest
1st
(55 to 65
ercent)
10th Motorized Rifle
Iasi
2nd
p
67th Motorized Rifle
Braila
2nd
2nd Motorized Rifle
Craiova
3rd
81st Motorized Rifle
Dej
4th
These manning practices should enable Romania to
mobilize quickly in a crisis. Like ready units through-
out the Pact, Romanian units do not depend on
reservists to remove equipment from storage and to
deploy to assembly areas. Even during mobilization,
most Romanian units should be able to call up
reservists and complete preparations within 10 days to
Reserve Training. Romanian conscripts serve 16
months, the shortest period of active duty in the Pact.
The massive turnovers in personnel reduce the need
for reserve training. Because of high levels of peace-
time manning and frequent turnovers in personnel,
Romanian motorized rifle regiments and tank regi-
ments probably can mobilize with reservists who have
served on active duty within the last year. Even the
nondivisional units and divisional support elements
probably can be filled out with reservists who were
released within the last two years.
The reduced need for reserve training is reflected in
the actual experiences of Romanian reservists. De-
spite stringent legal obligations-Romanian reservists
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are theoretically liable for three months of active-duty
training each year-reserve training is rarely con-
ducted in units. In contrast to emigres from other
Pact countries, Romanian emigres rarely report being
called up for reserve duty or seeing reservists in their
units while on active duty.
Reserve Officers. Reserve officers have little, if any,
role in Romanian ground units in peacetime. The
Romanians do train reserve officers, but their role is
limited to mobilization assignments in active units
and to positions in Patriotic Guards units.
Training for Romanian reserve officers is conducted
in two phases. Candidates for commissions are trained
in special reduced-term units for six months before
entering a university or technical institute. They
receive regular military training during their studies
and after graduation can be called up for a brief
period of active duty. Emigres who have had this
training, however, report that reserve officers, if
called up, rarely serve for more than a few weeks.
They may also be called up subsequently for three-
month training courses in military schools.
this usually involves only a few
Training
The Romanians train their conscripts and units to
implement their national defense policy, not Pact
offensive doctrine. The short term of active service,
the massive turnover in units every eight months, and
constraints on training distinguish military training in
Romania from other Pact countries.
Unit Training. Training is a major determinant of
the Pact's training program is intended to pre-
pare units for offensive operations. To complete this
program, units proceed systematically from training
in individual military skills through division field
exercises.
The ability of units to complete the training program
depends on peacetime manning. Soviet ready divisions
complete the program annually; their not-ready divi
sions, on the other hand, complete only part of the
program each year and are considered fit only for
Table 3
Troop Rotation in Pact Ground Units
Country Induction Cycle New Recruits as 25X1
Percent of Total
USSR
Poland
Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
Every six months 25
Hungary
Romania
Every eight months 50
defensive operations in an emergency. The Soviets
typically mobilize their not-ready divisions once every
five years to conduct division field exercises.
The short term of active duty and the massive turn-
over in personnel every eight months distorts training
in Romanian units in comparison with other Pact
units. Romanian ground units will have a much
higher proportion of new, untrained conscripts than
other units in the Pact (see table 3).' Moreover, most
of the NCOs in these units are conscripts who only
serve eight months as instructors. As a result, Roma-
nian commanders must devote a disproportionate
amount of time teaching basic military skills and
practicing small-unit tactics. Romania's attempts to
grapple with this problem have produced a unique
training program.
Romania's divisional
training program bears only superficial resemblance
to the Pact's program. The Soviets usually require one
The Romanians may reduce the impact of these dramatic
fluctuations in readiness in units by staggering troop rotations
within divisions. The evidence is tenuous; however, by comparing
reports by emigres who have served in different regiments in the
same divisions, some of the regiments appear to be out of cycle. If
this is the case, this practice would reduce the dramatic change in
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Figure 13
Training in Romanian Motorized Rifle Divisions
Motorized rifle
regiment
Motorized rifle
regiment
Motorized rifle
regiment
Command-staff exercise
Command-staff exercise
Field training
Map exercise
Command-staff exercise
Field training
Command-staff exercise
Field training
Map exercise
Field training
Map exercise
Command-staff exercise
Field training
Field training ?
Field training
a Tank regiments conduct field training in every cycle; however, this
training may be limited to qualification tests and battalion exercises in
some cycles.
the motorized rifle regiments over the two-year pro-
gram. For example, one of these regiments may
conduct a field exercise in the first cycle, a command-
staff exercise in the second cycle, and a map exercise
in the third cycle (see figure 13). Subordinate motor-
ized rifle battalions conduct field training in two of
year to complete a full division training program; the
Romanians expect to achieve similar levels of training
only every two years, and even this goal is not
accomplished. The expense of large-scale exercises
and the use of conscripts in the civilian economy has
caused a decline in division-level training.
Training within Romanian divisions also differs mark-
edly from training in other Pact divisions. Except in
Romania, each of the three motorized rifle regiments
in most Pact ready motorized rifle divisions conducts
the same training and completes a full regimental
training program every six months. Training in Ro-
manian motorized rifle divisions is staggered among
the three cycles.
This program seriously reduces training for each
Romanian conscript relative to his Pact counterparts. 25X1
The average conscript in a Pact ready unit will
complete the training program several times. Because
the training program exceeds his term of service, no
Romanian conscript completes the entire program.
Most Romanian emigres report that their units simply
never trained above company level.
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stress the importance of mountain
warfare for their national defense strategy, and the
training program is intended to develop the skills
necessary for such operations. One of Romania's two
large training areas is in the mountains outside Cluj-
Napoca, and all ground units are required to train
there at least once every other training cycle.
Even the training provided for the elite mountain
infantry troops appears to be elementary. The princi-
pal method of training is marching in the mountains,
a critical but still basic skill. Only career officers
receive training in mountain climbing. Moreover, the
one- to three-week course in skiing is barely satisfac-
tory to familiarize conscripts with the basic tech-
niques. After observing one demonstration of skiing
by the mountain infantry, the US defense attache
reported that their performance was, at best, medio-
cre.
Several of Romania's allies also conduct training in
mountain warfare, and some, particularly Hungary,
provide better training than Romania. Most Pact
countries train one or more units for operations in the
mountains. the
Soviets are demanding more emphasis on such train-
ing.
Patriotic Guards. Romania's paramilitary Patriotic
Guards receive more military training than reservists
elsewhere in the Pact. This training is conducted after
hours and on weekends and consists primarily of films
and lectures. In addition, Patriotic Guards units are
expected to conduct marksmanship training every six
months. Reports by emigres vary, but some units also
conduct training in platoon- and company-level drills
for the defense of their local areas once or twice each
year. In contrast, reservists in other Pact countries are
rarely called up for training more than once after
active duty and are often used for maintenance and
labor rather than trained in their military skills. F_
Patriotic Guards. Patriotic Guards staffs and local 25X1
defense councils apparently participate in most staff 25X1
exercises at regimental or higher echelons, and the 25X1
new army commands supervise field training by Patri-
Constraints
Romania places greater constraints on the time and
25X1
25X1
25X1
means available for military training than any other
member of the Pact. These constraints are imposed
directly by the use of conscripts for civilian labor and
by strict norms for the use of equipment, fuel, and 25X1
ammunition and indirectly by the efforts required to
maintain old equipment.
Labor.) the Roma
nians use conscripts on civilian projects during their
training programs. Compressed training schedules
theoretically permit units to send conscripts to con-
struction projects and farms for three to four months
each cycle. During these months, units were expected
to conduct some military training on worksites; how-
ever, none of the emigres who worked on these
projects reported any training.
25X1
25X1
In the last few years this planned integration of labor
and military training has degenerated so much that 25X1
the Romanian ground forces has primarily become a
source of cheap labor for the economy. Several emi-
gres who served during the early 1980s have reported 25X1
that they were sent to labor projects within weeks
The systematic exploitation of conscripts for labor has
had a devastating impact on training. Romanian
conscripts can expect to spend at least four of their 16
months on labor projects, and those scheduled for
release in the fall can expect to have their active duty
extended for two to three months until the harvest is
completed. The massive use of conscripts for labor
probably will continue until the Romanian economy
improves.
25X1
25X1
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Individual Training,
lindicates that Roma-
nian conscripts receive far less training than their
Soviet counterparts. If they are not assigned to labor
projects, Romanian conscripts can expect to receive
from 860 to 1,120 hours of training over 16 months. If
they have labor projects for four months this dro s to
720 to 840 hours.
(Soviet conscripts in
ready divisions are expected to complete 2,604 hours
of training over two years. The Romanian conscript,
therefore, can expect, at best, to receive 43 percent of
the training provided to his Soviet counterpart and
preserve the operational life of equipment, the Roma-
nians apparently have set extremely strict limits on
the annual use of equipment and on the number of
vehicles to be used in field training at each echelon.
Even these strict limits have not been adequate to
maintain the equipment for training. Several emigres
have reported that the lack of tanks in operating
condition seriously affected training in their units.
One emigre reported that, in part because of the poor
condition of his unit's equipment, the average tank
driver in his unit had less than one hour's driving per
training cycle. Another emigre reported that the
troops in his unit were so frustrated with the condition
of the equipment that fistfights broke out when a tank
was repaired to decide who would drive it.
25X1
25X1
25X1
while many o Romania's short- 25X1
comings are endemic throughout the Pact, they are
25X1
particularly severe in Romania. The Romanians gen-
erally gloss over their shortcomings 25X1
but criticism occasionally emerges. Some of their
25X1
primary complaints are:
? NCOs are poorly trained to teach conscripts. 25X1
? Conscripts and even junior officers are poorly
trained to operate their weapons.
25X1
? Junior officers are poorly trained in tactics.
? Units are not prepared for combined-arms opera- 25X1
tions.
more likely less than 30 percent
The reduced time available for training is reflected in
differences in the frequency of various types of train-
ing for Romanian and other Pact conscripts (see table
5). The Romanian conscript simply has far less experi-
ence firing his weapon or driving his vehicle than his
Pact counterparts. Similarly, Romanian units have
less time and opportunity to develop unit cohesion
among the assigned conscripts than most other Pact
units. Again, this experience is not entirely unique.
Soviet emigres who served in cadre divisions in the
USSR have reported similar low levels of practical
Romania's ground forces could be described as the
Pact's hollow army. Despite recent improvements in
equipment, Romanian ground units are still among
the worst equipped and worst trained in the Pact.
Even after mobilization these units would be compa-
rable only to the weaker cadre divisions in the Soviet
Union, units that require extensive preparations and
training before undertaking offensive operations.
training.
25X1
25X1
Equipment. The condition of equipment in most Ro-
manian units has had a major impact on training. To
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Top Secret
Table 5
Soviet and Romanian Conscripts: Frequency of Training
Soviet Not-Ready
Divisions
Romanian Divi
sions
Once every six months
Once every two
months a
to three
Subcaliber
Three times each week
Once every year b
Once every two
to three months
Live fire
Once every six months
Once every year b
c
Once every six months
Once or twice e
months
very eight
Twice every five years
Twice in two y
ears
Once every five years
Once every two
to five years
a Some Romanian units, like Soviet cadre units, only fire once every
six months.
b Tank units in not-ready divisions usually do not have tank gunners
and commanders in peacetime. These units usually call up reserv-
ists each year to conduct training up to battalion level and conduct
subcaliber and live-fire qualification tests during these exercises.
Romanians do not conduct live-fire training in their tank units in
peacetime.
Romania's limited offensive capabilities would almost
certainly restrict its role in a Pact war with NATO,
even in the unlikely case that Romania actively
supported the effort. Romania's role probably would
be limited during the initial stages of a war to
guarding the lines of communication, a role similar to
that of Poland's Internal Front in Central Europe.
Romanian forces might be used for subsequent Pact
operations in the Balkans but would need several
months of training to correct peacetime deficiencies.
This additional time would improve the ability of
conscripts to use their equipment but would do little to
compensate for the poor quality of the equipment.
Even when fully trained, Romanian units would be
only marginally effective for offensive operations.
increased Romania's military capabilities. These
changes, however, have been directed toward national
defense, not Pact offensive doctrine. Some of the
changes actually may complicate any attempt to
cooperate with the Pact.
The improvements in organization and equipment in
recent years have been balanced by a marked decline
in readiness and training in ground units. The Roma-
nians apparently have sacrificed current readiness for
future capabilities by investing in new equipment
rather than training. Moreover, the use of conscripts
for labor and the decline in training have forced the
Romanians to emphasize the role of the Patriotic
Guards at a very early stage during any invasion.
The reorganization of command, the introduction of
new equipment, and the formation of new units have
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The contribution of the Patriotic Guards to Roma-
nia's defense strategy has been increasing for several
years. Romania's conscripts and reservists receive less
training than their counterparts in the Pact. The
Patriotic Guards, on the other hand, receive more
regular training than reservists anywhere in the Pact,
are maintained as cohesive units for long periods, and
are assigned to clearly defined missions for local
defense. These factors should improve their effective-
ness during conventional and guerrilla operations.
Despite improvements in the ground forces and the
Patriotic Guards, the Romanian strategy is, at best, a
means to delay defeat. The Romanians regard an
intervention by the Pact as the most likely military
threat. Although they cannot hope to defeat Pact
forces, the Romanians can make such an invasion a
protracted and costly operation. Moreover, the will to
do so apparently exists. Even emigres who freely
criticize their military equipment and the quality of
their military training were convinced that their units
would fight if Romania were invaded.
Over the next several years the Romanians probably
will continue to improve their defensive capabilities.
New ground units probably will be formed to fill out
the new armies, and additional equipment will be
deployed to replace obsolete weapons and to correct
shortages. The rate of deployment, however, probably
will depend on improvements in the economy. At the
same time, integration of Patriotic Guards into local
and regional defense plans probably will improve
through increased joint training.
Any major change in Romania's relations with the
Pact is unlikely in the near future. Even in the
unlikely event that the Romanians resolved their
differences with the Soviets, it would be difficult to
reverse the trends of the past decade.
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Top Secret
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