(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
Directorate of Secret,
Intelligence
Andropov's Political Position:
A Postplenum Assessment
SOV 83-10147X
August 1983
289
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Andropov's Political Position:
A Postplenum Assessment
This paper was prepared byl lof the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Policy
Analysis Division, SOVA~
Secret
SOV 83-10147X
August 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 1 August 1983
was used in this report.
A Postplenum Assessment
Andropov's Political Position:
tional evidence of his preeminence.
Yuriy Andropov emerged from the June party plenum and Supreme Soviet
session with his personal authority and political prestige considerably
enhanced. His assumption of the presidency completed his acquisition of
the powerful portfolio-head of the party, state, and defense council-that
his predecessor had established over the years. References to Andropov as
"head" of the Politburo in the nominating speech of his putative rival,
Konstantin Chernenko, and in a postplenum party decree provided addi-
Leadership changes made at the plenum-the addition of Grigoriy
Romanov to the Secretariat, the appointment of Mikhail Solomentsev as
head of the Party Control Committee, and the promotion of Vitaliy
Vorotnikov to candidate membership in the Politburo-also strengthened
Andropov's political position. These shifts isolated Chernenko in the
Secretariat and brought a presumed Andropov client (Vorotnikov) into the
leadership. Andropov's increased authority also was suggested by the
removal from the Central Committee of two former Brezhnev associates
who fell victim to Andropov's anticorruption campaign. 25X1
Despite these successes, it is not yet clear whether Andropov can translate
this authority into effective political power. His failure to promote anyone
to full membership in the Politburo or to remove any reputed adversaries
suggests that the balance of power in that body has not been significantly
altered. The Politburo, while smaller in numbers, remains much the same
as under Brezhnev. Only two of the 11 full members-Defense Minister
Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko-have been consistently cited by
various middle-level Soviet officials as Andropov supporters. He probably
can also count on the support of Romanov, who is indebted to him, and
Mikhail Gorbachev, with whom he has been cultivating an alliance. The
other Politburo members are
politically uncommitted or opposed to Andropov
Secret
SOV 83-10147X
August 1983
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
Andropov's plenum speech gave credibility to this report, suggesting that
he was moving with great caution and deliberation. No new programs or
significant policy departures were announced, and the speech was couched
in broad philosophical terms. Andropov's decision to focus attention on
revising the party program, however, could help legitimize desired policy
shifts and allow him to set future policy agendas.
If the reports about Andropov's support are accurate, his efforts to make
any important changes-such as those some of his backers would like to
see in the economic sphere-could be running into some difficulty.
Without a solid majority committed to him in the Politburo, Andropov,
despite his recent gains, must deal with fluid political coalitions whose
members are in no sense clients and whose support for specific policy
initiatives must be earned.
Andropov's age (69) and uncertain health further complicate the situation
and suggest that the setting of a policy agenda cannot be delayed
indefinitely. If his health does not worsen dramatically, we would expect
Andropov to gain greater control over both policy and personnel decisions
over the next year or so, bringing into the leadership individuals who will
follow his lead. If his condition deteriorates, however, particularly if long
rest periods away from work are required, Andropov's efforts to further
consolidate political support would probably be stymied. Moreover, the
political maneuvers involving younger leaders, particularly Gorbachev and
Romanov, suggest that succession remains a live issue within the Soviet
elite.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
Secret
Andropov's Political Position:
A Postplenum Assessment
Leading Up to the Plenum
Andropov went into the plenum with considerable
political momentum. In late March, Foreign Minister
Gromyko, who reportedly is one of Andropov's strong-
est supporters, was appointed First Deputy Premier,
strengthening Andropov's position in the Council of
Ministers. This was followed in April by the replace-
ment of Ivan Kapitonov, a Brezhnev appointee, by
Yegor Ligachev as head of the Central Committee's
Organizational Party Work Department, which over-
sees cadre appointments.
In the months preceding the plenum, during conversa-
tions with US Embassy officials, various Andropov
loyalists and former associates had been insisting that
he would capitalize on his improved position by
pushing through major personnel shifts at the plenum.
In meetings in April and May, several Central Com-
mittee officials also raised the issue of expected
personnel moves They con-
veyed some disappointment that Andropov had not
moved more rapidly on this matter, claiming that
personnel changes were a prerequisite for any signifi-
cant change in the economic mechanism. These ex-
pectations probably were fueled by their high hopes
for Andropov as well as by the opportunities the
depletion of the leadership ranks since early 1982
presented to him. Death and retirement had reduced
the Politburo to 11 members, its smallest size since
the 1960s. The Secretariat, responsible for day-to-day
management of the party apparatus, was also smaller
than it had been during Brezhnev's latter years, and
only three of its nine members (Andropov, Konstantin
Chernenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev) held Politburo
rank.
Leadership Changes
Andropov, however, clearly was unable to take full
advantage of the opportunities offered by this thin-
ning of the ranks. The full membership of the Polit-
buro was not altered, and two presumed Andropov
clients with potential eligibility for advancement-
Yegor Ligachev and party secretary Nikolay
Ryzhkov-failed to move up.
Andropov, nevertheless, was able to push through
some personnel shifts that strengthened his position. 25X1
Lacking a strong clientele in the party apparatus, he
adroitly put forward leaders whose political careers
had languished under Brezhnev. This tactic gave him
some leeway to expand his support within the existing
leadership while adding only one client to it.
celebration in Berlin.
In what is clearly the most significant shift, Lenin-
grad party boss Grigoriy Romanov-already a Polit-
buro member-was added to the Secretariat. While
there is no evidence to link the careers of the two men,
Romanov's greater visibility in the leadership has
coincided with Andropov's rise to the top. In April,
Romanov was given the opportunity to head a delega-
tion to Finland and, benefiting from Chernenko's
illness, to lead a party delegation to the Karl Marx
This alliance is politically expedient for both men.
Romanov's career had stalled in Leningrad for 12
years, his standing among Brezhnev's inner circle
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
damaged by personal indiscretions. His pressing need
for a patron to move him to the political center
coincided with Andropov's desire to increase his flexi-
bility and influence in the Secretariat
Beyond purely political calculations, Andropov proba-
bly was attracted by Romanov's innovative manageri-
al style, intolerance for dissident activity, and stress
on worker discipline. In an era when the Soviet
Union's economic problems can no longer be solved
merely by increasing investment, Romanov offers a
blend of organizational and technological approaches
that could have wide applicability. In Leningrad, he
has been instrumental in promoting new approaches
to planning and management, such as "social develop-
ment" plans and production associations, that have
been adopted on a national scale. As Leningrad
Oblast is a center of defense industry in the USSR,
Romanov presumably has expertise in this area as
well. He also has championed the application of
advanced technologies to increase industrial growth-
an approach Andropov endorsed once again in his
plenum speech.
Traditionally, control over the party Secretariat has
been essential to a new party leader's efforts to
establish his preeminence in the Politburo. With
Romanov in the Secretariat and the apparent alliance
Andropov has formed with Gorbachev, the party
secretary and Politburo member responsible for agri-
culture, the General Secretary's influence over the
Secretariat has been substantially enhanced. Within
the Secretariat, Gorbachev has apparently been given
responsibility for personnel assignments. He presided
over the installation of the RSFSR Premier and the
new Leningrad party chief. Romanov seems likely to
assume overall responsibility for heavy industry, sup-
planting candidate Politburo member Vladimir
Dolgikh, whose relationship with Andropov is not
By transferring Romanov to the Secretariat,
Andropov may have effectively isolated Chernenko.
He is now one of four Politburo members who simul-
taneously serve in the Secretariat, and Andropov
seems to have limited his portfolio to ideology. While
Chernenko's delivery of the plenum's keynote address
on ideology confirmed his inheritance of at least part
Vitaliy Vorotnikov, new candi-
date member of the Politburo.
of Suslov's responsibilities, Andropov's remarks on the
need for a revised party program effectively stole
Chernenko's thunder.
leading party spokesman on all major questions, in-
cluding those of ideology.
Two other personnel changes set in motion by the
plenum-while not as significant in power terms as
Romanov's transfer-also appear to benefit
Andropov. Vitaliy Vorotnikov became a candidate
member of the Politburo and replaced Mikhail Solo-
mentsev as RSFSR Premier, while Solomentsev was
named chairman of the Party Control Committee,
replacing the deceased Arvid Pelshe. Both men had
been shunted to the sidelines during Brezhnev's tenure
and may have been ready and willing candidates for
Andropov's patronage. Solomentsev had moved from
the Secretariat in 1972 to the RSFSR premiership.
Since that time he has been passed over on several
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
Secret
Mikhail Solomentsev, whose
new post may signal an expand-
ed role for the party Control
Central Committee mandate to clean up the corrup-
This reputation for incorruptibility apparently at-
tracted Andropov's attention.
Vorotnikov also brings to his present position exten-
sive experience in industrial party management. In
the mid-1970s, when he was first secretary of the
Voronezh Oblast Party Committee, he contributed an
article to a prominent party journal that called for
greater economic inputs from specialists, more bu-
reaucratic accountability, and increased efficiency-
ideas that seem in accord with Andropov's.
The promotions of several officials from candidate to
full membership in the Central Committee appeared
to favor the military and underscore Ustinov's influ-
ence and importance as an Andropov ally. Those
advanced included First Deputy Chief of the General
Staff Sergey Akhromeyev, who was promoted to
Marshal of the Soviet Union earlier this year; Deputy
Defense Minister Vitaliy Shabanov, a known Ustinov
protege; and Minister of the Machine Tool and Tool
Building Industry Boris Bal'mont, a longtime defense
occasions for voting membership in the Politburo, a
status traditionally accorded to the RSFSR's chief
administrator. Although he has yet to win full mem-
bership in the Politburo in his new post, such a
promotion may be in the offing if Andropov's power
continues to grow. Andropov may intend to use a
revitalized Party Control Committee as a key instru-
ment in extending the anticorruption campaign to
party ranks, a move that the expulsion of two Central
Solomentsev's new job also provided Andropov with
an opportunity to promote Vorotnikov, an apparent
client, to Politburo ranks. Vorotnikov has enjoyed two
rapid promotions since Andropov's return to the Sec-
retariat in May 1982. Under Brezhnev, Vorotnikov's
career suffered a setback when he was replaced as
Voronezh Oblast first secretary and appointed Am-
bassador to Cuba in 1979. Such assignments usually
signal honorable exile. In June 1982, however, he was
brought home to become party chief in Krasnodar
Kray, replacing former Brezhnev associate Medunov,
Clean" and was given his Krasnodar post with a
industry official.
The plenum also strengthened Andropov's position by
boosting his prestige and acknowledging him as the
preeminent leader within the Politburo. He now has
the offices and titles Brezhnev took years to acquire.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
His rival Chernenko even referred to him as "head" of
the Politburo-a plaudit Brezhnev did not receive
until nine years after he became party leader. The
weeks following the plenum have provided further
confirmation of Andropov's standing in the
leadership:
? Participants in the June/July regional party meet-
ings were effusive in their praise for Andropov's
elevation to the presidency.
? Andropov's plenum speech was consistently cited as
providing guidance for the regional meetings, and
Kommunist published it ahead of Chernenko's re- 2.5X1
port, even though the latter was presented first. 25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
his election to the presidency
from his Politburo colleagues.
political divisions within the top leadership remain,
particularly as regards economic priorities, and
Andropov apparently does not yet have a solid major-
ity behind him.
Prior to the plenum, both Defense Minister Ustinov
and Foreign Minister Gromyko were
Andropov supporters. In
addition, the promotion of Romanov and the broaden-
ing of responsibilities for Gorbachev since Andropov
became party leader suggest that these two men, at
least for the present, have joined his camp. The other
six Politburo members, however, have been
uncommitted or op-
posed to Andropov. The latter category includes
Brezhnev loyalists Chernenko, Premier Nikolay Tik-
honov, and Kazakh party chief Dinmukhamed
Kunayev.
? The facade of collective leadership has been largely
abandoned. Regional party leaders specifically refer
to Andropov's statements and speeches as guides for
their own actions.
Although the above examples tend to confirm
Andropov's authority, it is not yet clear whether the
General Secretary can translate this into effective
political power. Andropov has yet to develop sufficient
support in the Politburo to alter its political balance-
either by promoting supporters or removing oppo-
nents. Despite several vacancies, the Politburo's full
membership was not changed at the plenum, a com-
promise that Andropov may have had to accept for
the gains he did achieve. The signs of debate on
economic policy in the press and the tentative ap-
proach evident in proposing new economic policies
suggest Andropov has encountered some opposition in
making changes in this area as well.
Andropov's Speech
Andropov's plenum speech buttressed the impression
that he lacks consistent majority support on the
Politburo and suggests that he either does not feel
confident of his ability to get the desired measures
adopted or has not yet fully formulated his strategy.
The speech, which focused on long-discussed revisions
in the party program, was couched in broad, philo-
sophical terms and did not unveil any major new
programs or significant policy departures.
Throughout his speech Andropov emphasized the
need to improve the economic mechanism, raise pro-
ductivity, and enforce the socialist principle "to each
according to his work." Yet he failed to make any
concrete proposals to improve the situation, noting
that "we have not yet studied properly the society in
which we live and work." Would-be economic reform-
ers probably can take some satisfaction, however,
from Andropov's failure to rule out any specific
approaches to studying economic problems.
the lack of strong support within the
Politburo would not prevent Andropov from assuming
the presidency but had forced him to back down from
planned policy initiatives. The ability to overcome this
policy hurdle may hinge on Andropov's power to
create a Politburo more to his liking. For now,
Andropov offered two strategies to raise labor produc-
tivity, which he described as "the key task in the
economic sphere"-the increased utilization of tech-
nology and an increased reliance on labor discipline.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
Secret
He complained that the present system often discour-
ages technological innovation and that managers who
risk the introduction of new technologies are often
penalized. Andropov called for new incentives to
encourage such risk-taking and "make work in the
old-fashioned way impossible."
While Andropov held out hope that the technological
revolution might one day eliminate the need for
manual, monotonous labor, his message to workers
and consumers was essentially a conservative one-
work harder and produce more. Stressing that equal
access to the material goods produced by society
awaits a Communist utopia, he defended wage differ-
entiation as a means of increasing labor productivity.
Although Andropov devoted more attention to con-
sumer issues than he has in previous speeches, his
remarks chiefly served to deflate consumer expecta-
tions. He professed dissatisfaction with the traditional
measurements of consumer welfare-income growth
and the production of consumer goods. Instead, he
proposed a standard of "reasonable consumption," a
concept so broad as to appear meaningless. Soviet
consumers are not likely to be reassured by Andro-
pov's set of indexes (including the "aesthetic use of
free time and quality of public order"), which purport
to measure their improved standard of living.
The most interesting comments in Andropov's speech,
touching on key aspects of Soviet economic planning,
were, perhaps purposefully, the least developed.
Taken as a whole, however, they do indicate that
Andropov favors a broad reevaluation of current
economic policies:
? His suggestion that the managerial apparatus can
be reduced in size and excess personnel reassigned
to areas with labor shortages represents a departure
from current Soviet practice.
? His reference to "price formation" as a key area
requiring further study implies that he believes the
system of administratively determined prices is not
doing the job.
? His admission that the quantitative "overfulfill-
ment" of production plans may be misguided also
strikes at the heart of current Soviet economic
practice.
? Finally, in calling for a stricter separation of party
and state functions, he appears to be associating
himself with technocrats and managers resentful of
excessive party tutelage and, perhaps, with rumored
proposals to abolish or reorganize the Central Com-
mittee's economic departments.
In sum, the immediate effect of the plenum, at least in
the economic arena, is to leave many loose ends and
postpone major changes.
=a long-expected plenum on management reform
now will not be held until next year. The changes
Andropov proposed in the party program, moreover,
must be approved by a party congress that need not
convene until 1986. If Andropov could garner suffi-
cient political strength, however, an early party con-
gress could be convened to ratify shifts in economic
policy.
Prospects
Andropov emerged from the plenum with his personal
status enhanced. His appointment to the presidency
confirms his preeminence in the leadership and is
further evidence that the General Secretary is secure
in his post. Although rumors persist about policy
disputes and opposing coalitions in the Politburo, it is
unlikely that opposition forces could directly threaten
Andropov's rule. Although Andropov did not effect
widespread personnel or policy changes at the plenum,
he appears to be making gradual progress in consoli-
dating his power base by improving his position in the
Secretariat.
At the same time, Andropov's age (69) and uncertain
health raise questions about his ability to consolidate
his power or place his personal stamp on Soviet policy.
Andropov suffered a heart attack in 1966, has a
history of high blood pressure, and wears a pacemak-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
Andropov's uncertain health-he is
assisted by aides during a public
Although Andropov's known medical problems would
not impair his mental faculties, they do require
.constant medical supervision and periods of rest
More important, perceptions of his health problems
by the ruling elite could become a source of political
weakness.
ndropov's frail appear-
ance at the plenum cast a mood of uncertainty over
the gathering and generated considerable gossip
among the participants. If Andropov comes to be
viewed as an interim leader because of this, he might
find it difficult to generate support for controversial
economic initiatives or necessary changes in Politburo
membership.
Moreover, Andropov's health and the political maneu-
verings involving younger leaders such as Gorbachev
and Romanov also suggest succession remains a live
issue within the Soviet elite. Romanov now joins the
select club of full Politburo members who are also
Central Committee secretaries (Andropov, Cher-
nenko, and Gorbachev) and from whose ranks the
General Secretary has traditionally been chosen.
With time, both Gorbachev and Romanov are likely
to emerge as contenders for Andropov's position. For
now, their presence in the Secretariat dilutes Cher-
nenko's influence. In addition, they could well become
rivals. Development of such counterweights is a tradi-
tion in Soviet politics that has been used by Stalin,
Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. Such competition could
provide protection for Andropov, should he become
more feeble. Andropov obviously intends to keep a
close eye on Romanov's ambitions, however, as Gor-
bachev seems to have been given cadre responsibility.
The presence of both Gorbachev and Romanov at last
month's installation of Romanov's successor in Lenin-
grad-a man we believe would not have been Roma-
nov's first choice for the post-suggests an effort to
keep Romanov in check.
For now Andropov remains firmly in charge. If his
health remains stable, he should be able to continue
his political progress, consolidating support for his
policies and placing allies in key personnel slots. His
physical condition suggests, however, that the next
succession looms in the background of all political
manuevering.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
Secret
Interlocking Directorate of
the Soviet Leadership
Politburo
Date of
Secretariat
Regional Post
Council of
Presidium
Birth
Election
Ministers
of Supreme
Soviet
Andropov
6/15/14
4/27/73
General Secretary
Chairman
Aliyev
5/10/23
11/22/82
1st Deputy Chairman
Chernenko
9/24/11
11/27/78
Ideology
Gorbachev
3/02/31
10/21/80
Agriculture
Grishin
9/18/14
4/09/71
Moscow party chief
Member
Gromyko
7/18/09
4/27/73
Minister of Foreign
Affairs and 1st
Deputy Chairman
Kunayev
1/12/12
4/09/71
Kazakhstan party chief
Member
Romanov
2/07/23
3/06/76
Heavy industry (?)
Leningrad party chief
Member
Shcherbitskiy
2/17/18
4/09/71
Ukraine party chief
Member
Tikhonov
5/14/05
11/27/79
Chairman
Ustinov
10/30/08
3/06/76
Minister of Defense
Candidate
Member
Demichev
1/03/18
11/03/64
Dolgikh
12/25/24
5/24/82
Industry
Kuznetsov
2/13/01
10/03/77
1st Deputy
Chairman
Ponomarev
1/17/05
5/19/72
Nonruling Commu-
nist parties
Rashidov
11/06/17
10/31/61
Uzbekistan party chief
Shevardnadze
1/25/28
11/27/78
Georgia party chief
Solomentsev
11/07/13
11/23/71
Party Control Committee
Vorotnikov
1/20/26
6/15/83
RSFSR Premier
Kapitonov-Light
industry and con-
sumer goods
Zimyanin-Propa-
ganda, ideology
Rusakov-Ruling
Communist parties
Ryzhkov-Economic
management
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84T00926R000100030003-8