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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00926R000100020002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
War Between Iran and Iraq
Moscow's Tilt Toward
Baghdad: The USSR and the
ropy 4 b 1
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Directorate of Tnn Secret
Intelligence
War Between Iran and Iraq
Moscow's Tilt Toward
Baghdad: The USSR and the
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
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Office of Soviet Analysis. T e statistics were compiled
by
the Office of Global Issues. 25X1
The paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. 25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief China-Third W rl Branch,
SOVA,
Top Secret
SOV 83-10145CX
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Moscow's Tilt Toward
Baghdad: The USSR and the_
War Between Iran and Iraq
Key Judgments The USSR has altered its policies toward Iran and Iraq in Baghdad's favor
I,~/ormation available during the past year and a half. In spring 1982 Moscow began a major ef-
as of 26 August 1983 fort to improve ties with Iraq, emphasizing closer military cooperation-
was used in this report.
particularly arms sales and deliveries. In 1982, for example, the number of
Soviet seaborne arms deliveries to Iraq tripled, and the tonnage delivered
set a record for Soviet equipment received by a Third World country. The
Kremlin also has supported Baghdad's call for a negotiated settlement of
the war between Iran and Iraq. Relations have improved to the point where
Soviet and Iraqi leaders have recently made laudatory public statements
about bilateral ties.
During the same period, Soviet-Iranian relations have steadily deteriorated
to their lowest level since the Shah's reign. The most telling indicators of
this decline are Tehran's recent abolition of the Tudeh (Iran's Communist
party) and expulsion of Soviet officials from Iran and Moscow's counter-
expulsion of Iranian officials.
Moscow's tilt toward Baghdad is a marked departure from its policy of try-
ing to maintain stable relations with the two while probing for better ties
with Iran. At the outset of the war in September 1980, the Soviets thought
they saw an opportunity to make some gains in Tehran. Their embargo of
arms deliveries to both countries benefited Iran because Iraq had been
receiving considerably more arms. The Kremlin coupled this with a
renewed effort to improve political ties with Tehran. When the gambit
produced no immediate results, the Soviets in spring 1981 lifted the
embargo but refused to conclude any new arms deals
In the spring of 1982, however, Moscow began to take steps that eventually
amounted to a clear tilt toward Baghdad. The Soviet move stemmed from
various factors:
? Iran's major battlefield victories in late 1981 and the first half of 1982
temporarily disadvantaged Iraq. The Soviets may have believed at that
time that if they did not aid Baghdad, Iraq might decide it had no choice
but to accelerate its turn toward Western Europe, China, and even the
United States.
? The USSR feared that an Iranian victory would lead to the spread of
Khomeini's type of Islamic fundamentalism near its southern border.
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? The risk that a Soviet tilt toward Iraq would impel Iran to turn back
toward the United States seemed much lower in the spring of 1982 than
it had earlier in the revolution. By th;~t time, Khomeini had crushed all
major opposition, including the relati~rely pro-Western Bani-Sadr, and
the regime's anti-American rhetoric was as shrill as ever.
? The Soviets had concluded that the prospects for the Iranian revolution
swinging to the left were becoming slimmer and that the outlook for good
bilateral ties was poor. They appareniay believed that as long as
Khomeini or his supporters remained in power Soviet influence would be
minimal.
There are, however, some important constraints on the improvement in
Soviet-Iraqi relations:
? Mutual distrust between Iraqi Presidf;nt Saddam Husayn and Moscow
remains great.
? The Soviets do not want to antagonize Syria-their principal ally in the
Middle East-by developing too close a relationship with its archenemy,
Iraq.
? Most important, we believe the Kremlin, despite the deterioration of its
relations with the Khomeini regime, still considers Iran more important
geopolitically than Iraq and will want to avoid providing an opening for
the United States in Tehran.
Although the Soviets are likely during t:he next year to continue supplying
political and military backing to Iraq, they will attempt to avoid a complete
break in relations with Iran
The course of the war will have a major effect on Soviet policies toward the
two countries during the next year. A prolongation of the military
stalemate-the most likely scenario-probably would strain Moscow's
relations with Iran even further and lead to continued improvement in its
ties with Iraq.
The Soviets consistently call for an end t.o the war, even though they realize
that cessation of the conflict would yield. them liabilities as well as benefits.
A peaceful settlement would:
? Reduce the significance of one of the prime irritants in Soviet-Iranian
relations-Moscow's weapons sales to Baghdad.
? Probably make the Persian Gulf states less nervous about Iranian
expansionism, which would decrease their need and willingness to
cooperate militarily with the United States.
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? Result in probably greater contributions from Iran and Iraq to the
struggle against Israel, thereby strengthening the pro-Soviet radical Arab
states.
? Possibly improve the prospects for a rapprochement between Baghdad
The potential liabilities for the Kremlin from an end to the war, however,
would be at least as significant:
? Iraq, without as acute a need for weaponry, might accelerate its
diversification of weapons suppliers and become less dependent on
Moscow.
? Iraq would probably improve its relations with the United States.
? Although a dramatic improvement in Iranian ties with Washington is a
remote possibility, Moscow might worry that the absence of the unifying
factor of the war could weaken the fundamentalist regime to the point
that more pragmatic clerics, who are not as averse to dealing with the
United States, would gain the upper hand.
But the Soviets have learned to live with the war and can continue to do so
as long as neither side gains a decisive military advantage. Although
Moscow would significantly enhance its position in the Middle East if it
became an honest broker negotiating a settlement, the prospects of that
occurring are slim.
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Key Judgments
Reassessment of Policy: Spring 1981 Through February 1982 3
Moscow Changes Course: March Through July 1982 4
Expanding Military Ties With Iraq 8
Limitations to the Soviet-Iraqi Rapprochement 12
Chronology of Soviet Policy Toward Iran and Iraq, 17
1980-83
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Figure 1
Saudi
ACabla
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Moscow's Tilt Toward
Baghdad: The USSR and the
War Between Iran and Iraq
Introduction
The USSR's primary aim in the Persian Gulf region
since 1979 has been to capitalize on the windfall it
received from the elimination of US influence in Iran
without jeopardizing its shaky, though important,
relationship with Iraq. The war between Iran and
Iraq, which began in September 1980, has created a
major impediment to the accomplishment of this
objective.
We believe that the Soviet Union has seen the war as,
on balance, detrimental to its interests. On the one
hand, the conflict has increased Iran's dependence on
Soviet and East European trade and transit routes,
weakened the position of the anti-Soviet Saddam
Husayn, and boosted Soviet hard currency earnings
from arms sales. Nevertheless, the Soviets probably
believe that these benefits are outweighed by other
factors. In particular, Moscow's shifting policy toward
the war has angered both Iran and Iraq. Only since
spring 1982 has Baghdad's attitude softened as the
Soviets have begun to favor Iraq.
Another of the war's liabilities is that it has made a
US military presence in the region less objectionable
to the conservative Persian Gulf states, who fear
Iranian expansionism. As the Soviets have often
lamented, the war has also benefited the United
States and Israel by bleeding two anti-US countries
and by diverting Arab and Iranian energies from the
confrontation with Zionism.
Although the USSR has maintained an official, pub-
lic policy of neutrality throughout the war, at differ-
ent points during the conflict it has leaned toward one
side or the other depending on its evaluation of the
fighting. Up until 1982, however, the Soviets
refrained from taking a decisive stance on the side of
either belligerent.
This paper analyzes why Moscow abandoned its
relatively evenhanded stance toward the two belliger-
ents in spring 1982 and adopted a policy that clearly
favors Iraq. It briefly examines Soviet interests in
each country and the policy the Kremlin followed
during the first year and a half of the war. It also
points out the factors that will limit Moscow's tilt
toward Baghdad-most important of which is Iran's
geopolitical significance to the USSR. Finally, the
paper discusses different scenarios for the course of
the war and how Soviet interests and policies will be
affected in each
Background: Soviet Policy Before the War
Moscow's relations with the Shah's regime after 1962
were relatively friendly despite the Shah's deep-seated
anti-Communism and suspicion of the USSR. Trade
expanded rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, and, begin-
ning in 1966, Tehran started purchasing Soviet arms.
By the time of the Shah's ouster in February 1979,
the Iranians had ordered $1.7 billion worth of Soviet
weapons-mostly ground force support equipment.
(See table on page 10.)
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after 1973, however, when the Shah started to use his
oil wealth to build Iran into the predominant military
power in the Persian Gulf region. The Shah's strategy
involved a much closer alliance with the United States
and resulted in a more assertive Iranian policy, which
often clashed with Soviet interests in the region. Thus,
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demise, welcomed it as a major blow to US influence
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The Soviets expended considerable effort after the
Shah fell in February 1979 in an attempt to court the
regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. The Islamic govern-
ment's decision to allow the previously illegal Tudeh
(Iran's Communist party) to operate openly and its
espousal of radical "anti-imperialist" and anti-Israeli
views presumably bolstered the Kremlin's hopes. Mos- 25X1
cow's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979,
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however, severely set back whatever prospects existed
for genuinely close relations with the Khomeini re-
gime. During 1980 Tehran spoke out often against the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan, closed down Iran's
natural gas pipeline to the USSR, and reduced the
number of Soviet nationals serving in Iran.
Soviet-Iraqi relations-which had expanded during
the first half of the 1970s with the signing of a
Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1972 and the
sale of large quantities of sophisticated Soviet weap-
ons to Baghdad-worsened during the last few years
of the decade. Iraq opposed the Soviet-Cuban involve-
ment in Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978, the Marxist coup
in Kabul in 1978, and Moscow's invasion of Afghani-
stan the following year. The Iraqi leaders' growing
disenchantment with the USSR convinced them in
1978 to execute some 40 Iraqi Communist Party
(CPI) members arrested three years earlier on charges
of recruiting among the armed forces. The only CPI
member holding a cabinet post was removed. Even
more worrisome for the Soviets, however, was Iraq's
effort to reduce its overwhelming dependence on the
USSR for arms-the only real basis of their relation-
ship-by purchasing major weapons systems from the
West.
The War: Early Soviet Maneuvering
The Kremlin clearly disapproved of the Iraqi decision
to attack Iran in September 1980.
Soviet official; have complained privately to Western-
ers that the Iraqis did not consult with the USSR, as
they were sup~~osed to according to the Soviet-Iraqi
treaty, before invading.
The Kremlin's decision in the early days of the war to
cut off direct ;arms shipments to both sides reflected
its opposition to the Iraqi invasion as well as its efforts
to curry favor in Iran. Iraq bore the brunt of this
decision because it had been receiving substantial
amounts of Soviet arms, while Iran had been getting
far less. From the start, however, Moscow attempted
to attenuate the negative effects of the arms embargo,
which it never publicized, on both countries. It al-
lowed small amounts of Soviet arms to filter through
to them in the first few months of the war and also
permitted, and probably encouraged, countries-such
as Libya, Syria, North Korea, Bulgaria, and Po-
land-to ship Soviet-origin weapons to them.
Despite this attempt to soften its impact, Iraq resent-
ed the Soviet embargo. A Soviet diplomat in Baghdad
told a US official in December 1980 that Saddam was
The Soviets also signed a Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty with Syria in early October de-
spite the oven hostility between Damascus and
Baghdad.
Moscow's williingness to risk a rupture with Iraq
apparently stemmed, in part, from its belief that the
Iraqis could not afford to break with the USSR
completely anti from its displeasure with Saddam
personally. In the fall of 1980, an East European
diplomat in the Middle East said Soviet diplomats
there attributed the embargo to Moscow's desire to
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Perhaps even more important in the Soviet decision to
undertake these anti-Iraqi steps was Moscow's appar-
ent perception of Iraq's invasion as an opportunity to
make some gains in Tehran. The Soviets began a new
effort to court the Khomeini regime. For instance,
Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov met with then Prime
Minister Rajai and Speaker of the Majlis Rafsanjani
on separate occasions in October and stressed Mos-
cow's interest in improving relations. Tehran, howev-
er, was not receptive, and the effort foundered.
Reassessment of Policy: Spring 1981
Through February 1982
In a major tactical shift, the Soviets lifted the arms
embargo in spring 1981. Removing the embargo
clearly favored Iraq because it bought much more
than Iran did from the USSR. We believe the Soviets
apparently feared that continuation of the embargo
was prompting Iraq to accelerate its arms purchases
from China and the West and could turn Baghdad
irrevocably away from the USSR. Their decision was
probably also influenced by worries about the growing
rapprochement between Baghdad and moderate Arab
states, signs that the United States was seeking to
improve relations with Iraq, and Moscow's own fail-
ure to make immediate headway with Iran.
During the next 12 months, until spring 1982, the
Soviets delivered over $1 billion worth of weapons to
Iraq-including MIG-23 fighters, T-72 tanks, sur-
face-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, and, for the
first time, MIG-25 interceptors.
appea ss for arms, received from Moscow much small-
er amounts of military equipment, including small
arms, ammunition, trucks, and spare parts~~
Lifting the embargo removed a major irritant in the
USSR's relations with Iran and Iraq and helped slow
Baghdad's shift from Soviet to Western weapons, but
it created new problems for Moscow. Both Baghdad
and Tehran presumably viewed the move as the
righting of a wrong. The Iranians now had good
reason to criticize Moscow for arming their enemy
and did so frequently.
In addition to the resumption of the arms deliveries,
the Kremlin sent out other signals that it was interest-
ed in mending fences with Baghdad. In April 1981,
Brezhnev-for the first time since 1978-signed the
annual message to the Iraqi leadership commemorat-
ing the signing of the 1972 Friendship and Coopera-
tion Treaty. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets repaired a
critical electric-generating facility in Iraq damaged
during the war, and they signed a few new economic
cooperation agreements.
Nonetheless, Soviet-Iraqi political relations remained
chilly throughout the rest of 1981. Although Baghdad
sent First Deputy Premier Ramadan to Moscow in
June, it remained suspicious of the Soviets.
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Meanwhile, the Kremlin probably was ambivalent
about the course of political developments in Iran. It 25X1
publicly applauded the ouster in June 1981 of Prime
Minister Bani-Sadr, whom Moscow considered anti-
Soviet and capable of turning Iran back toward the
West. At the same time, it shed no tears over the 25X1
Iranian clerics' crushing of the Islamic, leftist opposi-
tion-the Mujahedin-e Khalq-in the summer and 25X1
early fall. The Soviets had repeatedly criticized the
Mujahedin for refusing to unite with other leftist
forces in Iran and were especially skeptical of its
attempts to overthrow the Khomeini regime by force.
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But some Soviets recognized that the consolidation of
clerical control would not necessarily benefit the
USSR. For example, Izvestiya political commentator
Aleksandr Bovin warned in an article in June 1981
and on a. Moscow television program in July that the
fundamentalist clerics who were becoming dominant
in Tehran were virulently anti-Soviet.
Whatever reservations it had, however, Moscow con-
tinued to court the Khomeini regime. When Iran's
new President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister
took office late in the summer of 1981, they, unlike
many of their predecessors, did not speak out publicly
against the Soviets. In addition, trade increased in
1981 to slightly above prerevolutionary levels, the two
countries exchanged visits of various low-level delega-
tions, and Ambassador Vinogradov was granted a
number of meetings with Iranian leaders. This period,
h w v before the storm.
Moscow Changes Course: March Through July 1982
In our judgment, the lifting of the arms embargo in
spring 1981 was essentially adamage-limiting move
by Moscow. Its previous policy, which had been more
favorable to Iran, failed to produce benefits for the
Soviets in Tehran and further damaged their already
poor standing in Baghdad. Ending the embargo,
however, slowed but did not reverse the deterioration
in Soviet-Iraqi ties, partly because the Soviets contin-
ued to court Khomeini. It was not until the spring of
1982 that the Kremlin began to move from this policy
of equidistance between the belligerents to one of
clear support for Iraq.
Iraq. The most important indicator of the Soviet tilt
toward Baghdad was the conclusion on 21 April of a
major new arms contract-the first since before the
war began.
Figure 3. Tariq Aziz, Iraqi For-
eign Minister and .Deputy
In part because of these moves, political relations with
Baghdad also began to improve
etw~~en March and June, the Soviets host-
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ed visits from the Iraqi Deputy Trade Minister and
omments b Soviet officials to US diplomats in Minister of Industry and from Deputy Prime Minister
Baghdad
and subsequent Soviet ship- Aziz. During ttie same period, Iraq received a number
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ments indicate the deal included MIG-25 jets and
SU-22 fighter-bombers, T-62 and T-72 tanks, air
defense equipment, artillery, and armored personnel
carriers.)
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of high-ranking East European officials and the Chief
of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near East Depart-
ment, Oleg Grinevskiy-the highest level Soviet offi-
cial to visit Baghdad since before the war
In late May Moscow began praising Iraq's publicly
expressed willingness to end the war. Moscow Radio,
for example, in a broadcast in Arabic on 21 June,
welcomed Saddam's announcement that Iraq would
withdraw its troops from all Iranian territory, calling
it a "positive step" that could lead to "ending the
bloody conflict as soon as possible." The Soviets
supported the Iraqi-inspired UN Security Council
resolution on 12 July calling for an immediate cease-
fire and withdrawal of forces to prewar boundaries.
Soviet media commentary on the major Iranian offen-
sive at Basrah that began on 14 July-the first time in
the war that Iranian forces crossed into Iraq-was
implicitly critical of Tehran and supportive of Bagh-
dad
Iran. Moscow's frustration with the Khomeini re-
gime's failure to respond to its continual overtures for
closer relations and with Tehran's recurrent anti-
Soviet gestures was an important factor in the deci-
sion to tilt toward Iraq. The Soviets began to voice
these frustrations publicly at about the same time this
tilt toward Iraq was becoming evident. On 9 March
1982 Pravda published an authoritative article by its
senior Third World commentator, Pavel Demchenko,
who listed in stark detail Moscow's grievances against
Iranian policy toward the USSR. Demchenko charged
that there were "extreme right" factions, opposed to
improving Soviet-Iranian relations, operating around
the Ayatollah. He also warned that criticism of the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan was "futile" and that
Moscow would not withdraw its troops until outside
intervention-"including intervention from Iranian
soil"tended
Soviet media criticism of Iranian repression of the
Tudeh also began to increase. Such complaints, com-
mon in broadcasts of the National Voice of Iran
(NVOI~the Baku-based Soviet radio station pur-
porting to be Iranian-now began appearing more
frequently in official Soviet media.
Soviet Motivations. Various factors accounted for
this clear tilt toward Iraq. In our judgment, probably
the most compelling was Moscow's concern over the
shift in the war's military balance toward Iran. The
shift was occurring at a time when Moscow's own ties
with Iran were fraying
Statements by Soviet officials indicate Moscow was
wary of an Iranian victory. Iran's impressive string of
triumphs on the battlefield beginning in September
1981 made the threat of overall victory a reality. In
our judgment, the Kremlin probably thought an Irani-
an defeat of Iraq and establishment of apro-Iranian
regime in Baghdad would have undermined Soviet
influence in Iraq and strengthened the Khomeini
regime, making it even less susceptible to Soviet
inroads. Furthermore, Moscow did not want to see an
anti-Soviet Iranian regime, whose Islamic fanaticism
might potentially attract adherents among the
USSR's own 43 million Muslims, spread its influence
beyond Iranian borders. One of the USSR's leading 25X1
Middle Eastern specialists said as much-we believe
candidly-to a US official in May 1982.
Soviet leaders also probably feared that a threatened
Iraq would accelerate its turn toward the West,
China, and moderate Arabs. If Moscow would not
come to its aid, Baghdad might even appeal to
Washin ton.
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An article in the CPSU journal Kommunist (pub-
lished in the July 1982 issue but probably written
before MayJ is a landmark in the Soviets' reassess-
ment of the Iranian revolution. It criticized the
Iranian clerics' consolidation of power in the summer
011981 as a negative turning point in the revolution-
ary process. The author, Rostislav Ulyanovskiy, a
deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's Inter-
national Department and one of the USSR's senior
experts on the Third World, stated that the triumph
of the fundamentalist clerics marked the end of the
revolution's `genuinely people's anti-imperialist" na-
ture and the beginning of an "illusory" questlor an
Islamic "third path"between capitalism and social-
ism.
The article stated that the February 1979 revolution
was `bourgeois democratic,"and, with the right kind
of leadership, could have been turned in an "anti-
capitalist" (that is, pro-Soviet) direction. Ur4/ortu-
nately, lamented Ulyanovskiy, the complete triumph
of the Shiite clergy stifled the revolution's "progres-
sive"tendencies. In his words:
The more the new organization's power with its
spec~cally Islamic features (to which the ruling
clergy paid paramount attention) strengthened, the
more rapidly thefoundations of the revolution as a
truly peopl~~'s anti-imperialist and democratic rev-
olution were eroded. .
Perhaps engaging in wisltf'ul thinking, Ulyanovskiy
claimed that .!he clergy s policies were intensifying
the class strut;gle in Iran and suggested that "sharp
turnarounds in the future" were always possible. He
admitted, hoN~ever, that the leftwingforces in Iran
were in disarr~ay~
The article, which had to have high-level authoriza-
tion to run in Kommunist, was a rationalization and,
at the same time, a co~rmation of the negative shift
in the Soviets' view of Khomeini's Iran.
conclusion by spring 1982, as evidenced by an author-
itative article in the CPSU journal in July (see box)
and by their increasingly frank media criticism of
The blow the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982
inflicted upon Soviet interests and credibility in the
Middle East also may have contributed to Moscow's
tilt toward Iraq. The Soviets may have thought that,
if they did not increase support to Baghdad, it would
appear to the Arab world that Moscow was failing all
its Arab partners.
All of this was occurring at a time when Moscow
concluded that the Iranian revolution was swinging to
the right and that, as long as Khomeini or his
supporters remained in power, Soviet influence in Iran
would remain minimal. The Soviets had come to this
The Soviets apparently concluded, moreover, that
Iranian hatreol of the United States was still strong.
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Although the Soviets probably
remained wary about a potential improvement in ties
with the United States, they evidently thought that a
Soviet tilt toward Iraq would not produce an immedi-
ate move by Tehran back toward the United States.
Since Basrah: Intensification of the Tilt
The improvement in the USSR's ties with Iraq and
deterioration in its relations with Iran have acceler-
ated since Iranian forces first crossed into Iraq at
Basrah in July 1982
The War. While maintaining an official stance of
neutrality, Moscow has become increasingly critical
both publicly and privately of Iran's refusal to consid-
er anegotiated settlement. The Soviets in October
1982 again voted for an Iraqi-inspired UN Security
Council resolution calling for acease-fire.
The Iranians have responded with harsher public 25X1
criticism of Moscow's stance on the war. The regime-
sponsored Tehran newspaper Ettela'at blasted the
Soviets in late December for allowing Iraq to use
Soviet-made missiles in an attack on Dezful. At a
Friday prayer service in January, Speaker of the 25X1
Iranian Majlis Rafsanjani accused the "Western and
Eastern superpowers" of providing arms that allow
Iraq to continue the war. Ayatollah Meshkini was
even more blunt in the Friday prayer services in Qom
on 25 February, when he claimed that Moscow had
"spared no effort in assisting our enemy," which had 25X1
"caused the deaths of our dear youths." Subsequent
Iraqi missile attacks on Dezful and other Iranian
cities in April and May brought sharp condemnations
of Moscow by the clerical leaders. 25X1
Other Frictions With Iran. The USSR's relations
with Iran have become increasingly strained over a
host of other matters in addition to the war. The
Khomeini regime, as it had in 1980, allowed Afghan
refugees to march on the Soviet Embassy in Tehran
on the 27 December 1982 anniversary of the Soviet
invasion. They tore down and burned the Soviet flag
flying over the Embassy's front gate. Moscow filed an
official protest, but the Iranian Foreign Ministry
publicly condoned the attack on the Embassy by
suggesting it was justified by the USSR's occupation
of Muslim Afghanistan.
The Soviets have shown increasing concern over Teh-
ran's aid to the Afghan insurgents and are now
publicly and directly criticizing the Khomeini re ime
over the issue.
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The most telling indicators of the depths to which
Soviet-Iranian relations have sunk, however, have
been Tehran's arrest of the Tudeh's leaders, dissolu-
tion of the party, and expulsion of 18 Soviet diplomats
in May 1983. Tudeh General Secretary Kianuri and
other party members were arrested by the Khomeini
government on 6 February on charges of spying for
the KGB. Moscow lodged an official protest and
called, thus far unsuccessfully, for their release. In
late April and early May, Kianuri and other Tudeh
leaders "confessed" on Iranian television to being
agents of the USSR, intent upon overthrowing the
clerical regime. On 4 May the government dissolved
the party, a move Khomeini endorsed publicly. The
same day Tehran expelled 18 Soviet diplomats--close
to half the officially accredited Soviet diplomats in
Iran-for interfering in Iran's internal affairs.
Moscow's response to the May actions was restrained,
limited to private and media protests and the symbolic
expulsion of three Iranian diplomats. This restraint
reflects the Kremlin's unwillingness to write off Iran
totally and possibly a belief that dissolving the Tudeh
had more to do with Iranian internal than with
Figure 4. Nuredin Kianuri, imprisoned leader q(
foreign policies. Gromyko, however, in his speech to a
session of the Supreme Soviet in mid-June, implicitly
warned Tehr~~n that the USSR would respond in kind
to any future unfriendly Iranian acts.
Expanding N,fi[itary Ties With Iraq. In contrast to
sharply deteriorating relations with Iran, Moscow's
relations with Iraq have been continually improving.
Both sides' public rhetoric has reflected this. Gromy-
ko, during the same mid-June speech in which he
criticized Iran, stated that Iraq and the USSR "are
linked by relations of friendship." In an early July
interview with a French newspaper, Saddam lauded
the Iraqi-Soviiet "rapprochement." The most concrete
indicators of the rapprochement, however, are the
heavy flow of Soviet weapons to Iraq and the conclu-
sion of a major new arms deal. The number of Soviet
seaborne arms deliveries to Iraq tripled in 1982. The
156,000 tons of arms and military support equipment
delivered was more than double that received by any
other Third World arms client of the USSR and set a
tonnage record for Soviet military-related equipment
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received by a Third World country during one year.2
Among the weapons delivered in 1982 were:
? Over 65 fighter aircraft, including SU-20s,
MIG-17s, an improved version of the MIG-21, and
MIG-23s.
? More than 20 MI-8 helicopters.
? Over 215 T-72 tanks, some of which were the
improved model equipped with laser rangefingers.
? Hundreds of surface-to-air missiles and rockets.
' The estimated dollar value of the equipment delivered, however,
was less than twice that in 1981 ($1.7 billion compared with $980
million). This is because numerous big-ticket items, such as
MIG-25 interceptors, were delivered in 1981. Much of the tonnage
of the 1982 shipments consisted of munitions, spare parts, and
Soviet arms sales to Iraq-at least $3 billion worth
since the war began-have made an important contri-
bution to Iraq's ability to carry on the war. Neverthe-
less, Soviet arms represent only one-sixth of Bagh-
dad's total purchases since the war started (see table).
Baghdad has contracted for $11 billion from Western
countries and an additional $3.5 billion from China
since the war began. Iraq's purchases from Beijing
undoubtedly are particularly galling to Moscow.C
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Iran-Iraq: Arms Purchases, 1977-June 1983
Total
5,835
5,775
20,816
3,209
a
Communist
3,048
475
9,677
1,570
China
3,822
205
Eastern Europe
191
1
1,957
351
USSR
2,492
474
3,075
238
Yugoslavia
365
823
1
North Korea
775
Non-Communist
2,787
5,300
11,139
1,639
United States
4,679
France
1,976
4,796
3
Italy
178
452
2,410
I S
United Kingdom
53
97
268
9
West Germany
209
22
734
NA
Brazil
152
822
18
a In addition, an undetermined amount of military equipment and
support material has been purchased from private arms dealers,
perhaps as much as $1-1.5 billion.
The most recent Soviet-Iraqi arms deal apparently
was agreed upon in principle when two of the most
senior members of the Iraqi leadership-Ramadan
and Aziz-as well as Army Chief of Staff Shanshal
visited Moscow in December 1982. This was the
highest level Iraqi delegation to go to the USSR since
the war began. Its members had meetings, which were
publicized, with Gromyko and CPSU International
Department Chief Ponomarev and presumably met
with Soviet military leaders.
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Brezhnev was still at the helm when the Soviets
decided in the spring of 1982 to alter their policy
toward Iran and Iraq. However, Andropov's rise to
the top of the Soviet party began at around the same
time. Although we do not know his role in this change
in policy, as KGB chief and a Politburo member, he
undoubtedly had a say in the matter. Thefact that
his regime has pursued it even more vigorously
suggests that he supported the change.
The increasingly pro-lragi tilt, together with other
information, suggests that Andropov may be more
inclined to support Iraq and less convinced of oppor-
tunitiesfor the Soviets in Iran than was Brezhnev.
Andropov has not publicly expressed his views on
Iran, but Izvestia commentator Aleksandr Bovin,
reportedly one of his advisers, has been a critic of the
clerical regime. ~
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Moscow in February 1982, that Iraq and Syria would
end their mut~.~al hostility, but he was at a loss as to
how this would be accom lished.
In asking Damascus to moderate its policy toward
Iraq, the Kremlin is likely to argue that such a change
would foster ~-rab unity and lure Iraq back into the
radical Arab fold. The Soviets' apparent failure to
push Syria more forcefully, hoyvever, indicates the
value they put on their ties with Damascus
Third, and most important, we believe Moscow still
considers Iran more important geopolitically than
Iraq, if for no other reason than that the USSR and
Iran share a border of more than 1,500 miles (and
Iran, in addition, borders Afghanistan). The Khomei-
ni regime's virulent anti-Americanism and its growing
ties to radical Third World regimes serve Soviet
interests. Moscow will want to be careful not to tilt so
far toward Baghdad that it convinces some Iranian
leaders to rethink their hostility toward the United
States.
Moscow believed Iran would remain hostile to the
United States for a long time, Iran's improving ties
with Western Europe and Japan appear to be giving
Moscow second thoughts. A Soviet Foreign Minfstry
official, for example, expressed concern to a US
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Limitations to the Soviet-Iraqi Rapprochement
Some important constraints will limit the improve-
ment in Soviet-Iraqi relations. First, great mutual
distrust still exists between Moscow and Saddam. The
Soviets have not forgotten Saddam's execution of
Iraqi Communists in 1978 and his continuing tight
recently as 14 June, Saddam publicly condemned the
CPI. Moscow also remains wary of Baghdad's in-
creasing military, economic, and political contacts
with China and Western powers.
Saddam apparently still deeply resents Moscow's
arms embargo early in the war. This sentiment is
never far from the surface in his public statements on
relations with the Soviets. He also continues in these
statements to chastise Moscow on various issues. An
article in the Bath Party newspaper in mid-August
criticized the USSR's foreign policy, sparking a Sovi-
et rejoinder and an Iraqi counter-rejoinder.
Second, the Soviets have to weigh the effects of a full
rapprochement with Baghdad on their ties with Syria.
They will want to avoid antagonizing President
Assad, their most important ally in the Middle East
and a strong supporter of Iran, by developing too close
a relationship with his archenemy, Saddam Husayn.
Optimally, of course, Moscow would like to see
Baghdad and Damascus mend fences. According to
French Foreign Minister Cheysson, Gromyko ex-
pressed the hope, during talks between the two in
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Embassy officer in February 1983 that Iran is in-
creasingly turning to Western technology and that its
leaders were at heart oriented toward the Western
economic system. This is apparently leading Moscow
to think that better ties with Washington could come
next. A senior Pravda editor, for example, voiced
suspicion of alleged US encouragement of South
Korean military sales to Iran to a US Embassy officer
in June. The same theme of military contacts with
Iran has been appearing more frequently in Soviet
scholarly and media articles. Krasnaya Zvezda, for
example, claimed on 8 June that the United States is
providing Iran arms via Israel.
To avoid contributing to such an Iranian change of
course, Moscow is attempting to prevent its relations
with Iran from collapsing altogether. Although it
protested the arrest of Tudeh leader Kianuri, the
Kremlin has not made that act a major issue in
Outlook
~l'the Stalemate Continues. The course of the war
will have a major effect on Soviet policy toward Iran
and Iraq over the next year.
overthrow of Saddam.
A prolongation of the stalemate on the battlefield is
the most likely scenario. A major Iranian break-
through is now only a very slim possibility. Tehran's
fundamental disadvantages in materiel have become
obvious as the Iraqis have stabilized the front and
bolstered their defensive fortifications. Chances are
almost as slim that Iran and Iraq will settle the war at
the negotiating table. Despite Iraq's declared willing-
ness to settle the war peacefully and growing weari-
ness of war in Iran, Khomeini's hatred of Saddam
impels him to accept nothing less than the Iraqi
leader's ouster. Iran's most likely course of action is to
fight a war of attrition coupled with increased subver-
sion, hoping thereby to erode Iraqi morale, further
strain Iraq's economy, and eventually bring about the
Although the Soviets did not welcome the war and
have persistently called for the conflict's end, both
publicly and privately, they have learned to live with
it and can continue to do so indefinitely as long as
neither side gains a decisive military advantage. The
Soviets do not want to write off either Iran or Iraq.
For at least the next year, however, Moscow, while
probably attempting to stabilize relations with Teh-
ran, is almost certain to continue pursuing a policy
more favorable to Baghdad. As long as Khomeini and
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n Daryachah-ye
' , Or6r;.iyah
IL ake Urm~a'
boundary represontetionis
not necessarily authoritative.
~TENRAIM
ran
~_ lran~an-held area
~pezful
./ranian-held area
biidiin ,
Figure 9
Iran-Iraq War Front, September 1983
Infantry division
Mechanized division
Armored division
Infantry brigade
Armored brigade
Airborne brigade
Esfahan
.?
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his supporters remain in power, the Soviets stand little
chance of increasing their influence in Iran. The
Soviets have already improved their relations with
Baghdad and may believe that their arms sales will
increase Iraqi dependence on the USSR and eventual-
ly translate into Soviet leverage.
~ the War Ends. Although the Soviets consistently
have called for an end to the war, they probably would
view its cessation as a mixed blessing
The Soviets probably would welcome an end to a
major and unpredictable war on their border that
could redound to the United States' benefit. A peace-
ful settlement would:
? Reduce the significance of one of the prime irritants
in Soviet-Iranian relations-Moscow's weapons
sales to Baghdad.
? Probably make the Persian Gulf states less nervous
about Iranian expansionism, which would decrease
their need and willingness to cooperate militarily
with the United States.
? Result in probably greater contributions from Iran
and Iraq to the struggle against Israel, thereby
strengthening the pro-Soviet radical Arab states.
? Possibly improve the prospects for a rapprochement
between Baghdad and Damascus.
An end to the war, however, would also carry poten-
tial liabilities for the Kremlin:
? Iraq, without as acute a need for weaponry, might
accelerate its diversification of weapons suppliers
and become less dependent on Moscow. Saddam
might then have a freer hand to resume his effort to
distance Iraq from the USSR.
? Iraq would probably improve its relations with the
United States. Saddam, for example, has stated
publicly that full diplomatic relations will be re-
established as soon as the war ends.
? Although a dramatic improvement in Iranian ties
with Washington is a remote possibility, Moscow
might worry that the absence of the unifying factor
of the war could weaken the present fundamentalist
regime. Moscow may be concerned that in these
circumstances more pragmatic clerics, who are not
as averse to dealing with the United States, would
gain the upper hand.
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Afghan insurgents.
Moscow, however, is likely to probe Iran's position to
see if the costs of continued stalemate might move it
to agree to negotiations and possibly to Soviet media-
tion. Although Iranian suspicions of the USSR make
a Soviet role of honest broker unlikely, it would be the
most damaging scenario from the US point of view. A
role for the USSR in mediation-akin to that which it
played between India and Pakistan at Tashkent in
1965-would be a substantial boost to its objective of
becoming a major player in the Middle East, not to
mention to its standing with both Iran and Iraq.
Moscow will try to ensure that pro-Soviet Third
World states rather than US friends, such as Turkey
and Pakistan, play central roles in any mediation.
Early in the war, for example, the Soviets backed a
mediation effort of the Nonaligned Movement led by
Cuba.
The war's end almost certainly also would be accom-
panied by intensified Soviet efforts to improve bilater-
al ties with both Iran and Iraq, probably through
arms sales, economic deals, and increased political
contacts. Moscow, in addition, is likely to work
through both diplomatic means and active measures
to try to sustain Iran's hostility toward the United
States and to forestall a significant upturn in US-
Iragi relations.
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Appendix
Chronology of Soviet Policy Toward Iran and Iraq, 1980-83
of all but small pockets of Irani-
an territory.
October
Soviets and Syrians sign Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation.
December
Afghan refugees in Iran, demon-
strating on first anniversary of
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in-
flict minor damage on Soviet
Embassy in Tehran.
1981
Spring
Soviets lift arms embargo.
June
Iranians and Soviets agree on some
minor arms deals.
June through
September
Iranian Prime Minister Bani-Sadr
flees country; wave of Mujahedin
assassinations of Iranian leaders;
President Khamenei and Prime
Minister Musavi assume power.
September
First major Iranian victory at
Abadan.
October through
November
Iranian victory at Bostan.
Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov
seeks to cultivate new Iranian
leaders.
1982
March
Iranian victory at Shush-
Dezful.
Authoritative Pravda article lists
Soviet grievances against Iran.
April
Soviet troops operating against
Afghan insurgents cross Iranian
border for first time.
Ministry's Near East Department, vis-
its Baghdad. He is the highest level
Soviet official to call since the war
began.
Iranians win battle of Khor- Soviets begin publicly criticizing Soviets begin publicly praising Iraq's
ramshahr; they push Iraqis out Iran's stance on the war. stated willingness to end the war.
Soviets lift arms embargo.
First Deputy Premier Ramadan visits
Moscow.
Soviets and Iraqis sign first new arms
deal--estimated at $2 billion-since
war began.
Iranians cross Iraqi border for Landmark article in the CPSU Soviets support Iraqi-inspired UN
first time in major battle of the journal Kommunist criticizes the Security Council resolution calling for
war at Basra. Khomeini regime. immediate cease-fire and withdrawal
to prewar boundaries.
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Chronology of Soviet Policy Toward Iran and Iraq, 1980-83 (continued)
Iraqi defenses at Basra hold _
and Iranian offensive fails.
Front stabilizes.
Soviets support another Iraqi-inspired
cease-fire resolution in the UN
Security Council.
Brezhnev dies and Andropov Soviets and Iranians sign $I1.
becomes CPSU leader. million arms deal.
Demonstrators in Tehran burn the Ramadan, Aziz, and Army Chief of
Soviet Embassy flag on the anni- Staff Shanshal visit Moscow and nego-
versary of the Soviet invasion of tiate a major arms deal.
Afghanistan; Moscow lodges offi-
cial protest.
Soviets protest Iranians' expulsion
of a TASS correspondent.
Iranians' first Doveyrich River Tudeh leader Kianuri and other Shanshal makes followup visit to
offensive fails with heavy Tudeh members are arrested on Moscow.
casualties. charges of spying for the KGB.
Iranians close down aSoviet-run
hospital in Tehran.
Second Doveyrich River offen-
sive stalls after early gains.
No major battles. Iranians
adopt "war of attrition" strate-
gy of constant, but limited,
probes at various points along
the front. Iraq steps up its air
attacks on Iranian cities, ship-
ping and oil facilities.
Tudeh leaders make "confessions"
on Iranian television of spying for
Soviets.
Iran expels 18 Soviet diplomats for
ties with Tudeh and interference in
Iranian internal affairs.
The USSR expels three Iranian
diplomats in retaliation.
Gromyko meets with the new Irani-
an Ambassador to the USSR.
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Chronology of Soviet Policy Toward Iran and Iraq, 1980-83 (continued)
Saddam Husayn condemns Iraqi Com-
munist Party in interview with Italian
journalists.
Iran launches attack in the
Kurdistan area in the northern
sector of the border.
Saddam lauds the Soviet-Iraqi "rap-
prochement" in interview with French
journalist.
Aziz makes another trip to Moscow
(fifth since war began).
Iran protests to Moscow and Kabul Soviets and Iraqis snipe at each other
over alleged bombing by Soviet or in their media.
Afghan jets of Iranian village near
the Afghan border.
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