THE IMPACT OF SOVIET POLITICAL SUCCESSION ON MOSCOW S POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00658R000200120007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
Secret
SOY 83-10103
June 1983
Copy 5
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Policy Toward Eastern Europe
The Impact of Soviet
Political Succession on Moscow's
An Intelligence Assessment
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Intelligence
The Impact of Soviet
Political Succession on Moscow's
Policy Toward Eastern Europe
This paper was prepared by
National Intelligence Council.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
dircted to the Chief, Policy Analysis Division, SOYA,
Secret
SOV 83-10103
June 1983
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Secret
The Impact of Soviet
Political Succession on Moscow's
Policy Toward Eastern Europe
Key Judgments The Soviet Union is currently confronted by an array of problems in
Information available Eastern Europe that includes economic stagnation, consumer dissatisfac-
as of15 May 1983 tion, and continuing unrest in Poland. The Soviets are also facing difficult
was used in this report.
choices about how to guarantee their strategic interests in the region while
decreasing their economic assistance and getting their allies to shoulder a
greater part of their collective defense burden.
During the last decade, Moscow tolerated considerable diversity in eco-
nomic policy within the Bloc, permitted the East Europeans to borrow
heavily in the West, and, particularly after 1973, absorbed the shock of ris-
ing energy prices and provided other economic assistance that grew
increasingly burdensome to the USSR, reaching some $21 billion by 1981.
By the time of Brezhnev's death, Soviet economic problems and the
challenge to Communist rule in Poland had already led to some retreat
from his policy, with a reduction in subsidized oil deliveries to several East
European countries. This and the closing of the gap between CEMA and
world market energy prices contributed to a decline in the subsidy to $15
billion last year. The appointment of a new, more forceful General
Secretary and-given the advanced age of several senior members of the
Politburo-the additional turnover in the top-level Soviet leadership that
will occur in the next few years are likely to lead to further changes in
policy toward Eastern Europe.
General Secretary Andropov's track record as Ambassador to Hungary
(1954-57), Bloc Relations Secretary (1957-67), and head of the KGB (1967-
82) marks him as a tough-minded but flexible leader who is willing to
support some modifications of the Soviet economic model in Eastern
Europe but who demands strict adherence to Soviet security and foreign
policy goals. To judge from his public statements and the views of his key
associates, he is also likely to pursue a policy of closer economic and
military integration within CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, to urge greater
caution in economic ties with the West, and to continue gradually reducing
Soviet economic assistance to the region.
Although Andropov is likely to be more forceful than his predecessor in
dealings with Eastern Europe, he and other senior Soviet leaders, including
his putative rival Konstantin Chernenko, will probably seek to avoid sharp
discontinuities in policy toward the region out of concern for its political
stability and the impact that a crackdown might have on relations with the
West. Among the younger Politburo members, however, support for policy
continuity seems less certain, particularly if Moscow's own economic
iii Secret
SOV 83-10103
June 1983
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difficulties intensify. Pressure for policy change is likely to mount as the
older leaders depart the scene and are replaced by younger leaders who are
less committed to the existing strategy.
Four of the current Politburo juniors-regional leaders Vladimir Shcher-
bitskiy and Gregoriy Romanov, and economic specialists Mikhail Gorba-
chev and Vladimir Dolgikh-stand out as individuals whose careers are
likely to advance over the next few years, and whose views generally reflect
those of many midlevel officials. The public statements of Shcherbitskiy
and Romanov,
suggest that they are generally inflexible on foreign policy, critical
of basing social stability on consumerism, and adamant on the need to
maintain ideological orthodoxy. As party bosses in major industrial
centers, they presumably are keenly aware of the costs to the domestic
economy of supporting Eastern Europe and probably favor reducing Soviet
aid. They seem, to judge from the policies they have implemented at home,
to favor stepped-up ideological vigilance and police control to avert any
unrest that might result from such cuts. Their approach probably would
find support among the Soviet military, police, and party and state
bureaucracies, groups with an institutional interest in tightening Soviet
political control over Eastern Europe or reducing Soviet subsidies.
Agriculture Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Industrial Secretary Vladi-
mir Dolgikh, to judge from their public statements
would be willing to accept greater divergence from the
Soviet economic model than Romanov and Shcherbitskiy, but are relatively
inflexible on ideological and political issues. Their positions on economic
policy probably would be backed by many economic experts and academics
whose writings suggest that they look to Eastern Europe as a model for do-
mestic economic reform. These groups, however, lack the institutional clout
of the police, military, and party officials.
In the post-Andropov era, then, the principal Soviet leaders and most
influential elites are likely to press for greater belt-tightening in Eastern
Europe, more ideological and security service vigilance, greater caution in
dealing with the West, and stepped-up economic and military integration
within CEMA and the Warsaw Pact. The range of views on economic
management in Eastern Europe may be somewhat broader, but the odds
seem to favor considerable caution about economic reform as well.
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The USSR's adoption of a more demanding and less tolerant approach
toward Eastern Europe would complicate US policy in the region. Oppor-
tunities for exerting Western influence would be reduced to the extent that
East European economic contacts with the West were circumscribed and
the region's economies further oriented toward that of the Soviet Union.
Cultural contacts would also be reduced, and, presumably, the United
States would be even less able than at present to influence the Bloc's
fulfillment of Helsinki human rights commitments. The adoption of a more
demanding Soviet strategy, however, might also create frictions and social
stresses in Eastern Europe that could be exploited to undermine Moscow's
control over the region.
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The Impact of Succession
Soviet Elite Groups and Their Role in Succession
Economic Reformers
Prospects for Policy
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The Impact of Soviet
Political Succession on Moscow's
Policy Toward Eastern Europe
This paper discusses the impact that the ongoing
Soviet political succession is likely to have on
Moscow's policy toward Eastern Europe. It examines
Brezhnev's policy legacy, reviews the key current
issues in Soviet-East European relations, and assesses
how recent and prospective changes in the Soviet
leadership are likely to affect the resolution of these
issues.
Under Brezhnev, as in earlier years, Moscow required
the East European regimes to adhere to a number of
minimum demands:
? The maintenance of the Communist party's leading
role.
? Participation in CEMA and the Warsaw Pact.
? Adherence to the general lines of Soviet foreign
policy.
In the 1970s, however, the Soviets also accorded the
East Europeans latitude on a wide number of issues:
? The Hungarians continued the economic reform
initiated on the eve of the Czech crisis.
? The Poles and other East Europeans established
extensive contacts with the West and borrowed
heavily from Western banks.
? The East European regimes sought a greater degree
of popular legitimacy by making promises to the
consumer-a process significantly assisted by Soviet
economic subsidization.
Only Czechoslovakia-which avoided wider contacts
for its own domestic security reasons-and Bulgar-
ia-Moscow's most loyal client state-seemed largely
unaffected by the trend.
In the final three years of Brezhnev's tenure, events in
Poland and Moscow's mounting domestic economic
problems helped undermine the strategy of building
stability on consumerism, Soviet subsidization, and
greater ties to the West. In Poland, an ineffective
consumerist policy and the regime's tolerant attitude
toward dissent, private farming, and the Church
combined to create the most serious and sustained
challenge to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe since
the establishment of the Bloc. Moreover, the USSR's
economic support of Eastern Europe became increas-
ingly burdensome through 1981 as Moscow's hard
currency position was weakened by falling prices for
oil-its major cash earner-and its need to increase
food imports from the West.
By the time of Brezhnev's death, some significant
revisions of his earlier strategy were already under
way. The USSR reduced subsidized oil deliveries to
several CEMA countries (East Germany, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, and, perhaps, Bulgaria) in 1982.
Poland, according to published trade statistics, also
received less Soviet aid last year despite its continued
economic crisis. In addition, Moscow stepped up its
efforts to increase CEMA integration in preparation
for the forthcoming summit.
While these steps are a move away from the policy of
the previous dozen years, they have done little to
resolve the major issues in Soviet relations with
Eastern Euro e.
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the policy issues 25X1
that are likely to e most contentious include the level
of Soviet economic aid to the region, the degree of
modernization of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
(NSWP) military forces, and the degree of autonomy
Moscow will accept with respect to political and
economic contacts with the West and handling of
dissent.
Economic Support of Eastern Europe
Currently, the USSR provides economic assistance to
its East European allies by supplying raw materials-
particularly oil and natural gas-at below world
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The Old Guard at Brezhnev's
funeral: Nikolay Tikhonov,
Yuriy Andropov, Konstantin
Chernenko, and Andrey
Gromyko
market prices,` accepting payment in low-quality
goods for materials that could be marketed for hard
currency, and granting trade credits and loans. In
1982 this assistance amounted to about 15 billion
dollars, down from a high of 21 billion dollars in 1981
(see table).
Despite the decline that occurred last year, this aid, in
addition to commitments to other clients, places a
considerable burden on the USSR. The decline in
world market prices for oil this year-while it lowers
the subsidy by narrowing the gap between world
prices and those charged by the Soviets-will only
intensify pressure on Moscow to cut its assistance to
Eastern Europe and redirect supplies to the open
market to maintain hard currency earnings.
NSWP Modernization
The USSR has been pressing the East Europeans to
accelerate the modernization of their armed forces
since at least the mid-1970s. In 1978 this pressure led
to public polemics with the Romanians who refused to
support Pact-wide defense spending increases because
of their domestic economic difficulties. The other
NSWP countries, although refraining from public
' CEMA raw material prices since 1975 have been determined
according to a moving average of world market prices. In the case
of oil, this ensured continuation of a large implicit subsidy to all the
East European allies-except Romania-after the rapid rise in
world prices in the 1970s. However, as world market prices have
stabilized and even fallen over the last few years, the gap has closed
substantially. It is possible that Moscow's CEMA partners could
even pay more than world market prices if the formula is not
disputes with the Soviets, have generally failed to
increase the pace of their military modernization
efforts. the
Soviet military continues to press the NSWP coun-
tries to acquire or produce for themselves newer and
more expensive military equipment, including tanks,
artillery, and aircraft.
Political Controls
The Polish crisis reopened the question of how much
autonomy to permit the East European allies in their
dealings with the West and how to treat internal
dissent. Soviet ideologists are publicly debating
whether Poland's experience is generally applicable
and whether major social crises can emerge elsewhere
in Eastern Europe. The growth of the peace move-
ment in East Germany and Hungary's lenient policy
toward dissidents also probably raise questions in
Moscow about how to handle opposition to these
regimes.
For many ideologists and regional party leaders,
especially in the Western USSR, Poland underscored
the risks of political and ideological laxity and exces-
sively close ties to the West, which worked to under-
mine political stability. For those who favored eco-
nomic reform at home, on the other hand, Poland was
a warning against retaining a basically outmoded
political and economic system that is unable to carry
out timely reform.
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Implicit Subsidies a
Trade Surpluses
a These subsidies represent the difference between: (1) the world
market price for oil-and other raw materials-and the lower price
that the Soviets charge the East Europeans and (2) the price that
East European exports of machinery and equipment would com-
mand on the world market and the higher prices that the Soviets pay.
6.6 16.5 16.6 ___12.5
0.9 1.5 4.4 2.5
Moscow's attempts to resolve these issues will depend
on a variety of factors. Historical experience suggests,
however, that the political succession now under way
in the Kremlin will be a key element affecting policy
change.' Given the advanced age of the current Soviet
leadership, the next few years will likely see the
replacement of several key Politburo members. To
appreciate the impact that the succession is likely to
have on policy, it is necessary to examine the views
not only of the new General Secretary and his senior
supporters, but also those of the younger Politburo
members who can be expected to advance to positions
of greater influence
General Secretary Andropov's Views
Of the current leaders, Andropov has had the most
extensive experience in East European affairs as
Ambassador to Hungary (1954-57), head of the Cen-
tral Committee's Bloc Relations Department and
Secretary for Bloc Affairs (1957-67), and chairman of
the KGB (1967-82). In May 1982 he was again named
to the Secretariat, where he assumed the oversight
responsibilities for ideology and relations with foreign
Communists formerly exercised by Mikhail Suslov.
Andropov played an important role in Moscow's
management of the Hungarian revolt, the Czech
invasion, and the recent Polish crisis. He has also had
extensive dealings with the most maverick of the East
European regimes: Romania (a member of the War-
saw Pact and CEMA) and nonaligned Yugoslavia.
His record in dealing with East European issues both
prior and subsequent to Brezhnev's death provides
some basis for estimating his likely future policies.F-
ndro-
pov operated as a virtual proconsul in Hungary during
his tenure as Ambassador and worked closely with
arch conservative Mikhail Suslov in directing the
ate line when he became Bloc Relations Secretary by
supporting Kadar's unorthodox plans for regaining
public acceptance of the Communist regime. As head
of the KGB, he played a less central role in relations
with Hungary but apparently maintained his ties to
Kadar.
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Andropov greets Kadar in
December 1982
as
characterized Andropov as the ideal successor to
Brezhnev and a "special friend" of Hun ar . Since
November 1982 pave as-
serted that Andropov was instrumental in assuring
Soviet approval of Hungarian economic reforms in the
1970s, and that he continues to be favorably disposed
toward them. His close ties with Hungary were
underscored at the USSR's 60th anniversary celebra-
tion last December, when Kadar was the first East
European leader with whom Andropov met.
Although the evidence suggests that Andropov is
likely to pursue a tolerant policy toward Hungary-
the most liberal of the East European regimes-it is
doubtful that he can afford the luxury of increased
economic generosity.
Both during the Czech invasion and the Polish crisis,
Andropov displayed the more conservative facet of his
personality. In 1968 he was one of the first Soviet
leaders to react to the danger of events in Czechoslo-
Although the evidence on Andropov's role in Polish
events is somewhat contradictory, he apparently was
among the less patient members of the leadership in
dealing with Warsaw's temporizing.
Presumably, Andropov fully
vening militarily.
supported the martial law crackdown-an operation
that relieved Moscow of the responsibility for inter-
Since becoming General Secretary, Andropov has not
visibly altered Moscow's policy toward Poland, de-
spite reports of some differences with Warsaw over
tactics.
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Secret
Andropov talks with Jaruzelski
on 60th Anniversary of the
USSR in December 1982
The Soviet press has recently criticized Polish party
moderates-particularly one of Jaruzelski's close ad-
visers, Deputy Premier Rakowski-suggesting that
Moscow is dissatisfied with Jaruzelski's performance
in rebuilding the party. The criticism was probably
meant to pressure the Poles to sten then ideolo ical
orthodox .
Andropov appears consistently to have taken a hard-
line position in dealing with Romania and Yugoslavia.
under Andropov the Polish
leadership still has a free hand to implement economic
and social reforms. The Polish regime's public re-
sponse to Soviet criticism seems designed to avoid
intensifying the polemic.
Andropov probably realizes that the Polish problem is
too complex for quick solutions. He seems willing to
approve, and perhaps even encourage, some economic
reforms already under way, and he might hold out
Kadar's experience-repression followed by reform-
as a model for the Poles.' He will, however, veto any
reform moves that threaten to revive opposition in the
factories, and he may press aggressively for a return
Since succeeding Brezhnev, Andropov appears to have
taken a firm line with the Romanians, and he seems
more likely than his predecessor to press them to
comply with Soviet demands on CEMA integration
' Andropov made his first publicized visit to Hungary after many
years, in December 1981, soon after martial law was introduced in
Poland, perhaps to persuade Kadar to lend his advice to the Poles.
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The Yugoslavs have also had a stormy relationship
with Andropov. He clashed with Belgrade over Mos-
cow's support for the Soviet-based anti-Tito "Comin-
formists" during the mid-1970s when he headed the
KGB, and on occasion he acted as spokesman in
Moscow's polemics with Tito in the 1960s. High-
ranking Yugoslav Communist officials seemed to
share the Romanians' view that Andropov would be
"worse than Brezhnev."
besting his chief rival Chernenko.
Military integration could also prove an issue on
which Andropov will be forced to make some tough
choices. He has displayed considerable sensitivity to
the problem of East European political stability and is
probably sympathetic to East European arguments
that increasing defense spending at a time of econom-
ic stringency risks political unrest. Yet Andropov is
also sensitive to the Soviet military's desire for accel-
erated NSWP military modernization, and he owes a
debt to Defense Minister Ustinov for his support in
he may now feel the East Europeans have
On balance, Andropov's East European track record
suggests that he is a tough-minded but flexible leader
who sees potential value in economic experimentation
but demands strict adherence to Moscow's security
and foreign policy goals. He seems to have been
committed to Brezhnev's detente strategy throughout
the 1970s and was apparently influential in gaining
Brezhnev's support for Hungarian economic reform.
These factors strongly suggest he will be inclined to
maintain the broad lines of Brezhnev's East European
strategy of permitting considerable economic diversi-
ty, in return for political-strategic conformity.
At the November 1982 Central Committee plenum,
Andropov generally endorsed the idea of greater
economic integration under CEMA, a long-term Sovi-
et policy, which was given renewed prominence by an
authoritative Pravda editorial shortly before Brezh-
nev's death. Andropov may support changes in
CEMA that entail creating a stronger supranational
authority-as several Soviet proponents advocate-
but he appears to be
meeting strong resistance from Romania and perhaps
other allies and will probably be forced to compro-
mise.
visible under Brezhnev.4
to assume an increasing share in the burden of
maintaining the empire. So far, he seems determined
to continue the gradual weaning of the East Europe-
ans from Soviet economic assistance, a trend already
Other Politburo Seniors. Of all other senior members
of the Politburo, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov
will probably have the greatest influence with Andro-
pov on policy toward Eastern Europe, both because of
their long and close working relationship and because
of the military's key interest in the region. As in the
past, Ustinov will probably act as a conduit for the
professional military's demands to tighten Soviet con-
trol over the Warsaw Pact forces-a process that has
been proceeding rapidly in recent years-and to step
up the pace of NSWP military modernization-a
process that has lagged. On most political issues, he is
probably willing to go along with Andropov as long as
the military's concerns are addressed.
Along with Ustinov, Foreign Minister and First Dep-
uty Premier Andrey Gromyko will be a key player in
shaping policy toward Eastern Europe within the
Politburo. He will probably continue to be especially
visible in his dealings with Poland and East Germany,
It is doubtful that anyone in the USSR is now arguing that: (1) the
subsidy should be increased or (2) that the Soviet Union can afford
to maintain the subsidy at its present level. The debate within the
Soviet Union seems to be over the timetable for cutting hark F_
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Soviet leaders at the Warsaw
Pact PCC meeting in January
1983: Defense Minister
Ustinov, Premier Tikhonov,
General Secretary Andropov,
and Foreign Minister Gromyko
given their importance in East-West relations. Gro-
myko generally has a strong interest in preserving the
Brezhnev strategy of benign toleration to limit friction
in East-West relations. The advice received from
Soviet ambassadors in Eastern Europe-all former
local party secretaries-is likely to be ideologically
orthodox, but Gromyko,
is more pragmatic. He also has an interest in seeing
that Eastern Europe remains peaceful so that it does
not further complicate relations with the United
States or Western Europe.
Gromyko has taken a particularl
engaged in tough talks with Ceausescu following
Romania's public criticism of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.
Gromyko has also taken an important part in Soviet
relations with Yugoslavia.
Party Secretary Chernenko and Premier Nikolay
Tikhonov-the other two key senior leaders-can be
expected to act as watchdogs over the collectivity of
the leadership and protectors of Brezhnev's policies in
Eastern Europe. Although they may be tempted to
exploit any Andropov errors or to capitalize on dissat-
isfaction of key elite groups, they currently seem
largely in agreement with him on East European
policy. Premier Tikhonov, as head of the government,
can be expected to support a continuation of Brezh-
nev's caution, given his concern over the economic
cost of the subsidy and its negative impact on Soviet
economic performance. Since 1980 he has articulated
the Soviet position on the need to improve East
European energy efficiency. He has also urged that
CEMA make greater efforts to resist Western eco-
nomic sanctions through stepped-up economic inte-
gration and specialization.
Overall, therefore, the senior leaders, including
Andropov's potential opponents among the Brezhne-
vites, seem content to go along with the existing mixed
strategy of continued economic assistance-albeit at a
reduced level-in return for political loyalty and
internal stability.
The Politburo Juniors
Over the next few years, many younger leaders, now
in their late fifties or early sixties, will advance to
more influential positions and will thus play a greater
role in formulating policy toward Eastern Europe as
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Ukrainian First Secretary
Vladimir Shcherbitskiy (L-3)
sees off Bulgarian party leader
Zhivkov after the 60th Anni-
versary of the USSR
celebrations
older members are removed, retire, or die. As a group,
the juniors currently seem less committed to the
existing strategy and more inclined to revise it, al-
though their perspective could change as they attain
greater power. Those leaders who are most likely to
increase their influence fall into two categories: re-
gional officials and technocrats.
Among these, four individuals have seemed to benefit
most from the passing of several senior leaders during
1982. They are regional bosses Vladimir Shcherbi-
tskiy and Grigoriy Romanov and economic specialists
Mikhail Gorbachev and Vladimir Dolgikh.s Given
their relative youth and current standing in the
leadership, any of them could move into the inner
circle of senior leaders within the next few years and
eventually assume the post of General Secretary.
Although not identical in their views, Shcherbitskiy
and Romanov share a parochial and ideologically
conservative approach to East European affairs. In his
public statements on domestic issues, Shcherbitskiy
has scored consumerism, particularly among youth,
championed stringent controls over artists and intel-
lectuals, and taken a hard line toward dissidents. He
has been critical of forms of "national Commu-
nism"-a charge that led to the ouster of Shcherbi-
tskiy's predecessor as Ukrainian First Secretary. He
'The Central Committee plenum in June 1983 promoted Romanov
to the Secretariat in Moscow. As a result, he became one of the
senior party secretaries along with Andropov, Chernenko, and
Gorbachev.
has frequently called for more ideological vigilance
and stressed Bloc cohesion and adherence to the
Soviet model.
Shcherbitskiy appears to have supported the crushing
of Czech reform in 1968 and to have taken a rigid line
on Polish reform, perhaps because of his concern that
unrest could spread across the border to infect his own
republic
His public statements during the crisis
tend to confirm this. He endorsed the imposition of
martial law before any other Soviet leader, which
suggests that he may have felt the crackdown was
long overdue.
During his tenure in the Ukraine, Shcherbitskiy has
consistently called for greater conformity and control,
favored repression of dissent and nationalism, and
advocated orthodox Leninist solutions to problems.
Such an approach, if extended to the Bloc, would be
troublesome for the more domestically liberal re-
gimes, like Hungary. He might also be less inclined to
support market-style reforms; in 1968 he asserted that
Czech counterrevolutionaries (that is, reformers) were
really interested in reinstating capitalism. His appar-
ent concern about Soviet domestic stability and the
outmoded capital stock in the Ukraine presumably
also make him less willing to subsidize the USSR's
Warsaw Pact allies at the expense of the domestic
economy.
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Secret
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
(L) accompanies Foreign Minis-
ter Andrey Gromyko and Sec-
retary Boris Ponomarev to the
airport
Romanov, like Shcherbitskiy, has called publicly for
vigilance to avert "apolitical attitudes, nationalism,
... and a consumerist mentality" and taken a general-
ly hard line on foreign policy issues. To our knowl-
edge, he did not play a prominent role during the
support for economic decentralization at home and
endorsement of experiments based largely on Hungar-
ian reforms suggest that he would be sympathetic to
seeing limited economic reform continue in Eastern
Europe to improve efficiency and reduce the need for
Soviet assistance.
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Romanov seems to share many of the ideological and
security concerns of the other regional leaders. F
His parochi-
al views, purported narrowmindedness, and concern
over domestic control would probably dispose him to
favor greater Bloc conformity and to back it up with
tough security measures.
Party Secretaries Gorbachev and Dolgikh are the two
youngest members of the current leadership at 52 and
58, respectively. Mikhail Gorbachev is party secretary
with responsibility for agriculture, and, as a result, he
has made comparatively few public statements about
policy toward Eastern Europe. Since Brezhnev's
death, he has been the most vocal proponent of the
"food program," a policy closely tied to consumerism
at home. His statements on agricultural policy also
indicate a pragmatic and mildly reformist streak-he
favors a greater role for the private plots, advocates
more decentralization of farm management, and has
touted Georgian agricultural experiments, which
draw heavily on Hungarian practice. Gorbachev's
Gorbachev's stance on political reform, however, is
probably negative, though the evidence here is weak-
In a speech to the Vietnamese
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Party Congress in late March 1982, he made a point
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saved Poland "from counterrevolution and anarchy."
Vladmir Dolgikh, the party secretary responsible for
industry, has also risen rapidly at a comparatively
young age, due largely to his technical expertise. In
May 1982 he was elevated to candidate membership
in the Politburo. He, too, has taken a rather progres-
sive economic line, favoring management reforms and
a degree of experimentation. He is probably less
inclined than Gorbachev to support shifting resources
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to the consumer sector, given the industrial sector's
Dolgikh has also publicly
praised the more centralized East German variant of
economic reform, particularly its effective use of
resources. There are some indications in his speeches
that he supports greater coordination of efforts within
CEMA as a basis for rationalizing the socialist econo-
Dolgikh's approach to foreign policy is apparently
conservative, and he has termed the "unit
cohesion" of the Bloc its basis of strength
Dolgikh was among
several key economic officials who opposed military
intervention in Poland, because it would further com-
plicate economic policy.
Gorbachev and Dolgikh probably would pursue a
policy toward Eastern Europe that mixes elements of
political conservatism and economic toleration. They
might not only encourage but draw on East European
economic reform to increase domestic efficiency. As
economic realists, they probably realize East Europe-
an economic ties with the West cannot be broken
without causing a deterioration of an already precari-
ous economic situation. Dolgikh has probably contrib-
uted to the relatively cautious manner in which
Moscow has approached the problem of reducing its
economic assistance to Eastern Europe. He might, of
course, feel compelled by the USSR's own deteriorat-
ing economic situation to act more precipitously in the
future. It seems likely that he would be more willing
than the ideologically oriented regional leaders to
compensate the East Europeans by allowing room for
maneuver, rather than simply to prescribe belt tight-
ening and augmented controls.
Soviet Elite Groups and Their Role in Succession
Members of the Soviet elite and key institutions will
exert pressure on Andropov and his successors to
shape Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe in line
with their interests. The military, the police, and the
party bureaucracy-whose representatives make up
the majority of the party Central Committee mem-
bership-will probably support greater ideological
orthodoxy, economic belt tightening, and greater cau-
tion on economic reform and relations with the West.
Industrial managers, while taking a somewhat more
flexible position on economic reform and trade with
the West, will probably also favor reducing Soviet
economic assistance to Eastern Europe. Most foreign
policy specialists are likely to favor continuing the
current Soviet approach to the region. Only a handful
of economic reformers in the academic institutes
would be likely to support a policy of encouraging
extensive economic reform.
The Military and Police
Soviet military leaders, especially Warsaw Pact Com-
mander in Chief Viktor Kulikov, have called for
greater Bloc solidarity and Warsaw Pact integration
during the past few years.
Still, the Soviet military has a
number of outstanding concerns related to Eastern
Europe:
? Its leaders are likely to urge the Politburo to press
Romania to participate fully in Pact military exer-
cises and allow other Pact forces to exercise on its
soil.
? They may also press for increases in NSWP defense
spending, despite opposition in Eastern Europe
based on economic considerations.
The KGB shares many of the same concerns as the
military, and it has the additional concern of potential
spillover of East European unrest into the USSR. Its
career officers probably favor a tough line on dissent
and blame laxity for the emergence of the Polish
problem. KGB offi-
cers complained about being orce to remain on the
sidelines during the spring of 1981 at the height of the
Polish crisis. The martial law crackdown in Poland
has presumably reduced the chances for friction
between the political leadership and the security
services. The KGB, however, probably will press for a
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secret
less tolerant and less flexible policy toward Eastern
Europe, favor reduced contacts with the West, and
oppose any sort of potentially destabilizing reforms.
Party Officials
East European policy affects the regional party secre-
taries primarily via the economy. If aid to Eastern
Europe makes their jobs more difficult, they resent
they favor a
strong defense and are skeptical-even distrustful-of
change and reform.
Party ideologists have also taken a hard line toward
Eastern Europe, and they probably will continue to
press for greater cohesiveness and uniformity both in
CEMA and the Warsaw Pact. They also are likely to
favor decreased emphasis on consumerism-a major
theme of the ideological conferences initiated by their
longtime spokesman Mikhail Suslov in 1981.
Economic Managers
The viewpoint of economic managers is probably quite
similar to that of the party officials who oversee them,
and domestic resource constraints will dispose them to
favor cutting economic assistance to Eastern Europe.
Some economic planners have also supported greater
CEMA integration as a means of rationalizing the
Bloc's economic efforts and as insurance against
Western embargoes. Influential Soviet economists
have publicly argued the case for making CEMA
decisions by majority vote in an effort to augment
Soviet control-an "innovation" that the East Euro-
peans have until now successfully blocked. Soviet
economic officials probably favor using the forthcom-
ing CEMA summit to press these aims
Economic officials, however, probably also have an
interest in maintaining access to Western technology
and may-as in the late 1960s and early 1970s-see
better East-West relations as an argument for shifting
resources from the military to the civilian sector. Such
a viewpoint could make them wary of exerting pres-
sure on Eastern Europe, which might further damage
Soviet relations with the West
Foreign Policy Specialists
Among those groups likely to support the status quo,
only the foreign policy specialists at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, in the Central Committee, and at
academic institutes have significant influence. Like
Foreign Minister Gromyko himself, these policy spe-
cialists have an interest in seeing that Eastern Europe
remains tranquil so that it does not further complicate
relations with Western Europe and the United States.
Although this probably will disincline them to support
major reform in Eastern Europe, it also is likely to
predispose them against harsher and more demanding
policies toward the region.
Economic Reformers
Economic reformers, concentrated in the Academy of
Sciences Institutes, have a direct interest in policy
toward Eastern Europe because it is the only "ap-
proved laboratory" for testing out economic innova-
tions they might favor for the USSR. People like Oleg
Bogomolov, Director of the Institute of Economics of
the World Socialist System and onetime Andropov
subordinate, or Abel Aganbegyan, an influential eco-
nomic expert, have drawn on East European experi-
ence to discuss and even advocate ideas that would be
viewed as heretical if they came directly from the
West. Although concerned primarily with the Soviet
economy, they probably would press for toleration of
economic reform in Eastern Europe. Reformers can
remember that the crushing of Czech reform in 1968
also meant the death of hopes for meaningful econom-
ic reform in the USSR.
Prospects for Policy
Succession has had an impact on Soviet policy toward
Eastern Europe in the past. East European leaders
clearly feel that it will again. Analysis of the views of
the post-Brezhnev Soviet leadership and key institu-
tions suggests that policy change is likely to occur in
stages
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In the Andropov period, the Soviet leadership will
continue to tolerate considerable economic diversity
within the Bloc while gradually attempting to wean
the East European regimes from economic subsidiza-
tion. Andropov's support for such a policy gives it an
advantage over competing strategies. Andropov has
shown a degree of ideological flexibility and displayed
an awareness of the complexity of Eastern Europe's
internal problems and a willingness to tailor policy to
the peculiar situation in each of these countries. He is
also aware that precipitous cuts in economic assist-
ance could cause unrest in the region. While favoring
tight controls on dissent, he probably sees mainte-
nance of Soviet security interest as best served by
permitting the East European regimes a fair amount
of autonomy in formulating economic and social
policy. This strategy would allow the continuation or
initiation of economic reform in the region. Although
there is a risk that economic reform could spill over
into the political sphere, a successful reform of the
East European economies could reduce the need for
Soviet assistance.
In the longer term, the Soviet leaders who succeed
Andropov are likely to place increasing emphasis on a
strategy of heightened orthodoxy and austerity in
Eastern Europe. Indeed, Andropov himself might
favor such a strategy if Soviet economic problems
worsen significantly. Such an approach apparently
has substantial support among some of the younger
Politburo members and key elite groups like the
military, police, party functionaries, and many eco-
nomic managers. They view it as a low-cost policy
that would free some resources for Soviet economic
growth while lessening the risk of contamination from
the West and harnessing Soviet allies even more
closely to Moscow's policies by closing off other
options. Key Soviet institutional actors probably feel
that instead of catering to the East European allies,
the USSR should demand more from them in terms of
economic and military burden sharing. Such a policy,
moreover, logically flows from the deteriorating East-
West climate and can be blamed on the United
States.
This strategy, however, does entail an increased risk
of East European unrest, and it would be difficult to
calculate how far aid could be reduced before it might
affect political stability. Some Soviet leaders may feel
that Poland can serve as a model of how austerity can
be introduced by a regime determined to maintain
control.
The USSR's adoption of such a demanding and less
tolerant approach would complicate the current US
policy of differentiating among the East European
regimes and encouraging diversity within the Bloc.
Differentiation would become increasingly more prob-
lematic for the United States as Moscow moved to
reverse trends-such as limited toleration of dissent
or economic reform-which the United States views
positively. Opportunities for exerting Western influ-
ence would also be reduced to the extent that East
European economic contacts were circumscribed and
the East European economies further oriented toward
that of the USSR. Cultural contacts between Eastern
Europe and the West would also be reduced and,
presumably, the United States would be even less able
than at present to influence the Bloc's fulfillment of
Helsinki human rights commitments.
The adoption of a more demanding Soviet strategy,
however, might also create frictions and social stresses
in Eastern Europe, which could undermine Moscow's
control over the region. East Europeans, for example,
would resent greater Soviet assertiveness and the
harnessing of their economies to that of the USSR.
Austerity could also generate social unrest that might
possibly: (1) force liberalization of individual regimes,
(2) compel the USSR to restore some economic sup-
port and/or grant more autonomy, or (3) force Soviet
intervention that would complicate Moscow's policies
and undermine its relationship with the West Europe-
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