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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00658R000200100004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
Andropov's Political Position:
The Importance of
the June Plenum
This paper was prepared by
National Intelligence Council.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Policy Analysis Division,
SOVA~
Confidential
SOV 83-10097
June 1983
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Confidential
Andropov's Political Position:
The Importance of
the June Plenum FI
Key Judgments After six months as CPSU General Secretary, Andropov has brought
Information available about a distinct change in the style and tone of Kremlin deliberations and a
as of 31 May 1983 new sense of purposefulness to regime policies. Although he has yet to
was used in this report.
consolidate his political support in the Politburo or unveil a comprehensive
policy program of his own, since late March there have been indications
that he may have the momentum to do so:
? The 24 March appointment of his ally, Foreign Minister Andrey
Gromyko, as First Deputy Premier probably strengthened Andropov's
position in the Council of Ministers and may have laid the groundwork
for a move against one of Brezhnev's former cronies in the Politburo,
Premier Nikolay Tikhonov.
? Andropov's stature as a political leader has been bolstered by increasing-
ly deferential treatment in the Soviet media, and particularly by the
public acknowledgment that he is Chairman of the USSR Defense
Council.
? The appointment of a new Chief of the Central Committee's Organiza-
tional Party Work Department indicates that Andropov is making
progress in gaining control over sensitive personnel appointments.
These political gains were facilitated by the sidelining of Andropov's
putative rival, Konstantin Chernenko, by illness for two months this spring.
Andropov loyalists and other Soviet sources are now confidently predicting
that high-level changes will be made at the next Central Committee
plenum, reportedly set for mid-June. This meeting is important for
Andropov. He is operating under a number of time constraints, and it is es-
sential that he begin to reshape the top ruling bodies:
? Not to make progress in this regard, in view of the expectations that have
been raised, would be widely interpreted among the party elite as a sign
of significant weakness.
? Some personnel actions are urgent. The failure to name a new President
has become a source of concern among Soviet officials, and that office
cannot be left unfilled without signaling serious political division and
stalemate in the Politburo. The death of the Politburo's oldest member,
Arvid Pelshe, creates another vacancy to be filled.
iii Confidential
SOV 83-10097
June 1983
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Time is of essence in other respects. Now almost 69 years old and in
uncertain health, Andropov cannot count on a long tenure in which to leave
his mark on the future course of Soviet policy. His discipline campaign-
intended to end malingering, root out corruption, and increase accountabil-
ity and efficiency throughout the system-may have initially improved
economic performance, but it is likely to lose its effect unless combined
with other measures to provide incentives and reorganize the management
Soviet sources contend that Andropov will move cautiously in this area. He
probably does not yet have a comprehensive reform program in mind; and
he realistically cannot hope to launch such a program until he has made
some changes in the Politburo to bring it under his control.
A new department of the Central Committee has
een set up to eve op proposals for changing the economic mechanism, but
he is already giving attention to this problem.
The personnel actions taken at the June plenum should provide some
indication of how fast Andropov will be able to move, and clearer signals on
his policy preferences may emerge. Full implementation of his policies is
likely to depend on those who come after him, and perhaps the most he can
achieve is to bring to the top the kind of officials best suited to carry out his
policies. The increased prominence accorded party Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev and Andropov's evident intention to give new party Secretary
Nikolay Ryzhkov significant authority over economic policy suggests that
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Confidential
Andropov's Political Position:
The Importance of
the June Plenum FI
Andropov Strengthens His Position
General Secretary Andropov has regained the politi-
cal initiative in recent weeks, following a period in
February and March when his efforts to consolidate
his position seemed frustrated by ill health and politi-
cal opposition. Since late March there have been a
number of indications that he has significantly
strengthened his position. The appointment of Foreign
Minister Andrey Gromyko as First Deputy Premier
on 24 March placed this Andropov ally in the Presidi-
um of the Council of Ministers and possibly laid the
groundwork for a future move against one of Brezh-
nev's former cronies in the Politburo, Premier Nikolay
Tikhonov. Gromyko's seniority on the Politburo di-
minishes Tikhonov's authority and lends credence to
rumors that he is on the way out.
This promotion had all the appearances of adroit
backroom maneuvering by Andropov. Tikhonov was
on an official visit to Yugoslavia when the announce-
ment was made-a coincidence in timing that sug-
gested a deliberate attempt by Andropov to steal a
march on his Politburo opponents. The hasty return of
another ally, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, from
Hungary on 23 March suggests that his presence was
needed for the 24 March Politburo meeting that
probably made the decision on Gromyko. Two days
later, moreover, several high-level military promotions
were announced that suggested Andropov was consoli-
dating his ties with the high command and perhaps
preparing the ground for a shift in Ustinov's responsi-
bilities within the leadership. Rumors have indicated
he might be in line for the presidency or the premier-
ship, and the US Embassy has now heard from four
different Soviet sources that Ground Forces Com-
mander Vasiliy Petrov, one of the generals promoted,
will soon replace Ustinov as Defense Minister.
is now responsible for light industry and consumer
goods, appears to be a particularly important step in
Andropov's attempt to expand his influence in the
area of personnel assignments.' Chernenko, however,
' Ligachev's closest political ties were probably with former party
Secretary Andrey Kirilenko, with whom he first worked in the
RSFSR party bureau in the early 1960s. This is the second major
appointment of a presumed Kirilenko protege since Andropov took
over-party Secretary Ryzhkov also had close connections with
Kirilenko and with other members of the Kirilenko network. This
suggests that Andropov was able to take advantage of Kirilenko's
retirement last November for reasons of health to form an alliance
with some of his followers. Their interests would seem to coincide:
Andropov lacks a strong political following in the party apparatus,
The pace of personnel shifts also has picked up after a
lull in February and March. The appointment of
Yegor Ligachev as head of the Central Committee's
Organizational Party Work Department-a post criti-
cal to control of personnel assignments-and evidence
that the former head, party Secretary Ivan Kapitonov,
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Confidential
may still have some oversight responsibilities for cadre
matters. As recently as 24 May, Pravda commended
his writings on this subject.
Equally significant, the Soviet media have dropped
some of their former restraint in reporting personal
praise of Andropov, and there appears to be a new
effort to underscore his prestige and authority. He has
been publicly identified as Chairman of the USSR
Defense Council. Moreover, a Central Committee
agricultural conference, held on 18 April, further
buttressed Andropov's leadership image. The confer-
ence, which had the appearance of a miniplenum, was
attended not only by his Politburo colleagues, but by
all the republic and oblast party bosses-the group
that some Andropov partisans acknowledged had been
lukewarm in its support of him. Andropov's participa-
tion in the conference gave him a much-needed
opportunity to demonstrate his authority and develop
some rapport with this key group. The appointment of
Ligachev, who has served for over 17 years as a
regional leader, probably was reassuring to these
regional officials as well.
Andropov's political efforts were undoubtedly helped
by Konstantin Chernenko's illness and incapacitation
during April and most of May. Chernenko's office
told reporters that he had pneumonia, explaining his
absence from several major leadership gatherings-
the agricultural conference, Lenin's anniversary, and
May Day. He also was unable to go to Berlin to give
the address for the Marx anniversary celebration in
mid-April. Several indications-the appearance of his
portrait with those of other leaders at the May Day
celebration, a review of his latest book, and his
signature on obituaries-suggest that he is not on his
way out of the leadership. Moreover, there continue to
be rumors that ideology will be the subject of the June
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Confidential
plenum and that he will give the main report. Never-
theless, to be sidelined at such a critical period must
have weakened his position.
Despite Andropov's initial strong showing on assum-
ing the General Secretary post and recent signs that
his political bandwagon is gaining momentum, he still
does not control the Politburo. Until he has made
some changes in that and other top ruling bodies, it is
not likely that he will be able to set his stamp on the
direction of regime policies.
Andropov's overall strategy would seem to represent
the most practical course open to him, given his
inexperience in domestic economic matters and his
lack of strong institutional support in the economic
apparatus and among regional party officials. In
particular, the stress on economic discipline holds out
the possibility of improving economic performance in
the near term without new investments or risky policy
departures. The higher growth rates in industrial
production and labor productivity achieved for the
first quarter of 1983 are probably partially attribut-
able tc. the discipline campaign. Moreover, if the
Soviet leaders pushed implementation of measures
already on the books, such as the 1979 management
reform or the 1980 decree on agricultural incentives
and planning, economic performance might be consid-
So far the changes in policy that the Andropov
leadership has brought about, while significant, are
more a matter of style and tone than of substance.
The emphasis has been on policy continuity in domes-
tic and foreign affairs and improved implementation
of existing policies. This strategy appears to have
given new impetus to some old Brezhnev policies.
Many of these-particularly agriculture and the Food
Program-are closely identified with leaders other
than Andropov and may not even enjoy his whole-
hearted support. Before becoming party leader, he did
not give public support to the Food Program, and
some Soviet sources have implied that he has reserva-
tions about some aspects of it. Nonetheless, for now
he has thrown his weight behind it.
Leadership Style and Discipline
Andropov has sought to convey an image of strong
leadership that sharply contrasts with the more lax
style of the later Brezhnev years.
Soviet officials have
made this explicit, blaming Brezhnev for indecisive-
ness, failure to follow through on the implementation
of decisions, and unwillingness to hold errant officials
to account. Andropov, they claim, is determined to
change all this.
Andropov's influence has been most obvious in the
discipline campaign, a broad gauge effort to tighten
up performance at the workplace and eliminate cor-
ruption and mismanagement at all levels of the party
and government. The introduction of militia spot
checks for truant workers is only one aspect-and the
most transitory one-of a general effort to increase
accountability and efficiency throughout the system.
erably helped.
Economic Reform
The discipline campaign is not likely to have any long-
term economic impact, however, unless it is combined
with other measures to improve incentives and revital-
ize the management mechanism
Available evidence indicates that Andropov believes
that changes are necessary, but he does not appear to
have yet fleshed out a blueprint. His remarks on the
subject since assuming office have been limited pri-
marily to passing reference in his November 1982
plenum speech to the need to study East European
experience and the importance of giving enterprises
and farm managers more authority. Andropov loyal-
ists claim that he is familiar with the Hungarian
economic reform and credit him with protecting this
experiment in quasi-market socialism from orthodox
detractors in the Soviet leadership.'
' Hungary's New Economic Mechanism (NEM) is the most exten-
sive experiment in economic decentralization being carried out in
the Soviet Bloc. As in the other Communist countries, Hungarian
central authorities formulate state plans and set macroeconomic
goals. Under the NEM, however, the Hungarians rely heavily on
indirect economic regulators and market forces rather than on
binding plan targets and administrative controls to guide microlevel
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Confidential
Work on studying various reform models has speeded
up, moreover, since Andropov took over. According to
several Soviet officials, the new party Secretary Niko-
lay Ryzhkov was assigned specific responsibility for
developing proposals for change in the economic
mechanism. Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's
remarks in his 22 April Lenin Day speech suggest as
well that some work on a reform package may be in
progress. He noted that "measures are currently being
prepared to obtain a better blend of centralism and
local initiative in economic planning and manage-
ment."
an associated reorganization
of the central party apparatus is also being prepared.
This reorganization, which would involve the Central
Committee's economic departments, would be aimed
at giving the party apparatus greater control over
long-range economic planning and strategy and is
seen by Soviet officials as a prelude to economic
reform. Progress, however, is slow. No time has yet
been set for the much-ballyhooed plenum on reform-
ing the economic mechanism, mentioned first by
Brezhnev, and ideology (not economics) is rumored to
be the subject for the June plenum.
Soviet sources, moreover, have sought to play down
the prospects that the plenum on reform of the
economic mechanism-when it does occur-will
launch sweeping changes. Reform-minded supporters
of Andropov who initially predicted that he would
make major changes now emphasize the formidable
bureaucratic obstacles to any significant moves in the
direction of economic decentralization. They warn
that any serious effort at reform is at best years away
and even then is likely to be modest in scope.
Several Andropov consultants-most notably Fedor
Burlatskiy-have stressed that even modest reform
goals must be preceded by rejuvenation of the party
and government ranks. They point out that no reform
will work until government and party functionaries of
the Brezhnev era are replaced by more efficiency-
minded managers. For this reason, they say, the
Andropov leadership is concentrating first on "cadre
building."
Leadership Infighting
Andropov
intended to use the discip ine and anticorruption
campaign to gain control of the party apparatus, clean
out deadwood, and bring in new people who were
more attuned to modern management methods and
more supportive of his policy initiatives. His efforts
initially appeared to go smoothly. He appears to have
been instrumental in the promotions of two young
industrial managers from the Gosplan hierarchy-
Nikolay Ryzhkov to the party secretariat and Nikolay
Slyunkov as Belorussian party chief. Other high-level
changes, particularly in the Council of Ministers and
the propaganda apparatus, were made in December
and January. A Brezhnev crony in the Ministry of the
Interior was removed and replaced by one of Andro-
pov's proteges, KGB Chairman Vitaliy Fedorchvk.
Nevertheless, Andropov's strategy appeared to run
into some resistance, reportedly because of wide-
spread fear among the elite and opposition to his
program among his Politburo colleagues. Several
press articles in early February attacking "factional-
ism" in the party suggested that Andropov's cadre
renewal campaign was meeting high-level resistance.
In early March, dissident Soviet historian Roy Med-
vedev claimed that infighting had intensified and that
the influence of Chernenko and Tikhonov had in-
creased, as officials fearful of losing their jobs tried to
back them as a counterweight to Andropov. Cher-
nenko is reportedly popular among regional officials
and may have become a rallying point for threatened
ministers and bureaucrats. They evidently see his
presence on the Politburo as serving to protect their
interests and providing someone to turn to if Andro-
pov stumbles.
The pace of leadership replacements slowed markedly
in February and March, with almost no changes
above the deputy minister level and virtually no shifts
among important regional party officials that suggest-
ed the weeding out of incompetent officials. Some
officials continued to hold their jobs who earlier had
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'.umIucuuuI
Andropov presenting award to Honecker at award ceremony,
3 May 1983. Left to right, Kuznetsov, Solomentsev, Grishin,
Gromyko, Honecker, Tikhonov, Andropov, Ustinov, Gorbachev,
Aliyev, Ponomarev, Dolgikh, Kapitonov, Rusakov, Zimyanin, and
been rumored to be on their way out-Leonid Zamya-
tin, a Brezhnev-Chernenko loyalist and International
Information Department Chief, was one. Even the
exposes of corruption by high-level officials became
less frequent.
than they did under Brezhnev and have been fre-
quently rumored as candidates for the premiership or
presidency. While Andropov retains the role of the
most authoritative regime spokesman on major policy
issues, he has left responsibility for day-to-day con-
duct of policy to his colleagues. Gromyko's recent
appointment as first deputy premier gives him
broader responsibilities over the entire foreign policy
field and would seem to enhance his authority as a
Andropov's political program probably ran into diffi-
culty for several reasons, foremost among them the
delicate political balance within the Politburo and his
health problems. Although he probably commands a
plurality on most major issues and has no strong
political rivals within the Politburo, he does not have a
solid majority committed to him. Until illness side-
lined Chernenko, Andropov's opponents were evident-
ly able to muster sufficient strength to block or slow
down his efforts to expand his control over the party
and government machinery
We do not know the precise political alignments
within the Politburo.
the core of Andropov's political support,
and together they constitute a powerful leadership
troika. Both allies now play a more prominent role
regime spokesman.
More recently there have been signs of a budding
alliance between Andropov and Gorbachev, who has
been closely associated with the more innovative
aspects of the Food Program and has gained promi-
nence as a regime spokesman for agriculture. Part of
Andropov's reason for supporting the Food Program
was probably a desire to forge this alliance, and his
appearance with Gorbachev at the Central Commit-
tee agricultural conference was a major boost for the
youngest Politburo member. The choice of Gorbachev
to make the Lenin anniversary address was another
sign that he enjoys Andropov's favor,
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The Politburo's other members have been variously
described as ranging from uncommitted to opposed,
the latter category including Brezhnev's former cro-
nies Tikhonov, Chernenko, and Kazakh party boss
Dinmukhamed Kunayev. Four members-Viktor Gri-
shin, Grigoriy Romanov, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, and
Geydar Aliyev-remain the subject of considerable
speculation.
First Deputy Premier Aliyev, too, remains a political
enigma. His KGB ties led to early speculation that he
was Andropov's man, but two considerations-his
past political support for Brezhnev and Chernenko,
and Medvedev's statement that Aliyev's promotion
was arranged by Brezhnev before his death-suggest
that Andropov and Aliyev may not be close. Further-
more, Aliyev's chances to succeed Tikhonov as Pre-
mier, once rumored to be good, appear to have been
dimmed by Gromyko's promotion.
Andropov's ability to gain the support of his Politburo
colleagues will be affected by their perceptions of his
health and by sheer political opportunism on their
part. Andropov has a long history of heart trouble, a
fact that must have been known to his Politburo
colleagues at the time that he was chosen to succeed
Brezhnev. There is considerable evidence that his
health took a turn for the worse in early 1983:
? The handful of foreign statesmen who have met
with Andropov since mid-January have described
him as mentally vigorous but frail and apparently in
poor health.
? East European delegates to the March ideological
conference reportedly said that he looked "rather
bad" and appeared to be in worse shape than when
they saw him in December.
hospitalized
? Since January he has often been out of the public
eye for several weeks at a time-three weeks in
February, 12 days in early March, and another 10
days in late March-and Soviet sources contend
that during at least two of these periods he was
Whatever the precise nature of Andropov's medical
problems, uncertainty in the leadership regarding his
health may have created political problems for him.
Cadre renewal lost some of its momentum in January,
and reports of resistance to Andropov's efforts to
consolidate his position surfaced with greater frequen-
cy. The health problems may have caused fence sitters
in the Politburo to become more circumspect, tempo-
rarily at least, in casting their lot with him. In early
May, however, Andropov maintained a heavy public
schedule during East German Party boss Honecker's
official visit to Moscow, suggesting that his health has
improved.
The June Central Committee plenum is likely to be a
major watershed for Andropov. The time constraints
under which he operates makes it essential that he
begin reshaping the top ruling bodies. It is important
that he make some progress, if only because expecta-
tions have been raised so high. Since last December,
Andropov loyalists have been insisting that important
personnel actions would be made by early summer.
Not to meet this schedule would be widely interpreted
among the party and government elite as a sign of
significant weakness.
We believe that the plenum (and the Supreme Soviet
session to follow on 16 June) will shuffle responsibili-
ties within the leadership and bring in some new
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t-onnaenaai
faces, rather than removing present members. Andro-
pov and company already have a number of leadership
vacancies to fill that are bound to be the subject of
political infighting. The position of president (chair-
man of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), which
Brezhnev held, has not been filled since his death.
References at Soviet propaganda lectures to the lack
of action on this question suggest that it has become a
source of increasing concern in Soviet officialdom and
is considered a source of political weakness for Andro-
pov. Andropov may want to take this position himself;
but such a move-while it would increase his stature
as the USSR's authoritative leader-would not add
significantly to his actual political power. Some ru-
mors have indicated that Andropov would like to put
Tikhonov in the largely symbolic presidency, and thus
be able to position an ally-perhaps Ustinov-as
premier.
The death on 30 May of the Politburo's oldest
member, 84-year-old Arvid Pelshe, creates yet anoth-
er important vacancy to be filled. Pelshe had served
since 1966 as chairman of the Party Control Commit-
tee, the party's highest disciplinary review board. F_
The party Secretariat is also a key battleground for
political infighting. Only three Central Committee
secretaries-Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev-
are full members of the Politburo. The position on the
Politburo as the senior secretary for industry has not
been filled since Kirilenko retired. Vladimir Dolgikh
(a candidate Politburo member and party secretary)
and Ryzhkov are obvious rivals for this important slot,
with Ryzhkov probably being Andropov's choice.
With the appointment of a new personnel chief in the
Central Committee apparatus, a change in secretariat
responsibility for cadres is also likely. Ivan Kapitonov,
the longtime cadres secretary, appears to have been
assigned to less sensitive duties in the Secretariat,
possibly paving the way for the elevation to the party
Secretariat of Ligachev, his replacement as cadre
department head.
Andropov cannot begin to put a strong personal stamp
on the direction of Soviet policy or launch a compre-
hensive program of his own until he has gained better
control over party and government machinery. But
time is growing short. Although changes in the eco-
nomic mechanism can conceivably be deferred, the
leadership will have to address allocation issues before
approving the 1984 economic plan in the fall, and
signals must soon be given to the economic planners
about national priorities for the 12th Five-Year Plan
(1986-90).
The personnel actions taken at the June plenum will
provide some idea of the direction and speed of
Andropov's moves. If he can consolidate his position
at the plenum, then more explicit signals as to his
preferences on economic management and resource
allocation may begin to emerge. Given his age and
uncertain health, Andropov is undoubtedly aware that
he may have little time to make his mark. He
probably cannot hope to be around to see his pro-
grams fully implemented, and perhaps the most he
will be able to do is bring into the top leadership the
kind of officials who he thinks can follow the lead that
he favors. Gorbachev and Ryzhkov apparently repre-
sent the type of officials he has in mind
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Interlocking Directorate of
the Soviet Leadership
Secretariat
Regional Post
Full Member
Andropov
6/15/14 4
/27/73
General Secretary
Aliyev
5/10/23 11
/22/82
Chernenko
9/24/11 11
/27/78
Ideology
Gorbachev
3/02/31 10
/21/80
Agriculture
Grishin
9/18/14 4
/09/71
Moscow party boss
Gromyko
7/18/09 4
/27/73
Kunayev
1/12/12 4
/09/71
Shcherbitskiy
2/17/18 4
/09/71
Tikhonov
5/14/05 11
/27/79
Ustinov
10/30/08 3
/06/76
Candidate
Member
Demichev
1/03/18 11
/01/64
Dolgikh
12/25/24 5
/24/82
Industry
Kuznetsov
2/13/01 10
/03/77
Ponomarev
1/17/05 5
/19/72
NonrulingCom-
munist parties
Rashidov
11/06/17 10
/31/61
Shevardnadze
1/25/28 11
/27/78
Solomentsev
11/07/13 11/
23/71
Kapitonov-Light
industry and con-
sumer goods
Zimyanin-Propa-
ganda, ideology
Rusakov-Ruling
Communist parties
Ryzhkov-Eco-
nomic management
Council of Ministers Presidium of
Supreme Soviet
Minister of Foreign
Affairs and 1st Deputy
Chairman
Minister of Defense
Member
1st Deputy
Chairman
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP84T00658R000200100004-6
Confidential
Confidential
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP84T00658R000200100004-6