(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000600010010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 29, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
USSR: Tungsten Imported for Military Use . . . . . . . . . 5
Special Analysis
I 0 USSR: Second-Tier Candidates for Succession . . . . . . . 12
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The USSR's unusually large purchases of tungsten since 1979--
including several hundred tons reportedly purchased this year
US stockpiles--probably are earmarked for military programs.
from
The Soviets purchased about 11,000 metric tons in
1981, about triple the annual imports of the early and
middle 1970s. West European brokers, China, Peru, and
Bolivia are among the major sources. These higher
imports coincide with major purchases of tungsten-
related Western manufacturing technology, such as that
used for armor-piercing projectiles.
Comment: Most of the imported tungsten probably
is for military production, primarily antitank projec-
tiles and other new munitions.
Acquiring the related technology opens up many
opportunities for military applications. Possible future
uses include solid tungsten-alloy antitank and antiheli-
copter projectiles and fragmentation munitions for artil-
lery and missiles.
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USSR: Tungsten Imported for Military Use
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Age:57 Age:51
Party Secretary for Party Secretary for
Heavy Industry Agriculture
Politburo candidate member Politburo member
Age:64
Ukrainian Party Chief
Age:59
Leningrad Party Chief
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USSR: Second-Tier Candidates for Succession
The passing of several key members of the Politburo's old
guard almost certainly will improve the chances for advancement
of four younger leaders--party secretaries Vladimir Dolgikh and
Mikhail Gorbachev and regional leaders Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and
Grigoriy Romanov. None of the four is likely to succeed President
Brezhnev--at least immediately. Some are likely to join the Polit-
buro's inner circle, however, and they thus will play an important
role during what could be an unsettled transition period. One of
them is likely to become party leader in the succession's second
phase.--probably in a few years.
All of these younger leaders have the kind of tech-
nical and managerial expertise that will be sorely needed
as the leadership faces up to the country's mounting eco-
nomic problems. Their future policy preferences, however,
are difficult to predict. The parochial concerns of these
leaders now color their pronouncements on larger domestic
and foreign policy issues, and their current views will
be subject to change or compromise as the succession
struggle unfolds.
Although the USSR's leaders have become increasingly
concerned about the poor performance of the economy,
they have yet to formulate a comprehensive program that
promises significant improvement. Unlike their elders,
however, the second-rank leaders all have served as re-
gional party chiefs in the Brezhnev era. Such experience
may give them more familiarity with economic problems
and a greater sense of urgency in tackling management
All four leaders have publicly espoused some degree
of devolution of authority in economic management, al-
though they tend to approach the issue from different
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directions. Dolgikh and Romanov emphasize the need for
a greater regional role in planning and management.
Shcherbitskiy and Gorbachev apparently would like more
autonomy at the enterprise level.
The positions these leaders would take in any future
debates on resource allocation are uncertain, but their
current preferences are clearly reflected in their public
statements. Gorbachev, as agriculture secretary and a
former party chief in an important agricultural area, is
identified with heavy investment in agriculture. The
other three appear to have favored the heavy industry
Foreign Policy
These younger leaders have not been deeply involved
in the formulation of foreign policy or development of
national security options. Shcherbitskiy and Romanov
generally have taken a rather unsophisticated, hardline
approach toward foreign policy issues and have been
unenthusiastic about Brezhnev's detente policies.
Shcherbitskiy recently told a Western official that he
and other Soviet leaders blamed the US for causing the
fall. of former Chancellor Schmidt's government in order
to put an end to Ostpolitik and facilitate the deployment
of US missiles in West Germany.
Gorbachev and Dolgikh seldom speak out on foreign
policy, presumably because of their preoccupation with
economic issues.
Prospects
As the succession struggle develops, the political
prospects of the four young leaders will depend on their
current contacts in the leadership, their success in
forming new alliances, and luck.
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Dolgikh, the junior party secretary responsible for
heavy industry, may have the best chance for advancement.
His promotion to candidate member of the Politburo in
May, at a time when heavy industry chief Kirilenko was
in eclipse, seemed to underscore his indispensibility.
He is now the most logical choice to succeed Kirilenko,
and he also has been rumored as a possible successor to
Premier Tikhonov.
The memberships held by Gorbachev in the Secretariat
and the Politburo give him the most advantageous institu-
tional position at the moment. A fourth poor harvest,
however, might demand a scapegoat. Gorbachev, with no
apparent strong connections in the leadership, could find
himself politically vulnerable.
Gorbachev also could get into trouble if the imple-
mentation of Brezhnev's food program should become more
bogged down in bureaucratic infighting.
Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy's career has
been tied to that of Brezhnev. His failure to obtain a
national-level position in Moscow, however, may have
caused him to reassess his loyalties.
Shcherbitskiy recently was reported to have endorsed
Andropov's move to the Secretariat and to have seconded
Andropov's nomination of Vitaliy Fedorchuk for the top
KGB job. These actions may have risked alienating
Brezhnev and his protege, party secretary Chernenko,
who evidently favored other candidates for the KGB post.
Shcherbitskiy also has been rumored as a possible suc-
cessor to Tikhonov.
Leningrad party leader Romanov's espousal of innova-
tions in economic management could improve his prospects
for a move to Moscow. His fortunes have ebbed substan-
tially in recent years, however, at least partly because
of his personal indiscretions and volatile temperament.
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Top Secret
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