NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 16 OCTOBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000500010152-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 152
• Content Type: REPORT

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, Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
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10 October
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Lebanon : Army Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Japan: Political Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Nicaragua-Honduras: Increasing Tensions . . . . . . . . . . 4
Denmark: Government Threatened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Greece: Municipal Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Mexico: Threat of a General Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
South Korea: Student Protests in Kwangju . . . . . . . . . 8
Bolivia-Cuba: Closer Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Special Analyses
Lebanon: President Jumayyil's Prospects . . . . . . . . . . 10
China-Pakistan: President Zia's Visit . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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LEBANON: Army Operations
The Lebanese Army is moving cautiously in East Beirut and
the Shuf region as it tries to reassert the central government's
authority.
The Army moved to the edge of Christian-dominated
East Beirut yesterday as part of its two-week-old opera-
tion to demilitarize Beirut. Press reports say Army
units set up roadblocks and checked identity papers.
They reportedly intend to delay for now searches for
arms caches.
Comment: The Army is reluctant to confront the
Christian militia forces in East Beirut and in the Shuf
region, and President Jumayyil probably is unwilling to
risk a showdown with them at this stage. Any Army opera-
tions in East Beirut are likely tq be symbolic and aimed
at placating Muslim politicians.
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The leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party were unable
to a ree uesterday on a candidate to succeed Prime Minister Suzuki.
Press reports suggest former Prime Minister Fukuda
was able to block agreement on faction leader Nakasone,
even though Nakasone had the support of the two largest
factions. Party leaders have decided to allow each
faction to nominate a candidate today for a party-wide
primary in November.
Comment: //Most party leaders probably continue to
hope a primary will not be necessary. It would seriously
delay work on important economic issues, including the
budget for next year. Moreover, man believe infighting
can only hurt the party's image.//
//If a primary is required, Economic Planning Agency
Director Komoto would be likely to come out on top because
of his strong support among the rank and file. Masumo
Esaki, the head of the party's international trade com-
mittee, probably would place second, reflecting the strong
influence of former Prime Minister Tanaka's faction. If
the current coalition of the Tanaka, Suzuki, and Nakasone
factions holds together at the convention, Esaki will
be elected Japan's next prime minister.//
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NICARAGUA-HONDURAS: Increasing Tensions
A surge in anti-Sandinista activity along the Nicaraguan-
Honduran border has Zed to increased tensions between the two
countries and new pressure for a diplomatic solution.
About a dozen armed clashes have occurred in recent
weeks between anti-Sandinista groups and Nicaraguan
military units. Most of anti-Sandinista
raids into Nicaragua.
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. Nicaragua has sent six diplomatic notes to Honduras
protesting these and other incidents. At the same time,
Managua is continuing to insist that a high-level dia-
logue between the two countries is necessary to reduce
tensions.
Honduras prefers the broader approach outlined
earlier this month at the meeting in Costa Rica of
Foreign Ministers of democratic countries in the region.
Meanwhile, Honduran President Suazo has refused to accept
an invitation to a meeting with Nicaragua this month
in Caracas sponsored by Venezuela and Mexico.
//Despite the surge in anti-Sandinista activity from
Honduras, efforts to unite anti-Sandinista groups there
with those based in Costa Rica have made little progress.
A Costa Rican - based group headed by exiles Eden Pastora
and Alfonso Robelo is reluctant to include a militarily
stronger group in Honduras, because former Nicaraguan
National Guard officers hold leadershi Positions in
the Honduran-based organization.//
Comment: A major clash between Honduras and Nicara-
gua does not appear imminent, despite the increasing
Sandinista rhetoric. The Nicaraguans are waging a dip-
lomatic effort to convince the international community
that they are the victims of a Honduran-US conspiracy to
overthrow their regime, and they robabl do not want
to appear the aggressor.
In addition, the Nicaraguans are campaigning hard
for a seat on the UN Security Council. They hope it
would provide them with a better forum for focusing
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a good chance it will back off and accept symbolic tax
cuts with the promise of further reductions next year.
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The fate of Conservative Prime Minister Schlueter's month-old
center-right minority coalition government hangs in the balance
today as the parliament decides whether to a rove the controversial
economic austerity program.
The program tries to deal with the soaring budgetary
deficit by cutting funds available for unemployment,
health, and welfare benefits. It also calls for suspen-
sion of index-linked increases in wages and transfer
incomes.
The package has encountered opposition from the left
and from two smaller parties on which the government
depends for a majority. Hardliners in the rightwing
Progress Party have threatened to bring the government
down by withholding support for the austerity program
unless the government grants substantial relief in per-
sonal income taxes.
Comment: The government is caught in a bind between
a publicly announced determination to reduce budget
deficits and a desire to postpone any tax relief until
after nationwide wage contract negotiations next year.
Few parties, however welcome the prospect of early elec-
tions.
The Progress Party would become the principal scape-
goat for the government's fall. Consequently, there is
If the Progress Party stands fast, the Social Demo-
cratic Party--the leading opposition group--may abstain
from voting on the austerity program. It would do so
to gain more time to strengthen its position in antici-
pation of new Parliamentary elections next year.
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GREECE: Municipal Elections
Nationwide municipal elections scheduled to begin tomorrow
are likely to reflect only a limited reduction in public su ort
for Prime Minister Papandreou's Socialist Party.
After this first round of local voting, runoffs
will be held next week in places where no candidate wins
more than 50 percent. A second round usually is held
in the larger cities, where there are many mayoral can-
didates.
Comment: Local issues and personalities will deter-
mine the election results in many areas. National issues
will be important in the major cities, however, and the
results there will be viewed as a measure of support for
Papandreou.
General dissatisfaction with the sluggish economy
is likely to reduce the 48-percent vote won by the
Socialists in the national elections in 1981. Neverthe-
less, an effective grass-roots organization and the
lack of a strong alternative give the Socialists the
advantage.
The Communists almost certainly hope to secure the
support of many leftwing Socialists disgruntled over
Papandreou's cautious, pragmatic foreign policy. They
probably also are counting on capturing a large portion
of the newly enfranchised youth vote.
The conservative New Democracy party is poorly
organized and still has not recovered from its defeat
last year. Significant additional losses on Sunday
could provoke renewed party factionalism and possibly
prompt the resignation of party leader Averoff.
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Ton Secre
Labor leader Fidel Velazquez has announced that
unions affiliated with the ruling party will launch a
general strike on 1 November if the private sector does
not grant a 50-percent wage increase. A 24-hour general
strike is already planned for Wednesday to show unity
and resolve at the beginning of a 10-day period of
industry-by-industry negotiations. Government-sponsored
talks between business and labor broke down earlier
this month. Leaders of other unions are asking for a
35-percent increase but thus far have rejected joining
a nationwide strike.
Comment: Strikes by unions affiliated with the
ruling party would seriously threaten government-labor
relations. An interim wage settlement effective through
December might be worked out, but it probably would re-
quire President Lopez Portillo's direct involvement and
would probably be for less than 50 percent. Even if an
emergency increase is granted, President-elect de la Madrid
will have to deal with labor's minimum wage demands when
he takes office on 1 December.
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SOUTH KOREA: Student Protests in Kwangju
//The death this week of a former student leader
imprisoned in Kwangju has touched off major antigovern-
ment demonstrations by university students in the city,
the site of bloody civil disturbances in the spring of
1980. The students thus far have remained on campus,
but the number of demonstrators reportedly had risen
to 5,000 yesterday. The police claim religious leaders
from Seoul are inciting the students. Although the
government has announced that the prisoner died of nat-
ural causes, other reports contend that he died as a
result of a hunger strike or police brutality.//
Comment: //If the government does not produce credible
evidence to back its version of the death, the incident
could provide a new rallying point for students and
Christian dissidents in Seoul and elsewhere.//
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Efforts by the new government of President Siles
to improve ties with Cuba will anger the military, which
returned power to civilians only last week. The two
countries broke diplomatic relations in 1964 and have
had little contact since the Bolivians captured and
executed Che Guevara in 1967. A high-level Cuban dele-
gation attended Siles's inauguration, and its leader,
Vice President Rodriguez, formally addressed s.
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Comment: These events reflect the leftist ideology
of President Siles's ruling coalition and the new govern-
ment's desire to establish a more Third World - oriented
foreign policy. The actions could prompt dissident
military factions to unite and begin serious coup plotting.
The President is trying to place moderate officers in
key military positions to forestall such a move.
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Special Analysis
LEBANON: President Jumayyil's Prospects
President Amin Jumayyil, who visits Washington next week,
faces an uphill struggle to reestablish Lebanon's political and
territorial integrity. Although he was elected with the unprece-
dented backing of nearly all of the country's many confessionaZZy
based factions, his political base is fragile and he will have to
work hard to maintain it. During his talks with US officials,
JumayyiZ hopes to pin down the extent of the US commitment to
Lebanon and to himself as its leader.
In the month since taking office, Jumayyil has made
limited gains in returning Beirut to normal. At the
same time, however, he has been faced with outbreaks of
interfactional fighting in various parts of the country.
This violence underscores the continued ascendanc of
confessional and clan loyalties.
//Jumayyil's most pressing problem is to establish
control over the Phalange militia, especially hardcore
militants put into powerful positions by his assassinated
younger brother, Bashir. These militants have little use
for the new President, whom they see as representing the
bankrupt politics of the old guard. Fears that Amin will
not carry through on Bashir's policies may lead these
hardliners to consider a coup.//
//Other Christian and Muslim factions have expressed
willingness to work with Jumayyil, whom they view as
more open to their influence than his late brother. If
Jumayyil does not satisfy their often conflicting inter-
ests, they are likely to withdraw their support.//
Jumayyil favors the formation of a strong central
regime under Maronite hegemony. To this end, he held
extensive consultations with factional leaders on the
composition of his first government. He was unable to
reconcile their divergent demands, however, and had to
carry over Prime Minister Wazzan and install a cabinet
of academics, lawyers, and other politically inexperienced
professionals.
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This arrangement postpones a decision on power-
sharing among confessional groups while Jumayyil tackles
more urgent diplomatic and security problems. Most of
the political factions seem content to go along with
this situation for now.
Expanding Central Authority
Jumayyil's desire to expand central authority
throughout the country also is hampered by the weakness
of the national Army, which has never recovered from
fragmentation along confessional lines during the civil
war. Although it has since been reconstituted as an
integrated Christian-Muslim force, the rebuilding process
has been slow, and Lebanese leaders have been reluctant
to test it in situations where ethnic loyalties might
again divide it--or even lead to its disintegration.
//The President hopes that a combination of inter-
national political pressure and a strong military peace-
keeping presence will secure the early withdrawal from
Lebanon of Syrian, Israeli, and residual Palestinian
forces. Beirut has no leverage with Damascus or Tel
Aviv, and it cannot evict Palestinian fighters in the
north. In the south, the Israelis are insisting on
security arrangements in which the forces of Christian
militia leader Major Haddad will continue to play a key
role.//
Relations With Israel and Syria
//Israel has dropped for now its insistence on an early
peace treaty, but it is pushing for a written security
agreement covering a 40-kilometer zone north of the
Israeli border. Tel Aviv is contemptuous of the UN forces
now stationed in the south and may be cool to any other
international force unless it has a broader mandate and
includes US troops. Defense Minister Sharon has made it
clear that only forces controlled by Israel or in which
the Israelis have complete confidence can be counted on
to patrol the security zone adequately.//
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//Syria is displaying a cautious but positive attitude
toward Lebanon's new President. Although Damascus opposed
Bashir and may have been behind his assassination, it now
appears ready to normalize relations with Lebanon. This
attitude will be conditioned, however, by Beirut's W-i -
ingness to take Syrian interests into account.//
//Syria has agreed to proposals adopted by the recent
Arab summit in Morocco concerning withdrawal of its troops
from Lebanon. Although the Syrians insist that Israel
has to withdraw its forces first, they probably would
ultimately agree to a simultaneous pullout.//
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//Jumayyil will be seeking both symbolic and material
returns from his visit to Washington. He hopes for
tangible achievements in order to establish his legitimacy,
especially with hardline elements of the Phalange
militia.//
In addition, Jumayyil is likely to make more over-
tures to the US to expand its current $110 million com-
mitment to the rebuilding of Lebanon's economy. Accord-
ing to one Lebanese business leader, reconstruction will
cost roughly $24 billion.
//Jumayyil also will ask the World Bank and other
donors for reconstruction aid. He hopes the US will
prove to be an effective interlocutor with Saudi Arabia
and other countries from which he needs political and
economic support.//
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Special Analysis
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Beijing and Islamabad will use President Zia's third visit
to China, which begins tomorrow, to demonstrate a shared commit-
ment to maintain Pakistan's security and to cooperate against the
USSR in South Asia. The Pakistanis view the Chinese as their most
reliable aZZy, as an important arms supplier, and as a deterrent
to threats posed by India and the USSR. China regards Pakistan
as its strategic buffer in South Asia and as its diplomatic window
to the Arab world.
Zia may try to prepare Beijing for a more flexible
Pakistani approach toward Moscow. The Chinese are likely
to argue against any tactics offering Moscow political
concessions, however, especially ones that might le it-
imize the regime in Kabul or the Soviet presence.
Zia's mistrust of India will prompt him to probe
Chinese intentions for the next round of Sino-Indian
normalization talks next spring. The Chinese expect
slow progress on the border issue, and in the meantime
they will be trying to induce New Delhi to maintain a
positive approach to bilateral relations, to reduce
tensions with Pakistan, and to move farther away from
Moscow. They are likely to assure Zia that they will
keep him fully informed of their intentions toward New
Delhi.
Chinese leverage in the Middle East is limited,
but Beijing almost certainly sees its backing for Pakistan
as a means to strengthen its credentials in the Islamic
world and as a vehicle for its anti-Soviet message. In
this regard, the Chinese are likely to renew their earlier
encouragement of cooperation in defense matters amon
China, Turkey, and Pakistan.
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nn qprrpt
Military Aid
Beijing may approve new arms agreements during Zia's
visit, including additional sales of aircraft and naval
patrol boats. Such agreements, however, would not sig-
nificantly strengthen Pakistan's military capabilities.
Pakistan's armed forces are equipped primarily
with Chinese arms, with China having signed agreements
for nearly $850 million in military equipment since
1966. China's assistance gives Pakistan a supplement
to its acquisition of modern Western military hardware,
providing less-advanced and lower cost replacements for
an aging inventory.
Chinese policy backs the right of any state to
determine how to meet its own defense needs. Beijing
is aware, however, that clear evidence or a test of a
Pakistani nuclear explosive device would jeopardize US
and other Western military aid. China considers such
aid vital to Pakistan's security.
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