NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 31 AUGUST 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000400010210-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 210
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
Central
Intelligence
Top Secret
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
Top Secret
CPAS NIDC 82-204
August fy6z
Copy 402
Approved For Release 2008/08/06 : CIA-RDP84T00301 R000400010210-0
 Approved For Release 2008/08/06 : CIA-RDP84TOO301 R000400010210-0 25X1
 Suriname: Discontent Increasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Special Analyses
China: The 12th Party Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Western Sahara: No Solution in Sight . . . . . . . . . . . 9
 Evacuation of Syrian forces from Beirut began yesterday. As
the PLO and Syrian withdrawal nears completion more attention is
About 1,500 Syrian forces left Beirut yesterday.
According to Syrian press accounts, they have redeployed
Some 600 Palestinians left for Algeria and a small
contingent, including PLO chief Arafat, departed for
Lebanese leftist leaders continue to take a hard
line against President-elect Jumayyil. Ibrahim Qulaylat,
the leader of the Murabitun--one of the largest Muslim
militias--has threatened to resist forcibly any attempt
by the Israelis, the Lebanese Army, or Phalange forces
Qulaylat allowed Lebanese Army units and French
troops to take over some of the Murabitun's forward posi-
tions near the Museum Crossing. He considers the Army
to be Christian dominated, however, and opposes a unilat-
T The ura i un,
the two larger Communist factions, the Lebanese Arab Army,
and the Syrian-sponsored militias, however, reportedly
have been accumulating artillery, tanks, and other heavy
weapons since the civil war in 1975-76.//
Comment: Coordinated resistance by these militias
could seriously impede any effort by the Phalange militia
or the Lebanese armed forces to impose central government
control in West Beirut. The addition of recently aban-
doned PLO equipment would enhance this capability.
 The leftists, however, are not united and view each
other with distrust. Jumayyil and other Lebanese leaders
of the left and right may try to court the Murabitun, the
Lebanese Arab Army, and the smaller leftist parties in
order to isolate and reduce the threat from the Communists
Although Sunni elder statesman Salam says he has
made contact with the leftist leaders in a bid to nego-
tiate a peaceful restoration of government authority in
West Beirut, he faces a difficult task. To succeed, he
would have to improve his badly strained relations with
Jumayyil and to overcome the suspicions of the leftists.
The latter view Jumayyil as a Maronite radical bent on 25X1
 SURINAME: Discontent Increasing
//Army strongman Bouterse is facing growing civilian
and military dissatisfaction. Earlier this month he
provoked an intense public reaction when he rearrested
two officers after a civilian court had found them
innocent of coup plotting. Desertions reportedly are
increasing in the Army, and there is disgruntlement in
the military over Bouterse's preoccupation with political
activities and his efforts to expand ties with Cuba.//
Comment: //Bouterse is increasingly frustrated by
his inability to build a broad base of support and appar-
ently is becoming concerned for his personal safety. If
he resorts to repressive measures to strengthen his con-
trol of the government, he risks provoking additional
civilian anger and heightening prospects for instability.
 Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping will score impressive gains at
the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that opens tomorrow
in Beijing. Although Deng and his allies have had to compromise
with opponents and will have to do so again in the future, the meet-
ing will strengthen the positions of Deng's chosen successors.
The congress will cap Deng's five-year effort to
rebuild party institutions damaged during the Cultural
Revolution. When Deng formally proposed the organiza-
tional changes two years ago, his supporters expected
quick approval. Opposition from conservative and mili-
tary interests, however, forced him to delay and modify
his plans.
The party conclave is likely to increase the latitude
of Deng's heir apparent, General Secretary Hu Yaobang.
Deng will lead the top party elders to the political side-
lines, gambling that he will be able to limit their in-
fluence and interference as the reformers enhance their
Chinese leaders have said the congress will approve
establishment of a new Advisory Commission of older party
figures, headed by Deng, who will provide broad policy
guidance. This commission will join the Central Committee
and the Discipline Inspection Commission to form a troika
of leading party bodies.
In addition, the congress will elevate the Secretariat,
headed by Hu, to the "first line" of responsibility and
demote the Politburo--China's governing body since 1949--
to an essentially advisory role. It will retire the
titles of chairman and vice chairman of the Central Com-
mittee, leaving Hu at the top of the hierarchy. It also
 pand the Secretariat--now composed of 12 members--and
elect a new Central Committee. The Chinese have been
tightlipped about candidates for both bodies.
//Deng's group probably will make only limited progress
in removing lower ranking, older, and politically suspect
officials from the Central Committee. To dilute the
strength of his remaining opponents, Deng in recent years
has been placing his backers in existing institutions.
the Central Committee 25X1
will be younger as a whole, but for five to 10 years
there will still be a "considerable percentage of older
comrades."// 25X1
The reformers will still have to reckon with the
important reservoirs of conservative sentiment in the
Advisory Council, Politburo, and Central Committee.
Chinese politics depends more on personal networks than
on institutional roles, and semiretired party elders 25X1
will remain more influential than their titles suggest.
This will constrain the reformers to practice collective
leadership and to moderate their initiatives.
Former Party Chairman Hua Guofeng also seems to be
troubling the reformers. Recent comments by Hu and
articles in the media indicate Hua remains unwilling to
undergo self-criticism. This tarnishes the image of
stability and unity the reformers have sought to convey
Hua was personally disgraced at a party plenary
session last year, and he will lose his last major title
as party vice chairman at the congress. Nonetheless,
he continues to stand as a symbol of resistance to re-
formist policie for those party members who have suffered
at Deng's hand.
 Top Secret
Once the congress is over, China's leaders also will
shift their attention to economic planning and to reform-
ing the governmental apparatus at lower levels. In 1980,
the communique of the party's fifth plenum announced that
the 12th Congress would approve a new five-year plan.
This has been dropped from the formal agenda, however,
and may be left for the National People's Congress in
Deliberations at the congress will occur in an un-
usually xenophobic atmosphere. Strong signs of opposition
to China's "open door" policy have emerged in the press
and elsewhere since the beginning of the year. The
leadership has acknowledged this attitude by cracking
down on unregulated dealings with foreigners and by launch-
ing a campaign to oppose the influence of "bourgeois
Deng enters the congress with the issue of arms sales
to Taiwan receding, but the Japanese textbook controversy
continues to boil. Deng's uncompromising public posture
toward Tokyo may be intended to preempt those in the party
who seek to discredit the reform program by attacking its
The political climate in Beijing remains cool to new
initiatives toward the West, and the congress probably
will reinforce the independent-minded approach to foreign
 The continuing impasse in the 0AU over whether to grant
PoZisario Front insurgents formal membership is likely to harden
the positions of all parties to the seven-year-old dispute over
Western Sahara. Both the Moroccans and the Algerians will continue
their lobbying efforts, and the PoZisario probably will intensify
military activity. 25X1
//When the summit that was to be held in Tripoli
earlier this month collapsed for lack of a quorum,
a contact group consisting of Congo, Libya, Mali,
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia was given the task of
working out a compromise on the disputed issues that
would assure a quorum for a summit before the end of the
year. Further delay in convening a summit appears likely,
however, because of African opposition to Libyan leader 25X1
Qadhafi's assumption of the chairmanship of the OAU and
because all sides in the dispute show no willingness to
compromise.// 25X1
//Morocco's confidence has been increased by its 25X1
success--with strong support from Egypt and from non-OAu
member Saudi Arabia--in blocking the meeting in Tripoli.
//Morocco is thus likely to remain intransigent and 25X1
continue to avoid any situation where it would have to
Top 25X1
 //Algeria's strategy of obtaining recognition of
the Polisario in regional and international organiza-
tions suffered a defeat at Tri oli.
25X1
//Although Algiers believes neither side can win
militarily, it is unwilling to lose face by abandoning
the Front's cause. Algeria probably will try to erode
Morocco's African support while trying to gain broader
recognition for the Polisario in the region. To rein-
force its diplomatic efforts, Algiers also is likely to
urge the Polisario to increase its military activity.//
//Polisario leaders probably have not lost hope that
their "government" can eventually be seated at a summit,
because 27 of the 50 OAU members now recognize the
Saharan "republic." Like the Algerians, they reportedly
see little hope for an OAU-arranged settlement. They
are likely to maintain the public position that they
//Qadhafi's willingness to sacrifice the Polisario
o his ambitions to become OAU chairman
probably has strained Libyan relations with
--continued
Top Secret
 to play up its relations with Algeria, while trying to
With little prospect for political movement, the
Polisario almost certainly will increase its military
activity over the next few months in the hope of gaining
a psychological edge over the Moroccans. The insurgents
The Polisario probably also,will increase low-level
harassing attacks in the hope of drawing Moroccan forces
outside the protection of the berm. In addition, the
guerrillas may resume efforts to shoot down Moroccan
aircraft, which have been active against Polisario camps
in Western Sahara. Without increased support, however,
the Polisario probably will not be able to put enough
military pressure on Morocco to force it into direct
//Moroccan units are likely to remain in a defensive
posture. At the same time, they will proceed with plans
to extend the berm from Semara to the Mauritanian border
to deny more areas of Western Sahara to the guerrillas.
Although the Moroccans may conduct occasional sweep
operations outside the berm, they probably will continue
to rely heavily on airstrikes to disrupt Polisario
operations.// 25X1
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