NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 14 JULY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000400010057-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2007
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: July 14, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/09/13 : CIA-RDP84TOO301 R000400010057-1
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Central
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National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
14 July 1982
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 Approved For Release 2007/09/13 : CIA-RDP84TOO301 R000400010057-1
Top Secret
Contents
Vietnam: Repayments in Arrears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
/X USSR - Southern Africa: Changing Soviet Relations . . . . 11
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14 July 1982
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 VIETNAM: Repayments in Arrears
Hanoi's inability to meet payment obligations on $3.5 billion
of external debt will result in mounting arrears that will put
pressure on non-Communist creditors for debt relief and on Moscow
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Reports in the Western financial press say that
Hanoi wants a five-year deferral on all repayments, in-
cluding interest. Of Vietnam's total debt, $1.3 billion
is owed to non-Communist countries, mostly on official
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Total Vietnamese debt service payments in 1981
reached $284 million, or 77 percent of exports. For the
non-Communist area alone, the ratio of debt service to
Comment: Japanese and Western creditors probably
would prefer some form of debt relief rather than declare
a formal default, which would allow commercial banks to
J recover portions of the loans guaranteed by their govern-
ments and lead to confiscation of the Vietnamese assets
7/ within legal reach. A default declaration would be an
unattractive precedent, however, and Vietnam has few
attachable assets.
Creditors may look to the USSR to bail out Vietnam.
Soviet officials are unhappy that Hanoi has wasted much
of the aid it has received, however, and will be reluctant
Even if the repayments are deferred, the Vietnamese
y will gain only temporary relief. Their balance-of-payments
situation is not likely to improve in the near future.
ZJ Hanoi will sooner or later again face technical default
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14 July 1982
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 South
Africa
 The possible diminution of Soviet influence in Angola, should
a settlement on Namibia be achieved, and instability in Mozambique
have prompted Moscow to take steps to protect its position in south-
ern Africa. The deteriorating situation in Mozambique may present
the USSR with opportunities to increase significantly its influence
there if it is willing to underwrite the growing costs of supporting
Angolan President dos Santos's continued willingness
to deal with the US on Namibia and related issues has
intensified Soviet anxiety over his intentions, partic-
ularly because this might affect the Cuban troop presence
in Angola. Moscow is con-
cerned that dos Santos might call for the removal of most
of the Cubans in exchange for a security guarantee for
Angola's southern border. The departure of the Cubans,
coupled with better ties with Western countries, would
Dos Santos's handling of the Namibia problem and
his efforts to improve ties to the West reportedly have
intensified factional dissension in the ruling Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola. If the President's
efforts show progress, he may face a coup attempt by his
party's pro-Soviet faction, which stands to lose the most
The Soviets may hesitate to encourage a coup. It
would risk Moscow's position if it were to fail and would
jeopardize the USSR's equities among the other Frontline
A pro-Soviet coup plot in Luanda could develop
without direct Soviet instigation, and, if it succeeded,
Moscow presumably would endorse it. For now, however,
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14 July 1982
 the USSR will try to retain its influence in Angola by
using its connections with the hardliners in the ruling
Soviet-Mozambican relations have become strained
over the past year, largely because of President Machel's
dissatisfaction with Soviet assistance and his overtures
to the West.
Moscow may view the insurgent threat as another
opportunity to enhance its influence in Maputo. If
Machel is impelled to ask for major increases in military
assistance--possibly including Cuban combat troops--the
USSR might try to extract concessions from the regime.
The Soviets might hope to secure air and naval facilities,
which so far have been refused, and to make further use
of Mozambique as a channel of support to South African
guerrillas. F__~
A secondary consideration for Moscow would be that
a large Cuban military presence in Mozambique would cause
Pretoria to veto any settlement on Namibia, with the
Cubans leaving Angola only to reappear in Mozambique.
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 Although President Castro probably would be reluctant to
introduce Cuban combat troops into a potentially dangerous
military situation, he probably would accede to a Soviet
A major Soviet military assistance commitment would
entail new costs and risks, especially if it included
Cuban forces. South Africa, for example, probably would
intensify its efforts to undermine the Machel regime.
Moscow also would have to bear new financial costs.
Unlike Angola, Mozambique has few resources with which
to pay for such support. It is already in arrears for
much of the roughly $200 million in Soviet military
The USSR's financial problems have caused it to
reduce assistance to other clients, and a decision to
expand its involvement in Mozambique in a major way
would underline Moscow's determination to play a leading
role in southern Africa. The USSR's sustained interest
in exploiting the opposition of the Frontline States to
South Africa and in supporting the guerrillas there, as
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 Approved For Release 2007/09/13 : CIA-RDP84TOO301 R000400010057-1
i op secret
Approved For Release 2007/09/13 : CIA-RDP84TOO301 R000400010057-1