(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010210-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 210
• Publication Date: April 29, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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f~ uirector OI
T f ^; Central
n Intelligence Taily
('PAC V1[)P) itmIV
29 April /982
Copy P r 5 2
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Ton Secret
yl Poland: Problems With Youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Spain-US: Tougher Negotiating Position . . . . . . . . . . 8
!( EC: Budget Dispute Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Special Analysis
France: Review of Arms Control Policy . . . . . . . . . . 14
29 April 1982
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ineffective resistance groups.
Resistance activities since the imposition of martial
law generally have involved the young. Rebellious acts
v by high school students have included the printing and
distribution of leaflets and the formation of small and
corrupt system created and tolerated by their elders.
Top Secret
Martial law hit hardest at Poland's younger genera-
tion. The drive for reform by Solidarity and its allies
in student and agricultural circles was a revolt led
primarily by this generation against the inefficient end
University students are more of a problem, and the
authorities have moved cautiously to remove some popular
and liberal rectors and professors. The regime's appre-
hension was demonstrated earlier this week when the
military authorities had to threaten se Warsaw
University to prevent a strike.
Comment: Although students have seemed increasingly
willing to test the limits of martial law, most realize
the futility of protest and fear the brutality of the
security services and the loss of jobs. In the event
of a clash, they probably could not count on help from
the workers.
The party, which has little to offer young people
and cannot meet either their economic or political as-
pirations, will continue to rely on the threat of force.
The Central Committee plenum probably will produce nothing
more than platitudes.
29 April 1982
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Airbase
Naval base
0 i00
T.Mor6n
Madrid* rrej6n de Ardoz
S p a i n
`ti Gibraltar (U.K.)
Algeria
631706 4-82
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-2
4.Zaragoza
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0SPAIN-US: Tougher Negotiating Position
The Spanish Government, backed by the military, is taking an
increasingly hard Line in its,neaotiations toward a new bilateral
bases agreement with the US.
Chief Spanish negotiator Manueco was unusually blunt
late last week in rejecting US proposals that Madrid
believes would permit the US to use bases for out-of-NATO
activities without Spanish approval. He said the proposed
changes in the basic text would make the entire draft un-
acceptable.
agreement.
Civilian politicians, generally held in low esteem
by the military, feel under considerable pressure to
produce an agreement demonstrably better than the one
/ in force, which was negotiated in the last days of the
Franco regime. Many officials, moreover, seem to believe
that entry into NATO this spring will make Spain less
dependent on the US for military support, thereby reduc-
ing the need to find acceptable compromises on the bases
f any language changes.
Comment: Madrid's tough stance is to some degree
a bargaining tactic. It also reflects, however, genuine
(concern about the conservative military's reaction to
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EC: Budget Dispute Continues
tain the facade of EC unity.
Comment: Despite the UK's desire to maintain fragile
EC unity on sanctions against Argentina, London refuses
to acknowledge any link between sanctions and British
positions on internal EC problems. The Danes and the
Irish believe that London should moderate its rebate
demands in return for EC support on the Falklands crisis,
but most members appear willing to separate the issues.
The French and West Germans even suggested the budget
problem be dropped from the agenda in an attempt to main-
Argentina.
At the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting in Luxembourg
on Tuesday, London continued to block progress on set-
tling the budget and farm price issues. Although the
other nine members reportedly agreed to offer the UK a
three-year rebate on its budget contribution of about
$800 million annually, London is holding out for a
five-year, $1.4 billion annual rebate. Foreign Secre-
tary Pym again refused to lift the UK's block on setting
farm prices in 1982 until the budget problem is resolved.
Pym did not seek additional EC economic measures against
29 April 1982
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FRANCE: Review of Arms Control Policy
arms control.
The Mitterrand government is reviewing its policy toward NATO
consultations on strategic nuclear arms control, hoping to strengthen
its hand in resisting pressure to accept restraints on French nuclear
systems. Specifically, Paris is reconsidering its decision of 1979
not to participate in NATO's Special Consultative Group on INF nego-
tiations. A decision to join the group would tend to reinforce
NATO's stand on INF deployment and to strengthen sentiment among
the West European Allies for a greater say in matters of strategic
v
Paris also is against including French forces in any
ceiling on US systems. The French argue that their wea-
pons are under strict national control and would be used
to pursue unilateral rather than Alliance objectives.
2/ and modernized.
The reassessment stems from concern that France's
nuclear deterrent would be weakened if it were included,
even indirectly, in an INF or START agreement. The
/ French insist that if their comparatively small systems
are to be credible deterrents. they have to be maintained
France is increasingly aware, however, that tolerance
for its position is wearing thin. The French apparently
1 worry that the USSR will become more insistent on limiting
French and UK nuclear deterrents as part of an arms con-
trol agreement with the US. Paris almost certainly is
aware that its growing nuclear arsenal will complicate
the task of Soviet strategic planners after the mid-1980s.
Despite assurances from the US that it will reject
J Soviet efforts to introduce Allied systems into INF nego-
tiations, Paris probably sees an erosion of Allied sup-
port for its position. West Germany believes French and
29 April 1982
Top Secret
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UK systems must eventually be included in INF or START,
a position reflected in the security resolution passed
j at the Social Democratic Party congress last week. Bonn
probably could line up support for its position among
talks.
Moreover, the Mitterrand government may anticipate
problems at home with its "no negotiation" stance.
Although the Socialist Party has supported Mitterrand's
/ opposition to including French forces in strategic arms
,/negotiations, some party officials recently have sug-
gested that France cannot indefinitely advocate arms
control while barring French systems from international
INF negotiations.
Advantages of a Policy Change
These considerations have prompted Paris to rethink
tactics for gaining maximum influence over nuclear arms
control developments. Membership in the SCG is increas-
ingly attractive because it would give Paris a better
J forum to defend its interests in the INF negotiations.
/For example, Paris could argue against premature modifi-
3 cations of the US negotiating posture and resist pressure
in the Alliance to include nuclear-capable aircraft in the
5J covered by the INF talks.
France, in return for joining the SCG, also might
attempt to win US support for changing the SCG mandate
/ to include START as well as INF, or for creating a new
NATO mechanism for START consultations. The Mitterrand
government favors a closer link between INF and START,
arguing that it is artificial and undesirable to separate
the European nuclear balance from the overall strategic
7 relationship between the superpowers. In addition, the
I~ French might see the SCG as a vehicle to express their
concern that the US zero option proposal would leave
Western Europe vulnerable to Soviet nuclear weapons not
3 toward full reintegration with NATO.
If it joined the SCG, the Mitterrand government
would continue to oppose including French forces in the
current round of INF negotiations. It also would take
pains to refute domestic criticism that it was moving
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Implications of French Policy Shift
A decision to join the SCG probably would reinforce
3 Allied cohesion on INF deployment by offsetting the
antinuclear bias of some of the smaller Allies. It also
might increase French willingness to consult on strategic
of US and Soviet systems.
If the French insisted on expanding the NATO con-
sultative process to START, however, their membership
in the SCG could complicate US efforts to limit Allied
influence over US negotiating positions on strategic
3 arms control. Moreover, French participation in NATO
consultations on START would strengthen West European
support for the current ABM treaty. A revised ABM treaty
permitting the expansion of ABM systems would threaten
the credibility of the French deterrent mere than that
Top Secret
29 April 1982
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Top SC\-1 UL
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