NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 15 MARCH 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010051-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: March 15, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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.fLLICF.~ Director of ~ AAA AAYA*
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
15 March 1982
Top Secret
1.) March 1982
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Central America: Guatemalan Opposition Fragmenting . . . .
1
Pakistan: Domestic Troubles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
Western Sahara: Mediation Efforts Falter . . . . . . . . .
4
West Germany: Arms Export Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
Spain: Prospects for Early Elections . . . . . . . . . . .
6
Norway: Natural Gas Development . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
Poland: Church-State Impasse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
Morocco - Western Sahara: Additional Airstrike . . . . . .
9
USSR-Namibia: Soviet Media Commentary . . . . . . . . . .
10
Japan-Caribbean: Aid Initiatives Unlikely . . . . . . . .
10
China-Taiwan: Political Maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . .
11
Special Analysis
USSR: Succession Infighting Intensifies . . . . . . . . .
12
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Top Secret
CENTRAL AMERICA: Guatemalan Opposition Fragmenting
//The postelection coalition of Guatemalan opposition parties
is beginning to break up in the face of the regime's firm stand
and the government-controlled legislature's selection on Saturdau
//Guatemalan rightist candidate Anzueto's withdrawal
of his party from the antigovernment coalition weakens
opposition efforts to force an annulment of the disputed
presidential election.
Guevara and his key supporters are said to be will-
ing to offer posts to Anzueto and centrist candidate
Maldonado, but rightwing leader Sandoval is likely to be
excluded. Sandoval reportedly is hoping the Army will
intervene to set aside the election and form a coalition
government that would include his party. Sandoval's
armed supporters, previously assembled in the capital,
reportedly are beginning to disperse.
Comment: Guevara appears to have outlasted his
opponents and will take office with a minimun of conces-
sions. The chance of a military coup is remote, despite
some pro-Sandoval sentiment within the officer corps.
Sandoval's supporters may engage in sporadic anti-
regime violence unless they are granted additional con-
gressional seats or other government posts. A few
Christian Democrats may .join the new administration, but
many will go,into exile or collaborate with the leftist
guerrillas.
Top Secret
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The current round of unrest in Pakistan does not as yet
threaten President Zia's rule, but arrests yesterday in the capital
of the North-West Frontier Province--which had until now escaped
the recent law-and-order crackdown--indicate that trouble is spread-
ing
Authorities yesterday used tear gas against the mem-
bers of a banned political party that held a demonstra-
tion in Peshawar despite the closing of three universi-
ties in an effort to prevent it. The meeting was called
after the murder last week of a former Province Governor
who was also prominent in the leftist opposition party.
Although his killer is unknown, politicians used the
funeral to make strong antiregime statements.
In Islamabad a college was closed after a student
quarrel led to the death of one student, while in Sind
Province, students protesting alleged police excesses in
in the recent wave of mass arrests joined teachers on
the streets striking for higher wages. Punjab and Sind
Provinces have been the main targets of the arrests un-
Comment: Zia's crackdown may have been motivated
in part by the hope of forestalling a repetition of events
at the same time last year when a wave of student unrest
posed the most serious threat to the regime since Zia
came to power in 1977.
The North-West Frontier Provice--now the home of
the majority of Afghan refugees--has long been difficult
to control, and trouble there could worsen political ten-
sion throughout the country. If the murderer is revealed
to be either rightist or an Afghan--as some in the party
have claimed--then clashes between the left and the right,
or between local residents and Afghan refugees could
break out and easily turn the public against the govern-
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The OAU effort to mediate the dispute over Western Sahara is
in danger of collapse, and any progress toward a negotiated solution
is ZikeZy to depend on secret contacts among the parties to the
dispute.
//Mistrust among the disputants has grown in recent
months, hampering the effort of the already divided OAU
mediation committee. The Algerians, the principal
backers of the Polisario guerrillas, believe that closer
US-Moroccan military ties have encouraged Moroccan
intransigence and opposition to a legitimate referendum.
The Moroccans take a similar view of Algeria's support
for the admission of the Polisario to the recent OAU
ministerial session in Addis Ababa.//
Both the Moroccans and the guerrillas are preparing
for renewed fighting. They are now concentrating, how-
ever, on urging other OAU members to support their
respective positions at the OAU summit scheduled for
early August and are avoiding the onus for causing the
the collapse of the OAU mediation effort.
Comment: //Kenyan President Moi, the OAU chairman,
may not make much additional effort, in view of the
dimming prospects for a political settlement.
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WEST GERMANY: Arms Export Policy
//Social Democratic and Free Democratic parliamentary deputies
have endorsed the Federal Security Council's new guidelines for
arms exports and coproduction projects that the cabinet will use
to draft a new policy later this month.//
//The previous prohibition of exports to "areas of
tension" will be modified to permit such sales when they
are deemed essential for the political and security
interests of West Germany and NATO. A determination of
whether the sale would enhance or detract from the
regional balance of power also will play an important
role.//
//In exchange for granting the government more stat-
utory flexibility, representatives of both coalition
parties had hoped to establish a parliamentary oversight
committee to review proposed sales and joint production
projects with foreign firms. Because of the government's
insistence on retaining sole decisionmaking authority,
however, it is now proposed that parliamentary "consulta-
tion" be limited to having the chairmen of all parlia-
mentary party factions--each accompanied by an expert--
attend security council meetings.//
Comment: //Although the government has succeeded
in loosening statutory restrictions, political considera-
tions are still likely to bind its hands on controversial
sales. Given the coalition's difficulties, the government
probably will postpone decisions on sensitive exports,
such as "s to Saudi Arabia, as long as possible.//
//In the longer term, however, the increased flexi-
bility should lead to greater use of arms sales as a
tool of security and foreign policy. Bonn will hope
that Washington will view increased sales of West German
arms to Southwest Asia as evidence of a West German
contribution to that region's stability. West German
armaments manufacturers will now see some prospect for
offsetting anticipated cutbacks in equipment procurement
for the armed forces.//
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SPAIN: Prospects for Early Elections
//Prime Minister Calvo SoteZo's authority is threatened by
incipient defections from his party, making it unlikely that he can
delay elections until his nominal mandate expires next March.//
//Defections from government ranks in parliament by
members of the ruling Union of the Democratic Center
party since last November have already significantly
reduced the party's plurality. Defections in theme
two months could make its position untenable.//
Comment: //The fragility of Calvo Sotelo's hold on
government was demonstrated earlier this week when the
Union lost a vote on the Valencian autonomy statute,
one which all concerned agreed was not a confidence
vote. The outcome calls into question the government's
ability to deal with several controversial bills that
are impending, particularly if Suarez follows through on
his plans.//
//The current system of temporary alliances on spe-
cific legislation will be more difficult to maintain as
opposition parties sense the government is losing control.
It is likely to encounter increasing pressure to go to
the polls by mid spring.//
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NORWAY: Natural Gas Development
//The Norwegians have been reluctant to increase
their oil and gas production in order to avoid disrupting
their domestic economy. This has led them to place
ceilings on oil and gas production. The current soft oil
market, however, has already reduced the government's
projected revenues for the next four years from $28 bil-
lion to $15 billion, which may cause Oslo to accelerate
both gas and oil production.//
Comment: //An accelerated development program would
enable Norway by the mid-1990s to offer the West Europeans
30-40 billion cubic meters of gas annually--roughly the
amount to be supplied by the Soviet pipeline. Norway
might be able to supply an additional 10-15 billion cubic
meters annually by as early as 1990.//
//The Norwegian gas would be in addition to the So-
viet gas and could help the Europeans keep their purchases
of Soviet gas to the agreed minimum if they chose to do
so. To compete with Soviet gas exports, however, Norway
will need to become more flexible on pricing.//
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POLAND: Church-State Impasse
According to the Western press, Archbishop Glemp
yesterday made his strongest public statement to date
supporting the release of Lech Walesa and other internees
and the resumption of a national dialogue. The Primate
celebrated Mass in a working-class district of Warsaw
that is a Solidarity stronghold and then addressed a
crowd of 20,000, which he called the largest audience
to congregate since the imposition of martial law.
Meanwhile, a key negotiator in Church-State talks re-
cently told US Embassy officials that the regime has
not responded to the Polish bishops' communique two
weeks ago that had urged a resumption of the government's
dialogue with Solidarity. He stressed that the Church
had done all it could as a mediator.
Comment: Glemp's remarks--even though not combative--
reflect his own growing frustration at the current stale-
mate, as well as the need to respond to public unhappi-
ness at his seemingly ambiguous position on these issues.
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by the recent bombings.//
//After an unsuccessful airstrike earlier this month
against a major Polisario camp in Western Sahara, last
week the Moroccan Air Force launched at least one
additional attack. More than 13 buildings were damaged
may have served as their forward headquarters.
cated installation associated with guerrilla forces and
Comment: //The Polisario camp is the most sophisti-
The impact of the airstrike on guerrilla
capabilities, therefore, probably was minimal.//
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USSR-NAMIBIA: Soviet Media Commentary
The Soviets are now insisting in public that a
Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola can be considered only
after a settlement and a South African troop withdrawal
from Namibia. Izvestia claimed last week that "there are
no legal grounds" for linking the two issues and accused
the US of raising the Cuban troop issue to delay a deci-
sion and thus shift the blame on the USSR for not resolv-
Izvestia also charged US and South A rica
with pressing the Frontline States to accept the West-
ern position.
Comment: The tougher public line follows a recent
meeting of leaders of the Frontline States, the South-
West Africa People's Organization, and the African
National Council that apparently adopted a stronger posi-
tion on dealing with South Africa.
JAPAN-CARIBBEAN: Aid Initiatives Unlikely
Officials in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
recently told the US Embassy that Foreign Minister
Sakurauchi will bring no specific commitments on aid to
the Caribbean when he visits Washington this week.
Although the Foreign Ministry hopes to identify new aid
projects by June, it still does not expect any substantial
increase in aid to the region. In addition, the Ministry
believes the area's instability and marginal commercial
interest hurt the prospects for increased trade and
investment by Japanese business.
Comment: Japan has only peripheral economic and
foreign policy interests in the Caribbean. To the extent
Tokyo does increase aid to the region, it will be motivated
by a desire to,deflect US pressure on the trade and de-
fense issues.
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CHINA-TAIWAN: Political Maneuvering
Beijing's announcement that it will not attend the
softball tournament in Taipei in July if Taiwan's flag
is flown underscores its belief that the question of
sovereignty over Taiwan is more important than any propa-
ganda benefit that might be derived from the games.
China states that Taiwan, as a province of China, has no
"national flag." Moreover, the Chinese-controlled press
in Hong Kong has criticized the US for what it calls
interference in the preparations for the tournament,
claiming that Washington wants to create "two Chinas"
in order to facilitate arms sales to Taiwan. China now
wants the tournament site moved.
Comment: Although the Chinese orginally regarded
the tournament as a means of demonstrating success in
increasing direct contacts with Taiwan--and a prelude to
reunification. They now apparently believe that partici-
pation under Taiwan's flag might be construed to be a
tacit acknowledgement of Taiwan's independent status.
Taiwan probably intended to portray the Chinese partici-
pation in exactly this way, and--as the host country--
will continue to insist on its right to fly its flag.
At this point, the prospect that China will send a team
to Taipei is remote.
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USSR: Succession Infighting Intensifies
President Brezhnev, in the aftermath of senior party secretary
Suslov's death, moved decisively to signal his preference in the
succession sweepstakes for his friend and protege, Politburo member
Chernenko. Some behind-the-scenes opposition has developed to
Brezhnev's actions, but this sniping poses little threat to his
position. The attacks, however, indicate that succession maneuver-
ing is likely to intensify in coming months and increasingly will
preoccupy the Soviet leaders.
Following Suslov's death, Brezhnev moved quickly to
place Chernenko, and not his chief succession rival and
long-time party secretary Kirilenko, in Suslov's posi-
tion as the party's unofficial second secretary. Brezhnev
vaulted Chernenko over his rival in the leadership pro-
tocol rankings and gave him some of Suslov's duties.
For example, the President included Chernenko in the
delegation that met with Polish officials and chose him
as head of the group attending the French Communist
Party congress.
Without these decisive moves, Kirilenko's strength
in the party probably would have resulted in his becoming
"second secretary." Given Brezhnev's failing health--
b-the poor performance of the Soviet economy,
and the mixed results of his policy abroad, he probably
felt such an accumulation of power in Kirilenko's hands
would be dangerous. On the other hand, pushing Chernenko
into this position did not carry such a risk because
Chernenko is Brezhnev's protege and lacks the power to
act independently of the Soviet leader.
Brezhnev's intrigues and his declining health have
apparently inspired some opposition. An anticorruption
campaign sponsored by Chernenko is being used to embarrass
both Chernenko and Brezhnev.
Top Secret
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Rumors have been planted with Western correspondents
linking Brezhnev's children to corruption scandals, and
hints have surfaced that Brezhnev is at odds with some
officials in the KGB over protecting his family. In ad-
dition, some unflattering articles have appeared in the
Soviet press that can be read as thinly veiled attacks
on Brezhnev.
This sniping is probably troublesome and embarrass-
ing to Brezhnev, but it is not particularly threatening.
Such attacks, in fact, are risky and may reflect the des-
peration of those who oppose Brezhnev's recent moves.
Brezhnev has clearly demonstrated that he still
controls events. He has strengthened Chernenko's posi-
tion, attacked Kirilenko's, and made some key personnel
changes. For example, he promoted a crony to the key
post of first deputy chairman of the KGB, a move that
belies the image that he is having difficulty with this
organization. He also removed the trade union chief, who
may have been supported by Suslov and Kirilenko, and re-
placed him with an official indirectly criticized by
Kirilenko earlier.
Infighting Will Intensify
Whether Brezhnev intended it or not, his recent
actions have put the succession at the top of the leader-
ship's agenda. The coming plenum of the Central Committee--
probably to be held within the next several months--
could produce significant. personnel changes.
Chernenko, despite his recent success, does not
have a lock on the succession. Having been a staff man
for most of his career, he does not have the kind of exec-
utive experience that past party leaders have had.
While Chernenko will attempt to improve his position fur-
ther, it is unlikely that Brezhnev will name him as heir
apparent. Brezhnev may believe that Chernenko would pro-
tect his historical legacy, but he is well aware that
conferring such power on even a friend could endanger
his own position.
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With Brezhnev gone, Chernenko's rivals, Kirilenko
particularly, could probably defeat him unless he obtains
additional help. Despite Kirilenko's current difficulties,
he remains a formidable opponent if he can hang on. He
has considerable experience as a party manager and in
the past has acted for Brezhnev during his vacations
and illnesses.
As an original member of the group that replaced
Khrushchev, Kirilenko has had considerable opportunity to
build a client network that would serve him well in a
succession struggle. Even if he falters, other more jun-
ior leaders such as Moscow party boss Grishin are likely
to contest Chernenko's claim.
While Brezhnev remains on the scene, this infighting
is not likely to lead to significant policy changes.
The debate over policy, nonetheless, will probably heat
up, and some signs of dissension have already appeared.
A change in investment strategy probably favored by
Kirilenko was openly advocated in a recent Pravda article.
Those who oppose Brezhnev's political maneuvering
may try to raise other issues in an attempt to put him
on the defensive and complicate his political strategy.
Brezhnev will work to keep policy on its current track,
thereby avoiding the political risks that advocacy of
major changes would entail.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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