NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 16 FEBRUARY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010148-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 148
• Publication Date: February 16, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Ton Secret
Central
Intelligence
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Poland: Pressure on the Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Spain: Trial of Coup Plotters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Egypt-USSR: Status of Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Syria: Fighting in Hamah Continuing . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Arab States: Foreign Ministers' Conference Ends . . . . . 5
Zimbabwe: Mugabe Threatens Nkomo . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Namibia: Moderate Black Leader Resigns . . . . . . . . . . 6
Thailand-Burma: Impact of Antinarcotics Operations . . . . 7
Netherlands: Surveys for Cruise Missile Sites . . . . . . 7
Suriname: Military Consolidates Power . . . . . . . . . . 8
China: Industrial Targets for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Special Analysis
South Africa: Foreign and Domestic Policy Pressures . . . 9
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Top Secret
The government is increasing pressure on the Church to help
stem the rising level of popular resistance. Party hardliners,
meanwhiZe, may seek to oust moderates at the Central Committee
session scheduled for this weekend, and the government is urging
some internees to emigrate.
Polish media yesterday criticized some members of
the clergy for making "provocative statements" that will
further encourage the "extremist minority," presumably
such as the youthful demonstrators on Saturday in Poznan.
The media also are blaming radicals in Solidarity for
inciting a "bloody civil war," and for giving prominence
to alleged terrorist incidents, such as the discovery of
a homemade time bomb at a gas station in Lublin.
Comment: The rare public criticism by the regime
of the Church may have been prompted by the activities
of some priests who are student advisers at the universi-
ties and who in the past were militant supporters of the
independent student association. By playing on Archbishop
Glemp's fear of a breakdown in social order that will re-
sult in civil war, the authorities might hope that the
Church leadership will exert greater discipline over
local clergy.
The demonstration in Poznan apparently was the first
protest to occur there since the imposition of martial
law, and students at the newly reopened universities
seemed to be the driving force. The conspicuous presence
of military and police patrols during the past few days
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in other major cities probably intimidated many would-be
demonstrators. For example, the local authorities in
Gdansk yesterday claimed there had been no demonstrations
and announced some easing of martial law restrictions.
Central Committee Meeting 25X1
A high-ranking Polish party official recently told
US Embassy officers that party hardliners will try to
oust moderates at the next Central Committee session,
tentatively scheduled for this weekend. The hardliners
will seek to reduce Premier Jaruzelskias authority, but
the official expects them to be defeated overwhelmingly.
Comment: The long-delayed Central Committee session
is not likely to settle the intraparty strife, but
Jaruzelski, who at this point is immune to attacks from
hardliners, will probably orchestrate a meeting that em-
phasizes party unity. The contest between hardliners
and moderates will continue at the local level and in
the party apparatus for an indefinite period, giving
greater influence in the regime to the military.
Emigration for Internees
Press reports, citing Western diplomats, indicate
that the regime has begun implementing its announced
policy of offering emigration to internees who request
it. The authorities reportedly have threatened renewed
prison terms for released internees who do not leave.
Comment: The regime probably prefers to force mili-
tant intellectuals and Solidarity activists to leave the
country rather than risk more domestic resistance. The
closing of the internment camps also will eliminate a
major source of international criticism of the government.
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SPAIN: Trial of Coup Plotters
//The trial opening this week of rightists accused in the coup
attempt a year ago could pose the severest challenge to democracy
in Spain since that event.//
//A military court will begin on Friday to try the
32 officers and one civilian. Prosecutors have asked
30-year sentences for three accused ringleaders--General
Armada, General Milans del Bosch, and Lieutenant Colonel
Te-jero--and much lighter sentences for most of the others.//
25X1
//The trial will be held in a volatile political at-
mosphere. Disarray in the governing Center Democratic
Union Party has raised the possibility of early elections
that could produce a Socialist overnment--anathema to
many rightists in the military.
Comment: //Much of the military is disenchanted with
the government, but only a small minority has directly
challenged it so far. The trial could weaken the resolve
of the majority to stand in the way of the radicals,
particularly if press coverage makes it appear that the
military as a whole is being tried. Rough treatment for
the highly respected Armada and Milans del Bosch also
could make tempers flare.//
//The trial, moreover, may weaken King Juan Carlos's
ability to restrain the military. Defense assertions
that the plotters thought that they had the King's tacit
consent could imply betrayal by Juan Carlos, who moved
forcefully and publicly against the plotters after the
attempt was under way. Such charges would be especially
damaging because the King had long been close to Armada.//
//The government probably will be able to contain
these challenges. Although the government and its par-
liamentary opposition both want verdicts that would dis-
courage other disgruntled officers, they may try to limit
military unhappiness through private assurances of good
treatment and early pardons for those convicted. The
sensitivity to military concerns shown by the government
over the past year, combined with recent top-level per-
sonnel changes, will help the government keep ahead of
discontent.//
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President Mubarak is making a careful and measured effort to
improve the tone of relations with the USSR, but a significant up-
grading of ties is unlikely.
Mubarak has curtailed public criticism of the USSR
and indicated a willingness to renew some ties as long
as they provide economic benefits and Moscow understands
that it will have to respect Egyptian sovereignty. The
recent announcement of the temporary return of 60 Soviet
specialists out of the group of several hundred expelled
from Egypt last September was primarily motivated b
Although Mubarak is personally hostile to the Soviets,
there are several important constituencies in Egypt that 25X1
favor improved bilateral ties. Some Foreign Ministry
officials are worried that Egypt's reliance on the US
damages Cairo's nonaligned credentials. 25X1
Opposition leaders charge that the government's
pro-US policies unnecessarily involve the country in
superpower tensions. Some military personnel would like
to regain access to Soviet weapons and spare parts, but
few would favor a return to the close ties that existed
in the early 1970s.
ing in Cairo.
Comment: The thaw in Soviet-Egyptian relations is
likely to be gradual and limited. Egypt's desire to
strengthen its nonaligned image, however, could lead
Mubarak to appoint a new ambassador to fill the vacant
post in Moscow later this year. The Soviets, meanwhile,
probably will play on Egypt's need for economic assistance
and military spare parts in order to improve their stand-
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SYRIA: Fighting in Hamah Continuing
quarter of the city continued yesterday.
//Syrian forces are conducting mopping-up operations
aaai.nst dissidents in Hamah, where resistance in the old
A sympathy strike called in the northern
forced shops and businesses to open.//
city of Aleppo reportedly was ended on Sunday when troops
//Although the government has issued statements that
the operation against the dissidents was over, continued
fighting forced Damascus to cancel a planned trip by
journalists to Hamah on Sunday. The road through the
city, also scheduled to open on Sunday, was still closed
yesterday.//
ARAB STATES: Foreign Ministers' Conference Ends
The Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference in. Tunis
ended. on Saturday with Syria unable to persuade the
participants to adopt sanctions against the US. The
meeting called to forge a common policy on Israel's
annexation of the Golan Heights, was able to agree only
on a commitment to work for Israel's expulsion from the
UN and the formation of a ministerial-level committee to
reevaluate relations between Israel's supporters and the
Arabs. The committee will submit its recommendations to
the next Arab summit meeting.
Comment: The final statement of the conference in-
cluded anti-US rhetoric, but Arab moderates, led by Saudi
Arabia, opposed more concrete anti-US moves. The Saudis
apparently were also responsible for the deletion from
the final statement of a call for closer relations with
"socialist" states.
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ZIMBABWE: Mugabe Threatens Nkomo
Prime Minister Mugabe on Saturday threatened to take
harsh actions against his coalition partner Joshua Nkomo
over the recent discovery of several secret arms caches
belonging to Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union.
In his most bitter attack to date, Mugabe accused Nkomo
of personal disloyalty to the government. Nkomo so far
has not responded to the charges but is calling an emer-
gency meeting of his party's executive committee to dis-
cuss the matter.
Comment: Relations between Mugabe and Nkomo have
been deteriorating steadily in recent months, and the
government has accused some ZAPU members of collaborating
with South Africa and whites in Zimbabwe in subversive
activities. Mugabe probably believes that the discovery
of the arms caches offers him the opportunity to force
Nkomo into choosing beween continued participation in
the government or cracking down on ZAPU malcontents. The
government probably will decide today what action to take
at its scheduled cabinet meeting. At a minimum, Mugabe
will demand that Nkomo and the other four ZAPU cabinet
members reaffirm their loyalty to the government, but
hardliners within Mugabe's party will argue for measures
that could destroy the coalition.
NAMIBIA: Moderate Black Leader Resigns
The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the multiracial
coalition that is principal political opponent in Namibia,
of the South-West Africa People's organization, yesterday
lost its most important black leader with the resignation
of Peter Kalangula. Kalangula, the DTA's president, also
withdrew his Namibia Democratic Party from the coalition.
Kalangula's party competes with SWAPO for support among
the Ovambos, Namibia's largest black tribe which accounts
for almost 50 percent of the territory's population.
Comment: Kalangula had become increasingly dis-
satisfied recently with the policies of the DTA's white
chairman, Dirk Mudge. Kalangula's departure is a serious
blow to the South African - backed DTA's chances in inde-
pendence elections and will further harden Pretoria's
bargaining positions in the current Namibian negotiations.
South Africa realizes that the DTA's electoral fortunes
depended in large part on gaining the support of those
blacks who opposed SWAPO and considered Kalangula a
legitimate black spokesman.
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THAILAND-BURMA: Impact of Antinarcotics Operations
//Government military operations under way in the
Thai corner of the Golden Triangle against the Shan
United Army are causing some disruption to drug process-
ing and trafficking. Last year, the Shan United Army
controlled 50 to 60 percent of the narcotics trafficking
in the Golden Triangle and was the principal heroin ex--
per_ter. Heroin from that region accounted for 15 percent
of the heroin smuggled into the US in 1980. A considerable
number of opium refineries are located near the region
occupied by the Thai Army but on the Burmese side of the
border.// 25X1
Comment: //The Thai action will have little impact
on raw opium production, most of which occurs in. Burma,
away from the border region. Production this year is
likely to be about 600 tons, the same as in 1981. Even
an extended Thai occupation would probably have little
effect on heroin exports from the Golden Triangle, how.-
ever, because the lucrative nature of the drug trade
will. provide a strong incentive for the Shan United Army
or other grou s to revive the operations at a safer
location.// 25X1
NETHERLANDS: Surveys for Cruise Missile Sites
//Defense Minister van Mierlo last week read a state-
ment: into the parliamentary record--agreed to by all three
coalition parties--to prepare the way for surveys of cruise
missile sites in the Netherlands. He emphasized the purely
technical and legal nature of the decision on basing, and
the opposition Liberals promised not to make an issue of
it. Antinuclear leftists, arentl caught off guard,
had little reaction.// 25X1
Comment: //The government's statement, intended pr=i_--'
marily to demonstrate that the Netherlands is a good ally,
is not likely to remain unchallenged for long. When it
becomes public or when surveys actually begin, antinuclear
forces almost certainly will mount a major campaign to
halt any preparations for basing. Pressure will be most
intense from the large number of antinuclear groups, the
Labor Party, and van Mierlo's own Democrats '66 Party,
which is badly split on the issue. The pressure is
likely to be strong enough to force a "postponement" of
further preparations pending the outcome of the talks in
Geneva.//
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SURINAME: Military Consolidates Power
Army strongman Bouterse has announced plans for the
rapid installation of a new and completely restructured
government. He has appointed an Acting President, stated
that a new cabinet will be named soon, and indicated that
he will not tolerate factionalism.
country's shrinking budget resources.
evaporate as unions push to gain a greater share of the
Comment: Bouterse's actions will help consolidate
the power of the left-leaning military clique and will
muzzle dissent within the government. Nevertheless, the
moves are likely to produce greater polarization and in-
creased opposition from conservative elements, including
those in the Army. Current labor support, moreover, may
CHINA: Industrial Targets for 1982
Early projections from the State Economic Commission
call for an industrial growth rate of 4 to 5 percent in
1982. Light industry is scheduled to rise by 7 to 9
percent and heavy industry by 1 percent. Overall indus-
trial expansion last year was 4 percent, with a 13.6-
percent growth in light industry offsetting a 4.5-percent
decline in heavy industry.
Comment: The Chinese should have no trouble meeting
their targets. Heavy industrial production began to
pick up late last year, after the earlier decline led
to minor policy changes. Light industry--which produces
mostly consumer goods--continues to receive top priority.
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SOUTH AFRICA: Foreign and Domestic Policy Pressures
The South African Government this year will be particularly
sensitive to the domestic impact of its foreign policy decisions.
Pretoria will negotiate more cautiously on Namibia because of a
growing conservative trend in the ruling National Party, which
followed the unprecedented defections of Afrikaner voters to the
far right in the general election last April. In addition, the
conservative backlash and the current economic recession in South 25X1
E.frica virtually eliminate the possibility of significant racial
reform and increase the chances for racial unrest.
Namibia has the potential for intensifying the
ricfhtwing backlash to Prime Minister Botha's efforts at
limited racial reform, but the far right has not yet
made government cooperation in the Western-sponsored
necfctiations on Namibia a major issue. Botha is aware,
however, that heated debate over security issues in the
next phase of the settlement process would leave his
government open to charges of abandoning the interests
of whites and could strengthen the ri htwin arties at 25X1
the expense of the National Party. ~ 7
Botha's concern will reinforce his already tough
negotiating stance on Namibia. The government is likely
to demand a limited role for the UN during the transition
period and guarantees that an independent Namibia will
nod: be host to either black insurgents or their Communist
backers. Pretoria also will insist on a Cuban withdrawal
from Angola as a prerequisite for any settlement on
Namibia. 25X1
The government's recent tough rhetoric on Namibia
appears aimed at creating a domestic consensus that it
could point to in pushing its demands. It also is part
of an effort to attract disaffected Afrikaner voters back
--o the National Party. Pretoria's strategy, however,
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could limit its future flexibility in-the negotiations
as well as give the far right ammunition to counter gov-
ernment efforts to sell an eventual settlement to the
white electorate.
The government also will be reluctant to push for
racial reform because of mounting economic problems.
Real economic growth dropped from a record 8 percent in
1980 to about 5 percent in 1981 and probably will fall
below 3 percent this year.
External economic factors are largely to blame for
the decline. Rising US interest rates prompted interna-
tional currency traders to turn from gold--South Africa's
major export--to the US dollar after the middle of 1980.
Gold prices declined steeply last year, cutting foreign
exchange revenues by about $3.5 billion. Nongold exports
also lagged, reflecting reduced demand because of economic
recession in major western countries. 25X1
Pretoria probably realizes that the economic slow-
down further reduces the tolerance for racial change
among working-class whites, who feel threatened by black
labor and resent government spending on black social
welfare. Many of these same whites defected from the
National Party to the far right in the elections last
April. Moreover, lower growth rates will ease the skilled
labor shortage and reduce the drive among South African
businessmen to eliminate many restrictions on black 25X1
The government will be less inclined to increase
spending on black education and housing. The budget last
year had been increased 51 percent for black education
and 10 percent for housing. A major reduction of profits
in the gold mining industry, however, have cut government
revenues, making similar increases unlikely in the budget
to be presented to Parliament in March.
Black frustrations will rise as government social
and economic programs aimed at blacks lose momentum. The
already economically depressed eastern area of Cape Prov-
ince--which has a highly politicized black population--
probably will become a major trouble spot.
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Top Secret
Pretoria's current emphasis on repressive security
measures to control black political and labor union
activities is designed to head off unrest but may only
precipitate it. The government detained over 600 indi-
viduals for political or security reasons last year,
including about 300 trade unionists. Some of these de- 25X1
tainees will be tried during the next few months, and
their trials could create public outbursts.
The reluctance to proceed with even limited racial
reforms is helping to discredit moderate black leaders
willing to cooperate with the government. The main
beneficiary of this trend is the Soviet-backed African
National Congress, which is gaining more political
support or its terrorist campaign from South African
blacks.
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