SOME PERSPECTIVES ON THE PIPELINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00109R000100110037-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: February 10, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
10 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Maurice C. Ernst
NIO for Economics
SUBJECT: Some Perspectives on the Pipeline
lac-'~~v
1. The insistence on precise estimates of how much US sanctions could
delay completion of the Yamal pipeline indicates a lack of perspective
concerning Soviet capabilities and options in gas pipeline construction.
Specific estimates of delays are feasible only when comparing technical
options involving specific sources of equipment (for example, producing GE
rotors in France instead of the United States). In practice Moscow is
likely to use a variety of technical options and Western sources of
equipment unless the latter are all shut off. This flexibility would
presumably mean smaller delays than would occur if only one technical
option were involved.
2. Even if Moscow had no access to Western compressors, there is no
question that it would be able to make adjustments in domestic production
and in its pipeline construction plans. Consider the following:
o The USSR builds more long distance gas pipelines than the rest
of the world put together; the Yamal line is only one of six planned
for construction during 1981-85.
o Although the Soviets have found their own compressors to be less
satisfactory than some of those built in the West, their compressors do
work and may be improving. Since 1978, most Soviet long distance lines
have used Soviet-built 10 Megawatt .compressors. The existing line to
Western Europe uses Soviet as well as some Western compressors of this
size.
o Moscow has been developing a 25 Megawatt compressor. It hopes
to get Western help, but does not lack technical capability. The USSR
is among the world leaders in electric power generation and builds
large numbers of effective and reliable, if not efficient, jet
engines. There is every reason to believe that the Soviets could
develop an adequate large compressor without Western help. It might
take more maintenance and use more fuel, but that is characteristic of
most Soviet equipment.
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SECRET
o The GE compressors on which so much is being written are
characterized as including "1950's technology." What the Soviets like
is their proven track record and reliability, but that doesn't mean
someti~ing else won't do.
3. Even if they have to go it alone, the Soviets almost certainly
will build pipelines to expand gas exports to Western Europe. They realize
they badly need the hard currency. If they build the Yamal pipeline with
their own compressors, there would be greater gas consumption to run the
pipeline, and therefore slightly smaller gas sales to Western Europe. The
foregone earnings, however, are not massive except when cumulated over many
,years. Completion of such a pipeline need not be delayed if Moscow gives
it a very high priority. Some domestic pipelines might be delayed, but
perhaps not much since it seems reasonable to expect domestic compressor
production to be accelerated beyond planned level.
4. Even if there were substantial delays, Moscow could partially
bridge the gap using new domestic pipelines for most of the distance to
Western markets.
5. If Moscow could not buy Western compressors, it would still be
dependent on Western suppliers for a great deal of pipe. However, France
and Italy, which are large potential suppliers of compressors but not pipe,
might find buying Soviet gas less attractive. The principal potential
attraction of Soviet gas for these countries would then shift from larger
export sales to low gas prices. There is little question that Soviet gas
is potentially the cheapest source of large amounts of new gas for Western
Europe. The cost of producing and transporting Algerian gas is probably
less, but Algerian reserves are far smaller than Soviet reserves. Norway
has the reserves to supply substantial amounts of new gas in the 1990s, but
I suspect that much of the new Norwegian gas would be more expensive to
transport than Soviet gas. Consequently, if the West Europeans want to
ensure long term supplies of gas at prices low enough to compete with oil
in widespread industrial uses, they probably must go to the Soviet Union.
This key selling point for Soviet gas will remain even if there are no tied
exports of equipment. Even so, French and Italian government enthusiasm
for the pipeline might weaken considerably, especially in the face of
political criticism.
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Ananalytic Framework
(1) Baseline assessment: Soviet capabilities without sanctions:
Best case
-- Baseline against which other assessments are to be measured
-- Need to determine:
-- Can contracted gas be delivered by 1984?
-- When can 1st leg be completed--84? --86?
-- when can full flow be expected?
-- What would be specific bottleneck--
-- construction? turbines?
(2) Worst case: What can Soviets do in "absence" of Western technology
-- Assumes deliveries of pipe
-- Assumes availability of certain components which cannot be
effectively controlled such as valves.
-- Need to determine:
-- How dates for completion would differ from baseline case
-- How flow would differ
-- Would bottlenecks be the same or different
-- What are Soviet abilities for:
Turbines
Compressors
Pipe layers
Construction & Engineering
-- Impact on domestic plans
(3) Current situation
-- How would current restrictions affect pipeline vis-a-vis
baseline case
(4) What if only 10 Megawatt turbines were available from the West --
other factors being equal.
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Ananalytic Framework
(1) Baseline assessment: Soviet capabilities without sanctions?
pest case
-- Baseline against which other assessments are to be measured
-- Need to determine:
-- Can contracted gas be delivered by 1984?
-- 4Jhen can 1st leg be completed--84? --86?
-- when can full flow be expected?
What would be specific bottleneck--
-- construction? turbines?
(2) Worst case: What can Soviets do in "absence" of Western technology
-- Assumes deliveries of pipe
-- Assumes availability o.f certain components which cannot be
effectively controlled such as valves.
- Need to determine:
-- Now dates for completion would differ from baseline case
-- How flow would differ
Would bottlenecks be the same or different
(3)
-- What are Soviet abilities for:
Turbines
Compressors
Pipe layers
Construction & Engineering
-- Impact on domestic plans
Current situation
-- How would current restrictions affect pipeline vis-a-vis
baseline case
(4) 4Jhat if only 10 Megawatt turbines were available from the UJest --
other factors being equal.
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Figure 1
USSR: Production of Major Fuels
N tural Gas
Oil
Coal _
Billion M~
-~mtoe
AARG1
_
Million tons
AAR~
Million tons AARG1
1960
45.3
38.1
147.9
509.6
23.0
10.4
2.5
1965
127.7
105.0
242.9
577.7
9.2
7.8
1.6
1970
197.9
165.4
353.0
624.1
7.9
6.8
2.4
1975
289.3
239.7
603.2
701.3
8.5
4.2
0.4
1980
435.2
360.6
503.2
716.4
7.7
0.8
1.6
1985
Plan
630.0
522.0
630.0
775.0
1 Average annual rate of growth calculated from unrounded numbers. Narkhoz 1980
pp> 156-7.
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Figure 2
Soviet Natural Gas Trunklines of 1,420 mm. Diameter
Completed Through 1980:
Total Length 17,050 Kilometers
(See accompanying map)
Northern Route
Length (Km~
Medvezh'ye-Punga-Ukhta-Torzhok-Minsk
3,100
Central Route
Urengoy - Punga - Nizhnyaya-Tura - Perm - Kazan
2,100
Urengoy - Punga -Nizhnyaya-Tura - Perm
1,520
Southern Route
Urengoy-Vyngapur-Chelyabinsk-Petrovsk-Novopskov
3,380
Urengoy-Vyngapur-Chelyabinsk
1,70
"Soyuz"
Orenburg-Aleksandrov Gay-Novopskov-Uzhgorod
2,750
Central Asia-Center
Shatlyk-Beyneu-Alexandrov Gay-Ostrogozhsk
2,500
1 7 ,~5~
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Aleksandrov Gay
Soyuz prenburg
C~
m
Aral
Sea
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Figure 3
Soviet Natural Gas Trunklines of 1,420 mm.
Diameter Included in Plan for 1981-85:
Total Length, 20,000 Kilometers*
(See accompanying map)
Northern Route Length_(Km~
Urengoy-Punga-Ukhta-Gryazovets-Moscow**
2,800
Gryazovets-Torzhok-Minsk-Ivatsevichi
1,300
Central Route
Kazan-Petrovsk-Novopskov
1,100
Perm-Kazan-Petrovsk-Novopskov
1,650
Urengoy - Nizhnyaya-Tura - Yelets - Kursk
3,500
Urengoy - Nizhnyaya-Tura - Petrovsk - Uzhgorod***
4,650
Southern Route
Chelyabinsk-Petrovsk-Novopskov
1,700
Subtotal
1.6,700
Plus allowance for terrain adjustments, cap-
ital repairs and unspecified construction
3,300
20,00
* During the past year, Soviet journals have been inconsistent
in their discussion of pipeline routes and distances. The
routes shown here must therefore be considered as provisional.
** The Urengoy-Gryazovets-Moscow Ring line was completed in
February 1981, and was claimed as the first of seven lines
planned for completion in the Eleventh FYP. Subsequent plans
refer to the remaining six line.
*** This is the so-called "export pipeline." An alternative
alignment discussed in Soviet publications is Urengoy-Chelybinsk-
Petrovsk-Uzhgorod along the the Southern Route, some ?~0 km.
1 onger.
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~` ~ , ~ 5
Routes shown should tre
considered as provisional.
800 Kilometers
600 Miles
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Figure 4
USSR: Progress of the Gas Trunkline System
1965
41.8
1970
67.5
1975
98.8
1980
132
1985 Plan
180
Length Com ressor Station Power
,000Tc~ _-- ,0~0 M~,----
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Figure 5
Gas Pipeline Compression and Throughput
Natural Gas Pipeline Characteristics
Diameter Pressur~ 1 Throughput Ca~acit
~Mi limeters~ Inches) ~K~m ) bi lion m %yrj~
1020
40
55
8.5
1020
40
75
12.0
1020
40
100
17.0
1220
48
55
13.5
1220
48
75
19.0
1220
48
100
27.0
1420
56
55
20.0
1420
56
75
29.0
1420
56
100
41.0
1 Kg/cm2 is roughly equivalent to "atmosphere."
Nonlinear Relation Between Compressor Power and Throughput
Compressor-drive Power
(Percent of Maximum)
Throughput
(Percent of Designed Capacity)
8
50
15
60
27
70
44
80
67
90
1(10
10 0
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Ivatsevichi
zhgorod Minsk
Export pipeline pnep~
Nizhnyaya
Tura
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