SOVIET GAS PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00109R000100090003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 2, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP84TO0109R000100090003-9
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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DCI
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DIA review completed.
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'SAT
 1_In !
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? THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ?
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Soviet gas pipeline construction (U)
(U) This is in reply to your 29 January 1982 Memorandum concerning
Soviet gas pipeline construction. The Defense Intelligence Agency
agrees in substance with the Central Intelligence Agency draft
assessment, but has some reservations, especially with paragraphs 4
and 5 of the assessment. These reservations are based on the
following assessments that DIA has made on the status of Soviet gas
pipeline construction.
a. (S) The USSR is planning to construct six pipelines during
the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981-86); of these, two are nearing
completion and a third is probably already under construction.
Since two of the lines are already basically completed and a third
has been started, the turbine requirements are not considered as
great as suggested in paragraph 4. In addition, the Soviet's
outstanding pipelaying capability is demonstrated by the fact that
the two lines that are already basically completed were begun only
two years ago. The two completed lines are large-diameter pipe,
and are each 3,000 to 3,400 kilometers in length. One of the two
lines is scheduled to be extended- into Eastern Europe this year.
Furthermore, this line could readily be extended to Western Europe
and, in effect, be considered the "Yamburg line." It should also
be noted that the USSR plans to construct all but one of the six
pipelines using, for the most part, their own equipment. Accord-
ingly, the Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that a complete
Western embargo would, at most, delay completion of one or two of
the six pipelines planned for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan but not
necessarily the "Yamburg line."
b. (S) The Defense Intelligence Agency is presently examining
the existing gas lines and compressor stations out of West Siberia
to Chelyabinsk, and this research confirms that a large number of
small compressor units is being used, although there is also a
number of stations with units over 15 megawatts. Out of the 58
compressor stations in the two pipeline corridors, 48 have Soviet
equipment; seven contain Coberrow (Cooper Rolls-Royce units) and
three have not been identified. The Coberrow-units are of 12 mega-
watts and represent 12 percent of the total capacity. The Soviet
Cia'ssilied by Mn It i p 1 Si wi r ~ Pc
Declassify on
Review on- 2 February 2002
See Def Cent Rr.
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0
equipment consists of 345 turbine units with 225 under 10 megawatts
in size. The Soviets are capable of constructing 6, 11, 15, and 22
megawatt units. Reportedly a 25 megawatt unit has been tested and
serial production-was to have begun in 1981. This data should be
considered with reference to a reevaluation of paragraph 5.
c. (S) The Defense Intelligence Agency concurs with the
Central Intelligence Agency statements on aircraft engine produc-
tion and availability. It is agreed, however, that there is
considerable uncertainty as to production levels and plant
capacities for aircraft engines, and almost no hard information is
available concerning these aspects of the industrial turbine
industry, especially over the next few years. Acknowledging these
limitations, it is considered that the Soviets could, if necessary,
increase the output of large aircraft engines over the next few
years.
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP84TO0109R000100090003-9