INDONESIA'S ARMED FORCES: ENTRENCHED AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00928R000200180003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate -seriTt-
Intelligence
Entrenched as a
Political Institution
Indonesia's Armed Forces:
EA 84-10033
March 1984
326
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t?fl +~ Directorate of Secret
.A)l
Indonesia's Armed Forces:
Entrenched as a
Political Institution
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by Office
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 84-10033
March 1984
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Secret
Indonesia's Armed Forces:
Entrenched as a
Political Institution
Summary As a political force in Indonesia, the armed forces are second only to
Information available President Soeharto. They have dominated the political scene for the past 17
as oil February 1984 years, and we see nothing on the immediate horizon to change this. In
was used in this report. $
reward for the military's loyalty, Soeharto has advanced and protected its
political and economic interests to the point that the military will be the
key factor in the orderly transfer of power when Soeharto passes from the
scene. The military's transition to a younger generation of leaders and an
apparent willingness to accept more civilians in senior government positions
could lead the military to a less visible role in future years, but it will con-
tinue to exercise ultimate authority on major policy issues.
The military will have the major voice in selecting a successor to President
Soeharto:
? Upon Soeharto's death, the military leadership would settle on a
successor from within its ranks.
? In the unlikely event Soeharto should retire, he will almost. certainly
choose a successor from among senior military officers.
No group, in our judgment, will be able to challenge the military's role as
long as major fissures do not appear within the officer corps; we believe
there is no threat to military unity.
? Opposition to the military's political role is concentrated among Muslim
fundamentalists and a small number of political dissidents.
? Although many junior officers would prefer the armed forces to concen-
trate on professional military skills, they support a modified dual role for
the military in civilian functions.
iii Secret
EA 84-10033
March 1984
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Figure 1
Indonesia: Parallel Civil-Military Administrative Structure
Village/
Rural District
a Provincial and district military commanders are also head of the
KOPKAMTIB (internal security) units at their respective levels.
b Area leadership councils are made up of appropriate civil and military
officials at each administrative level.
Secret iv
Regional
Executive
Council I
Regional
Executive
Council II
Regional
Leadership
Triumvirate I
Regional
Leadership
Triumvirate 11
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Indonesia's Armed Forces:
Entrenched as a
Political Institution
Army officers have the guts, the leadership, the
managerial skills, and they are very quick. They are
trained to do things according to a certain system.
[Some civilians have these skills] but I have the
impression they are not very sure of themselves.
Lieutenant General Soepardjo
Third Territorial Defense Command
The Military's Political Roots
Then.... The political role of the Indonesian military
is rooted in its revolutionary experience against the
Dutch. In 1945, Indonesian civilian politicians reluc-
tantly acceded to the demands of student revolution-
aries to legitimize existing youth defense units, creat-
ing the forerunner of today's armed forces. Indonesian
military doctrine has emphasized this development.
Because the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) were
not created by civilian politicians as an instrument of
their authority, but arose spontaneously from among
the people, the military's political authority is derived
from the people and not from the politicians, accord-
ing to writers on military affairs.
ABRI's political role is further justified by its repeat-
ed interventions as guardian of independence and
national unity. Many senior Indonesian officers be-
lieve the armed forces saved the revolution from a
Communist revolt in 1948 and, after independence in
1949, from several regional rebellions and an insur-
rection by Islamic extremists. After the attempted
Communist coup in 1965 and General Soeharto's
assumption of power, the military was frequently the
only trusted source of administrative personnel, giving
it a role in the formerly civilian bureaucracy that it is
only gradually relinquishing today
And Now. Under President Soeharto, ABRI's political
role has been reinforced by:
? Soeharto's commitment to the principle of dwi-
fungsi (dual civilian-military functions).
? The acceptance of dwi-fungsi by the officer corps.
? Legislation enacted in 1982 that established the
dual function as a mission for the armed forces.
? The military's domination of GOLKAR (the ruling
political party), the parliament, and the
bureaucracy.
President Soeharto's commitment to dwi-fungsi is the
most critical of these factors. Because of Soeharto's
continued backing, ABRI has become the single most
important political institution next to the Presidency. 25X1
For its part, the military has encouraged its own civic
action role under the dwi-fungsi doctrine while en-
trusting economic development to the technocrats.
ABRI's Pervasive Role in Government 25X1
The military's control of the government extends from
the president's office down through the villages.
ABRI dominates both the senior bureaucracy and
parliament, while at the provincial and local levels it
not only occupies many civilian positions, but also
maintains a parallel administrative structure with
local civil authorities (see figure 1).
Domination of the Senior Bureaucracy. For the first
time since independence, both the president and vice
president are retired military men. In addition, the
two most powerful men in Indonesia after Soeharto,
ABRI Commander Murdani and State Secretary
Sudharmono (who directs the bureaucracy), are mili-
tary officers. Active or retired officers staff over half
the senior bureaucratic posts. ABRI officers head the
key Ministries of Defense, Justice, Home Affairs, and
Manpower. The Attorney General's office is dominat-
ed by military men, and the Chief of the Supreme
Court is a retired general. The military also controls
major government enterprises such as Pertamina (the
state oil company), Bulog (the state agency responsible
for food imports and distribution), and numerous
other state-owned corporations.
Control of Parliamentary Politics. ABRI dominates
GOLKAR, the government party, which is a coalition
representing labor, farmers, women, businessmen, civ-
il servants, and the professions. Control is maintained
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ABRI Officers in the Senior Bureaucracy
President
Military
Military
Military
Military
Vice President
Vacant
Vacant
Civilian
Military
Coordinating Ministers a
20
0
67
67
Ministers of State
NA
0
0
14
Department Ministers
44
22
47
43
Secretaries General
55
41
89
67
Inspectors General
NA
73
65
62
Directors General
36
36
35
29
Provincial Governors
80
80
56
52
a The three Coordinating Ministers oversee policy implementation
of several ministries. They do not have responsibility for the day-to-
day operation of ministries, which is left to Department Ministers.
through military officers in leadership positions, and
vital administrative support is furnished by the mili-
tary to GOLKAR at the local level. In addition,
ABRI directly participates in parliamentary legisla-
tive and electoral functions. ABRI has 75 permanent-
ly assigned seats out of parliament's 460 to compen-
sate for the exclusion of the military from voting in
elections.' The military also has 230 out of 920 seats
in the People's Consultative Congress (the MPR),
which meets every five years and is responsible for
electing the president and establishing national policy
guidelines. ABRI's influence within GOLKAR and
the number of seats it controls in the MPR, both
directly and through the government party, give it an
effective veto over the choice of a presidential succes-
sor or any change to the Constitution that could affect
the military's political status.
Influence at the Provincial and Local Level. The
military controls provincial and local governments two
ways:
? A vertical military command structure paralleling
civil institutions down to the village level.
' Despite the prohibition on voting, ABRI participates in parliamen-
tary campaigns largely through surrogates such as the retired
officers' association and the military wives' organization. The
military also keeps a close eye on the political scene, passing on
? Area leadership councils linking the military struc-
ture with civil and police authorities at the district
level.
Within the civil administration, provincial governors
and district heads frequently are active or retired
military officers. When Soeharto installed a new
Cabinet in March 1983, the number of provincial
governorships held by military men fell by one, to 14
of the 27 provinces. Although down from a peak of 21
posts in 1975, the military nonetheless retains control
of the most important provinces. On the island of
Java, all the provinces except Yogyakarta are gov-
erned by active or retired officers (see figure 2).
Sumatera Utara (North Sumatra), Sulawesi Utara
(North Sulawesi), and Maluku are also governed by
ABRI officers, in part because of a postindependence
history of rebellion against Jakarta's authority. =
even in the provinces
governed by civilians the governors play a secondary
role to military commanders, whose influence is en-
hanced by their internal security responsibilities.
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Figure 2
Province-Level Units With Military Officers as Governors
' Nicobar
ak lalsods
(India)
Internationall boundary
-?- Province-level boundary
* National capital
p Province-level capital
0 200 400 Kilometers
0 200- 400 Miles
North
eo ..ew ?n.oos YOe + eel
eswwa.s~ asOs.ww. Nauss
n Ywauu srs *ews
disc .l auks.
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The military extends its influence at the local level
through civic action programs, the most publicized of
which is the ABRI Masuk Desa (Armed Forces
Entering the Villages) program. Since inauguration of
this program in August 1980, 13 operations have been
conducted in which company-sized units (approxi-
mately 150 men) assist in a variety of projects,
including the construction of roads, bridges, and
irrigation facilities; the repair of mosques, schools,
and homes; and the provision of medical care, enter-
tainment, and political indoctrination. The program
combines village development with the strengthening
of civilian-military relations, particularly on the part
of younger officers. Although proclaimed a success,
according to public statements by Indonesian offi-
cials, the program has recently been affected by
budget cutbacks. According to General Murdani,
from now on only troops locally available will be used,
in order to keep costs down. Nonetheless, Murdani
believes that it is necessary for officers to move
around to different projects to ensure they receive
wide regional exposure to the people.
The Military's Financial Interests
ABRI's major stake in the Indonesian economy not
only provides necessary income for the military, but
rewards for officers and the military's supporters (see
appendix). Many senior officers and their wives have
links to various enterprises. General Murdani, for
example, reportedly has considerable financial inter-
ests in East Timor that are fostered by his role of
overseeing military operations there against rebels
fighting for independence. The Soeharto family has
extensive business connections throughout the coun-
try, some of which are linked to military enterprises.
despite such widespread abuses as exploiting
businesses and institutionalizing corruption, the mili-
tary's involvement in the economy is useful because it
contributes managerial skills to business enterprises.
Moreover, a military backer can provide the necessary
support to promote a firm's development and help
overcome bureaucratic hurdles. Thus the military's
symbiotic relationship with the business community
can facilitate growth and, to some extent, efficiency
by cutting redtape and reducing legal obstacles
Negative Views on Dual Function Range From ...
Reservations Among Younger Ofcers.... The
majority of the officer corps supports the dual func-
tion, benefiting from the economic and political influ-
ence it confers. some
younger officers, lacking the revolutionary experience,
question the doctrine. To compensate for their lack of
experience, senior military officers have sought to
instill a commitment to dwi-fungsi among the younger
generation through training courses. US military ob-
servers in Jakarta have reported that the largest block
of instruction at the ABRI staff school (SESKOAD)
concentrates on "nationbuilding," emphasizing
among other things the nonsectarian state ideology
(Pancasila Z), and national political-social-economic
development. Although we believe the training proc-
ess has generally instilled an appreciation for the
social-political role of the military among younger
officers, there are signs that many of them believe
modifications are necessary. US and foreign military
observers report that many younger officers place a
greater emphasis on military professionalism and
favor a reduced role in civilian affairs and politics.
Several officers who have recently assumed senior
command positions within ABRI also share some of
the reservations of their juniors but insist on retaining
a social-political role for ABRI
Army Chief of Staff
u mi as sat tat ABRI should encourage local
civilian authorities to take over some of the military's
social development functions. He strongly criticized
those political and military figures who view dwi-
f'ungsi as a legal justification to meddle in civilian
affairs at any level. Even ABRI Commander Murdani
has publicly said that, although he accepts the mili-
tary's dual function, he would prefer to see it reduced
in order to concentrate on creating a professional
fighting force.
' Pancasila is the name given to the Indonesian state ideology based
upon five principles: belief in one God, humanitarianism, national
unity, populism, and social justice.
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To Open Opposition. Both fundamentalist Muslims
and a small group of political dissidents oppose the
military's involvement in politics. The fundamentalist
Muslims seek to establish an Islamic state and are
suspicious of the government and military in which
Christians, such as General Murdani, hold a dispro-
portionate number of leading positions.' For its part,
the military fears Islamic fundamentalism]
even
ttughfundamentalists are only a fraction of the 30
percent of the general populace who are orthodox
Muslims. The older officers have not forgotten-nor
do they let the younger officers forget-the savage
fighting in the 1950s and early 1960s against Islamic
extremists who rebelled in an attempt to establish an
Islamic state in Jawa Barat (West Java) and several
although the complete elimination of the
dwi-fungsi role has met with reservations among the
former military members of the Committee, younger
Muslim or nationalist members of the Committee
want a rapid elimination of the military's political
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other regions of Indonesia
The Committee of Fifty, a vocal coalition, has repeat-
edly called for a severe restriction, if not elimination,
of the military's dual function. The Committee,
founded in 1980, consists of retired military officers,
politicians, academics, and religious leaders who have
united in widely publicized, but so far ineffective,
opposition to the Soeharto government. Led by the
former governor of Jakarta, retired Marine Corps Lt.
Gen. Ali Sadikin, the group has called for a return to
civilian government, increased power for a more
representative parliament, and a reduction in the
economic power of Chinese businessmen associated
with political and military figures.
most Committee
members believe that ABRI's dual function must be
phased out for the good of Indonesian society and the
' Nowhere is this sectarian disparity more noticeable than among
SESKOAD graduates, reputedly the single most important source
of government leaders in Indonesia. Christians made up 17 percent
of the 1982-83 graduating class, although they account for only 5
percent of the national population. The contrast in some earlier
classes has been higher, according to a US Army officer who
attended SESKOAD.
' Retired military
membership
cials. Indeed, State Secretary Sudharmono in the past has request-
ed the Committee's input in developing the nation's five-year policy
role.
Looking Ahead 25X1
We expect the military will retain its command of
domestic politics through the end of the decade
because of Soeharto's strong support for ABRI's
political role, ABRI's desire to safeguard its economic
interests, and the lack of any effective political opposi-
tion. Nonetheless, we expect a gradual trend toward
greater civilian visibility in the government to contin-
ue as ABRI limits its role to more traditional security- 25X1
related ministries and a few key posts in other minis-
tries. This will enable ABRI to maintain its influence
within the government while allowing civilians a
larger role in day-to-day management
We believe that the reservations of younger officers
about the dual role will have little effect upon the
extent of ABRI's political role as long as Soeharto
remains in office.' If the newly emerging emphasis on
military professionalism continues into the post-
Soeharto era, however, the gradual trend away from
direct military involvement in running the govern-
ment may accelerate.
We also believe that ABRI will maintain its dominant
role in GOLKAR, despite public statements by
GOLKAR officials to the contrary and several recent
moves that on the surface point to a greater civilian
role in party affairs. The Third National GOLKAR
Party Congress in 1983 named State Secretary Sud-
harmono chairman, in what many domestic observers
' Although we believe a coup by younger officers to be most
unlikely under present circumstances, they could be tempted to oust
civilian politicians and take direct control should Soeharto adopt
the trappings of Sukarno's personal rule, thus distancing himself
from both the people and the armed forces, and government policies
become discredited by worsening social strains and economic
hardship. Such intervention would reverse the trend toward a less
visible military role in government and could lead to popular
disaffection toward a new regime, which might rely more on
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ficers and approved by the MPR.
The dominant role of the military ensures it a major voice in the presidential suc-
cession. Should Soeharto die or be disabled while in office, we believe the most
likely succession outcome would be for a triumvirate of the following to run the
government until a single successor could be chosen by a small group of senior of-
Gen. (Ret.) Umar Wirahadikusumah
As Vice President, he is the constitutionally designated successor to Soeharto
until a special session of the MPR can elect a new president. According to US
Embassy officials, Umar has no apparent political ambitions. In the event of
Soeharto s death, Umar would probably be acceptable to the military as an
interim president or as a figurehead with real power exercised by Murdani or
Sudharmono or both men working together
Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani
The first of a new generation of military officers to hold the key position of ABRI
commander in chief, he is an ambitious professional soldier with close personal
ties to Soeharto. A Catholic in a predominantly Muslim country, Murdani's
prospects for accession to the Presidency seem remote. But as both internal
security and military intelligence chief, in addition to his control ofABRI, he is in
an excellent position to act as "kingmaker, " if not "king, " should the Presidency
fall vacant before 1988.
Lieutenant General (Ret.) Sudharmono
A military lawyer, he is one of Soeharto's most trusted aides. As head of the bu-
reaucracy, and now leader of GOLKAR, Sudharmono has gradually expanded his
influence within the government. He appears to have established an effective
working relationship with Murdani. We believe that Sudharmono would probably
maintain the constitutional succession while consolidating his position, perhaps in
concert with Murdani. one
plan in circulation within the government calls for Sudharmono to assume power
until the MPR meets
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believe is an effort to enhance GOLKAR's credibility
as a political party. The Congress also appointed a
prominent civilian, the brother of the current Foreign
Minister, as Secretary General and moved to allow
participation on an individual basis rather than partic-
ipation by groups in an attempt to broaden the party's
civilian base. The US Embassy and some foreign
observers, however, believe that these changes are
largely cosmetic because the Congress also adopted a
resolution reaffirming GOLKAR's support for dwi-
fungsi.
The dominant role of the military ensures it has the
major voice in the presidential succession. Should
Soeharto die or be incapacitated, Vice President
Umar would assume the reins of government under
the Constitution until the MPR can meet in special
session to elect a successor, probably from within the
ranks of the senior military. In the unlikely event
Soeharto decides to retire at the end of his term in
1988, when he will be 67 years old, he would almost
certainly name his successor. He has been careful not
to disclose any choice he may be considering, but we
strongly believe it would be a senior military officer.
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Appendix
Military Economic Activity
The military's commercial enterprises have several
common characteristics. They are financed primarily
from resources acquired as a result. of ABRI's politi-
cal influence in such areas as import licenses, forestry
concessions, and civilian use of military storage facili-
ties and vehicles. They are established largely to raise
funds to meet the shortfall between the ABRI budget
and actual operating costs of military commands and
units. For the most part, wholly owned military
companies are small and concentrated in trade, trans-
port, construction, and warehousing. When military
officers are involved in large enterprises, they are
usually junior partners in joint ventures with foreign
or Chinese firms. In some instances, the military is
compensated for protecting Chinese business groups.
Military commercial enterprises fall into one of five
groups:
? Regional Military Enterprises. Set up by regional
commands and divisions, they have been established
at the provincial, subprovincial, and district military
command levels. Each of the main army divisions,
particularly those on Java, controls business con-
glomerates with interests ranging from copra proc-
essing to steel fabricating and from tourism to
trucking. For example, PT Propelat, one of the
largest corporations in the country, with interests in
engineering, construction, vehicle assembly, and
real estate, is associated with the Siliwangi Division
headquartered in Bandung, West Java.
? Military Firms. Similar to the regional enterprises,
these are primarily Jakarta-based firms, established
by the services. The most prominent of these firms is 25X1
Tri Usaha Bhakti, a holding company organized in
1969 by the Defense Department to assist foreign
companies having difficulty finding a local partner.
It is run by retired servicemen and has shares in at
? Command-Integrated Enterprises. Originally estab-
lished to handle the supply needs of the armed
services, these have diversified into such areas as
rice milling and distributing construction
equipment.
? Military Cooperatives. There are four cooperatives,
one for each branch of service, which are involved in
a variety of enterprises. The Navy's cooperative, for
example, has financial interests in fisheries, tailor-
ing, plantations, and a golf course.
? Civic Mission Enterprises. Focusing on the con-
struction of public works (schools, mosques, and
roads), these firms largely provide employment to
local inhabitants rather than make money. Often
they have expanded into regional or national
enterprises.
least 38 joint ventures.
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