NORTH KOREA: THE PARTY ELITE AND THE SUCCESSION ISSUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00928R000100120003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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North Korea:
The Party Elite and
the Succession Issue
Confidential
EA 83-10182
September 1983
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
North Korea:
The Party Elite and
the Succession Issue
This paper was prepared byl Office of
East Asian Analysis, with contributions from
Office of Central Reference.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
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EA 83-10182
September 1983
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North Korea:
The Party Elite and
the Succession Issue
Summary President Kim 11-song rules North Korea with an iron hand, and the
Information available personality cult surrounding him has grown to unprecedented heights.
as of I September 1983 Within the North, the exploits of the "Great Leader" are synonymous with
was used in this report.
the history of the country. His speeches and on-the-spot guidance are
immediately transformed into party policy. Kim 11-song is now attempting
to develop this same aura of infallible leadership for his son and heir
apparent, Kim Chong-il.
Kim 11-song, mindful of events in the USSR and China following the
deaths of Stalin and Mao, clearly hopes that installing his son Kim Chong-
il as his successor will forestall any rapid dismantling of his own policies
and personality cult. Most significant for US and South Korean interests,
an orderly transfer of power to Kim Chong-il is, we judge, the outcome
most likely to ensure the continuation of a hostile and militant regime in
P'yongyang-a regime that clings to the belief it can achieve reunification
of the peninsula on its own terms, by force if necessary.
Despite the highly personalized leadership styles of the two Kims, the
Korean Workers Party-as the ruling Communist Party is titled-remains
a vital instrument of control. Borrowing from both the Chinese and Soviet
models, the party has its own codified rules, complex structure, and
operational norms. With over 2 million members, the party counts in its
ranks one out of every 10 persons in North Korea. The Political Bureau of
the Central Committee sits at the apex of this large party structure.
In the Political Bureau the influence of the veteran guerrilla leaders who
rose to power with Kim II-song is waning and is likely to decline
precipitously in the next several years. The influence of leaders in the 50-
to-60-year age bracket will grow accordingly. The regime is taking steps to
manage carefully this generational change within the elite. Some senior
leaders in critical positions are being eased into retirement. The size of the
Political Bureau has been increased, thus allowing for an infusion of new
blood.
Nevertheless, we judge that Kim Chong-il's supporters are attempting-to
use the expansion of the Political Bureau as an opportunity to strengthen
support for the younger Kim's succession. Some of the second-generation
leaders may indeed owe their current positions in part to their endorsement
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EA 83-10182
September 1983
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of Kim Chong-il and the succession plan.
IWe believe, however, that some
second-generation leaders who have worked their way up through the
postwar system-while loyal to Kim 11-song-may not in all cases be
indebted to Kim Chong-il.
Political maneuvering is likely to intensify as Kim 11-song's passing from
the scene draws nearer. Given the many unknowns in the leadership
equation in P'yongyang, changes in the alignment of the Political Bureau
are likely to evoke quite diverse interpretations on the part of outside
observers.
This study seeks to shed some light on the political alignment and relative
importance of the 32 officials, who, along with Kim I1-song and Kim
Chong-il, currently make up the bureau. It begins by identifying the
principal interest groups or factions on the Political Bureau. These include:
? Veteran guerrilla fighters.
? Second-generation leaders.
? The military.
? The technocrats.
? Province leaders and others.
The study then analyzes Kim Chong-il's position and discusses some of the
methods-and the pitfalls-in attempting to identify his allies on the
Political Bureau.
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Summary
The Political Bureau: Major Interest Groups
1
Veteran Guerrilla Fighters
1
Second-Generation Leaders
1
Influence of the Military
5
The Technocrats
6
Kim Chong-il's Position
7
Kim Chong-il's Allies
8
Impact of Generational Change
9
Prospects
10
Organization and Function of the Political Bureau
11
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Table 1
Institutional Representation
on the North Korean Political Bureau
Presidium
Kim 11-song General Secretary President/Commander in chief
Kim Chong-il Secretary
Kim II Vice President
0 Chin-u Defense Minister
Yi Chong-ok Premier
Full members
Pak Song-chol Vice President
Yim Chun-chu Vice President
So Choi Control Committee
Kim Chung-nim Secretary
Kim Yong-nam Secretary
Yon Hyong-muk Secretary
Kim Hwan Vice Premier
O Paek-yong
Chon Mun-sop First Vice Premier
Kang Song-san
O Kuk-yol Chief of General Staff
Paek Hak-nim Vice Minister of Defense
Choe Yong-nim Department Director
So Yun-sok P'yongyang City
Alternate members
Ho Tam
Hyon Mu-kwang Secretary
Chon Pyong-ho
Choe Kwang
Chong Chun-ki
Chong Kyong-hui
Kong Chin-tae
Kye Ung-tae
Yi Kun-mo Nampo City
Cho Se-ung North Hamgyong Province
Kim Tu-nam Department Director
Kang Hui-won Chongjin City
Kim Kang-hwan
Hong Song-nam South Pyongan Province
Yi Son-sil
Vice Premier
Vice Premier
Vice Premier
Vice Premier
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North Korea:
The Party Elite and
the Succession Issue
The Political Bureau:
Major Interest Groups
Because President Kim 11-song dominates the political
scene in North Korea, other leaders on the Political
Bureau tend to remain in the background. As a result,
it is difficult to identify factions or interest groups.
Because of the lack of reliable biographical data,
there are problems even distinguishing officials by
profession or age group.
Veteran Guerrilla Fighters
One group that clearly stands apart is made up of the
veterans who participated with Kim 11-song in the
guerrilla campaigns against the Japanese occupation
forces in the 1930s. The regime itself has called
attention to the close-knit identity of this group by
publishing periodic remembrances by these guerrilla
veterans. The group includes eight full members of
the Political Bureau. They are, in rank order, Vice
President Kim Il, Defense Minister 0 Chin-u, Vice
President Pak Song-chol, Vice President Yim Chun-
chu, Control Committee Chairman So Chol, Gen. 0
Paek-yong, and Colonel Generals Chon Mun-sop and
Paek Hak-nim. Presumably they constitute a solid
core of loyal support on the Political Bureau. All of
these officials, with the exception of Chon Mun-sop
and Paek Hak-nim, are over 70 years old.
Defense Minister 0 Chin-u clearly is the most power-
ful military leader in North Korea today. Elevated to
chief of the general staff in the late 1960s and to
Defense Minister in 1976, General 0 represents conti-
nuity within the armed forces hierarchy.
Gen. 0 Paek-yong, although relatively inactive, serves
on the government's prestigious National Defense
Commission. He is believed to supervise North
Korea's large paramilitary and reserve forces. Col.
Gen. Chon Mun-sop, Kim's bodyguard in the early
years, is believed to control the internal security forces
responsible for providing protection for the President
and his son. Chon has not appeared in public since
September 1982 and may be in poor health.
Col. Gen. Paek Hak-nim, although a guerrilla veter-
an, was elevated to the Political Bureau only in 1978.
He is a vice minister of defense. In the fall of 1981
Paek headed an official North Korean delegation to a
number of countries in Africa that have military
cooperation agreements with P'yongyang. North
Korea has dispatched a number of military advisers to
several of the countries visited by General Paek.
So Chol, as chairman of the Control Commission,
enforces party discipline. He is not an active military
officer and he does not control any security forces.
Nevertheless, he is in a position to wield influence
because of the discretionary punitive powers of his
commission. For example, political foes can be fully
prosecuted for party wrongdoings while allies can
merely be admonished or let off with minimum
disciplinary action.
Kim Il, Pak Song-chol, and Yim Chun-chu, who serve
as vice presidents, appear to perform mainly ceremo-
nial tasks and also lead delegations to foreign coun-
tries. Although these individuals at one time may
have held considerable power, they have, in effect,
been moved into semiretirement. Kim Il's health, in
particular, is poor.
Second-Generation Leaders
About a dozen members of the Political Bureau could
be described as second-generation leaders. Most are
50 to 60 years old. They have made their way up the
ladder in the postwar years. For the most part, they do
not appear to have suffered setbacks along the way.
' Detailed information on the organization and workin s of the
Political Bureau is contained in the appendix
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North Korean Party Elite
Veteran Guerrilla
Fighters
Military Leaders
(Second-Generation)
Kim Kang-hwan
2
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North Korean Party Elite (continued)
Kim Chong-il 10
Second-Generation
Leaders
Kim Chung-nim
Kang Song-san
Province Chiefs
and Others
0 0
O
Choe Kwang Chong Kyong-hui Yi Son-sil
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Chon Pyong-ho
~o o
a 4 I.
O O
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Five out of 12 of these second-generation officials
hold positions in the central party apparatus. Kim
Chung-nim, in his early sixties, is party secretary
responsible for North Korea's campaign of political
action and subversion against South Korea. Except
for a brief hiatus in the mid-1970s, he has held this
assignment since 1969. Kim has been characterized
In point of fact, P'yongyang's attempts to build a
viable clandestine organization in the South have
proved largely ineffective. Kim Chung-nim is also
believed to be in charge of all North Korean intelli-
gence operations.
Kim Yong-nam, in his fifties, is one of North Korea's
leading foreign affairs experts. As the director of the
party's International Department since the early
1970s, Kim has played a major role in opening the
door to official relations with many foreign countries
by initiating contacts with leftist parties and other
influential groups. Kim has served as a party secre-
tary since 1975. In July 1980 Kim met with US
Representative Stephen Solarz, the first American
political figure to visit North Korea since the war.
Poor health recently kept
Kim sidelined for about eight months.
Much less is known about the three other central
party officials. Choe Yong-nim, who first joined the
Political Bureau in 1980 as an alternate member, was
promoted to full membership in August 1982. In his
fifties, Choe is the director of an unidentified depart-
ment of the Central Committee. Kim Tu-nam and
Chon Pyong-ho, both in their fifties, were named
alternate members of the Political Bureau in 1982.
Kim is director of an unidentified department of the
Central Committee; Chon's position is unknown.
So Yun-sok, also in his fifties, has been chief secre-
tary of the P'yongyang City party committee since
1978. The P'yongyang post has served in the past as a
springboard for higher positions in the central power
structure; First Vice Premier Kang Song-san, for
example, held this post in the early 1970s. Like Choe
Yong-nim, So was promoted to full membership in
August 1982. Both men merit close watching.
Four of the 12 second-generation leaders on the
Political Bureau are vice premiers in the State Ad-
ministration Council-North Korea's cabinet. Kang
Song-san, in his fifties, was designated "first" vice
premier in August 1982. He appears to have assumed
much of the responsibility for supervising the econo-
my from Premier Yi Chong-ok. Kang has served in a
variety of party and government posts. He reportedly
is related by marriage to Kim 11-song.
Vice Premier Kim Hwan, like Kang, is a full member
of the Political Bureau. Kim, who has specialized in
heavy industry, was only recently transferred from
party secretary to vice premier.
rise since the mid-1970s. His assignment as vice
premier could result in a sharpened rivalry with Kang
Song-san.
Vice Premier Ho Tam has been Foreign Minister
since 1970. About 54, Ho has played a key role in
carrying out North Korea's ambitious efforts to ex-
pand its diplomatic representation in the Third
World. Ho has been North Korea's principal contact
with the Nonaligned Movement and he is the only
Political Bureau official to have visited the United
States, where he attended the UN General Assembly
session in the fall of 1977.
Educated at Moscow University in the late 1940s, Ho
reportedly is related by marriage to Kim 11-song.
Vice Premier Chong Chun-ki, in his late fifties, is the
regime's chief spokesman. He has traveled extensively
and is said to have a good memory for facts and
statistics. His career has been devoted almost exclu-
sively to propaganda activities. His political status has
not changed much since he first joined the Political
Bureau as an alternate member in the early 1970s.
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Table 2
Foreign Travel of Political Bureau a
Communist
World
Kim Il
O Chin-u
Yi Chong-ok
Pak Song-chol
Yim Chun-chu
So Chol
Kim Chung-nim
Kim Yong-nam
Yon Hyong-muk
Kim Hwan
O Paek-yong
Chon Mun-sop
Kang Song-san
O Kuk-yol
Paek Hak-nim
Choe Yong-nim
So Yun-sok
Ho Tam
Hyon Mu-kwang
Chon Pyong-ho
Choe Kwang
Chong Chun-ki
Chong Kyong-hui
Kong Chin-tae
Kye Ung-tae
Yi Kun-mo
Cho Se-ung
Kim Tu-nam
Kang Hui-won
Kim Kang-hwan
Hong Song-nam
Yi Son-sil
a North Korea may be isolated from the rest of the world
community, but its vigorous diplomatic competition with South
Korea keeps its leading officials on the road. This table reflects the
number of publicized foreign visits by Political Bureau members and
alternates over the past 10 years.
Influence of the Military
In North Korea the military and security services
have always had a strong voice in the Political Bureau
and other leadership councils. The military's influence
derives from the early days of the regime when Kim
and his partisans battled the Japanese and when Kim
in 1950 tried to seize control of the peninsula by force.
It has been reinforced in subsequent years both by
Kim's continued adherence to a confrontational policy
toward the South and by the heavy allocation of
manpower and material resources to sustain North
Korea's extensive military forces.
As noted earlier, four of the eight guerrilla veterans
(0 Chin-u, 0 Paek-yong, Chon Mun-sop and Paek
Hak-nim) are still on active duty. In addition, among
the second-generation leaders on the Political Bureau,
the armed forces are represented by the chief of the
general staff and his ranking deputy.
Col. Gen. 0 Kuk-yol, in his fifties, has served as Chief
of the General Staff since 1979 and as a full member
of the Political Bureau since 1980. He apparently was
promoted over a number of more senior officers. As a
career Air Force officer, 0 Kuk-yol's appointment is
viewed as another indication that P'yongyang intends
to increase its emphasis on joint service operations. 0
Kuk-yol reportedly was also a classmate of Kim
Chong-il's at the Mangyongdae Institute. According
to some accounts, he is the nephew of Gen. 0 Chin-u.
Lt. Gen. Kim Kang-hwan is the First Deputy Chief of
General Staff. Not much is known about Kim's
background, although he is believed to be in his fifties.
Kim Kang-hwan appears to be the only active duty
officer among the 15 alternate members on the
Political Bureau.
The influence of the military goes beyond the number
of uniformed personnel on the Political Bureau. The
armed forces are viewed as a major avenue for
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upward mobility in North Korea. Many officers re-
portedly retire early to pursue lucrative careers in the
party and government: Undoubtedly the shared expe-
riences and close ties developed in the military profes-
sion are carried along by these officials throughout
their careers.
The Technocrats
In North Korea the role played by technocrats in the
Political Bureau appears to be quite different from
that seen in the leading organs of other Communist
societies. It is a common phenomenon in Communist
societies that, as the state develops and grows more
complex, officials with special technical skills begin to
exercise a growing influence in the leadership. In
North Korea, however, the development of a highly
skilled group of technocrats in the Political Bureau
and the society at large has been sharply retarded by
excessive adherence to Kim II-song's widely publi-
cized ideology of self-reliance or chuche.
Kim 11-song frequently has reiterated the need to
develop technological skills and to apply selectively
foreign experiences to North Korea's development
problems. But these exhortations are largely swept
aside by the far greater emphasis on self-reliance as
the only way to maintain independence and sovereign-
ty. Kim's chuche policy, first enunciated in the 1950s,
was given added impetus following the Sino-Soviet
split in the early 1960s. By the late 1960s, North
Korea virtually ended the practice of sending officials
and students to other Communist states for advanced
training, although some North Korean specialists
apparently are still receiving training at a Soviet
nuclear research institute.
As a result, foreign-trained technocrats are becoming
a vanishing species in North Korea. The impact has
been widespread.
North
Korea is relying on production techniques that are
often 20 years behind the times. There were numerous
accounts in the 1970s that industrial equipment or-
dered from abroad remained unopened or unassem-
bled because North Korean technicians lacked the
necessary skills or were prevented from seeking assist-
ance from their foreign counterparts.
A number of veteran technocrats accompanied the
Kim II-song regime into power or were trained abroad
in the 1950s. They are valued by the regime for the
competence they bring to bear on managing what has
become an increasingly complex economy. But these
technocrats have no constituency and no independent
power base. They frequently have served as scape-
goats for errors made by overzealous party
bureaucrats.
Premier Yi Chong-ok, in his late sixties, is the best
known of North Korea's technocrats. In the mid-
1950s, Yi, as chairman of the State Planning Com-
mittee, was instrumental in organizing North Korea's
first five-year plan. Yi held several important posts in
the heavy industry sector during the seven-year plan
in the 1960s, but Yi was demoted when the plan had
to be extended by three years to reach its assigned
goals.
Yi regained favor in the early 1970s, and in 1977 he
was named Premier to provide leadership for North
Korea's current seven-year plan (1978-84). As a meas-
ure of his prestige, Yi was included in the five-man
Presidium of the Political Bureau organized at the
Sixth Party Congress. Yi received his training in
Manchuria at the Harbin Technical College.
Party secretary Yon Hyong-muk is an industrial
specialist and economic planner who has held posi-
tions both in light and heavy industry. In his late
fifties, Yon has the longest continuous service on the
party Secretariat. He has frequently accompanied
both Kim II-song and Kim Chong-il on inspection
tours. Yon acquired technical training in Czechoslo-
vakia in the 1950s.
Party secretary Hyon Mu-kwang, about 70, is one of
North Korea's most durable industrial management
specialists. Hyon has served as an alternate member
of the Political Bureau on an on-again, off-again basis
for the past 20 years. He reached a personal peak in
1970 as party secretary for industry when he ranked
12th in the overall leadership. Hyon was assigned as a
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provincial leader in the heavily industrialized north-
east region from 1977 to 1981, but he returned to the
Secretariat by late 1981.
Vice Premier Kye Ung-tae, in his sixties, is the
regime's leading foreign trade specialist. As Minister
of Foreign Trade from 1967 to 1977, Kye presided
over a rapid growth in North Korea's commercial
relations with the non-Communist world. Kye has had
to deal with irate trading partners displeased with
P'yongyang's unwillingness even to discuss measures
to remedy its persistent foreign indebtedness. His
courteous and tactful style have helped ease tensions.
Kye studied in both Manchuria and the USSR. Kye
became the first political casualty following the 1980
party congress; he was demoted in October 1981 from
full to alternate membership on the Political Bureau.
Kye's duties as vice premier do not appear to have
been affected, however.
Hamgyong Province), Hong Song-nam (South Pyon-
gan Province), Yi Kun-mo (Nampo City), and Kang
Hui-won (Chongjin City). Nampo and Chongjin, be-
cause of their size and industrial development, are
treated administratively like provinces.
These local leaders, unlike P'yongyang City chief So
Yun-sok who is often seen with the central leadership,
spend most of their time in their own bailiwicks. They
are outside the mainstream. A provincial post can,
nonetheless, serve as a steppingstone for higher ad-
vancement in the party.
A few officials on the Political Bureau do not fit
neatly into any of the groupings. Vice Premier Choe
Kwang is a former senior military leader who has
recently been rehabilitated after undergoing a long
period of reeducation. Chong Kyong-hui, the only
woman of the Political Bureau, has a long association
with anti-South Korean operations; her influence in
the inner councils of the party is not clear. Lastly, Yi
Son-sil remains largely a question mark. Because he
makes only rare appearances, it is difficult to deter-
mine if he is still an alternate member of the Political
Bureau.
and capable economist. In 1982 Kong was named Kim Chong-il's Position
Vice Premier Kong Chin-tae, like Kye Ung-tae, has
spent most of his career managing North Korea's
foreign economic relations. As Minister of External
Economic Affairs during most of the 1970s, Kong
traveled extensively to negotiate foreign aid agree-
ments. About 60, he has been described as a tactful
chairman of a newly created Trade Committee, sug-
gesting at the time that he was assuming greater
control in that long-troubled sector from Kye Ung-
tae. More recently, Kong has been inactive and may
have been demoted.
Province Leaders and Others
As the North Korean economy has become more
complex, P'yongyang has moved to strengthen eco-
nomic management in the provinces. In 1981 North
Korea instituted a new system of economic guidance
committees at the provincial level and gave these
committees certain functions and perquisites previous-
ly reserved for the central bureaucracy.
On the political side, too, the authority of the province
chiefs has been upgraded in recent years. Four local
party chiefs concurrently hold alternate membership
on the Political Bureau. They are: Cho Se-ung (North
The regime used the Sixth Party Congress in October
1980 as the occasion to unveil publicly Kim 11-song's
scheme to install his eldest son, Kim Chong-il, as his
successor. The younger Kim, making his first publi-
cized appearance, was designated fourth-ranked
member of the Political Bureau. Kim Chong-il also 25X1
was awarded leading positions on both the party
Secretariat and the party Military Commission-a
distinction shared only by Kim II-song.
The Secretariat is headed by General Secretary Kim
11-song. Kim Chong-il, as the ranking secretary under
the elder Kim probably exercises control over organi-
zational and personnel affairs. He is in a unique
position to influence promotions and demotions within
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the party. Kim Chong-il's membership on the Mili-
tary Commission is undoubtedly intended to demon-
strate his credentials as a military as well as party
leader.
As the fourth-ranked member of the Political Bureau,
Kim Chong-il gained membership on the five-member
Presidium. The implications for his eventual succes-
sion are obvious; the other four members of the
Presidium-Kim 11-song, Kim Il, 0 Chin-u, and Yi
Chong-ok-are all in their seventies. Since the con-
gress, he has moved up to second place in periodic
leadership turnouts, bypassing Defense Minister 0
Chin-u in 1981 and moving ahead of senior Vice
President Kim Il by early 1983.
Kim Chong-il's Allies
Kim II-song's unprecedented hereditary succession
scheme, although kept under wraps until 1980, had
become public knowledge by the late 1970s. During
the 1970s outside observers tended to view every
promotion and demotion in the party hierarchy as
directly related to the succession issue. It was widely
assumed, for example, that any North Korean official
whose career prospered after 1973-the year the
succession scheme moved into high gear-was a
supporter of Kim Chong-il.
This tendency was particularly strong if the official
was relatively young. The notion that these officials
were riding on Kim Chong-il's coattails does not
square with subsequent developments. Several offi-
cials who rose to prominence in the 1973-75 period
subsequently fell into disfavor.
The Political Bureau announced at the Sixth Con-
gress in October 1980 showed a marked increase in
size from its predecessors. Nineteen full members and
15 alternate members were named compared with
only 11 full members and four alternates named at
each of the three previous party congresses. Most of
the 34 officials had in fact.been appointed to the
Political Bureau during the 1970s, but it was a major
step for the 1980 Congress to formalize the expansion.
We believe that Kim Chong-il and his supporters used
the congress as an occasion to reward existing allies
and to gain new ones.
There remains, nevertheless, the knotty problem of
distinguishing supporters of Kim Chong-il from those
who are passive or even hostile toward the succession
Nepotism is commonplace in North Korea and it adds
another factor to the leadership equation. Vice Presi-
dent Pak Song-chol, First Vice Premier Kang Song-
san, Vice Premier Ho Tam, and Chongjin City chief
secretary Kang Hui-won reportedly are all related by
marriage to the senior Kim. The younger Kim pre-
sumably can rely on them as allies.
Family relationships are complex, however. Kim
Chong-il's mother died in 1949, and Kim 11-song
remarried and has additional children by that mar-
riage~
Now that Kim Chong-il is appearing in public, there
is a somewhat better basis for determining at least
some of his putative supporters. Since the party
congress, Kim Chong-il has personally led 12 publi-
cized inspection tours in North Korea. He is invari-
ably accompanied on these visits by several other
Political Bureau officials. We know that these appear-
ances are closely scrutinized not only by outsiders but
also by the North Korean officials themselves. In
some cases the nature of the event may dictate which
officials are to be present. But it is reasonable to
assume that officials who appear repeatedly with Kim
Chong-il are close allies or at least willing to be
perceived as such.
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The following tabulation reflects the number of times
individual Political Bureau officials accompanied Kim
Chong-il on visits between May 1981 and June 1983:
Defense Minister 0 Chin-u
9
Party Secretary Yon Hyong-muk
8
Foreign Minister Ho Tam
7
Party Secretary Kim Chung-nim
6
Party Secretary Kim Yong-nam
4
In addition, four other Political Bureau officials have
accompanied Kim Chong-il on one or two occasions.
Another method of assessing the attitude of individual
North Korean leaders toward the succession issue is to
examine their public statements. Since the party
congress, North Korean officials have been routinely
praising the role of the "party center"-an honorific
expression used as a cover term for Kim Chong-il. This
cover term was useful to the regime before the public
unveiling of Kim Chong-il, and it is still used in much
of the media discussion about domestic affairs.
A few Political Bureau officials have gone beyond the
routine expressions of support for Kim Chong-il. For
example, Defense Minister 0 Chin-u was very expan-
sive in his evaluation of the younger Kim's visit to
China in June 1983. 0 Chin-u disclosed details about
the visit not previously publicized by P'yongyang.
Party Secretary Kim Yong-nam was the official
selected in March 1982 to present Kim Chong-il's
first major publicized theoretical work, a so-called
treatise on elder Kim's chuche ideology. Significantly,
both 0 Chin-u and Kim Yong-nam are among those
who have often accompanied the son on inspection
tours.
Impact of Generational Change
If Kim Chong-il is to inherit the mantle of leadership
from his father, he will have to outmaneuver not one
but two generations of leaders in the North Korean
Political Bureau. There seems little doubt now that
the son has crossed the first hurdle-the veteran
guerrilla leaders of Kim II-song's generation.
0 Chin-u, one of the most active and powerful among
The visit to China by Comrade Kim Chong-il, the
leader of our party, some time ago at the kind
invitation of respected Comrade Hu Yaobang marked
a new milestone in keeping bright the glorious tradi-
tion of the Korea-China friendship, which was sealed
in blood in the flames of the arduous revolutionary
struggle and has withstood the grim trial of history.
During his recent visit to China Comrade Kim
Chong-il had historic meetings with respected Com-
rades Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian,
Zhao Ziyang, Peng Zhen, Deng Yingchao, and nearly
all other leading cadres of the Chinese party and
government and had talks with them in a sincere,
friendly, and comradely atmosphere and had impor-
tant conversations and was accorded a cordial hospi-
tality and warm welcome by the Chinese party and
people during his tour of Beijing and local areas.
The recently held seventh plenary meeting of the
sixth Central Committee of the Korean Workers
Party expressed great joy at the distinguished contri-
butions made by the China visit of Comrade Kim
Chong-il to the cause of further strengthening and
developing the militant friendship and revolutionary
solidarity between the parties and peoples. of Korea
and China.
O Chin-u, 11 July 1983, at a
reception at the Chinese Embassy
in Pyongyang
this group, has clearly endorsed the succession
through both word and deed. Senior Vice President
Kim 11-the only veteran with anything approaching
an independent stature-has deferred to the son in the
highly symbolic leadership rankings.
The principal challenge is likely to come from the
group of second-generation leaders on the Political
Bureau. These leaders are too young to have been part
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of Kim I1-song's guerrilla campaigns and yet old
enough to have launched their careers in the postwar
bureaucracy before Kim Chong-il began his appren-
ticeship in 1973. Some of these leaders have only
recently joined the Political Bureau. They may have
had to pledge their loyalty to Kim Chong-il as part of
the price of joining the party elite. But others may not
be indebted to Kim Chong-il. Although loyal to Kim
11-song, 'they may be inclined to push their own
careers forward after the elder Kim leaves the scene.
demotions in North Korea are probably the result of a
mix of factors involving past political debts, bureau-
cratic infighting, and complex trade-offs.
Significant events in North Korea's domestic calendar
over the next two years are likely to heighten maneu-
vering within the leadership. Next year marks the end
of North Korea's current seven-year economic plan.
The transition from one plan period to another is often
accompanied by changes in the government leader-
ship. In 1985 the regime may hold elections for a new
national assembly and convene a party congress. Any
one of these events could serve as an occasion for Kim
Chong-il's supporters to make a major move to fur-
ther solidify the son's position as heir apparent. If
such a move is undertaken, it will undoubtedly be
played out in the ranks of the Political Bureau.
Only Kim Chong-il has been noted mak-
ing the kind of publicized inspection tours long associ-
ated with his father's reign. And only Kim Chong-il
has published major works, which are being held up
as guidance in the manner of Kim I1-song's own
writings.
The size of the Political Bureau appears to have
stabilized at roughly 34 members and alternates. The
institutional representation also seems to be relatively
fixed, with officials in the central party apparatus
holding more positions on the Political Bureau than
the government and military. Second-generation po-
litical leaders are taking the dominant role in running
affairs of the country.
With the old guard revolutionaries retiring, political
maneuvering at the Political Bureau level is likely to
intensify in the next several years.
Kim
Chong-il and his supporters have to rec on wit i the
possibility that the elder Kim's health could deterio-
rate at any time.
We anticipate that Kim Chong-il's supporters will
continue to strive to place as many adherents as
possible on the Political Bureau. It would be unwise,
however, to view every new face as a loyal ally of the
son. As in any political system, promotions and
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Appendix
Organization and Function
of the Political Bureau
The Political Bureau is made up of the highest
ranking members of the Central Committee. It con-
ducts the party's business between the meetings of the
much larger Central Committee, which holds two
plenary sessions a year. The Political Bureau formu-
lates all policy on political and social affairs, econom-
ic, defense, and internal security matters. It meets in
unpublicized sessions about once a week.
The Political Bureau, in addition to its role as the
principal policymaking organization, is also the chief
organization for implementing policy. It exercises
control through a full-time party Secretariat and a
number of functionally organized departments under
the Secretariat. The Political Bureau also wields
power through other specialized organizations in the
central party apparatus, such as the Military Com-
mission (military affairs), the Control Committee
(party discipline), and the Liaison Department (anti-
South Korea operations). The officials heading these
central party organizations are usually members of
the Political Bureau.
As in the case of other ruling Communist Party
organizations, many officials on the Political Bureau
also hold positions in the central government, in the
armed forces, or in the provinces. This overlapping
representation is one method used by the party to
ensure that the bureaucracy remains responsive to
party control. In particular, the number of cabinet
officers and province chiefs on the Political Bureau
has increased markedly in recent years.
The Political Bureau consists of both full members
and alternate members. Alternate members are non-
voting members, but that is probably not an important
distinction since voting generally is to rubberstamp
Kim 11-song's decisions. Any official aspiring to full
membership on the Political Bureau apparently is
required first to serve at least some months as an
alternate member.
Over the years the formal structure of the Political
Bureau has undergone some minor changes. From
1966 to 1980 it was known by the title of Political
Committee. From time to time an executive commit-
tee is formed within the Political Bureau. The Sixth
Party Congress, for example, designated the top five
full members as the Presidium of the Political Bureau.
Similar changes have been noted in both the USSR
and China. The formation of the North Korean
Presidium apparently serves to further centralize pow-
er at the apex of the decisionmaking structure.
North Korea as a rule only reveals the full lineup of
the Political Bureau at major party gatherings, such
as at its infrequent party congresses. The party con-
gress is largely ceremonial, comprising both party
leaders and party activists from across the country.
Party regulations call for a congress to convene once
every five years, but in fact 10 years lapsed between
the Fifth Congress in 1970 and the Sixth Congress in
October 1980.
The makeup of the North Korean Political Bureau,
like its Soviet and Chinese counterparts, undergoes
numerous changes between party congresses. On oc-
casion, these changes are formally announced at
plenary meetings of the Central Committee. It is far
more common, however, for the regime to disclose
these changes in a piecemeal way at selected leader-
ship turnouts.
From time to time the party hierarchy in North Korea
has been jolted by a major purge. During the mid-
1950s there were several upheavals as Kim 11-song
moved to consolidate his control over the various
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factions within the leadership. There were two major
shakeups in the leadership in the mid- and late 1960s.
These purges coincided more or less with the begin-
ning and ending of a period of heightened militancy in
North Korea's campaign of harassment and provoca-
tion against South Korea and the United States.
There was a significant expansion of the Political
Bureau-from 15 to 34 members and alternate mem-
bers-between the Fifth Party Congress and the Sixth
Congress in 1980. The new members were added
incrementally over the decade; most were party and
government bureaucrats. There were no leadership
purges in the 1970s comparable to those in the 1950s
and 1960s, thus providing for a considerable measure
of leadership continuity.
Relative stability in the leadership has continued into
the 1980s. The status of 27 of the 34 members and
alternate members identified in 1980 has remained
unchanged. Continuity among the 19 full members is
particularly strong. At a party plenum in August 1982
two alternate members were promoted to full mem-
bership to fill the vacancies created by the death of
one member and the demotion of another to alternate
status.
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