(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00928R000100080005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Indonesia: -
Profile of the Next Generation
of Military Leaders
Secret
EA 83-10174
September 1983
COPY 2 8 6
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Secret
EA 83-10174
September 1983
Indonesia:
Profile of the Next Generation
of Military Leaders
This paper was prepared by
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Office of East Asian Analy:
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asian Division, OEA,
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Secret
Overview
Information available
as oft September 1983
was used in this report.
Indonesia:
Profile of the Next Generation
of Military Leaders
The officers who will lead the Indonesian military by the late 1980s are
more insular and probably more authoritarian than is the current military
leadership. At the same time they are decidedly less inclined toward a
pervasive military role in the economy and civilian bureauracy than their
seniors. Termed the Magelang Generation, these rising officers were the
initial graduates in the early 1960s of the Indonesian military academy at
Magelang, Central Java. US military observers consider them better
trained and more professional than their predecessors, but with less
exposure to foreign influences than those who have led the Indonesian
military since independence in 1949.
The transition to the new generation of officers has begun in earnest. Since
December 1982, some 118 senior officers have retired and been replaced by
"Bridge Generation" officers-a group of about 40 officers who were
commissioned during the 1950s prior to the opening of the Magelang
Academy and who will command until the late 1980s-and their Mage-
lang Generation subordinates.
Like the older generation officers, the Magelang officers give top priority
to maintaining political stability and favor the military's retaining control
of the government, but without the current extensive involvement in
nonmilitary affairs.
Some of the Magelang officers privately express resentment of the older
leadership because of corruption, lethargy, and delay of the promotion of
younger officers. Nonetheless, institutional loyalties, deference to author-
ity, and concern over career prospects have kept the new generation of
officers from challenging established policy.
Factionalism, based on such distinctions as education, religion, and intra-
service rivalries, exists among the new-generation officer corps. However,
we believe that the multiplicity of differences is unlikely to disrupt the
cohesion of the officer corps given the strength of institutional loyalty and
lack of single focus.
Secret
EA 83-10174
September 1983
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Although we believe the Magelang officers would continue to value the US
strategic presence in Southeast Asia as a counterweight to China and the
Soviet Union, they will probably remain opposed to formal security ties
with the United States. In our judgment, they share the prevailing view in
Jakarta that Indonesia should play a greater role in international and
regional forums and maintain a nonaligned attitude that distinguishes
Indonesian interests from those of the United States. Barring major new
developments in global power relationships, we expect no radical depar-
tures from the Soeharto government's foreign policy by the new-generation
leadership.
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Indonesia:
Profile of the Next Generation
of Military Leaders t
The Winds of Change
The current military leadership, the "Generation of
'45," is beginning to retire, after some 35 years of
service.' Since late 1982, the senior military hierarchy
has sharply stepped up the pace of phasing the new-
generation officers at the rank of colonel and above
into more responsible assignments as the older officers
retire. These rising younger officers, who were com-
missioned in the postrevolutionary era, come from two
groups-the Bridge Generation and the Magelang
It is these officers who will increasingly influence and
implement government policies by the late 1980s.
They also-particularly those from the Magelang
Generation-are the officers with whom US and
other foreign officials will be dealing on economic and
political matters as well as military-security affairs
because of the unique role that President Soeharto has
mandated for the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI).
Embodied in the concept of dwifungsi (dual function),
ABRI is considered an integral part of Indonesia's
political, economic, and social life in addition to its
military role. As such, ABRI is the preeminent
national institution.
ABRI personnel are assigned as cabinet ministers,
ambassadors, parliamentarians, corporation execu-
tives, mayors, and even university rectors. Although
management of the economy is left largely to civilian
technocrats, military officers head such major public
entities as the state oil company (PERTAMINA), the
State Logistics Bureau (BULOG), and the state tin
company. The military provides manpower and mana-
gerial personnel to a wide range of government enter-
prises and institutions including agricultural estates
' In the preparation of this paper, considerable use was made of
personal interviews conducted with US defense attaches and train-
ing officers who have served in Indonesia as well as disseminated
defense attache reporting
' The "Generation of '45" is a term used by t e officers themselves
as well as foreign observers. They were the youths and junior
officers who emerged as commanding officers during the 1945-49
revolution against the Dutch. That experience and their subsequent
pervasive involvement in running the nation have shaped their
attitudes and in turn Indonesia's policies at home and abroad.F
and even labor unions.' Military officers currently
hold some two-thirds of the 27 governorships, and for
more than a decade ABRI officers on assignment
have exercised a major role within GOLKAR, the
government-sponsored political organization. In the
cabinet reshuffling following his reelection in March
1983 to a fourth five-year term, Soeharto appointed
active or retired military officers to 15 of the 37
positions in his cabinet.
The Bridge Generation
As the more senior of the two officer groups, the
Bridge Generation consists of some 40 officers who
were commissioned during the early-to-middle 1950s
and currently range in rank from colonel to full
general. As the group's name implies, it spans the gap
in the officer ranks between the Generation of '45 and
the initial graduates of the Indonesian military acade-
my. Most of the Army Bridge Generation received
some domestic training at the Jogjakarta Military
Academy in the late 1940s or at two other military
schools in the 1950s. Many officers also attended the
Dutch military academy in the Netherlands in the
early 1950s. These officers-the younger of whom are
about 50 years old-will provide much of the military 25X1
leadership over the next three to five years until they
are scheduled to retire at age 55.
Although Bridge Generation officers lag their seniors
by only a few years and many of them fought as
youths in the revolution, most of their superiors
generally consider them as lacking the education,
political commitment, and experience for top-level
positions, according to comments made to US military
observers. Thus, until quite recently the leadership
has moved slowly in naming Bridge officers, to senio25X1
' In addition, the military owns a large number of enterprises,
ranging from timbering to manufacturing plants. The profits from
these operations provide a substantial share of ABRI's operational
funding requirements, Officers are
expected to utilize these funds to provide for their troops. Many
officers also benefit personally from these business activities to
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At the time of the revolution against the Dutch, the
military consisted of a poorly equipped and poorly
trained people's revolutionary army. The few profes-
sional officers and enlisted personnel had gained
some experience with the Dutch colonial and the
Japanese occupation forces as had some paramilitary
youth organizations. Under President Sukarno the
armed forces in the mid-1950s began a decade of
sharp expansion and reorganization as they were
called on to meet rebellions in the outer islands and
the confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore. The
abortive Communist coup of 1965 marked a halt to
the military's expansion as the new regime under
President Soeharto turned government priorities to
economic development. Soeharto redirected the mili-
tary's primary focus from external security to main-
taining internal political stability, a focus that con-
tinues at present.
The successful revolutionary campaign by the officers
of the Generation of '45 imbued them with an endur-
ing self perception as idealists and popular-based
freedom fighters. They consider themselves responsi-
ble not only for independence and for transforming
the disparate revolutionary forces into a disciplined
military force but, more important, for shepherding
the nation through several political crises since then.
They see no reasonable alternative to the military's
continued stewardship of the nation for the indefinite
future because of their distrust of civilian institu-
tions, such as political parties, which they believe
undercut their efforts during the revolution and con-
tributed to the turmoil of the Sukarno era. The older
generals worry that their less politically experienced
subordinates might retreat to the barracks leaving
the government in civilian hands, according to US
military observers. They also are concerned about
stepping down from their financially lucrative posi-
tions when they retire, according to their conversa-
tions with US military officers.
Predominantly Javanese, officers from the Genera-
tion of '45 are contemporaries of President Soeharto
who is himself a retired general. Close personal
loyalties developed during their early careers persist
as a major factor and consideration in appointments
to senior positions in the military and the govern-
ment. Personal trust was the primary consideration
in military reassignments in the late 1950s and early
1960s and during the chaos following the 1965 coup
attempt when the military was factionalized and
infiltrated with Communist sympathizers. More re-
cently, Soeharto's surprise selection in February
1983 of Gen. Umar Wirahadikusumah for vice presi-
dent was based to some degree on personal trust,
He was the local
harto at the time of the 1965 coup attempt.
posts. An exception is General Murdani, the most
prominent and influential Bridge officer, according to
Embassy reporting, who was appointed Commander
in Chief of ABRI last March by Soeharto (see
appendix).
According to Embassy and defense attache reports,
Murdani apparently owes his rapid advancement to
close personal ties to Soeharto. In conversations with
US officials, Murdani has acknowledged that several
more senior Bridge officers resent him because of his
promotion over them and because his career has been
in the intelligence field with little experience com-
manding troops.' Nonetheless, Murdani's new posi-
tion, plus his responsibilities in domestic security,
the security forces and most of the intelligence apparatus. Accord-
ing to people who have dealt with him, Murdani is forceful and
direct. Among other actions he has taken in his new position,
Murdani authorized the recent crackdown on criminals that includ-
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Army Manpower strength of 210,000. Pre-
dominantly infantry, its primary focus
is maintaining internal security. The
Army has undertaken a program to
upgrade its capabilities, but continues
to suffer serious deficiencies in logis-
tics, training, and manpower.
Navy Manpower strength of 42,000 including
about 10,000 Marines. According to
the US defense attache, naval personnel
are competent seamen, but inadequate
technical expertise limits the service's
combat effectiveness. The Navy suffers
in meeting its needs because the Army
dominates the defense structure and
garners the lion's share of the budget.
Among other things, the Navy is unable
to recruit its quota of technically quali-
fied Magelang Academy officers be-
cause of low pay.
Air Force Manpower strength of 29,000. Like the
Navy, it suffers from the Army's pre-
dominant role. Foreign military ob-
servers rate the service's transport ca
pabilities as good, but note that severe
pilot, supply, and maintenance deficien-
cies limit overall capabilities, particu-
larly with modern aircraft.
National Manpower strength of 120,000 to
Police 150,000. Responsible to the Depart-
ment of Defense and Security for main-
taining public order and security. The
police force is underfunded and suffers
from lack of equipment and training,
and it is widely regarded as ineffective.
have, for now, made him a key figure in the presiden-
tial succession process. According to the Embassy, it
may even allow for the remote possibility of Murdani
to succeed Soeharto.
The Magelang Generation
Most officers commissioned since 1960 are graduates
of the national military academy at Magelang, Cen-
tral Java. The first five graduating classes, those who 25X1
graduated between 1960 and 1965, will form the pool
from which the senior military leaders of the late
1980s will be selected. 25X1
Magelang Generation officers-sometimes also re-
ferred to as the New Generation-are markedly
different from their predecessors, according to US
military observers. Most are from urban, middle class
backgrounds.' As a group, they are better educated
militarily and more professional than their superiors
because of progression through a more selective and
established schooling and career pattern. Academy
entrance qualifications are strict by Indonesian edu-
cational standards and require a high school degree
and a series of entrance examinations.
Since graduation in the early 1960s, the Magelang
officers have been closely monitored as they pro-
gressed though assignments in various line, adminis-
trative, staff, and intelligence positions. Those ad- 25X1
vancing to the rank of major and above are carefully
screened for political attitudes, loyalties, and even
social deportment and marital considerations. Like
the older officers, most of them are from Java and
consequently have generally had a better chance for
promotion than other ethnic groups. Progression
through increasingly more selective advanced service
training, such as the Army Staff and Command
School (SESKOAD) and the Combined Armed Forces 25X1
Staff School (SESKOGAB), is for the most part a
requisite to advancement beyond major or lieutenant
colonel
5 Few sons of the current elite choose a military career, preferring
instead education at more prestigious universities at home and
abroad and civilian professions. Nonetheless, the military services
continue to attract sufficient qualified officer candidates. Most are
nominal Muslims rather than orthodox, reflecting the government's
distrust of religious fundamentalists. Defense attache reporting
suggests that academy applicants are probably screened on this
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Emphasis at these schools is on political indoctrina-
tion in the military's dual-function role. A US officer
who recently attended SESKOAD reports that one-
third of the 11-month curriculum is devoted to issues
such as the state ideology, the Constitution, the values
of the Generation of '45, and economic development,
while applied military subjects account for only about
one-fourth of the program.
Combat experience is another factor figuring heavily
in the advancement of Magelang officers, according
to defense attache reporting. Although exposure is not
as extensive as that of the Generation of '45, some
senior Magelang officers had field experience in a
number of combat situations, including the confronta-
tion with Malaysia and Singapore in 1963-66 and
more recently in East Timor. The military leadership
took advantage of the Timor campaign to rotate as
many young officers as possible through combat
tours.6 Although such experience is not mandatory for
advancement, exceptional service in East Timor has
contributed to some officers' being promoted ahead of
schedule. Magelang officers have also served in inter-
national deployments such as the armistice force in
Vietnam, the UN detachment to the Middle East, and
in Zaire.
Similarly, selection for advanced training at
SESKOAD favors combat and field experience over
administrative and technical branches. According to a
US military observer, as a tacit policy, officers with
combat experience in East Timor-who account for
an estimated 50 percent of recent classes-are ex-
empted from the entrance examination. According to
defense attache reports, the Army decided in 1980 to
officially restrict SESKOAD to officers with experi-
ence in field operations. Advanced training for offi-
cers with an administrative or technical background
takes place in a new sister program at the Army
Administration Staff School (SESMINAD), which
only recently has begun to turn out its first graduates.
It is too early to predict how these graduates will fare
6 ABRI did not distinguish itself during the initial Timor campaign
and the military realized it had serious shortcomings in equipment,
in logistic support, and training, according to defense attache
reports. Since then, the insurgency in East Timor has declined to
sporadic, low-level guerrilla fighting. Although the resistance and
government forces began informal talks last spring on ceasing
in future promotions compared with their colleagues
in field units. At present, officers in the administrative
track, for example, are unlikely to advance beyond the
rank of major or lieutenant colonel, according to
defense attache reports. On the other hand, combat
and field unit officers will have limited administrative
experience-a potential problem because of the mili-
tary's expansive nonmilitary functions.
Magelang Generation Attitudes
According to US military and academic observers,
Magelang Generation officers consider themselves
better qualified and better trained professionals than
the Generation of '45, some of whom they believe
gained leadership by opportunity of the revolution
rather than proven ability or training. Magelang
officers have privately complained that many of the
older generation officers are corrupt, lethargic, do not
have the military's best interests at heart, and have
delayed promotion of younger officers. Nevertheless,
the younger officers' institutional loyalties, deference
to authority, allegiances to superiors rather than to
peers, and their own bright career prospects apparent-
ly keep them from challenging established policy,
according to US military observers.
Despite their misgivings about the Generation of '45
as a group, many younger officers have close personal
ties to individual senior officers. Superior officers
have traditionally cultivated personal loyalty among
subordinates with favored treatment in promotions
and assignments and with help in meeting personal
problems. Former Defense Minister Jusuf, for in-
stance, reportedly personally assigned a number of his
favorites as area commanders. General Murdani has
similarly advanced his proteges in the intelligence
structure in recent years, and now as ABRI com-
mander is assigning loyalists to various sensitive posts,
such as the Special Forces Command and the area
commands on Java. Although such patron-client rela-
tionships are difficult to assess, they do not appear to
be a source of serious resentment within the officer
corps.
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Determining Officer Attitudes
Most information the Intelligence Community has
been able to gather about the attitudes and views of
younger officers is impressionistic, largely because
Indonesia in recent years has implemented measures
that discourage foreign military contact with its
younger officers. According to US military observers,
the attitude of many of the officers themselves is the
less to do with foreigners the better, and some
Indonesian field grade officers have been reprimand-
edfor being too Westernized, according to defense
attache reporting. Indonesian security regulations
severely restrict such contacts. A law still on the
books, although not rigorously enforced, makes it a
crime for military officers to associate with foreigners
without prior approval. In 1981, the Defense Minister
ordered that officers had to be "resocialized" and
sent to their respective branch school on returning
from overseas training. Overseas training has often
been restricted to officers already indoctrinated in
national policies and those with senior-level contacts,
although more junior grade officers are now receiving
foreign training.
Officers who graduated from the Magelang Academy
during 1960-65 have in particular had limited expo-
sure to US training or personnel and thus lack the
broader exposure of the Generation of '45. Post-1965
graduates, however, have had relatively more expo-
sure to the United States through military training
programs, and US military training officers believe
that such exposure is succeeding in fostering a more
positive attitude toward the United States
Some Magelang Generation officers resent the re-
strictions as being shortsighted and indicating a lack
of confidence by superiors and prefer closer contact
with foreigners, particularly their US counterparts.
One younger officer admitted that the restrictions,
combined with the concentration on domestic securi-
ty, contribute to younger officers becoming national-
istic, somewhat isolationist, and uninformed about
external affairs. The majority, however, apparently
agree with the rationale of limiting foreign influence
and even those officers opposed are unwilling to defy
the system.
The Magelang Generation subscribes to a number of
attitudes and perceptions common throughout the
Indonesian officer corps, according to defense attache
reporting. Like the older officers, the younger officers
place overriding priority on the maintenance of politi-
cal stability. Because they regard civilian political
institutions as inept, they see no alternative to contin-
ued military control, at least for the time being. The
younger officers consider the technocrats less disci-
plined than themselves and more inclined toward self-
interest, thus reinforcing the need for military over-
sight of domestic and foreign affairs. The Magelang
officers also share their superiors' strong aversion to
Communism and suspicions of the ethnic Chinese
community and Muslim fundamentalists.
But, at the same time, Magelang officers are more
skeptical of the military's dual-function role despite
greater attention to indoctrination. The results of an
attitudinal survey of Magelang graduates conducted
by the Defense Ministry in the early 1970s so startled
senior authorities that they sharply increased pro-
grams to indoctrinate the younger officers in the
military's dual-function role. However, many younger 25X1
officers consider themselves inadequately trained for
their nonmilitary functions, according to defense atta-
che reporting. Some have expressed concern that
civilian responsibilities detract from effective
performance of their military duties. Some field grade
officers have complained that their own ranks have
been "bled dry" of qualified personnel to staff other
government sectors. Although conceding that the
military must remain in charge for now, a number of
field grade officers have said they would like to curtail 25X1
assignment of military personnel to the civilian bu-
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Factionalism is present among younger officers, ac-
cording to academic and US military observers. It is
based on distinctions such as academy graduates
versus nonacademy officers, combat versus support
units, staff versus command, Muslim versus Chris-
tian. However, the multiplicity of these differences
apparently keeps any single issue or faction from
predominating, and several foreign observers have
concluded that the differences are unlikely to disrupt
military cohesion.
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Like the older officers, the Magelang Generation
officers regard the United States as the ultimate
guarantor of Indonesian security against external
threats, although they remain opposed to any formal
security ties. Restrictions on foreign contacts, how-
ever, appear to be fostering a division in officer corps'
perceptions of the United States that parallels the
generation gap, according to US military observers.
Few pre-1966 Magelang graduates have received
advanced training in the United States, but of those
who have, most are favorably impressed with the
United States. They consider the United States as at
least a qualified role model for the Indonesian mili-
tary and as a preferred source of training, technology,
and equipment. US military observers report that US
training has in most cases reinforced this attitude but
note that there are some younger officers who regard
Indonesia as overly dependent on the United States
and who are concerned about the reliability of the US
regional commitment in the aftermath of Vietnam.
The Pace of Transition
The military leadership's long-promised turnover of
authority to the post-1945 generation of officers has
begun in earnest. Since late 1982, some 118 senior
ABRI officers have retired and been replaced with
Bridge and Magelang officers. In addition to General
Murdani, Bridge Generation officers now hold key
command positions that include three of the four
service chiefs of staff and three of the four territorial
commands. Magelang officers now command all of
the Army's battalions and brigades, a number of
special and support units, and 13 of the 16 area
commands. General Murdani and the newly appoint-
ed Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Rudini,
are both intent on advancing younger officers, and,
according to defense attache reports, they plan addi-
tional appointments
President Soeharto has tried to make certain the
transition will proceed smoothly and, in particular, to
assure that there will be no problems from disgruntled
senior officers who have been retired. In March 1983,
parliament split the combined position of Defense
Minister/Armed Forces Commander. The new De-
fense Ministry, headed by General Poniman, a Gener-
ation of '45 officer, is being staffed with retired senior
officers while Bridge and Magelang Generation offi-
cers continue to fill the active-duty assignments in the
command structure. Thus, retired loyalists from the
Generation of '45 will retain major influence over
policymaking via the Defense Ministry. Soeharto's
flexibility in managing the transition was helped by
legislation enacted in 1982, which enables him to
extend selected senior officers on active duty past the
mandatory retirement age of 55 on the basis of
necessary skills and experience.
jeopardize their career advancement.
Looking Ahead
We believe the chances of a sharp shift in government
policies in the next few years as a result of the
generational transition are minimal. The officer corps'
commitment to maintaining political stability, its
sense of discipline, and its general consensus on the
regime's goals point to the continuation of current
domestic and foreign policies. Differences in attitude
that do exist are manageable by senior officers, in our
judgment. For their part, younger officers are reluc-
tant to get out in front of their superiors on policy
matters and are unlikely to take actions that would
By the late 1980s, however, as Magelang Generation
officers assume greater authority in the military and
in the government, they could begin steering new
policy directions. The Magelang Generation's disincli-
nation toward its nonmilitary responsibilities, for ex-
personnel cutback would most likely result in a gradu-
al reduction of active-duty officers serving at lower
levels in the bureaucracy, while control of the upper
levels is maintained primarily with retired officers.
Several foreign academic observers have speculated
that the Magelang Generation may be more authori-
tarian than its predecessors in dealing with the civil-
ian sector. Lacking the close contact with the popu-
lace and political experience of the Generation of '45
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1982-83 Generation Breakdown for 70 Senior ABRI Positions
Generation of '45-56-
Magelang Generation-5
Bridge Generation-39-
QJ
and trained in a system of strict military discipline,
they may be less tolerant of the views of domestic
critics and political parties.
It is not yet clear what impact, if any, the advance-
ment of Magelang officers to top-level posts would
have on foreign relations. There is little evidence to
suggest they would make any radical departures from
the foreign policy of the Soeharto regime. Their
strong anti-Communist sentiment suggests they would
maintain some distance from both China and the
Soviet Union. On the other hand, their limited under-
standing of how the rest of the world operates, their
suspicion of foreigners, and their strong nationalism
could make them more insular and formal than their
predecessors in dealing with the West, and the United
States in particular. Nonalignment, in this case, 25X1
would become more of a policy in practice than it has
been under the Soeharto regime.
In our judgment, rising Magelang leaders share the
prevailing view in Jakarta that Indonesia-because of
size and strategic location-should, by right, exert a
greater leadership role in regional and international 25X1
forums. Their security interests would most likely
continue to focus on Southeast Asian rather than
broader concerns, however. Thus, we believe they
would continue to promote closer cooperation with
their Association of Southeast Asian Nations counter-
parts in military and security affairs, building on the
base that has been established in recent years. F 25X1
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US bilateral relations with Indonesia may continue to
be prone to friction with the Magelang Generation in
power. Their strong nationalism leads us to believe
that they are apt to react strongly to perceived slights
over matters such as Indonesia not being accorded
due deference in bilateral dealings. Frictions could
arise from their being more assertive in promoting
Indonesian interests in both bilateral and internation-
al financial and economic affairs; for example, in
negotiations over commodity exports, access to devel-
oped-country markets, foreign investment, and eco-
nomic aid.
Although they will probably continue to value the US
strategic presence in Southeast Asia as a counter-
weight to the USSR and China, the Magelang Gener-
ation officers may take a stronger nonaligned attitude
in seeking to exert Indonesia's regional role. In our
judgment, they are almost certain to remain opposed
to any formal security ties to the United States. At
the same time, their appreciation of the potential
benefits of foreign technology and assistance in help-
ing to meet ABRI's needs-particularly given the
prospect of leaner defense budgets in the remainder of
the decade-could induce the Magelang leadership to
accept closer, but still limited, contact. Reinforcing
this inclination would be their preference for US
equipment, although we believe that, like the current
military leadership, the Magelang officers would be
reluctant to become overly dependent on any single
foreign source of supply
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Appendix
Selected Biographies of Military Leaders
Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani
The most prominent and powerful Bridge Generation
officer, he is the first to hold the position of ABRI
Commander in Chief. His close personal ties to
President Soeharto make him one of the few individ-
uals in the government with direct presidential access.
Murdani has received advanced military training in
the United States, and during his career he has served
in a number of overseas intelligence and diplomatic
assignments. As ABRI commander, he reportedly
plans to emphasize increased training with current
equipment rather than acquisition of advanced weap-
onry.
Lieutenant General Rudini
Formerly commander of the elite Strategic Army
Reserve, he is the most prominent Bridge Generation
officer next to General Murdani. Rudini has long
been considered in Army circles as a professional
soldier and a fast riser, and, according to defense
attache reports, he is liked and respected by younger
generation officers. Moved ahead of six senior Bridge
Generation officers, his appointment to Army Chief
of Staff was given prominent billing within the de-
fense establishment as part of the long-awaited transi-
tion in leadership. Rudini has had advanced military
training in the United States, and US military observ-
ers consider him one of Indonesia's most capable
senior officers.
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Maj. Gen. Try Sutrisno
At 47, Sutrisno holds the most important post of any
younger generation officer as commander of the
politically sensitive Jakarta military region. A 1959
graduate of the Bandung Army Engineer Academy,
Sutrisno is generally considered by US military ob-
servers as the front-runner of the younger generation.
He was formerly a senior aid to President Soeharto,
who has taken a personal interest in Sutrisno's career,
according to the US Embassy. A self-promoter,
Sutrisno claims to be a protege of General Murdani.
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